Regulating Finance in the Public Interest Regulatory Capture and Mitigating Strategies Dr. Stefano Pagliari [email protected]
Jun 20, 2015
Regulating Finance in the Public Interest Regulatory Capture and Mitigating
Strategies
Dr. Stefano Pagliari [email protected]
“Is it possible at all to create an international regime that prevents regulatory capture?” George Stigler (1971) & the motor trucking industry
Mattli and Woods (2009): capture as “the control of the regulatory process by those whom it is supposed to regulate or by a narrow subset of those affected by regulation, with the consequence that regulatory outcomes favor the narrow `few’ at the expense of society as a whole”
Material incentives vs. ideas (cognitive capture)
Popular concept to explain flaws in rule-making, implementation, supervision but weak empirical standards
When is Regulatory Capture More Likely to Occur?
3 Factors
Demand: Balance of Stakeholders
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
When is Regulatory Capture More Likely to Occur?
3 Factors
Demand: Balance of Stakeholders
Supply: Institutional Design of Regulatory Agencies
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
When is Regulatory Capture More Likely to Occur?
3 Factors
Demand: Balance of Stakeholders
Supply: Institutional Design of Regulatory Agencies
The Broader Political-Economic context
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
Asymmetry among stakeholders competing for regulatory influence
Financial Resources
Technical Expertise and Information Asymmetries
Collective Action Problems for deposit holders, investors, and consumers
Congressional Lobbying from Securities Firms
(Data” Centre for Responsive Politics)
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
$0
$20,000,000
$40,000,000
$60,000,000
$80,000,000
$100,000,000
$120,000,000
$1.4 million spent daily by financial industry lobbies during the financial crisis to lobby Congress
Demand Side: Balance of Stakeholders
Balance of stakeholders
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
Heavy bias towards business
Since the crisis: Greater diversity of
stakeholders Greater diversity within the
business community
Source: Pagliari and Young 2013
Pre-Crisis
Post-Crisis
% Difference
Finance (target) 75.1% 60.3% -19.8%
Non-financial business groups
16.4% 24.2% +47.5%
NGOs / Cons. / Trade Unions / Research
8.4% 15.5% +83.8%
USA EU UK
Financial business groups
66.6% 70,6% 59.6%
Non-financial business groups
23.2% 18.9% 28.1%
NGOs / Cons. / Trade Unions / Research
10.2% 10.5% 12.2%
CRD IV (2010)
Banks 43.7%
Non-bank financial groups 33%
Non-financial business groups 19.6%
NGOs / Cons. / Trade Unions / Research
3.6%
Balance of stakeholders
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
Heavy bias towards business
Since the crisis: Greater diversity of
stakeholders Greater diversity within the
business community
Differences between rule-making and implementation
Supply Side: Institutional Design of Reg. Agencies
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
Formal Independence
Consultative Processes
Transparency
Supply Side: Institutional Design of Reg. Agencies
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
Mandate
Funding
Hiring (Revolving Doors) Inter-temporal conflict of
interests Preferential Access & Inside
Knowledge Socialization, Psychological
Biases, & intellectual capture US vs. Europe
SEC Staff
Shares traded in US
1939 1,700 260 mln
2001 2,900 2 bln.
2009 3,584 5.4 bln.
The Broader Economic and Political Context
Pro regulatio
n
Against regulatio
n
AFME
EACT
AIMA
Finance Watch
Allianz
Capture through the political process Electoral weight of Financial industry Finance and the Real economy Banks as primary sovereign-debt
holders
Cyclical Nature of Capture
SlumpSlump
Crisis Crisis
Boom
Boom
Pressures on regulators not to ‘remove the
punchbowl from the party’
Electoral pressures to re-regulate Pressures on
regulators not to forestall economic recovery
What can we do about it?
Paradox of financial regulation: Interaction between regulators and regulated firms…
… is necessary to design regulatory policies … open the policymaking process to the risk of
regulatory capture
Some degree of regulatory capture is inevitable
Channel participation of stakeholders through safeguards & mitigating strategies
1. Promoting Greater Balance & Diversity of StakeholdersBreaking up large banks (Johnson)
Creation of Participatory Mechanisms: “fair, transparent, accessible, open” (Mattli & Woods)
Tripartitism
Proxy Advocates (Consumer Panels; Finance Watch)
Altering incentives of financial firms lobbying E.g. Insurance industry and car safety standards Promoting long-termism and diversity within financial industry
(compensation rules, fiduciary duties of boards, whistleblowers)
2. Getting the institutional design right
Mandate: danger of conflicting/ambiguous mandates
Internal decision-making processes Rotation requirements, internal
audit, devils’ advocates; IMF’s IEO: ‘strengthen the
incentives to “speak truth to power”’ and ‘create internal advisory boards ‘to challenge and think the unthinkable’
2. Getting the institutional design right
Hiring practices: Mitigating strategies: e.g.
disclosure, cooling off periods, complement “revolvers” and career supervisors
Promote diversity of experiences and training (e.g. IMF)
Funding Level Sources (government vs. levies
from fin. industry)
Limits of existing checks Board of Directors; Parliament; Press.
Transparency Sunshine clauses requiring US regulators to
publish details of meeting with industry representatives
3. External Checks & Balances
Public Interest Review Bodies “The Sentinel” (Barth Caprio and
Levine 2012)
Reciprocal oversight from other domestic regulators
Macroprudential regulators; Consumer protection bodies;
Reciprocal oversight from foreign regulators
Financial Stability Board’s peer review,
Colleges of Supervisors, IMF’s surveillance (FSAP and ROSC)
3. External Checks & Balances
Conclusion
Paradox of financial regulation: Interaction between regulators and regulated firms/stakeholders….
… is necessary to design regulatory policies
… open the policymaking process to the risk of regulatory capture
Some degree of capture is inevitable
Channel participation of stakeholders through safeguards & mitigating strategies
Thank you for your attention