State Planning Policy Guidelines...State Planning Policy Guideline - Guidance on development involving hazardous chemicals -5-5. Model levels of assessment It is recommended LG adopt

State Planning Policy Guideline

State interest—emissions and hazardous activities

Guidance on development involving hazardous chemicals

December 2013

State Planning Policy Guideline - Guidance on development involving hazardous chemicals

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The Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning is responsible for driving the economic development of Queensland.

© State of Queensland, December 2013. Published by the Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, 63 George Street, Brisbane Qld 4000, Australia

Licence: This work is licensed under the Creative Commons CC BY 3.0 Australia licence. To view a copy of the licence, visit www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/deed.en. Enquiries about this licence or any copyright issues can be directed to the Senior Advisor, Governance on telephone (07) 3224 2085 or in writing to PO Box 15009, City East Qld 4002.

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An electronic copy of this report is available on the Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning’s website at www.dsdip.qld.gov.au

Source Reference: D13/113421


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Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1

2. Background ................................................................................................ 2

3. Purpose ..................................................................................................... 3

4. Model assessment provisions for protecting existing MHFs ...................... 4

5. Model levels of assessment ....................................................................... 5

6. Model self-assessable development outcomes ......................................... 9

7. Model assessable development code ...................................................... 35

8. Advice for demonstrating and assessing compliance against the model code for assessable development ................................................. 38

Glossary ........................................................................................................... 63

Further Information ........................................................................................... 68


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1. Introduction Using, storing or generating hazardous chemicals (hazchems), particularly during their manufacturing or when in large quantities can generate off-site risks that need to be managed appropriately. The State Planning Policy (SPP) requires development involving hazchems is resilient and appropriately located with neighbours of compatible level of sensitivity. The SPP state interest emissions and hazardous activities provides planning provisions for the protection of community health and safety, sensitive land uses and the natural environment from potential adverse impacts of emissions and hazardous activities while also ensuring the long-term viability of industrial development, including development involving hazchem. These policies aim to ensure public safety in the event of an emergency involving hazchems on the surrounding community due to a fire, explosion or toxic release. Whilst the SPP contains policies pertaining to the location and management of development involving hazchem, including Major Hazard Facilities (MHF), it does not include planning provisions for the development of MHFs, as they are defined as assessable development under Schedule 3 of the Sustainable Planning Regulation 2009 (SP Regulation) and the State Development Assessment Provisions, Module 13. Nor does it include potential environmental impacts managed under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 or risks to workers associated with the development itself that are managed under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act).1

1 Note: Development that propose to use, store or generate hazchems in excess of 10% of the MHF thresholds prescribed in Schedule 15 of the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011 is required to notify Workplace Health and Safety Queensland and will be subject to a determination in regards to being an MHF. Where a proposed facility is determined as an MHF, such development also triggers assessable development under Schedule 3 of the SP Regulation described above.


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2. Background The emissions and hazardous activities state interest in the SPP contains policies that guide the planning and assessment of developments involving hazchem and major hazard facilities. There are many definitions for what is a hazchem. Many names exist to describe chemicals with hazardous properties such as dangerous goods (DG), hazardous substances (HS), hazardous materials (HM), hazardous chemicals (hazchems) and goods too dangerous to be transported (GTDTBT). DGs and GTDTBT are defined by the “Australian Code for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail” (ADG Code). “Safe Work Australia” (SWA) defines what is a HS and includes those substances that are harmful to workers. A substances with harmful chemical, physical or biological properties is generally defined as a HM however, are not numerically defined. Europe and other parts of the world define hazchems by the “Globally Harmonised System for identification and labelling of chemicals” (GHS) and in 2011 adopted in many Australian states including Queensland. GHS is a holistic and numerically based definition that includes DG, GTDTBT, HS and other liquids that can readily burn such as diesel. GHS is to be fully adopted in Queensland by 2017. Until then however, manufacturers and importers can identify their chemicals under the ADG Code, SWA or GHS. Until GHS has been fully adopted in Qld, the SPP defines HazChems as any of the following chemicals:

a) those that are toxic or very toxic substances2 under the GHS; or b) classes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.1 and 8 of the ADG code; or c) those of Class 9 of the ADG code that are environmentally hazardous

substances; or d) those listed in Appendix A of the ADG Code; or e) any other liquid with a flash point less than or equal to 93oC.

2 Where a chemical is classified as a toxic or very toxic substance under the GHS, that classification shall prevail over any other classification for a toxic substance under the ADG Code.


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MHF (SDAP-SARA)

Model assessable development provisions

Model self-assessable development provisions

No model planning provisions recommended

Large - major

industry

Medium - large

industry

Small - medium industry

>10% MHF Threshold

Requirements

State Development Assessment Provisions - Module 13 MHF

SPP Requirements for Hazardous Chemicals: Provisions for Assessable Development

High – major HazChem risks (MHFs)

Medium – high HazChem risk

Low – medium HazChem risk

Facilities

SPP Requirements for Hazardous chemicals: Provisions for Self-Assessable Development

Minor – low HazChem risk

3. Purpose The purpose of this guideline is to assist a local government (LG) to achieve the policies in the SPP that relate to hazchems by providing:

a) guiding principles for developing risk-based planning provisions; b) model assessment provisions for protecting existing MHF land uses; c) model assessment provisions for self-assessable and assessable development; d) model acceptable outcomes for self-assessable development and a model

code for assessable development; e) model assessment methodology for assessable development; and f) model assessment report (hazard assessment report) structure for

demonstrating achievement of assessable development outcomes. Off-site hazards and the associated risks from development with hazchems are greatly influenced by the following 3 factors:

I. the type of hazchems; II. the quantity of hazchems; and

III. their storage and handling characteristics. An LG may adopt any model planning provisions of this guideline or opt to achieve the SPP’s outcomes in another way that best suits the local context. This guideline recommends LG adopt risk-based planning provisions for commercial and industrial uses with hazchems accounting for the above risk factors. LGs can develop their own planning provisions or adopt the model planning provisions in this guideline. This guideline promotes the policy of adopting the lowest appropriate level of assessment for commercial and industrial uses by providing model self-assessable and assessable development triggers for hazchems with the above risk factors in mind. Figure 1 below describes these model planning provisions and their relationship with the Assessable Development for MHFs under Schedule 3 of the Sustainable Planning Regulation 2009.

Figure 1 Planning framework for hazardous chemicals in Queensland.

This Guideline


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4. Model assessment provisions for protecting existing MHFs3

Planning provisions shall be provided to manage development adjacent existing MHF land uses or noxious and hazardous industry zones or equivalent. Planning provisions shall promote the co-location of MHFs and adjacent uses that compliment and/or are compatible with each other’s off-site risks.

This guideline recommends LG adopt a mix of self-assessable and assessable planning provisions for development adjacent MHF land uses, noxious and hazardous industry zones or equivalent. Specifically, uses compatible with MHF risks such as high-impact industry, other noxious and hazardous industry can be encouraged through the use of the lowest appropriate assessment level for such industry and other uses sensitive to off-site MHF risks shall be managed through the use of assessment provisions such as code assessment.

The model planning provisions of this guideline recommends development assessment criteria for vulnerable, sensitive and commercial land uses be considered against the sensitivity criteria outlined in Table 4.1 where located in any of the following areas:

a) vulnerable land uses within 1,500m of any existing Tier 1, 2 or 3 MHF or Special Industry zone, precinct or equivalent;

b) sensitive or commercial land uses within 250m of an existing Tier 1 MHF; or

c) sensitive or commercial land uses within 750m of an existing Tier 2 MHF; or

d) sensitive or commercial land uses within 1500m of an existing Tier 3 MHF.

Table 4.1 Sensitivity criteria for assessing development adjacent MHFs Performance Outcomes Acceptable Outcomes PO1. Sensitivity of development is compatible with adjacent MHF risks.

AO1. Development involves a population density < 1 person/250m2/24hours

3 Note: An LG should consult with HICB of DJAG to determine if an MHF exists in their area and if so, its corresponding tier.


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5. Model levels of assessment It is recommended LG adopt a mix of self-assessable and assessable planning provisions for low and medium to high risk hazchem development. Specifically, it is recommended that lower risk development with hazchems be self-assessable and medium to high risk development be made code assessable, where proposed in an appropriate commercial or industrial land use zone, precinct or equivalent. Model levels of assessment for development with hazchems are identified in the following tables:

a) for self-assessable development - Table 5.1; and b) for assessable development - Table 5.2.

Each table includes a list of types and threshold quantities of hazchems and the applicable storage and handling system to which each model assessment level applies. Exclusions have been included for specific hazchems, quantities and/or storage and handling systems as they:

I. may have higher inherent risk and therefore, trigger a corresponding higher level of assessment; or

II. be an MHF and trigger assessable development under the SP Reg.


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Table 5.1 – Model self-assessable development triggers

Hazchem description

PG or type

Threshold quantity

Applicable storage and handling description

Exclusions

Flammable gases

n/a 1,000 – 5,000L

Cylinder stores with natural ventilation

1) Refrigerated gases; 2) Gases stored in tanks; 3) Exchange facilities for portable cylinders

managed in accordance with AS1596; 4) Stores within or attached to buildings,

with mechanical ventilation or containing aerosols with a WC <1L;

5) Oxy-acetylene gas systems in AS4839; 6) Cylinders connected to a consuming

device, including fire protection systems;

Oxidising gases

n/a 1,000 –20,000L

Non-flammable, non-toxic

gases

n/a 2,000 – 200,000L

Flammable liquids

PGII or

PGIII

10,000 – 60,000L

Aboveground storage areas with natural ventilation

1) Blending, processing, pressurized or heated tanks;

2) Tanks >6m in diameter; 3) Storage areas within or attached to a

building; 4) Package stores with mechanical

ventilation; 5) Storage areas co-locating Classes 2, 3, 4,

5 or 6.1; 6) Combustible liquid storage areas also

containing Class 2, 3, 4 or 5

10,000 – 500,000L

Underground storage

Combustible liquids with a

flashpoint <93oC

n/a

10,000 – 100,000L

Package stores with natural ventilation

10,000 –500,000L

Aboveground or underground tanks

Oxidising substances

PGII 10,000 – 20,000kg

Liquid storage tanks or package stores with natural ventilation

1) Ammonium Nitrate; 2) Blending, processing, pressurized or

heated tanks; 3) Solids stored in silos, bunkers or loose

bulk stockpiles; 4) Storage areas within or attached to a

building; 5) Package stores constructed of

combustible materials; 6) Package stores with mechanical

ventilation; 7) Package store with a floor area >500m2

PGIII 10,000 - 250,000kg

Toxic or very toxic

substances

PGII or

PGIII

10,000 – 500,000L/kg

Storage tanks or package stores with natural ventilation

1) Arsenic Trioxide or Pentoxide; 2) Blending, processing, pressurized or

heated tanks; 3) Very toxic materials >20,000kg; 4) Toxic materials >200,000kg; 5) Storage areas co-locating Classes 2.1, 3,

4, 5

Corrosive substances

PGII or

PGIII

10,000 – 200,000L/kg

Storage tanks or package stores with natural ventilation

1) Blending, processing, pressurized or heated tanks;

2) Hydrofluoric Acid with a concentration >50% >50,000kg;

Substances hazardous to

the environment

PGII >2,500L/kg Store area located within an LG flood hazard area

Non environmentally hazardous substances

PGIII >10,000L/kg

Notes: I. A Dangerous Goods (DG) class(es) and Packing Group (PG) or type, where applicable, can be found under

Section 14 of the chemical’s Safety Data Sheet (SDS). Flash points can be found under section 9. II. Exclusions may trigger assessable development under Table 3.2 or under Schedule 3 of the Sustainable

Planning Regulation 2009 as a Major Hazard Facility.


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Table 5.2 – Model assessable development triggers

Hazchem description

PG or

type

Threshold quantity


Exclusions (MHF Quantities)

GTDTBT n/a >500L/kg Any Any oxidising material or peroxide >50,000kg

2.1 n/a >1,000L – 200,000kg

Cylinder stores with at least one of the following attributes: a) contains aerosols; b) co-located with Class 3, 4 or

5; c) mechanical ventilation; d) is within or attached to a

building

1) Phosgene >750kg; 2) Arsine >1,000kg; 3) Very toxic gases

>20,000kg; 4) Chlorine >25,000kg; 5) Acetylene >50,000kg; 6) Hydrogen >50,000kg; 7) Nitrous Oxide >50,000kg; 8) Nitrogen Dioxide

>50,000kg; 9) Nitrogen Trioxide

>50,000kg; 10) Ethylene Oxide >50,000kg; 11) Hydrogen Sulfide

>50,000kg; 12) Ammonia >200,000kg; 13) Sulfur Dioxide >200,000kg; 14) Toxic gases >200,000kg; 15) Liquefied oxidising gases

>200,000kg; 16) Hydrogen Chloride

>250,000kg; 17) Oxygen >2,000,000kg

>2,500 kg – 200,000 kg

Aboveground, unmounded tanks

>5,000L – 200,000kg

Cylinder stores with natural ventilation

2.2 sub-risk 5.1

n/a >1,000L Cylinder stores with at least one of the following attributes: a) contains aerosols; b) co-located with Class 2.1, 2.3,

3, 4 or 5; c) mechanical ventilation; d) within or attached to a building

>1,000 – 10,000L

Aboveground tanks co-located with Classes 2.1, 3, 4, or 5

>10,000L Aboveground tanks >20,000L Cylinder stores with natural

ventilation 2.2 n/a >200,000L Any

2.3 n/a >500L Any

3 PGI >500L Any 1) Propylene Oxide >50,000kg;

2) Class 3 PGI >200,000kg or if Crude Oil PGI in remote locations >2,000,000kg;

3) Flammable liquids stored above their boiling points >200,000kg;

4) Assigned to HAZCHEM Code 4WE >500,000kg;

5) Class 3 >50,000,000kg

PGII or

PGIII

>1,000L Pressure or reaction vessels and blending or heated tanks with a W/C > 1,000 L

>10,000L Storage areas with at least one of the following attributes: a) co-located with Classes 2, 4, 5

or 6.1; b) mechanical ventilation; c) within or attached to a building

>60,000L Any

Combustible liquids with a

flashpoint <93oC

n/a

>1,000L Aboveground tanks within a multi-story building

>10,000L Storage areas with at least one of the following attributes: a) co-located with Classes 2, 3, 4

or 5; b) mechanical ventilation; c) within or attached to a

building; d) tanks > 6m in diameter

>100,000L Package stores with natural ventilation

>500,000L Aboveground tanks 4 PGI >500kg All 1) Class 4.1, PGI

>200,000kg; 2) Class 4.2, PGII

>200,000kg;

PGII or

PGIII

>1,000kg Pressure or reaction vessels and blending or heated tanks with a W/C > 1,000 L


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Hazchem description

PG or

type

Threshold quantity


Exclusions (MHF Quantities)

>2,500kg All 3) Class 4.3, PGII >200,000kg

5.1 PGI >500kg All 1) PGI or PGII > 200,000kg; 2) Ammonium Nitrate

>2,500,000kg; 3) Ammonium Nitrate

fertilisers >5,000,000kg

PGII or

PGIII

>1,000kg Pressure or reaction vessels and blending or heated tanks with a W/C > 1,000 L

PGIII >20,000kg Package stores with at least one of the following attributes: a) co-located with Classes 2.1,

2.3, 3, 4, 5.2 or 8; b) mechanical ventilation; c) within or attached to a

building; d) floor area > 500m2; e) constructed of combustible

materials >20,000kg Solids stored in silos, bunkers or

loose bulk stockpiles

>250,000kg Tanks or package stores with natural ventilation

5.2 Any >500 Any 1) GTDTBT >50,000kg;

2) Any 5.2 >200,000kg

6.1 PGI >500L/kg Any 1) Arsenic Trioxide >100kg;

2) Methyl Isocyanate >150kg; 3) Arsenic Pentoxide

>1,000kg; 4) Very toxic materials

>20,000kg; 5) Toxic materials

>200,000kg; 6) Toluene Diisocyanate

>200,000kg

PGII or

PGIII

>1,000L/kg Pressure or reaction vessels and blending or heated tanks with a W/C > 1,000 L

>10,000L/kg Storage areas with at least one of the following attributes: a) co-located with Classes 2.1, 3,

4 or 5; b) mechanical ventilation; c) within or attached to a building

>500,000L/kg Any

8 PGI >500 L/kg Any 1) Sulfur Dichloride >1000kg;

2) Hydrofluoric Acid (with a concentration > 50%) >50,000kg;

3) Hydrogen Fluoride >50,000kg;

4) Sulfuric Anhydride or Sulfur Trioxide >75,000kg;

5) Bromine or Bromine solutions >100,000kg;

6) Assigned to HAZCHEM Code 4WE >500,000kg

PGII or

PGIII

>1,000L/kg Pressure or reaction vessels and blending or heated tanks with a W/C > 1,000 L

>10,000L/kg Package store with at least one of the following attributes: a) co-located with Class 5; b) compounds containing > two

Class 8’s that may react dangerously with each other;

c) mechanical ventilation; d) within or attached to a building

>200,000L/kg Any Notes:

I. A Dangerous Goods’ (DG) class(es) and Packing Group (PG) or type, where applicable, can be found under Section 14 of a chemical’s Safety Data Sheet (SDS). Flash points can be found under section 9.

II. Exclusions may trigger assessable development under Schedule 3 of the Sustainable Planning Regulation 2009 as a Major Hazard Facility (MHF), which are measured in tonnes only.

III. Care shall be taken when noting the units used throughout this table.


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6. Model self-assessable development outcomes

Purpose

The purpose of this section is to provide LG with model outcomes for self-acceptable development.

Applying this model code

The model outcomes for self-acceptable development are divided into parts 6.1 – 6.10 depending on hazchem types and classes and storage characteristics.

Advisory notes for applying model self-assessable development outcomes

Subsidiary risks

In the event a hazchem has one or more subsidiary risk(s) or is also a combustible liquid all relevant model outcomes shall be applied. If conflict arises between any two outcomes, the more conservative of the two shall prevail.

Separation to property boundaries

Measuring across a property boundary to protected places on a neighbouring property may create potential conflict in the future, particular if a neighbouring property is vacant or undeveloped. This practice is not recommended.

Plant and equipment

Under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act) a package, cylinder (a package used for storing compressed gases), tank or area for the storage and handling of hazardous chemicals shall be adequately designed, constructed and compatible with the chemicals to be stored. There are relevant Australian Standards, Codes and/or international standards that specify example design and construction guidelines for such storage and handling systems and their associated safety design features. Designers and manufacturers of plant and equipment at workplaces have duties under the WHS Act to ensure they are fit for purpose. Additionally, associated professional engineering services (as defined in the Queensland Professional Engineers Act 2002 (QPE Act)) can only be provided by a Registered Practicing Engineer of Queensland (RPEQ), or others who are 'directly supervised' by an RPEQ. Model outcomes have not been provided for the design and construction of hazchem plant and equipment components or systems managed under the WH&S Act or QPE Act.


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6.1 Gases in cylinders General requirements— Cylinder storesAll separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured laterally from the outermost cylinder to any area to be protected. Cylinder stores (areas of stored cylinders) shall be located outdoors and used to store closed cylinders only. Toxic gases are not permitted within a cylinder store. LPG decanting cylinders are not permitted in cylinder stores. Gas cylinders shall be stored in the upright position only unless specified by the cylinder’s manufacturer. Nominally empty cylinders shall be separated in the same manner as those which are full.

Construction requirements Cylinder stores shall be constructed from non-combustible materials that are compatible with the gases to be stored. Hardwood frames or floors are not considered combustible materials for the purposes of this code, however, hardwood cladding is. Where there is a space between the floor of a cylinder store and the ground (i.e. cylinders are stored on a platform), such a space shall be either completely filled with a non-combustible solid material or shall be empty, open on at least three sides and free of any combustible materials. The floor of a cylinder store shall not be capable of pooling liquid. Any doors in a cylinder store shall open outwards or be of a ventilated roller type. Any door shall also be able to be opened from inside the store.

Siting and separation— Cylinder storesWhere no minimum separation distance between a cylinder store and an on-site protected place is specified, the cylinder store shall be located > 1m from building openings. For cylinder stores with mixed divisions of gases separation distances shall be based on the aggregate of all gas cylinders within in the store with the greatest separation distance of Tables CS1-3 applying to the store. Any two cylinder stores can be considered separate stores if they are separated from each other by > 3m or the same distance required between the largest store and a property boundary, whichever is greater. Cylinder stores shall be separated from UN1075 (LPG) decanting cylinders or filling points by > 6.5m. Cylinder stores shall be separated from property boundaries by > Table CS1. Cylinder stores shall be separated from on-site protected places by > Table CS2. Cylinder stores shall be separated from aboveground accumulations of combustible materials or storage and handling areas of other DG classes or combustible liquids > Minor Storage by > Table CS3. Gas cylinders shall be segregated by > 3m from any incompatible gases or substances. Division 2.2 gases are not considered to be incompatible with flammable gases, oxidising gases or toxic gases and can be used to segregate incompatible gases. Gases shall be segregated from any other substance they may react dangerously with by > 5m.


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Table CS1

Aggregate capacity cylinder store

UN1075 only Class 2.1, other than UN1075

Class 2.2, sub-risk 5.1

Class 2.2, no sub-risk

1000 - 2000L 3m 3m 3m 1m 2000 - 2500L 3m 6m 5m 5m 2500 - 5000L 4.5m 6m 5m 5m

5000 - 20,000L Not self-assessable

Not self-assessable

5m 5m >20,000L Not self-assessable 5m

Table CS2





1000 - 2000L 3m 3m 3m not specified 2000 - 2500L 3m 3m 3m not specified 2500 - 5000L 4.5m 3m 3m 3m


Not self-assessable

3m 3m >20,000L Not self-assessable 3m

Table CS3





1000 - 2000L 3m 3m 3m 3m 2000 - 2500L 3m 5m 5m 3m 2500 - 5000L 3m 5m 5m 3m


Not self-assessable 5m 3m >20,000L Not self-assessable 3m

Siting and separation— LPG decanting cylindersLPG decanting cylinders shall be located outdoors on the ground in a static position only, with the outlet and safety relief valves directed away from any above ground LPG storage tank, dangerous goods storage area or fuel dispenser for flammable or combustible materials. LPG decanting cylinders shall be segregated by > 3m from any incompatible gases or substances and any other substance they may react dangerously with by > 5m. The centre point of any LPG decanting cylinder shall be a located to achieve the following minimum separation distances:

I. 6.5m to any boundary; II. 6.5m to any on-site protected place; III. 6.5m to any aboveground LPG storage tank; IV. 6.5m to any fire-risk dangerous goods or combustible materials stored above ground; V. 4.5m to any fuel dispenser for a flammable or combustible material;

VI. 4.5m to any non fire-risk dangerous goods stored above ground; VII. 4.5m to any entrance to any drain, pit or basement; VIII. 3.5m to any opening into a building; IX. 3.5m to any structure that limits egress past the cylinder; X. 2.5m to any fill or dip cap of any underground storage tank.

Note: these separation distances are inclusive of a maximum hose length of 1.5 m.


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Impact avoidance— Cylinder storesCylinders within a cylinder store shall be secured to restrict their movement by railings, chains or barriers. Cylinder stores serviced by motor vehicles (including forklifts) or in vehicle manoeuvring areas (e.g. car parks or hard stands) shall be provided with impact protection in accordance with at least one of the following:

I. fully enclosed metal cage, not including the floor or roof of the store; or II. platform > 900mm above the ground level where motor vehicles can operate/manoeuvre; or III. 1.2m high x 75mm wide core filled metal bollard buried a minimum of 500mm deep and located

either side of any point a motor vehicle can access or exit the store; or IV. concrete kerb a minimum of 190mm high located a minimum of 2m from the cylinder store.

Impact avoidance— Decanting cylindersDecanting cylinders located in or adjacent to vehicle manoeuvring area shall be provided with impact protection in accordance with at least one of the following:

a) Core-filled metal bollards: I. minimum of 1.2m high x 75mm wide; and II. buried a minimum of 500mm deep below ground; and III. spaced at a maximum of 1.3m between any 2 posts or bollards required to separate a cylinder

from a vehicle access area; and IV. a minimum of 1.5m away from the side of the cylinder or

b) Metal guardrail a minimum of 700mm high with posts buried a minimum of 500mm deep and located a minimum of 1.5m from any cylinder; or

c) A chain-wire metal fence a minimum of 1.8m high with a minimum of 50mm steel posts buried a minimum of 600mm deep and located a minimum of 3m from the cylinder; or

d) A concrete or masonry kerb a minimum of 190mm high located a minimum of 5m from a cylinder. Fire safety Cylinder stores shall have > 1 x hose reel and > 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher within 10m but not closer than 3m. Decanting cylinders shall have > 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher within 10m but not closer than 3m. Where > 2 decanting cylinders are stored < 6.5m from each other, a hose reel shall also be provided within 10m but not closer than 3m from each cylinder. Any hose reel shall be capable of reaching all sides of the package store or decanting cylinder it is protecting. Access restriction Cylinder stores shall be kept under lock and key.

Ventilation Cylinder stores shall be provided with a ventilation system capable of providing sufficient fresh air to dilute and remove gases and allow any flammable vapours to dissipate and reduce any risk of asphyxiation, fire or explosion. Where lighter-than-air gases are to be stored high-level ventilation shall be provided in the roof ridge or at the highest point(s) of any roof. Ceilings are not permitted in any roof. Ventilation shall be in the form of an open wall or vents. An open wall means a completely open external wall or wall of fixed louvers, chequered brickwork, slotted bricks, slotted roller doors or wire mesh from floor to ceiling with a minimum of 50% of its area as openings. A vent means an opening in an external wall with a minimum free surface area of > 0.1m2. Where vents are used, they shall be provided at both high and low levels relative to the floor and roof and ventilate directly to outdoor areas away from building entrances, doors, windows, air conditioning intakes, sources of ignition, areas people are not likely to congregate or other areas that allow free air movement. Vents that pass through cavity walls must be lined to prevent vapours from escaping into a wall cavity. Cylinder stores shall be provided with at least one of the following ventilation systems: Two opposing external sides that are open; or One external side that is open, provided at a minimum it is twice as long as it is wide; or Vents in at least one pair of opposing external sides, provided that—

I. the distance between the opposing external walls does not exceed 10 m; and II. in every 2m length of external opposing walls, there are at least two vents evenly distributed; and III. the total area of vents per meter length of wall.


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6.2 Flammable and combustible liquids in packages and IBCs

General requirements Package stores (areas of stored packages and IBCs) shall be located outdoors only and used for the storage of closed packages and/or IBCs only. All separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured from the inside edge of any bund wall or natural vent opening to any areas to be protected. Package stores shall be constructed from non-combustible materials that are compatible with the flammable and combustible liquids to be stored. Hardwood frames are not considered combustible materials for the purposes of this Code, however, hardwood cladding is. The lowest point of any package store containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII shall be higher than any relevant flood height level identified in an area’s flood hazard area. Alternatively, package stores are provided with impervious bund walls or racking systems higher than the relevant flood height level.

Siting and separation – Package store Package stores shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > Table FL1. Flammable and combustible liquids shall be segregated from any other substance that it may react dangerously with by > 5m and stored in separate spill compounds. Package stores shall be separated from any decanting area for flammable or combustible liquids by > 6m. Package stores shall be separated form aboveground tanks containing flammable liquids by > 6m or the diameter of the tank up to a maximum of 15m, whichever is greatest. Package stores shall be separated form aboveground tanks containing combustible liquids by > 3m or the diameter of the tank up to a maximum of 7m, whichever is greatest. Table FL1

PGII with or without PGIII, C1 or C2

PGIII with or without C1 or C2

C1 with or without C2

Minimum separation distance

2 500L 10 000L 3m 2 000L 8 000L 20 000L 4m 4 000L 16 000L 40 000L 5m 7 000L 28 000L 70 000L 6m 10 000L 40 000L 100 000L 7m 14 000L 60 000L 8m 20 000L 9m 26 000L 10m 34 000L 11m 42 000L 12m 52 000L 13 m 60 000L 14m

Note: Flammable or combustible liquids with differing flashpoints stored within the same package store, shall all be treated as an aggregate of the liquid with the lowest flashpoint.


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Spill Containment Spill containment systems shall not bring together two or more hazardous chemicals that are not compatible (including common drains). Package stores shall be provided with a spill compound (e.g. bund) that complies with all of the following:

I. is impervious; II. constructed of a fire resistant material(s); III. capable of holding liquid when full; IV. sloped to a low point or sump; V. provided with a means of being emptied;

VI. free from any other dangerous goods; VII. provided with restraints or barriers to prevent packages falling outside of the bund if packages are

positioned closer than 600mm from a bund wall; VIII. has a minimum internal volume as per Table FL2:

Table FL2

Aggregate volume of packages/IBCs Minimum volume of spill compound 2,000L 2,100L 4,000L 2,600L 7,000L 3,350L 8,000L 3,600L 10,000L 4,100L 14,000L 4,500L 16,000L 4,700L 20,000L 5,100L 26,000L 5,700L 28,000L 5,900L 34,000L 6,500L 40,000L 7,100L 42,000L 7,300L 52,000L 8,300L 60,000L 9,100L 70,000L 10,100L

100,000L 13,100L Ventilation Package stores shall be provided with ventilation to allow for flammable vapours to dissipate. Ventilation shall be in the form of an open wall or vent. An open wall means any external wall that is completely open above the top of the bund wall or a wall of fixed louvers or wire mesh having a minimum of 50% of its area are openings. A vent means 2 x openings in an external wall with a minimum free surface area of 0.15m2 with one located directly above the top of a bund wall and the other above the highest package. For package stores storing combustible liquids only, the opening above the highest package is not mandatory. Any vent that passes through a cavity wall must be lined to prevent vapours from escaping into a wall cavity. Package stores shall be provided with at least one of the following ventilation systems:

I. Two or more open walls; or II. One open wall, provided it is longer than it is wide; or III. One open wall and vents in the opposite or adjacent wall at a minimum of every 3m; or IV. A minimum of two opposite walls provided with vents a minimum of every 3m; or V. For package stores longer than 6m but no wider than 5m, vents in the longest wall a minimum of

every 1.4m.


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Impact avoidance Impact damage caused by fork-lift trucks or other moving equipment against racking uprights shall be avoided by the protection of corner uprights as follows:

I. An upright protector with a height of not less than 400mm shall be positioned at the end upright of each run of racking between cross-aisles;

II. An upright protector shall be positioned at all those uprights positioned at aisle and gangway intersections;

III. The upright protector shall be designed for energy absorption of > 400 Nm in any direction at any height between 0.1 m and 0.4 m;

IV. The upright protector shall be positioned in such a way that, after its deformation by absorbing an impact, the upright will not be damaged.

Note: As an alternative to the use of upright protectors, the installation may be designed to survive the complete removal of a section at the bottom of an upright.

Fire safety Package stores shall be provided with a 24hr monitored fire detection system and fire protection equipment > Table FL3.

Table FL3

Storage type Fire protection Unroofed package store containing flammable liquids only

4 x 9kg ABE extinguishers, 2 x 9kg foam extinguishers and 1 x hose reel able to reach all areas of the package store with a branch pipe, pick up and a supply of foam concentrate*.

Roofed package store containing flammable liquids only

1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher located at each doorway(s), 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher located internally every 15m and 1 x hose reel able to reach all areas of the package store with a branch pipe, pick up and a supply of foam concentrate*.

Unroofed package store containing combustible liquids only

1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher and 2 x 9kg foam extinguishers.

Roofed package store containing combustible liquids only

1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher located at each doorway(s) with a total no less than 2 and 1 x 9kg foam extinguisher located at each doorway(s) also with a total of no less than 2.

Unroofed package store containing flammable and combustible liquids

4 x 9kg ABE extinguishers, 2 x 9kg foam extinguishers and 1 x hose reel able to reach all areas of the package store with a branch pipe, pick up and a supply of foam concentrate*.

Roofed package store containing flammable and combustible liquids

1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher located at each doorway(s), 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher located internally every 15m and 1 x hose reel able to reach all areas of the package store with a branch pipe, pick up and a supply of foam concentrate*.

* A supply of foam concentrate shall be consistent with the quantity identified in a site’s emergency plan required under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. Access restriction Package stores shall be kept under lock and key.


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6.3 Flammable and combustible liquids in tanks General requirements for tanks Aboveground tanks, vents, fill points and dispensers shall be located outdoors only. Separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances for any tank, dispenser, pump, vent or fill point shall be measured from the outermost external surface. Separation distances for any spill compound (bund) containing a flammable liquid tank shall be measured from the inside edge of the bund walls. Aboveground tanks shall be made of steel only. The outer shell of any fire-rated double walled tank can be made of heat resistance materials required to achieve a 240/240/240 fire resistance level. Underground tanks shall be double walled with the outer wall constructed of corrosion resistant materials. Separation distances for spill compounds (bund) shall be measured from the inside edge of the bund walls. Tanks shall be located > 1m from any wall to allow access for inspection and maintenance. Spill compounds and tank supporting structures shall be constructed of fire resistant materials only. ADG Code compliant isotainers and intermodal tanks are considered tanks for the purposes of this code. Aboveground tanks, including isotainers or intermodial tanks shall not be stacked on top of each other. Where the base of any tank containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII is lower than a relevant flood height level identified in a local government’s flood hazard area such a tank shall be anchored so it cannot float if submerged or inundated by water; and, any opening not provided with a liquid tight seal, i.e. an atmospheric vent, shall be extended above the relevant flood height level. Siting and separation – tanks not including fire-rated tanks


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Aboveground tanks shall be separated from property boundaries by > Table FL4. Aboveground flammable liquid tanks shall be separated from on-site protect places by > Table FL4. Aboveground combustible liquid tanks shall be separated from on-site protect places by > 50% of Table FL4 or 7.5m, whichever is less. Spill compounds containing flammable liquid tanks shall be separated from property boundaries by > 50% of Table FL4. Any two aboveground flammable and/or combustible liquid tanks shall be separated from each other by > Table FL5. Flammable and/or combustible liquid tanks shall be segregated from substances they may react dangerously with by > 5m and be stored in separate spill compounds. Aboveground flammable liquid tanks shall be separated from package stores and decanting areas for flammable or combustible liquids by > 6m. Aboveground combustible liquid tanks shall be separated from package stores containing flammable or combustible liquids by > 3m or the diameter of the tank, whichever is greater. Underground tanks shall be separated from property boundaries by > 2m. Siting and separation – Fire-rated double walled tanks Aboveground fire-rated self-bunded tanks shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > 50% of Table FL4.

Siting and separation – Tank openings, vents and fill points Fill points for flammable liquid tanks shall be located outside in open air > 4m from property boundaries and building openings. Fill points for combustible liquid tanks shall be located outside in open air > 2m from building openings. Tank fill points shall also be adequately located to ensure delivery vehicles:

I. can park entirely inside the property boundaries; II. are not required to enter a tank bund; III. are capable of exiting the fill point area without reversing.

Any vent discharge point of a flammable liquid tank shall be located a minimum of:

I. 4m aboveground or a minimum of 150mm above the top of the tank or above the highest point of a refuelling vehicle, whichever is greater; and

II. 4m from any opening into a building (i.e. window, mechanical vent intake etc) for flammable liquids; III. 1.5m from a property boundary for underground tanks and self-bunded tanks; or IV. 3m from a property boundary for an aboveground tank.

Any vent discharge point for a combustible tank shall be located a minimum of:

I. 4m above ground or a minimum of 150mm above the top of the tank or above the highest point of a refuelling vehicle, whichever is greater; and

II. 2m from any opening into a building. Siting and separation – Dispensers Flammable liquid dispensers shall be separated from property boundaries by > 4m. Flammable liquid dispensers shall be separated from aboveground non fire-rated tanks by > 8m.


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Table FL4

PG II PG III C1 Minimum separation distance 1,000 2,500 10,000 3m 2,000 8,000 20,000 4m 4,000 16,000 40,000 5m 7,000 28,000 70,000 6m

10,000 40,000 100,000 7m 14,000 60,000 140,000 8m 20,000 200,000 9m 26,000 260,000 10m 34,000 340,000 11m 42,000 420,000 12m 52,000 500,000 13 m 60,000 14m

Table FL5 Liquid type Vertical tanks Horizontal tanks Vertical and horizontal

Flammable liquid tanks only < 60,000L

> 1m or 1/3 of the larger tank’s diameter, whichever is greater.

> 600mm and side to side, (not end-to-end).

> 1m or 1/3 of the larger tank’s diameter, whichever is greater, and horizontal tank ends shall not face vertical tanks.

Combustible liquid tanks only < 60,000L

> 1m > 600mm and side to side, (not end-to-end)

All tanks shall be separated from each other by 1m and horizontal tanks cannot face vertical tanks

A mix of flammable and combustible tanks < 60,000L

> 1m or 1/3 of the diameter of the largest flammable liquid tank, whichever is greater.

> 600mm side to side, (not end-to-end).

> 1m or 1/3 of the diameter of the largest flammable liquid tank, whichever is greater, and horizontal tank ends cannot face vertical tanks.

A mix of flammable and combustible tanks > 60,000L

Not self assessable Not self assessable Not self assessable


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Spill containment – Aboveground tanks, not including double walled self-bunded tanks Spill containment systems shall not bring together two or more hazardous chemicals that are not compatible (including common drains). Aboveground tanks, other than self-bunded aboveground tanks, shall be located inside a spill compound (e.g. bund) that complies with all of the following:

I. is impervious; II. free from pipe work penetrating through any wall of the bund; III. constructed of fire resistant material(s); IV. able to hold liquid when full; V. sloped to a low point or sump;

VI. provided with a means of being emptied; VII. the distance between a bund wall and the nearest tank is a minimum of half the distance between the

top of the tank and the top of the bund wall or 1m whichever is greater; (see figure T1.1 for guidance) VIII. has an internal volume > 110% of the largest tank within the compound. (Includes 10% for fire water)

Impact avoidance – Aboveground tanks

Aboveground tanks, not including fire-rated self-bunded tanks or those with a bund wall >190mm high shall be provided with impact protection in accordance with at least one of the following: (a) core-filled metal bollards:

(i) minimum of 1.2m high x 75mm wide; and (ii) buried a minimum of 500mm deep below ground; and (iii) spaced at a maximum of 1.3m between any 2 posts or bollards required to separate a tank

from a vehicle access area; and (iv) a minimum of 1.5m away from the side of the tank; or

(b) metal guardrail a minimum of 700mm high with posts buried a minimum of 500mm deep and located a minimum of 1.5m from the tank; or

(c) a chain-wire metal fence a minimum of 1.8m high with a minimum of 50mm steel posts buried a minimum of 600mm deep and located a minimum of 3m from the tank; or

(d) a concrete or masonry kerb a minimum of 190mm high located a minimum of 5m from the tank. Impact avoidance – Underground tanks Underground tanks shall be buried a minimum of 300mm belowground and provided with a reinforced concrete slab a minimum of 150mm thick covering the tank storage area.

>H/2 (minimum of 1m)

Minimum bund wall height = 190mm

H

Figure T1.1. An illustration of minimum bund wall height relative to tank height.

Not to scale

Top of tank

Top of bund wall


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Impact avoidance – Fill points Fill points shall be positioned below ground and provided with a metal cover or located inside an above ground tank bund or provided with impact protection as required for above ground tanks. Impact avoidance – Vent pipes Vent pipes shall be located inside an above ground tank bund or provided with impact protection as required for above ground tanks. Impact avoidance – Vehicle dispensers

Dispensers for road vehicles shall be provided with metal bollards in accordance with all of the following: I. core-filled with concrete; II. minimum of 1.2m high x 75mm wide; III. buried a minimum of 500mm deep; IV. located at all 4 corners of a dispenser at a distance as wide as or wider than the dispenser; V. located a minimum of 500mm from any side of a dispenser.

Note: Multiple dispensers in a row < 2m apart may be grouped together and considered as one individual dispenser. Fire safety – Storage tanks Tanks shall be provided with fire protection equipment in accordance with Table T3 and all fire fighting equipment shall be located outside of spill compounds and within 10m.

Fire safety – Dispensers Dispenser shall have access to > 2 x 9kg ABE extinguishers within 10m and one no closer than 3m. Fire safety – Tank fill points Fill points shall have access to > 2 x 9kg ABE extinguishers with one extinguisher > 3m from the fill point. Fire safety – Transfer pumps Transfer pumps shall have access to > 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher within 10m but not closer than 3m.

Table T3 Storage type Storage

capacity Fire protection

Aboveground flammable liquid tanks

< 30,000L 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher and 1 x 9kg foam extinguisher.

30,000 - 60,000L

1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher and 1 x hose reel able to reach all sides of the storage tank(s) with a branch pipe, pick up and a supply of foam concentrate*.

Aboveground combustible liquid tanks

< 60,000L 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher in a single tank; or

2 x 9kg ABE extinguishers if multiple tanks

60,000 - 500,000L


Aboveground flammable and combustible liquid tanks stored within the a common spill compound

< 30,000L 1 x 9kg ABE extinguisher and 1 x 9kg foam extinguisher.

30,000 - 60,000L


Underground flammable or combustible liquid tanks

any Nil

* A supply of foam concentrate shall be consistent with the quantity identified in a site’s emergency plan required under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011.

Access restriction Aboveground tanks shall be kept under lock and key.


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6.4 Oxidising substances in packages and IBCs General requirements Package stores (areas of stored packages and IBCs) shall be located outdoors only and used for the store closed packages and/or IBCs only. Separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured from the inside edge of any bund wall or natural vent opening to any areas to be protected. Package stores shall be constructed from non combustible materials that are compatible with the oxidising substances to be stored. Hardwood frames are not considered combustible materials for the purposes of this Code, however, hardwood cladding is. Package stores with a spill compound >250m2 shall have a minimum of 2 egress points. The lowest point of any package store containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII shall be higher than any relevant flood height level identified in an area’s flood hazard area. Alternatively, package stores are provided with impervious bund walls or racking systems higher than the relevant flood height level. Siting and separation Package stores shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > Table OS1. Oxidising substances shall be segregated from any other substance that it may react dangerously with by a minimum of 5m and stored in separate spill compounds.

Table OS1 Maximum aggregate quantity of store PGII with or without PGIII PGIII only

2,500 – 10,000L or kg 5m 3m 10,000 – 20,000L or kg 8m 5m 20,000 – 50,000L or kg Not self-assessable 5m 50,000 - 250,000L or kg Not self-assessable 8m

Storage in stacks

Oxidising substances stacked > 2 high and not in a pallet racking system, shall comply with the following: I. not exceed 3m in height; II. separated a minimum of 1.2m from any perimeter wall of a package store; III. multiple stacks within the same package store are separated from each other by > 3m; IV. each stack shall not exceed table OS2:

Table OS2

Stack size PGII with or without PGIII PGIII only

Involving combustible pallets 20,000kg 20,000kg No combustible pallets 20,000kg 50,000kg


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Spill containment Spill containment systems shall not bring together two or more hazardous chemicals that are not compatible (including common drains). Package stores, containing liquids shall be provided with a spill compound that achieves the following:

I. is impervious; II. constructed or lined with material(s) compatible with the oxidising substance(s) kept; III. capable of holding liquid when full; IV. sloped to a low point or sump; V. provided with a means of being emptied;

VI. internal volume > 35% of aggregate storage volume (includes provision for fire water) ; VII. Where liquid IBCs are stored, the distance between a bund wall and the nearest IBC shall be > 50%

the distance between the top of the highest IBC tank and the top of the closest bund wall; (See figure OS1.1 in section 4.5 for guidance. Impervious shields can be used to extend bund walls)

VIII. provided with restraints or barriers to prevent packages falling outside of the bund if packages are positioned < 1m from a bund wall.

Ventilation

Package stores shall be provided with ventilation to allow for any vapours to dissipate. Ventilation shall be in the form of an open wall or vent. An open wall means any external wall that is completely open above the top of the bund wall or a wall of fixed louvers or wire mesh having a minimum of 50% of its area are openings. A vent means 2 x openings in an external wall that are completely open each with a minimum surface area of 0.1m2 with one located directly above the top of a bund wall and the other above the highest package. Any vent that passes through a cavity wall must be lined to prevent vapours from escaping into a wall cavity. Package stores shall be provided with at least one of the following ventilation systems:

I. Two or more open walls; or II. One open wall, provided it is longer than it is wide; or III. One open wall and vents in the opposite or adjacent wall at a minimum of every 3m; or IV. Two opposite walls provided with vents a minimum of every 3m; or V. For package stores > 6m long and < 5m wide, vents in the longest wall > every 1.4m.

Impact avoidance

Impact damage caused by fork-lift trucks or other moving equipment against racking uprights shall be avoided by the protection of corner uprights as follows:

I. An upright protector with a height of not less than 400 mm shall be positioned at the end upright of each run of racking between cross-aisles;

II. An upright protector shall be positioned at all uprights positioned at aisle and gangway intersections; III. The upright protector shall be designed for energy absorption of > 400 Nm in any direction at any

height between 0.1 m and 0.4 m; IV. The upright protector shall be positioned in such a way that, after its deformation by absorbing an

impact, the upright will not be damaged. Note: As an alternative to the use of upright protectors, the installation may be designed to survive the complete removal of a section at the bottom of an upright.

Fire safety

Package stores shall be provided with a 24hr monitored fire detection system and >1 x 9kg ABE fire extinguisher, within 10m but no closer than 3m and >1 x hose reel capable of reaching all areas of the store. Security Package stores shall be kept under lock and key.


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6.5 Oxidising substances in tanks General requirements Aboveground tanks, vents, fill points and dispensers shall be located outdoors only. Underground tanks are not permitted. Separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured from the outermost external surface of a tank, fill point or dispenser. Separation distances for spill compounds (bund) shall be measured from the inside edge of the bund walls. Tanks shall be located > 1m from any wall to allow access for inspection and maintenance. Spill compounds and tank supporting structures shall be constructed of fire resistant materials only. ADG Code compliant isotainers and intermodal tanks are considered tanks for the purposes of this code. Aboveground tanks shall not be stacked on top of each other.

Hydrogen Peroxide tanks > 5,000L shall be fitted with an externally visible temperature measuring device.

Where the base of any tank containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII is lower than a relevant flood height level identified in a local government’s flood hazard area such a tank shall be anchored so it cannot float if submerged or inundated by water; and, any opening not provided with a liquid tight seal, i.e. an atmospheric vent, shall be extended above the relevant flood height level. Siting and separation Tanks shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > Table OS3. Tank bunds shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected place > 3m. Tanks containing oxidising substances that are compatible with each other shall be separated by > 1m. Oxidising substances shall be separated from any other substance that it may react dangerously with, including any another oxidising substance, by a minimum of 5m and stored in separate spill compounds. Tank fill points shall also be adequately located to ensure delivery vehicles:


Fill or dispensing points shall be located > 3m from property boundaries or on-site protected places. Separation distances may be measured around an intervening screen wall provided it is > 1m above the transfer point, impervious to liquid and vapour, immune to attack by the oxidising substance(s) kept and acts as a shield or deflection barrier.

Table OS3 Tank size PGII PGIII

2,500 – 10,000L 5m 5m 10,0000 – 20,000L 8m 5m 20,0000 – 50,000L Not self-assessable 5m 50,000 – 250,000L Not self-assessable 8m


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Spill containment – Tank shell No two spill compounds containing incompatible substances or substances that may react dangerously with each other shall be connected to a common drain.

Tanks containing liquids shall be located inside a spill compound that achieves the following: I. is impervious; II. compatible with the oxidising substance(s) kept and fire-resistant; III. capable of holding liquid when full; IV. sloped to a low point or sump; V. provided with a means of being emptied;

VI. free from pipe work penetrating through any bund walls; VII. the distance between a bund wall and the nearest tank shall be > 50% the distance between the top

of the tank and the top of the bund wall or 1m whichever is greater; (See figure OS1.1 for guidance. Impervious shields may be used to extend bund wall heights)

VIII. has an internal volume > 110% of the largest tank stored within the compound.

Impact avoidance Tanks, other than those provided with masonry bunds >190mm high or self bunded fire-rated tanks shall be provided with impact protection in accordance with at least one of the following:

a) core-filled metal bollards: I. minimum of 1.2m high x 75mm wide; and II. buried a minimum of 500mm deep below ground; and III. spaced at < 1.3m between any 2 posts or bollards required to separate a tank from a vehicle

access area; IV. a minimum of 1.5m away from the side of the tank.

b) metal guardrail a minimum of 700mm high with posts buried a minimum of 500mm deep and located a minimum of 1.5m from the tank; or

c) a chain-wire metal fence a minimum of 1.8m high with a minimum of 50mm steel posts buried a minimum of 600mm deep and located a minimum of 3m from the tank; or

d) a concrete or masonry kerb a minimum of 190mm high and a minimum of 5m from the tank. Fire safety

Tanks shall be provided with > 1 x 9kg dry chemical fire extinguisher, within 10m but no closer than 3m and > 1 x hose reel capable of reaching all sides of the tank(s). Security

Tanks shall be kept under lock and key.



H

Figure OS1.1. An illustration of minimum bund wall height relative to tank height.

Not to scale

Top of tank

Top of bund wall


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6.6 Toxic substances in packages and IBCs General requirements Package stores (areas of stored packages and IBCs) shall be free standing and used for the storage of closed packages and/or IBCs only. Package stores within buildings shall be located on a floor with immediate access outside the building. All separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured from the inside edge of any bund wall or natural vent opening to any areas to be protected. Package stores shall be constructed from materials compatible with the toxic substances to be stored. Package stores with a spill compound > 25m2 shall have a minimum of 2 access points. Toxic substances with a flammable liquid subsidiary risk or vice versa shall not be stored with toxic substances that do not have a flammability (class 3) risk. Decanting, blending or filling packages is not permitted in package stores containing toxic substances. The lowest point of any package store containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII shall be higher than any relevant flood height level identified in an area’s flood hazard area. Alternatively, package stores are provided with impervious bund walls or racking systems higher than the relevant flood height level.

Siting and separation Separation distances between a package store and a property boundary shall be > Table TS1. Separation distances between a package store and an on-site protected place shall be > 50% Table TS1. Toxic substances shall be separated from any other substance that it may react dangerously with by a minimum of 5m and stored in separate spill compounds.

Table TS1 Package store volume (L/kg) PGII with or without PGIII PGIII only

2,500 – 10,000 5m 3m 10,000 – 20,000 6m 4m 20,000 – 50,000 8m 5m

50,000 – 100,000 10m 8m 100,000 – 200,000 15m 10m 200,000 - 500,000 17.5m 15m


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Spill containment Spill containment systems shall not bring together two or more hazardous chemicals that are not compatible (including common drains). Package stores, including those storing solids only, shall be provided with a bund that complies with all of the following:

I. is impervious; II. constructed or lined with a material compatible with the toxic substance(s) kept; III. capable of holding liquid when full; IV. sloped to a low point or sump; V. provided with a means of being emptied;

VI. free from any other dangerous goods, incompatible materials or materials that may react violently with the toxic substances;

VII. has a minimum internal volume > 25% of the aggregate storage capacity; VIII. Where liquid IBCs are stored, the distance between a bund wall and the nearest IBC shall be > 50%

the distance between the top of the highest IBC tank and the top of the closest bund wall. (See figure TS1.1 in section 4.7 for guidance. Impervious shields may be used to extend bund walls);

IX. provided with restraints or barriers to prevent packages falling outside of the bund if packages are positioned < 1m from a bund wall.

Ventilation

Package stores shall be provided with ventilation to allow for corrosive vapours to dissipate. Ventilation shall be in the form of an open wall or vent.

An open wall means any external wall that is completely open above the top of the bund wall or a wall of fixed louvers or wire mesh having a minimum of 50% of its area are openings.

A vent means 2 x openings in an external wall with a minimum free surface area of 0.1m2 with one located directly above the top of a bund wall and the other above the highest package.

Any vent that passes through a cavity wall must be lined to prevent vapours from escaping into a wall cavity.

Package stores shall be provided with at least one of the following ventilation systems: I. Two or more open walls; or II. One open wall, provided it is longer than it is wide; or III. One open wall and vents in the opposite or an adjacent wall at a minimum of every 3m; or IV. Two opposite walls <10m apart provided with vents a minimum of every 3m; or V. For package stores > 6m long and < 5m wide, vents in the longest wall < every 1.4m.

Impact avoidance

Impact damage caused by fork-lift trucks or other moving equipment against racking uprights shall be avoided by the protection of corner uprights as follows:


II. Upright protectors shall be positioned at uprights positioned at aisle and gangway intersections; III. The upright protector shall be designed for energy absorption of > 400 Nm in any direction at any

height between 0.1 m and 0.4 m; IV. The upright protector shall be positioned in such a way that, after its deformation by absorbing an

impact, the upright will not be damaged. Note: As an alternative to the use of upright protectors, the installation may be designed to survive the complete removal of a section at the bottom of an upright.

Fire safety Package stores shall be provided with a 24hr monitored fire detection system and > 1 x 9kg ABE fire extinguisher, within 10m but no closer than 3m.

Security A package store shall be kept under lock-and-key.


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6.7 Toxic substances in tanks General requirements

Underground tanks are not permitted. Separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured from the outermost external surface of a tank, fill point or dispenser. Separation distances for spill compounds (bund) shall be measured from the inside edge of the bund walls. Tanks shall be located > 1m from any wall to allow access for inspection and maintenance. Spill compounds and tank supporting structures shall be constructed of fire resistant materials only. ADG Code compliant isotainers and intermodal tanks are considered tanks for the purposes of this code. Tanks shall not be stacked on top of each other. Where the base of any tank containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII is lower than a relevant flood height level identified in a local government’s flood hazard area such a tank shall be anchored so it cannot float if submerged or inundated by water; and, any opening not provided with a liquid tight seal, i.e. an atmospheric vent, shall be extended above the relevant flood height level. Siting and separation Separation distances between tanks and property boundaries shall be > Table TS2. Separation distances between tanks and on-site protected places shall be > 50% Table TS2. Any two tanks containing toxic substances compatible with each other shall be separated by > 1m. Toxic substances shall be separated from any other substance that it may react dangerously with by a minimum of 5m and stored in separate spill compounds. Tank fill points shall also be adequately located to ensure filling vehicles:


Table TS2

Volume of tank (L/kg)

PGII PGIII

Inhalation hazard No Inhalation

hazard Inhalation hazard

No Inhalation hazard

2,500 – 10,000 10m 5m 6m 3m 10,000 – 20,000 12m 6m 8m 4m 20,000 – 50,000 16m 8m 10m 5m

50,000 – 100,000 20m 10m 16m 8m 100,000 – 200,000 30m 15m 20m 10m 200,000 - 500,000 35m 17.5m 30m 15m


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Spill containment – Tanks

No two spill compounds containing incompatible substances or substances that may react dangerously with each other shall be connected to a common drain.

Tanks shall be within an impervious spill compound/bund that achieves the following: I. is constructed of material(s) compatible with the toxic substance(s) kept; II. capable of holding liquid when full; III. sloped to a low point or sump; IV. provided with a means of being emptied; V. free from any other dangerous goods, incompatible materials or materials that will react violently

with the toxic substance(s) kept; VI. free from pipe work penetrating through any bund walls; VII. the distance between a bund wall and the nearest tank shall be a > 50% the distance between the

top of the tank and the top of the bund wall or 1m whichever is greater (see figure TS1.1 for guidance. Impervious shields can be used to extend bund wall heights);

VIII. has an internal volume > 110% of the largest tank within the compound. (includes 500L of fire water)

Impact avoidance

Tanks, other than those provided with masonry bunds >190mm high, self bunded fire-rated tanks or tanks located inside a building not accessible by motor vehicles shall be provided with impact protection in accordance with at least one of the following: (a) core-filled metal bollards:

(i) minimum of 1.2m high x 75mm wide; and (ii) buried a minimum of 500mm deep below ground; and (iii) spaced at a maximum of 1.3m between any 2 posts or bollards required to separate a tank from

a vehicle access area; and (iv) a minimum of 1.5m away from the side of the tank; or



(d) a concrete or masonry kerb a minimum of 190mm high and a minimum of 5m from the tank.

Fire safety

Tank shall have access to > 1 x 9kg ABE fire extinguisher, within 10m but no closer than 3m. Security Aboveground tanks shall be kept under lock and key.



H

Figure TS1.1. An illustration of minimum bund wall height relative to tank height.

Not to scale

Top of tank

Top of bund wall


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6.8 Corrosive substances in packages and IBCs General requirements Package stores (areas of stored, closed packages and IBCs) shall be free standing and used for the storage of closed packages and/or IBCs only.

Package stores within a building shall be located on a floor that has immediate access from outside the building. All separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured from the inside edge of any bund wall or natural vent opening to any areas to be protected. Package stores shall be constructed from materials compatible with the corrosive substances to be stored. Package stores with a spill compound > 25m2 shall have a minimum of 2 access points. The lowest point of any package store containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII shall be higher than any relevant flood height level identified in an area’s flood hazard area. Alternatively, package stores are provided with impervious bund walls or racking systems higher than the relevant flood height level. Siting and separation Package store shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > Table CPS1. Corrosive substances shall be separated from any other substance that it may react dangerously with by a minimum of 5m and stored in separate spill compounds.

Table CPS1 PGII with or without PGIII PGIII only

Open containers Closed containers Open or closed containers 5m 3m 3m

Spill containment Spill containment systems shall not bring together two or more hazardous chemicals (including any two incompatible substances of the same class) that are not compatible (including common drains). Package stores including those storing solids only shall be provided with a bund that complies with all of the following:

I. is impervious; II. constructed or lined with a material that is compatible with the corrosive substance(s) to be stored; III. capable of holding liquid when full; IV. sloped to a low point or sump; V. provided with a means of being emptied;

VI. has an internal volume > 35% of the aggregate storage capacity but need not exceed 5,500L; VII. Where liquid IBCs are stored, the distance between a bund wall and the nearest IBC shall be > 50%

the distance between the top of the highest IBC tank and the top of the closest bund wall. (See figure CS1.1 in section 4.9 for guidance. Impervious shields may be used to extend bund wall heights);

VIII. is provided with restraints or barriers to prevent packages falling outside of the bund if packages are positioned closer than 1m from a bund wall.


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Ventilation

Package stores shall be provided with ventilation to allow for corrosive vapours to dissipate. Ventilation shall be in the form of an open wall or vent.

An open wall means any external wall that is completely open above the top of the bund wall or a wall of fixed louvers or wire mesh having a minimum of 50% of its area are openings.

A vent means 2 x openings in an external wall with a minimum free surface area of 0.1m2 with one located directly above the top of a bund wall and the other above the highest package.

Any vent that passes through a cavity wall must be lined to prevent vapours from escaping into a wall cavity.

Package stores shall be provided with at least one of the following ventilation systems:

I. Two or more open walls; or II. One open wall, provided it is longer than it is wide; or III. One open wall and vents in the opposite or adjacent wall at a minimum of every 3m; or IV. Two opposite walls provided with vents a minimum of every 3m; or V. For package stores > 6m long and < 5m wide, vents in the longest wall < every 1.4m.

Impact avoidance

Impact damage caused by fork-lift trucks or other moving equipment against racking uprights shall b Impact damage caused by fork-lift trucks or other moving equipment against racking uprights shall be avoided by the protection of corner uprights as follows:


II. An upright protector shall be positioned at all those uprights positioned at aisle and gangway intersections;

III. The upright protector shall be designed for energy absorption of > 400 Nm in any direction at any height between 0.1 m and 0.4 m;

IV. The upright protector shall be positioned in such a way that, after its deformation by absorbing an impact, the upright will not be damaged.

Note: As an alternative to the use of upright protectors, the installation may be designed to survive the complete removal of a section at the bottom of an upright.

Fire safety Package stores shall be provided with a 24hr monitored fire detection system and > 1 x 9kg ABE fire extinguisher, within 10m but no closer than 3m.

Security

A package store shall be kept under lock-and-key.


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6.9 Corrosive substances in tanks General requirements

Underground tanks are not permitted. Separation distances shall be achieved by open air only and measurement across a property boundary is not permitted for self-assessable development. Separation distances shall be measured from the outermost external surface of a tank, fill point or dispenser. Separation distances for spill compounds (bund) shall be measured from the inside edge of the bund walls. Tanks shall be located > 1m from any wall to allow access for inspection and maintenance. Spill compounds and tank supporting structures shall be constructed of fire resistant materials only. ADG Code compliant isotainers and intermodal tanks are considered tanks for the purposes of this code. Aboveground tanks shall not be stacked on top of each other. Where the base of any tank containing >10,000L of PGIII is lower than a relevant flood height level identified in a local government’s flood hazard area such a tank shall be anchored so it cannot float if submerged or inundated by water; and, any opening not provided with a liquid tight seal, i.e. an atmospheric vent, shall be extended above the relevant flood height level. Siting and separation Tanks, not including fire-rated double walled tanks, shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > Table CS2. Fire-rated self bunded tanks shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > 50% Table CS2. Tank bunds shall be separated from property boundaries and on-site protected places by > 3m. Any two tanks containing corrosive substances compatible with each other shall be separated by > 600mm. Corrosive substances shall be segregated from any other substance that it may react dangerously with, including another corrosive substance, by a minimum of 5m and stored in separate spill compounds. Any fill or dispensing point for a corrosive tank containing PGII shall be located > 5m from property boundaries and on-site protected places. Fill and dispensing points for corrosive tanks containing PGIII shall be located > 3m from property boundaries and on-site protected places. Tank fill points shall be adequately located to ensure delivery vehicles:


Separation distances from fill or dispensing points may be measured around an intervening screen wall if it is a minimum of 1m higher than the fill or dispensing points, impervious to liquid and vapour, immune to attack by the corrosive substances kept and acts as a shield/deflection barrier.


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Table CS2

Tank size PGII or PGIII

Solid Liquid 2,500 - 3,000L 3m 3m 3,000 – 50,000L 3m 5m >50,000L 5m 8m

Spill containment –Tank shell No two spill compounds containing incompatible substances or substances that may react dangerously with each other shall be connected to a common drain. Tanks other than self bunded fire-rated tanks, shall be located inside a secondary spill compound/bund that complies with all of the following:

I. is impervious; II. constructed or lined with a material compatible with the corrosive substance(s) kept; III. capable of holding liquid when full; IV. sloped to a low point or sump; V. provided with a means of being emptied;

VI. free from pipe work penetrating through any bund walls; VII. the distance between a bund wall and the nearest tank shall be > the distance between the top of the

tank and the top of the bund wall or 1m, whichever is greater. (See figure CS1.1 for guidance. Impervious shields may be used to extend bund wall heights);

VIII. has an internal volume equal to or greater than 110% of the largest tank within the compound.



H

Figure CS1.1. An illustration of minimum bund wall height relative to tank height.

Not to scale

Top of tank

Top of bund wall


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Impact avoidance

Tanks, other than those provided with masonry bunds >190mm high or self bunded fire-rated tanks shall be provided with impact protection in accordance with at least one of the following: (a) core-filled metal bollards:

(i) minimum of 1.2m high x 75mm wide; and (ii) buried a minimum of 500mm deep below ground; and (iii) spaced at a maximum of 1.3m between any 2 posts or bollards required to separate a tank

from a vehicle access area; and (iv) a minimum of 1.5m away from the side of the tank; or



(d) a concrete or masonry kerb a minimum of 190mm high and a minimum of 5m from the tank. Security Aboveground tanks shall be kept under lock and key.


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6.10 Environmentally hazardous substances in package stores or tanks General requirements The lowest point of any package store containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII environmentally hazardous substances shall be higher than any relevant flood height level identified in an area’s flood hazard area. Alternatively, package stores are provided with impervious bund walls or racking systems higher than the relevant flood height level.

Where the base of any tank containing >2,500L of PGII or >10,000L of PGIII environmentally hazardous substances is lower than a relevant flood height level identified in a local government’s flood hazard area, such a tank shall be anchored so it cannot float if submerged or inundated by water; and, any opening not provided with a liquid tight seal, i.e. an atmospheric vent, shall be extended above the relevant flood height level.


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7. Model assessable development code

Purpose

The purpose of this model code is to provide local governments with model performance and acceptable outcomes for assessable developments with hazardous chemicals for those identified by the model assessable development triggers identified in this Guideline.

Applying the model code

The model code specifies Performance Outcomes (PO) and Acceptable Outcomes (AO) recommended for assessable development with hazardous chemicals. These are specified below. POs identify a desired outcome for development and provides for flexibility in how this outcome can be achieved. AOs represent a specific and rigid way of achieving a PO. A development application that complies with an AO satisfies the corresponding POs. POs allow for a more flexible approach, however, if an alternative solution to an AO is proposed, the onus lies with the applicant to demonstrate that the alternative solution meets the PO(s) of the code.

Advisory notes to interpreting this model Code

It is a fundamental principle of the model code that development involving quantities of hazardous chemicals identified in table 5.2 are designed taking account sound engineering principles, relevant Australian Standards and other good-industry-practice to manage risk so far as reasonably practicable (SFARP). In addition to this, a hazard assessment of the proposed design shall be conducted to identify any foreseeable hazard scenarios with the potential to create off-site physical or chemical effects. Any such hazard scenarios shall be estimated using suitable software modelling or calculations. Proponents shall be capable of demonstrating that they have taken all measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of any off-site hazards from materialising and to limit their physical and chemical effects in the event they did occur. As a guiding principle, development shall be designed so that the effects of any hazards shall be contained within its boundaries. Where a development cannot be designed in accordance with this principle, it must be designed so that the likelihood of such hazards does not exceed the recommended risk criteria of table 7.1.


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Table 7.1 Model assessable development code for Hazardous Chemicals

Performance Outcomes Acceptable Outcomes

PO1 Off sites risks from foreseeable hazard scenarios involving hazardous chemicals are commensurate with the sensitivity of the surrounding land use zones.

AO1.1 Off site impacts or risks from any foreseeable hazard scenario does not exceed the dangerous dose at the boundary of land zoned for vulnerable or sensitive land uses as described below: Dangerous Dose

a) for any hazard scenario involving the release of gases or vapours:

i. AEGL2 (60minutes) or if not available ERPG2; ii. An oxygen content in air <19.5% or >23.5% at

normal atmospheric pressure. b) For any hazard scenario involving fire or explosion:

i. 7kPa overpressure; ii. 4.7kW/m2 heat radiation.

If criteria AO1.1 (a) or (b) cannot be achieved, then the risk of any foreseeable hazard scenario shall not exceed an individual fatality risk level of 0.5 x 10-6/year. AO1.2 Off site impacts or risks from any foreseeable hazard scenario does not exceed the dangerous dose at the boundary of a commercial or community activity land use zone as described below: Dangerous Dose





If criteria AO1.2 (a) or (b) cannot be achieved, then the risk of any foreseeable hazard scenario shall not exceed an individual fatality risk level of 5 x 10-6/year.

AO1.3 Off site impacts or risks from any foreseeable hazard scenario does not exceed the dangerous dose at the boundary of an industrial land use zone as described below: Dangerous Dose





If criteria AO1.3 (a) or (b) cannot be achieved, then the risk of any foreseeable hazard scenario shall not exceed an individual fatality risk level of 50 x 10-6/year.


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Performance Outcomes Acceptable Outcomes

PO2 Buildings and package stores containing fire-risk hazardous chemicals are designed to detect the early stages of a fire situation and notify a designated person.

AO2 Buildings and package stores containing fire-risk hazardous chemicals are provided with 24 hour monitored fire detection system for early detection of a fire event.

PO3 Common storage areas containing packages of flammable and toxic hazardous chemicals are designed with spill containment system(s) that are adequate to contain releases, including fire fighting media.

AO3 Storage areas containing packages of flammable and toxic hazardous chemicals are designed with spill containment system(s) capable of containing a minimum of the total aggregate capacity of all packages plus the maximum operating capacity of any fire protection system for the storage area(s) over a minimum of 60 minutes.

PO4 Storage and handling areas, including manufacturing areas, containing hazardous chemicals in quantities greater than 2,500L or kg within a Local Government “flood hazard area” are located and designed in a manner to minimise the likelihood of inundation of flood waters from creeks, rivers, lakes or estuaries.

A04.1 The base of any tank with a WC >2,500L or kg is higher than any relevant flood height level identified in an area’s flood hazard area. Alternatively:

a) bulk tanks are anchored so they cannot float if submerged or inundated by water; and

b) tank openings not provided with a liquid tight seal, i.e. an atmospheric vent, are extended above the relevant flood height level.

A04.2 The lowest point of any storage area for packages >2,500L or kg is higher than any relevant flood height level identified in an area’s flood hazard area. Alternatively, package stores are provided with impervious bund walls or racking systems higher than the relevant flood height level.

PO5 The applicant can demonstrate that the development has been designed with the control measures required to achieve the outcomes of PO1 – PO4.

AO5 A hazard assessment report from a suitably qualified and experienced person is provided that includes the following: a) a list of the foreseeable hazard scenarios associated with

the hazardous chemicals for the development; b) a description of the control measures incorporated into the

design to manage the impacts or risks from the identified hazard scenarios;

c) a copy of any calculations or estimates made to verify that the development complies with the acceptable outcomes;

d) a statement of how the development achieves each performance outcome.


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8. Advice for demonstrating and assessing compliance against the model code for assessable development

Purpose

The purpose of this model assessment methodology is to:

a) Provide guidance to local governments on how to have proponents demonstrate how they will achieve the outcomes for the model code for assessable development;

b) Provide development proponents, consultants, engineers, safety officers, with the basis for an understanding of the various elements of a hazard assessment and the standards of analysis and reporting required. It is not intended that it provide the basis for a person or group without prior knowledge or experience to carry out a hazard assessment.

Assurance

The model code recommends the local government requires assurance that the location and design of a proposed hazardous chemicals development meets the model code’s criteria in a way consistent with the assessment methodology of this guide.

Role of the designer

For the purposes of the model code, a designer is anyone who designs plant and structures, or who modifies the design of existing plant and structures associated with hazardous chemicals development that trigger an MCU. Examples include:

designing a hazardous chemicals warehousing facility on a greenfield site or at an existing facility

designing a new manufacturing plant or an extension to an existing one, and

designing a hazardous chemicals storage and handling system for a new or existing facility.

The designer is responsible for ensuring that appropriate risk control measures are incorporated into the design of the proposed hazardous chemicals’ development. Risk controls are to be adopted in a way that is consistent with the Hierarchy of Controls approach taken in the Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011. Section 36 of the Regulation focuses on substitution of hazards and use of engineering or isolation controls before relying on operational risk control measures to reduce risk.


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The risk control measures adopted are inherently linked to the hazard assessment and other relevant safety studies (e.g. fire study). Wherever the model code’s criteria cannot be met, a review of the suitability of control measures would be required and reassessed against the model code’s criteria. Designers must provide a level of assurance to the regulatory authority of the engineering standards used and relevant engineering judgments that have been made.

Engineering Activities

In Queensland, the Queensland Professional Engineers Act 2002 (QPE Act) requires that any engineering work be undertaken by, or supervised by, a registered engineer (RPEQ). Design according to a ‘prescriptive standard’ does not require RPEQ qualifications. More information is available at www.bpeq.qld.gov.au

Role of the Hazard Assessment Report

The purpose of a hazard assessment report is to identify all foreseeable hazard scenarios associated with the hazardous chemicals for the development and how they will be managed to achieve the performance outcomes.

A competent person must compile the hazard assessment report. A competent person is someone with the skills and experience with identifying hazards and assessing their risks associated with facilities with hazardous chemicals. Various professional bodies may provide assurance of relevant competencies e.g. Engineer’s Australia or Australasian Institute of Dangerous Goods Consultants (AIDGC).


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Achieving the performance outcomes

Hazard identification, hazard analysis and risk analysis are the three primary tools for assessing the suitability of hazardous industry for a particular site. The role of these studies in land use safety planning is to demonstrate that the risk from a facility is tolerable when considering the surrounding land uses. These studies should also demonstrate that this risk can be appropriately and adequately managed.

It is a fundamental principle of the model code that facilities are designed taking account of relevant Australian Standards, other good-industry-practice and sound engineering principles to reduce risk so far as reasonably practicable.

This is consistent with the duties under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. Specifically, section 22 has a duty for a designer who designs plant and structures to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the plant or structure is designed without risks to health and safety of persons. Similar duties apply to persons that manufacture, import, supply and construct or commission plant or structures (sections 23-26).

The siting and design of any proposed development should be sufficiently detailed to allow an accurate hazard assessment to be made against the criteria of the model code. A hazard assessment should be capable of identifying the foreseeable hazard scenarios associated with the development and the engineering, isolation or substitution controls selected to eliminate or reduce risks so far as reasonably practical.

The assessment methodology and the underlying principles for achieving the model code’s performance outcomes (PO1-5) via acceptable outcomes (AO) are described below. The model format for a hazard assessment report is provided in Section 8.6.


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8.1 Achieving PO1- Assessment Methodology (AO1) Where a proposed development is within the prescribed quantities and circumstances described in Table 5.2 of the model code for assessable development, the location and design of the proposed development should be subjected to a hazard assessment. The purpose of the hazard assessment is to identify any foreseeable hazard scenario/s with the potential to create off-site (i.e. beyond property boundary) physical or chemical effects.

Proponents of assessable hazardous chemicals’ developments shall be capable of demonstrating that they have taken all measures necessary to minimise the consequences of any off-site hazards and if necessary the likelihood of an event occurring. As a guiding principle, hazardous chemicals’ assessable development shall be designed so that the effects of any hazards shall be contained within its boundaries or do not exceed the effects criteria of the model code. Where such a facility cannot achieve this principle, it should be designed so that the likelihood of such hazards does not exceed the risk criteria of the model code, represented by the applicable fatality risk level.


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Identify foreseeable hazard scenario(s) involving hazardous chemicals associated with the proposed development

Compare the effects of the hazard scenario(s) against the effects criteria of AO1.

Development achieves the

hazard criteria of AO1.

Yes

No

Review suitability of controls applied to manage hazard scenario(s) that exceed the criteria of AO1 and consider incorporating additional controls, reducing

inventories or redesigning storage and handling systems to reduce risk SFARP.

Conduct a quantified risk assessment (QRA) to estimate

the likelihood of the effects occurring for the hazard

scenario(s).

Development does not achieve risk criteria of AO1.

No

Are effects contained within the boundaries of

the development?

Are effects of hazard scenario(s) within the

AO1 criteria?

Is risk from hazard scenario(s) within the

AO1 risk criteria?

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

After review, are effects of hazard scenario(s)

within the AO1 criteria?

Figure 2 below outlines the process for demonstrating that a proposed development complies with the acceptable outcome (AO1). Further supporting information is provided in Attachment 1 for conducting a hazard assessment.

Figure 2 Overview of hazard assessment process for PO1.


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8.2 Achieving PO2- Design for early detection of fire event (AO2) Early detection of a fire event can play a significant role in preventing its escalation that may otherwise lead to significant material losses. While the Building Code of Australia specifies minimum requirements for fire protection, additional fire protection will usually be required for premises where fire-risk hazardous chemicals are stored and handled. The Work Health and Safety Regulation 2011 has specific requirements for fire protection and fire fighting equipment for hazardous chemicals (section 359). For guidance on the design and construction of the fire protection for each area in which hazardous chemicals are stored and handled and for the premises as a whole, refer to the relevant Australian Standards and industry codes of practice or associated fire study conducted for the facility.

Facilities subject to the model code for assessable development are required to include early fire detection systems within the overall fire protection strategy for the facility. Fire alarm systems should be designed in accordance with AS1670 and AS1603.5 and installed so that:

automatic systems are also capable of being manually activated at clearly identified manual alarm call points at convenient and safe locations near work areas;

the alarm signal is sufficiently distinguishable from any other signals to permit ready recognition, and clearly audible throughout the storage installation;

where high noise levels or the use of ear protection may prevent the recognition of an alarm signal, an effective alternative alarm system is also installed, such as a visual system; and

the system remains operable when the main power supply fails.

Alarm systems for larger hazardous chemicals storage and handling facilities should be directly linked to the emergency services authority.

System components shall be selected and located in order to achieve stable and reliable performance. Equipment shall be suitable for the environment in which it is to be located. If environmental conditions such as high temperature, dampness, dust, corrosion, vibration, shock, flammable atmosphere or explosive atmospheres may be experienced, the equipment shall be of a type complying with the appropriate Standard. Australian Standard 1670 series should be consulted for fire detection, warning, control and intercom system design.


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8.3 Achieving PO3- Design for spill containment for toxic and flammable substances (AO3) The importance of the containment of contaminated fire water to prevent off-site impacts will depend on the nature of the chemicals held on site and where the site drains to. For example, if substantial quantities of toxic substances (e.g. pesticides and herbicides) are involved and/or the site drains to a sensitive area then special attention is warranted. Factors that need to be taken into account in the design of the retention system include control, drainage, storage and disposal. The model code recognises that special attention is required for package stores co-locating packages of flammable liquids and toxic substances within the same spill compound by including increased spill containment capacity relative to other hazardous chemicals.

The model code requires that the full inventory of flammable and toxic hazardous chemicals in packages plus on-site fire protection systems (e.g. sprinklers) are able to be contained and controlled in an appropriate manner to reduce off-site impacts and facilitate clean-up and disposal of contaminated fire water. The code prescribes a minimum containment capacity.

Where an alternative solution is proposed, a spill containment analysis should be conducted. The analysis should account for not only the total containment of the calculated run-off of potentially significantly contaminated water from the worst case fire scenario but also the availability of the retention capacity as affected by rain events, testing, treatment and disposal arrangements.

Tertiary containment is a recognised control measure that may be applied, where secondary containment may be exceeded.

Tertiary containment should be designed to:

be independent of secondary containment systems

be capable of fully containing foreseeable firewater and contaminated liquid volumes resulting from the failure of secondary containment

be impermeable to water and foreseeably entrained or dissolved contaminants

use cellular configuration, to allow segregation of ‘sub-areas’ so as to limit the extent of the spread of fire and/or contaminated liquids

operate robustly under emergency conditions

allow the controlled movement of contained liquids within the site under normal and emergency conditions.


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8.4 Achieving PO4- Design for flood protection (AO4) Floodwaters have buried, moved or damaged hazardous chemical containers causing them to end up in various and sometimes unexpected locations, often outside the boundary of the facility at which they were originally held. Flooding can have the following consequences:

buoyancy of the container leading to lifting/floating

erosion and land scour from rapidly moving water causing undermining of structures

product displacement

water ingress into static storage systems e.g. via fill pipes, vents, damaged bund walls

electrical system damage

Given the historical flood events in Queensland that have seen widespread impacts and relatively high frequency of such events, it is appropriate for new developments to consider the potential for flooding and mitigate the impacts. The model code recognises this need in PO4.

The model code refers to the flood hazard area which is available from the relevant local council and/or the SPP Interactive Mapping System. Such flood hazard areas should be referred to when determining the likelihood of the proposed development being inundated by flood waters. Where there is a known flood hazard, the code specifies acceptable outcomes to minimise the associated risk. The hazard assessment report should document that any relevant flood hazard area has been reviewed and how the PO4 has been achieved.


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8.5 Achieving PO5- The Hazard Assessment Report (AO5) The underlying principle for the hazard assessment report (the ‘report’) is that it should provide a reasonable basis for an informed judgment to be made on the acceptability of a facility. It should provide people with relevant expertise sufficient information to be able to reconstruct and verify the analysis. The report should clearly communicate to the assessment authority how a proposed development complies with the outcomes of the Code.

It should also be stressed that it is not beneficial to produce unduly lengthy or ‘glossy’ reports. A simple analysis of a simple site or system will only require a brief report. The following paragraphs provide guidance on the information expected to be provided in such a report to the extent that each topic is applicable.

Such a report should include the following sections:

Title Page

Table of Contents

Executive Summary

Statement regarding achievement of POs

Site Description

Location

Processes

Hazardous Chemicals (types and quantities)

Description of selected control measures

Achieving the performance outcomes:

PO1- Hazard analysis, estimation of the likelihood of hazardous events, and presentation of risk results (AO1)

PO2- Design for early detection of fire event

PO3- Design of spill containment for toxic and flammable substances

PO4- Design for flood protection

Conclusions

Appendixes

Further information of what each section listed above should cover is provided in Section 8.6.

Key Point: The Hazard Assessment Report should not only document the assessments made against the codes criteria in PO1, but it should also address PO2, PO3, and PO4 and state how each is being achieved. Where any of these are not relevant, the report should state this and the reasons why.


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8.5.1 Hazard assessments

The assessment of the suitability of a site to accommodate an existing or proposed development of a potentially hazardous nature must be based on consideration of:

the nature and quantities of hazardous chemicals stored, handled and used on the site

the type of plant and equipment in use

the adequacy of the proposed the risk controls for the facility

the surrounding land uses or zones

the interactions of these factors.

This information is to be incorporated into the hazard assessment. The objective of hazard assessment is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the hazards and risks associated with a development and of the adequacy of risk control measures. Without such an assessment being conducted, it is difficult to be confident that design and operation can be carried out with an adequate level of safety.

The quality of the hazard assessment depends on the ability of the analyst to understand the plant and processes at the facility and assess what might go wrong, i.e., foreseeable hazard scenarios. The analyst should draw upon specialised technical expertise to provide guidance as necessary. This guide provides the general approach recommended for conducting a hazard assessment and details the requirements that a hazard assessment report should include before being submitted to the relevant local government to which the development application is made.

8.5.2 Hazard identification

Hazard identification is the first and most crucial step in assessing the risks from a development involving hazardous chemicals. This process involves the systematic and comprehensive identification of all possible scenarios that could lead to a hazardous incident at the site. There is no single definitive method of hazard identification prescribed for the hazard assessment. The choice of method(s) will depend on the type of facility being studied, information availability and the expertise of the analyst. The important thing is that a good understanding is gained of the way in which incidents may be initiated, and how they might develop to the point of inflicting harm on people, property or the environment. It is essential that the analyst be experienced in hazard identification, and that, where possible, plant designers and company personnel with relevant operating experience are involved in the identification process. There are many techniques for conducting a hazard identification exercise. These include:

review of incident history

checklists

what-if scenarios

HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study)

Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), and

Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA).


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Fault trees and event trees can also be used to assist in the identification of possible failures and their consequences. Fault trees identify all the failures that must occur in order for a particular consequence to occur, while event trees determine all the possible events (hazard scenarios) that may occur as the result of a particular failure.

The results of the hazard identification should be a list of possible failures and a description of the physical and chemical effects of these failures. For example, the failure may be damage to a pipe due to vehicle impact; depending on the contents of the pipe, the effects of this failure could be the release of a flammable liquid resulting in a fire, or release of a toxic gas.

Hazard identification requires the consideration of all the relevant available information regarding the facility. This might typically include:

site and plant layout

detailed process information in the form of engineering diagrams and operating conditions

the nature and quantities of chemicals being handled

operational, organisational and physical control measures; and

design standards.

The identification process should not be limited to the activities at the facility, but should also consider:

natural events such as floods, tropical cyclones, earthquakes or lightning strikes

technological events such as vehicle impact on a support structure

malicious acts, and

hazardous events on neighbouring sites.

The results of the hazard identification can be presented in tables indicating:

the plant or system studied

the item description and identification

failure modes identified

the types of foreseeable hazard scenarios that could occur and their possible effects

optionally, priority ranking.

8.5.3 Hazard analysis

Hazard analysis involves taking the hazards that have been identified and determining the actual impacts of these incidents on people (fatality, injury and irritation) and property (degree of damage). The types of incidents that need to be analysed are fires, explosions and toxic releases. Once all significant hazardous chemical hazards have been identified, hazard scenarios are carried forward for further study. This should consider potential effects on people, property and the environment. In particular, careful attention should be given to identifying worst case scenarios.


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Hazard scenarios should not be dismissed because they are thought to be unlikely. All credible scenarios with offsite effects shall be carried forward for further analysis.

A hazard assessment report shall be as accurate and realistic as possible; however, simplifying assumptions may be required. In this case, it is usually appropriate to employ a degree of conservatism and any assumptions should be clearly stated.

The types of hazardous scenarios most commonly encountered include fires, explosions and toxic releases. The effects of these can be estimated quantitatively in terms of thermal effects, explosion overpressures and toxic effects.

Fires

If a release of hazardous chemical is ignited, a fire or explosion will result. Depending on the physical properties of the hazardous chemical, the mode of release and the time of ignition, the types of fires of greatest concern are pool fires, jet fires, flash fires, fireballs and warehouse fires. These can give rise to high levels of thermal radiation and in some cases, blast overpressures.

Thermal radiation intensity is determined by factors such as:

the rate and efficiency of burning

the heat of combustion

the size and orientation of the flame, and

the fraction of radiation transmitted through the atmosphere.

Pool Fires

A pool fire occurs if a flammable or combustible liquid accumulates in a pool on the ground and vapours caused by evaporation are subsequently ignited. The resultant fire covers the whole pool area. The thermal radiation from pool fires tends to attenuate rapidly with distance from the flame surface, and so thermal effects are relatively localised. There is often significant potential, however, for escalation to incidents with more severe consequences.

Pool fires involving flowing flammable liquids may also need to be considered depending on spill compounds.

Jet Fires

A jet fire occurs when a flammable liquid or gas, under some degree of pressure, is ignited after release, resulting in the formation of a long stable flame. Jet flames can be very intense and can impose high heat loads on nearby plant and equipment.

Consideration of jet fires often leads to recommendations regarding spacing within and external to the site to limit heat radiation incident on critical plant and equipment.

Where appropriate separation is not possible, special protection systems can be recommended.


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Flash Fires

A flash fire occurs when a cloud of flammable gas mixed with air is ignited. If the cloud is sufficiently large, it is also possible that the flame may accelerate to a sufficiently high velocity for a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) to occur. Though very brief, a flash fire can cause serious or fatal to anyone in the burning cloud. Its effects are confined almost entirely to the area within the burning cloud. Incident propagation, e.g. a domino effect, can occur through ignition of materials or structures within the cloud.

BLEVE

Many fireballs are due to the phenomenon known as a 'boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion' or BLEVE. These mostly involve liquefied flammable gases stored under pressure. Most BLEVEs occur due to a storage vessel being subjected to flame impingement above the liquid level. Hot spots can develop resulting in substantial weakening of the metal to such an extent that it is no longer capable of containing the internal pressure. Internal pressures would also typically be higher than usual during such events due to the high temperatures. If the vessel fails, the pressurised contents escape rapidly and expand forming a large cloud of vapour and entrained liquid. If ignited, a large fireball may result. Casualties can be due to thermal radiation, blast effects and projectiles. The most significant impact is usually thermal radiation.

Warehouse Fires

The possibility of fires in stores containing hazardous chemicals should also be considered as part of the hazard analysis. The consequences of such fires may be complex due to the variety of goods often stored in the same building. Storage of certain combinations of hazardous chemicals within the same storage area can be particularly hazardous given the potential dangerous reactions that could occur as they interact in an uncontrolled situation. Of particular concern is the possibility of the evolution of toxic fumes, although explosions, fire and pollution of the environment may also be important. The nature of possible consequences needs to be considered carefully with particular regard given to interactions between the various substances present. Such analysis will often lead to recommendations for the segregation of incompatible materials and their spill containment systems.


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Heat Radiation Effects

A large amount of information exists and a number of charts and tables are available to provide an estimate of the effects of exposure to thermal radiation. Most of these charts and models refer to exposure of bare skin. Fire damage estimates are based upon correlations with recorded incident radiation flux and damage levels.

Table 1 Consequences of Heat Radiation

Heat Radiation (kW/m2)

Effect

1 .2 Received from the sun at noon in summer 2.1 Minimum to cause pain after 1 minute 4.7 Will cause pain in 1 5-20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds’ exposure (at least

second degree burns will occur) 12.6 Significant chance of fatality for extended exposure. High chance of injury

Causes the temperature of wood to rise to a point where it can be ignited by a naked flame after long exposure

Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach a thermal stress level high enough to cause structural failure

23 Likely fatality for extended exposure and chance of fatality for instantaneous exposure

Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures which can cause

failure Pressure vessel needs to be relieved or failure would occur

35 Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute’s exposure Significant chance of fatality for people exposed instantaneously

Explosions

Explosions can occur through a variety of mechanisms, but in each case damage or injury is caused by a pressure wave which in turn is created by rapid expansion of gases. The magnitude of the pressure wave is usually expressed in terms of blast overpressure. However, in order to properly predict the destructive capacity, it is necessary to consider the rate of increase/decrease in pressure as the wave passes. Explosions involving flammable gases are of particular concern in industrial facilities. These can occur if a mixture of flammable gas and air within the flammable range is ignited. The magnitude of an overpressure is strongly influenced by factors such as:

degree of confinement

the size of the cloud

degree of turbulence

the combustion properties of the gas, and

the location of the ignition source relative to the cloud.

Explosions may also occur as a result of catastrophic rupture of a pressurised vessel, ignition of dust clouds, thermal decompositions, runaway reactions and detonation of high explosives such as TNT. Both blast waves and projectile fragments may result.


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Explosion Effects

Explosion effect models predict the impact of blast overpressure on people and structures. Explosions are hazardous to people due to blast overpressure, collapsing buildings and projectiles. Explosion effects are determined by correlating damage produced with the overpressure resulting from the explosion.

Table 2 Effects of Explosion Overpressure

Explosion Overpressure Effect

3.5 kPa (0.5 psi) 90% glass breakage No fatality and very low probability of injury

7 kPa (1 psi) Damage to internal partitions and joinery but can be repaired Probability of injury is 10%. No fatality

14 kPa (2 psi) House uninhabitable and badly cracked

21 kPa (3 psi) Reinforced structures distort Storage tanks fail 20% chance of fatality to a person in a building

35 kPa (5 psi) House uninhabitable Wagons and plants items overturned Threshold of eardrum damage 50% chance of fatality for a person in a building and 15%

chance of fatality for a person in the open

70 kPa (10 psi) Threshold of lung damage 100% chance of fatality for a person in a building or in the open Complete demolition of houses

Toxic Releases

The release and dispersion of toxic material can adversely affect people and the environment. The greatest potential for far field effects is generally associated with the evolution of toxic gas. However, toxic concentrations in the air can also result from:

vapours from toxic liquids

reactions of materials giving off toxic vapours or gases

the evolution of toxic products from combustion or thermal decomposition

liquid spills entering watercourses or contaminating land and ground water, and

spills of solids (particularly powders and dusts) being blown or washed into water or onto land.

The effects of such toxic releases may be particularly significant for sensitive areas. A large number of mathematical models have been developed to estimate the consequences of various types of incidents. Complex dispersion models are available to estimate the concentration/time profiles of airborne toxics. These models require inputs of the conditions preceding the release such as:

physical and chemical properties of the released material

storage or operating conditions prior to the release

size of the release orifice, and

assumptions such as meteorological conditions and ignition sources.


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Toxic Effects

Toxic substances can affect people in many different ways and the seriousness of the exposure will be highly dependent on the sensitivity of the individual and on the duration of the exposure. Effects can range from fatality or injury (e.g. damage to respiratory or nervous system, emphysema, etc.) to irritation of eyes, throat or skin, through to a nuisance effect. Effects can also be classified as acute, chronic or delayed. The toxic effects are frequently specific to conditions at the time of release. The estimated dose to which an organism is exposed should be translated into an effect. This should be done using quantitative dose–effect functions relating the level of exposure to probability of fatality, injury etc. However, these functions are not available for all hazardous chemicals and usually relate to short-term effects of acute exposures.

There are a number of comprehensive sources of toxicological data which cover a large range of chemicals. Information on the concentrations of hazardous substances that can cause serious injury or death has been published in sources such as AIChE (1988) and Sax and Lewis (1989). Electronic databases are also available.

Use of Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL)

The Queensland Code has adopted the AEGLs where they are available. AEGLs have been preferentially adopted over the historically used Emergency Response Procedure Guidelines (ERPGs) as a best practice approach to protecting the community from exposure to airborne chemicals in an emergency situation. AEGL 2 has been nominated as the Code’s criteria. Those conducting assessments involving toxic exposure assessment, should conduct an evaluation using AEGL-1 values to fully understand the extent of the hazard and those that will be impacted beyond the facility’s boundary, particularly for sensitive land uses.

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGL) were developed by the USEPA to provide guidance in situations were there can be a rare, typically accidental exposure to a particular chemical that could involve the general public. The AEGL values are based primarily on acute toxicology data and not subchronic or chronic data and do not reflect the effects from frequent exposure. These levels can be used for emergency planning, prevention and response activities related to the accidental release of hazardous chemicals. They are also designed to protect the general population, including the elderly and children, groups that are generally not considered in the development of workplace exposure levels.


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What is an AEGL value?

AEGLs represent threshold exposure limits for the general public and are applicable to emergency exposure periods ranging from 10 minutes to 8 hours. Three levels are provided as AEGL 1, AEGL 2 and AEGL 3 which are distinguished by varying degrees of severity of toxic effects. It is believed that the recommended exposure levels are applicable to the general population including infants and children, and other individuals who may be susceptible.

The AEGL are defined as follows:

AEGL-1 The airborne concentration, (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic non-sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure.

AEGL-2 The airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.

AEGL-3 The airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death.

Further information on AEGLs are available at www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/ .

When AEGL are not available

ERPG2 values may be used where AEGL values are not available. ERPG values estimate the concentrations at which most people will begin to experience health effects if they are exposed to a hazardous airborne chemical for 1 hour. Sensitive members of the public—such as old, sick, or very young people - may experience adverse effects at concentrations below the ERPG values.

A probit approach may be used where information exists for specific substances. Such an approach enables the number of fatalities/injuries to be estimated through the consideration of both toxic gas concentration and the duration of exposure. However, the results need to be used with caution as probit equations are largely based on data derived from animal population responses and the extrapolation to human response is not straightforward. For both human and other species exposures, where data are limited, end effect calculations may be difficult or of little value. In such cases, estimation of the duration and exposure to defined levels of concern such as a workplace exposure standard or an immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) concentration may be appropriate.

The following section discusses modelling software that may assist in conducting the hazard analysis.


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Modelling software

Given the large number of computations required and the range of mathematical models in use, computerised techniques have been used increasingly for effects analysis. Care should be exercised in selecting and using software. The suitability of particular software will vary from case to case. It may be appropriate to seek advice on the acceptability of the particular software from HICB.

Some of the major types of models are discussed in the following sections. Depending on the type of incidents to be modelled, the analyst would need to use a selection of, or possibly all of the types of models described.

Dispersion Models

Gas dispersion modelling can assist occupiers to appreciate the likely magnitude and duration of a gas release and the potential for an emergency to escalate, potentially affecting those beyond the facility’s boundary. Dispersion models are used to estimate concentration/time profiles of flammable or toxic gases at various distances downwind from the point of release. In some instances, it may be necessary to model the dispersion of a mixture of particulates and gases (e.g. smoke).

Vapour cloud behaviour is determined by a variety of factors including:

the density of the gas relative to air

the rate of release over time

the amount of air entrainment at source

wind speed

weather stability, and

effects of any buildings or surrounding structures on local air flow.

Lighter than air clouds tend to rise, limiting the harm they can inflict. Dense clouds stay at low levels for a considerable distance downwind and pose a much greater hazard. Many hazardous chemicals are denser than air (e.g. LPG or chlorine) or behave as if they are much denser due to their low temperature on release (e.g. LNG or ammonia).

It is also necessary to consider whether the release will be an instantaneous puff, a continuous plume or a time-varying release as this will have a significant effect on the concentration profile over time. Weather conditions such as wind velocity and stability affect the extent of dilution with air, and the cloud velocity. The mathematics of dispersion modelling is sufficiently complex to require computer software to assist in the calculations. However, caution must always be exercised in using computer models to ensure that the situations simulated by the models are realistic.

A few examples of dispersion models available are described below. It is important to note that regardless of the tools used, the limitations of the selected modelling must be understood. The hazard assessment report should include the parameters chosen, the modelling limitations and the assumptions made, and how these are accounted for.


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Examples of software models

ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) is a software program designed especially for use by people responding to chemical incidents, and emergency planning and training. ALOHA can predict:

the leak rates from broken gas pipes, leaking tanks, and evaporating puddles where it can predict the dispersion of the chemical after the release, and

how a toxic gas cloud might disperse in the atmosphere after a release.

It can be used to evaluate hazardous chemical scenarios and determine the likely ‘footprint’ of such spills. This can help with estimating how far a toxic gas cloud may travel and where (i.e. the extent of the affected area). The ALOHA software was developed through a joint venture between the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. EPA and is available as a free download from www.epa.gov .

RMP*COMP is a free program available to complete offsite consequence analyses (both worst case scenarios and alternative scenarios). It should be noted that this model is a planning tool designed to help easily identify high-priority hazards at a facility. It makes simple, generalized calculations. In contrast, models like ALOHA are intended to give as accurate an estimate as possible of the extent and location of the area that might be placed at risk by a particular chemical release. They account for many more of the factors that influence the dispersion of a hazardous chemical. Another difference is that RMP*Comp uses fixed values for certain atmospheric parameters, and does not allow them to be set by the user. This is because the software is intended as a simplified model. Such limitations must be recognised and accounts for differences that may arise in outputs from different models because of these limitations.

Some software packages in this area tend to be designed for modelling atmospheric pollution/emissions as part of environment protection requirements. For example, AUSPLUME is the Victoria EPA approved air dispersion model for modelling emissions of wastes to air. This software can be obtained from EPA Victoria at: www.epa.vic.gov.au .

More sophisticated software modelling is also available such as PHAST produced by DNV. PHAST is a comprehensive process industry hazard analysis software tool for all stages of design and operation. The software examines the progress of a potential incident from the initial release to far-field dispersion including modelling of pool spreading and evaporation, and flammable and toxic effects. Further information on PHAST software is available at www.dnv.com .

Assumptions/limitations

The analyst should be conscious of the uncertainties associated with the assumptions made within the models. Assumptions should usually be made on a 'conservative best estimate' basis.


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8.5.4 Results of hazard analysis

Hazard analysis results can be used in a number of ways. Firstly, they provide an extension of the hazard identification process in that it leads to a better understanding of the potential hazards at the facility. Secondly, hazard analysis may lead to recommendations for the elimination of hazards or the reduction of consequences. It may also lead to the conclusion that the likelihood of particular events needs to be minimised, due to their severity. Opportunities should always be taken where there are technically feasible alternatives which will not adversely affect the economic viability of the project. Depending on the purpose of the hazard assessment, these recommendations may cover issues such as:

the choice of the location of the facility

the technology in use

plant layout

vessel design and operating conditions

the use of alternative less hazardous chemicals, or

reduction of inventories.

8.5.5 Review of risk control measures

Where the hazard analysis shows that off-site impacts will exceed the prescribed effects criteria, then the code requires that the suitability of controls be reviewed so that the effects may be further reduced. Examples include:

reduction in inventory

use of fire walls

change in layout to increase separation distances, and

incorporating additional engineering controls.

This process might be revisited a number of times to meet the effects criteria and arrive at a final design.

Ultimately if the effects criteria cannot be achieved, then the likelihood of the effects will need to be estimated by conducting a quantitative risk assessment. The code also provides risk criteria for acceptable ouctomes.

8.5.6 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

Quantitative risk assessments require specialised knowledge. Selection of scenarios, models, assumptions, failure rates and interpretation of results requires skill and judgement. QRAs are resource intensive. They are only required when the effects criteria cannot be met.

KEY POINT: A Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is not required if the effects criteria of this code are achieved.


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QRAs require a quantitative analysis of the likelihood and effects of each hazard scenario. The hazard scenarios are then assessed cumulatively. The results are then presented as risk contours which may be compared against the risk criteria.

The analyst shall justify the selected methodology by referencing reputable publications such as:

Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, 2nd Edition, October 1999, published by Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) available at www.aiche.org .

Lee’s Loss prevention in the process industries: Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control, 3rd Edition, 2005 published by Elsevier.

Manual for the Classification and Prioritisation of risks due to major accidents in process and related industries, 1996, published by International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-TECDOC-727.

Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper #6: Guidelines for Hazard Analysis, January 2011, published by the NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure available at www.planning.nsw.gov.au .

8.6 Model format for Hazard Assessment Reports Title Page

The report should have a title page which should be shown clearly on the cover and on a separate title sheet. The title page should clearly and unambiguously identify the facility covered by the hazard assessment and the location of the facility. The title sheet should also show who performed the hazard assessment, their qualifications and professional membership (e.g. RPEQ/AIDGC), and the date of the report.

Table of Contents

The report should include a table of contents with page numbers. The table of contents should include a list of figures and appendixes.

Executive Summary

The purpose of the hazard assessment, along with an overview of the approach used, should be clearly stated. The summary should highlight major findings of the hazard assessment. It is important to demonstrate a good understanding of the hazards and risks for the proposed development with the foreseeable hazard scenarios identified. A brief comment on data limitations, assumptions and other uncertainties that could affect the conclusions of the analysis should also be included. The interaction between the hazard assessment and any other safety studies (e.g. fire study) that have been carried out for the facility should be highlighted.

Statement regarding achievement of POs

The Hazard Assessment Report should include a statement that the development meets all of the code’s criteria (PO1-4). It should include information on the engineering


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standards followed and where engineering calculations and judgements have been made. Where these are made it should identify the relevant RPEQ who is providing the assurance that the code’s criteria have been met.

Site Description

This section should present an overview of the location of the site and operations carried out. It should present all relevant factual information available on the site, its activities, neighbouring activities and surroundings.

Location

The report should provide a description and evaluation of the site location and layout, and any inherent hazards, including off-site and natural hazards. The report should describe surrounding land uses and zones, population densities, and any sensitive natural environmental areas in the vicinity. Maps and sketches of the facility and of surrounding land should be included, including those from the relevant local government’s planning scheme.

A compilation of topographical, meteorological, seismological and other relevant information may be included as appendixes where appropriate. The report should also indicate the number of people on site at various times and describe site security arrangements.

Relevant flood hazard area information (relevant to PO4) should be included here showing the extent of the flood hazards and the facility’s location relative to this.

Process

A brief process description should summarise all the processing steps and operations involving hazardous chemicals being carried out, with references to documents containing more detailed information cited where appropriate. The description should be accompanied by engineering information such as process flow diagrams and/or piping and instrumentation diagrams (if available). Access to proprietary process or technology information may need to be provided to the assessment authority on a confidential basis.

Hazardous Chemicals

This section should include a list of all chemicals (including their UN number and packing group where applicable) being handled, stored or processed at the facility, with maximum and average quantities shown. Full chemical names should be used rather than trade names or common names. Vessel and packaging size and type should also be shown. A scale plan of the site showing locations and quantities of significant inventories of hazardous chemicals and indications of normal operating or storage conditions should be provided. Safety data sheets may be included as appendixes where appropriate.


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Description of selected control measures

The report should provide a description of the risk reduction measures adopted on-which the final assessment against the Code’s criteria has been made. The risk control measures that limit the consequences of foreseeable hazard scenarios could cover:

choice of technology

layout of storage and process vessels

design of vessels and ancillary equipment, and

mitigating systems.

Achieving PO1- Hazard Analysis

This section presents the results of hazard identification process undertaken. The various methods of hazard identification used and some justification for their appropriateness in each case should be provided. The results of the hazard identification should be listed for each major process or storage unit or area, with a brief description of possible incident initiating events, possible consequences and proposed or existing risk control measures. The report should comment on the adequacy of hardware and software safeguards, present or proposed, for each hazard identified.

Findings that will reduce or eliminate hazards should be included where appropriate. This may include, for example, the choice of location of the facility or technology, changes to design and operating parameters and reduction of inventories of hazardous chemicals on site.

Details of initiating events for foreseeable hazard scenarios having potential off-site effects should be provided along with a description of the postulated scenario developments, usually in the form of event trees. If event trees are too numerous or complex, they may be more appropriately presented in an appendix. It may also be appropriate for representative examples only to be included in the report.

Effect analysis results should be presented in sufficient detail to provide a good appreciation of the effects of the hazardous scenarios identified for further analysis. The extent to which detail should be provided requires judgment on behalf of the analyst, and will vary from case to case. Where a small number of cases has been analysed, a full presentation of effects would be appropriate, whereas for large facilities a complete presentation may be unduly onerous and a summary of representative results may suffice.

Information regarding inputs and relevant assumptions should also be presented in sufficient detail to allow a third party to assess and validate calculations. Mathematical models used in the calculations should be described briefly. Names of any computer software or other models used in the calculations should also be provided. All software and analytical tools used, including proprietary software, should be accessible to the assessment authority on request. Sample calculations might be appropriately included as appendixes, particularly when unusual mathematical models or calculation techniques have been utilised.

Achieving PO1- Estimation of the Likelihood of Hazardous Events

Where a quantitative risk assessment has been performed, the results of the analysis of the likelihood of hazardous scenarios and their final outcomes should be presented.


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Sufficient information on assumptions relevant to the calculations and analysis should be provided to facilitate an understanding and enable reproducibility if required. It should include:

the various methods of frequency and probability assessment used

all failure data and sources

sources and assumption for probabilities used

relevant fault trees and event trees

details of wind, weather, topographical, population, hydrological and other data used

the details of all other assumptions, and

names and purposes of computer software used in the calculations.

Access to software, even when it is proprietary, should be allowed where hazard assessment reports are submitted to an authority for approval. In the case of complex analyses, representative information, such as sample fault trees, may be included in the report provided that full information is available to assessment authorities on request.

Presentation of Risk Results (AO1)

The risk results should be compared with the qualitative and quantitative risk criteria prescribed in the code (AO1).


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Achieving PO2- Design for early detection of fire event

The report should include a description of the fire-risk hazardous chemicals involved in the proposed development and specify the fire detection and associated alarm systems to be employed to achieve the code’s performance outcome (PO2).

Achieving PO3- Design of spill containment for toxic and flammable substances

The report should include a description of the flammable and toxic liquids in packages involved in the proposed development and specify the proposed spill containment systems to be provided to meet the code’s performance outcome (PO3).

Achieving PO4- Design for flood protection

The report should include a description of the relevant flood hazards for the proposed development and the flood mitigation measures that will be employed to meet the code’s performance outcome (PO4).

Conclusions

The overall conclusions on acceptability and on hazard and risk management from the analysis should be presented in this section. This should include a clear statement about whether all of the code’s criteria (PO1-4) can be achieved.

Appendixes

The following information should also be provided:

a list of materials collected as part of the study, and

the qualifications and experience of the hazard analysis team.

Other information which may, where appropriate, be supplied in appendix form includes:

description of calculation methods used and some sample calculations

meteorological data for the site

description of computer software used in the various computations and sample output from the various models used

process and instrumentation diagrams, and other relevant drawings, and

fault trees and event trees.


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Glossary ADG Code means the Australian Code for the Transport of

Dangerous Goods by Road and Rail 7th edition as published by the National Transport Commission.

Aboveground tank means a static tank located wholly above ground level.

AEGL means Acute Exposure Guidelines Level which identifies threshold exposure limits for the general public and are applicable to emergency exposure periods ranging from 10 minutes to 8 hours as published by the US Environmental Protection Agency.

AEGL2 means the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm ormg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that thgeneral population, including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lastinadverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.

AIDGC means the Australasian Institute of Dangerous Goods Consultants, www.aidgc.org.au .

Bollard means a barrier that provides a visual and physical deterrent for a vehicle operator (e.g. motor vehicle or forklift truck) to avoid damage to tanks, fill points, decanting points of dispensers or a racking system for packages.

Corrosive substance means materials that meet Class 8 criteria of the ADG Code.

Commercial or community activity land use zone

means any land zoned for a commercial use including retail centres, shops, offices, entertainment buildings, market, showroom, convention centres, sporting stadiums, tourist attraction, nightclub, building for religious worship, community hall, theatres and art galleries but does not include parks, sporting fields or open spaces.

Combustible liquid means any liquid with a flash point > 60oC and < 93oC. Combustible material means materials that burn or combust in a fire (e.g.

paper, wood). Cylinder means a portable pressure vessel for gases with a water

capacity < 500L that meets the criteria of AS2030.1. Cylinder store means a storage area for multiple cylinders. Dangerous Goods See the definition of dangerous goods in the Work Hea

and Safety Act 2011, schedule 1, part 1, item 1(6). Decanting means the process of transferring product from one

container to another. Dispenser means a fuel transfer device normally attached to a

metering device intended principally for dispensing flammable or combustible liquids or automotive LPG from a tank to a vehicle, boat or aircraft.

Dispensing point means the outlet of a transfer line. Double walled tank means a tank within a secondary tank separated by

an interstitial space to provide integral secondary containment in accordance with AS1940.

ERPG means the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines developed by the American Industrial Hygiene


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Association and includes ERPG -2. ERPG-2 means the maximum airborne concentration below

which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1hr without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual’s ability to take protective action.

Fill point means the point a tank delivery truck’s hose is connected to fill a storage tank.

Fire Detection means a fire detection system identified in AS1670. Fire Rated Tank means a tank with an external fire rated covering

complying with AS1940. Flammable liquid means any liquid with a flashpoint < 60oC. Flammable gas means gases that meet the Class 2 criteria, division

2.1 of the ADG Code. Foreseeable Hazard Scenario

means a scenario resulting in an uncontrolled fire, explosion, corrosive vapours or toxic gas release from the development based on the hazardous properties of its hazardous chemicals, their quantities, how they are to be stored or handled and any relevant historical incidents.

Fire risk hazardous chemical means a Class 2.1, 3, 4 or 5 dangerous goods. Flood Hazard Area means an area shown on the SPP Interactive Mapping

System as a flood hazard area. Good industry practice means local, national, international standards, industry

codes of practices or other publicly available known ways to manage risks from hazardous chemicals.

Goods too Dangerous to be Transported (GTDTBT)

means those goods listed in Appendix A of the ADG Code.

Hazardous Chemicals (hazchems)

mean any of the following substances: a) those that are toxic or very toxic substances4

under the GHS; or b) classes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.1 and 8 of the ADG code;

or c) those of Class 9 of the ADG code that are

environmentally hazardous substances; or d) those listed in Appendix A of the ADG Code; or e) any other liquid with a flash point less than or

equal to 93oC.

IBC means ‘intermediate bulk container’ which is a portabcontainer for solids or liquids with a capacity < 1600L/kand meets the ADG Code’s requirements ftransportable containers.

Ignition source is a source of energy sufficient to ignite a flammable gas atmosphere, including naked flames, smoking, hot surfaces, exposed incandescent materials, electrical welding arcs, static electricity and electrical and mechanical equipment not suitable for use in a particular hazardous zone.

Immediately dangerous to life and health

(IDLH) means an exposure to airborne contaminants that is likely to cause death or immediate or delayed

4 Where a chemical is classified as a toxic or very toxic substance under the GHS, that classification shall prevail over any other classification for a toxic substance under the ADG Code.


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permanent adverse health effects or prevent escape from such an environment as defined by the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).

Incompatible means in relation to dangerous goods or other materials that are –

a) Likely to interact with the dangerous goods or combustible liquid so as to increase the risk when mixed;

b) Listed in the ADG Code as being incompatible;

c) Identified of a product’s Material Safety Data Sheet (section 10) as incompatible.

Individual Fatality Risk Level

means the risk of fatal injury to a person at a particular point.

Industrial land use zone means any land zoned for an industrial use including warehouse, low impact industries, medium impact industries, high impact industries and special industries.

Lighter than air gas means a gas that has a density less than 1.2041 kg/m3 at STP.

Lock and key means any of the following: a) A compound with a security fence; b) A locked building with secured doors and

windows; c) A secure locked freight container d) A lockable fill point or dispensing point on a

cylinder or tank.

LPG means “Liquid Petroleum Gases” which is a mixture hydrocarbon gasses that are liquefied under pressure anstands.

LPG decanting means the process by which liquid phase LP Gas is transferred from one cylinder to another by utilising the difference of pressure between the two cylinders.

LPG decanting cylinder means a cylinder from which LPG decanting takes place.

Hose reel is an assembly consisting of a hose, nozzle, drum, inlet pipe, connection fitting, stop valve and a hose guide as defined in AS1221 capable of discharging > 0.33 L/s of water for at least 15 minutes or where foam is required, 27L/min of foam for 30 minutes.

May means that more than one option exists. Minor Storage means any quantity of a dangerous goods or combustibl

liquids < quantities listed in Section 2 of a relevant dangerous goods or combustible liquid Australian Standard, such as: AS2187, AS1596, AS4332, AS1940,AS5026, AS4326, AS2714, AS4452 or AS3780.

Monitored fire detection system

means an AS1670 compliant, fixed heat or smoke detection system that is monitored 24 hours/day, 7 days/week for the purposes of early detection of fire.

Mounded tank is a static tank located wholly or partially above ground level with the part above ground covered with at least 60mm of earth in accordance with AS1596 “The storage anhandling of LP Gas”.


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Multi-story building means a building with more than one floor above or belothe ground level.

Non-combustible material means a material that does not burn or combust if fire is introduced: e.g. concrete or masonry.

Non-flammable, non-toxic gas

means gases that meet Class 2 criteria, division 2.2 of the ADG Code.

Nominally empty cylinder means a cylinder that has discharged its contents but has not been gas-freed.

Opening into a building: means any opening that gas or vapour can enter. Oxidising gas means gases that meet Class 2 criteria, division 2.2

and subsidiary risk 5.1 of the ADG Code. Oxidising substance means materials that meet Class 5.1 criteria of the

ADG Code. On-site protected place means:

a) buildings where people are employed or reside within a development’s boundaries such as any office, lunchroom, warehouse, processing area or caretaker accommodation;

b) another storage area of a different class of dangerous goods > Minor Storage;

c) an aboveground storage or accumulation of combustible materials.

Package means a container for hazardous chemicals with a

capacity < 500L or kg. Package store means an area used to store packages and/or IBCs of

hazardous chemicals. Powder fire extinguisher means a 9kg ABE type extinguisher with a rating of > 2

60B(E). Probit approach means a sophisticated method which allows the predictio

of the probability of an adverse outcome (usually fatalitgiven knowledge of exposure conditions.

Property boundary means the perimeter of the whole of the site under thsame occupancy as the dangerous goods or combustibliquids storage and handing area.

Reacts dangerously means in relation to reactions of substances, to react in a manner that directly creates a hazard due to the reaction-

a) being violent b) produce an explosion or producing a

potentially explosive combination of products; c) producing fire or rapid evolution of heat; or d) producing toxic vapour or toxic gas.

Sensitive land uses means a use that is a : child care centre, community care centre, community residence, dual occupancy, dwelling house, educational establishment, health care services, hospital, hostel, multiple dwelling, relocatable home park, residential care facility, retirement facility, short-term accommodation, tourist park.

So far as reasonably practicable (SFARP)

means what is reasonably able to be done in relation to ensuring health and safety, taking into account and weighing up all relevant matters including: likelihood of thhazard or risk occurring; the degree of harm; what the person concerned knows or ought reasonably to know about the hazard or risk and ways of eliminating or


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minimising the risk and the availability and suitability of ways to eliminate or minimise the risk; and after assessinthe above, the cost and whether cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk. Further information is available at www.swa.gov.au

Spill compound means an impervious secondary containment system around a tank or package store to contain and minimise the spread of any leaks, spills or fire water.

Storage and handling means the storage, use or handling of a hazardochemical or group of hazardous chemicals in acombination.

Tank means a container for hazardous chemicals with a WC 500L.

Tank delivery vehicle is a vehicle designed to transport dangerous goods in bulk.

Tank vent is an opening fitted to a tank to allow it to equalised internal pressures.

Toxic material is defined by Table 1.3 below. Toxic substance means materials that meet criteria Class 6.1 of the

ADG Code. Underground tank is a storage tank located at least 600mm

underground or 300mm underground with a 150mm concrete cover over it.

Vehicle refuelling point means a dispenser for motor vehicles or a gantry used to fill road or rail tankers.

Very toxic material is defined by Table 1.3 Vulnerable land use means a vulnerable use including a child care centre,

community care centre, educational establishment, health care service, hospital or retirement facility.

Water Fire extinguisher means a 9L portable water extinguisher with a rating of > 2A.

WC means “water capacity” and is used to describe the volume of a container if filled with water.

Table 1.3

Description Oral Toxicity (1) LD50 (mg/kg)

Dermal Toxicity (2) LD50 (mg/kg)

Inhalation Toxicity (3) LC50 (mg/L)

Very Toxic LD50 ≤ 5 LD50 ≤ 40 LC50 ≤ 0.5 Toxic 5 < LD50 ≤ 50 40 < LD50 ≤ 200 0.5 < LC50 ≤ 2

Key: (1) in rats, (2) in rats or rabbits and (3) four hours in rats.


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Further Information Workplace Health and Safety Queensland

The Hazardous Industries and Chemicals Branch with WHSQ provide technical advice on:

hazardous chemicals under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011

hazardous materials state interests under the State planning policy including the hazardous materials Codes and supporting guideline (this document), and

developments of possible major hazard facilities under the Sate Development Assessment Provisions.

Further information is available from the Hazardous Industry & Chemicals Branch (HICB) of Workplace Health & Safety Qld on 3109 0811 or www.worksafe.qld.gov.au .

NSW Hazardous Industry Planning and Assessment Guidelines

A number of Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Papers (HIPAP) and other guidelines have been developed by the NSW Department of Planning and Infrastructure related to risk assessment and management techniques related to land use safety planning. These guides may assist proponents to understand the underlying principles and practices for develop of hazardous industry. These include:

HIPAP No. 1 - Industry Emergency Planning Guidelines

HIPAP No. 1 - Industry Emergency Planning Guidelines

HIPAP No. 3 - Risk Assessment

HIPAP No. 4 - Risk Criteria for Land Use Planning

HIPAP No. 5 - Hazard Audit Guidelines

HIPAP No. 6 - Guidelines for Hazard Analysis

HIPAP No. 7 - Construction Safety Studies

HIPAP No. 8 - HAZOP Guidelines

HIPAP No. 9 - Safety Management System Guidelines

HIPAP No. 10 - Land Use Safety Planning

While these guides may be useful from a technical sense, they do not represent the same planning approval process as adopted in Queensland and as described in this guide. While this guide is based on aspects of the HIPAP documents, there are necessary differences to account for the different legislative frameworks that exist in each state. These guides are available at www.planning.nsw.gov.au


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Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning State Planning Policy PO Box 15009 City East Qld 4002 Australia tel 13 QGOV (13 74 68) email [email protected] www.dsdip.qld.gov.au

State Planning Policy Guidelines...State Planning Policy Guideline - Guidance on development involving hazardous chemicals -5-5. Model levels of assessment It is recommended LG adopt

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