October 5, 2018 STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT Adam Bandemer, vs. Ford Motor Company, Eric Hanson, et al., Respondent, Appellant, Defendants. APPELLATE COURT CASE NUMBER: Al 7-1182 TRIAL COURT CASE NUMBER: 77-CV-16-1025 APPELLANT FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S REPLY BRIEF Michael R. Carey, #0388271 BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP 150 S. Fifth St., Suite 3000 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 Telephone: (612) 339-8682 and Sean Marotta (pro hac vice) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 637-4881 Attorneys for Appellant Kyle W. Farrar, #0397942 KASTER, LYNCH, FARRAR & BALL,LLP 1010 Lamar, Suite 1600 Houston, TX 77002 Telephone: (713) 221-8300 and Steven D. Lastovich, #0146547 STEVEN D. LASTOVICH, LTD. 13073 Evergreen Drive PO Box2906 Baxter, MN 56425 Telephone: (218) 828-9670 Attorneys for Respondent
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STATE OF MINNESOTA October 5, 2018 · October 5, 2018 STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT Adam Bandemer, vs. Ford Motor Company, Eric Hanson, et al., Respondent, Appellant, Defendants.
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October 5, 2018STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
Adam Bandemer,
vs.
Ford Motor Company,
Eric Hanson, et al.,
Respondent,
Appellant,
Defendants.
APPELLATE COURT CASE NUMBER: Al 7-1182
TRIAL COURT CASE NUMBER: 77-CV-16-1025
APPELLANT FORD MOTOR COMPANY'S REPLY BRIEF
Michael R. Carey, #0388271 BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP 150 S. Fifth St., Suite 3000 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402 Telephone: (612) 339-8682
and
Sean Marotta (pro hac vice) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Telephone: (202) 637-4881
Attorneys for Appellant
Kyle W. Farrar, #0397942 KASTER, LYNCH, FARRAR & BALL,LLP 1010 Lamar, Suite 1600 Houston, TX 77002 Telephone: (713) 221-8300
and
Steven D. Lastovich, #0146547 STEVEN D. LASTOVICH, LTD. 13073 Evergreen Drive PO Box2906 Baxter, MN 56425 Telephone: (218) 828-9670
Attorneys for Respondent
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... ii
Antonini v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:16-CV-2021, 2017 WL 3633287 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) ............................................................... 7, 10, 11
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) ................................................................................... 4
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) ................................................................................. 16
Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114 (Ala. 2016) ...................................................................... 7
11
TABLE OF ATHORITIES-Continued
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ................................................................................. 15
J McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) ............................................................................... 4, 8
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) ................................................................................. 16
(10th Cir. 2012). Indeed, in identical circumstances-where a defendant
sold the same kind of product in the forum, but the particular product that
malfunctioned was sold elsewhere-the Tenth Circuit has held that specific
jurisdiction did not exist. Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG,
102 F.3d 453, 454-457 (10th Cir. 1996).
The Pennsylvania decision, Antonini v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3: l 6-
CV-2021, 2017 WL 3633287 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) is of dubious
correctness for the same reason. The Third Circuit, too, has a causal
connection requirement that Antonini did not take heed of. See O'Connor v.
7
Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 322-323 (3d Cir. 2007). And similar
to the Tenth Circuit, the Third Circuit has held that the stream-of-commerce
metaphor cannot create specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state
manufacturer where the manufacturer's product "reached [the forum] by a
series of fortuitous circumstances independent of any distribution channel
[the manufacturer] employed." D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v.
Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 106 (3d Cir. 2009). In any event,
Bandemer' s contrary cases do not outweigh the holdings from around the
country dismissing similar claims against similarly situated defendants
including Ford. Opening Br. 10-14 (collecting cases). The weight of
authority favors Ford.
Bandemer's expansive stream-of-commerce theory "impermissibly
would remove the 'arising from or related to' requirement from the specific
jurisdiction test and unjustifiably would treat the stream-of-commerce theory
as a source of general jurisdiction." D'Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 106. But "even
regularly occurring sales of a product in a State" like those Bandemer
alleges here "do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim unrelated
to those sales." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 930 n.6 (2011); see also J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 882 (plurality op.) (the
8
stream of commerce "does not amend the general rule[s] of personal
jurisdiction"). The Court should reject it.
II. BANDEMER'S CLAIMS Do NOT ARISE OUT OF OR RELATE To FORD'S MINNESOTA MARKETING.
Bandemer further contends that his claims arise out of or relate to
Ford's Minnesota marketing activities. Relying on Rilley, Bandemer argues
that Ford's Minnesota marketing need not cause his claims so long as Ford's
Minnesota marketing has a connection with his claims. Bandemer Br. 10-11.
That portion of Rilley was dicta, as Ford has explained. See Opening Br. 33-
34. But even taking Rilley at face value, Bandemer's claims do not relate to
Ford's Minnesota contacts.
Ford explained that the non-causal link Rilley elucidated was a narrow
one. Opening Br. 19-21. Rilley suggested ads could create specific
jurisdiction over a defendant on a plaintiffs claims-even if the plaintiff did
not see the ads-when the ads themselves touted the product at issue and the
ads were tortious. Id. That is, when the ads for the product were the
"means by which" the defendant carried out its torts. Rilley, 884 N.W.2d at
337. But Ford's marketing here is not alleged to be tortious, and Bandemer
cannot even identify any Ford Crown Victoria ad in circulation at the time
Greg Hanson purchased his 1994 model-year Crown Victoria in 2013.
9
Opening Br. 18-19. Ford explained all of this. Id. Yet Bandemer does not
address Ford's analysis.
Bandemer argues that an even greater level of abstraction is
permissible, listing all of Ford's various marketing contacts with Minnesota
and then arguing that they create a connection to his claims because they
"solicited Minnesotans to purchase ... vehicles being sold by Ford."
Bandemer Br. 13. That is wrong twice over. For one, the Crown Victoria
here was not "sold by Ford." A third party that Ford had no relationship
with sold it. See Opening Br. 3-4. But more broadly, Bandemer cites no
authority suggesting that a defendant's generic promotion of its products in a
State is sufficient to create specific jurisdiction over a defendant on claims
involving a product that was not even in production at the time the plaintiffs
claims arose.
Bandemer purports to find support in an unreported district court case.
Bandemer Br. 14 (discussing Antonini, 2017 WL 3633287, at *3). The
plaintiff in Antonini, however, alleged that had she not seen Ford's
advertisements, she would not have purchased the Ford vehicle. Antonini,
2017 WL 3633287, at *3. Bandemer does not satisfy even that flawed
standard; he never alleges that had Greg Hanson not seen Ford advertising,
10
he would not have purchased his Crown Victoria. See supra p. 7 (further
explaining why Antonini was wrongly decided).
Beyond that, Bandemer argues that Ford "specifically targeted"
Minnesota with its marketing and goes on to list all of the Minnesota
specific marketing he believes that Ford engaged in. Bandemer Br. 11-14.
But targeted advertising at most shows that the advertising is a "relevant
contact[] for the purpose of [the] minimum contacts analysis." Rilley, 884
N.W.2d at 335. It does not mean that any targeted marketing at Minnesota
suddenly makes all claims here fair game.
Myers v. Casino Queen, Inc., 689 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2012) is not to the
contrary. Cf Bandemer Br. 14. The portion of Myers that Bandemer quotes
is from its discussion of the reasonableness requirement, not its discussion of
the connection requirement. 689 F.3d at 913. In fact, when Myers addressed
the connection requirement, it found specific jurisdiction based on the causal
link between the defendant's advertising and the plaintiff's claims, not the
advertising standing alone. Id. at 908, 913. The plaintiff saw the ads and
chose to patronize the defendant as a result of them. Id. Here, by contrast,
Bandemer does not allege that Greg Hanson saw any Ford ads, much less
that those ads caused him to purchase his 1994 Crown Victoria. See
11
Opening Br. 18-19. Myers is therefore no different than Bandemer' s
unreported Pennsylvania district-court case.
The breadth of Bandemer' s marketing argument is breathtaking,
however. As a national company, Ford markets in every State. See Ford
Add. 19-20. If Ford marketing its products in a State is sufficient by itself
for specific jurisdiction over Bandemer's product-defect claims, Bandemer
could have brought his case literally anywhere in the United States. That
illogical result is not supported by Rilley or any other case. And it is not the
law.
III. BANDEMER'S CLAIMS Do NOT ARISE OUT OF OR RELATE To
FORD'S COLLECTION OF DATA FROM MINNESOTA VEHICLES OR
CONSUMERS.
Bandemer further argues that Ford is subject to specific jurisdiction in
Minnesota on his claims because they arise out of or relate to Ford's data
collection from Minnesota vehicles and consumers. Bandemer Br. 15-16.
But Bandemer' s argument misrepresents the record.
Bandemer contends that "Ford admitted that its Critical Concern
Review Group" makes safety decisions based on "vehicle data gathered
from Minnesota dealerships through Ford's Global Common Quality
Indicatory System," a Ford database. Bandemer Br. 15. No. What Ford
admitted was that its Critical Concern Review Group "may analyze a variety
12
of information which may or may not include information from" the Global
Common Quality Indicatory System. Bandemer Add. 40 ( emphases added).
That Ford may analyze a variety of information which may include
information from a certain database is a far cry from saying that Ford does
analyze information from that database, much less information from that
database contributed by Minnesota dealerships.
Bandemer further assertsthatihere is "no dispute that Ford collected
and analyzed data from Minnesota drivers when designing the subject
Crown Victoria." Bandemer Br. 16. Wrong again. Ford actually admitted
that "it receives information regarding vehicle performance across the
United States, including in Minnesota, and that information may be used by
Ford as it considers future designs." Ford Add. 29 ( emphasis added).
Bandemer's statement that Ford did use Minnesota data in designing the
1994 model-year Crown Victoria is simply not accurate. Indeed, Ford's
design engineer swore-without contradiction-that the Crown Victoria's
airbag systems were designed in Michigan. Ford Add. 34 (,r 3).
Bandemer's argument on this score is particularly troubling because
Ford explained all of this in its opening brief. See Opening Br. 23-24. Yet
Bandemer does not even acknowledge Ford's explanation of the record,
much less try to refute it.
13
With Bandemer' s misrepresentations clarified, his jurisdictional
argument falls apart. At most, Ford may have used some information from
somewhere-possibly Minnesota-for some purposes. But none of it has to
do with Greg Hanson's 1994 model-year Crown Victoria, 1994 model-year
Crown Victorias generally, or any Crown Victoria at all. Such generalized
research cannot support specific jurisdiction over Ford in Minnesota on
Bandemer's claims. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.
Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (research in the forum unrelated to the product at
issue cannot satisfy connection requirement.); see also Opening Br. 24.
IV. SPECIFIC JURISDICTION Is NOT PROPER IN MINNESOTA JUST
BECAUSE BANDEMER'S ACCIDENT HAPPENED To OCCUR HERE.
Bandemer makes the surprising argument that Bristol-Myers Squibb
and other Supreme Court cases support him, contending that there is a
sufficient connection between his claims and Ford's Minnesota contacts
because his accident occurred in the State. Bandemer Br. 1 7-19. Bandemer
misreads Bristol-Myers and overreads Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117
(2014) and Goodyear.
Bandemer focuses on the fact that the plaintiffs whose claims were
dismissed in Bristol-Myers were not California residents and were not
injured there. Bandemer Br. 17-18. But Bandemer absolutely ignores
Bristol-Myers's statement that there is no specific jurisdiction over the
14
forum-even when a plaintiff "suffer[s]" there-when all of the defendant's
"relevant conduct" occurred elsewhere. 137 S. Ct. at 1781-82 (emphasis
omitted). And here, all of Ford's conduct relevant to Bandemer's claims
designing, manufacturing, selling, and warrantying the Crown Victoria
occurred outside of Minnesota. See Opening Br. 3-4. To be sure, the
personal-jurisdiction claims of the nonresident plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers
were "even weaker" because they did not live in California and did not
suffer harm there. 137 S. Ct. at 1782. But it does not change that allegedly
suffering foreseeable harm in Minnesota from Ford's actions elsewhere does
not add up to specific jurisdiction under Bristol-Myers. Id. at 1781-82.
Bandemer highlights Daimler's statement that specific jurisdiction
requires the court "to determine whether the connection between the forum
and the episode-in-suit could justify the exercise the specific jurisdiction."
571 U.S. at 139 n.20. But Bandemer is wrong to think that this stray
footnote statement (responding to an unrelated argument made by Justice
Sotomayor's separate opinion) somehow broadens specific jurisdiction. As
Daimler explains in text, the requisite connection is not between the forum
and the claims, but the defendant's forum contacts and the claims. Specific
jurisdiction is when the defendant's forum contacts "g[a]ve rise to the
liabilities sued on." Id. at 127 (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
15
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)) (brackets in Daimler). And the rest
of the Supreme Court's cases concur. See, e.g., Walden, 571 U.S. at 284
( explaining that specific jurisdiction "focuses on 'the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation' " and that "the defendant's suit
related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State")
(quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 (1984));
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414
( 1984) ( explaining that specific jurisdiction is when the "controversy is
related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum").
Finally, Bandemer highlights Goodyear's statement that there was no
specific jurisdiction over the defendant in that case because "the episode-in
suit, the bus accident, occurred" outside the forum and tries to tease out of it
the converse rule-that where an accident does occur in the forum, there is
specific jurisdiction over the defendant there. Bandemer Br. 18-19 ( quoting
Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). But nothing in Goodyear supports that leap of
logic. Instead, Goodyear is like Bristol-Myers. The specific-jurisdiction
issue in Goodyear was an easy one because the accident did not occur in the
forum. Cf Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1782. But that does not mean that an
accident occurring in the forum where a defendant has contacts is sufficient
16
to create specific jurisdiction. The Court should decline Bandemer' s
invitation to misread Goodyear.
V. THE COURT'S STATEMENTS IN RILLEY SUGGESTING A NON-CAUSAL
APPROACH To THE CONNECTION REQUIREMENT Is AT ODDS WITH
MOST OTHER COURTS.
Lastly, Bandemer argues that Rilley's dicta was correct in suggesting a
noncausal test for connection-that is, that a defendant's contacts in a State
need not cause the plaintiffs claims. Bandemer Br. 23-26. The Court, of
course, need not reach that question. Even accepting Rilley as written,
Bandemer's claims still do not arise out of or relate to Ford's Minnesota
contacts. See Opening Br. 17-24; supra pp. 9-10.
But the Court should still consider whether to repudiate Rilley's dicta.
As this case demonstrates, precisely what "relation" is sufficient for specific
jurisdiction to exist is hopelessly indeterminate, while causation is a test
well-established and well-understood in the law. Opening Br. 35-36. This
Court should therefore adopt a causal standard, either by repudiating its
dicta in Rilley or by limiting it to the specific, and unusual, circumstances
that the case addressed. See Opening Br. 17-20, 33-38.
Bandemer argues that a causal connection standard would override the
Supreme Court's statements that connection requires that a plaintiffs claims
"arise out of or relate to" a defendant's forum contacts. Bandemer Br. 23-
17
24. But Bandemer places too much weight on the disjunctive phrasing. The
Supreme Court's cases are "an opinion ... not a statute." Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353,372 (2001). Not every word need have independent meaning.
See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638,640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en bane)
("Judicial opinions must not be confused with statutes .... "). Courts
"frequently say two ( or more) things when one will do or say two things as a
way of emphasizing one point": "cease and desist," "arbitrary and
capricious," "good faith and fair dealing." TMW Enters., Inc. v. Federal Ins.
Co., 619 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir. 2010) (Sutton, J.); see also Antonin Scalia
& Bryan A. Gamer, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 177
(2012) ("Doublets and triplets abound in legalese."). "Arise out of or relate
to" is the same.
Bandemer also argues that a causal standard is an outlier, focusing on
a single Third Circuit decision cited in the opening brief. See Bandemer Br.
24-25. But causation is the majority rule-including in the Eighth Circuit.
As Bandemer says, the Eighth Circuit rejected a proximate cause standard.
Id. (citing Myers, 689 F.3d at 912-913). It has, however, embraced a causal
standard, explaining that the requisite connection was present when a
plaintiff was injured after responding to the defendant's solicitations in the
forum. Myers, 689 F.3d at 913. But for the solicitations, there would be no
18
claims. See id. And most other courts have followed suit; a causal standard
is the predominant rule in courts that have addressed the question. 1
Bandemer's argument that a causal standard is irreconcilable with the
Supreme Court's case law flies in the face of all of the decisions that have
held the opposite. This Court should consider following suit and adopting
an explicitly causal standard for personal jurisdiction's connection
requirement.
1 See, e.g., Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008); Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007); Williams v. Lakeview Co., 13 P.3d 280, 284-285 (Ariz. 2000) (en bane); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549, 553 (Mass. 1994); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 783 P.2d 78, 81-82 (Wash. 1989) (en bane) (all adopting a but-for causal approach); see also, e.g., Beydoun v. Wataniya Rests. Holding, Q.S.C., 768 F.3d 499, 507-508 (6th Cir. 2014); uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421,430 (7th Cir. 2010); O'Connor, 496 F.3d at 323; Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2005); Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 316 P.3d 287, 300 (Or. 2013) (en bane) ( all adopting causal tests that require but-for causation plus some additional connection between claims and contacts, akin to proximate cause).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those in the opening brief, the court of
appeals' judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the court of
appeals for further proceedings.
October 5, 2018
Respectfully submitted,
BOWMAN AND BROOKE LLP
/s/ Michael R. Carey Michael R. Carey(MN#0388271) 150 South Fifth Street, Suite 3000 Minneapolis, MN 55402 Tel: (612) 339-8682 Fax: (612) 672-3200 [email protected]
Sean Marotta (admitted pro hac vice) HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 555 Thirteenth Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004 Tel: (202) 637-4881 Fax: (202) 637-5910 [email protected]