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StateIdentityDisjunctureandthePoliticsofTransitionalJustice:TheCaseofRussia
PaperpreparedfortheCEEISA-ISAJointConference,2016,Ljubljana
PanelSB01:ThePointwherethePendulumStops:RevisitingIdentity(Politics)inIR
June25,2016,11:00am-12:45pm
DrMariaMälksoo
SeniorResearchFellowinInternationalRelations
JohanSkytteInstituteofPoliticalStudies
UniversityofTartu,Tartu,Estonia
[email protected]
Workinprogress.Pleasedonotquoteordisseminate.
Abstract:
Theemergingglobalnormativeexpectationsrelatedtothestates’dutytocometotermswiththeirviolentlegacies
present unique challenges to the sustenance of their continuous
sense of ‘self’. This
paperunpacksontologicalsecurity-seekingasagenericsocialmechanismininternationalpoliticswhichallowstoconceptualisetheconnectionbetweenstate’stransitionaljustice(TJ)andforeignpolicies.Itutilisestheexampleofpost-SovietRussia’slimitedpoliticsofaccountabilitytowardstherepressionsofitsantecedentregimeinordertoilluminatetheroleofhistoricalmemoryintheontologicalsecurity-seekingstrugglesofstatescaughtbetweentheliberalpremisesoftheglobal(ising)normofTJandtheirquestforsustainingstatusasagreatpower,regardlessofthemismatchbetweenthetraditionalandcontemporarynormativeconnotationsattachedtoit.Withsimultaneouspressuresonrevisingitsspatialandmnemonicvisionofitself,Russia’spost-Soviet,andparticularlyPutin-era,politicalhandlingofthecommunistpasthasbeenmarked
by the desire to establish mnemonic security rather than embrace
reflexively a range of
TJmeasures.Thishashadpalpableimplicationsforthecountry’spoliciesandpracticesinthepost-Sovietneighbourhoodand
international society at large.Howcanwe study theway(s)Russia’s
idiosyncraticapproachtowardsTJhasproducedpreconditionsforthecountry’sinternationalaction?Thepaperputsforthanovelmethodological
framework forunderstanding the
linkbetweenstate’sapproachtoTJathomeanditspursuanceofspecificnotionsoforderandjusticeininternationalpolitics.
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1. ConcatenatingTransitionalJustice(TJ)andForeignPolicy(FP)
Transitional justice (TJ) isan interdisciplinaryapproach to
redressingpasthuman rightsviolationsandinternational crimes in
thepost-conflictorpost-authoritarian/-totalitarian setting
throughavarietyofjudicialandnon-judicialmeansofaccountability,rangingfromtrialstotruthcommissions,reparationsandinstitutionalreform.Thecross-disciplinarytheoryandpracticeofTJisamajortopicinInternationalRelations(IR),InternationalLaw(IL)andComparativePolitics(CP).Yet,thelackofsystematicattentionon
the connection between states’ (non-)adoption of particular TJ
measures domestically and
theirforeignpoliciesremainsaglaringoversightinmainstreamscholarship.Thisisespeciallyproblematicforanalysing
the international behaviour of the Russian Federation (RF)whose
coming to termswith
itscommunistpasthasbeencomplicatedbytheconflictingdemandstheantecedentregimehaspresentedforstatecontinuityandthestabilityofitsself-conceptafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Thefactthatthe
sources of Russia’s sense of ontological security and insecurity
are located in the same
temporalbackdrophashadfundamentalimplicationsforitsforeignpolicydiscourseandpracticeinthepost-ColdWarera.Thescholarshiphasfailedtograspthesignificanceofthisconnection,remainingill-equippedandscatteredbetweendistinctdisciplinesforitscomprehensivestudy.
Atatimeofthepost-ColdWarnadirinRussia’srelationshipwiththeWest,itismostpertinenttoturntotheperennialproblemofthesourcesofRussia’sinternationalbehaviour.ThispaperfocusesonRussia’spolitical
handlingof its communistpast inorder todeterminehow its
idiosyncratic approachtowards transitional justice (TJ) has
produced preconditions for the country’s international
action,enablingcertainpoliciesandpracticesintheimmediateneighbourhood,aswellasininternationalsocietyatlarge.Inspiteofseemingaffinitieswiththeresearchagendafocusingontheimpactoftheideationalfactors
in thedecision-makingofstateactorsand in theiractual
foreignpolicybehaviour,
thepresentresearchseekstounderstandwhycertaindevelopmentsinRussia’spost-communistTJpoliticshavetakenplaceinthefirstplace,aswellashowtheongoingdevelopmentoftherespectivepoliciesrelatestothedynamicsofforeignpolicydiscoursesandpracticesoftheRussianFederation(cf.Guzzini2012b:48).MyultimateaimistoteaseouttheinternationalimplicationsofRussia’spost-communistpoliticsoftruthandjustice-seeking(cf.PettaiandPettai2015),askingwhich(perceived)threatsRussiahastriedtostaveoffby
its limited application of TJmeasures. How has ‘coming to termswith
the communist past’
beenunderstoodinRussiainthecontextofthecountry’spost-communisttransition?HowhasTJrepertoirebeenapplied–ornotappliedinpost-communistRussia;whyso,andtowhateffectandresonanceforthecountry’sforeignpolicydoctrineandpractice?Thepuzzleforthisstudythusconcernsthemeaningandfunctionofstate’sreckoningwiththeantecedentregime’shumanrightsviolationsonitsforeignpolicydiscourseandpractice.
WhilekeepingtheempiricalgazefirmlyonRussia,mycentralaspirationwiththispaperis,infact,methodological
– and thereforemore limited in generatingactual empirical answers
to thequestionsdriving the broader research project this paper
forms a preliminary part of. I seek to specify
therelationshipbetweenstate’sadoptionornon-adoptionof(acoresetof)TJmeasuresanditsinternationaloutlook
and foreign policy. This is, admittedly, a very ambitious aim, not
short of clarifying a
causalrelationshipbetweenthetwopolicies,whiletheoverallknowledgeofthestate-leveleffectsofTJhasbeendescribedas‘insufficient’(Thomsetal.2010).Nonetheless,thispaperattemptstolookevenfurther,byinvestigating
the links between state’s TJ and foreign policies, and proposing a
novelmethodologicalframeworkforstudyingthisallegedconnection.Atthisphase,Russiaprovidesageneralempiricalcontextformydiscussion,whereasthesystematicempiricalanalysisaccordingtotheanalyticalmodelproposedinthispaperremainsyettobeundertakeninduecourse.
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ThemethodologicalframeworkputforthheredrawsonthreewhalesinIRtheory:MiljaKurki’sAristoteliandeepenedandbroadenedunderstandingofcause(Kurki2008);StefanoGuzzini’sinterpretiveprocesstracing(Guzzini2012),andNedLebow’saccountofinefficientcausation(2014).Specifically,thispaperunpacksontologicalsecurity-seekingasagenericsocialmechanismininternationalpoliticswhichallowstoproductivelyconceptualisetheconnectionbetweenstate’sTJandforeignpolicies.Itutilisestheexampleofpost-SovietRussia’slimitedpoliticsofaccountabilitytowardstherepressionsofitsantecedentregimeinordertoilluminatetheroleofhistoricalmemoryintheontologicalsecurity-seekingstrugglesofstatescaughtbetweentheliberalpremisesoftheglobal(ising)normofTJandtheirquestforsustainingstatusasagreatpower,regardlessofthemismatchbetweenthetraditionalandcontemporarynormativeconnotationsattachedtoit.Developinganovelanalyticalframeworkinordertoexplainhowontologicalsecurity-seekingactuallyworksininternationalpolitics;howitrelatestomajortransitionsandconsequentstateidentitydisjuncture,aswellasstate’spoliciesoftruthandjusticeseeking,andwithwhatkindofresonanceforitsforeignpolicies,isthecoreaimofthispaper.
Thisisimportantaslongasontologicalsecurity(OS)theoryinIRremainsstillrelativelyschematictodate(Browning2016).OSperspectiveunderscorestheintimaterelationbetweenstateidentityanditssenseofsecurity(Mitzen2006;Steele2008;seealsoGiddens1984,1991;Huysmans1998).Accordingly,statesnotonlyseekphysicalsurvival,butimportantlyalsothestabilityandcontinuityoftheiridentities(or
‘selves’).1 The realm of dangers to the state’s existence hence
also includes normative threats asspecific kind of transgression
besides physical violations (Creppell 2011), generating the
tendency toprotect one’s mnemonical self-narrative internationally,
along with the pursuance and defence of aparticular normative order
(Mälksoo 2015a). Retaining a sense of continuous state identity
becomesparticularlyacute inperiodsofpolitical transformation,
suchas in transitions fromnon-democratic
todemocraticregimesorfromthesuppressionbyaforeignpowertoself-government.Russia’slong-timereluctance
to systematically reckon with its antecedent regime’s repressive
legacy is, against
thatbackdrop,consistentwithitsattemptstosustainthebasicstabilityofapositivesenseofitsnationalandinternational
‘self’.TheextentofadoptedTJmeasuresandtheanalysisofaccompanyingpoliticalandpublicdebatesthusenabletoshedlightontheissueofwhatkindofsubjectRussiawantstobe.
Astheanalyticalmodelproposedinthispaperisdeeplycontextual,somecontextneedstobeprovidedbeforeitsproperintroduction.IwillsubsequentlyoutlinetheprevailingargumentonTJasanemergingglobalnorm.Whilethislineofthinkinghasbeenprevalentinthepost-conflictapplicationsoftheTJrepertoire,theapplicabilityofsuchunderstandingonthecaseofpost-communistRussiawillberelatedtotherecentdebatesonsocialisation/stigmatisationdynamicsinIRtheory(FinnemoreandSikkink1998;
Risse and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009; Hafner-Burton 2013; Posner
2014; Zarakol 2011,
2014;Adler-Nissen2014).Thereafter,Iwilltakestockoftheexistingattemptstoconceptualisetherelationshipbetween
TJ, memory politics, and foreign policy in comparative politics and
international
studies,indicatingthelimitationsandblindspotsinthecurrentliterature.Thenextsectionoffersabriefoverviewof
Russia’s post-communist record of TJ, using Pettai and Pettai’s
(2015) three temporalities of
post-communisttruthandjusticeseeking–thatis,transitional,retrospectiveandpost-transitionaljustice–asananalyticalguideline.UnderstandingTJasaliminalrite,IdiscussthepotentialofthenotionofprotractedliminalityformakingsenseofRussia’spost-communistpredicamentinthefield.Thesebuildingblocksinplace,
I delineate a methodological model for studying the link between
Russia’s
post-communistapproach(es)toTJanditsforeignpoliciesinanumberofkeyareas,allegedlymostaffectedbyitspolitical
1Notethatininternationallegalsense,stateidentityandcontinuityhaveanidenticalmeaning.SeeMarek(1954)andCrawford(2007).
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handlingof thecommunistpastathome.Specifically, these
includeRussia’s relationswiththe formerSoviet satellites and
subjugate states; Russia’s international politics on human rights
and
stateresponsibilityanditshistoricaljusticediscoursespursuedinvariousinternationalfora(suchastheUN,CouncilofEuropeandtheOSCE).Theultimateaimofthebroaderstudythispaperlaysthegroundworkfor
is to explain both Russia’s mnemopolitics-laden international
behaviour (or practices) and
theoutcomes(orimplications)ofthechoicesmadebytheactorsobserved.
2. TJasaLiminalRiteandanEmergingGlobalNorm(ativeDuty)
What is generally being referred towhen talking about
‘transitional justice’? Towhat extent
has‘comingtotermswithone’spast’becomerecognisedintersubjectivestandardofappropriatebehaviourin
international society?Which systemicbackground factorsare important
to take
intoaccountwhentacklingRussia’spositionvis-à-vistheallegedlyemergingglobalnormofTJ?
Originallyemergedas‘handmaidentoliberalpoliticaltransitions’andincreasinglyassociatedwithpostconflictpeacebuildingandreconciliationmoregenerally(Sharp2014:1),TJisaquintessentialriteofcollectivepassage.InherTJgenealogy,RutiG.Teitelassociatedit‘withperiodsofpoliticalchange’,aimedat
‘confront[ing] thewrongdoingsof repressivepredecessor regimes’
(2003: 69).According to a2004report by the then-UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan, TJ comprises ‘the full range of processes
andmechanisms associatedwith a society’s attempts to come to
termswith a legacy of large-scale
pastabuses,inordertoensureaccountability,servejusticeandachievereconciliation’(UNSecGen2004:3).Alongthedimensionsofcriminal,politicalandsymbolicjustice,themechanismsandreckoningpracticesofTJ
includecourttrialsagainst formerdecision-makers, lustrationpolicies
(that is,banningof formerofficialsandsecretagents
fromoccupyingpublicpositions in thenewregime),public
identificationofformeragents,enablingaccesstopreviousregime’ssecretfiles,rehabilitationandrestitutionpoliciesvis-à-visvictims,andvarioussymbolicmeasures(suchastheestablishmentoftruthcommissionsandstate-sponsoredmemorycollection,government-fundedmuseumsandotherhistoricalresearchinstitutions,victimorganisationsandreconciliationprogrammes,rewritinghistorytextbooks,variousmemorialisationinitiatives,officialapologiesandcondemnations).AstheprocessofTJpertainstofracturingandchangingidentitiesand
the transgressionofboundaries in thecourseof re-gearing
thecommunities
fromtheirviolentlegacies,beitinthecourseoftransitioningfromundemocratictodemocraticregimeorfromwartopeace,supposedlyleadingtothehealingandreconciliationofasociety,itisariteoftransitionofitsown
kind. The toolkit of TJ is indeed symbolically charged as trials,
truth commissions
andmemorialisations‘notonlyenactliberalidealsandsubjectivitiesbutalsosignifyapurificationofthesocialbody,whichissymbolicallymovedfromacontaminatingstateofconflictandilliberalismtoaconditionofliberaldemocraticpurity’(Hinton2010:8).EspeciallyforthedemocratictransitionsinEasternEuropeandLatinAmericaWesternliberalmarketdemocracyhasbeendeemedasanendpointofthetransitioninquestion(Sharp2013).TJishencenotonlyaboutconfrontingaviolentornondemocraticpast,butalsoa‘symbolicresourcelegitimating,directing,andconsolidatingdemocratictransitionprocesses’(Fein2005:216).Akintotheritesofre-aggregationorincorporationinthetheorisationsofliminality(seevanGennep1960;Turner1969),TJaimstoleadtothedelineationoftheviolentpastinawaythatincreasesthesocialcohesionofthefracturedsocietyaswellaslegitimatesthepostconflict/post-authoritariangovernmentthatinitiatedtheTJprocess(Osiel1997).
OnlyinrealityTJishardlyaslinear.AlthoughliberaldemocratictransitionsimplicitlyconstitutetheparadigmatictransitionofTJ(Teitel2000:5;McAuliffe2011),theunderstandingoftransitionbasedonateleologicalviewofhistorywhereofwesternliberaldemocracyconstitutestheend(cf.Fukuyama
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1992)isempiricallynotaccurate(Sharp2014:7).Forinstance,‘TJ’labelhasbeenappliedtocontextsthatdo
not involve liberal political transition (Rwanda, Chad, Uganda,
Ethiopia), or no significant politicaltransitionatall
(Kenya,Colombia),orto
liberalwesterndemocraciesthathaveusedcertainmeasuresfromtheTJtoolkit(Australia,Canada)(ibid.).Inexplicitterms,mostdefinitionsofTJactuallyleavethesupposedendpointoftransitionsunspecifiedandthequestionsofwhenandhowthetransitionreallyendsorwhodefinestheendoftransitionunanswered(Karl2014:733;Roht-ArriazaandMarieqcurrena2006:1).Indeed,untiltherecentintroductionofamorerigidtemporalcriteriabyPettaiandPettai(2015),therehasbeenhardlyanyclarityamongscholarsandpractitioners‘astowhetherthereisorneedstobeaboundedconceptof„transition”duringwhichtransitionaljusticeapplies’(Bell2009:23-24).ExploringtheTJprocesstowardsthedisappearedinMexico,Karlhasthustakenittobeanunfinishedriteofpassage(2014:
733). She builds uponHinton’s (2010) earlier adoption of liminality
in analysing TJ as a rite
ofpassageinthephasebetweenanoldandnewstatusofsociety.Karl’sapproachisvictim-centric,enablingonly
thevictimsofviolencetodefinetheendpointof transitionor
tomeasurewhenanewstatusofintegration(inaritual
theorysense)hasbeenachievedandthe
justiceestablished.TakingadiversionfromthebulkofliteraturethatregardsTJasaliberalgoalwithauniversaltoolkit,Karlemphasisestheconflictivecharacterofthetransitoryphasewherebyemergingconflictsandfrictionbecome‘expectedoutcomes’(Karl2014:734).SheconcludesthatintheMexicancasetheglobaldiscourseofTJwasonlyaninstrumentalisedpartofpolitical
rhetoricof change, serving to legitimise thenewpowerholders
andleavingthegoaloffoundingjustandpeacefulsocietyunachieved(ibid:744-745).Indeed,thelegalisticveneerofTJdoesnotchangethefactthat‘veryrealpowerdynamicsandcontestedpoliticalchoices[are]at
the heart of any set of transitional justicemechanisms’ (Sharp
2014: 7). Speaking of justice in
thecontextoftransitionitisthereforepertinenttokeepinmindRosemaryNagy’squestion,‘when,towhomand
for what transitional justice applies’ (Nagy 2008: 279).
Consequently, transition could be
fairlyconceptualisedinabroaderwaythanaliberalpoliticalmouldwouldpresume(seeSharp2014:8).
Aswesee,theterm‘transitionaljustice’hasbeenambiguousfromitsinception,leadingtothreedevelopmentalaccountsof
thephenomenon,rangingfromTJashumanrightsto
itsunderstandingasconflictresolutionandinternationalintervention(Bell2009:15).Inregardtotheincreasinglyscatteredattempts
todelimit therespective field,ChristineBellhassuggestedtoviewTJ
ratheras ‘acloakthatcovers a rangeofparticularizedbargainson
thepast’ (ibid.).According to this view, TJ is
increasinglydelivered ‘not throughoneholisticmechanismbut
througharangeof institutionalvehicles
thatoftenoperatesimultaneouslywithoutaclearlegalhierarchy(ibid.:19).Inherrecentstock-takingexerciseofthedevelopmentofthefieldbyitsoriginalname-giver,RutiG.Teitelalsorefutestheideathattherecanbeonerightresponseindealingwithastate’srepressivepast,mostsupportiveofalastingdemocracy(Teitel2014:103).Instead,states’approachtoTJispoliticallycontingent,regardlessofthepresenceofaparadigmatic
transitional response in the law (ibid.). Teitel nonetheless points
at the emergence of
a‘global’paradigmofTJwhereintheproblemofjusticeisbeingreconceptualisedthroughglobalpoliticsofaccountabilitywhichisnotpresumedonaclearorconsolidatedpoliticaltransition(ibid.:xiv).Accordingly,TJhasbecome‘normalised’,departingfromtheoriginal1980s’transitionsassociatedwithjustice-seekingforexceptionaltimesandincreasinglydisassociatedfromthepoliticsoftransition(ibid.).
TodayTJdiscoursehasgainedglobalnormativeproportionsand
itsmechanismshavebecomeincreasinglyinstitutionalisedasgeneralobligationsofaccountabilityforthepast,requiredasamatterofconstitutional2and/orinternationallaw(ibid.:181;seealsoBen-YosefHirsch2014).TheUnitedNationsendorsesthe‘righttothetruth’,affirmingthat‘[e]verypeoplehastheinalienablerighttoknowthetruth
2Understoodbroadlyas‘thesetoffundamentallegalandpoliticalnormsandpracticesthatareconstitutiveofthepolity’(Teitel2014:181).
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about past events concerning the perpetration of heinous crimes
and about the circumstances andreasons that led, throughmassive or
systematic violations, to the perpetration of those crimes’
(fordiscussion,seeBen-YosefHirsch2007).3Measures,suchastruthcommissions,havespreadworldwideand
become institutionalised at the international level and bymajor
non-governmental
organisations(e.g.,AmnestyInternational,HumanRightsWatch,InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice)(seeBen-YosefHirsch2014foradetailedaccount).Butwhatarethepolicyimplicationsofsuchanemerginggeneralobligationofaccountabilityforthepastforindividualstatesthen?
LeadingconstructivisthumanrightsscholarsMarthaFinnemoreandKathrynSikkinkhaveofferedaconcisesocialconstructivistdefinitionofanormas‘astandardofappropriatebehaviourforactorswithagivenidentity’(FinnemoreandSikkink1998:891).Forthem,normsimplyamoralobligation,makingthemdistinct
fromother kindsof rules. Yet, according to this constructivist
view,whilenorms createpermissive conditions for action or constrain
behaviour by offering standards of judgement and
thepossibilityofdisapprovalorcondemnationbyotherstates,theydonotdetermineaction:they‘enable’ratherthan‘ensure’aparticularbehaviour(Finnemore1996:157-158).Normsnonethelessdomorethanregulatebehaviourbyalsomoulding
the identitiesofactors,defining social
roles,andshapingactors’understandingsoftheirinterests(FinnemoreandSikkink1998:913).Accordingly,aconvincingargumenthas
been made that leaders’ legal justifications regarding particular
international norms and
theirfavouredprinciples‘cannotbedivorcedfromwiderconceptionsofposition,status,andrecognitionwithintheinternationalsystem’(Allison2013:10).
Contrary to Risse and Sikkink’s famous socialisation model for
understanding the
domesticadaptationandinternalisationofinternationalnorms(seeRisseandSikkink1999),AyşeZarakol(2014,2011)hasputforthapersuasiveargumentforfiguringoutbothnorm-complianceandnorm-rejectionbynon-Westernstates(includingRussia)throughthedynamicofstigmatisation
instead.Accordingtoheraccount, modern international society has
been fundamentally shaped by stigmatisation as
non-Westernersallegedlyjoinedthesystematadisadvantage(regardlessoftheirformallycolonisedstatusinhistory)withmajorconsequencesfortheirmodernnationalnarrativesandstateidentities(Zarakol2014:312-313;
cf. Epstein 2012). In case of stigmatisation, or the
‘internalisation of a particular
normativestandardthatdefinesone’sownattributesasundesirable’(Zarakol2014:314),theresponseofthenorm-taker‘ismuchmorelikelytobefailedattemptsatcorrection,overcompensation,orastubborndenialthataproblemexists’(ibid.:317).Consequently,thepropositiontoexamineindepthtowhatextentthenormofTJisactuallysharedbyRussia(asastateaswellassocietally)ispremisedontheideathatthewayRussiahasbeenbroughtintotheframeworkofthenormativeexpectationsassociatedwithcomingto
termswithone’s past hasmajor repercussions for its perceivedplace
andposture in
internationalsociety.ExaminingRussianperceptionsofthelegitimacyoftheTJnormshouldthereforeshedlightonitsbroaderinternationaloutlookonissuesasvariedashumanrights,4
individualaccountability5andstateresponsibility and the pursuance
of ideas of ‘historical justice’ in various international formats.
Theenthusiastic policy predictions of the preachers of the logic of
(legal) appropriateness in IR
shouldaccordinglybetemperedwithamorepragmatistemphasisonthestates’logicofconsequences(SnyderandVinjamuri2003/2004:40).Accordingly,insteadof‘supplantingthenormofsovereigntyandbolstering
3AnnieBirdpointstotheevenmorecomprehensiveapproachtoTJlaidoutinSwissForeignAffairsDepartment´sholisticframeworkfor‘DealingwiththePast’,involvingthe‘righttoknow’,‘therighttoreparation’,‘therighttojustice’,anda‘guaranteeofnon-recurrence’(seeBird2015:23).SeealsoDeBaets(2016)andRikka(2014).4TheRussianFederationratifiedtheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR)in1998.
5AsembodiedintheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC).RussiaisnotastatepartyoftheRomeStatuteoftheICC.
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thenormofhumanrightsandindividualaccountability,thenormofjusticehasmutatedindirectionsthatrecognizetherightofstates,especiallypowerfulstates,toexertcontroloverthetermsofjustice’(ibid.).
Yetanotherqualificationisinorderwhenexaminingtheadoptionoftheglobal(ising)normativedutyofTJinRussia.AsRoyAllison’s(2013)importantstudyofRussia’sapproachtomilitaryinterventionandthenormofResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)hasdemonstrated,thegloballevelofanalysisneedstobejuxtaposedwiththeobservationoftheregionaldynamicsofaparticularnorm.Besidestheexplorationofemergingglobalstandardsofconduct(andtheircontestationthereof),itisalsoessential‘toconsiderthewaymajorstates’commitmenttoglobalstandardsmaybeinfluencedbystandardsofconductdefinedwithinandforaregion’
(ibid.:18-19).That is, statesmightwishtokeeptheirownregionalorder
inadifferentregisterasfarastheparticularnorm’sglobalexpectationsandrestraintsareconcerned(ibid.:19).AsAllisondemonstrates,Russia’srhetoricoverglobalprinciplesofsovereigntyandnon-interventionis
only selectively applied in the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS) regional order
(ibid.).MoscowhasofteninterpretednormsdifferentlywhenappliedtotheCISregionalsetting(ibid.:216).Thisresonates
furtherwith Ben-Yosef Hirsch’s studies on the ideational change in
the content of a normfacilitating its emergence as international
norm (Ben-Yosef Hirsch 2014, 2007). I take cue from hersuggestion
thatwhen studying international norms,we should focus on
‘uncovering changes as theyoccur’, inorder tooffer
‘abetterunderstandingof theactualprocesses throughwhich the
ideationalnormativeandinternationalenvironmentisshaped’’(Ben-YosefHirsch2014:825).
Withthesecaveatsinmind,wouldwenotbebetteroffanalysingRussia’spoliticalhandlingofitscommunistpastthroughtheperspectiveofthepoliticsofmemoryratherthanthatofTJ?Afterall,whilelegalnormsandargumentationarguablycontinuetobecentraltoTJasafield(Bell2009:23),Russia’srecordincriminal-judicial,6butalsopolitical-administrativemeasures7adoptedvis-à-vistheperpetratorsofthehumanrightsviolationsofitsantecedentregimeisatbestscant.NanciAdlerevenlaments,inherentry
on Russia in the comprehensive Encyclopedia of Transitional
Justice, that ‘the
post-Sovietgovernmentshaveimplementednoneoftheknownand/orinstitutionalizedjusticemechanisms’(Adler2012a:406).Russia’schosenTJmodelhasindeedbeenaimedatimpunityratherthanaccountabilitywhileitsstanceonvariouskindsof‘Nazis’,pastandpresent,isstronglypunitive(cf.Bell2009:23-24).Ifindacompromiseterm-thepoliticsoftruthandjustice’(cf.BarahonadeBritoetal.2001)-ofconsiderableanalyticalvalueintheRussiancontext.Eva-ClaritaandVelloPettaihaveutilisedthisterminordertokeepthefocuson‘thestruggleswagedbypoliticalandsocialactorstoinfluencetherolethestateplays(a)insettingprevailingtruthdiscoursesaboutanon-democraticpastand(b)inpassingmeasurestoenactsomeinterpretationofjusticeinrelationtothispast’(2015:4).Ilargelyconcurwiththeircriticismabouttherelative
vagueness of the politics of memory as a broad field encompassing
the activities of
variousmnemonicactors,withdifferentabilitiestoinfluenceandshapepublicperceptionsofthepastandleavetheirimprintonthestate’srespectivepolicy-makingprocess(ibid.:6).Eventhoughthereisconsiderableoverlapbetweenthepoliticsoftruthandjusticeseekingandwhatisgenerallyreferredtoasthepoliticsofmemory/mnemopolitics,thelatteralonewouldnotenabletoexplicitlyexaminetheaspectofjustice(beithistorical,criminal,politicalorsymbolic)inthepoliticalhandlingofastate’spast,bothdiscursivelyandpracticallyunderstood.ThatiswhyIhavechosentoalternatebetweenthenotionsof‘thepoliticsoftruthandjustice’,‘thepoliticsofTJ’and‘thepoliticalhandlingof/dealingwiththecommunistpast’ratherthanusethesignificantlybroaderandlessconcise‘politicsofmemory’inthecontextofpost-communistRussia.
6
Seeboxes1aand1binPettaiandPettai’smatrixofpost-communisttruthandjustice(2015:32).
7 Seeboxes2aand2binibid.
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3. TJandFP:StateoftheArt
Whatisthenatureoftheconnectionbetweenhistoricalmemory,TJandforeignpolicy?HowdounderstandingsandpoliticsofTJconditionparticularforeignpolicydiscoursesandpractices?DoesthechoiceofadoptedTJmeasuresentailspecificconceptionsofstate-societyrelationshipandstateidentityintheinternationalsystem?HowhasRussia’sversionofpost-communistTJproducedpreconditionsforthe
country’s international action? In particular, how has Russia’s
state identity disjuncture with
thecollapseoftheSovietUnioninfluenceditswayof‘comingtotermswith’itsSovietlegacy–andtowhicheffectforitsforeignpolicyinthepost-Sovietera?
TheseareresearchquestionsthathavenotpreviouslybeenaddressedinasystematicmannerintheexistingliteraturesonRussia’sreckoningwithitscommunistpast,states’adoptionofaparticularsetofTJmeasuresandtheimplicationsfortheirinternationalbehaviourthereof.Myinterdisciplinaryframingof
theresearchsubjectseeks tobring together thecurrentlydisconnected
(andgenerally legal
issues-oriented)scholarshiponTJ,criticalIRperspectivesaccountingforthecentralroleofhistoricalmemoryinRussia’s
contemporary international predicament (e.g., Neumann 2013;Morozov
2015), and
practicalforeignpolicyanalysis.WhiletheimpactofhistoricalmemoryontheinternationalbehaviourofGermanyandJapaninparticular,hasbeenanalysedinextensivedetail(e.g.,Berger2012;LangenbacherandSchain2010;
Lind 2008; Buruma 1994), a comprehensive exploration of the Russian
case remains yet to bewritten. This is a costly omission for
‘memory is clearly crucial to understanding the case of
Russia’sinternational politics’ (Neumann 2013: 24). Yet, there has
not been sufficient
theoreticalconceptualisationofthemechanismsthathavedrivenandcontinuetodriveRussia’sidiosyncraticpoliticstowards
TJ, nor their wider international implications. Generally,
post-Soviet Russia remains just
afootnoteintheburgeoningfieldofTJ.RussiaisfrequentlydismissedinscholarlydebatesasanexampleofTJfailuresinceitsofficialrecordinlegal,political,administrativeandsymbolicdimensionsofaddressingthe
legacy of the antecedent regime has been half-hearted, if not
outright revisionist during theconsolidation of the current
illiberal government. Except for the rehabilitation of the victims
of
thecommunistpoliticalrepressions,nolegaladjudicationoftheperpetratorsofcrimesinconnectionwiththeadministrationoftheSovietjusticehastakenplace;themodestsuggestionsforlustrationbytheDumaDeputyGalina
Starovoitova led to nowhere (with Starovoitova herself assassinated
in 1998), and theopening of the former Soviet archives has remained
severely limited, leading, at times, to thereclassificationof
certain files (see furtherKramer2012).8Altogether, a clear
structural, political,
andsymbolicbreakwiththepasthassimplynothappenedinpost-SovietRussia.Thestate’sgeneralaversiontoassumingresponsibilityforpast-relatedclaimsandtowardsthepoliticalandlegalreassessmentoftheSovietpastisnotparticularlysurprisingconsideringthestrongdegreeofcontinuitybetweentheSovietandpost-SovietelitesinRussia(Sakwa2011;Gill2013;Nuzov2014;cf.Gjerde2015).Theoverallpost-communisttransitionofRussiahaspurportedlyproducedahybridregime(seeRobertson2011)whichisselectivelymimickingthenormativelanguageoftheWestern(particularlyEuropean)community,ratherthanfullyabidingwithdemocraticpractices(cf.Allison2013:16;Allina-Pisano2008;Shevtsova2008).TheRussiancasehasbeendescribedasagoodcounterexampleofTJforits‘faux’orpseudo-TJinterventionsthathavenotaimedatdemocratisationandtheprotectionofvictims’rightsasmuchasatlegitimisingthenewpoliticalelite(Andrieu2011).WhilethereisanumberofthoroughaccountsofRussia’schoicesinadoptingparticularTJmeasures(seeAdler2012a,b,c;Andrieu2011;Calhoun2004;Nuzov2014;Stan2009;Cole2007;Fein2007;Kritz1995),thebroaderimplicationsofthecountry’slimitedreckoningwithits
antecedent regime’shuman rights
violationshavenotbeenaddressed.TheexplorationofRussia’s
8
Seealsohttp://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/battle-in-the-archives---uncovering-russias-secret-past/563566.html(accessedJune5,2016).
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reckoningwith its communist past has been generally relegated to
the scholarship on the politics
ofmemory(Khapaeva2016;Sherlock2007,2011;ShlapentokhandBondartsova2009;Smith2009;Torbakov2011;Wertsch2002,2008)andculturalstudiesonRussia’s‘workingout’ofitstraumasinducedbythecommunistexperiment(e.g.,Etkind2009,2013;Satter2012;Schlögel2013).WhatiscriticallyabsentintheexistingliteratureonRussia’spost-communistVergangenheitsbewältigungistherealisationthatitisascrucialtoanalyseRussia’sreasoningsfornotadoptingcertainTJmeasuresasthemeasuresRussiahasadoptedinitspoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpast.
PreviousworkshaveacknowledgedthesymboliccentralityofTJforliberaltransition(Teitel2000),focusingonthewaysRussia’sfailedTJhasaffecteditspost-communistdemocraticconsolidation,humanrights
protection and civil society development, while not necessarily
problematising the universalistpresumptions and liberal teleology
of the transition paradigm. While the connection between
thecommemorationofvictimsofstateviolenceinthepastanddebatesoverhumanrightsinthepresenthasnot
gone unnoticed in the literature on historical memory (see Huyssen
2003; Winter 2013),
theimplicationsofRussia’spoliticalhandlingofitscommunistpastforitsinternationalbehaviourhavenotbeen
systematicallyanalysedorunderstood in the studyof IR.
Yet,Russia’swayof reckoningwith
itsforebear’slegacyhasconsiderablerepercussionsforitsrelationswithitsformerSovietdependentsandforeign
policies in various multilateral settings, ranging from its
politics of human rights and
stateaccountabilitytopursuingparticulardiscoursesofhistoricaljusticeininternationalfora,suchastheUNandtheOSCE.AsthecontinuatorstateoftheSovietUnionininternationallegalterms,theRFhasbeenpersistent
in refusing toassume legal responsibility for the
internationallywrongfulactsof theSovietregime, both within its
current borders and beyond. Russia’s lack of political penitence
towards
theEasternEuropeannationsandstatesaffectedbytheSovietrepressivepolicieshasmadeitanantipodeofa‘sorrystate’,unwillingtopubliclyexpresscontritionforpasthumanrightsabusesinordertopromotereconciliationbetweentheformerrepressorstateandtherepressed(cf.Lind2008).Meanwhile,thePutinregimehascunninglyappropriatedthediscoursesofhumanrights,genocidepreventionandHolocaustremembrance
for identity-politicalprojects. In2014, theStateDumapasseda ‘memory
law’ targetedspecificallyagainst the ‘disseminationof false
informationon theactivitiesof theSovietUnionduringWorldWar II’ and
the ‘rehabilitationofNazism’, therebyexplicitly
criminalisingcertainwaysofpublicdiscussionandremembranceofWorldWarIIasacrucialperiodintheSoviethistoryandRussia’srelationswith
its formerdependents (seeArt.354.1.of
theRF’sCriminalCode;Koposov2014).Thishasmajorimplications for its
relations with the former Soviet republics and satellites,
themselves seeking
toconsolidatetheirpost-communiststateidentitiesininternationalpolitics(Mälksoo2015a).Mostrecently,RussianannexationofCrimeain2014anditssupportfortheseparatists
ineasternUkrainehavebeenshapedbymnemonicalundercurrentsincomplexways:Russianmediahassystematicallydemonisedpro-democraticforcesinUkraineas‘Nazis’,insinuatingtheirintentiontoerasethehistoricalmemoryoftheSovietVictoryinthewaragainstNazismandperpetrategenocideagainstRussianandJewishminorities(foragoodoverviewanddiscussion,seeFedor2015).
It is temptingtosuggestthatRussia’s
failuretocometotermswiththepasthascontributedtoitsinterventioninUkraine.However,asthescholarshipontheissuecurrentlystands,wehavenowayofestablishingthecausalconnectionwithanydegreeofcertainty.
The basic argument drawn from the literature on democratic peace
about the impact
ofdomesticregimetypeandpoliticalcultureonstatebehaviourin
internationalpoliticsonthepeaceful-aggressive-scaleisfartoogenerictoaccountspecificallyfortheTJandforeignpolicy-linkage.
Thewell-coveredGermanandJapanesecasesintheliteraturearegenerallyquotedasexamplesrevealingtheconnectionbetweencountries’wayofcomingtotermswithpastviolenceandtheprospectsforinternationalreconciliation(seefurtherGustafsson2014,2015;Hagström2015).Thisconnectionisnot
straightforward, however, as Jennifer Lind’s (2008) study on
international apologies and
theirpotentialdomesticbacklasheshasdemonstrated.Whilecontritionis
likelytoreducethreatperception
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andpromote reconciliation, apologies arenotprerequisitesof
international reconciliation. Forgetting,denying, or glorifying
past atrocities nonetheless tend to elevate threat perception and
inhibitreconciliationininternationalrelations,assuchpracticessignalcontemptforvictimisedcountry’speople,its
status in international society, and the future of the bilateral
relationship between the
formerperpetratorandvictimstate(Lind2008:9,13).TypicallyforIR’spredispositiontofollowthepower(ful),representationsofthepastinformerperpetratorstateshavereceivedmoreattentionthanthoseinthevictimisedstates(butcf.Gustafsson2014;Mälksoo2009).Russia’smnemopoliticalpredicamentisallthemorecomplicatedforitstickingofbothboxesconcurrently.ParaphrasingAlexanderEtkind(2009:184),Russia’spost-communistreckoningwiththeStalinistterrorhasthusasifamountedtocomingtotermswiththesuicide(cf.Viola2013).
Altogether, the effects of historical memory on international
relations range from
indirect(throughshapingidentitiesandvaluesthattheforeignpolicymakersbringintotheprocessofdecision-making)
to concrete historical ‘lessons’ and analogies drawn on inmaking a
particular foreign
policydecision(Müller2002;Lebow,Kansteiner,Fogu2006;Olick2007;Langenbacher2010:38-39).MemorynonethelessremainsgenerallyunderestimatedinIRexplanationsofstatebehaviourintheinternationalsystem
(Neumann 2013: 24). Anne Clunan (2009) has offered one of the few
systematic attempts toincorporate temporality,historicalmemory,
andaspirations into theexplanationof
theemergenceofstate’snationalinterestsandstatus-seekingininternationalpoliticsontheexampleofRussia.Whileheraspirationalconstructivisttheoryremainssomewhatmarredbythepresumptionofessentiallyrationally-mindedforeignpolicymakers,theobservationthat‘thepastselfcanserveasthekeyidentitystandard,particularlyintimesofchange,andthepastbecomesthebenchmarkagainstwhichtheselfattemptstoverifyitspresentidentity’(Clunan2009:27)isinsightfulformygeneralobjectivetoestablishthecausalnexusbetweenTJandforeignpolicybywayofathickdescriptionofthepost-communistRussiancase.Promptedbythelimitationsoftheexistingliterature,myaccountfollowsthereasoningofthescholarshipemphasisingthecentralityofstatus,recognitionandinternationalstandingforstates’senseofontologicalsecurity(cf.Lebow2008;Clunan2009;Zarakol2010),inordertounpacktheuniquechallengespresentedbytheemergingglobalnormativeexpectationsrelatedtoTJonsustainingtheinternationalstateidentityinquestion.
Hence,thisstudyrelatestobroadertheoreticaldebatesinthesocialsciencesandlawabouttheinfluenceofinternationalnormsonthedomesticpoliciesandpracticesofstates(FinnemoreandSikkink1998;
Risse and Sikkink 1999; Simmons 2009; Hafner-Burton 2013; Posner
2014). Capitalising on
thestudiesofstigmatisationininternationalsociety(Zarakol2011,2014;Adler-Nissen2014)andimpelledbycallsforamodeldescribinghowsocietiesendupbeingontologicallyinsecure(seeMorozov2015:57),Iintendtomovethedebateforwardinanumberofways.BesidesseekingtoaccountforhowTJinfluencesforeignpolicy,anotherimportantquestionconcernstheinternalvsexternalsourcesofRussia’slong-timedifficultiesrelatedtoacknowledgingthecriminallegacyofitspredecessor(cf.Zarakol2010,2011,2014).Thepropositiontoexamineindepthtowhatextenttheallegedlyglobal(ising)normofTJ(seeTeitel2014)isactuallysharedbyRussia(asastateaswellassocietally)ispremisedontheideathatthewayRussiahasbeenbroughtintotheframeworkofthenormativeexpectationsassociatedwithcomingtotermswithone’spasthasmajor
repercussions for its perceivedplaceandposture in contemporary
internationalsociety. Interlinking the adoption of particular
TJmeasures and state’s ontological security-seeking ininternational
politics therefore improves the understanding of system-level
conditions enabling ordisabling state’s reckoning with the
antecedent regime’s legacy. I depart from the assumption
thatRussia’senduringinabilitytoclearlydistinguishitscurrentpredicamentfromtheproblematicchaptersofitsSovietpasthassignificantlycontributedtothecountry’sentanglementintheroutinelyantagonisticbehaviourinitsimmediateneighbourhoodandincreasinglyvis-à-vistheWestatlarge.
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4. Post-SovietRussia:WhatKindofTransitionandPoliticsofTJ?
InordertodeterminetheinternationalimplicationsofRussia’spoliticalhandlingofitscommunistpast,theconceptualassumptionswhichhaveguidedRussia’spost-communistdealingwiththe
legacyof itsantecedent regime should be established first. These
include Russians’ conceptualisations of
thetransitionfromcommunism(aswellastowhatexactly;thejuryisstillout)andRussia’slimitedadoptionofTJrepertoire.OnlythenitbecomespossibletoaccountforthewaysthedomesticmodelofreckoningwiththerepressivelegacyoftheSovietregimehasbeentranslatedintoRussianforeignpolicydiscourseandpracticefromGorbachevtoPutin’sthirdterm.
The study of political transitions in CP and IR tends to focus
on states in transit,
generallyunderstandingpoliticsthroughanarrowinstitutionalistlens,andthusdemonstratingmoreoftenthannotan
alarming lack of experiential depth in making sense of what a
transition really means for thecommunities inquestion (but
cf.Oushakine2009). Thishasbeen thegistof
criticismdirectedagainstvariousapproachesoftransitionalpoliticsdrawingonthemodernisationtheory,allegedlysubscribingtoevolutionaryWesternisation‘inthesenseofbelievingintheneedoftransitionsocietiestocatchupwithandmodelthemselvesafterWesternsocietyanditsbasicinstitutions’(Kollmorgen2013:89).Contratheassumptions
of transitioning towards a fixed model as the bulk of literature on
post-communistdemocratisationpresumes(seeWydra2008:14-15),adoptingaliminalperspectivetoRussia’stransitionfromcommunismenablestoaddresstheconcretepracticesofthoseintransitionwithoutdepoliticisingtheir
particular historical experiences in the course of the allegedly
teleological move toward
auniversalisednormativeandpoliticalmodel(suchasliberaldemocracy).
Thisisimportantforlivedexperiencehasatransformativeeffectonhumanbeingsandthelargersocialcirclestheyarepartofinvariousways(Wydra2015:97).Theliminalexperiencehenceencapsulatesthetransformationofsubjectivityincourseofapassagetoan‘otherworld’(Thomassen2014:16).Regimetransitions
when people are initiated into new forms of authority are therefore
not just politicaltransformations but ‘total social facts, liminal
situations where the twomain aspects of
experiencescoincideinthe„objective”characterofamajorsuddenevent,andthe„subjective”perspectiveofhowthiseventwaslivedthroughbytheindividualsundergoingthechanges’(Wydra2009:92;seealsoWydra2007:51-54).Thetryingexperienceoftransitionbrimswithpossibledangersnotonlyforthosedirectlypartakingit,butalsopotentiallydefyingtheoverallstructureoftheexistingorder.Asliminalsubjectsfallin-betweenestablishedstructuresandhierarchies,theyinherentlychallengethem,therebyappearingasthreatening
to thoseconcernedwith theirmaintenance
(Turner1969;cf.Rumelili2003:219;
seealsoRumelili2012).Applyingthelensofliminalityforstudyinginternationaltransitionsthereforeforcesustorethinktheroleofagencyinthepoliticsoftransitionandtakenoteoftheimplicitandexplicithierarchiesat
play. It compels us to be attentive to what actually happens in the
course of large-scale
politicaltransitions;whoaresubjectedtothetransitionandconsequenttransformationbywhom;andwhatistheroleofthetransitionalordealinshapinganascentpoliticalcommunityinaparticularway.Anytransitionnaturallyraisesthequestionofitsultimatedirectionandtelos,aswellasthewayofitsconduct(Buckley-Zisteletal.2014,p.5).Indeed,
theverynotionoftransitionimpliesakindofteleology:wealwaystransit‘towards’something,andinthepost-ColdWarera…thepoliticalhorizonwasalwaysdefinedassomeformofliberaldemocracy:aplural,openregime,tolerantofdiversity,andnotpubliclydependentonanymetaphysicalconceptionoftruthormorality(Andrieu2014:97).
Insteadofapre-determinedvisionofapost-transitionpoliticalcommunity,liminalityrecognisesthephaseoftransitionasthefoundingpoliticalmomentwherein‘anewdemos,anewwe,iscreatedthroughtheconstruction
of a new social vision and a new order’ (Renner 2013: 160; cf.
Schaap 2006). Liminality
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embracesthefundamentalambiguityandunpredictabilityoflarge-scalesocietaltransitions.Thenotionof
liminality entails a cyclical rather than progressive understanding
of international politics and
arelationalratherthanabsoluteconceptionofpower(Wydra2015:98;Mälksoo2012).AsTurner’sfamousquipgoes,liminalityimpliesthat‘thehighcouldnotbehighunlessthelowexisted,andhewhoishighmustexperiencewhatitisliketobelow’(Turner1969:83).Whetheraddressingtheshiftfromoneregimetypetoanotherorfromwartopeace,transitionsamounttotheconcentratedmomentsof‘thepolitical’wherein
a new community is born (Edkins 1999: 3). Yet, adopting a liminal
perspective to
politicaltransitionsalsocompelsustoask‘[w]hereistheauthorityintransition’(Teitel2000:71),andtoaddresswho
exactly sets the parameters of the new normality and measures the
milestones of sufficienttransition.Against thatbackdrop,
thenotionofprotracted,orpermanent, liminality (Szakolczai
2000;Thomassen2014: 93) should likewisebe accompaniedwith a
critical discussionof forwhom the
saidcommunityisperceivedaspermanentlyliminalinordernottobecompromisedinthewaythewholesalecondemnation
of defective, unfinished or failed democracies remains vulnerable
to criticism of theallegedly uniform application of the Western
yardstick (see Wydra 2008: 2). Consequently, theattentiveness to
the liminal origins of democracy (Wydra 2009) enables to unfold the
particularistdemocraticprojectsoutsideofthe‘West’(cf.Morozov2013).
Thepresentresearchseekstoaddressthecriticismaccordingtowhich‘[e]xistingscholarshiphasnotyetcapturedtheprevailingdynamicoftransitionaljusticeoritsnexuswithongoingpoliticalchange’(Teitel2014:60).UnderstandingTJasaliminalriteofaparticularkindhasfundamentalconsequencesformakingsenseofRussia’spost-communistVergangenheitsbewältigung.Thestructureofthe(democratic)transitionisgenerallypresumedtobeofkeysignificanceinpredictingwhichTJmeasuresacountrywilladopt
inthecourseof
itscomingtotermswiththepast.Russia’spost-communisttransitionhasbeennotoriously
difficult to categorise: it does not fit effortlessly into the
categories of
transformation,negotiatedtransitionorrupture(Calhoun2004:146).‘TheSoviet-Russianmodeoftransitionwasneitherimposednorpacted.Nohegemonicpowerspelledoutnewrulesofthegameforotherstofollow,’MichaelMcFaul(2001:123)similarlymaintains.Russiancasepokestheverynatureoftransitionin‘transitionaljustice’:whileRussiahascertainlyundergoneachangeofpowersincetheSovietera,itremainsanopenquestionhowsubstantive,infact,thischangehasbeen(asepitomised,inparticular,bythecontinuityandsignificance
of the internal state security structures, or the KGB-FSB
continuity in post-Soviet
Russia).Historically,Russiahasgenerallybeenviewedasa‘landoftransition’oranintermediarybetweentwoworlds
(cf. Koschmal 2008). Its postcommunist transition has incarnated
its subjugation to
constantmeasurementofitsEuropeancredentialsandostensibledeviancefromaliberaldemocraticmodelor‘theWest’
more generally (cf. Prozorov 2009). The 1990s, in particular, have
emerged as a period
ofheightenedliminalityinRussia’spostcommunisttransition,asthisdecadeisoftencharacterisedintermsof‘timelessness’(bezvremenie),‘averitableblackholeinbetweenthecollapseoftheSovietorderandthereassertionoftheRussianstateunderPresidentPutin’(Prozorov2009:40);‘aperiodofmomentouschangewithout
end’; ‘an uncomfortable time out of time’ standing for ‘the
revolutionarymoment offoundation’(ibid.:42-43).Indeed,
thisperiodcondensesamultiplicityoftimes,unitinginasingledecadeallthatmighthavehappened,allpossibilities
of Russia’s political development, and suspending themat the
verymomentwhen a
singlemodelofthefuturelookedsettobecomeirreversible.The1990swerethereforealsoatimeoftrials,oftryingouteverypossiblepathwayoffuturedevelopmentatthesametime,withoutafinalcommitmenttoanysingleoneofthem(ibid.:46).
Yet, the lingering state of political rupture of the early
Russian experience of
postcommunismdemonstratedthat‘Russiawasnotmovinganywhereotherthanincircles’,andcertainlynottransitioningtoWestern-styledemocracyinanunequivocalsense(ibid.:45-46).
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InthecontextofTJinparticularwhichisgenerallyunderstoodasaprocessthatshouldleadtothehealingorreconciliationofasociety,thereestablishmentofhumandignityandtheruleoflawafterthe
collapse of a repressive regime, the policies post-Soviet Russia
has adopted have
remainedconspicuouslyhalf-hearted.ConsideringtheenormityofhumanrightsviolationsandmassrepressionsoftheSovietregime,Russia’sfailureatmostmechanismsofTJafterthecollapseofthecommunistorderisrather
striking. Except for the increasingly persecutedwork of theMemorial
Society,9 the piecemealrehabilitationof
thevictimsofmostseriouspolitical repressions, andmost recently,
theguardedde-Stalinisation campaign of the Medvedev administration,
Russia’s reckoning with its
predecessor’srepressivelegacyhasremainedeclectic,ifnotoutrightrevisionistduringthePutinera(Khapaeva2016).Whilethecountrywentthrougharadicalpoliticaltransitionintheearly1990s,mostTJmechanismsneverreallytookholdaspartoftheRussianpoliticsoftransition.Mostconspicuously,Russiahasessentiallyignored
the question of punishing perpetrators of the political repressions
and gross human
rightsviolationsofitsantecedentregime(seefurtherNuzov2014).Putin’spoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpast,inparticular,hasbeendenouncedasaimedatconstructinganewnationalmythologyofthepositivelegaciesof
thecommunistperiod inRussianhistory, ratherthanaccounting for
therepressionsof
theantecedentregime.Whilehumanrightsorganisations,suchastheMemorialSociety,havedugintothesocialmemoryofcommunisminearnesteversincethegradualcollapseoftheSovietsystem,thepoliticaleliteshavegenerallyavoidedcontemplatingissuesofresponsibilityandguiltinthecontextofWorldWarII,theSovietsuppressionofRussia’sneighbouringnationsandstates,andmassrepressionsinflictedontheRussian
nation itself. The preferred frameof public remembrance regarding
the violent legacy ofcommunism has been the victimhood if not
outright martyrdom of the Russian people.10 There is
aprevalenttendencytoevadequestionsofaccountabilitybyforegroundingtheimmensityoftheRussians’own
suffering under the Soviet regime (Mälksoo 2015b). The overall
Russian approach to Stalinistrepressions (aswell as later human
rights violations by the Soviet regime) has been characterised
asvictim-based,notperpetrator-centric(seefurtherRoginski2008).Still,theprospectofbuildinganofficialcentralmonumenttothevictimsofpoliticalrepressionsinRussiahasbecomerealisticonlyrecently.11
ConsideringthelengthoftheSovietcommunistregime,thevaryingdegreeofitsrepressivenessthroughoutitsseventyyearsofexistence,andthestutterednatureofRussia’spost-communisttransitiontowardsamoredemocraticformofgovernment,theattentivenesstowardsthetemporaldimensioninRussia’spost-communistVergangenheitsbewältigung
becomescrucial.While in
theoryTJmechanismsaimtoestablishacleardistinctionbetween‘now’and‘then’bybridging‘aviolentorrepressivepastandapeaceful,democraticfuture’(Nagy2008:80),states’engagementwiththepasttendstobeconsiderablymurkierandmorespreadoutonatemporalscaleingeneral.PettaiandPettai(2015)haveofferedthemostrecentandanalyticallyconvincingdistinctionbetweendifferenttemporalitiesoftruthandjusticeseeking,
highlighting how transitions and TJ happen in ‘bouts and waves’.
They distinguish betweentransitional justice, or the immediate
reckoning with the crimes, repression, and wrongdoing of theregime
that has just been toppled from power, retrospective justice,
referring to truth and
justiceinitiativesvis-à-vistheearlywrongdoingsofthepreviousregimethatlastedformanydecades,andfurtheryet,post-transitionaljustice–thatis,theemergenceorintensificationoftruthandjusticeprocesseslongafterademocratictransitionisover(PettaiandPettai2015:22-31).IntheRussiancase,transitionaljusticewouldaccordinglydemarcatethereckoningwiththerepressive
legacyoftheBrezhnevandKhruscheveras(andnotforgettingtheshort-livedAndropovandChernenko’sreigns,ofcourse)immediatelyafterthe
collapse of the communist regime, while the measures of
retrospective justice engage with the
9
Foranimportantgrassrootsinitiative,seealsothe‘lastaddress’project(www.poslednyiadress.ru).10AsfamouslycapturedbySergeyKaraganov’s‘RussiaisonelargeKatyn’(seeKaraganov2010,2011).11
Seefurtherhttp://konkurs.gmig.ru/(accessedJune5,2016).
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Stalinist crimesand repressions, andpost-transitional justice
signifies themost recentmnemopoliticalinitiatives, such as the
project on the ‘Perpetuation of theMemory of theVictims of the
TotalitarianRegimeandNationalReconciliation’launchedtwentyyearsafterRussia’spost-communistregimechangebythethen-presidentDmitriMedvedev.12Suchatemporallynuancedapproachenablestosignificantlytemper
thewhole-scale reduction of stalled or protracted processes of
reckoningwith the past to
asocietaldiagnosisof‘stuckinpermanenttransition’aswellasyieldamoregradatedanalysisoftheallegedTJ-foreignpolicy
linkage.Russiaoffersaparticularlyengagingcasefortestingthesuggestiontosolidlyincorporatetemporality
intotheanalysisof truthand justiceprocesses.
ItsrecentlyadoptedpolicyoncondemningattemptstojustifymassSovietrepressionaddsanintriguingnewtwisttothissequence.13
TakingacuefromPettaiandPettai(2015),anattempttomakesenseoftheTJmeasuresRussiahasadoptedsincethegradualdisintegrationofthecommunistregimewouldneedtofocusonthepoliticsof
their emergence, contestation and implementation. That would
necessitate, first, a
systematicdescriptionofthefullspectrumofhistoricaltruthandjustice-seekingmeasuresadoptedintheRussianFederationsinceperestroika.Theprocess-tracingoftherelativelymeagrelistofTJmeasuresadoptedinRussia
should be supplemented with a comprehensive account of the
country’s post-communistdiscourses on how to come to terms with the
communist past (distinguishing between its
political,academic,andpublic/popularlayers).InRussia’scase,therearenotmanyadoptedTJmeasuresalongthecriminal-judicialandpolitical-administrativeaxistoscrutinise.ThepresenceofTJhasbeenmostpalpableinregardtostate-ledpoliciesinvolvingthesymbolic-representationalacknowledgementofvictims.Yet,the
reasoning given for the dismissal of particular TJ policies by the
political leadership, aswell as inbroader societal debates on which
measures would actually be desirable, and which
allegedlycounterproductive for the society’s and state’s healing
and moving on (which are not
necessarilyoverlappinggoals)aremostinterestingformakingbettersenseofRussia’schoicesinregardtoitspoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpastand,consequently,theireffectsonRussianforeignpolicydiscourseandpractice.Asthesechoices
illuminateRussianunderstandingsofhumanrights,ruleof law,the
‘proper’relationshipbetweenstateandsociety,thenormativeconvergenceordivergencefromtheexpectationsoftheemergingnormofTJ,andrelatedly,theperceivedplaceofthecountryininternationalsociety,theyhavefundamentalforeignpolicy
implications.Thesuggestionthat`Russia’spermanentandsometimesagonizingquestforidentity’hasbeenthe‘ultimatelymostpoignantinfluence’onRussianforeignpolicy(Legvold2007:20)isparticularlyevocativeinthiscontext.
To further contextualiseRussia’s post-communist politics of TJ,
international discourseon
thedesiredaimsandmeansofRussia’sreckoningwiththedarkerlegaciesofthecommunistregimeshouldbe
summarisednext. This step should enable tooffer a close readingof
the interactionbetween
thenormativeexpectationsoftheinternationalcommunity(pro‘theWest’)onaproperwayofhandlingtheviolentlegaciesofthepastregimeandRussia’sowndomesticdebatesontheissuethroughoutthe1990sand
2000s to this date.14 Russia’s hurdles with coming to terms with
its communist past have been12
AnintriguingquestionfromtheviewpointofthistaxonomyconcernsthecategorisationofKhrushchev’sexposureofStalinistcrimesinthe20thand22ndCPSUCongresses(in1956and1961,respectively),aswellasthetrialsofBeriaandanumberofsecretpolicebossesandNKVDinterrogatorsin1953-1955,alongwiththeearlyrehabilitationmeasures
towards the victims of Stalinist repressions (for a detailed
overview, seeNuzov 2014: 284-93; for
anexcellentbroaderculturaldiscussion,seeJones2006,2013).13 See
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/new-policy-on-commemorating-victims-of-repression-at-odds-with-actions/528254.html(accessedJune5,2016).14
This resonates with Vincent Pouliot’s ‘sobjectivist’ methodology,
combining induction (in order to
recoversubjectivemeanings),theobjectificationofmeanings intheir
intersubjectivecontext,andtheirsettinginmotionthroughhistoricization(Pouliot2007:360).
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exacerbatedbythelackofaclearlydistinguishable‘self’towhichRussiacouldhavereturnedafterthecollapseof
theSovietUnion inorder to sustain theconsistencyof its collective
‘selfhood’. It ishardlysurprising, against that backdrop, that
contemporary Russia’s state-sanctioned politics vis-à-vis
itsrelationshiptotheSovietpastmightbedescribedasambivalent,tosaythe
least.Victory
intheGreatPatrioticWarandthemasscrimesoftheveryStalinistregimethatgovernedandledthecountrythroughthat
war sit uneasily together in the modern Russian mnemonical
template, marking the poles
ofontologicalsecurityandinsecurity,respectively.Russia’sdifficultiesinreckoningwiththecommunistpasthavebeenmagnifiedbythecomplicateddemandsoffacingthe‘otherinoneself’asunliketheCentralandEastEuropeannations,Russianshave
lacked theoption to lay theblameonsomeoneother thanthemselves. As
Zarakol (2010: 4) has suggested in the context of Japan and Turkey,
intersubjectivepressurestohandleone’spastinaparticularwaymattermoreattimeswhentraditionalself-routinesarebroken–andaremorelikelytocreateontologicalinsecurityoutsidetheWest.Againstthatbackdrop,itmight
be reasonable to claim that Russia’s difficulties in fully
reckoningwith its forebear’s legacy arerelated to
thecomplicateddemandsofontological securitydue to the still
continuingopennessof
itsinternationalbelonging(cf.Zarakol2010:6).Russia’sgeneralnon-compliancewiththeWesternnormofTJreflectsitssensitivitytowardstheparticularoriginofthatnorm(cf.Zarakol2014:313).Atthesametime,itsoccasionalemulationoftheTJdiscourserevealsanequalobsessionwiththecountry’sperceivedpositioninthesociallystratifiedinternationalsocietyofestablishedandstillliminalmembers.
Grounding Russia’s international behaviour in the analysis of
the political handling of
itscommunistpastdovetailswitharecentargumentmadeinthecontextofRussianapproachtomilitaryintervention,accordingtowhich‘theRussianviewofglobalnormsandlaw…interactsinsignificantwayswithconceptionsof
regionalanddomesticstateorder’ (Allison2013:18;cf.
L.Mälksoo2015).Asanypolicyastatepursuesinternationallyislikelytobeatleastinformedby,orreflectiveof,thecareforitsontologicalsecurityoraconsistencyofits‘self’,itisimportanttoavoidgettingcaughtinthetautologicaltrapandtryingtocoveressentiallyeverything.Iwillthereforeconcentrate,inmyfurtherstudy,onthreecoreforeignpolicyareas.Theseinclude:(i)Russia’srelationswithitsformerSovietsubjugatestates;(ii)Russia’sinternationalpoliticsonhumanrightsandstateresponsibility,and(iii)Russia’shistoricaljusticediscoursespursuedinvariousinternationalfora.ThefirstsphereenablestoaddressRussia’sreflexesofimperialoversight
intheformerSovietspace, including
itsattemptedcontroloverthemnemopoliticaldevelopmentsincountrieslikePoland,theBalticstates,UkraineandGeorgia.Russia’sbehaviourtowardsitsformerSovietsubjugatestatesinEasternEuropeoffers,inturn,potentiallyinterestinginsightsaboutitsself-positioningvis-à-vistheWest.IfwearetofollowOrlandoFiges(2002:415),accordingtowhomthereis‘theRussiantendencytodefinetheirrelationswiththeEastinreactiontotheirself-esteemandstatusintheWest’,Russia’srefusaltoparticipateintheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyonparwithitsformerimperialperiphery(suchasUkraineorGeorgia)issymptomaticofitsontologicalinsecurityvis-à-visitspost-Sovietstatusininternationalsociety.TheanalysisofRussia’sbilateralrelationswithitsformerSovietsubjugatestatesfurtherallowstodemonstrateitscasualinheritingoftheusefulbitsoftheUSSRfor
its international presence, and the concurrent strategic silences
(cf. Knutsen 2016) on the moreproblematic chapters of the Soviet
past, including theMolotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the
consequentoccupationandannexationofcertainEasternEuropeanstatesinthecourseofWorldWarII.AsTJpertainsdirectly
to the norm of accountability, its way of adoption has potentially
intriguing implications
forRussia’spoliticsofhumanrightsandstateresponsibilityat large.The
latter is, inRussia’scase,mainlyunderstood geopolitically, with
reference to special international responsibilities of great powers
incomparisontotheinsignificanceofsmallstates,ratherthanviaendorsingcertaininternationalnorms.Inaddition
to investigating Russia’s little-studied perspective on the ICC, I
will pay special attention
toRussia’shistoricaljusticediscoursesaspursuedinvariousinternationalfora(e.g.,theUN,OSCE).Thelogicofthischoicedepartsfromtheassumptionaccordingtowhichgreatpowersareparticularlymotivatedto
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reproduceattheinternationallevelthevaluesenshrinedintheirdomesticpoliticalcultures(seeMorris2005).
The international implications of Russia’s political handling of
its communist past couldconsequently be delineated on bilateral,
regional, and global levels. The first dimension would,
forinstance,refertoRussia’sguardedlyregretfulstanceadoptedtowardstheKatynmassacreinitsrelationswithPolandsince2010,aswellasanumberofbilateral‘historycommissions’establishedinrecentyearswith
Poland, Ukraine, Latvia and Lithuania. Russia’s state commission to
counteract attempts of‘falsification of history to the detriment of
Russia’s interests’, legislation on the legitimate frames
ofremembering the roleof theUSSR inWorldWar II (i.e.Art.354.1.of
theRussianCriminalCode),andhandlingoftherelevantcasesattheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)(e.g.,Kononovv.Latvia)havetheirwiderresonanceintheEasternEuropeanregionaswellasa‘backlooping’effectforRussia’sdomesticpolitics(e.g.,considertherecentrulingoftheRussianConstitutionalCourtontheprecedenceof
theRussian constitutionover the decisions of the ECtHR) (Mälksoo
forthcoming). These
‘mini-casestudies’willthusbeanimportantpartofthebroadercasestudyontheRussianTJ-foreignpolicylinkage.Atthegloballevel,IwillinvestigatethewaysRussia‘translates’itsexperienceswithcomingtotermswiththecommunistpasttointernationalinstitutions,bypursuingparticularideasofhistoricaljusticeinvariousinternationalfora,rangingfromtheOSCEandtheCouncilofEuropetotheUnitedNations.Theseinclude,forexample,Russia’sfightagainstneo-NazismintheUNanditsrefutationoftheEastEuropeanpoliciescallingfortheinternationalcondemnationof’communistcrimes’inOSCEandtheCouncilofEurope(seefurtherMälksoo2014).
IlyaPrizel’s (1998: 246) verdict that ‘[m]ostRussianshave found it
difficult
toacceptcomparisonsbetweentheUSSRandthedefeatedfascistpowers’stillholds,asillustratedbythereactiontotheUkrainiancrisisperhapsmorefirmlythaneversincethecollapseoftheSovietregime.Itthusbecomesurgentto
investigatehowprecisely
thepracticesofTJathomehavebeenconnectedtospecificnotionsofsecurity,justiceandorderininternationalpolitics.15
5. UnpackingtheTJ-FPNexus:WhichCausality?
How shouldwe then best examine the conditioning causal power of
state’s truth and justice-seekingpoliciesover its
foreignpolicydiscourses and international action?A
cursoryoverviewof
theexistingliteratureconfirmsthatatheoryconnectinghistoricalmemoryandstate’sconsequentpracticeofTJtoitsforeignpolicyisclearlyoverdue.Mymainaimistocontributetoourunderstandingofthewayinwhichthe
(lack of) reckoningwith the antecedent regime’s human rights
violations affects foreign policy.
Iunderstandthelatterasacombinationofstate’sself-visionanditsvisionofitsplaceintheworld;thatis,as
entailing a foreign policy or security imaginary (Weldes 1999;
Mälksoo 2010; Guzzini 2012b), arespective foreign policy doctrine,
and state’s consequent international practice. ‘Foreign policy’
thusrefersbothtothebasicdefenceofaparticularnotionofstate’s‘self’withininternationalsocietyaswellasthenormativeprojectionofitsvaluesandideasattheinternationallevel.Isuggestthatanalysingthereasonsprovidedfortheadoptionornon-adoptionofspecifictruthandjustice-seekingmeasuresenablestotracktheemergenceofRussia’spost-communiststateidentitywhich,inturn,contributestowardsasociologicallyrichandthickunderstandingofthesourcesofstate’sinternationalconduct(cf.Campbell1998;Hansen2006).Studyingtheimpactofstate’sTJpolicyonitsforeignpolicyconsequentlyallowsforengagingwithdeepercausalontologyoftheemergenceandevolutionofstateforeignpolicy.Itakethe
15Think, for instance,ofGorbachev´spoliciesofglasnost and ´new
thinking´–andhis ideaofa comprehensivesecurityinEurope.
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domestic and international levels to be ontologically
intertwined, or fundamentally connected,
andthereforealsoanalyticallynotsoclearlyseparablelevelsofanalysisininternationalpolitics(cf.Kurki2008:252).Thehypothesisedcausalrelationshipbetweenstate’sTJandforeignpoliciesisnotunderstoodasasinglemono-causalityintheempiricist-positivisttraditionofconceptualisingcausation.InsteadofastrictHumeanunderstandingofcause,
I followMiljaKurki’s (2008)Aristotelian ‘deepened’and
‘broadened’conceptualisationofcauseinmyexplorationofthecausallogicsgoverningstate’sTJandforeignpolicies.
Kurkiexemplifiesheraccountofcausationininternationalpoliticsviaacriticaldiscussionofthecore
question animating the extensive literature on ‘Democratic Peace’
(i.e. ‘does democracy
causepeace?’).Contratraditionaltaxonomicalindexationoftheconceptofdemocracythroughachecklistofquantifiablecharateristicsandagainstthegrainoftheassumptionaboutdemocraciesbeingessentiallythesamethroughtime,Kurkiproposestostartwithasking‘detailedquestionsabouthowdemocracieswork
institutionally, socially and historically’ (2008: 271). In the
context of the present research,
thistranslatesintonotmerelycheckingRussia’sfittingornon-fittingwiththevariousmatrixesofTJmeasures,but
providing a thick, multi-level description, how reckoning with the
communist-era human
rightsviolationsandinternationalcrimeshasbeenactuallyunderstoodinRussia;howthisunderstandinghaschangedthroughoutthepost-communistperiod(includingperestroikayearsasaparticularlyvolatileanddiscursivelyilluminatingstageofimmediatetransitionbetweentheSovietregimeandthenewRussianstate);
and which reasonings have framed various TJ-related moves? Coupling
Russia’s respectiveunderstandings and state- and society-led truth
and justice-seeking initiatives with its historicalsensitivities
towards (alleged)Western stigmatisation and orientalisation of
Russia (cf. Zarakol
2011;Neumann1999)recognisesthecomplexinternational-domesticdynamicsatplayinboththeemergenceofthecountry’struthandjustice-seekingpoliciesathomeandtheirinternationalreverberations.Inthespiritof‘how’causality(cf.Vennesson2008:232),thisstudyisinterestedindetermininghowtheadoptionornon-adoptionofvariousTJmeasuresiscausalforstate’sinternationaloutlookandbehaviour,aswellas
concrete foreign policies in particular areas, and how the
reckoningwith the antecedent regime’shuman rights violations
interacts with other causal forces affecting state’s foreign
policy. How
weinterpretactors’motivesandperceptionsintheprocessisclearlyofkeyhere–whichiswhytheresearchapproachadoptedinthisstudyfallsunderhistoricallyinformedinterpretivemethodology.
Theproposedapproachthusreachesbeyondestablishingregularitiesbetweenindependentanddependentvariablesandseeks
toengage inmoresociologicallyandhistoricallygrounded
interpretiveanalysisofcausalrelations(seefurtherKurki2008:272).Itdepartsfromanunderstandingthatdifferentcausesofstate’sforeignpolicyconductaredeeplyintertwined.Therefore,theactivepowersofagents(ortheso-calledefficientcauses)needtoberelatedtofinalcauses(purposesandreasoningsprovidedbyactors,theanalysisoftheirintentionality)andcontextualisedwithinthe‘constitutive’conditioningcausalpowersofrulesandnormsaswellasmaterialconditions(ibid.:296-7).Thecausaleffectofstate’struthand
justice-seeking policies on its foreign policy are hypothesised to
followmost closely the logic ofAristotelian formal causes, that is,
structures, ideas, rules, norms, or generally ‘ways of
thinking’‘accordingtowhich’sociallifeismade’(forinstance,bytheagents’formingoftheiridentities,intentions,decisions,andactions).Thiseffectisthusdistinctfromthatofmaterialconditions(‘outof’)aswellasfromtheextrinsiccauses,suchasefficient(actor/action‘bywhich’)andfinalcauses(reason/purpose‘forthesake
of’) (ibid.: 220-4). Following the Aristotelian conception of
formal cause, the causal
relationshipbetweenstate’sTJandforeignpoliciesisaccordinglysuggestedtobeof‘constrainingandenabling’type,ratherthananactive‘pushingandpulling’-kindofcause(ibid.:225).Russia’spoliciesofreckoningwithitsantecedent
regime’s human rights violations and international crimes is
consequently taken to be
acontextualcauseconditioningthecountry’sinternationaloutlookandpracticesinaparticularwayratherthanactivelybringingaboutconcreteeffects.By‘constrainingandenabling’Russia’sforeignpolicymaking
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agents, the country’s post-communist politics of truth and
justice-seeking has provided a
specificcontextualcontext,meaningandconditionsofpossibilityforparticularempiricalpatternsinthecountry’sforeignpolicy(cf.WeldesandDuvall2001:196).Theaccountofthecausaleffectsstate’sTJpolicyhasonitsforeignpolicythereforeneedstobedeeplyandthicklycontextual,payingalsoattentiontoalternativechainsofcausation,theirmechanisms,processesandenablingconditions.Moreover,theconstitutivepartofcausation(astraditionallydubbedinconstructivistliterature)whichistheprimarysourceofidentitiesandvalues(which,inturn,aremaindeterminantsofhumanbehaviour)needstobeaccountedforaswell(seeLebow2014:148-9).
In terms of social scientific approach, the present endeavour is
located within the criticalconstructivist and poststructuralist
traditions in IR which are interested in the constitution of
actoridentitiesandthe intersubjectiveconstructionof
theenablingconditions for their
internationalaction(e.g.,Weldes1999;Neumann1999).Theresearchapproachfallsunderhistoricallyinformedinterpretivemethodologywhichinvolvesacarefulreconstructionofhistoricalcontextandactors’narratives(Pouliot2007).Asinterpretivismseekstounearththemeaningofhumanexperience,including‘thevariationsinpossiblemeaningsforgivenevents,howmeaningismadethroughknowledgeconstruction,howpowerandethicsconstitutemeaning,the
implicationsofmeaningforpoliticalandsocialphenomena’ (Lynch2014:
2), it is particularly well-suited for the current study. I take
agency to be located within theconstraints imposed by the
structural space, and social action to be contingent on time,
space,
andcontext.Theapproachunderliningtheanalysisofthisprojectmovesbackandforthbetweeninductiveanddeductivereasoning,16pinpointingthesocialcontextoutofwhichpolicyoutcomesarise.Ibegin,ontheonehand,withasetoftheoreticalassumptions,analysedthroughempiricalevidencesubsequentlygenerated,andturnthenbacktogeneratingbroadertheoreticalclaimsonthebasisofthecase-studymaterial.Myanalytical‘toolbox’combinespoststructuralistdiscourseanalysis(Hansen2006;Hopf2002;Milliken
1999; Torfing 1999, 2005) and interpretive process-tracing (Guzzini
2011, 2012; see also
Ish-Shalom’s2006modelofdiscourse-tracing;17cf.BennettandCheckel2015;GeorgeandBennett2005).Theformerenablestoavoidanthropomorphisationofthestateandthenecessitytotranslateemotionsfrom
the individual to state level (Morozov 2015: 60). The latter,
meanwhile, takes the diverseinterpretations actors themselves give
to their state identity disjuncture (shaping consequently
bothstate’s truthand justice-seekingand foreignpolicies) as the
startingpointof theanalysis (see
furtherGuzzini2012,fullvolume).Carefulempiricalcheckingofhowparticularinputshavebecometranslatedintopolicyresponsesenablestocontroltheriskofequifinality18andspuriousrelationships(Guzzini2012a:4).
This is done by adopting Lebow’s model of inefficient causation – a
multi-step searching
forconnectionsbetweenandamongcausesatmultiplelevelsofinquiry(Lebow2014:65).Asanelaborationofsingularcausation,Lebow’sapproachoffersadetailedvariationonthethemeofhow-causality,seekingtoaccountforhowvariousframesofreference,processes,mechanisms,andotherfeaturesofcontext(suchasconfluences,actorgoals,and
interactions)mayberesponsibleforparticularoutcomes(ibid.).Importantly,
this kind of causal analysis is wary of determining a single,
original cause for specificoutcomes. Causes remain hypothesised as,
at the end of the day, ‘there is no way of effectively
16 Foragoodrecenttakeoncombiningthetwo,seeBlagden(2016).17
Thatis,analysingtheprocessinwhichonekindofdiscoursetransformsintoanother,orhowtheacademicandtheoreticdiscoursebecomesapublicandpoliticalone‘shapingtheunderstandingofworldpolitics,thusframingthemenuofacceptablepolicies’(Ish-Shalom2006:566-7).18
Equifinality refers to the possibility that the same outcome may
have been reached by following ‘severalexplanatorypaths,
combinationsandsequences’ (GeorgeandBennett2005:20).Theoretically,
inorder
tokeepequifinalityundercontrol,allpossiblealternativecausalpathsthatcouldhaveproducedthesameoutcomewouldhavetobechecked(seeGuzzini2015).
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establishing causation’ (ibid.: 144; emphasismine). Inefficient
causation therefore aims at
developing‘layeredaccountsofhumanbehaviourinlieuoflaw-likestatements’,highlightingthatoutcomes(alongwiththeirmeanings)arecontextdependent(ibid.:146;cf.Guzzini2015).FollowingLebow,IhypothesiseRussia’s
idiosyncratic approach to TJ to be a necessary but insufficient
condition for explaining
thecountry’spost-Sovietforeignpolicydynamics.
SinceRussia’spost-SovietTJandforeignpoliciesshareaconstitutivecrisisaboutcontinuousstateidentity,
I propose to examine the alleged linkage between TJ and foreign
policy from an ontologicalsecurity perspective. Ontological
security concerns the sense of confidence the self has in its
owncontinuity(Browning2016;Kinnvall2004:746).ThissensewasobviouslysignificantlyshakeninRussia’scasewith
thecollapseof theSovietUnion, leading toamajordisjuncture in state
identitydue to theinterruption of previously taken-for-granted
self-understandings and foreign policy role positions
(cf.Guzzini2012a:3).CombiningandrefiningelementsoftheontologicalsecurityresearchprogrammeinIR,mymaintheoreticalaimwiththepresentstudyistomoreclearlydefineandoperationaliseontologicalsecurity-seekingontheexampleofthemeetingpointofRussia’slimitedpoliticsofaccountabilitytowardstherepressionsofitsantecedentregimeanditspost-Sovietforeignpolicy.ItakeRussia’spoliticalhandlingof
its communist past as a theory-generative case for making sense of
the condition of
protractedliminalityincontemporaryinternationalsociety.19Thecase-studyapproachenablestofocusonempiricaldetailwithoutreducingthesocialscientificambitiontoonlytheobservable.Whileanyforeignpolicymove(and
even more so its outcomes) is overdetermined, my analytical
framework does not claim tofundamentally challenge the existing
explanations of Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policies, but
rathersupplement theexisting literaturewithanoverlooked,yet
substantivelyhighlyyieldingperspective.
Itcombinestheconceptsofnarrativeidentity,mnemonicsecurity,andprotractedliminalityensuingfromthestate’slimitedengagementwithTJanditsconsequentforeignpolicypracticeintoanovelconceptualandmethodologicalmodel(Figure1).
19
WhilemyempiricalfocusdoesnotaccommodatesystematiccomparisonwithcaseslikeJapan,China,TurkeyorIsrael,Iintendtodrawonrelevantsecondaryliteratureforcomparativeinsightstosupportmytheorygenerationambitioninspe(e.g.,Gustafsson2014,2015;Hagström2015).
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Letme now dissect each element in the suggestedmatrix in turn.
First, some parameters of
ontologicalsecurityneedtobeclarifiedinordertomaketheconceptmoreoperative.Delineatingthemnemonicdimension
instate’sbiographicalnarrative (which, in turn, constitutes
thebackboneof
itsontologicalsecuritynarration)anddrawingattentiontothenarrativesoftransitioninparticularwillyieldamorecomprehensiveandconvincinganalyticalframeworkforexaminingtheinternationalimplicationsof
a state’s domestically adopted TJ package than the existing
accounts. To operationalise state’sontological security-seeking in
international relations,or thequest for its continuous senseof
‘self’
ininternationalsociety,Iwillturntotheanalysisoftheformationandrepresentationsofstate’sbiographicalnarrativeinpolitical,academicandpublicdiscourses(Steele2008:10;Berenskoetter2014).Itakestate’sbiographical
narrative to combineboth the internal dynamics of the formationof
its so-called ‘I’ andexogenously induced production of its
so-called ‘Me’, or its social ‘self’ in international
society(Berenskoetter2014:266).TakingmycuefromBrentSteele(2008)whoseaccountofontologicalsecurity-seekingininternationalpoliticsremainsthemostdetailedtodate,Iconsiderthebiographicalnarrativetobeofcentral
importanceforstateidentity‘becauseit
isthelocusthroughwhichagents„workout”theirunderstandingofsocialsettingsandtheplacementoftheirSelvesinthosesettings’(Steele2008:7).As
endogenous identity formation processes at the domestic level are
deeply intertwined with
theengagementandreflectionoverthepertinentdiscursiveframingsbytheoutsideactors,theconfigurationofastate’s‘I’and‘Me’isentangledtotheextentnottowarrantanattemptattheiranalyticaldistinction(cf.Hopf2002).Thestoriesstatestellaboutthemselveshavebehaviouralconsequences:identitiesarenotonlytold,theyarealsoenacted.Sincestatesallegedlyseekconsistencybetweentheirself-identitynarrativesandtheirbehaviourininternationalpolitics,toincreasetheircredibilityandtodefendthemfrom
threats to that identity, foreign policy is expressive of state
identity (Steele 2008: 11).
State’sbiographicalnarrativeconstitutesandmaintainsits‘self’,givinglifetoroutinisedforeignpolicyactions(Steele2008:3).Affirmingone’sbiographicalnarrativeisparamountforstates,happening,attimes,at
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the expenseof states’material interests, or in extreme cases,
even their physical survival (cf.Mitzen2006).Narratives
andpractices send signals about state’s intentions to its
international
counterparts.Accordingly,weneedtoanalysebothdiscourseandpractice;bothwhatisbeingsaidandactuallydone.Thereadingoftextsshouldthusbecarefullycombinedwiththeprocess-tracingofparticularpolicymovesandthelinkingofdiscoursesandpolicychoicesinthefieldofTJtospecificdiscursivecounterpartsandpracticaloutcomesinthatofforeignpolicy.
Fundamentaltransitions(betheypolitical,economic,ideological,orallatonce,ashasbeenthecasewithRussia’semergencefromtheUSSR)presentspecificchallengesformaintainingstatecontinuity20andtheconsistencyofitsself-concept.21Tounderstandstate’sontologicalsecurity-seekingagainstthebackdropofamajorregimetransitionandtherelatedexpectationsto‘cometotermswiththepast’,weneed
to break state’s biographical narrative22 further down, considering
the particular
challengespresentedforitstemporalandspatialcontinuity,inturn.Ifthepurposeofabiographicalnarrativeis‘toprovidetheSelfwithknowledgeofitsplacein„theworld”,specificallytomeaningfullysituatetheSelfanddelineateitsexistenceintimeandspace,toprovideuswithanecessarysenseoforientationaboutwherewecomefrom,andwhereweare,orcouldbe,going’(Berenskoetter2014:269),themaintenanceof
themnemonic backbone linking state’s former andemerging
‘self’within its biographical
narrativebecomesofkeysignificance.‘Comingtotermswiththepast’callsfortherevisionofthestate’smnemonicvision
of itself, thus destabilising its identity and potentially
endangering its continuous agency ininternationalpolitics
(Mälksoo2015a:224). Thenormativeexpectations related to
theadoptionof
TJmeasurescansubsequentlyemergeasidentitythreatsofaspecifickind.Thestatus-relatedcostsentailedwith
coming to terms with the past are not just emotionally charged, but
have concrete
politicalconsequences.InRussia’scase,theunqualifiedrenouncingofthecommunistregimewouldhavemadeitdifficulttoconcurrently‘inherit’thedesirablelegacyoftheUSSRintheinternationalsystemasa‘statecontinuator’
(gosudarstvo-prodolzhitel’) of the Soviet Union (i.e. Russia’s
privileged position in
theinternationalsystemthroughthepermanentmembershipoftheUNSC,aswellasitsgreatpowerstatusingeneral).Againstthatbackdrop,Russia’snotoriousunarticulation,orstrategicsilence,aboutcertainproblematic
chapters in the life of this antecedent ‘self’ is not particulary
inconsistentwith the basicpremises of the OS theory (cf. Fivush
2010, Knutsen 2016). For Russia, the political handling of
itscommunistpasthasbeenfurthercomplicatedbytheadditionalchallengesthecollapseoftheantecedentregimehaspresentedfor
itsspatialcontinuity. It is inthiscontextweshould interpretPutin’s
famouswordsonthecollapseoftheSovietUnionbeingthegreatestgeopoliticalcatastropheofthetwentiethcentury(‘PoslaniePrezidenta’2005;seealsoTsygankov2013).Losingaconsiderablejunkoftheformerlyinhabitedspace,aswellasmillionsofRussiancompatriotstothenewlyindependentstatesatRussia’sbordershasforcedthecountrytofundamentallyreconsider(andthusfarnotparticularlysuccessfully)itshistoricalself-definitionasanempireratherthananation-state.
Subsequently,thestoriesstates(andsocieties)tellabouttheirexperiencesofthefundamentaltransitionsinthelifeofthecollective‘self’,comeintofocus.Narrativesoftransitionareimportanttoconsiderfortheyilluminatethestrugglesrelatedtotherevisionofthecorebiographicalnarrativeofthestateinthecontextofamajorupheavalandchange.TheyalsoshedlightontheTJchoicesthestatemakesastheybuildaconnectionbetweenapoliticalcommunity’spastwithitsfuturebyconstructingaparticular
20State‘identity’and‘continuity’areunderstoodasidenticalininternationallaw,whileIRtheoreticalschoolsassignconcretepropertiestostateidentities,suchasrationalego-drivenness,orvariousrolecharacteristics.
21Ontherelationshipbetweenpolicychangeandstatenarrativecontinuity,seeSubotić(2015).22
Cf.theunderstandingofidentityasacoherent‘narrativerepresentation’oftheself(BiallyMattern2005:129).
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normativerelation.Inthatsense,‘[t]ransitionalhistoriesarenot„meta“-narrativesbut„mini“-narratives,alwayssituatedwitinthestate’spreexistingnationalstory’(Teitel2014:109).TakingstockoftheRussiannarrativesofpost-communisttransitionneedstofactorintheeliteandpopularaccountsofthebroadershiftthatoccurredintheinternationalcontext,settingontheRussiantransition.RussianaccountsoftheendoftheColdWar(andthenatureofitsallegeddefeatthereof)willthusbeofparticularresonanceforthe
country’s contemporary foreign policy reasonings and choices,
ranging from Russia’s position
onNATOenlargementtoitsassessmentofthegeneralnormativedynamicsininternationalsociety.HowhasthemeaningofRussia’s
transition from theUSSRbeenarticulatedwithin the country’s
foreignpolicydiscussionswillthusbetheguidingquestionforthisstageofanalysis.
Establishingthelinkbetweenstate’stransitionalnarrativesanditsapproachtowardsTJlogicallyfollows.
It is my core assumption that unpacking state’s application of
particular TJ measures incombinationwith a close examination of its
transitional narratives provides an excellent window for‘reading’
the said state’s identity, discursively and in practice. As the
bottom-line
poststructuralistargumentgoes,identitiesarebestrevealedattheirlimits,orborders.Consequently,itisfairtopresumethat
the delineation of Russia’s transition from communism, both
discursively and in
practice,wouldrevealthe(intended)limitsofits‘self’,withfundamentalconsequencesforthecountry’sforeignpolicy(which,asweknowfromthetrail-blazingworkofCampbell,1998,isaboundary-producingexerciseofaspecifickind)inturn.
The empirical analysis should consequently delve into an
extensive background research ofRussian government sources (policy
documents, speeches by political leaders and elites,
publicannouncements, political memoirs), academic sources and the
media (following in particular suchnewspapers and periodicals as:
Argumenty i fakty, Izvestiya, Kommersant-Daily, Moscow
News,Moskovskie novosti, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Novaya gazeta,
Rossiiskaya gazeta, Russia Profile,
RussiaToday,Vedomosti,Voenno-promyshlennyykurier).Themainprimarysourceswouldaccordinglyincludeofficialstatements,speechesanddocumentsbyRussianpolitical
leadersandpublicofficials
inRussianandEnglish,mostlyreadilyaccessibleonline.Thiswouldprovidethestartingpointfordeterminingthenodalpointsofthediscoursebyrelyingonthemostauthoritativetexts(Milliken1999:229),whichsatisfythecriteriafortextselectionspecifiedbyHansen(2006:85):‘theysetoutclearconstructionsofidentityandpolicy;theyarewidelyattendedtobyotherpoliticians,thepublicandbygovernmentsthroughouttheworld;and
theyarearticulatedbya formalpoliticalauthority’. Theaimwould thusbe
to seek todiscern a set of historically determined signifiers that
relate to TJ (such as the accountability of thegovernment to the
people), examining the ways discourses and technologies of
government areintertwined in theRussian case.Havingdone this,
thepoolof sourceswouldbe
furtherexpandedbyaddingmaterialsfromthemedia,especiallytextswrittenbyleadingpublicintellectualsonthetopic.ThereisabundantpublicopinionpolldatarelatedtothetopicavailableinRussianwhichwouldalsobeconsultedforthisstudy.
Combiningmyoriginal readingof the scholarly literature, the
analysis of primary sources andsemi-structured interviews with
Russian lawyers, sociologists, civil society activists, policy
analysts,journalists, political scientists and historians on the
subject, I seek to provide a deep
qualitativereconstructionofRussia’sevolutioninthefieldofTJ.Thefocusofthestudyisonthemeaningsthatagentsattachtothesocialreality:thatis,whenanalysingforeignpolicyactionsandstate’sinternationalpractice,we
try tounderstand them through theactors’own justificationsof their
conduct.Consequently,
theemphasiswillbeonthemeaningandlegitimationprovidedforparticularchoicesbythecorestateactors.TheunderlyingmethodologyisinformedbyGuzzini’sinterpretivist,historicalandmulti-layeredapproachtoprocesstracingwherebylinksbetweenpossiblecausesandobservedoutcomesaremappedoutinawaythattaketheactors’understandingsofeventsandphenomenainquestionasthestartingpointof
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23
analysis,ratherthantheeventsandphenomenathemselves(seeGuzzini2012a:4;GeorgeandBennett2005:6,176).Adoptinganinterpretiveversionofprocess-tracingwithinasingle,complexcase(Guzzini2012;cf.GeorgeandBennett2005),IwillexaminetheadoptedTJmeasures,institutionalisationsofstateTJpoliciesinlaws,commemorativeandeducationalpractices,andrespectivepositionspursuedbyRussiaintheUN,OSCE,CouncilofEuropeaswellasinbilateralrelationswithRussia’sEastEuropeanneighbours.IintendtofocusontheRussianpost-communistdebatesoverthe(non-)prosecutionoftheperpetratorsof
the Soviet violators of human rights (and the related definitional
difficulties thereof), but also
payparticularattentiontotherevisionofofficialnational-historicalnarratives(incl.inhistorytextbooksandrelated‘patrioticeducation’policydocuments),varioushistorycommissionsinRussia’sbilateralrelationswithitsformerSovietsatellites;theprevailingattitudestowardsofficialapologiesforthecriminallegacyof
the Soviet regime in Russia’s public diplomacy, and related
commemoration and
memorialisationpractices(includingtheso-called‘monumentalpolitics’vis-à-visrememberingthecommunistregime).
Takingfurtherupthesuggestiontobreaktheanalyticalproblemintotwostepsinordertoexplainpoliticaloutcomes,Iwillconsider,first,thebehaviourofactors,andthen,itsconsequences(seeLebow2014:
4). The analysis of reasons actors give for their choices and
behaviour needs accordingly besupplemented with the identification
of the mechanisms and processes that turn behaviour intooutcomes.
Lebow’smodel of inefficient causationwhich entails amulti-step
process of searching forconnections between and among causes at
multiple levels of inquiry (ibid.: 65) provides the
thirdmethodological sourceof inspiration for this
study.Tomeaningfully ‘activate’
themethodofprocess-tracingandtomakeaseriousattemptatlookingfor‘causesofcauses,tracingbackcausallinksasfaraspossible’
(ibid.:144), itwouldbe important to interviewalsopolicy-makers
inorder todetermine
theactors’ownviewsofhowRussiaendedupwhereitcurrentlyis
intermsofitspoliticalhandlingofthecommunistpast.WhileitisunlikelyforanEstonianscholartoreceivetopicalinterviewsfromthemembersandadvisorsofthePutinadministrationinthecurrentpoliticalatmosphere,itmightstillbepossibletogetaccess
to themembersof
theStandingCommitteeonHistoricalMemory,23andpossiblyeven
thefunctionariesoftheMinistryofForeignAffairs.
TheanalyticalmodelforeseestwobasicwaysofengagingwithTJ:thatis,(i)areflexiveand(ii)amnemonicsecurity-orientedapproach.Whilethepursuitofontologicalsecurityisarguablycentraltothehuman
condition (Browning 2016), the strategies of aspiring a sense of
ontological security
cansignificantlyvary,withmajorconsequencesforstate’spredispositionforcooperationorconfrontationinitsforeignpolicies.Isuggestthatareflexiveapproachinstate’sreckoningwithitsantecedentregime’shuman
rights violations and international crimes tends to contribute
towards amore systematic
andcomprehensiveadoptionofarangeofTJmeasures.Showcasingadaptabilityandadevelopedabilitytocopewithchangeinreckoningwiththelegaciesofthepast‘self’(cf.Craib1998:72)indicates,inturn,aheightenedcapacityforaself-reflexive,creativeandinnovativeengagementwiththechangingworld(cf.Giddens1991:40-1),andlaysthebasisforamorecooperativestanceinstate’sforeignpolicy.Meanwhile,if
state’s approach towards coming to terms with its repressive
legacies is geared towards
thesafeguardingandsecuritisationofitsgloriousmemoriesand‘usefulpast’attheexpenseofengagingwiththemoreproblematic
chapters in its history, self-interrogation and self-reflexivity
tend to be activelydiscouragedandtheadoptionofTJremainaccordingly
limitedorhighlyselective (tothedegreeof
itssubstantivedismissal).Thecallstorevisitstate’spast‘self’arethusresisted,thealternativeapproachesdepictedasdangerousandunderminingforthestate’ssenseofontologicalcontinuity,leadingeventually
23 This is a subcommittee on the Presidential Council of Human
Rights. See
http://president-sovet.ru/about/comissions/permanent/read/5/(accessedJune5,2016).
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24
to a more confrontational stance vis-à-vis the perceived
challengers of the state’s mainstream
self-narrativeininternationalsociety.
My main hypothesis is that Russia’s ambivalent settlement of its
relationship towards
therepressiveSovietlegacy,exacerbatedbytheconflictbetweentheemergingglobalnormati