State Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National ...wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/166/166489_State Creation.pdf · State Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National

State Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National Integration and Local AutonomyAuthor(s): Henry E. AlapikiSource: African Studies Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Dec., 2005), pp. 49-65Published by: African Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20065139 .Accessed: 28/09/2011 15:45

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State Creation in Nigeria: Failed Approaches to National

Integration and Local Autonomy Henry E. Alapiki

Abstract: This paper seeks to demonstrate how the fissiparous tendencies bearing

on the Nigerian national polity make the policy of using state creation to achieve

national integration a failed strategy. The paper shows how the outcomes of state

creation exercises in Nigeria have failed to assuage the very forces that instigate new

state demands. It contends that the prospects for national integration and local

autonomy depend on the emergence of a purposeful national leadership and

proper political restructuring of the federation designed to generate a national

image that has more appeal than the regional ones.

R?sum?: Cet essai cherche ? d?montrer comment les tendances s?cessionnistes

pesant sur le syst?me politique national du Nigeria mettent en ?chec la strat?gie de

cr?ation d'un ?tat pour accomplir le projet d'int?gration nationale. Cet essai mon

tre comment les r?sultats de simulation de cr?ation d'un ?tat au Nigeria n'ont pas

r?ussi ? apaiser les forces m?mes qui engendrent de nouvelles raisons d'?tat. A cela

s'oppose le fait que les projets d'int?gration nationale et d'autonomie locale d?pen

dent de l'?mergence d'une direction nationale sens?e et d'une restructuration

politique appropri?e de la f?d?ration constitu?e en vue de g?n?rer une image

nationale qui a plus d'attrait que les images r?gionales.

Separatist agitation and the attendant creation of more states in Nigeria demonstrate an obvious absence of political integration among the diverse

ethnic nationalities and groups that make up Africa's largest country of 130

million people. The territorial configuration of Nigeria has been relatively

49

African Studies Review, Volume 48, Number 3 (December 2005), pp. 49-65

Henry Alapiki is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria. He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Asso

ciation (NPSA) and the International Political Science Association (IPSA) and

has published widely in national and international journals. His most recent

works include Politics and Governance in Nigeria (Owerri, 2000) and "The Political

Economy of Globalization."

50 African Studies Review

unstable since independence in 1960. However, it is important to note that

the forces responsible for the prevailing fissiparous tendencies in Nigeria, and indeed in most African states, were activated long before indepen

dence. For many formerly colonial African states?and Nigeria is a good

example?the state

preceded the nation. Many groups of people

were arbi

trarily sandwiched into a territorial unit that formed a geopolitical entity called the state. To many of the peoples of these "new" states, there was no

identification with the state as a symbol of collective identity?no political

community. In fact, most of these groups became exposed to one another,

in terms of self-government and administration, in the terminal period of

colonial rule.

The explanation invoked here is that given the history of state forma

tion in Africa, the major locus of political identification and socialization

has been not the nation, but subnational communal groups with substan

tially different institutions, cultures, and history. Bringing these discrete

groups together as a nation will entail the overcoming of primordial loyal ties. The idea of nation always implies integration?the creation of a sense

of nationality that overshadows or eliminates subordinate parochial loyal

ties (Alapiki 1995:38). One way of achieving this "new" nation-state, at least in the thinking of

successive state officials in Nigeria, is the creation of more states or con

stituent units that give discrete peoples a sense of self-governance and local

autonomy so that the processes of national integration can

proceed with

out threatening the cultural framework of personal identity. The assump

tion is that whatever discontinuities occur as a result will not radically dis

tort stable political functioning. Some political scientists in Nigeria support this view, such as Isawa Elaigwu, who argues that "attachment to the sub

national group is not necessarily detrimental to the development of a

nation. In fact the creation of states in Nigeria vindicates this point?that

subunits could help promote a sense of nationhood and contribute posi

tively to the process of nation-building" (1983:463). Perhaps the conver

gence of official thinking and systemwide pressure by separatist state agita tors explains the increased segmentation of Nigeria's political structure

from three regions at independence in 1960 to four regions in 1963, twelve

states in 1967, nineteen states in 1976, twenty-one states in 1987, thirty states in 1991, and thirty-six states in 1996. In an attempt to rationalize the

first countrywide state creation exercise in the postcolonial era, the official

view was that:

With the creation of twelve states in Nigeria, the fundamental problems, which threatened to dissolve a

political association of over 30 years, has

been solved. It is clear that the states represent a successful attempt to rec

oncile conflicting interests of the ethnic communities with their desire to

participate in the federal process as one people. The new structure of

State Creation in Nigeria 51

states will provide the basis for welding together the heterogeneous com

munities of Nigeria into a nation. The internal structure of the new states

will curb the excesses of any ethnic group and ensure peace and stability.

(Mid-West State Government, 1968, quoted in Osaghae 1985:514)

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the various state cre

ation exercises in Nigeria have failed to assuage the very forces that insti

gate new state demands, and more important, that creation of more states

in Nigeria has been accompanied by serious endemic problems that

undermine progress toward political integration of the country. The arti

cle seeks to demonstrate how the fissiparous or disintegrative tendencies

bearing on the Nigerian national polity negate the intention of using state

creation to achieve national integration and local autonomy and make it a

false hope. The article is organized into five sections. The first seeks to provide a

conceptual framework for understanding the political process in Nigeria. The second examines the evolution of state creation in Nigeria and iden

tifies the instigating elements, as well as factors that reinforce the increas

ing segmentation of the polity. The third section outlines the official ratio

nale and criteria for state creation in Nigeria,

assesses the prospects for

success, and examines the inadequacies of this approach for achieving national integration and local autonomy. The fourth section discusses state

creation as a reflection of contemporary Nigerian political reality. The

final and concluding section argues that the future of national integration and local autonomy depends on the emergence of a purposeful national

leadership and proper political restructuring of the Nigerian federation.

Theoretical Matrix

In the literature on state creation in Nigeria, a number of distinctive

approaches may be identified. The class analysis perspective posits that

incessant pressures on the polity and the consequent fragmentation of

state power are best understood as a class phenomenon. The assumption is

that state creation in Nigeria is a process by which members of the privi

leged classes try to find an ethnic base to enhance competition and access

to or control over state apparatuses and resources (Ake 1985:20; Ekekwe

1986:249; Nnoli 1980:257).

Although the class analytical perspective offers important insights, a

deeper understanding of the phenomenon of state creation in Nigeria

requires an examination of the interface between the class factor and other

variables such as ethnicity, religion, history, and the quality of political lead

ership. For example, while it is clear that members of the privileged classes

benefit disproportionately from the prevailing mode of association or the


character of politics in Nigeria, generalized support for the pattern of polit ical competition is premised on the totality of systemic-structural impera tives, which constitute the "instrumentalities of survival" (Young 1976:21).

Accordingly, in Nigeria the politics of group exclusivism or "primor dialism" modulates and may indeed be intertwined with class-motivated

actions. From this perspective, it becomes easier to understand nonclass

variables such as ethnicity and religion as the identifications that best serve

the interests of any group seeking to enlarge its power and its access to state

resources. Indeed it is normal for individuals and groups to make alterna

tive choices to maximize their chances in competitive socioeconomic and

political situations. It is one of the principal tasks of social science research

to specify the particular conditions.

A major aspect of politics in Nigeria that supports the conceptual matrix adopted in this article is the issue of patron-client relationships, which link the underprivileged persons in society to members of the upper classes. The scenario is such that ruling parties and governments at all lev

els make it possible for their members to retain their clients by a judicious allocation to their constituencies of public service appointments, contracts,

government projects, and resources. Those who are unable to gain power

and to share in the prerogatives of office become frustrated and all too

readily resort to

ethnicity as a means of winning

access to political power

(Alapiki 1995:3-4). Hence, in order to come to grips with the essentials of

the political process in Nigeria, it is necessary to combine the important

insights provided by the various conceptual approaches discussed above.

Background and Evolution of State Creation

The essence of the Nigerian state is the plurality of the people. Nigeria

comprises over 250 ethnicities, of which the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and

the Yoruba are the major groups. The total area of the country is

913,072,64 square kilometers. At its widest extremes of east to west, it mea

sures over 1,120 kilometers; from north to south it measures 1,040 kilome

ters. There are three main religious groups: Muslims (47%), Christians

(34%), and adherents to traditional African religion and other groups

(19%) (Bayero 1990:371). Before the imposition of British colonial rule, the territory now known as Nigeria consisted of numerous politically autonomous societies?chiefdoms, kingdoms, feudal aristocracies, and

acephalous states.

The beginning of modern Nigeria can be traced to 1900, when Britain

established effective political control over three separate territories: the

colony of Lagos and the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. In 1906 the Lagos colony was merged with the protectorate of Southern

Nigeria; this marked the beginning of two administrations, which subse

quently gave rise to the North-South dichotomy. The amalgamation of the


two protectorates was proclaimed in 1914 and Nigeria was thus geographi

cally united, although administratively, politically, and culturally it

remained two dichotomous entities.

Political analysts have argued that the 1914 amalgamation was a prod uct of economic necessity and political convenience. There was a

strong

need to use the revenues from the buoyant southern economy to fund the

administration of the less-endowed feudal northern protectorate. Thus,

except for the amalgamation of some essential departments such as cus

toms, education, railways, police, and prisons, little effort was made at inte

gration. What emerged up to 1946 was a country with two separate admin

istrations and a growing schism in terms of tradition, character, and orien

tation (Oshintokun 1979:103). The introduction of the Richard's Constitution of 1946 factionalized

the emerging spirit of nationalism through the creation of three regions: Eastern, Western, and Northern. Regional Houses of Assembly

were estab

lished to serve as the fulcrum of politics in the regions. Perhaps this devel

opment was responsible for the strong sectional orientation and political outlook that prevailed in the late 1940s and 1950s. Whenever any party or

group felt strongly aggrieved over any significant national issue, the natural

thing to do was to threaten secession from the federation. For example, the

Northern region issued secessionist threats in 1950 to back up its demand

for North-South parity of representation in the federal legislature, and in

1953 it did so over disagreements on the motion for "self-government" from direct British rule. In 1953, too, the Western region threatened to

secede if the "crown" territory of Lagos was excised from it (Tamuno 1970:18).

In the immediate post-1953 and early postcolonial period, the charac ter of separatist agitation changed from the

previous pattern of secession

threats. Subsequent agitation was associated mainly with minority ethnic

groups who demanded the creation of more states on the basis of per

ceived fears of political domination by the majority groups. It is very reveal

ing that up to that time, no minority group had expressed fears about the

federal government. The expressed fears all concerned the regional gov ernments, which in each region were looked upon, with good reason, as

synonymous with the majority ethnic group. The fact of the matter was that

the demands for the creation of more constituent states in Nigeria began

seriously in 1954 when the regions were formally institutionalized as pow erful political entities, especially with the adoption of the federal system,

which granted residual powers to the component units.

The prevailing character of politics was such that the contest for power took place between elements of the governing class, who belong to the

majority ethnic groups in each region, and their counterparts from minor

ity groups. The former used their majority-group advantage to gain power, while the latter, unable to gain power and share in the benefits of office, were frustrated. Both sides resorted to appeals to ethnicity to win political


support, with the group in power portraying any attempt to replace it as an

attack on the ethnic group to which it belonged (Ekekwe 1986:251). (See

figure 1 below.) In these circumstances, ethnic groups in Nigeria were in such bitter

contention that in 1957 it was necessary to appoint a special commission

(the Willink Commission) to recommend ways of allaying minority fears

and to affirm that the creation of new states was only

a measure of last

resort (Ake 1967:22). The commission did find that "even when allowance

had been made for some exaggeration, there remained a body of genuine fears and the future was regarded with real apprehension." Yet its basic rec

ommendation was only that some fundamental human rights provisions in

the proposed independence constitution be reinforced. According to the

commission, "Provisions of this kind in the constitution are difficult to

enforce and sometimes difficult to interpret. However, their presence defines beliefs widespread among democratic countries and provides a

standard to which appeal may be made by those whose rights are infringed"

(Nigeria 1958:97). At the Resumed Nigeria Constitutional Conference in 1958, the repre

sentatives of those groups that had agitated for the creation of more states

renewed their demands and expressed their dissatisfaction with the Willink

Figure 1: Ethnic Composition of Regions in Nigeria, 1946-1967

NORTH Hausa-Fulani (majority group)

Kanuri

Nupe Igalla

Birom Gwari

Lantang Tivs Jukuns

WEST Yuruba (majority group)

Benin Edo Urhobo Itshekiri Ijaw (Western) Ika-lbo

EAST Ibo (majority group)

Efik Annang Ajaw (East & Central) Ibibio

Ogoni Ikwerre


Commission's report. The British Secretary of State for the colonies ruled

that if states were to be created, the request for independence in 1960

should be abandoned (Nigeria 1958:22). In this way, the British govern ment succeeded in coercing agitators for state creation to accept indepen dence before the problem was resolved and then try to resolve it internally. In the three regions, the minority groups organized to pursue the issue of

state creation within the context of the proposed 1960 independence con

stitution. The minority political parties that articulated the demands for

the creation of more states were the United National Independents Party (UNIP) and the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) in the Eastern region, the

United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) and the Bornu Youth Movement

(BYM) in the Northern region, and the Bendel People Party (BDPP) and

the Mid-West State Movement in the Western region. These minority par ties were generally affiliates of external majority parties (the AG-West, NPC

North, and NCNC-East), which supported the demands for state creation

outside their political domains. In this process, the AG supported the UNIP

in the East and the UMBC and BYM in the North; the NPC aligned with the

NDC in the East; while the NCNC concentrated its support for the BDPP

in the West (see table 1, below).

During the years of the First Republic (1960-66), the issue of creation

of more states was used as a tool to divide and weaken the region that was

Table 1: Ethnic Groups/Party Platforms in the Regions before 1967

(A) Northern Region:

Majority Ethnic Group: Hausa/Fulani (Party -

NPC)

Minority Groups:

(a) Kanuri - Demanded Borno State through the Bornu Youth Movement

(BYM). (b) Middle Belt Minorities -

Tiv, Birom, Angas, Idoma, Igala, Igbirra,

Higgi, Gwari, Chamba, Shuwa, Kaje, Nupe - Demanded Middle Belt State

through the UMBC.

(B) Eastern Region: Majority Ethnic Group: Igbo (Party

- NCNC)

Minority Groups: Efik, Ibibio, Ekoi, Ijaw, Kalahari, Ekpeye, Ogba, Okrika,

Bonny - Demanded a

Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) State through the UNIP

and NDC.

(C) Western Region: Majority Group:Yoruba (Party-A. G.)

Minority Groups: Edo, Urhobo, Isoko, Itshekiri, Ijaw and Ika-Ibo - Demanded

and received a Mid-Western region in 1963 through the BDPP in alliance

with NCNC.


controlled by an opposition political party. The major concern of the "big three" political parties was the control of the federal government at the center. The party system was unbalanced. While the Northern People's

Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) of

the Eastern region had formed a national coalition government, the Action

Group (AG) of the Western region remained in opposition, assuming the

posture of a radical party and preaching the ideology of democratic social

ism. The exclusion of the AG from the cabinet meant that it was a greatly

disadvantaged player (Ojo 1985:141-62). Given the prevailing circum

stances, whereby each of the major parties supported the creation of more

states for minority groups only outside its own regional power base, it was

obvious that the creation of any new states (or regions) would come from

the region that was excluded from the central government.

Not unexpectedly, the creation of the Mid-West region in 1963 was the

product of a partisan approach by the NPC-NCNC coalition government. The AG expressed its opposition to the exercise from the time the process was initiated in 1961, and in 1963 it instituted two court cases challenging the constitutionality of the process. For the NPC-NCNC alliance, the cre

ation of the Mid-West region was a political victory over a "stubborn and

recalcitrant" opposition party. And for the NCNC in particular (which became the majority party in the new region), it enlarged its power base and expanded its horizon to compete with the NPC for control of power at the center (see figure 2). In hindsight, it does appear that plans for the

creation of more states in Nigeria in the first Republic were subject to the

whims and caprices and political manipulations of those in power. No offi

cial nationwide criteria or principles were outlined or adopted. The Prime

Minister (from the NPC) simply rationalized the Mid-West region request on the grounds that "the federal government is not interested in creating new states, but when people belonging

to a particular

area want a separate

state and ask for the support of the federal government, we are obliged to

aid them. The support for the creation of the Mid-West region is on these

grounds" (HOR Debates, 3rd Session, 1962: Cols 35-39). The 1963 exercise did not come close to satisfying the numerous

demands made by several significant minority groups across the country. But despite continued pressures from separatist agitators,

no new states

were created until the collapse of the Republic via a coup d'?tat on Janu

ary 15, 1966, and the creation of twelve states in 1967 by the new military

regime. In creating the twelve-state structure, General Go won made a con

scious effort to "balance" the North and the South, giving each region six

states (see figure 3). Perhaps the 1967 exercise came too late to prevent the thirty months of civil war that engulfed the country between July 1967

and January 1970. By the early 1970s, a new wave of agitation for more

states had begun. What were the instigating variables? What old and new

criteria and principles served as the official rationale for the post-1970 state creation exercises in Nigeria?


Figure 2: Nigeria as a Federation of Four Regions, 1963

NORTHERN REGION

WESTERN REGION

EASTERN MID- \ REGION

/WESTERN/ REGION,

Official Principles of and Criteria for State Creation in

Nigeria

The general reasons for the creation of more states in Nigeria

can be exam

ined from the point of view of the official rationale, on one hand, and the reasons that derive from the sociopolitical milieu, on the other. Both

before and after 1967 (i.e., from 1914 to 1996), one major official reason

for the division of Nigeria into smaller units has been the so-called need to

bring government closer to the people. It has been argued that the division

of colonial Nigeria into two administrations carried just such an advantage,

particularly in the Northern protectorate with its government in Kaduna, which otherwise would have been in Lagos (Kirk-Greene 1968:60). The fur

ther division of the Southern province into two provinces in 1939 was jus tified in terms of the need to bring administration nearer to the people in

the Western areas of the country. This was necessary because the transfer

of the capital of the Southern provinces to Enugu (in the Southeast) in

1928 had meant that communications between the Western area and the new seat of government was greatly handicapped as the railways (and thus

the mail) had to go through Kaduna in the north.

The postcolonial official rationale for the creation of more states did not depart much from their colonial roots. In the first nationwide exercise


Figure 3: Map of Twelve States, 1967

in 1967, five major principles were enunciated in the creation of twelve

states.

1. No one state should be in position to dominate or control the

central government.

2. Each state should form one compact geographical area.

3. Administrative convenience should take into account the his

tory and wishes of the people. 4. Each state should be in a position to discharge effectively the

functions allocated to regional governments.

5. The new states should be created simultaneously.

When a subsequent exercise was announced in 1976, the head of state

(General Mohammed) in a broadcast to the nation affirmed that "the

supreme military council has accepted that Nigeria's future political stabil

ity would be enhanced by the creation of states. The basic motivation in the

exercise is to bring government nearer the people while, at the same time,

ensuring even

development within a federal structure of government"

(Daily Times, February 4 1976). In the 1976 review, several additional prin

ciples were added to the above, namely:


6. even development;

7. the need to preserve the federal structure of government;

8. the need to maintain peace and harmony within the

federation; 9. the need to bring government nearer to the people; and

10. the need to minimize minority problems in Nigeria. (Federal Government Views on the Report of

the Panel on Creation of States, 1976:53).

Despite these principles and criteria, however, a number of questions need

to be asked about the effects of state creation in Nigeria. Has the creation of

more states led to "even development"? Do Nigerians have more peace, har

mony, and unity today than they had three decades ago? Has the creation of

more states minimized the problems of ethnic minorities? Has the creation

of more states minimized separatist agitation? On the strength of the evi

dence, the answers to these questions, as we will see below, are

negative.

Post-1970 State Creation

After the 1967 exercise, subsequent demands for the creation of new states

were no longer the exclusive preserve of minority ethnic groups. The strug

gle for more access and control over state resources by various factions of

the power elite assumed greater saliency. In 1970, for example, a decree by the military government modified the existing federal revenue allocation

formula. The new formula for dividing the Distributable Pool Account

(DPA) resources among the constituent states allocated 50 percent equally among the states and 50 percent proportionally to their populations. This

benefited those regions that had been split into the most states and worked to the disadvantage of the Western region, for which the new revenue for

mula meant a sharp decline in its share of the DPA from 18 percent to 7.3

percent. The Western region, in a sense, was paying the price for the cre

ation of six new states in the former Northern region and three in the for

mer Eastern region. Thus, for the West, the only way to restore the finan

cial status quo was to agitate for more states in its geopolitical zone (Bach

1989:232). The kind of argument that was made then for the creation of

new states continued to be expressed from 1970 on: for example, that "a

situation in which the Ibos (Eastern region) have two states as against five

for the Huasa/ Fulani (Northern region) and the Yourba (Western region) cannot make for peace and harmony in the country. Until this anomaly is

corrected to create a fair balance between the three main tribes [of Nige ria] the prospects of harmony and stability in the country will remain shaky (Nwabueze 1982:7). Thus, between 1967 to 1996, the complex mix of eth

nic, economic, and class forces brought about the increase in the number

of constituent states in Nigeria from twelve to thirty-six (see figure 4).


Effects of State Creation in Nigeria

Despite the announced intention, each state creation exercise in Nigeria,

significantly, was

accompanied by attendant effects that actually exacer

bated preexisting interethnic and intergroup conflicts rather than reliev

ing them. The August 27, 1991, events are particularly interesting in this

regard. First, they demonstrate clearly the low level of political integration among the various peoples and communities that make up Nigeria. Sec

ond, the exercise was greeted with violence, rampages, and public demon

strations unsurpassed in the history of state creation in Nigeria. Third, the

displacement of "non-state indigenous persons" and the subsequent "asset

sharing" controversies among affected state governments were unprece

dented. Instructive, too, is the fact that the violence and public demon

strations took place in all the geopolitical zones of Nigeria, that is, the for

mer Northern, Eastern, and Western regions. In the Northwestern zone, the noncreation of a Zamfara state with its

proposed capital at Gusau led to street protests and violence. Much to the

anger of the Zamfara people, Kebbi State was created for their neighbors, even though the Kebbi people had not requested a state at the time. Lives

and property were lost in the riots that followed. The guest house of the

Sultan of Sokoto, Ibrahim Dasuki (the highest Islamic leader in Nigeria), located in Gusau, was burnt. So too was the house of Alhaji Garba Nadama, former governor of Sokoto State, which Kebbi was part of during his tenure

(TellMagazine, September, 9, 1991, 11). In Rivers State, South-South Nige ria, placard-carrying demonstrators marched to the governor's office in

Port Harcourt protesting the noninclusion of a proposed Abayelsa State.

Earlier in the day, leaders of the Abayelsa State movement, led by Chief

Alfred Diete-Spiff, a former governor of Rivers State, had held a press con

ference in which they decried the noncreation of their proposed state as

"an indication of the marginalization and lack of sensitivity of the Federal

Government to the plight of the oil producing areas of Rivers State, whose

vegetation has been ruined by oil pollution resulting from the exploration activities of oil companies" (African Guardian, March 2, 1992, 14).

In Kano State, North-Central Nigeria, angry crowds protested against the creation of Jigawa State at the expense of the proposed Hadeija State.

Hadeija is the second largest town in the old Kano State, next only to Kano

City. The ensuing rampage led to the destruction of the fire station in

Kano, the Magistrate and Area Court buildings, the National Population Commission office, and the Social Welfare office building. In addition, the

National Republican Convention (NRC) Secretariat and the office of the

Hadeija Development Project were razed. Also in the North, atjalingo, cap ital of the newly created Taraba State, the palace of the highest religious

Moslem cleric, the Emir of Muri, was burnt. The complaint of the protest ers was the failure of the federal government to create the proposed Sar

dauna State for the majority of the new state indigenes who are mainly


Figure 4: Evolution of Regions/States in Nigeria

19 STATES AND ABUJA, 1975 21 STATES AND ABUJA, 1987 1. Anambra 2. Bauchi 3. Bendel 4. Benue 5. Borno 6. Cross River 7. Gongola 8. Imo 9. Kaduna

10. Kano 11. Kwara

12. Lagos 13. Niger 14. Ogun 15. Ondo 16. Oyo 17. Plateau 18. Rivers 19. Sokoto 20. Abuja Federal Capital

Territory

1. Akwa I bom 2. Anambra 3. Bauchi 4. Bendel 5. Benue 6. Borno 7. Cross River 8. Gongola 9. Imo

10. Kaduna 11. Kano 12. Katsina

13. Kwara 14. Lagos 15. Niger 16. Ogun 17. Ondo 18. Oyo 19. Plateau 20. Rivers 21. Sokoto 22. Abuja Federal Capital

Territory

30 STATES AND ABUJA, 1991 36 STATES AND ABUJA, 1996 1. Abia 2. Adamawa 3. Akwa I bom 4. Anambra 5. Bauchi 6. Benue 7. Borno 8. Cross River 9. Delta

10. Edo 11. Imo 12. Jigawa 13. Kaduna

14. Kano 15. Katsina 16. Kebbi 17. Kogi 18. Kwara 19. Lagos 20. Nassarawa

Niger 22. Ogun 23. Ondo 24. Osun 25. Oyo 26. Plateau

21

27. Rivers 28. Sokoto 29. Taraba 30. Yobe

Abuja Federal Capital Territory

31

1. Abia 2. Adamawa 3. Akwa Ibom 4. Anambra 5. Bauchi 6. Bayelsa 7. Benue 8. Borno 9. Cross River

10. Delta 11. Ebonyi 12. Edo 13. Ekiti

14. Enugu 15. Gombe 16. Imo 17. Jigawa 18. Kaduna 19. Kano 20. Katsina 21. Kebbi 22. Kogi 23. Kwara 24. Lagos 25. Nassarawa 26. Niger

27. Ogun 28. Ondo 29. Osun 30. Oyo 31. Plateau 32. Rivers 33. Sokoto 34. Taraba 35. Yobe 36. Zamfara 37. Abuja Federal

Capital Territory


Christians and non-Moslem Hausa-Fulani people ( Tell Magazine, Septem ber, 9, 1991, 12).

A possible explanation of the discontent and violence that accompa nied the 1991 state creation exercise in Nigeria could be that separatist agi tators who did not get new states despite serious lobbying were frustrated

and bitter. A deeper analysis shows that the reported incidents took place in states and communities that habored deep-seated bitterness and rancor

among members of the different ethnic and social groups. In Sokoto State, Northwestern Nigeria, for example, the people of Zamfara, a Hausa king

dom, had stubbornly resisted the Fulani Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodio in the

nineteenth century. Ever since, it had never wavered in its determination

to be free of the influence of the Sokoto caliphate, even in modern Niger ian politics. In the politics of the First Republic (1960-66), Zamfara

embraced the Northern opposition party?the Northern Elements Pro

gressive Union (NEPU)?while Sokoto was the stronghold of the ruling Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). In the Second Republic (1979-83), Zamfara supported the Northern minority party?the Great Nigeria Peo

ples Party (GNPP)?while Sokoto was the nerve center of the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN). In the failed politics of transition to a

Third Republic, Zamfara supported Abiola's Social Democratic Party (SDP), while Sokoto stayed with the conservative National Republican Con

vention Party (NRC). For a long period, therefore, Zamfara had been

locked with Sokoto in a political duel, much of which had been expressed

through the quest for a separate state. This political trend explains why the

deep-seated bitterness and anger of the Zamfara people boiled over into

street protests and rampages when their bid for a Zamfara State failed to

materialize in the 1991 state creation exercise.1 In general, those who lost

out in their bids for new states blamed the loss on high-level power plays and political manipulations of the elites of opposing ethnic groups. Hence

such suspected persons became targets and victims of the ensuing ram

page. Where specific individuals could not be identified, the property, assets, and facilities of the federal government became symbolic targets of

destruction.

Assets Sharing and Displacement of Fellow Nigerians

The policy of assets sharing and the resulting displacement of many Nige rians from their place of residence is also bound up with the protests and

the failure of state creation to further the goal of political integration in

Nigeria. These problems are by-products of the ideology of "statism," which

makes it impossible for a non-native of a state to hold administrative, teach

ing, political, or commercial positions of any consequence. The problem with this citizenship criterion is that it identifies Nigerian citizens with com

munities encompassed by increasingly constrained geopolitical bound


aries. And because state creation reinforces this perception of citizenship,

it structurally undermines the process of political integration and pro motes a vicious cycle of separatist agitation. In this process, primordial loy

alties and sentiments and old intergroup antagonism easily become the ful

crum around which bias and the assertion of separate identities are mobi

lized.

After the August 27, 1991, state creation exercise, the federal govern ment set up nine Assets and Liabilities Sharing Committees to handle cases

between the states of Anambra and Enugu, Abia and Imo, Delta and Edo,

Oyo and Osun, Kano and Jigawa, Bornu and Yobe, Adamawa and Taraba,

and Sokoto and Kebbi, and among Kogi, Benue, and Kwara States. The

acrimonious conflict over assets sharing among states prevents political

integration because it makes Nigerians perceive themselves as strangers in

their own country as they lose their right to property, residence, and

employment in states where they are considered nonindigenes. The Anambra-Enugu assets sharing conflict is a good example. Alleg

ing undue bias by the Office of the Vice President, the governor of Enugu State sent a thirty-four-page petition to President Babangida appealing for a reversal of some of the assets-sharing panel's decisions and warned that

"to prevent a breach of public peace and a disruption of the transition pro

gramme, justice and fairness should be restored to the marginalised peo

ple of Enugu State" (African Guardian, March, 2, 1992, 29). While awaiting the president's response, the Enugu State governor made a radio broadcast

terminating the appointments of all civil servants of Anambra State in the

Enugu State public service and urged them to vacate their official resi dences within forty-eight hours. In retaliation, the Anambra State govern

ment proceeded to annex the jointly owned Nnamdi Azikiwe University located at Awka and the Colleges of Education at Awka and Nsugbe and

unilaterally took over the Anambra State Polytechnic at Oko. All staff of

Enugu State origin in these institutions were asked to relocate to Enugu State. It was in the midst of this state of conflict that President Babangida set up an Assets Review and Implementation Committee (to review the

work of the Assets and Liabilities Sharing Committees) headed by

Brigadier Adeniji Olanrewaju (African Guardian, March 2, 1992, 33). Such displacement of staff and appropriation of existing joint assets

have taken place in all instances of state creation. In Sokoto State, about 70

percent of the civil servants who were from Kebbi State had to move over

to Birnin-Kebbi, the new state capital. In Imo State, staff of the state-owned

media enterprise?the Imo Broadcasting Corporation (IBC)?who were of

Abia State origin staged a peaceful demonstration against the "forced lock

out" from their offices by persons from Imo State. In a bizarre move, all the

office locks of Abia State indigenes had been changed as part of an official Imo State government decree that all employees of Abia State origin move

over to Umuahia, capital of the newly created Abia State (African Guardian, March 2, 1992:31).


Conclusion and the Way Forward

This study has shown that the policy of state creation as a solution to the

problems of national integration and local autonomy in Nigeria has failed.

It demonstrates that Nigerians have been more concerned with creating boundaries of inclusion and exclusion as the quest for political power and

the control of national resources have become more important than polit

ical integration.

The present thirty-six-state structure of the Nigerian federation is now

an established fact. However, there is nothing sacrosanct about the

existing

divisions. Notably India, in 1956, reorganized the existing twenty-nine states and territories into fourteen unilingual and indigenous states of

equal status and five centrally administered territories based on the rec

ommendations of a States Re-organisation Commission (Ellah 1983:42). A

similar experiment may represent progress in the search for a balanced

federation in Nigeria. One solution might consist of organizing the major

ity groups into a number of separate "uni-ethnic" states and the minority

groups into a number of balanced "multi-ethnic" states, taking into

account the essential economic and political features of federation world

wide. Alternatively, the existing six geopolitical zones in Nigeria currently used by the political elite for regional identity and political mobilization

could be transformed into regions. Each of these alternatives holds better

prospects for national integration and local autonomy in a federal system,

especially as the states or

regions would have enhanced ability to ade

quately discharge the functions allocated to regional governments. At the time of the writing of this paper, a National Political Reform

Conference is in progress in Nigeria. It is hoped that the political leader

ship will take advantage of this moment to recreate conditions that will

enable national integration and stable federal democracy. Ultimately, the

key lies in the emergence of a dynamic and purposeful political leadership. As R. L. Watts has said: Federations do not simply "happen" because there

are desires for unity. The activating of these desires and the achievement

of federal union has in every case depended upon the appearance of

dynamic and able leadership, of statesmanship at the right time. Where

such leadership has lacked vigour or the willingness and ability to com

promise, the process of constitution making has proved more protracted and controversial. (Watts 1966:60)

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Note

1. This scenario also explains why Zamfara State was among the six new states cre

ated in the next exercise of 1996. It is possible that the federal government was

determined to prevent a repeat of the 1991 experience in Sokoto State

(Alapiki 1998:184-85).

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