Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
There are 4 parties in this case: a. Federation of Free Farmers
(union representing the farmers/laborers) b. Planters (the group
which harvests the lands where the farmers work) c. Santos and
Tikol (individual planters) d. Central or Victorias milling corp,
Inc. (Planters bring their harvest here to be milled).Section 1 of
RA 809 stipulates that in the absence of written milling agreements
between the majority of planters and the millers of sugarcane in
any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar
produced in that district from the milling by the sugar central of
the sugarcane of any sugarcane planter or plantation owner, as well
as all by-products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided
between them in the proportion therein satisfied.
Section 9 stipulates that any increase in the share of proceeds
of milled sugarcane and derivatives obtained by planters from the
Central, 60% of said increase should be paid by planters to their
respective laborers
*The following are the opposing contentions of the
petitioners:(1) FFF alleged that they have not been paid from
1952-53 despite the 10% increase and from 1953-1974 with the 4%
increase. FFF claimed too that Planters and Victorias entered into
an agreement when they have no legal right because the law has
already provided the ratio of division. Also, FFF contended that
even if planters and millers had legal right to enter into such
agreement, still 60% of the produce of milled sugarcane as well as
the derivatives obtained by the planters have not been paid to the
laborers.CA ruled that the planters and Victorias be jointly and
severally liable.FFF agreed with this decison.
(2) Victorias said that evidence incontrovertibly shows that it
has already paid in full to the planters their respective shares in
proceeds and derivatives from the moment it was legally decided and
agreed that it should do so. Also, based from initial petition,
petitioner said that the Federation admitted the laborers have been
given what is due them as far as 1952-53 to 1954-55 crops are
concerned. Victorias claimed that planters and Victorias should not
be held jointly and severally liable. The action filed was not
founded on torts but on either an obligation created by a contract
or by law, and even if on torts, the action has prescribed. They
have paid the Planters so the Planters should only be the one
sued.
(3) Planters association claim they have freedom to stipulate
ration as they might agree. And that they have paid the
laborers.(4) Individual planters complain that the decision of the
Court of Appeals ignored their plea of lack of jurisdiction of the
trial court over their persons in spite of their proven claim that
they had not been properly served with summons, and that the
portion of said decision holding them jointly and severally liable
with VICTORIAS and the PLANTERS to the latter's laborers for the
amounts here in question has no factual and legal basis,
considering they were not parties to the pertinent questioned
agreements.In this connection, the question raised is: Does
Republic Act No. 809 apply even if the majority of the sugarcane
planters have written milling agreement with the miller or central
stipulating a sharing proportion different from that provided in
Sec 1 of the Act, such that any increase of participation granted
the planter under said milling agreement will be divided between
the planter and his plantation laborer in the proportion of 60% for
the latter and 40%% for the former? What is the legislative intent
which should be given effect.
Issue:a. WON Planters and Victorias should be severally liableb.
WON RA 809 is applicable regardless if there exists a milling
contract between Central and Planters.Held:
a. NO. Legal basis is that arising from law which does not
impose upon Centrals any liability, whether expressly or impliedly,
any joint and several liability.The judgment of the Court of
Appeals is hereby modified by eliminating the joint and several
liability of VICTORIAS with the PLANTERS for the said unpaid
amounts, the said liability being solely and exclusively of the
PLANTERS No contract bet sugar mill and the laborers. Principal
liability lies on Planters and secondarily on Dept or Labor.b. YES.
The Act is thus operative irrespective of whether there exists a
milling agreement between the central and the sugar planters. To
give literal import in interpreting the two section will defeat the
purpose of theAct. It is undeniable that Section 9 of Republic Act
809 uses the words "any increase in participation granted the
plantersunder this Act". Read literally, there could be a little
shade of plausibility in the posture of VICTORIAS and PLANTERS that
only any increase as a result of the application of Section 1 of
the Act is contemplated in its Section 9, and not an increase by
virtue of a written milling contract executed after the effectivity
of the Act. But if we look at the purpose why the Act was enacted:
1.) continuous production of sugar 2.) to grant the laborers a
share in the increased participation of planters in the sugar
produce. Therefore, any such increase should be deemed as an
"increase under this Act", since it is a result of its operation.
The legislative intent is, thus to make the act operative
irrespective of whether there exists a milling agreement between
central and sugar planters.
43 MANILA JOCKEY CLUB Inc. Vs GAMES AND AMUSEMENT
Facts: This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by
petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of First Instance
Manila praying that judgment be rendered against respondents Games
and Amusements Board (GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon.
Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No.
983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16
Saturdays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White
Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12 Saturdays to the President for
other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days can not be
disposed of by the GAB without authority of law.
Issue: W/N the placement of the six (6) additional racing days
given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of
Republic Act No. 1502, is proper
Ratio: At the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in
June, 1956, the long, continuous, and uniform practice wasthat all
sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during the
whole day when Congress chose not to specify in express terms how
the additional sweepstakes draws and races would beheld, it is safe
to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing
situation and practice. Appellants have no vested right to the
unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps,
on theholidays), because their holding of races on these days is
merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determinationby the
GAB. Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the
sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying thedays for
holding them GAB had no alternative except to make room for the
additional races, from among the only available racing
daysunreserved by any law the Sundays on which the private
individuals and entities have been permitted to holdtheir races,
subject to licensing and determination by the GAB. In the
interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute (unlike in
the interpretation of an ordinary writtendocument) It is not enough
to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or
authorsbut also to see whether the intention or meaning has been
expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect andvalidity
The purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author
meant by the language he used, but also to see thatthe language
used sufficiently expresses that meaning.
The legal act is made up of two elements an (1) internal and an
(2) external one it originates in intention and is perfected by
expression failure of the latter may defeat the former Legislative
debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual
members and are not safe guides It may not be resorted to in
ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body It is
impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put
upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the
bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof Those who
did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those
who spoke, might differ from eachother
Aisporna v. CAGR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)First
Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no partFacts: Since 7
March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by
Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated
as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of
policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the
aforementioned policy.For reason unexplained, an information was
filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the City Court
of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on
21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance
without securing the certificate of authority from the office of
the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of
true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as
clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because
Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her
husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her
husbands desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found
Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial courts decision was
affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the
present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974,
the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of
Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having
violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.Issue: Whether Mapalad
Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the
Insurance ActHeld: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order
to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first
paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent,
subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of
authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the
second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the
intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate courts
ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second
paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a
reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph
2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is any
person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the
intent of this section. Without proof of compensation, directly or
indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad
Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and
acquitted the accused of the crime charged, with costs de
oficio.
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation 136 SCRA 142
Facts:Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex
Mining Corporations mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able
to recover under the Workmans Compensation Act (WCA).
Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the
company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety
protection.
The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the
court of first instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila.
Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action
was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA,
and therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex
argues that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively
under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA, which provides:
Section 5: Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and
remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal
injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights
and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal
representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x
x.
Section 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmens Compensation Commissioner
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for
compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act, subject to appeal
to the Supreme Court, x x x.
Philex further contends that the WCA covers work-connected
accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under
Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that
the employer was negligent.
The heirs, however, content that the CFI has jurisdiction as
their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code
provisions on damages arising out of negligence.
The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme
Court.Issue: Does the CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Held:
Majority Opinion; Makasiar, J.
Several opinions [amicus curiae] were advanced as to the nature
of the remedies provided for under the WCA, namely:
CUMULATIVE Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that the heirs may
file a complaint for damages (which is different from compensation
under the WCA) with the regular courts on the basis of the
negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil code
provisions.
EXCLUSIVE Atty. (now Senator) Angara believes that recovery
under the WCA is exclusive and therefore precludes an action of
damages under the Civil Code.
SELECTIVE Atty. Bacungan believes that the remedies are
selective, i.e., the heirs had the option of choosing between
availing of the compensation under the WCA or filing an action for
damages arising out of negligence under the provisions of the Civil
Code. If the heirs had chosen one remedy and have collected under
that remedy, they can no longer avail of the other remedy.
The allegations of the complaint indicate that there was a
breach of contract which may justify an award for damages under the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. The question now is whether
or not the action for damages will prosper, notwithstanding the
fact that the heirs had already received compensation under the
WCA.
The Court agreed with the position of Atty. Bacungan that the
two remedies are selective. The WCA is based on a theory of
compensation distinct from existing theories on damages. Recovery
under the WCA is not based on any theory on the part of the
employer.
Since the two remedies are distinct and the heirs have the
option of selecting which remedy to avail of, are the heirs now
precluded from selecting the remedy under the Civil Code,
considering that they had already availed of (and received
compensation) under the WCA?
The heirs have a choice but they cannot pursue both choices
simultaneously.
The Court, however, noted that the heirs only learned of the
negligence report after they had already availed and received
compensation under the WCA; they thus could not make an intelligent
and informed choice at the time they opted for the WCA remedy.
The heirs were thus allowed to pursue the Civil Code remedy but
they are not entitled to recover under both remedies. Any payment
they received under the WCA shall be deducted from the courts award
of damages, if any.
Lidasan v ComelecG.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967 Sanchez,
J.:
Facts:1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached
portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967
elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned
that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral
purposes be nullified.Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the
province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.
2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality
ofBuldon intheProvince of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the
municipality ofParang, also in theProvince of Cotabatoand not of
Lanao del Sur.
3.Apprised of this development, the Office of the President,
recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be
suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabatois unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in
the title
YES. RA 4790 is null and void
1.The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon
legislative power.First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous
subjects.Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and
those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of
relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute
must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional
requirement "breathes the spirit of command."Compliance is
imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of
Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire
text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which
became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to
its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local
application, originated.2.The Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should
serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the
body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate
action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislators.3.The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or
not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms
where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth,a title
which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not
be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.4.The title "An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton,in the Province of Lanao del
Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or
contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known
fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in
one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also
dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different
from Lanao del Sur.5. Finally, the title did not inform the members
of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the
province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as
to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC.,petitioner, vs.BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and
the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,respondents.
Stat-Con Principle: Relative Constitutionality PrincipleThe
constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be
constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid
in its application to another.A statute valid at one time may
become void at another time because ofaltered circumstances. Thus,
if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or
confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former
adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light
ofchanged conditions.Facts:On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New
Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of
the Philippines, and created a new Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP).Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides that
those with Salary Grades (SG) 20 and above are exempted from the
Salary Standardization Law (SSL), meaning their Money Board can
make its own compensation structure; while those with SG 19 and
below are not exempted from SSL, such that their salary structure
are bound to the provisions of SSL.Following the enactment of RA
No. 7653, other Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) like the
GSIS, SSS, DBP and others, followed suit and changed their
respective charters. The controversial difference however is that
all of its employees, regardless of SG, are exempted from SSL.This
prompted the Central Bank Employees Association to petition, after
8 years since its enactment, R.A. No. 7653.The petitioners thrust
for their challenge is that RA 7653 denies them the equal
protection of the law as it makes an unconstitutional cut between
two classes: 1) officers and executives (SG 20 and above), exempted
from SSL; and 2) rank-in-file (SG 19 and below), not exempted from
SSL. This thus is a class legislation. Further, one of their
sub-sets of arguments is that GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are
all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of
rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions
(GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated
upon.Issue:Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II
of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No
person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the
laws.Ruling:A) UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.It is settled
in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not
prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the
classification is not unreasonable. That is, the standard for
classification is satisfied if it is based on reasonable foundation
and is not palpably arbitrary.In the case at bar, exemption of SG
20 and above from SSL was reasonable as it was intended to address
the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent
officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate the
rank-in-file employees. If the discrimination of the rank-in-file
employees was the end result, the discrimination has a rational
basis and is not palpably arbitrary.B) THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF
SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEESOF
GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE
CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
(this is where concept of Relative Constitutionality comes in)A
statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the
conditions to which it is applied.Although R.A. No. 7653 was held
valid under the present standards of equal protection, the
subsequent enactments of the charters of the other GFIs which
unanimously exempted all of their employees from the SSL, including
those occupying rank-in-file positions, where now invidious to that
of the rank-in-file employees of the BSP, who are not exempted from
the SSL, considering that they all belong to the same class of
GFIs.The rights for equal protection of laws of the rank-in-file
employees of the BSP were now abridged.Held:The continued operation
and implementation of the lastprovisoof Section 15(c), Article II
of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 178831-32 (Promulgated April 1, 2009)Jocelyn
SyLimkaichong vs. COMELECLouis C. Biraogo vs. Hon. Prospero
Nograles, Jocelyn SyLimkaichongOlivia P. Paras vs. House of
Representatives, Jocelyn SyLimkaichongRenald F. Villando vs.
COMELEC, Jocelyn SyLimkaichong
At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1)
the Joint Resolutionof the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second
Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. SyLimkaichong
(Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the
First District of Negros Oriental; (2) the COMELECEn
BancResolutiondated June 29, 2007, affirming her disqualification;
and (3) the COMELECEn BancResolution dated August 16, 2007,
resolving that all pending incidents relating to her qualifications
should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
Facts On March 26, 2007 LIMKAICHONG filed a COC for House Rep.
Two petitions for her disqualification: April 4, 2007 and April 11,
2007 Napoleon Camero and Renald F. Villando, respectively, filed
separate petitions on the grounds of her lacking of citizenship
which would invalidate her candidacy. COMELEC consolidated such
complaints, the cases remained pending on May 14, 2007 when the
elections were conducted. LIMKAICHONG EMERGED AS THE VICTOR
(65,708) on the margin of 7, 746 from opponent Olivia Paras
(57,962) On May 15, 2007 Olivia Paras filed to COMELEC for the
suspension of the Proclaimation of Limkaichong as winner In the
COMELEC investigations, it was found that LIMKAICHONGs father did
not fully acquire said naturalization where the resolution
disqualifies LIMKAICHONG. On May 18, COMELEC En Banc issued
resolution 8062 not suspending the proclamation of winning
candidates with pending disqualification caseswhich shall be
without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution
of the involved cases. LIMKAICHONG filed a motion for
reconsideration and to lift the suspension (May 20, 22 2007) where
on May 25 the PBOC proclaimed her as First District Representative.
Numerous cases followed suit reaching the Supreme Court in a
petition for certiorari. The Court granted it and dismissed all
petitions, including Biraogos petition, and reversed the ruling of
the COMELEC. Petitioner also questioned on the 360-degree turn of
the decision by the Court dated April 1, 2009 as embodied in the
Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes, which although
unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by 14 Associate Justices and
approved en banc on july 15, 2008. Issue/s:1. Was the proclamation
of LIMCKAICHONG valid?2. Upon proclamation, would it have been the
HRET, and not COMELEC whom have had the jurisdiction over the
Disqualification cases?3. Was COMELEC (Second Division and En Banc)
correct in disqualifying LIMKAICHONG on the grounds of her being
not a natural-born citizen?4. Can the HoR be compelled to prohibit
LIMKAICHONG from assuming her duties as representative?5. WON the
unpromulgated Decision of the Court is final and
executoryHeld/Decisions
1. Yes it was valid. On the grounds that LIMKAICHONG timely
filed with COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration and the
lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation.
COMELEC resolution 8062 is valid exercise of COMELECs
constitutional power to promulgate its own rules of conduct and
procedure. Planas vs. COMELEC the proclamation of Defensor, the
respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the
Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was
not yet final.As such, his proclamation was valid or legal, as he
had at that point in time remained qualified.2. Yes it should be
the HRETs jurisdictionThe Court has invariably held that once a
winning candidatehas been proclaimed,taken his oath, andassumed
officeas a Member of the House of Representatives,the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins.3. Since there was a flaw in the naturalization process of
LIMKAICHONGs father, Julio OngSy, which prevented him from gaining
finalty, LIMKAICHONG remains a Chinese national and was supposed to
be disqualified to run.However, Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473 clearly states that the cancellation of the naturalization
certificate can only be made "upon motion made in the proper
proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by
the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must
come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation
in each particular case. Thus, the State, through its
representatives, not private persons, are the only ones who may
question the illegally or invalidly procures certificate of
naturalization.4. No (presumption of regularity) [Norgales] went on
to state that after assumption by the Member-elect, or having
acquired a presumptively valid title to the office, the House of
Representatives cannot, (motuproprio, cancel, revoke, withdraw any
recognition given to a sitting Member or to remove his name from
its roll, as such would amount to a removal of such Member from his
office without due process of law. The unseating of a Member of
theHouse of Representatives should be exercised with great caution
and after the proper proceedings for the ouster has been validly
completed.For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the
highest number of votes in the elections, and during the pendency
of the proceedings determining ones qualification or
disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the electorate
in whom sovereignty resides.5. NO. in Belacvs COMELEC, held that a
decision must not only be signed by the Justices who took part in
the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a
Decision, to wit:[A] true decision of the Court is the
decisionsigned by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that
decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the
Court to speak of.before a decision is signed and promulgated, all
opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation
of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon
no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may
serve for determining what the opinion of the majority
provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the
decision of the Court, but inno way is that decision binding unless
and until signed and promulgated.
Thus an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all.
Relation to said TOPIC (ANALYSIS)Promulgation: Operative Fact
for the Effectivity of a DecisionIt can be seen that in the case of
Limkaichong vs. COMELEC (wherein it involves numerous cases under
one common theme) there is the idea of the usage of promulgation of
resolutions as a means to effect decision to the parties. The
importance of timing, as seen in the facts of the case (see full
text) consummates the multiple angles affected by said cases. The
Supreme Court taking cognizance of the matter looked into the
details of TIME as basis for their decisions. Where on the multiple
cases that followed suit, the idea of operative fact steps in on
the grounds of when the decisions were made (on/against
Limkaichong) and the effect to which it constituted (affecting the
validity of Limkaichong as not only a citizen but as a proclaimed
winner).
Reversal of Judicial ConstructionThe previous leaked
unpromulgated decision of the court is not yet final and executory.
Although it is already signed, as long as it is not still
promulgated, it can still be change. An unpromulgated decision is
not a decision since they are part of internal deliberations of the
Court which must not be released to the public, since it is still
subject to change. This goes to the reason of preserving ones
freedom of action, thus a member of the court, although he already
signed can withdraw his vote as long as the decision has not yet
been promulgated.
Source:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html
Villanueva Y Paredes vs. Commission on Elections (municipal
board of canvassers of dolores, quezon, vivencio g. lirio)
---------December , 1985Doctrines1. Laws and statute should be
construed in accordance with the spirit of the law2. Election laws
should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their
purposeto effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in
the choice of their representatives. The rules and regulation for
the conduct of elections are mandatory before the elections, but
when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are
held to be directory only. Since if they are held mandatory,
innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault
on their part.Facts[Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decision (a decision which dismissed his petition to set
aside the COMELEC resolutions on Feb. 21 and July 31 1980-denying
his petition for annulment of the proclamation of respondent
Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon arguing
that it should have been him considering the majority of the votes
casts) on May 3, 1983.]Narciso Mendoza had filed on Jan. 4, 1980
(the last day of filing for candidacy) a sworn certificate of
candidacy for the Office of Vice-mayor in Dolores,Quezon. However
on that same day Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own
handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for
personal reasons." On the next day, January 25, 1980, petitioner
Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza's
withdrawal,. filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in
substitution" of Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a
one-man independent ticket. The results showed that Villanueva won
(3,112 votes over 2,660 votes of Lirio, his opponent). But the
Municipal board of Canvassers didnt acknowledge the victory because
for them it was a stray vote because Villanueva didnt appear in the
COMELECs certified list of candidates in that municipality,
presuming that his candidacy was not approved by the COMELEC. The
canvassers then proclaimed Vivencio G. Lirio as the unopposed
winner of the elections.The Comelec argued: The 1978 Election Code
provides:SEC. 27. ...Nocertificate of candidacy duly filed shall be
considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files with the office
which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn
statement of withdrawal ...SEC. 28. ... If,afterlast day for filing
certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of
candidacy duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified
for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
for which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate
on or before midday of election ...Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva
could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the strength of
Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one
thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath,
asrequiredunder Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal
effect. For another, said withdrawal was made not after the last
day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy,
ascontemplatedunder Sec. 28 of the Code, but onthat very same
day.Issues:1. Is the literal interpretation of the Comelec on the
Election code (denying the proclamation of Villanueva due to an
unsworn withdrawal of certificate of candidacy of Mendoza (sec. 27)
and because the withdrawal was not done after the last day of
filing) in accordance with the spirit of the law?Held/Rationale1.
The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a
technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's
will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. Moreover,
Mendozas withdrawal was an actual fact, so much that no votes were
cast for him at all. Although, his candidacy was filed on the last
day, his name was not on the certified list of candidates. Thus,
his unsworn withdrawal was accepted by the election registrar
without protest or objection. Also, since there was no time to
include the name of the petitioner in the candidates list, he
circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and
members of the citizens election committees in compliance with the
suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.2. The
legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to
be merelydirectoryand Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement
should be "considered a harmless irregularity.3. The Comelec's
post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy
certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and
spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides
for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or
disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections.
Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for
regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had
filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such
withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made
substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the
literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.4. It follows that
the votes cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case,
there is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as
Vice Mayor
Manahan vs. ECC, 104 SCRA 198Facts: Claimant was the widow of
Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of Enteric Fever while employed as a
classroom teacher in the Las Pias Municipal High School. Claimant
filed her claim with the GSIS for death benefits under P.D. No.
626. GSIS denied the claim finding that the ailment of the deceased
is not an occupational disease. Claimant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health
when admitted to the service and that the ailment of the deceased
was attributable to his employment, GSIS maintained its
denial.Claimant appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission
which affirmed the GSIS denial.Issue: WON claimant is entitled to
the benefitsHeld:Majority Opinion. The medical records of the
deceased showed that he had a history of ulcer-like symptoms
several months before his death on May 2, 1975. He was even treated
for epigastric pain due to hyperacidity on Dec. 10,1974. Epigastric
pain is a symptom, and ulcer is a common complication of typhoid
fever. Hence, it is clear that the illness which claimed his life
could have had its onset months before Dec. 10,1974. Such being the
case, his cause of action accrued before Dec. 10,1974.In any case,
the Court has always maintained that in case of doubt, the same
should be resolved in favor of the workers. The Workers
Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally construed
to attain their laudable objective, that is, to give relief to the
workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should
die or sustain an injury. The presumption of compensability
subsists in favor of the claimant.Concurring Opinion, Justice
Melencio-Herrera:Although enteric fever is not an occupational
disease, considering the cause of such illness, the risk of
contracting it could have been increased by the working conditions
of the deceased as a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the
school canteen and used the comfort room and other facilities of
the school.VillavertvsECC,110SCRA 233G.R. No. L-48605, December 14,
1981
FACTS:
This is a petition to review decision of the Employees
Compensation Commission affirming decision of the Government
Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits on
the ground that acute hemmorhagic pancreatitis is not an
occupational disease, thus, petitioner failed to show the causal
connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino Villavert and the
nature of his employment. He was employed at the Philippine
Constabulary as code verifier. However, due to shortage of
qualified civilian personnel to handle certain task, he was
assigned various tasks that would require him to render overtime
services especially in the preparation of the checks for the salary
of the Philippine Constabulary and the National Integrated Police
personnel throughout the country.
ISSUE:Whether or not Marcelino Villavert thru mother Domna
Villavert is entitled to death benefits?
HELD:
Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be
resolved in favor of thelabor.Judgment rendered ordering
theGovernment Service Insurance System to pay the petitioner death
benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00)
Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. (Petitioner)
vs.NLRC, PaulinoMabuti, NapoleoBorata, SilvinoTudio and Calinar
Security Agency (Respondents)
FACTS:
Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. (Petitioner)
entered into a Contract of Services with Calinar Security Agency
for the supply of security guards. PaulinoMabuti, NapoleoBorata and
SilvinoTudio, three of the guards deployed by the Security Agency
with the Petitioner, filed a Complaint against the Security Agency
and the Petitioner for underpayment of salary and the non-payment
of living allowance and 13th month pay. The Security Agency denied
liability alleging that it cannot comply with the payments required
by law to the Security Guards because of the inadequate contract
price paid by the Petitioner. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
Complaint against the Petitioner because of the non-existence of an
employer-employee relationship but ordered the Security Agency to
pay the Security Guards the total amount that they sought which was
P2,923.17. Upon appeal by the Security Agency, the NLRC decided to
hold both the Security Agency and the Petitioner jointly and
severally liable to pay the Security Guards because the Petitioner
is considered an indirect employer of the Security Guards. The
Security Agency, in its appeal to the NLRC above, failed to file it
under oath and did not pay the required appeal fee on time.
ISSUE: WON the NLRC erred in deciding that the Petitioner and
the Security Agency are jointly and severally liable to pay the
Security Guards. WON the NLRC erred in giving the appeal due course
despite the Security Agencys failure to file the appeal under oath
and pay the appeal fee on time.
RULING:On Issue No. 1:The SC affirms the decision of the NLRC
holding the Petitioner and the Security Agency jointly and
severally liable for the underpayment of the salary and the
non-payment of the living allowance and 13th month pay to the
Security Guards. Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, the Principal
(in this case, the Petitioner) should be held jointly and severally
liable with the Contractor (in this case, the Security Agency), in
case the latter fails to pay the wages of its employees. This is
more so the case with Petitioner considered as an indirect employer
under the definition stated in Article 107 of the same Labor
Code.The joint and several liability imposed by the Court is
however without prejudice to the Petitioners right to reimburse
from the Security Agency the amount it paid the Security Guards.The
SC further ruled that the inadequate contract price received by the
Security Agency from the Petitioner is irrelevant because the
Security Agency is expected to have known the labor laws and the
correct compensation it should have demanded for its services.On
Issue No. 2:The SC rules that the NLRC has the right to accept the
appeal despite the lack of verification and the delay in the
payment of the appeal fee. Article 221 of the Labor Code provides
that, unlike in the Courts of law where the rules of evidence are
controlling, the primordial interest of the Labor Code and the NLRC
is to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts of the case
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. Anyway, the deficiency in the verification
in this case can be cured in the actual oath-taking.
People v. ManantanGR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)En Banc,
Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leaveFacts: In an
information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan
was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted
in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was
committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon
defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the
defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to
dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview
of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who
cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the
peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower
court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence,
the appeal by the Solicitor General.Issue: Whether the justice of
the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the
Revised Election CodeHeld: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro
omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The
maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule
of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a
particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For
in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers
appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that
capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is
said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did
not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section
54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the
enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the
more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of
judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the
courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.The Supreme Court set aside
the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the
case for trial on the merits.
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994Mario Centeno vs. Hon Victoria
Villalon-Pornillos236 SCRA 197
Topic: Penal Statutes: Strictly against the State; liberally in
favor of the accusedFacts: Last quarter of 1985, the officers from
a group of elderly people of a civic organization (Samahan ng
Katandaan ng Tikay, MalolosBulacan)esblished a fund raising
activity for the purpose of renovating the chapel of their barrio.
Petitioner Martin Centeno, solicited fromJudge Adoracion G. Angeles
a contribution of P1,500 Said solicitation was made without a
permit from the DSWD As a consequence, an information was filed
against Martin Centeno for violation of PD No. 1564 (Solicitation
Permit Law) On December 29, 1992, the court rendered judgment,
sentencing the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.And required
to pay only P200.00 and recommended a pardoned the accused for it
is acted in good faith. Petitioner Centeno filed a motion to
nullify the information on the ground that PD 1564 only covers
solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but
not those made for religious purposes such as
construction/renovation of a chapel On May 21, 1993, Judge
Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but
modified the penalty because of perversity of the act committed,
increasing the penalty of imprisonment to 6 yrs and the fine to
P1,000. Issue: Should the phrasecharitable purposes be construed in
its broadest sense so as to include religious purposes? NO.Ruling:
PD 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only
goes to show that the framers of the law never intended
solicitation for religious purposes within its coverage. It will be
observed in Article VI Section 28 of 1987 Constitution, treat the
words charitable and religious separately and independently to each
other. These two terms are likewise dissociated and individually
mention in some statutes. Accordingly, the term charitable should
be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for religious
purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying
virtually all Penal Legislation that such interpretation should be
adopted as would favor the accused. Petitioner next avers that
solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the
law for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction
on the free exercise clause guaranteed under constitution. It may
be conceded that the construction of church is social concern of
the people involve public welfare and that such activity is within
the cloak of free exercise clause under the right to freedom of
religion guaranteed by the Constitution. To conclude, solicitations
for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the
state in the exercise of police power. However, the case at bar,
considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are
not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564..
WHEREFORE, decision appealed is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with
costs de oficio.-
In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to
subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such
strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. Where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others.
The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not
have made specified enumerations in a statue had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms. If the
statute is ambiguous and admits two reasonable but contradictory
constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused
under its provisions be preferred. The purpose of strict
construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape from
punishment through a technicality but to provide a definition of
forbidden acts.