statcon

Amatan v. Aujero

A.M. No. RTJ-93-956. September 27, 1995

FACTS:

A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed. After preliminary investigation by the office of the provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad with the crime of Homicide.

Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as originally charged in the information. Respondent judge found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted Homicide exactly in accordance with the plea bargaining agreement. 

A letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct wherein he contended that the sentence of respondent judge finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide and not Homicide as charged.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide.

HELD:Yes. While it is true that Sec. 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged", the fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally

liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide.

In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice.  The fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties.

Salvacion v. Central Bank

G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment.  Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.  On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail.  The policemen recovered from Bartelli a Dollar Account in China Banking Corp.

The Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any

court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act can be made applicable to a foreign transient.

HELD:

No. The foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit

encourage by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because

such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit

in the bank only for a short time. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which

provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the

lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.  “Ninguno non deue enriquecerse

tortizerzmente con damo de otro.”  Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is

one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of

conscience.  (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377) It would be unthinkable, that the questioned

Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for

wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. The provisions

of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A.

6426 are inapplicable to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.  

Demafiles v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-28396. December 29, 1967

FACTS:

The petitioner Agripino Demafiles and the respondent Benito B. Galido vying for the mayoralty in the general elections. On November 21 the respondent Galido asked the provincial board, acting as municipal board of canvassers pursuant to section 167 (b) of the Revised Election Code, to disregard, as "obviously manufactured", the election return from precinct 7 on the ground that the said return shows that 195 voters were registered, of whom

188 voted, when, according to a certificate of the municipal election registrar only 182 had registered in that precinct as of October 30, 1997. At its session on the following day, November 22, the board, over the objection of one member, voted to reject the return from precinct 7 and then proceeded with the canvass of the returns from the other precints. The resulting tally gave Galido 888 votes as against 844 for Demafiles. Accordingly, Galido was proclaimed mayor-elect of the municipality of Sebaste.

On November 24 Demafiles wired the Commission on Elections, protesting the board's action of rejection of the return from precinct 7 and the subsequent proclamation of Galido, and challenging the right of two board members, Julito Moscoso and Quirico Escaño, to sit, considering that they were reelectionists. The  COMELEC resolved to annul the canvass and proclamation of the local officials of the new municipality of Sebaste, Antique, which was made by the Provincial Board of Antique and to constitute the Board of Canvassers by appointing the substitutes pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 167 (a) of the Revised Election Code, which shall canvass anew the results of the election for local offices.

ISSUES:(1)   Whether or not the case is moot because respondent Galido had

taken his oath and assumed office on November 22, pursuant to Republic Act 4870.

(2)   Whether or not the canvassing board may pass upon the validity of the election return in this case.

(3)   Whether or not the canvass and proclamation should be annulled.

HELD:(1)   No. In the court’s view, the last portion of the provision — "and

shall have qualified" — is devoid of any meaning and does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. Here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from

assuming and, consequently, from supplying. The court agreed by the general rule that the term of office of municipal officials shall begin on the first day of January following their election, and so the assumption of office by the respondent Galido in no way affected the basic issues in this case.

(2)   Yes. A canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function — that of compiling and adding the results they appear in the returns, transmitted to it. However, they cannot pass upon the validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal. But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justified on the ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certificate of the local election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October 30, 1967.

(3)   Yes. The canvass and proclamation should be annulled because two of the four members of the board of canvassers were disqualified from sitting in it, they being candidates for reelection. The statement of respondent Galido that reelectionist members of the provincial board are disqualified under section 28 only when the board acts as a provincial board of canvassers, to prevent them from canvassing their own votes, and not when they sit as a municipal board of canvassers, is branded as obiter dictum

The statute draws no distinction between the provincial board acting as a provincial board of canvassers and the same board acting as a municipal canvassing body new municipalities, and so we make none, in line with the maxim ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.

People v. Gutierrez

G.R. No. L-32282-83. November 26, 1970

FACTS:Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan, capital of the province.

The Secretary issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice. The Administrative Orders were issued at the instance of the witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety.

ISSUES:(1)   Whether or not Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the

court below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court.

(2)   Whether or not the cases should be transferred to the Circuit Criminal Court.

HELD:(1)   Yes. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal

Courts nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases to the circuit courts. The very terms of Administrative Order No. 226 relied upon by the petitioners, in

merely authorizing, and not directing, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.

(2)   Yes. It is unfortunate that in refusing to consider Department Administrative Order No. 226 as mandatory, respondent Judge Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases should be transferred because a miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their lives would be endangered.  There is an imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the case.

Since the rigorous application of the general principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice — "summum jus, summa in juria."

  Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal

G.R. No. 191618. June 7, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Atty. Macalintal questions the constitutionality of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. While petitioner

concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal". Petitioner avers that the designation of the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitution of the PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.

HELD:

No. On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET. But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution should be read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.

Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of the court’s power to judge presidential and vice-presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary. The court reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution.

With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and

vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution.

The court had previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were designated. The PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.

Chua v. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:

Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the

National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original

charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized

under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,

regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of

government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces

of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.

Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however,

denied the same. The NIA and the Civil Service contend that petitioner is excluded from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683 because petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA, and said project was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position became functus officio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s application for ealy retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 6683 should be granted.

HELD:

Yes. The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose.

In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law.

COA v. Province of Cebu

G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001;

FACTS:

In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province

for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF.  Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province.  Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned.

HELD:

Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services.  Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.  Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the pertinent laws of the Local

Government Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated.  

Shioji v. Harvey

G.R. No. L-18940. April 27, 1922

FACTS:

In cause No. 19471 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein S. Shioji was plaintiff, and the Toyo Kisen Kaisah and the Pacific Mail Steamship Co., were defendants, judgment was rendered on October 31, 1920, by Judge Concepcion presiding in the second branch of the court, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Thereafter, the defendants duly perfected an appeal by way of bill of exceptions, to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands filed on February 16, 1922.

The countermove of the respondents in the injunction proceedings pending the Court of First Instance was to file a complaint in prohibition in the Supreme Court, to compel the respondent Judge of First Instance to desist from interfering with the execution of the judgment in case No. 19471 of the Court of First Instance of Manila and to issue an order revoking the previously promulgated by him. The preliminary injunction prayed for as an incident to the complaint in prohibition was immediately issued by the Supreme Court, and has been complied with by the respondents herein. Counsel Petitioner herein moves for judgment on the pleadings.

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not the Judge of First Instance may assume the jurisdiction to interpret and review judgment and order of the Supreme Court, and to obstruct the enforcement of the decisions of the appellate court.

(2)   Whether or not Rule 24 (a) is in conflict with any law of the United States or of the Philippine Islands.

HELD:

(1)   No. The only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a high court is returned, is the ministerial one, the issuing of the order of execution, and that lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court as it would seem to be superfluous. A judge of a lower court cannot enforce different decrees than those rendered by the superior court. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Island is expressly authorized by statute to make rules for regulation of its practice and the conduct of its business. Section 28 of the Judiciary Act (No. 136), grants to the members of the Supreme Court the power to "make all necessary rules for orderly procedure in Supreme Court . . . in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which rules shall be . . . binding upon the several courts."

(2)   No, Rule 24 (a) is not in conflict with any law of the United States or of the Philippines, but is a necessary rule for orderly procedure and for regulating the conduct of business in Supreme Court. It is a rule which relates to a matter of practice and procedure over which the Legislature has not exercised its power. It is a rule which does not operate to deprive a party of any statutory right. It is a rule in harmony with judicial practice and procedure over which the Legislature has not exercised its power. It is a rule which does not operate to deprive a party of any statutory right. It is a rule in harmony with judicial practice and procedure and essential to the existence of the courts. And, finally, it is a rule which must be enforced according to the discretion of the court. Independent of any statutory provision, the court asserts that every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.

Luciano v. Provincial Governor

G.R. No. 30306. June 20, 1969

FACTS:

The petition now before us, originally for mandamus filed by Jose C. Luciano, Councilor of Makati, Rizal, who received the highest number of votes in the last general elections of 1967, to compel the Provincial Governor and/or the Provincial Board of Rizal under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to suspend Makati Mayor Maximo Estrella and others, soon branched out to include quo warranto to have petitioner declared to be entitled to act as Mayor of Makati, Rizal and, thereafter, further expanded to add a prayer for injunction against newly named party respondents, Judges Delfin B. Flores and Herminio C. Mariano, both of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the Court of Appeals, because said judges and the Court of Appeals have restrained or enjoined the suspension of Mayor Estrella and others.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise the mandatory act of suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?

HELD:

It is true to say that nothing in Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act grants with specifity upon the Court of First Instance the power to suspend an official charged with a violation thereof. The plain import of the last sentence of Section 13, which says that if acquitted, is that a defendant in an Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices case "shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him."   And so, there is in this legal provision a recognition that once a case is filed in court, all other acts connected with the discharge of court functions — which here include suspension — should be left to the Court of First Instance. Section 13 requires as a pre-condition of the power to suspend that there be a valid information.

          Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed from one who should logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a given statute fairness must have in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless refinements, and rule that

under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to suspend the public official indicted there under.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936

FACTS:

Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified. Petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. Petitioner, in seeking for the issuance of the writ prayed for, contends that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly.

HELD:

No. The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of

members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents

G.R. 26803, Oct. 14, 1975

FACTS:

In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes" proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the question of

priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the Patent Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Director of Patents may be compelled to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.

HELD:

No. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office."

It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.  There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and

expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." 

People v. Concepcion

G.R. No. 19190. November 29, 1922

FACTS:

By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000. "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership. Venancio Concepcion is a member of the board of directors of this bank and was charged with a violation of Section 35 of Act No. 2747. Section 35 of Act No. 2747, provides that "The National Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the branch banks."         

ISSUE:

Whether or not the granting of a credit to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747 hence violative of said law.

HELD:

Yes. The prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may serve two masters — that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in the success or failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to partnership of which the wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition. A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a member, is an indirect loan to such director. The court is of the opinion that the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to himself directly. The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm.

Tantuico, Jr. v. Domingo

G.R. No. 96422. February 28, 1994

FACTS:

On January 26, 1980, petitioner was appointed Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) to serve a term of seven years expiring on January 26, 1987. Petitioner had discharged the functions of Chairman of the COA in an acting capacity since 1975. On December 31, 1985, petitioner applied for clearance from all money, property and other accountabilities in preparation for his retirement. He obtained the clearance applied for, which covered the period from 1976 to December 31, 1985. Petitioner sought a second clearance to cover the period from January 1, 1986 to March 9, 1986. All the signatures necessary to complete the second clearance, except that of Chairman Guingona, were obtained.

In a letter dated December 21, 1989, a copy of which was received by petitioner on December 27, 1989, respondent Chairman informed petitioner of the approval of his application for retirement under R.A. No. 1568, effective as of March 9, 1986. However, respondent Chairman added that in view of the audit findings and inventory report adverted, payment of only one-half (½) of the money value of the benefits due petitioner by reason of such retirement will be allowed, subject to the availability of funds and the usual accounting and auditing rules. Payment of the balance of said retirement benefits shall be subject to the final results of the audit concerning petitioner’s fiscal responsibility and/or accountability as former Chairman of this Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the withholding of one-half of petitioner’s retirement pay is valid.

HELD:

No. Respondent Chairman cannot withhold the benefits due petitioner under the retirement laws. In said case, where petitioner herein was one of the respondents, we found that the employee had been cleared by the National Treasurer from all money and property responsibility, and held that the retirement pay accruing to a public officer may not be withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government. Well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning his livelihood (Profeta vs. Drilon, 216 SCRA 777 [1992]). The petition is granted insofar as it seeks to compel respondent Chairman of the COA to pay petitioner's retirement benefits in full and his monthly pensions beginning in March 1991.

Matuguina Integrated Wood Products v. CA

G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996

FACTS:Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. (MIWPI) filed this action for prohibition, Damages and Injunction, in order to prevent the respondent Minister of Natural Resources from enforcing its Order of Execution against it, for liability arising from an alleged encroachment of the petitioner over the timber concession of respondent DAVENCOR located in Mati, Davao Oriental. The Court of Appeals in its decision found MIWPI as an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina and/or Matuguina Logging Enterprises (MLE), to be liable to DAVENCOR for illegal encroachment.

ISSUE:Whether or not a transferee of a forest concession is liable for obligations arising from the transferor’s illegal encroachment into another forest concessionaire committed prior to the transfer.

HELD:No. Section 61 of P.D. 705 provides that “Unless authorized by the Department Head, no licensee, lessee, or permittee may transfer, exchange, sell, or convey his license agreement, license, lease or permit, or any of his rights or interest therein, or any of his assets used in connection therewith.

The licensee, lessee, or permittee shall be allowed to transfer or convey his license agreement, license, lease, or permit only if he has not violated any forestry law, rule or regulation; has been faithfully complying with the terms and conditions of the license agreement, license, lease or permit; the transferee has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to hold a license agreement, license, lease or permit; there is no evidence that such transfer or conveyance is being made for purposes of speculation; and the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor.”

In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their ordinary meaning, that is, such meaning which is ascribed to them when they are commonly used, to the end that

absurdity in the law must be avoided. The term “obligations” as used in the final clause of the second paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary course of business.  It cannot be construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of the transferor, and could not have been included in the term “obligations” absent any modifying provision to that effect.

Ernesto v. CA

GR 52178, Sep 28, 1982

FACTS:Petitioner for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-08166-R, Demetrio Ernesto, et. al. vs. San Carlos Milling Co., et al., which affirmed the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch III, City of San Carlos dismissing the complaint of petitioners seeking the payment of their 60% share of the alleged contractual increase in the share of the planters in the proceeds of sugarcane milled in respondent's sugar mill during the crop years 1958-59 to 1967-68 and all subsequent crop years to which they maintain they are entitled under the Sugar Act of 1952 (R.A. 809).

Petitioners insist that in the San Carlos Milling district, there was no such majority during all the

times materials hereto, which contention is denied by respondents. And the issue revolves solely

around the point of whether or not so-called emergency, non-quota and non-district or

accommodation planters should be counted in determining the majority contemplated in the law.

The determination of the issue is decisive because the record indicates that if the emergency, or

non-quota, non-district and "accommodation" planters are to be considered in ascertaining how

many "planters" with written milling contracts with the sugar mill", the result would be that the

planters in the San Carlos Milling district with such written contracts would be in the minority,

in which case Section 9 of Republic Act 809 would be applicable, not in relation to any

contractual increase in the share of the planters.

ISSUE:

Whether or not so-called emergency, non-quota and non-district or accommodation planters should be counted in determining the majority of planters contemplated in the law.

HELD:Yes. The court believes that there is no valid reason why the statutory definition of planters under Act 4166 and Executive Orders 900 and 901 should still be adhered to after the factual situation to which they were addressed had already changed. The limitation to sugar quotas, whether export, domestic or reserve among all the mills continued only until 1955. From that year, emergency, non-quota, non-district or accommodation planters came into being with the blessings of the Sugar Quota Administration. With such a change in situation, it would not be logical to continue adhering to the previous definitions that had already lost their legal effect. Consequently, the court is of the considered opinion that after the quota system ceased, the definition of planters within the district for the purposes of Section 1 of the Sugar Act should be all planters who delivered their sugarcane to the respondent Central who milled the same. Hence, as such, they should all be counted in determining the total number of planters in the sugar district in ascertaining whether or not a majority of them have written milling contracts with the respondent Central.

Amadora v. CA

G.R. No. L-47745 Apr. 15, 1988

FACTS:

While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other

students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. The respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 2180 of the Civil Code applies to all schools, academic as well as non-

academic.

HELD:

Yes. The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

Carandang v. Santiago

G.R. No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari against Honorable Vicente Santiago, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to annul his order in Civil Case No. 21173, entitled Cesar M. Carandang vs. Tomas Valenton, Sr. et al., suspending the trial of said civil case to await the result of the criminal Case No. 534, Court of First Instance of

Batangas. In this criminal case, Tomas Valenton, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang, petitioner herein. Tomas Valenton, Jr. appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where the case is now pending.

Petitioner invokes Article 33 of the new Civil Code. The Code Commission itself states that the civil action allowed under Article 33 is similar to the action in tort for libel or slander and assault and battery under American law. But respondents argue that the term "physical injuries" is used to designate a specific crime defined in the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages

arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide.

HELD:

Yes. The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the

term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945

FACTS:

This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.

The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation.

ISSUE:          

Whether or not the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," affects the proceedings in civil cases pending in court under the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation.

HELD:No. The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of

the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. It should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of principles of international law. The court ruled that the term “processes” does not refer to judicial processes but to executive orders of the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Committee, ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines and the constitution itself of said Republic, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word “processes” is associated.

Escribano v. Avila

G.R. No. L-30375, Sep. 12, 1978

FACTS:On September 25, 1968 Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato, filed directly with the Court of First Instance of that province a complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato. In that complaint Escribano was charged with having said in a speech, which was broadcasted on a radio station, that "Mr. Pendatun is the worst animal that ever live in this province.” Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the offense. Judge Avila in his orders of March 5, 20 and 27, 1969 ruled that he had the power to conduct the preliminary investigation. On April 1, 1969 Escribano filed in this Court against Judge Avila and Pendatun the instant special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition, praying that the said orders of Judge Avila be set aside. On April 18 Escribano filed a supplemental petition to annul Judge Avila's order of March 29, 1969. In that order he found that Pendatun's evidence had "established a probable cause to believe that" libel by radio had been committed and that Escribano "probably committed the same". The city fiscal filed an information for libel against Escribano. Petitioner invokes the provisions of article 360 of the Revised Penal

Code, which were inserted by Republic Act No. 4363, which do not empower the Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation of written defamations.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city attorney of that city.

HELD:Yes. The lawmaking body, by means of that amendment of Art. 360, never intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely sought to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a preliminary investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of First Instance is not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the preliminary investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration of particular things excludes the Idea of something else not mentioned.)

However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in this case because, as shown above, the fact that the Court of First Instance is not mention in the amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation in cases of written defamation, has nothing to do with the purpose of the amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the court must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and it should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which win best effect its purpose rather than one which win defeat it. The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct an investigation of criminal actions for written

defamations does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation.

People v. Tamani

G.R. No. 22160, Jan 21, 1974

FACTS:

After the appellant had filed his brief, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was forty-seven days late. The lower court's decision convicting defendant Tamani was promulgated on February 14, 1963. He filed his notice of appeal only on September 10, 1963 or forty eight days from July 24th.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 15-day period within which to appeal a judgment of conviction in a criminal

action is counted from the date of promulgation of judgment.

HELD:

Yes. Section 22, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “an appeal must be taken within

fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of judgment or order appealed from.” The court

held that the 15-day period should be counted from the promulgation and not from receipt of

copy of judgment. The word "promulgation" in Section 6 should be construed as referring to

"judgment" under Section 6 of Rule 120, while the word "notice" should be construed as

referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the rule of reddendo singula singulis.

Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion for reconsideration was served by

registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only one (1) day within which to file

his notice of appeal and not eleven days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on

September 10, 1963, was fifty-eight days late.

People v. Purisima

G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978

FACTS:

These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People of the Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges issued an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to

constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under PD No. 9.

HELD:

No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.

In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, “whereas" clauses.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all

objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 

Quibuyen v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-16854, Dec 26, 1963

FACTS:

In this case, the defendants filed three motions but they were denied. On August 15, 1958, judgment was rendered. On September 29, 1958, they filed a pleading entitled "Petition for Relief from Judgment", which was denied by the trial judge on January 5, 1959. On January 10 and 29, 1959 they filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond, respectively; but the record on appeal was not registered until February 4, 1959. On February 12, 1959, the plaintiff filed their opposition to the approval of the defendants' appeal, on the ground that the order of January 5,1958 and the judgment on the merits of August 15, 1958 are not appealable the latter having already become final and executory. On April 27, 1959, the Judge issued an Order denying the defendants' appeal, for the reasons stated in plaintiffs' opposition dated February 12, 1959 and granted the issuance a writ of execution.

Petitioners, in contending that their petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was

sufficient invokes Rule 67 which provides that petition is issued only if the petition is sufficient

in form and substance to justify such process. But the Court of Appeals found that the petition

was fatally defective, in the sense that the necessary supporting papers were not attached with the

petition, and most important, the precise order dated January 5, 1959, which petitioners sought

to annul through said petition. Petitioners contended that the order of January 5, 1959, the order

of the trial judge denying the petition for relief mentioned or designated in the prayer of the

petition, was not the order which was being assailed, but the order of April 27, 1959, which was

attached as Annex A, to the petition for certiorari and this was the one refusing to give due

course to the appeal from the order denying the petition for relief filed by the petitioners.

Petitioners submit that Annex A, order of the trial court under date of April 27, 1959, having

been actually attached to the petition, it was no longer necessary for petitioners to attach the

other supporting papers, such as the petition for relief, the opposition thereto, the order denying

the said petition for relief and so forth.

ISSUE:

(1)   Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals is sufficient in form

and substance, such that a dismissal by said Court of said petition on the ground that is "fatally

defective” is invalid.

(2)   Whether or not it is necessary petitioners to attach still "other supporting papers" since a copy of the order sought be annulled was actually attached to the certiorari petition, as Annex A. 

HELD:

(1)   No. The court is satisfied that it is a case of lapsus calami. The mistake consists in mentioning in

the prayer of the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that the writ be issued "annulling

the aforesaid order of the respondent Judge of January 5, 1959, and directing the respondent

Judge to give due course to the appeal interposed by the herein petitioners", without a attaching a

copy of said order, but accompanying the said petition, as Annex A, with a copy of the order of

the court dated April 27, 1959. The order of January 5, 1959 was one denying the petition for

relief "for lack of merit" while order of April 27, 1959 was an order denying the defendants'

appeal and granting the issuance of a writ of execution. The petition mentioned the order of

January 5, 1959 as the order assailed, instead of designating that April 27, 1959, as the order

appealed from. It is seen, therefore, that the designation of the order by date, in the petition was a

mistake.

(2)   No. The query invites a negative answer, because it being a special action of certiorari, Rule 67 governs, at least, in matter of form of petition. All that the Rules require is that the petition be verified, the facts be alleged with certainty and it must pray for the annulment of the judgment order complained of (sec. 1, Rule 67). These requisites were met by the petitioner with the respondent Court. Granting for the sake of argument, that section 2, Rule 49 is applicable, the same was also substantially complied with. The copy of the order of April 27, 1959 was filed as (Annex A with the petition, on the date the petition was presented, and the other pleadings such as the Petition for Relief from Judgment Annex B), opposition to petition for relief (Annex C) order of the respondent court denying petition for relief (Annex D), Notice of Appeal (Annex E), Opposition to Defendants'

appeal, and Motion for Execution (Annex F), with the motion for reconsideration, dated March 14, 1960, of the order of dismissal of the petition, which served to cure the alleged defect, in form and substance, of the petition in question. If at all, petitioners were guilty of a technical violation of procedural requirements, a technicality which does not seem to be of much moment presently, since the reason for its existence had been satisfied.

Ferrer v. Pecson

G.R. No. L-5221. October 27, 1952

FACTS:

On March 1, 1949, the petitioner Benito Ferrer Y Rodriguez was accused before the municipal court of Manila of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the said court. After trial, the Municipal Court of Manila found him guilty and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Defendant appealed the case to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Petitioner through counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over the offense and, consequently, the Court of First Instance had no appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Municipal Court of Manila had jurisdiction over the offense.

HELD:No. The jurisdiction of the court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Sec. 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and not under the Revised Penal Code. The criminal jurisdiction of a justice of the peace or a municipal court as defined in the Judiciary Act of 1948 is confined to offenses in which the penalty is not more than six (6) months. From this it is clear that the Municipal Court of Manila had no jurisdiction over this case where a maximum penalty of six (6) years may be

imposed; and if it had no original jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance presided over by Judge Pecson had likewise no appellate jurisdiction.

It is true that section 67 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law was amended by section 16 of Republic Act No. 587, in the sense that acts of negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving resulting in death or serious bodily injury upon any person shall be prosecuted and punished under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. But this act may not be given retroactive effect so as to confer on the municipal court jurisdiction which it did not have when it tried and decided the case against petitioner. It may be true that the provisions of the penal code are more favorable to the petitioner in this case as regards the penalty, but when the very accused, herein petitioner, far from invoking the benefits of said Republic Act No. 587, disregards it and instead, invokes the Revised Motor Vehicle Law which was in force at the time that the acts imputed to him were committed, at least for that reason alone the question of retroactivity cannot and will not be considered.