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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DEFINED
Statutory Construction – the art or process of discovering and expoundingthe meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in
the law.
Justice Martin defines statutory construction as the art of seeking the
intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state
of facts.
A judicial function is required when a statute is invoked and different
interpretations are in contention.
Difference between judicial legislation and statutory construction:Where
legislature attempts to do several things one which is invalid, it may be
discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way depends upon
the invalid portion, but if that portion is an integral part of the act, and its
excision changes the manifest intent of the act by broadening its scope to
include subject matter or territory which was not included therein as enacted,
such excision is “judicial legislation” and not “statutory construction”.
THE OBJECTIVE OF “STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION”(LEGISLATIVE INTENT)
Legislative intent
In law, the legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation may sometimes be
considered by the judiciary when interpreting the law (see judicial interpretation). The judiciary
may attempt to assess legislative intent where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to
directly or adequately address a particular issue, or when there appears to have been a legislative
drafting error.
When a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that the inquiry into
legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a statute could be interpreted in more than
one fashion that legislative intent must be inferred from sources other than the actual tet of the
statute.
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Sources of legislative intent
!ourts frequently loo" to the following sources in attempting to determine the goals and
purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it passed the law#
• the tet of the bill as proposed to the legislative body,
•
amendments to the bill that were proposed and accepted or rejected,• the record of hearings on the topic,
• legislative records or journals,
• speeches and floor debate made prior to the vote on the bill,
• legislative subcommittee minutes, factual findings, and$or reports,
• other relevant statutes which can be used to understand the definitions in the statute
on question,
• other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question,
• legislative files of the eecutive branch, such as the governor or president,
• case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the problems the
legislature was attempting to address with the bill, or
• constitutional determinations (i.e. %Would !ongress still have passed certain sections
of a statute &had it "nown& about the constitutional invalidity of the other portions of
the statute'%).
• legislative intent- the reason for passing the law
literal meaning or plain meaning rule. If the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
you get the meaning of the law from the word per word written law. iteral meaning or plain rule
means IT*++*T-TI of the -W. - W+/0 words in a statute should if possible, be
given effect.
Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should not, by
!0T+1!TI, be given a different meaning. When the legislature defines a word used in a
statute, it does not usurp the courts function to interpret the laws but it merely *2I0-T*0
what should form part of the law itself.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to define words, words and phrases used in
statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning which is supported by
the maimgeneralia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is generally spo"en shall be
generally understood. It is also the same as 2**+-I /I!T13 2**+-ITI+ *0T
IT*++*T-/13 a general statement is understood in a general sense.
WORS !"S# $% S"$S%R&I%'# #O #(% I'#%'# and not intent to words.
1bi le non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. When the law does not distinguish, do not
distinguish.
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dura le sed le or 4! 51I/*3 *+51-3 /1+13 *0T, 0*/ IT- *6 0!+IT- *0T.
The law maybe harsh but is still the law. It is e)ceedingly hard, but so the law is written.
doctrine of necessary implication this doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as
much a part thereof as that which is e)pressed. *very statute is understand by implication
to contain all such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to its ob*ect and purpose, or to ma"e effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. The
principle is epressed in the maim *6 *!*00IT-T* *2I0 or from the necessity of the law.
ejusdem generis. #(% S+!% I' OR S%I%. This is to give effect to both the particular
and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general
words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the
particular words.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application7 it should be used to carry out, not to
defeat the intent or purpose of the law7 the rule must give way in favor of the legislative
intent/
limitations of ejusdem generis requisites#
8. 0tatue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general
word or phrase7
9. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same 0ind7
:. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not e)haustive or is not merely by
eamples7
;. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader
meaning.
e)pressio unios est e)clusio alterius.
the e)pression of 1 person, thing or conse2uence I!LI%S the %3L"SIO' of
O#(%RS or
What is e)pressed puts an end to that which is implied.
*6+*0013
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application of e)pressio unius rule. This auiliary rule is used in !0T+1!TI of
statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common right, and
imposing penalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly construed. It is
only a tool and not a mandatory rule used for ascertaining the legislative intent. #he rule must
also yield to legislative intent.
negative- opposite doctrine, W(+# IS %3R%SS% "#S +' %' #O W(+# IS
I!LI% is "nown as negative>opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario.
doctrine of casus omissus (case of omission) pro omisso habendus est. - person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This rule is
not absolute if it can be shown that the legislature did not intend to eclude the person, thing or
object from the enumeration. If such legislative intent is clearly indicated, the !1+T maysupply the omission if to do so will carry out the intent of the legislature and will not do violence
to its language.
doctrine of last antecedent or -/ +6I313 -T*!*/*0
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heir cannot ta"e, unless in cases where a construction can be made reddendo singula singulis,
that the net of "in shall ta"e the personal estate and the heir at law the real estate. 8; @es. ;AB.
@ide 88 *ast,, C8:, n.7 =ac. -b. !onditions, .
Stare ecisis Datin, et the decision stand.E The policy of courts to abide by or adhere to principles established by decisions in earlier cases. (stah>ray duh>see>sis) n. atin for 4to stand
by a decision,4 the doctrine that a trial court is bound by appellate court decisions (precedents)
on a legal question which is raised in the lower court. +eliance on such precedents is required of
trial courts until such time as an appellate court changes the rule, for the trial court cannot ignore
the precedent (even when the trial judge believes it is %bad law%)
Res 8udicata [ atin, - thing adjudged. ] A rule that a final judgment on the merits by a court
having jurisdiction is conclusive between the parties to a suit as to all matters that were litigated
or that could have been litigated in that suit.The party asserting res judicata, having introduced a final judgment on the merits, must then
show that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive as to the matters in the second suit.
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"# R%S !+7IS &+L%+# 9"+! %R%+#, - 0T-T1T* must be interpreted to give it
efficient operation and effect as a whole avoiding the nullification of provisions. IT is so that a
legal provision must not be so construed as to be a useless 01+10-2*. -ccordingly, in case
of /oubt or obscurity, that construction should ma"e the statute fully operative and effective. IT
I0 +*013*/ T4-T T4* *2I0-T1+* /I/ T / - @-I T4I2 I T4*
*-!T3*T < T4* 0T-T1T*.In +R% !+#%RI+, of the same person or thing.
I'#%RR%#+R% %# O'OR+R% L%7%S L%7I$"S %S# O#I!"S
I'#%RR%#+'I !O"S, or every statute must be so !0T+1*/ and harmoniFed with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of Gurisprudence. +LL laws are presumed to be
consistent with each other.
IS#I'7"% #%!OR+ %# O'OR+$IS 8"R+, distinguish times and you will
harmoni;e laws.
I enacting a 0T-T1T*, the legislature is presumed to have been aware, and ta"en into account,
+I+ -W0 on the subject of legislation. Thus, conflict on same subject is not intended and if
such occur, !ourt must construe, through reconciliation to give effect to the statute. If it is
impossible to reconcile and harmoni;e, one statute has to give way to the other. The latest
statute shall prevail being the latest epression of the legislative WI.
- 2**+- -W and a 0*!I- -W are in pare materia. The fact that one is general and
the other special creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an
eception of the 2eneral -ct. One as a General Law of the Land, the other as a LAW for a
Part!"lar !ase# This shall apply all the time regardless of which law was enacted first.
!T*3+-*10 !0T+1!TI0 or !T*3+-+? !0T+1!TI0 are
made by the *6*!1TI@* /epartments.
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0tatutes passed by congress, laws that are enforced. These are !T*3+-+?
IT*++*T-TI0 and !onstructions.
T4*0* O'#%!OR+R: O'S#R"#IO'S 0T-T1T*0 4-*, W4* T4*+*
-+*'O +#"+L O'#RO&%RSI%S 9"%S#IO'I'7 #(% &+LII#: O< S#+#"#%S
I' #(% S"R%!% O"R#, therefore, 0T-+* /*!I0I0 4-@* ?*T =** 3-/*. I<
T4*+* -+* G1/I!I- IT*++*T-TI0 -/ !0T+1!TI0, T4*T4* 8"II+L O'S#R"#IO'S +R% governing and are #(% O'%S followed $:
#(% %3%"#I&% %+R#!%'#S once promulgated by the Supreme ourt.
!2+*00, T =*I2 T4* !0TIT1TI-? W*+ T IT*++*T -/
!0T+1* T4* -W0 T4*? 3-H*, 3-? -0 / !T*3+-+?
!0T+1!TI I o any stated facts in support of the conclusion.
A.Socorro Ramir! " CA a#$ E%&r Garcia
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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,vs.ONORA!"E COURT O# APPEA"S, $%& ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
'APUNAN, J.:
civil case da!a"es #as filed b$ petitioner Socorro D. Ra!ire% in the Re"ional Trial &ourt of'ue%on &it$ alle"in" that the private respondent, (ster S. )arcia, in a confrontation in the latter*soffice, alle"edl$ ve+ed, insulted and hu!iliated her in a hostile and furious !ood and in a !anneroffensive to petitioner*s di"nit$ and personalit$, contrar$ to !orals, "ood custo!s and publicpolic$. 1
In support of her clai!, petitioner produced a verbati! transcript of the event and sou"ht !oralda!a"es, attorne$*s fees and other e+penses of liti"ation in the a!ount of P-/,///.//, in additionto costs, interests and other reliefs a#ardable at the trial court*s discretion. The transcript on #hichthe civil case #as based #as culled fro! a tape recordin" of the confrontation !ade b$petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follo#s0
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ra!ire% 1&huchi2 3 )ood fternoon M*a!.
Defendant (ster S. )arcia 1(S)2 3 no ba an" nan"$ari sa *$o,na4ali!ot 4a na 4un" paano 4a napunta rito, por4e !e!ber 4a na,!a"su!bon" 4a 4un" ano an" "a"a#in 4o sa *$o.
&56&5I 3 7asi, na4a dut$ a4o noon.
(S) 3 Tapos ini#an no. 1Sic 2
&56&5I 3 5indi !*a!, pero ilan beses na nila a4on" binali4an,sabin" "anoon 3
(S) 3 Ito and 1sic 2 !asasabi 4o sa *$o, a$a# 4un" 1sic 2 !a" e+plain4a, 4asi han""an" /0// p.!., 4inabu4asan hindi 4a na pu!aso4.N"a$on a4o an" babali4 sa *$o, na"8aapl$ 4a sa States, na"8aapl$ 4asa revie# !o, 4un" 4a4ailan"anin an" certification !o, 4ali!utan !ona 4asi hindi 4a sa a4in !a4a4ahin"i.
&56&5I 3 5indi M*a!. 7asi an" ano 4o tala"a noon i8cocontinue 4oup to /0// p.!.
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(S) 3 Bastos ka, na4ali!utan !o na 4un" paano 4a pu!aso4 ditosa hotel. Ma"su!bon" 4a sa 6nion 4un" "usto !o. Na4ali!utan !ona 4un" paano 4a na4apaso4 dito Do $ou thin4 that on $our o#n!a4a4apaso4 4a 4un" hindi a4o. Panunu!b$o$an na 4ita1Sinusu!batan na 4ita2.
&56&5I 3 Itutulo$ 4o na M*a! sana an" dut$ 4o.
(S) 3 7aso ilan" beses na a4on" binabali4an doon n" !"a no 1sic 24o.
(S) 3 Na4ali!utan !o na ba 4un" paano 4a pu!aso4 sa hotel,4un" on $our o#n !erit ala! 4o na!an 4un" "aano 4a 4a bobo !o.Mara!i an" na"8aapl$ ala! 4on" hindi 4a papasa.
&56&5I 3 7u!uha 4a!i n" e+a! noon.
(S) 3 Oo, pero hindi 4a papasa.
&56&5I 3 (h, ba4it a4o an" na4uha ni Dr. Ta!a$o
(S) 3 7u4unin 4a 4asi a4o.
&56&5I 3 (h, di sana 3
(S) 3 5u#a" !on" ipa"!ala4i na !a$ uta4 4a 4asi wala kangutak . 4ala !o ba !a4u4uha 4a dito 4un" hindi a4o.
&56&5I 3 Ma"8ee+plain a4o.
(S) 3 5u#a" na, hindi a4o !a"8papa8e+plain sa *$o, !a4aalala 4a4un" paano 4a pu!a8rito. Putang-ina sasabi8sabihin !o 4a!a"8ana4 n" nana$ at tata$ !o an" !"a !a"ulan" 4o.
(S) 3 9ala na a4on" pa4iala!, dahil nandito 4a sa loob, nasalabas 4a pu#ede 4a n" hindi pu!aso4, o4e$ $an nasaloob 4a u!alis4a doon.
&56&5I 3 7asi M*a!, binbali4an a4o n" !"a ta"a 6nion.
(S) 3 Nandi$an na rin a4o, pero hu#a" !on" 4ali!utan na hindi 4a!a4a4apaso4 4un" hindi a4o. 7un" hindi !o 4ini4ilala $an o4e$ lan"
sa a4in, dahil tapos 4a na.
&56&5I 3 Ina8ano 4o !*a! na utan" na loob.
(S) 3 5u#a" na lan", hindi !o utan" na loob, 4asi 4un" ba"a sano, nilapastan"an !o a4o.
&56&5I 3 Paano 4ita nilapastan"anan:
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Petitioner vi"orousl$ ar"ues, as her !ain and principal issue * that the applicable provision ofRepublic ct
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sa$, Hour 5onor, that the intention is to cover it #ithin the purvie# of this bill oroutside:
Senator TaGada0 That is covered b$ the purvie# of this bill, Hour 5onor.
Senator Padilla0 (ven if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in &ivil &ases or special proceedin"s:
Senator TaGada0 That is ri"ht. This is a comlete !an on tae recor"e"con#ersations taken without the authori$ation o% all the arties.
Senator Padilla0 No#, #ould that be reasonable, $our 5onor:
Senator TaGada0 I believe it is reasonable because it is not sorting to recor" theo!ser#ation o% one without his knowing it an" then using it against him. It is not %air, it is not sortsmanlike. If the purposeC Hour honor, is to record the intention of theparties. I believe that all the parties should 4no# that the observations are bein"recorded.
Senator Padilla0 This !i"ht reduce the utilit$ of recorders.
Senator TaGada0 9ell no. For e+a!ple, I #as to sa$ that in !eetin"s of the board ofdirectors #here a tape recordin" is ta4en, there is no obAection to this if all the parties4no#. It is but fair that the people #hose re!ar4s and observations are bein" !adeshould 4no# that the observations are bein" recorded.
Senator Padilla0 No#, I can understand.
Senator TaGada0 That is #h$ #hen #e ta4e state!ents of persons, #e sa$0 Pleasebe infor!ed that #hatever $ou sa$ here !a$ be used a"ainst $ou. That is fairness
and that is #hat #e de!and. No#, in spite of that #arnin", he !a4es da!a"in"state!ents a"ainst his o#n interest, #ell, he cannot co!plain an$ !ore. But i% &ouare going to take a recor"ing o% the o!ser#ations an" remarks o% a erson withouthim knowing that it is !eing tae" or recor"e", without him knowing that what is!eing recor"e" ma& !e use" against him, I think it is un%air .
+++ +++ +++
1&on"ression Record, Vol. III, No. B, p. ?-
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+++ +++ +++
The una!bi"uit$ of the e+press #ords of the provision, ta4en to"ether #ith the above8@uoteddeliberations fro! the &on"ressional Record, therefore plainl$ supports the vie# held b$ therespondent court that the provision see4s to penali%e even those priv$ to the privateco!!unications. 9here the la# !a4es no distinctions, one does not distin"uish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is i!!aterial to a violation of the statute. The substance ofthe sa!e need not be specificall$ alle"ed in the infor!ation. 9hat R..
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95(R(FOR(, because the la#, as applied to the case at bench is clear and una!bi"uous andleaves us #ith no discretion, the instant petition is hereb$ D(NI(D. The decision appealed fro! is
FFIRM(D. &osts a"ainst petitioner.
SO ORD(R(D.
Pa"illa, )a#i"e, *r+ an" Bellosillo **+, concur+
ermosisima, *r+, *+, is on lea#e+
#oot%ote
Doc4eted as &ivil &ase No. ??8
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> I" ., at =/.
=/ I" ., at =.
B.Gr'r& R. Cor! " Dai%*+*# Tiro+ S&o. Toma% a#$ &,So+ici&or G#ra+Republic of the hilippines
Supreme ourt
!anila
#(IR I&ISIO'
7%R$%R# R. OR"?,
etitioner,
> versus >
+IS:L:' #IROL S#O.
#O!+S and #he SOLII#OR
7%'%R+L,
+espondents. -- -
7.R. 'o. 1@ABC1
resent#
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,BRION,BERSAMIN,*ABAD, andVILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
PromulgatedAugu!t "", #$"$
)>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> )
% I S I O '
$RIO', ( .#
=efore the !ourt is a direct appeal from the decision D8E of the +egional Trial
!ourt ( *T& ) of aoag !ity, =ranch 88, elevated via a petition for review
oncertiorariD9E under +ule ;C of the +ules of !ourt (present petition).
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn3
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etitioner 2erbert +. !orpuF was a former
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second paragraph of Article - of the ,amily &odeDE in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under hilippine law.DAE -rticle 9J of the
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2r .D9BE and 3ilapil v. 'bay4#omera.D98E In both cases, the !ourt refused to ac"nowledge
the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree
between the alien and the
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spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.D9JE
2iven the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of -rticle 9J of the
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In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mista"e of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment issufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recogniFed in the hilippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.D9KE
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
ac"nowledgment that our courts do not ta"e judicial notice of foreign judgmentsand laws. Gustice 4errera eplained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.D9E This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.D9AE The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in
another action where a party invo"es the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.
In 2erberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recogniFing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, 0ection 9;, +ule 8:9 of the +ules of !ourt
comes into play. This 0ection requires proof, either by (8) official publications or
(9) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not "ept in the hilippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the hilippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the recordis "ept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that 2erbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,D:BE but failed to
include a copy of the !anadian law on divorce.D:8E 1nder this situation, we can, at
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn32http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn28http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn29http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn30http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/august2010/186571.htm#_ftn32
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this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the +T! to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the !anadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to ta"e this latter course of action, given the-rticle 9J interests that will be served and the
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acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the
!anadian divorce decree on 2erbert and /aisylyns marriage certificate, on the
strength alone of the foreign decree presented by 2erbert.
*vidently, the asig !ity !ivil +egistry ffice was aware of the requirementof a court recognition, as it cited 0 !ircular o. ;, series of 8A9, D:JE and
/epartment of Gustice pinion o. 88, series of 8A9 D:KE both of which required a
final order from a competent hilippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving
a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree.
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!+R#I' S. &ILL+R+!+, 8R.
-ssociate Gustice
+##%S#+#IO'
I attest that the conclusions in the above /ecision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the !ourts
/ivision.
O'(I#+ +RIO !OR+L%S
-ssociate Gustice&hairperson
%R#I9B.D:E 'd . at 9K.D;E 3arriage !ertificate, id . at :K.DCE !ertificate of /ivorce, id . at :.DJE 'd . at ;K>CB7 the pertinent portion of 0 !ircular o. ;, series of 8A9, states#
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It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the +egister of
-nnulment of 3arriages in 3anila, unless and until final order of eecution of such foreign
judgment is issued by competent hilippine court.DKE #upra note 8.DE *ecutive rder o. 9BA, enacted on Guly J, 8AK.DAE *ollo, p. :8.D8BE 2.+. o. 8C;:B, ctober C, 9BBC, ;K9 0!+- 88;.D88E 'd . at 898.D89E 2erberts motion for reconsideration of the +T!s ctober :B, 9BB decision was denied in an order dated
K and 89C>8;9, respectively.D8CE The void marriages are those enumerated under -rticles :C, :J, :K, :, ;B, ;8, ;;, and C: in relation to -rticle C9
of the ;8.D:8E The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between 2erbert and /aisylyn was dissolved by the
!anadian court. The full tet of the courts judgment was not included.D:9E iterally means a thing adjudged, =lac"s aw /ictionary (C th ed.), p. 88K7 it establishes a rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former. #upra note 9 at ;J9.D::E 0ee 3hilsec 'nvestment &orporation v. &ourt of Appeals, 2.+. o. 8B:;A:, Gune 8A, 8AAK, 9K; 0!+- 8B9, 88B,
where the !ourt said#
While this !ourt has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it wasafter the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on
grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or
proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunityto challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is
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act, a formal change>rebutting the presumption of substantial change.
e. % We %assume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the
relevant statute.%
f. When current and prior versions of a statute are at issue, there is a presumption that
the !2+*00, in amending a statute, intended to effect a substantive change in the law.
%;B9K, which requires that reviewing courts %ta"e due account%
of the %eperience and specialiFed competence of the agency% promulgating the regulation. *ven
so, %deference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only those agency interpretations that
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are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ. o matter how
one calibrates judicial deference, the administrative power to interpret a regulation does not
include the power to rewrite it . When a regulation is %not ambiguous,% judicial deference %to the
agency&s position would be to permit the agency, under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to
create de facto a new regulation.% Though agencies may be tempted to adjudicate their way
around unwanted regulations, such overreaching undermines the notice and public hearing procedures of the rulema"ing process > thereby putting in jeopardy the %enhanced political
accountability of agency policy decisions adopted through the rulema"ing process% and the
democratic virtue of allowing %all potentially affected members of the public an opportunity to
participate in the process of determining the rules that affect them.
l. %4owever, whenever an %agency&s statutory interpretation conflicts with the language of the
statute or when the interpretation has not been consistently and regularly applied, the usual
deference accorded to an agency&s interpretation should be withheld.
m. When !ongress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the implementation of aneecutive agency, it has no control over that implementation (ecept, of course, through further,
more precise, legislation). #he legislative and e)ecutive functions are not combined. =ut
when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule,
and thus the initial determination of the rule&s meaning. -nd though the adoption of a rule is an
eercise of the eecutive rather than the legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the
effect of law. It seems contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the
person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.
/eferring to an agency&s interpretation of a statute does not encourage !ongress, out of a desire
to epand its power, to enact vague statutes7 the vagueness effectively cedes power to the
*ecutive. =y contrast, deferring to an agency&s interpretation of its own rule encourages the
agency to enact vague rules which give it the power, in future adjudications, to do what it
pleases.
A.Dirc&or o La#$% " CA
The &ourt of ppeals ruled that it #as !erel$ procedural and that the failure tocause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authorit$ to "rant theapplication.Jut the Solicitor )eneral disa"reed and thus filed this petition to set asidethe DecisionE pro!ul"ated on ul$ B, >> and the subse@uentResolutionE= pro!ul"ated on Nove!ber >, >> b$ Respondent &ourt of ppeals EB in&8).R. &V No. =BK>. The dispositive portion of the challen"ed Decision reads0 E
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aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in
Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are
hereby dismissed for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this
land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."
T-e #$t
On Dece!ber ?, >?-, Private Respondent Teodoro bistado filed a petition for
ori"inal re"istration of his title over - dis!issed the petitionfor #ant of Aurisdiction. 5o#ever, it found that the applicants throu"h their predecessors8in8interest had been in open, continuous, e+clusive and peaceful possession of thesubAect land since >B?.
In dis!issin" the petition, the trial court reasoned0 EK
"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions
of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E'
was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the
Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction over
the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministr$ of ustice Opinion No.
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second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to
publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of general
circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is dispensable. As to the first,
publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because without it, the
court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper
of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due
process; otherwise, any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be
legally infirm.
6nsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent &ourt of ppeals #hich,as earlier e+plained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the re"istrationof the title in the na!e of Teodoro bistado.
The subse@uent !otion for reconsideration #as denied in the challen"ed &
Resolution dated Nove!ber >, >>.The Director of ;ands represented b$ the Solicitor )eneral thus elevated this
recourse to us. This &ourt notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition onRule -.This is an error. 5is re!ed$ should be based on Rule , the notice of initial hearin"shall be published !oth in the Official )a%ette an" in a ne#spaper of "eneralcirculation.ccordin" to petitioner, publication in the Official )a%ette is necessar$ toconfer Aurisdiction upon the trial court, and +++ in +++ a ne#spaper of "eneral circulationto co!pl$ #ith the notice re@uire!ent of due process.E
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to co!pl$ #ith there@uire!ent of publication in a ne#spaper of "eneral circulation is a !ere proceduraldefect.The$ add that publication in the Official )a%ette is sufficient to confer Aurisdiction.E=
In reversin" the decision of the trial court, Respondent &ourt of ppeals ruled0 EB
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x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid
that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
Further, Respondent &ourt found that the oppositors #ere afforded the opportunit$to e+plain !atters full$ and present their side. Thus, it Austified its disposition in this#ise0E re@uirin"publication of the notice of initial hearin" reads as follo#s0
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from
the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. --
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall
be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
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persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall also
require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
d!ittedl$, the above provision provides in clear and cate"orical ter!s thatpublication in the Official )a%ette suffices to confer Aurisdiction upon the land re"istrationcourt.5o#ever, the @uestion boils do#n to #hether, absent an$ publication in ane#spaper of "eneral circulation, the land re"istration court can validl$ confir! andre"ister the title of private respondents.
9e ans#er this @uer$ in the ne"ative. This ans#er is i!pelled b$ the de!ands of statutor$ construction and the due process rationale behind the publication re@uire!ent.
The la# used the ter! shall in prescribin" the #or4 to be done b$ the &o!!issioner of ;and Re"istration upon the latters receipt of the court order settin" the ti!e for initialhearin". The said #ord denotes an i!perative and thus indicates the !andator$character of a statute. E 9hile concededl$ such literal !andate is not an absolute rule instatutor$ construction, as its i!port ulti!atel$ depends upon its conte+t in the entireprovision, #e hold that in the present case the ter! !ust be understood in its nor!al!andator$ !eanin". In Reu!lic #s+ Marasigan,E- the &ourt throu"h Mr. ustice 5ilario). Davide, r. held that Section =B of PD => re@uires notice of the initial hearin" b$!eans of 12 publication, 1=2 !ailin" and 1B2 postin", all of #hich !ust be co!plied#ith. If the intention of the la# #ere other#ise, said section #ould not have stressed indetail the re@uire!ents of !ailin" of notices to all persons na!ed in the petition #ho,per Section of the Decree, include o#ners of adAoinin" properties, and occupants of the land.Indeed, if !ailin" of notices is essential, then b$ parit$ of reasonin", publicationin a ne#spaper of "eneral circulation is li4e#ise i!perative since the la# included suchre@uire!ent in its detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land re"istration is a proceedin" in rem.EK Jein" inrem, such proceedin" re@uires constructive sei%ure of the land as a"ainst all persons,includin" the state, #ho have ri"hts to or interests in the propert$. n in rem proceedin"is validated essentiall$ throu"h publication. This bein" so, the process !ust strictl$ beco!plied #ith. Other#ise, persons #ho !a$ be interested or #hose ri"hts !a$ beadversel$ affected #ould be barred fro! contestin" an application #hich the$ had no4no#led"e of. s has been ruled, a part$ as an o#ner see4in" the inscription of realt$ in
the land re"istration court !ust prove b$ satisfactor$ and conclusive evidence not onl$his o#nership thereof but the identit$ of the sa!e, for he is in the sa!e situation as one#ho institutes an action for recover$ of realt$.E? 5e !ust prove his title a"ainst the #hole#orld. This tas4, #hich rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved #hen all personsconcerned 88 na$, the #hole #orld 88 #ho have ri"hts to or interests in the subAectpropert$ are notified and effectivel$ invited to co!e to court and sho# cause #h$ theapplication should not be "ranted. The ele!entar$ nor!s of due process re@uire that
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before the clai!ed propert$ is ta4en fro! concerned parties and re"istered in the na!eof the applicant, said parties !ust be "iven notice and opportunit$ to oppose.
It !a$ be as4ed #h$ publication in a ne#spaper of "eneral circulation should bedee!ed !andator$ #hen the la# alread$ re@uires notice b$ publication in the Official)a%ette as #ell as b$ !ailin" and postin", all of #hich have alread$ been co!plied #ith
in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the realit$ that the Official )a%etteis not as #idel$ read and circulated as ne#spapers and is oftenti!es dela$ed in itscirculation, such that the notices published therein !a$ not reach the interested partieson ti!e, if at all. dditionall$, such parties !a$ not be o#ners of nei"hborin" properties,and !a$ in fact not o#n an$ other real estate. In su!, the all8enco!passin" inrem nature of land re"istration cases, the conse@uences of default orders issueda"ainst the #hole #orld and the obAective of disse!inatin" the notice in as #ide a!anner as possible de!and a !andator$ construction of the re@uire!ents for publication, !ailin" and postin".
d!ittedl$, there #as failure to co!pl$ #ith the e+plicit publication re@uire!ent of
the la#. Private respondents did not proffer an$ e+cuseC even if the$ had, it #ould nothave !attered because the statute itself allo#s no e+cuses. Ineludibl$, this &ourt has noauthorit$ to dispense #ith such !andator$ re@uire!ent. The la# is una!bi"uous and itsrationale clear. Ti!e and a"ain, this &ourt has declared that #here the la# spea4s inclear and cate"orical lan"ua"e, there is no roo! for interpretation, vacillation or e@uivocationC there is roo! onl$ for application. E> There is no alternative. Thus, theapplication for land re"istration filed b$ private respondents !ust be dis!issed #ithoutpreAudice to reapplication in the future, after all the le"al re@uisites shall have been dul$co!plied #ith.
ERE#ORE, the petition is (RANT) and the assailed Decision and Resolutionare R.RS) and ST ASI) . The application of private respondent for land
re"istration is )ISMISS) #ithout preAudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
)a#i"e, *r+, Melo, and Francisco, **+, concur +Nar#asa, C+*+, /Chairman0, on leave.
E Rollo, pp. =>8B-.
E= I!i"+, p. BK.
EB Seventh Division co!posed of ustice &elso ;. Ma"sino, onente, and ustices Serafin (. &a!ilon,&hair!an, and rte!on D. ;una, concurrin".
E
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E? I!i"+, pp. , >>= ad!itted the OS)s petition for revie# on certiorari , clearl$ rulin" that the petition#as one for revie#, and not one for certiorari .
E/ I!i"+, p. =. This should reall$ read reversible error since as alread$ e+plained, the petition should betreated as one for revie# under Rule 8?/, ul$ =, >K?, citin" Di%on #s+ (ncarnacion, > S&RK? S&R =>, ==K8==?, une -, >>.
EK )re$ lba #s+ De la &ru%, K Phil. , Septe!ber -, >/.
E? rchbishop of Manila #s+ rnedo, B/ Phil. >B, March B, >.
E> &ebu Portland &e!ent &o!pan$ #s+ Municipalit$ of Na"a, &ebu, =< S&R K/?, K=, u"ust ==, >-?citin" ;i%arra"a 5er!anos #s+ Hap Tico, =< Phil. /BC People #s+ Mapa, ;8==B/, u"ustB/, >-KC Pacific O+$"en and cet$lene &o. #s+ &entral Jan4, ;8=??, March , >-?CDe@uito #s+ ;ope%, ;8=KKK, March =?, >-?.
B.O+i"ia S. /a%ca+ a#$ Hrm% /a%ca+ ". E%ra#!a C/a%ca+ Ba&i%&a0 &. A+
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
S(&OND DIVISION
G.R. No. 8(2(+ M$r- 25, 1992
O"I4IA S. PASCUA" $%& ERMES S. PASCUA", petitioners,
vs.ESPERANZA C. PASCUA"!AUTISTA, MANUE" C. PASCUA", 6OSE C. PASCUA", SUSANA C.PASCUA"!AUTISTA, ER"INDA C. PASCUA", ENCES"AO C. PASCUA", 6R., INTESTATEESTATE O# E"EUTERIO T. PASCUA", A4E"INO PASCUA", ISOCE"ES PASCUA", "EIDAPASCUA"MARTINES, 4IRGINIA PASCUA"NER, NONA PASCUA"#ERNANDO, OCTA4IOPASCUA", GERANAIA PASCUA"DU!ERT, $%& TE ONORA!"E PRESIDING 6UDGEMANUE" S. PADO"INA o7 !r. 1)2, RTC, P$, Metro M$%0$, respondents.
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PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for revie# on certiorari #hich see4s to reverse and set aside0 1a2 the decision of the&ourt of ppeals 1 dated pril =>, >?? in &8).R. SP. No. KB #ithout an$ issue, le"iti!ate, ac4no#led"ednatural, adopted or spurious children and #as survived b$ the follo#in"0
1a2 dela Soldevilla de Pascual, survivin" spousesC
1b2 &hildren of 9enceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the deceased, to#it0
(speran%a &. Pascual8JautistaManuel &. Pascualose &. PascualSusana &. Pascual8Jautista(rlinda &. Pascual9enceslao &. Pascual, r.
1c2 &hildren of Pedro8Jautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to #it0
velino PascualIsoceles Pascual;oida Pascual8Martine%Vir"inia Pascual8Ner Nona Pascual8FernandoOctavio Pascual)eranaia Pascual8DubertC
1d2 c4no#led"ed natural children of (li"io Pascual, brother of the full blood of thedeceased, to #it0
Olivia S. Pascual5er!es S. Pascual
1e2 Intestate of (leuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased andrepresented b$ the follo#in"0
Do!in"a M. PascualMa!erta P. Fu"oso
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braha! S. Sar!iento, IIIRe"ina Sar!iento8Macaiba$(leuterio P. Sar!ientoDo!i"a P. San Die"oNelia P. Mar@ue%Silvestre M. Pascual
(leuterio M. Pascual1Rollo, pp. >8/2.
On Februar$ =K, >K?K, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate 5ereditar$ Ri"hts 1Rollo, pp. B8
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On ril =>, >??, the respondent &ourt of ppeals rendered its decision the decision the dispositivepart of #hich reads0
95(R(FOR(, the petition is DISMISS(D. &osts a"ainst the petitioners.
SO ORD(R(D. 1Rollo, p. B?2
Petitioners filed their !otion for reconsideration of said decision and on ul$ ??, the &ourt of ppeals issued its resolution den$in" the !otion for reconsideration 1Rollo, p. >= of the &ivil &ode of the Philippines, can be interpreted to e+clude reco"ni%ed and of the doctrine laid do#n in )ia$ #+IAC 1/ S&R -?K2 because bein" ac4no#led"ed natural children, their ille"iti!ac$ is notdue to the subsistence of a prior !arria"e #hen such children #ere under conception 1Rollo, p.
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la# does no !ore than reco"ni%e this truth, b$ avoidin" further "rounds ofresent!ent.
(li"io Pascual is a le"iti!ate child but petitioners are his ille"iti!ate children.
ppl$in" the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent I& did not err in holdin" that petitioners
herein cannot represent their father (li"io Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestateestate of the decedent ndres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In their !e!orandu!, petitioners insisted that rticle >>= in the li"ht of rticles >/= and >?> of the&ivil &ode allo#s the! 1Olivia and 5er!es2 to represent (li"io Pascual in the intestate estate of Don
ndres Pascual.
On !otion for reconsideration of the decision in )ia$ #+ IAC, this &ourt further elucidated thesuccessional ri"hts of ille"iti!ate children, #hich s@uarel$ ans#ers the @uestions raised b$ thepetitioner on this point.
The &ourt held0
rticle >/=, >?>, and >>/ clearl$ spea4s of successional ri"hts of ille"iti!atechildren, #hich ri"hts are trans!itted to their descendants upon their death. Thedescendants 1of these ille"iti!ate children2 #ho !a$ inherit b$ virtue of the ri"ht ofrepresentation !a$ be le"iti!ate or ille"iti!ate. In #hatever !anner, one should notoverloo4 the fact that the persons to be represented are the!selves illegitimate+ Thethree na!ed provisions are ver$ clear on this !atter. The ri"ht of representation isnot available to ille"iti!ate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of ale"iti!ate "randparent. It !a$ be ar"ued, as done b$ petitioners, that the ille"iti!atedescendant of a le"iti!ate child is entitled to represent b$ virtue of the provisions of
rticle >?=, #hich provides that the "randchildren and other descendants shallinherit b$ ri"ht of representation. Such a conclusion is erroneous. It #ould allo#
intestate succession b$ an ille"iti!ate child to the le"iti!ate parent of his father or!other, a situation #hich #ould set at nau"ht the provisions of rticle >>=. rticle >?=is inapplicable to the instant case because rticle >>= prohibits absolutel$ asuccession a! intestato bet#een the ille"iti!ate child and the le"iti!ate children andrelatives of the father or !other. It !a$ not be a!iss to state rticle >?= is the"eneral rule and rticle >>= the e+ception.
The rules laid do#n in rticle >?= that "randchildren and other descendants shallinherit b$ ri"ht of representation and in rticle >/= that the ri"hts of ille"iti!atechildren . . . are trans!itted upon their death to their descendants, #hether le"iti!ateor ille"iti!ate are su!1ect to the limitation prescribed b$ rticle >>= to the end that anille"iti!ate child has no ri"ht to inherit a! intestato fro! the le"iti!ate children andrelatives of his father or !other. 1!icus &uriae*s Opinion b$ for!er ustice Minister
Ricardo &. Puno, p. =2. Dia% v. Inter!ediate ppellate &ourt, ?= S&R ?
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applied re"ardless of #ho !a$ be affected, even if the la# !a$ be harsh or onerous. 1Nepo!uceno,et al. v. F&, / Phil.
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Internal Revenue 1&o!!issioner2 to #ithdra# his letters dated pril =, >?? and u"ust ?? assessin" donors ta+es and to desist fro! collectin" donors ta+es fro!petitioners.
Durin" the >?K national elections, petitioners, #ho are partners in the n"ara, bello, &oncepcion, Re"ala and &ru% 1&&R2 la# fir!, contributed P??=,--.B each
to the ca!pai"n funds of Senator (d"ardo n"ara, then runnin" for the Senate. Inletters dated pril =, >??, the Jureau of Internal Revenue 1JIR2 assessed each of thepetitionersP=-B,/B=.-- for their contributions. On u"ust =, >??, petitioners@uestioned the assess!ent throu"h a letter to the JIR. The$ clai!ed that political or electoral contributions are not considered "ifts under the National Internal Revenue&ode 1NIR&2, and that, therefore, the$ are not liable for donors ta+. The clai! for e+e!ption #as denied b$ the &o!!issioner. E
On Septe!ber =, >??, petitioners filed a petition for revie# #ith the &T, #hich#as decided on October K, >> in favor of the petitioners. s aforestated, the &Tordered the &o!!issioner to desist fro! collectin" donors ta+es fro! the petitioners. E=
On appeal, the &ourt of ppeals reversed and set aside the &T decision on pril=/, >>
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The fact that the contributions were given to be used as campaign funds of Sen.
Angara does not affect the character of the fund transfers as donation or gift. There
was thereby no retention of control over the disposition of the contributions. There
was simply an indication of the purpose for which they were to be used. For as long as
the contributions were used for the purpose for which they were intended, Sen.
Angara had complete and absolute power to dispose of the contributions. He was fully
entitled to the economic benefits of the contributions.
Section 91 of the Tax Code is very clear. A donors or gift tax is imposed on the
transfer of property by gift.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued Ruling No. 344 on July 20, 1988, which reads:
Political Contributions. For internal revenue purposes, political contributions in the
Philippines are considered taxable gift rather than taxable income. This is so, becausea political contribution is indubitably not intended by the giver or contributor as a
return of value or made because of any intent to repay another what is his due, but
bestowed only because of motives of philanthropy or charity. His purpose is to give
and to bolster the morals, the winning chance of the candidate and/or his party, and
not to employ or buy. On the other hand, the recipient-donee does not regard himself
as exchanging his services or his product for the money contributed. But more
importantly he receives financial advantages gratuitously.
When the U.S. gift tax law was adopted in the Philippines (before May 7, 1974), the
taxability of political contributions was, admittedly, an unsettled issue; hence, itcannot be presumed that the Philippine Congress then had intended to consider or
treat political contributions as non-taxable gifts when it adopted the said gift tax law.
Moreover, well-settled is the rule that the Philippines need not necessarily adopt the
present rule or construction in the United States on the matter. Generally, statutes of
different states relating to the same class of persons or things or having the same
purposes are not considered to be in pari materia because it cannot be justifiably
presumed that the legislature had them in mind when enacting the provision being
construed. (5206, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 546.) Accordingly, in the
absence of an express exempting provision of law, political contributions in thePhilippines are subject to the donors gift tax. (cited in National Internal Revenue Code
Annotated by Hector S. de Leon, 1991 ed., p. 290).
In the light of the above BIR Ruling, it is clear that the political contributions of the
private respondents to Sen. Edgardo Angara are taxable gifts. The vagueness of the
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law as to what comprise the gift subject to tax was made concrete by the above-quoted
BIR ruling. Hence, there is no doubt that political contributions are taxable gifts. E>. E
Petitioners thereupon filed the instant petition on ul$ =-, >>. Raised are thefollo#in" issues0
. DID T5( 5ONORJ;( &O6RT OF PP(;S (RR 95(N IT FI;(D TO&ONSID(R IN ITS D(&ISION T5( P6RPOS( J(5IND T5( (N&TM(NT OFO6R )IFT TL ;9:
=. DID T5( 5ONORJ;( &O6RT OF PP(;S (RR IN NOT &ONSID(RIN) T5(INT(NTION OF T5( )IV(RS IN D(T(RMININ) 95(T5(R OR NOT T5(P(TITION(RS PO;ITI&; &ONTRIJ6TIONS 9(R( )IFTS S6J(&T TODONORS TL:
B. DID T5( 5ONORJ;( &O6RT OF PP(;S (RR 95(N IT FI;(D TO&ONSID(R T5( D(FINITION OF N (;(&TOR; &ONTRIJ6TION 6ND(RT5( OMNIJ6S (;(&TION &OD( IN D(T(RMININ) 95(T5(R OR NOTPO;ITI&; &ONTRIJ6TIONS R( TLJ;(:
B>:
K. DID T5( 5ONORJ;( &O6RT OF PP(;S (RR IN R(SO;VIN) T5( &S(MIN;H ON T5( JSIS OF R6;IN) ISS6(D JH T5( R(SPOND(NT ON;H
FT(R T5( SS(SSM(NTS 5D ;R(DH J((N MD(:
?. DID T5( 5ONORJ;( &O6RT OF PP(;S (RR 95(N IT DID NOT&ONSTR6( T5( )IFT TL ;9 ;IJ(R;;H IN FVOR OF T5( TLPH(R
ND STRI&;TH )INST T5( )OV(RNM(NT IN &&ORDN&( 9IT5 PP;I&J;( PRIN&IP;(S OF STT6TORH &ONSTR6&TION:E-
#rt, #7t- $%& S of the National Internal Revenue &ode 1NIR&2 reads0
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(A) There shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid upon the transfer by
any person, resident or nonresident, of the property by gift, a tax,
computed as provided in Section 92
(B) The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether
the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal,
tangible or intangible.
The NIR& does not define transfer of propert$ b$ "ift. 5o#ever, rticle ? of the&ivil &ode, states0
In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.
Thus, reference !a$ be !ade to the definition of a donation in the &ivil &ode. rticle
K= of said &ode defines donation as0
. . . an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it.
Donation has the follo#in" ele!ents0 1a2 the reduction of the patri!on$ of the donorC 1b2the increase in the patri!on$ of the doneeC and, 1c2 the intent to do an act of liberalit$or animus "onan"i .EK
The present case falls s@uarel$ #ithin the definition of a donation. Petitioners, thelate Manuel ). belloE?, ose &. &oncepcion, Teodoro D. Re"ala and velino V. &ru%,
each "ave P??=,--.B to the ca!pai"n funds of Senator (d"ardo n"ara, #ithout an$!aterial consideration. ll three ele!ents of a donation are present. The patri!on$ of the four petitioners #ere reduced b$ P??=,--.B each. Senator (d"ardo n"araspatri!on$ correspondin"l$ increased b$ PB,B/,- of the NIR& isclear and una!bi"uous, thereb$ leavin" no roo! for construction. In Ri$al Commercial Banking Cororation #+ Interme"iate Aellate Court E/ the &ourt enunciated0
It bears stressing that the first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law.When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for
construction or interpretation. As has been our consistent ruling, where the law speaks
in clear and categorical language, there is no occasion for interpretation; there is only
room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga, 24 SCRA
708 [1968])
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Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it
says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Chartered
Bank Employees Association v. Ople, 138 SCRA 273 [1985]; Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 [1969]; Quijano v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, 35 SCRA 270 [1970]).
Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or
construe its true intent. Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings,
of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the
same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible
meanings, in which case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial
functions, which is to interpret the law according to its true intent.
Seo%& I/e
Since animus "onan"i or the intention to do an act of liberalit$ is an essentialele!ent of a donation, petitioners ar"ue that it is i!portant to loo4 into the intention of the "iver to deter!ine if a political contribution is a "ift. Petitioners ar"u!ent is nottenable. First of all, donative intent is a creature of the !ind. It cannot be perceivede+cept b$ the !aterial and tan"ible acts #hich !anifest its presence. This bein" thecase, donative intent is presu!ed present #hen one "ives a part of ones patri!on$ toanother #ithout consideration. Second, donative intent is not ne"ated #hen the persondonatin" has other intentions, !otives or purposes #hich do not contradict donativeintent. This &ourt is not convinced that since the purpose of the contribution #as to help
elect a candidate, there #as no donative intent. Petitioners contribution of !one$#ithout an$ !aterial consideration evinces animus "onan"i . The fact that their purposefor donatin" #as to aid in the election of the donee does not ne"ate the presence of donative intent.
T-r& I/e
Petitioners !aintain that the definition of an electoral contribution under theO!nibus (lection &ode is essential to appreciate ho# a political contribution differs
fro! a ta+able "ift.E
Section >
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by individuals volunteering a portion or all of their time in behalf of a candidate or
political party. It shall also include the use of facilities voluntarily donated by other
persons, the money value of which can be assessed based on the rates prevailing in the
area.
Since the purpose of an electoral contribution is to influence the results of theelection, petitioners a"ain clai! that donative intent is not present. Petitioners atte!pt toplace the barrier of !utual e+clusivit$ bet#een donative intent and the purpose of political contributions. This &ourt reiterates that donative intent is not ne"ated b$ thepresence of other intentions, !otives or purposes #hich do not contradict donativeintent.
Petitioners #ould distin"uish a "ift fro! a political donation b$ sa$in" that theconsideration for a "ift is the liberalit$ of the donor, #hile the consideration for a politicalcontribution is the desire of the "iver to influence the result of an election b$ supportin"candidates #ho, in the perception of the "iver, #ould influence the shapin" of
"overn!ent policies that #ould pro!ote the "eneral #elfare and econo!ic #ell8bein" of the electorate, includin" the "iver hi!self.
Petitioners atte!pt is strained. The fact that petitioners #ill so!eho# in the futurebenefit fro! the election of the candidate to #ho! the$ contribute, in no #a$ a!ounts toa valuable !aterial consideration so as to re!ove political contributions fro! thepurvie# of a donation. Senator n"ara #as under no obli"ation to benefit thepetitioners. The proper perfor!ance of his duties as a le"islator is his obli"ation as anelected public servant of the Filipino people and not a consideration for the politicalcontributions he received. In fact, as a public servant, he !a$ even be called to enactla#s that are contrar$ to the interests of his benefactors, for the benefit of the "reater "ood.
In fine, the purpose for #hich the su!s of !one$ #ere "iven, #hich #as to fund theca!pai"n of Senator n"ara in his bid for a senatorial seat, cannot be considered as a!aterial consideration so as to ne"ate a donation.
#o/rt- I/e
Petitioners raise the fact that since >B> #hen the first Ta+ &ode #as enacted, up to>?? the JIR never atte!pted to subAect political contributions to donors ta+. The$ar"ue that0
. . . It is a familiar principle of law that prolonged practice by the government agency
charged with the execution of a statute, acquiesced in and relied upon by all
concerned over an appreciable period of time, is an authoritative interpretation
thereof, entitled to great weight and the highest respect. . . . E=
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This &ourt holds that the JIR is not precluded fro! !a4in" a ne# interpretation of the la#, especiall$ #hen the old interpretation #as fla#ed. It is a #ell8entrenched rulethat
. . . erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers do not block
subsequent correct application of the statute (PLDT v. Collector of Internal Revenue,90 Phil. 676), and that the Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the
part of its agents (Pineda v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807;
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. v. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724). EB
Se=e%t- I/e
Petitioners @uestion the fact that the &ourt of ppeals decision is based on a JIRrulin", na!el$ JIR Rulin" No. ??8B?2 of the NIR& as supple!ented b$ the definition of a donation found in rticleK= of the &ivil &ode, is clear and una!bi"uous, and needs no further elucidation.
E-t- I/e
Petitioners ne+t contend that ta+ la#s are construed liberall$ in favor of the ta+pa$er
and strictl$ a"ainst the "overn!ent. This rule of construction, ho#ever, does not benefitpetitioners because, as stated, there is here no roo! for construction since the la# isclear and una!bi"uous.
Finall$, this &ourt ta4es note of the fact that subse@uent to the donations involved inthis case, &on"ress approved Republic ct No. K-- on Nove!ber =, >>, providin"in Section B thereof that politicalelectoral contributions, dul$ reported to the&o!!ission on (lections, are not subAect to the pa$!ent of an$ "ift ta+. This all the!ore sho#s that the political contributions herein !ade are subAect to the pa$!ent of "ift ta+es, since the sa!e #ere !ade prior to the e+e!ptin" le"islation, and Republic
ct No. K-- provides no retroactive effect on this point.
ERE#ORE, the petition is D(NI(D and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the &ourt of ppeals are FFIRM(D.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
)a#i"e, *r+, C+*+, /Chairman0, 2uisum!ing, and Cario, **+, concur +3nares-Santiago, *+, no part.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/120721.htm#_ftn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/feb2005/120721.htm#_ftn13
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E Rollo, p. B?.
E=
I!i" .EB Penned b$ ustice &onsuelo Hnares8Santia"o, no# ssociate ustice of this &ourt, and concurred in b$
ssociate ustices Oscar M. 5errera and Delilah Vidallon8Ma"tolis, of the (leventh Division of the&ourt of ppeals.
E8=8.
E> P??=,--.B + < PB,B/,- 1>>>2.
E Rollo, p. K
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T5IRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 11)*19. 6$%/$r 18, 199):
PEOP"E O# TE PI"IPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATRICIOAMIGO $0$ !E!OT, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
M(;O, * .0
Initiall$, Patricio !i"o #as char"ed #ith frustrated !urder in anInfor!ation readin" as follo#s0
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED
MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed
as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a
knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito
Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT
THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM
STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.
thus perfor!in" all the acts of e+ecution #hich should have produced thecri!e of !urder as a conse@uence but nevertheless, did not produce it b$reason of causes independent of his #ill, that is, because of the ti!el$ andable !edical assistance i!!ediatel$ rendered to the said Jenito N" Su$.
1p., Rollo.2
to #hich he pleaded not "uilt$.
Subse@uentl$, due to the death of the victi!, an a!ended Infor!ation #asfiled char"in" no# the cri!e of !urder, to #it0
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That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a
knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one
Benito Ng Say, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his
death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.
(p. 3, Rollo.)
fter trial on the !erits, the court a ;uo rendered a decision, disposin"0
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with
no modifying circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusiontemporal in its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party
the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
(p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is no# sou"ht, #ith accused8appellant ar"uin" that error #as co!!itted b$ the trial court in i!posin" or !etin" out the penalt$of reclusion eretua a"ainst hi! despite the fact that Sec. > 12, rticle III of
the >?K &onstitution #as alread$ in effect #hen the offense #as co!!itted.
The facts of the case, as briefl$ su!!ari%ed in the brief sub!itted b$ theOffice of the Solicitor )eneral and as borne out b$ the evidence, are asfollo#s0
On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store,
located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was
driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada,
Davao City. With him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a
younger one together with his two year old son, who were all seated at the front seatbeside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle.
(TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)
On their #a$ ho!e and #hile traversin" the National 5i"h#a$ of JaAada,Davao &it$, an oran"e To$ota Ta!ara# driven b$ one Vir"ilio bo"ada,suddenl$ !ade a left turn in front of the Re"ional 5ospital, JaAada, Davao
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&it$, #ithout noticin" the Ford Fiera co!in" fro! the opposite direction. ThisTa!ara# #as headin" for Sterl$n 7itchenette, #hich #as situated at thecorner of the said hospital. 1TSN, pril =>, >>, p. >=,pp. B and B2
9ith Vir"ilio #as Patricio !i"o alias Jebot, a vulcani%er at ;in"lin"svulcani%in" shop o#ned and operated b$ a certain )aladua. 5e #as alsoseated at the ri"ht front seat beside Vir"ilio.
Due to the une+pected veer !ade b$ Vir"ilio, an accidental head oncollision occurred bet#een the Fiera and the Ta!ara#, causin" a sli"htda!a"e to the ri"ht bu!per of the latter. 1TSN, March B, >>=, p. , >>, p. , >>, p.-2
9hile the t#o drivers #here havin" this verbal confrontation, Patricio #ho#as !erel$ a passen"er of Vir"ilio also ali"hted fro! the front seat of theTa!ara# and instantaneousl$ approached Jenito and advised the latter toleave since it #as !erel$ a s!all and !inor accident. 1TSN, pril =>, >>,pp. -8?2
bit irritated #ith the actuation e+hibit b$ Patricio, Jenito rebu4ed thefor!er and told hi! not to interfere, since he had nothin" to do #ith theaccident. /I!i"+, p. K2
Ir4ed b$ the co!!ent !ade b$ Jenito, Patricio sarcasticall$ as4edC Houare &hinese, is it $ou: 9ith a read$ ans#er Jenito saidC Hes, I a! a &hineseand #h$: Patricio in turn repliedC So, $ou are a &hinese, #ait for a #hile, thenleft. /I!i"+, pp. K and >2
I!!ediatel$ thereafter, Jenito ordered ocel$n to call a police!an, butafter a lapse of about one !inute, Patricio returned and arro"antl$approached Jenito, as4in" the latter once a"ain, Hou are a &hinese, is it not:
To this Jenito cal!l$ responded in the affir!ative./I!i"+, pp. K, >8=/2
6pon hearin" the response, Patricio !u!bled h, so $ou are a &hinese,and suddenl$ too4 a five inch 4nife fro! his #aist and si!ultaneousl$ stabbedJenito hittin" hi! t#ice on the chest. /i!i"+, p. =/2
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fter bein" hit, Jenito #ounded and sensin" that his life #as in peril, triedto evade his assailant b$ pushin" Patricio a#a$ and run around the Ta!ara#but Patricio #ieldin" the sa!e 4nife and not content #ith the inAuries he hadalread$ inflicted, still chased Jenito and upon overta4in" the latter e!bracedhi! and thrusted his 4nife on the victi! several ti!es, the last of #hich hitJenito on the left side of his bod$. /I!i"+, pp. ?, /, ==2
It #as at this Auncture that ocel$n #ho #as still inside the Ford Fiera,pleadin" for !erc$ to spare her father tried to "et out of the vehicle but it #asver$ unfortunate that she could not open its door. /I!i"+, p. /2
7no#in" that Patricio #as reall$ deter!ined to 4ill her father b$ refusin" toheed her pleas, osel$n shouted for help, since there #ere alread$ severalpeople around #itnessin" that fatal incident, but to her consternation nobod$lifted a sin"le fin"er to help the!. /I!i"+, pp. -, /, ?, =8==2 Onl$ after her father la$ seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after bein" hit on the left sideof his bod$ that she #as able to open the door of the said vehicle. /I!i"+, p. =2
fter this precise !o!ent, her $oun"er sister, upon seein" their father bathin" #ith his o#n blood, e!braced hi!, causin" Patricio to cease fro! hisferocious assault and noticin" the presence of several people, hefled. /I!i"+, p. ==2
Thereafter, an enra"ed ocel$n chased hi!, but since the assailant ranfaster than her, she #as not able to overta4e hi!, thus, she instead decided to"o bac4 to #here her father #as and carried hi! inside the Ta!ara# #hobu!ped the! and conse@uentl$ brou"ht hi! to San Pedro 5ospital #here he#as attended to at the (!er"enc$ Roo!./I!i"+, p. B2
9hile at the (!er"enc$ Roo!, Jenito #ho #as on a ver$ criticalcondition, due to !ultiple 1B2 stabbed #ounds, #as operated b$ Dr. Rolando&hiu. fter the operation, he #as subse@uentl$ brou"ht to the I&6 and sta$edthere for three 1B2 #ee4s. 1ul$ =, >>, pp. B and
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abolished and hence, the penalt$ that should have been i!posed for thecri!e of !urder co!!itted b$ accused8appellant #ithout the attendance of an$ !odif$in" circu!stances, should be reclusion temoral in its !ediu!period or K $ears, < !onths and da$, to =/ $ears of reclusion temoral+
Reasons out accused8appellant0. . . Since the death penalt$ 1or capital punish!ent2 is not i!posable #hen
the stabbin" and 4illin" happened, the co!putation of the penalt$ should bere"arded fro!reclusion eretua do#n and not fro! death penalt$. Indeed,the appropriate penalt$ is deducible fro! reclusion eretua do#n to reclusiontemoral in its !ediu! period. 5ence, there bein" no !odif$in"circu!stances present 1p. Decision, i!i"+0, the correct penalt$ should be inthe !ediu! period 1rt. -?>2 thusl$0
In People #s+ )avarra, ustice Pedro ;. Hap declared for the &ourt that invie# of the abolition of the death penalt$ under Section >, rticle III of the>?K &onstitution, the penalt$ that !a$ be i!posed for !urder is reclusiontemoral in its !a+i!u! period to reclusion eretua, thereb$ eli!inatin"death as the ori"inal !a+i!u! period. ;ater, #ithout cate"oricall$ sa$in" so,the &ourt, throu"h ustice !eurfina . Melencio85errera in
People #s+ Masan"4a$ and throu"h ustice ndres R. Narvasa inPeople #s+ tencio, divided the !odified penalt$ into three ne# periods, theli!its of #hich #ere specified b$ ustice (d"ardo ;. Paras in People #s+ Intino,as follo#s0 the lo#er half of reclusion temoral !a+i!u! as the !ini!u!C theupper half of reclusion temoral !a+i!u! as the !ediu!C and reclusion
eretua as the !a+i!u!.
The &ourt has reconsidered the above cases and, after e+tendeddiscussion, co!e to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein doesnot reflect the intention of the fra!e
