STALIN S CONVERSATIONS - Wilson Center | … · involving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia Uni-versity, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the

4 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

STALIN ’S CONVERSATIONS Talks With Mao Zedong, December 1949-January 1950,

And With Zhou Enlai, August-September 1952

with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok

This issue of the Cold War International History ProjectBulletin leads off with translations of five meetings betweenSoviet leader Joseph Stalin and top leaders (Mao Zedong andZhou Enlai) of the newly-created People’s Republic ofChina (PRC) between 1949 and 1952. The originals of thedocuments, which constitute some of the most intimateglimpses of the personal interaction between Soviet andChinese leaders yet to emerge from the formerly closedarchives of the communist world, are kept in the RussianPresidential Archives (officially known as the Archive of thePresident, Russian Federation, or APRF) in Moscow. Theywere recently declassified by Russian authorities in connec-tion with efforts to gather materials related to the KoreanWar for presentation by the Russian Government to SouthKorea. CWIHP obtained copies of these documents, as wellas many other Russian archival records concerning theKorean War which appear later in this issue of the Bulletin,as a consequence of its cooperation with a research projectinvolving the Center for Korean Research, Columbia Uni-versity, and the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

(Photocopies of all the Russian documents obtained byCWIHP are available to researchers through the NationalSecurity Archive, a non-governmental documents reposi-tory, library, and research institute located on the seventhfloor of The Gelman Library at The George WashingtonUniversity in Washington, D.C., and will also be madeavailable through Columbia University.)

The documents that follow begin with transcripts of twoconversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong,which took place in Moscow on 16 December 1949 and 22January 1950, during the Chinese leader’s two-month visitto the USSR shortly after the establishment of the PRC inOctober 1949. Those conversations came as the two coun-tries negotiated the terms of the incipient Sino-Soviet alli-ance following the Communist victory in the Chinese CivilWar, and also constituted the first and only personal encoun-

ter between these two communist titans and major figures of20th-century world history.

Next come three transcripts of conversations in Moscowbetween Stalin and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai inAugust-September 1952, where issues on the table for discus-sion included the ongoing Korean War, Sino-Soviet ties, and therelationship of both to the broader Cold War. The transcriptsyield insights into these issues, and also into the state of mind ofStalin himself in his final months (he died in March 1953), oneof the murkiest periods in his nearly-three decade reign over theUSSR.

To assess the significance of these documents, the CWIHPBulletin has assembled four specialists familiar with Sino-Soviet relations, and the personalities of Stalin and Mao, fromvarious perspectives: Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Uni-versity at Carbondale), author of China’s Road to the KoreanWar: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1994); Prof. Vojtech Mastny(Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University School ofAdvanced International Studies, currently at the University ofHokkaido, Japan), author of The Cold War and Soviet Insecu-rity: The Stalin Years, 1947-1953 (Oxford University Press,1996), a forthcoming sequel to his Russia’s Road to the ColdWar, 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979);Dr. Odd Arne Westad (Director of Research, NorwegianNobel Institute), author of Cold War and Revolution: SovietAmerican Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War,1944-1946 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); andDr. Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), co-author (with Constantine Pleshakov) of Inside the Kremlin’sCold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, March 1996).

Translations of the documents were performed for CWIHPby Danny Rozas, with additional assistance from KathrynWeathersby and Chen Jian.

—Jim Hershberg, Editor, CWIHP Bulletin

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 5

WITH CHINESE LEADERSI: Conversation between Stalin andMao, Moscow, 16 December 1949

[Classification level blacked out:“NOT SECRET” Stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONBETWEEN COMRADE

I.V. STALIN AND CHAIRMANOF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE’SREPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO ZEDONG

on 16 December 1949

After an exchange of greetings and adiscussion of general topics, the followingconversation took place.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The most im-portant question at the present time is thequestion of establishing peace. China needsa period of 3-5 years of peace, which wouldbe used to bring the economy back to pre-war levels and to stabilize the country ingeneral. Decisions on the most importantquestions in China hinge on the prospectsfor a peaceful future. With this in mind theCC CPC [Central Committee of the Com-munist Party of China] entrusted me to as-certain from you, comr[ade]. Stalin, in whatway and for how long will internationalpeace be preserved.

Comrade Stalin: In China a war forpeace, as it were, is taking place. The ques-tion of peace greatly preoccupies the SovietUnion as well, though we have already hadpeace for the past four years. With regards toChina, there is no immediate threat at thepresent time: Japan has yet to stand up on itsfeet and is thus not ready for war; America,though it screams war, is actually afraid ofwar more than anything; Europe is afraid ofwar; in essence, there is no one to fight withChina, not unless Kim Il Sung decides toinvade China?

Peace will depend on our efforts. If wecontinue to be friendly, peace can last notonly 5-10 years, but 20-25 years and perhapseven longer.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Since LiuShaoqi’s return to China, CC CPC has beendiscussing the treaty of friendship, alliance

and mutual assistance between China andthe USSR.

Comrade Stalin: This question we candiscuss and decide. We must ascertainwhether to declare the continuation of thecurrent 1945 treaty of alliance and friend-ship between the USSR and China, to an-nounce impending changes in the future, orto make these changes right now.

As you know, this treaty was concludedbetween the USSR and China as a result ofthe Yalta Agreement, which provided forthe main points of the treaty (the question ofthe Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, PortArthur, etc.). That is, the given treaty wasconcluded, so to speak, with the consent ofAmerica and England. Keeping in mind thiscircumstance, we, within our inner circle,have decided not to modify any of the pointsof this treaty for now, since a change in evenone point could give America and Englandthe legal grounds to raise questions aboutmodifying also the treaty’s provisions con-cerning the Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin,etc. This is why we searched to find a wayto modify the current treaty in effect whileformally maintaining its provisions, in thiscase by formally maintaining the SovietUnion’s right to station its troops at PortArthur while, at the request of the Chinesegovernment, actually withdrawing the So-viet Armed forces currently stationed there.Such an operation could be carried out uponChina’s request.

One could do the same with KChZhD[Chinese Changchun Railroad, whichtraverses Manchuria], that is, to effectivelymodify the corresponding points of the agree-ment while formally maintaining its provi-sions, upon China’s request.

If, on the other hand, the Chinese com-rades are not satisfied with this strategy, theycan present their own proposals.

Comrade Mao Zedong: The presentsituation with regard to KChZhD and PortArthur corresponds well with Chinese inter-ests, as the Chinese forces are inadequate toeffectively fight against imperialist aggres-sion. In addition, KChZhD is a trainingschool for the preparation of Chinese cadresin railroad and industry.

Comrade Stalin: The withdrawal of

troops does not mean that Soviet Unionrefuses to assist China, if such assistance isneeded. The fact is that we, as communists,are not altogether comfortable with station-ing our forces on foreign soil, especially onthe soil of a friendly nation. Given thissituation anyone could say that if Sovietforces can be stationed on Chinese territory,then why could not the British, for example,station their forces in Hong Kong, or theAmericans in Tokyo?

We would gain much in the arena ofinternational relations if, with mutual agree-ment, the Soviet forces were to be with-drawn from Port Arthur. In addition, thewithdrawal of Soviet forces would provide aserious boost to Chinese communists in theirrelations with the national bourgeoisie. Ev-eryone would see that the communists havemanaged to achieve what [Nationalist Chi-nese leader] Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]could not. The Chinese communists musttake the national bourgeoisie into consider-ation.

The treaty ensures the USSR’s right tostation its troops in Port Arthur. But theUSSR is not obligated to exercise this rightand can withdraw its troops upon Chineserequest. However, if this is unsuitable, thetroops in Port Arthur can remain there for 2,5, or 10 years, whatever suits China best. Letthem not misunderstand that we want to runaway from China. We can stay there for 20years even.

Comrade Mao Zedong: In discussingthe treaty in China we had not taken intoaccount the American and English positionsregarding the Yalta agreement. We must actin a way that is best for the common cause.This question merits further consideration.However, it is already becoming clear thatthe treaty should not be modified at thepresent time, nor should one rush to with-draw troops from Port Arthur.

Should not Zhou Enlai visit Moscow inorder to decide the treaty question?

Comrade Stalin: No, this question youmust decide for yourselves. Zhou may beneeded in regard to other matters.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would liketo decide on the question of Soviet credit toChina, that is to draw up a credit agreement


for 300.000.000 dollars between the gov-ernments of the USSR and China.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done. Ifyou would like to formalize this agreementnow, we can.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, exactlynow, as this would resonate well in China.At the same time it is necessary to resolvethe question of trade, especially between theUSSR and Xinjiang [Sinkiang], though atpresent we cannot present a specific tradeoperations plan for this region.

Comrade Stalin: We must know rightnow what kind of equipment China willneed, especially now, since we do not haveequipment in reserve and the request forindustrial goods must be submitted ahead oftime.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We are havingdifficulties in putting together a request forequipment, as the industrial picture is as yetunclear.

Comrade Stalin: It is desirable to expe-dite the preparation of this request, as re-quests for equipment are submitted to ourindustry at least a year in advance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would verymuch like to receive assistance from theUSSR in creating air transportation routes.

Comrade Stalin: We are ready to ren-der such assistance. Air routes can be estab-lished over Xinjiang and the MPR [Mongo-lian People’s Republic]. We have special-ists. We will give you assistance.

Comrade Mao Zedong: We would alsolike to receive your assistance in creating anaval force.

Comrade Stalin: Cadres for Chinesenavy could be prepared at Port Arthur. Yougive us people, and we will give you ships.Trained cadres of the Chinese navy couldthen return to China on these ships.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Guomindang[Kuomintang] supporters have built a navaland air base on the island of Formosa [Tai-wan]. Our lack of naval forces and aviationmakes the occupation of the island by thePeople’s Liberation Army [PLA] more dif-ficult. With regard to this, some of ourgenerals have been voicing opinions that weshould request assistance from the SovietUnion, which could send volunteer pilots orsecret military detachments to speed up theconquest of Formosa.

Comrade Stalin: Assistance has notbeen ruled out, though one ought to considerthe form of such assistance. What is most

important here is not to give Americans apretext to intervene. With regard to head-quarters staff and instructors we can givethem to you anytime. The rest we will haveto think about.

Do you have any assault landing units?Comrade Mao Zedong: We have one

former Guomindang assault landing regi-ment unit which came over to join our side.

Comrade Stalin: One could select acompany of landing forces, train them inpropaganda, send them over to Formosa, andthrough them organize an uprising on theisle.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Our troops haveapproached the borders of Burma and Indo-China. As a result, the Americans and theBritish are alarmed, not knowing whether wewill cross the border or whether our troopswill halt their movement.

Comrade Stalin: One could create arumor that you are preparing to cross theborder and in this way frighten the imperial-ists a bit.

Comrade Mao Zedong: Several coun-tries, especially Britain, are actively cam-paigning to recognize the People’s Republicof China. However, we believe that weshould not rush to be recognized. We mustfirst bring about order to the country,strengthen our position, and then we can talkto foreign imperialists.

Comrade Stalin: That is a good policy.In addition, there is no need for you to createconflicts with the British and the Americans.If, for example, there will be a need to putpressure on the British, this can be done byresorting to a conflict between the Guangdongprovince and Hong Kong. And to resolvethis conflict, Mao Zedong could come for-ward as the mediator. The main point is notto rush and to avoid conflicts.

Are there foreign banks operating inShanghai?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes.Comrade Stalin: And whom are they

serving?Comrade Mao Zedong: The Chinese

national bourgeoisie and foreign enterpriseswhich so far we have not touched. As for theforeigners’ spheres of influence, the Britishpredominate in investments in the economicand commercial sectors, while the Ameri-cans lead in the sector of cultural-educa-tional organizations.

Comrade Stalin: What is the situationregarding Japanese enterprises?

Comrade Mao Zedong: They have beennationalized.

Comrade Stalin: In whose hands is thecustoms agency?

Comrade Mao Zedong: In the hands ofthe government.

Comrade Stalin: It is important to focusattention on the customs agency as it isusually a good source of government rev-enue.

Comrade Mao Zedong: In the militaryand political sectors we have alreadyachieved complete success; as for culturaland economic sectors, we have as yet notfreed ourselves from foreign influence there.

Comrade Stalin: Do you have inspec-tors and agents overseeing foreign enter-prises, banks, etc.?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, we have.We are carrying out such work in the studyand oversight of foreign enterprises (theKailan [?] mines, electric power plants andaqueducts in Shanghai, etc.).

Comrade Stalin: One should have gov-ernment inspectors who must operate le-gally. The foreigners should also be taxed athigher levels than the Chinese.

Who owns the enterprises mining wol-fram [tungsten], molybdenum, and petro-leum?

Comrade Mao Zedong: The govern-ment.

Comrade Stalin: It is important to in-crease the mining of minerals and especiallyof petroleum. You could build an oil pipe-line from western Lanzhou to Chengdu [?],and then transport fuel by ship.

Comrade Mao Zedong: So far we havenot decided which districts of China weshould strive to develop first - the coastalareas or those inland, since we were unsureof the prospects for peace.

Comrade Stalin: Petroleum, coal, andmetal are always needed, regardless ofwhether there be war or not.

Comrade Stalin: Can rubber-bearingtrees be grown in southern China?

Comrade Mao Zedong: So far it has notbeen possible.

Comrade Stalin: Is there a meteorologi-cal service in China?

Comrade Mao Zedong: No, it has notbeen established yet.

Comrade Stalin: It should be estab-lished.

Comrade Stalin: We would like toreceive from you a list of your works which


could be translated into Russian.Comrade Mao Zedong: I am currently

reviewing my works which were publishedin various local publishing houses and whichcontain a mass of errors and misrepresenta-tions. I plan to complete this review byspring of 1950. However, I would like toreceive help from Soviet comrades: first ofall, to work on the texts with Russian trans-lators and, secondly, to receive help in edit-ing the Chinese original.

Comrade Stalin: This can be done.However, do you need your works edited?

Comrade Mao Zedong: Yes, and I askyou to select a comrade suitable for such atask, say, for example, someone from CCVKP/b/ [All-Union Communist Party ofbolsheviks].

Comrade Stalin: It can be arranged, ifindeed there is such a need.

Also present at the meeting: comrs.Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, Vyshinskii,[Soviet translator N.T.] Fedorenko and [Chi-nese translator] Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

Recorded by comr. Fedorenko.

[signature illegible 31/XII]

[Source: Archive of the President, RussianFederation (APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis (op.)

1, delo (d.) 329, listy (ll.) 9-17; translationby Danny Rozas.]

* * * * *

II. Conversation between Stalin andMao, Moscow, 22 January 1950

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONBETWEEN COMRADE I.V. STALIN

AND CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE’S

GOVERNMENT OF THEPEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

MAO ZEDONG

22 January 1950

After an exchange of greetings and ashort discussion of general topics, the fol-lowing conversation took place.

Stalin: There are two groups of ques-tions which must be discussed: the firstgroup of questions concerns the existingagreements between the USSR and China;the second group of questions concerns thecurrent events in Manchuria, Xinjiang, etc.

I think that it would be better to beginnot with the current events, but rather with adiscussion of the existing agreements. Webelieve that these agreements need to bechanged, though earlier we had thought that

they could be left intact. The existing agree-ments, including the treaty, should bechanged because war against Japan figuresat the very heart of the treaty. Since the waris over and Japan has been crushed, thesituation has been altered, and now the treatyhas become an anachronism.

I ask to hear your opinion regarding thetreaty of friendship and alliance.

Mao Zedong: So far we have not workedout a concrete draft of the treaty, only a fewoutlines.

Stalin: We can exchange opinions, andthen prepare an appropriate draft.

Mao Zedong: Judging from the currentsituation, we believe that we shouldstrengthen our existing friendship using thehelp of treaties and agreements. This wouldresonate well both in China and in the inter-national arena. Everything that guaranteesthe future prosperity of our countries mustbe stated in the treaty of alliance and friend-ship, including the necessity of avoiding arepetition of Japanese aggression. So longas we show interest in the prosperity of ourcountries, one cannot rule out the possibilitythat the imperialist countries will attempt tohinder us.

Stalin: True. Japan still has cadresremaining, and it will certainly lift itself upagain, especially if Americans continue theircurrent policy.

Mao Zedong: Two points that I made

Rivals and Allies:Stalin, Mao, and the Chinese Civil War,

January 1949

Introduction by Odd Arne Westad

In early 1949, as the communist-ledPeople’s Liberation Army (PLA) was win-ning decisive victories on the battlefield inthe Chinese civil war, the Guomindang(GMD) government made a last attempt at apeace settlement through Great Power me-diation. Stalin decided not to disregardcompletely the GMD initiative, but to offerSoviet mediation in case the Chinese gov-ernment accepted those harsh preconditionsspelled out in his January 10 telegram toMao Zedong. That telegram, in turn,prompted a brief but revealing exchangebetween the two communist leaders over themerits of diplomatic versus military tactics

in the conflict; the exchange, recently de-classified in the Russian archives, is printedbelow.

There are several likely reasons whyStalin did not want to turn the GMD appealdown forthright. He may genuinely haveseen the response he outlined to Mao as thebest tactic in order to forestall a propagandavictory for the GMD and Washington. Stalinprobably also wanted to impress on Mao andthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leader-ship his status as the master tactician of theworld Communist movement—as someonewho immediately understood a political situ-ation wherever it came up with more clarityand breadth than “local” leaders. Thirdly, hemay have wanted to remind the CCP leaders,in a not too subtle way, of their dependenceon Soviet political and diplomatic supportnotwithstanding the PLA’s victories.

Whatever his motives, Stalin’s scheme

backfired badly when Mao refused to playalong with the Soviet leader’s initiative. Inhis telegram of January 13, Mao not onlyturned down Moscow’s instructions on howhis party should respond to the GMD, buteven had the temerity to suggest to Stalinhow he ought to respond on behalf of theSoviet Union. In both cases Mao empha-sized that there was no need for negotiationsand that Stalin’s suggestions would onlydelay the final military victory.

For the leader of a Communist party torespond in such a way to Stalin’s instruc-tions was rather unusual in the late 1940s,and did not endear the CCP to the Sovietleadership. On the Chinese side—even afterMoscow basically accepted Mao’s reply—there remained a suspicion that Stalin hadreally wanted to stop the PLA offensivesnorth of the Yangzi river and thereby createa

continued on page 27


earlier are cardinal in changing our futuretreaty from the existing one. Previously, theGuomindang spoke of friendship in wordsonly. Now the situation has changed, withall the conditions for real friendship andcooperation in place.

In addition, whereas before there wastalk of cooperation in the war against Japan,now attention must turn to preventing Japa-nese aggression. The new treaty must in-clude the questions of political, economic,cultural and military cooperation. Of mostimportance will be the question of eco-nomic cooperation.

Stalin: Is it necessary to keep the pro-vision, stated in article 3 of the currentTreaty of friendship: “...This article shallremain in force up until that time when, byrequest of both High Participants in theTreaty, the United Nations is given theresponsibility of preventing any future ag-gression on the part of Japan”?

Mao Zedong: I don’t believe it is nec-essary to keep this provision.

Stalin: We also believe that it is unnec-essary. What provisions do we need tospecify in the new treaty?

Mao Zedong: We believe that the newtreaty should include a paragraph on consul-tation regarding international concerns. Theaddition of this paragraph would strengthenour position, since among the Chinese na-tional bourgeoisie there are objections to thepolicy of rapprochement with the SovietUnion on questions of international con-cern.

Stalin: Good. When signing a treaty offriendship and cooperation, the inclusion ofsuch a paragraph goes without saying.

Mao Zedong: That’s right.Stalin: To whom shall we entrust the

preparation of the draft? I believe that weshould entrust it to [Soviet Foreign MinisterAndrei] Vyshinskii and [Chinese ForeignMinister] Zhou Enlai.

Mao Zedong: Agreed.Stalin: Let us move over to the agree-

ment on KChZhD. What proposals do youhave on this question?

Mao Zedong: Perhaps we should ac-cept as the guiding principle the idea ofmaking practical changes concerning theKChZhD and the Port Arthur agreements,while legally continuing them in their presentstate?

Stalin: That is, you agree to declare thelegal continuation of the current agreement,

while, in effect, allowing appropriate changesto take place.

Mao Zedong: We must act so as to takeinto account the interests of both sides, Chinaand the Soviet Union.

Stalin: True. We believe that the agree-ment concerning Port Arthur is not equi-table.

Mao Zedong: But changing this agree-ment goes against the decisions of the YaltaConference?!

Stalin: True, it does—and to hell with it!Once we have taken up the position that thetreaties must be changed, we must go all theway. It is true that for us this entails certaininconveniences, and we will have to struggleagainst the Americans. But we are alreadyreconciled to that.

Mao Zedong: This question worries usonly because it may have undesirable conse-quences for the USSR.

Stalin: As you know, we made thecurrent agreement during the war with Ja-pan. We did not know that Jiang Jieshi wouldbe toppled. We acted under the premise thatthe presence of our troops in Port Arthurwould be in the interests of Soviet Union anddemocracy in China.

Mao Zedong: The matter is clear.Stalin: In that case, would you deem the

following scenario acceptable: declare thatthe agreement on Port Arthur shall remain inforce until a peace treaty with Japan is signed,after which the Russian troops would bewithdrawn from Port Arthur. Or perhaps onecould propose another scenario: declare thatthe current agreement shall remain in place,while in effect withdrawing troops from PortArthur. We will accept whichever of thesescenarios is more suitable. We agree withboth scenarios.

Mao Zedong: This question should bethought through. We agree with the opinionof comrade Stalin and believe that the agree-ment on Port Arthur must remain in forceuntil a peace treaty is signed with Japan, afterwhich the treaty shall become invalid and theSoviet soldiers will leave. However, wewould like for Port Arthur to be a place formilitary collaboration, where we could trainour military naval forces.

Stalin: The question of Dalny [Dairen;Dalian]. We have no intention of securingany Soviet rights in Dalny.

Mao Zedong: Will Dalny remain a freeport?

Stalin: Since we are giving up our rights

there, China must decide on its own thequestion of Dalny: will it remain a free portor not. During his time Roosevelt insistedthat Dairen remain a free port.

Mao Zedong: So the preservation of thefree port would be in the interests of Americaand Britain?

Stalin: Of course. It’s a house withopen gates.

Mao Zedong: We believe that PortArthur could serve as a base for our militarycollaboration, while Dalny could serve as abase for Sino-Soviet economic collabora-tion. In Dalny there is a whole array ofenterprises that we are in no position toexploit without Soviet assistance. We shoulddevelop a closer economic collaborationthere.

Stalin: In other words, the agreementon Port Arthur will remain in force until apeace treaty is signed with Japan. After thesigning of the peace treaty the existing agree-ment shall become invalid and the Russiansshall withdraw their troops. Did I sum upyour thoughts correctly?

Mao Zedong: Yes, basically so, and itis exactly this which we would like to setforth in the new treaty.

Stalin: Let us continue the discussion ofthe KChZhD question. Tell us, as an honestcommunist, what doubts do you have here?

Mao Zedong: The principal point is thatthe new treaty should note that joint exploi-tation and administration will continue inthe future. However, in the case of adminis-tration, China should take the lead role here.Furthermore, it is necessary to examine thequestion of shortening the duration of theagreement and to determine the amount ofinvestment by each side.

Molotov: The conditions governing thecooperation and joint administration of anenterprise by two interested countries usu-ally provide for equal participation by bothsides, as well as for alternation in the ap-pointment of replacements for managementpositions. In the old agreement the adminis-tration of the railroad belonged to the Sovi-ets; however, in the future we think it neces-sary to alternate in the creation of manage-ment functions. Let’s say that such an alter-nation could take place every two-three years.

Zhou Enlai: Our comrades believe thatthe existing management of KChZhD andthe office of the director ought to be abol-ished and a railroad administration commis-sion be set up in their place; and that the


offices of the commission chairman and ofthe director should be replaced by Chinesecadres. However, given comrade Molotov’sproposals, this question requires morethought.

Stalin: If we are talking about jointadministration, then it is important that thereplacements for the managing position bealternated. That would be more logical. Asfor the duration of the agreement, we wouldnot be against shortening it.

Zhou Enlai: Should we not change theratio of capital investment by each side, byincreasing the level of Chinese investmentto 51%, instead of the current requirementfor parity?

Molotov: This would go against theexisting provision for parity.

Stalin: We do indeed have agreementswith the Czechs and the Bulgarians whichprovide for parity and equal-footing for bothsides. Since we already have joint adminis-tration, then we might as well have equalparticipation.

Mao Zedong: The question needs to befurther examined, keeping in mind the inter-ests of both sides.

Stalin: Let us discuss the credit agree-ment. We need to officially formalize thatwhich has already been agreed to earlier. Doyou have any observations to make?

Mao Zedong: Is the shipment of mili-tary arms considered a part of the monetaryloan?

Stalin: This you can decide yourself:we can bill that towards the loan, or we canformalize it through trade agreements.

Mao Zedong: If the military shipmentsare billed towards the loan, then we will havelittle means left for industry. It appears thatpart of the military shipments will have to bebilled towards the loan, while the other partwill have to be paid with Chinese goods.Can’t the period of delivery of industrialequipment and military arms be shortenedfrom 5 to 3-4 years?

Stalin: We must examine our options.The matter rests in the requisition list for ourindustry. Nevertheless, we can move thedate that the credit agreement goes intoeffect to 1 January 1950, since the shipmentsshould begin just about now. If the agree-ment specified July 1949 as the time for thecommencement of the loan, the internationalcommunity would not be able to understandhow an agreement could have been reachedbetween the Soviet Union and China, which

at the time did not even have its own govern-ment. It seems that you should hasten some-what to present the requisition list for indus-trial equipment. It should be kept in mindthat the sooner such a list is presented, thebetter for the matter at hand.

Mao Zedong: We believe that the con-ditions of the credit agreement are generallyfavorable to China. Under its terms we payonly one percent interest.

Stalin: Our credit agreements withpeople’s democracies provide for two per-cent interest. We could, says comr. Stalinjokingly, increase this interest for you aswell, if you would like. Of course, we actedunder the premise that the Chinese economywas practically in ruin.

As is clear from the telegrams that wehave received, the Chinese government in-tends to use its army in the reconstruction ofits economy. That is very good. In our timewe also made use of the army in our eco-nomic development and had very good re-sults.

Mao Zedong: That’s right. We aredrawing on the experience of our Sovietcomrades.

Stalin: You raised the question of Chinareceiving a certain amount of grain forXinjiang?

Mao Zedong: Wheat and textile.Stalin: For this you need to come up

with the necessary requests that include num-bers.

Mao Zedong: Very well, we shall pre-pare these.

How shall we proceed with the tradeagreement?

Stalin: What is your opinion? Up untilnow we have only had a trade agreementwith Manchuria. We would like to knowwhat sort of a situation we should lookforward to in the future: will we be signingseparate agreements with Xinjiang, Man-churia and other provinces, or a single agree-ment with the central government?

Mao Zedong: We would like to have asingle, central agreement. But in timeXinjiang may have a separate agreement.

Stalin: Just Xinjiang; what about Man-churia?

Zhou Enlai: A separate agreement withManchuria can be ruled out, since in theagreement with the central governmentChina’s obligations would in essence befulfilled by shipments made from Manchu-ria.

Stalin: We would like the central gov-ernment to sanction and take the responsibil-ity for the agreements with Xinjiang or Man-churia.

Mao Zedong: The agreement withXinjiang must be signed in the name of thecentral government.

Stalin: Right, since [a] provincial gov-ernment might not take many things intoaccount, whereas things are always clearerto the central government.

What other questions do you have?Mao Zedong: At the present time the

main question is economic cooperation - thereconstruction and development of the Man-churian economy.

Stalin: I think that we will entrust thepreparation of this question to comrs.Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, Zhou Enlai, and [CCPCC member and Vice Chairman of Financeand Economics Commission] Li Fuchun.

Any other questions?Mao Zedong: I would like to note that

the air regiment that you sent to China wasvery helpful. They transported 10 thousandpeople. Let me thank you, comrade Stalin,for the help and ask you to allow it to stay alittle longer, so it could help transport provi-sions to [CCP CC member and commanderof the PLA’s Second Field Army] LiuBocheng’s troops, currently preparing foran attack on Tibet.

Stalin: It’s good that you are preparingto attack. The Tibetans need to be subdued.As for the air regiment, we shall talk thisover with the military personnel and giveyou an answer.

The meeting took two hours.Present at the meeting were comrs.

Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii,Roshchin, Fedorenko and Mao Zedong, ZhouEnlai, Li Fuchun, [PRC Ambassador to theUSSR] Wang Jiaxiang, [CCP CC member]Chen Boda, and Shi Zhe /Karskii/.

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 29-38;translation by Danny Rozas.]

* * * * *

III. Conversation between Stalin andZhou Enlai, 20 August 1952

[Classification level blacked out:“NOT SECRET” stamped]


RECORD OF CONVERSATIONBETWEEN COMRADE

I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI

20 August 1952

Present:

On the Soviet sidecomrs. Molotov, Vyshinskii,

Fedorenko.

On the Chinese side comrs.[Vice Premier] Chen Yun, Li Fuchun,

[PRC Ambassador to the USSR] ZhangWentian, [Deputy chief of staff] Su Yu

Translated bycomrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe

Zhou Enlai sends comrade Stalin greet-ings from Mao Zedong and inquires aboutcomrade Stalin’s health.

Stalin thanks Zhou Enlai and inquiresabout Mao Zedong’s health.

Zhou Enlai announces that Mao Zedonghas been feeling well during the past twoyears. Speaks of the enormous amount ofattention being focused in China on theupcoming [October 1952] XIX Congress ofVKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party ofbolsheviks].

Stalin notes that there has not been aconvention for a long time, that in 1939there were only 1.5 mln. party members,while now there are about 6 mln.; eventhough we have been holding down theinflux of new party members, the party isstill growing.

He asks about the delegation’s trip.Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for the

attention and answers that the trip wentquite well and that the delegation travelledin full comfort. In the name of Mao Zedong,[he] thanks comrade Stalin, the party CC[Central Committee] and the Soviet govern-ment for the enormous help in both thedevelopment of the national Chineseeconomy and in the struggle with its en-emies.

Stalin. There is no need to thank. Thisis our duty. Wouldn’t the Chinese comradeshelp us if we were in the same position?

Zhou Enlai agrees that this is true, add-ing that though assistance should be given,gratitude, obviously, should also be ex-pressed.

Stalin. We must also thank the Chinesepeople for carrying on the right struggle.China also helps us by delivering us caoutch-ouc [natural rubber]. Thus, we will have tothank China as well.

Zhou Enlai says that, unfortunately,China’s assistance to Soviet Union is insuf-ficient.

Stalin. You came to power too late. Youwere late by more than 30 years.

Zhou Enlai asks for permission to setforth the reason for the delegation’s visit.Refers to the telegram from Mao Zedongwhich contains the Chinese government’swishes. States three main topics to be dis-cussed. First question - the situation inKorea. Second - the internal situation withinPRC over the past three years and the fiveyear plan for economic development. Notesthat a written report is under preparation.The Chinese delegation would like to dealwith this question after the report has beenpresented. Third - the extension of the agree-ment on Port Arthur.

Stalin notes that the initiative to extendthe joint use of the military naval base at PortArthur must come from China. We areguests there, and guests don’t ask such ques-tions.

Zhou Enlai agrees with comrade Stalinand offers to exchange diplomatic notes.The Chinese government shall address theSoviet government with the necessary re-quest.

The next question concerns the con-struction of the railway from Ulan-Bator tothe Sino-Mongol border.

Stalin asks whether China is interestedin such a railway.

Zhou Enlai notes that a railway toXinjiang would be of greater importance.But that would be a complicated and difficultconstruction project. The Chinese govern-ment is intent on first building a railroad toMongolia which could then connect to So-viet Union. The length of this railroad onChinese territory would be approximately350 km. This railroad is projected to becompleted by June 1955. Such a railroadserves Chinese interests as it opens a meansof direct rail communication with SovietUnion and eases the receipt of industrialequipment from the USSR to China and theexport of Chinese goods to Soviet Union.

Stalin responds that a railway to Xinjiangis very important in the long term, and thatwe could help China build this railway. But

this is indeed a long project. If the Chinesecomrades are interested in building a rail-way across Mongolia, we are ready to help inits construction within Mongolian territory.This would be quicker. However, we be-lieve that one cannot lose sight of a Xinjiangrailway, since this would be a very importantrailway which would pass through regionsrich in oil. There should be oil there.Mongolia doesn’t have much of it.

Zhou Enlai notes that there are largedeposits of iron ore in the Pinditsiuan region,and that it will become the center of therailroad and steel industries. Right now aplan for the construction of the Xinjiangrailway is being drafted. In the course of thefirst five year plan a railway will be con-structed from Lanzhou to Khami. In thesecond five-year plan a railroad will be builtfrom Khami to the USSR border.

Stalin approves of this and reiterates thesignificance of a Xinjiang railway with re-spect to prospective oil mining.

Zhou Enlai affirms that there are oildeposits all along this route. Moves on to theagreement on hevea [rubber] trees.

Stalin indicates that the question hasbeen pretty much decided.

Zhou Enlai agrees and shifts to the ques-tion of the five year plan for the PRC’seconomic development. Says that a writtenreport on the subject is under preparationand that, as soon as the report is completed,he would like to visit comrade Stalin andpersonally go over the report with him.

Stalin agrees to this.Zhou Enlai requests assistance for work

in geological exploration.Stalin promises such assistance.Zhou Enlai shifts to the question of

construction projects for various industrialenterprises in China. Says that there are 151such enterprises planned to be constructed.Points out that China needs the SovietUnion’s help in procuring equipment. Asksthat the PRC’s written request be consideredand that an answer be given as to whetherand in what capacity the Soviet Union wouldrender such assistance, and that time periodsbe specified, and also that Soviet specialistsbe sent to China. Emphasizes that Sovietspecialists working in China have performeda great deal of work and have been of greathelp to China, especially in the area of train-ing work cadres and specialists.

Stalin. That is most important. Chinamust have its own cadres in order to stand


strong on its own feet.Zhou Enlai informs that they would like

to receive an additional 800 specialists fromSoviet Union.

Stalin says that this request will be ex-amined and that we will try to send as manyas we can.

Zhou Enlai asks also for assistance withtechnical documentation (blueprints, etc.).

Stalin answers that this is, indeed, nec-essary.

Zhou Enlai asks if it will be possible tocontinue to educate students in the USSRand to send interns to Soviet enterprises.

Stalin expresses agreement.Zhou Enlai touches on the question of

the military five year plan. Informs thatmaterials are under preparation and that awritten report will be presented. Also wishesto receive military equipment.

Stalin asks what Zhou Enlai has in mind:shipments of weapons or equipment for mili-tary factories.

Zhou Enlai says that he meant ship-ments of weapons. Noting that since agree-ment has already been expressed with regardto weapons for 60 divisions, he would like todiscuss shipments for naval forces. Askswhat sort of assistance could be received inthe way of airplanes.

Stalin asks whether the Chinese gov-ernment is thinking of building aero-manu-facturing plants.

Zhou Enlai says that this would be verydifficult to do in the course of the first fiveyear plan, particularly with regard to jetairplanes. Notes that such construction isnot planned to begin until at least 5 yearsfrom now, and motor-building - in 3 years.

Stalin points to the example of Czecho-slovakia and Poland, which began with as-sembly plants. Says that the USSR couldsend China motors and other airplane parts,and China could organize the assembly ofthese airplanes. Cadres can be trained in thisway. We went through the same process.Such a process would be more beneficial forChinese comrades as well. First you mustbuild 1-2 factories for motor assembly. Wewill send motors and other airplane partswhich would then be assembled in China.That’s how it was done in Poland, Czecho-slovakia, and Hungary. This ought to beorganized. Having organized assemblyplants, you could then, in another 3 years,build an airplane factory. That is the easiestand the best way.

Zhou Enlai says that they are beginningto understand this and are organizing main-tenance and assembly plants. He adds that ifcomrade Stalin finds it necessary to hastenthe process, then they will take all appropri-ate measures to comply.

Stalin asks whether divisions of somesort have been organized in order to receivethe shipment of weapons for 60 divisionswhich Soviet Union sent to China.

Zhou Enlai explains that out of the 10divisions’ worth of armaments that Chinahas received, 3 have been given over toKorea and 7 have been earmarked for Chi-nese detachments in Korea.

Stalin asks if he understands correctlythat all of the weapons will go to the Koreanfront.

Zhou Enlai affirms that it will be so,assuming that the war will continue. In-forms that, out of the total of 60 divisions’armaments, the Chinese government is in-tent on sending 3 to Korea, preparing 42divisions [of Chinese soldiers] to serve inKorea ..... [ellipsis in original]

Stalin asks whether the Chinese havegotten used to the new weapons.

Zhou Enlai explains that they are gradu-ally becoming proficient with the new weap-ons, with 3-4 months of training.

Stalin. Under these circumstances weoperate in a way so as to allow soldiers tobecome familiar with the weapons and theoverall organization of the division. Thistakes time - approximately 6 months. With-out it one could lose the weapons. Besides,during this time we inspect the operation ofvarious mechanisms, and only then do wesend these units to the front. Of course thispreparation could be carried out behind thefront, in Korea, for example. Half of thedivisions receiving the new weapons shouldremain in China.

Zhou Enlai notes that the shipment ofdivisions to Korea results in losses, whichmust be made up.

Stalin emphasizes that it is imperativeto train the divisions, so as to make themstronger.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of assis-tance with artillery.

Stalin asks whether China can produceammunition.

Zhou Enlai answers that they have notyet addressed this question.

Stalin notes that, all in all, it is moredifficult to transport ammunition than artil-

lery pieces.Zhou Enlai repeats his request for assis-

tance with artillery. Emphasizes that forevery Chinese shell fired, the Americansanswer with 9 shells of their own.

Stalin. That’s bad. Adds that if theAmericans are firing 9 shells, the Chineseshould be firing 20. We smothered theGermans with artillery. We had a gun sta-tioned every 2 meters, while the Germanshad a gun every kilometer. Artillery isimportant stuff. The Chinese governmentneeds to get the munitions production going.We will help you build these factories.

Zhou Enlai points out that they are reor-ganizing existing factories and are planningnew factories.

Stalin. That is necessary. Machinetools are of utmost importance here.

Zhou Enlai says that they have machinetools, but old ones.

Stalin says that machine tools are essen-tial in the production of ammunition for122mm, three-inch and anti-aircraft guns.We can help in this matter. Adds that it is notnecessary to build large factories. We buildammunition in different plants: one plantmakes shell casings while another loadsthem. It’s difficult to do everything in onefactory.

Zhou Enlai announces that the Chinesegovernment will act upon the advice of theSoviet government regarding its aviationindustry and take all measures to further itsdevelopment.

Stalin emphasizes the importance offirst organizing assembly plants.

Zhou Enlai says that the Chinese gov-ernment plans to build tank-producing fac-tories: one for light tanks with an output of 1thousand tanks per year, and another formedium tanks, to be completed in 4-5 years.

Stalin advises to start here with assem-bly plans as well, pointing out that during thewar we converted automobile factories toproduce tanks. Says that it would be goodfor China to have 1-2 auto assembly plants.

Zhou Enlai says that they plan to builda factory in Changchun with an output of 20thousand cars and are organizing an assem-bly plant with an output of 3 thousand cars ayear. Asks for assistance in the planning ofyet another factory.

Stalin emphasizes that cadres must re-ceive training in assembly and maintenancefactories. This issue must be addressed.

Zhou Enlai agrees completely with this


observation and notes that the Chinese gov-ernment is addressing this matter. Theyhave maintenance factories and are cur-rently working to organize assembly plants;these plants will open next year.

Stalin inquires whether China hasworker education schools in their factories.Adds that we have such a school in everyfactory.

Zhou Enlai admits that this is one of theweaker spots. They are taking measures torectify the situation. There are coursesgiven in factories. They are trying to attractstudents and are selecting party members toteach.

Stalin points out that we have a specialministry, the Ministry of Labor Resources.There are vocational schools. It would begood for China to establish something of thesort. Every year these schools graduatearound 1 mln. young workers.

Zhou Enlai asks, what sort of institu-tions does Soviet Union have to train middlemanagement cadres[?]

Stalin explains that there are specialtechnical schools for this purpose.

Zhou Enlai says that he would like todiscuss the question of radar.

Stalin promises to assist in this matter.Radio and radar are very important.

Zhou Enlai says that they were thinkingof building assembly plants for this pur-pose.

Stalin emphasizes that subsequentlythey should build radar equipment manu-facturing plants.

Zhou Enlai says that so far they are notcapable of producing radar equipment.

Stalin promises to help.Zhou Enlai returns to the question of

specialists. Says that the Chinese govern-ment does not intend merely to ask us forhelp with specialists but also plans to pre-pare its own specialists.

Stalin approves of this, pointing outthat, in time, other countries will ask Chinafor specialists: India, Burma, Indo-China.Adds that it would be wiser for the Chinesegovernment to send engineers and techni-cians to Soviet factories, where they couldhone their skills.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of de-fraying the costs that China bears from thetrade imbalance between the two countries.Says that the Chinese government wouldlike to ask for a new loan. However, ob-serves Zhou Enlai, we understand that this

would be a burden for the Soviet Union.Stalin points out that this is because we

came to power earlier, that we were lucky. Ifthe Chinese comrades had come to powerbefore us, then we would have had to ask thesame of them.

To this Zhou Enlai responds that Mos-cow is the center from which all nationsderive inspiration for their struggle for lib-eration.

He goes on to give a short account of thesituation in Korea. He points out that up untilMay 1951 the war in Korea was not static, butwas a war of movement. Since May 1951, afront has been established, and the war hasbecome static. Both sides are about equal instrength. The enemy is in no position to carryout an offensive. There is a certain equilib-rium. But we are not carrying out largeoffensives, either. Like the enemy which hasreinforced its position 15-20 km. deep, sohave we created our own fortified zone, andcontinue to dig even now. The enemy has notbeen able to destroy our fortifications. Thefront line extends for about 200 km and iscompletely fortified, as are the left and rightflanks.

Mao Zedong has put forth three ques-tions. First - will we be able to repulse theenemy? We are convinced that we will.Second - will we be able to hold our presentpositions? This year has shown that we willbe able to hold and strengthen our positions.Third - will we be able to carry out anoffensive, to attack the enemy? Earlier wethought that we would hardly be able to carryout an offensive for more than 7 days. Nowwe are sufficiently strong to launch longeroffensives and have entrenched ourselveswell enough to withstand bombing raids.

Stalin asks whether they are capable ofwidening the scope of the offensives.

Zhou Enlai explains that they can launchoffensives to capture isolated positions, but ageneral offensive would be difficult to carryout. Since the war acquired its static nature,the American command has been intent ondrawing out the negotiations and is not inter-ested in signing a truce.

Stalin says that apparently the Ameri-cans want to keep more Chinese POWs. Thatwould explain their refusal to return POWs.Perhaps they turned them over to Jiang Jieshi.

Zhou Enlai affirms that there are agentsof Jiang Jieshi among the POWs.

Stalin observes that Americans want todecide the POW question on their own, in

defiance of all international laws. Underinternational law the warring sides are obli-gated to return all POWs, except those con-victed of crimes. What does Mao Zedongthink regarding this matter: will he give in orwill he hold his own?

Zhou Enlai briefly relates the differ-ences that separate them and the [North]Korean comrades in this matter. Americahas agreed to return 83 thousand POWs, and[North] Korea was ready to accept the offer.However, they have not considered the craftygame that America is playing here - out ofthe 83 thousand, only 6400 are Chinese, andthe rest Koreans. In truth, they are supposedto return another 13,600 Chinese volunteers,but the Americans don’t want to do this,though they are quite willing to return 76thousand Koreans. This clearly shows thatthey are out to provoke us, by trying to drivea wedge between China and [North] Korea.

Stalin asks how many Korean POWsare there.

Zhou Enlai answers - 96,600. Empha-sizes that the question of the number ofChinese and Korean POWs supposed to bereturned is a matter of principle. Informsthat the Chinese government is firmly com-mitted on having all 116 thous. POWs, in-cluding 20 thous. Chinese, returned. But ifAmericans were to agree on returning a fewless, then we would not strongly object, if[they] promised that negotiations for thereturn of the other POWs will continue.

Stalin affirms that this is the right posi-tion.

Zhou Enlai informs that Mao Zedong,having analyzed the current situation re-garding this matter, believes that one shouldstand firmly committed on the return of allPOWs. The [North] Koreans believe thatthe continuation of the war is not advanta-geous because the daily losses are greaterthan the number of POWs whose return isbeing discussed. But ending the war wouldnot be advantageous to the USA. MaoZedong believes that the continuation of thewar is advantageous to us, since it detractsUSA from preparing for a new world war.

Stalin. Mao Zedong is right. This waris getting on America’s nerves. The NorthKoreans have lost nothing, except for casu-alties that they suffered during the war.Americans understand that this war is notadvantageous and they will have to end it,especially after it becomes clear that ourtroops will remain in China. Endurance and


patience is needed here. Of course, oneneeds to understand Korea - they have suf-fered many casualties. But they need to beexplained that this is an important matter.They need patience and lots of endurance.The war in Korea has shown America’sweakness. The armies of 24 countries can-not continue the war in Korea for long, sincethey have not achieved their goals and can-not count on success in this matter. Koreansneed our help and support.

Asks about the bread situation in Korea.Says that we can help them.

Zhou Enlai says that Korea is havingdifficulties in this regard. The Chinese gov-ernment knows that USSR has helped Ko-rea. Says that they have also helped Koreaand have told Kim Il Sung that this is not anobstacle, that they will give them foodstuffsand clothing and everything they ask for, butthat they cannot give weapons.

Stalin says that we can give Korea addi-tional weapons. We will begrudge nothingto Korea.

Zhou Enlai repeats that they cannotyield to the Americans during the negotia-tions.

Stalin observes that if the Americansback down a little, then you can accept,assuming that negotiations will continue onquestions still unresolved.

Zhou Enlai agrees, adding that if theAmericans don’t want peace, then we mustbe prepared to continue the war, even if itwere to take another year.

Stalin affirms that this is correct.Zhou Enlai emphasizes the truth of com-

rade Stalin’s observations, namely that thiswar is getting on America’s nerves and thatthe USA is not ready for the world war.Adds that China, by playing the vanguardrole in this war, is helping to stave off the warfor 15-20 years, assuming that they willsucceed in containing the American offen-sive in Korea. Then the USA will not be ableto unleash a third world war at all.

Stalin says that this is true, but with onestipulation: Americans are not capable ofwaging a large-scale war at all, especiallyafter the Korean war. All of their strengthlies in air power and the atom bomb. Britainwon’t fight for America. America cannotdefeat little Korea. One must be firm whendealing with America. The Chinese com-rades must know that if America does notlose this war, then China will never recap-ture Taiwan. Americans are merchants.

Every American soldier is a speculator, oc-cupied with buying and selling. Germansconquered France in 20 days. It’s beenalready two years, and USA has still notsubdued little Korea. What kind of strengthis that? America’s primary weapons, sayscomrade Stalin jokingly, are stockings, ciga-rettes, and other merchandise. They want tosubjugate the world, yet they cannot subduelittle Korea. No, Americans don’t knowhow to fight. After the Korean war, inparticular, they have lost the capability towage a large-scale war. They are pinningtheir hopes on the atom bomb and air power.But one cannot win a war with that. Oneneeds infantry, and they don’t have muchinfantry; the infantry they do have is weak.They are fighting with little Korea, and al-ready people are weeping in the USA. Whatwill happen if they start a large-scale war?Then, perhaps, everyone will weep.

Zhou Enlai states that if America makessome sort of compromises, even if they aresmall, then they should accept. If Americadoes not agree to return all POWs and pro-poses a smaller number, then they shouldaccept the offer, under the condition that thequestion of the remaining POWs will beresolved under mediation by some neutralcountry, like India, or the remaining POWstransferred to this neutral country until thequestion is resolved.

Stalin asks how many American POWsthere are.

Zhou Enlai explains that the overallnumber of POWs in North Korean and Chi-nese hands is 12,000, out of which 7,400 areSouth Koreans.

Stalin does not exclude such a resolu-tion to the question, as proposed by ZhouEnlai. On his part, [he] proposes that theycould announce to the Americans that if theyare holding back a certain percentage ofKorean and Chinese POWs, then NorthKorea and China will hold back the samepercentage of South Korean and AmericanPOWs until a final solution to the POWquestion is agreed upon. This needs to betried as a way of pressuring Americans bypublicizing it in the press. If America rejectsthis offer, then it should be declared that theyapparently want to send Chinese POWs toJiang Jieshi. If these proposals are unsuc-cessful, then you can resort to mediation.The main thing here is to propose a ceasefire.

Zhou Enlai declares that, indeed, anarmistice agreement also involves a cease-

fire. On the POW question [he] enumeratesthree positions. First - announce from thebeginning that they will hold back the samepercentage of South Korean and AmericanPOWs as the percentage of North Koreansand Chinese held back by America, andleave it at that. Second - resort to mediationby a neutral country. Third - sign an armi-stice agreement by putting off the POWquestion and resuming its discussion after-wards.

Then Zhou Enlai returned to the ques-tion of military assistance and put forth theKorean comrades’ request for 10 anti-air-craft gun regiments. We told the Koreansthat we don’t have such capabilities, but thatwe would bring this up with the Sovietgovernment.

Stalin. Kim Il Sung asked as for 5regiments. We promised to send him these.Perhaps China will also give 5 regiments?

Zhou Enlai repeats that they do not havesuch capabilities and that this is new to them.

Stalin says that this question needs to becleared up with Kim Il Sung.

As for Zhou Enlai’s request to send 10regiments, irrespective of those promisedearlier, comrade Stalin answers that it willhave to be examined.

Zhou Enlai brings up the Korean com-rades’ request for advice on whether theyshould start bombing South Korea. They arenot sure whether it’s the right way to go.

Stalin explains that the air force belongsto the state and that Chinese volunteers shouldnot use state planes.

Zhou Enlai informs that the Koreancomrades have asked about launching a newoffensive, to which the Chinese governmentreplied that they cannot carry out a strategicoffensive.

Stalin points out that when armisticenegotiations are taking place, they shouldnot be launching either strategic or tacticaloffensives. They shouldn’t be launchingany offensives.

Zhou Enlai asks, referring to MaoZedong’s question whether Kim Il Sung and[Chinese military commander] Peng Dehuaishould be invited to Moscow.

Stalin. I would happily talk to them, butthey are far away. Besides, we are not verycomfortable with inviting them. If they wereto bring up the question, then we wouldhappily welcome them here.

Zhou Enlai informs that Peng Dehuaiwould very much like to come, though he is


unsure of what Kim Il Sung thinks. Perhapsit would be good to speak to them about this.

Stalin agrees.Zhou Enlai repeats that the Chinese

government believes that it is wise to con-tinue the negotiations in Panmunjom. ButChina is preparing for the possibility ofanother 2-3 years of war. Again asks forassistance with aviation, artillery, and am-munition, as China cannot deal with thesematters on its own.

Stalin announces that everything wecan give you, we will.

Asks how is the Korean morale. Isthere confusion?

Zhou Enlai explains that, indeed, therehas been much destruction in Korea, espe-cially after the bombing of the electric powerstation on the Yalu river. This has had animpact on Korean morale and on their ef-forts to accelerate the struggle to achievepeace.

Stalin says that the American strategyis fright. But they have not frightenedChina. Could it be said that they have alsofailed to frighten Korea?

Zhou Enlai affirms that one could es-sentially say that.

Stalin. If that is true, then it’s not toobad.

Zhou Enlai adds that Korea is waveringsomewhat. They are in a slightly unsteadystate. Among certain elements of the Ko-rean leadership one can detect a state ofpanic, even.

Stalin reminds that he has been alreadyinformed of these feelings through Kim IlSung’s telegram to Mao Zedong.

Zhou Enlai confirms this.Asks how should the Chinese delega-

tion proceed further.Stalin proposes to start work immedi-

ately. Informs that Soviet Union has as-signed a commission under the chairman-ship of comrade Molotov and consisting ofcomrs. Bulganin, Mikoyan, Vyshinskii andKumykin, and that the Chinese delegationcan speak to Molotov about when to startwork.

Zhou Enlai expresses thanks for theinformation and asks comrade Stalin to namethe time when he can brief comrade Stalinon the internal situation in the PRC.

Stalin agrees to see Zhou Enlai as soonas he receives a finished version of thewritten report.

Transcribed byA.Vyshinskii [signature]N.Fedorenko [signature]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 54-72; translation by Danny Rozas.]

* * * * *

IV: Conversation between Stalin andZhou Enlai, 3 September 1952

RECORD OF MEETINGBETWEEN COMRADES

I.V. STALIN AND ZHOU ENLAI

3 September 1952

Present:

on the Soviet sidecomrs. Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin,

Beria, Mikoyan, Kaganovich,Vyshinskii, and Kumykin.

on the Chinese sidecomrs. Chen Yun, Li Fuchun,

Zhang Wentian, and Su Yu

translated bycomrs. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe.

After an exchange of greetings the dis-cussion began with the question of the fiveyear plan of the People’s Republic of China.

Stalin. We have familiarized ourselveswith your five year plan for construction.You are setting the yearly growth at 20%. Isnot the setting of yearly industrial growth at20% strained, or does the 20% provide forsome reserve margin?

Zhou Enlai draws attention to the factthat they do not yet have sufficient experi-ence in such planning. The experiences ofthe past three years has shown that the PRCis underestimating its capabilities. The fea-sibility of the plan will depend on the effortsof the Chinese people and on the assistancethat China is counting on receiving from theUSSR.

Stalin. We draft the five year plan witha reserve margin, as it is impossible to takeinto account every instance. There are vari-ous reasons that may affect the plan in onedirection or another. We always include thecivil and military industries in the plan. The

PRC five year plan does not. In addition, itis necessary to have the complete picture ofall expenditures provided by the plan.

We must know how much is requiredfrom us on a paragraph by paragraph basis.It is necessary to do the calculations. Thegiven documents do not contain such data.Hence we cannot give our final answer. Weneed at least two months in order to do thecalculations and tell you what we can pro-vide you.

Usually it takes us at least a year toprepare our five year plan. Then we analyzethe prepared draft for another 2 months, andstill we manage to let mistakes go by.

We would like you to give us some twomonths to study your plan, so that we couldanswer your questions.

How do things stand in other matters? Itseems that the question of Port Arthur hasbeen examined. In that case we need to makea decision. If there are any sort of objectionsthen they should be discussed right now.

In addition, it seems that there are alsono objections to the draft communiqué onthe transfer of KChZhD.

The third question concerns hevea [rub-ber] trees. We would like to receive fromyou 15 to 20 thousand tons of caoutchouc[natural rubber] each year. You, it seems,object, citing difficulties. The fact is that wehave a tremendous need for caoutchouc,since automobiles and trucks, which are alsobeing sent to you, require large amounts ofrubber. We would like to receive at least 10-15 thousand tons of caoutchouc. We havenot much opportunity to buy caoutchouc,since Britain keeps it to itself. We ask you toreexamine the question of purchasing for usthe necessary amount of caoutchouc.

If all these questions get resolved, thenthe remaining can be decided with otherdelegation members, as it seems that ZhouEnlai is hastening to return.

Zhou Enlai says that it’s difficult forhim to remain here for two months, that hewould like to return to China in mid-Sep-tember. [Vice chairman of the Northeast(China) People’s Government] Li Fuchuncan remain here.

Stalin. Fine.There still remains the question of con-

structing the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuanrailroad. The Mongolian Premier, who wasjust here in Moscow, has given his approval.

In other words, four questions remain tobe decided by Zhou Enlai: Port Arthur,


KChZhD, caoutchouc, and the constructionof the new Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan railroad.

Zhou Enlai referring to the hevea ques-tion, says that they will take all measures inorder to provide USSR with 15-20 thousandtons a year, but they are apprehensive thatthe blockade and other measures directedagainst China by its enemies may prevent itfrom fulfilling this commitment in full. Thedelegation is apprehensive that this may beseen as a breach of its commitments to theSoviet Union.

[He] repeats that they will take all mea-sures to fulfill this commitment, but wouldlike to reserve the right to explain the rea-sons and not be held in breach of its commit-ments, if in extraordinary cases the shipmentfalls short of what was promised.

Stalin says that he understands this. Wecan soften the wording in the agreement, bysaying that China will strive in every pos-sible way to realize the shipments of thestated amount. But if it is unable to delivercaoutchouc in the amount stipulated, thenwe will have to decrease the number oftrucks ordered.

Asks jokingly whether President HoChi Minh might not be able to help in thismatter.

Zhou Enlai notes that China has manyoptions in this regard (mostly through con-traband).

[He] returns to the question of the con-struction of the new railroad. Notes that hereare no objections.

Stalin notes that they can make publicannouncements on Port Arthur and KChZhD,but not on hevea, and only make announce-ments on the Ulan-Bator-Pinditsiuan rail-road once it has been completed.

Zhou Enlai expresses agreement withthis and returns to the question of the fiveyear plan. Again emphasizes that they areunderestimating their capabilities. He agreesthat it is difficult to perceive the five yearplan as a general picture, as it does notinclude the military, since they are havingdifficulties with military planning. Overall,they are unsure whether to include the mili-tary in the general plan. As for publishingthe five year plan, they were not intent onpublishing the plan itself, only its generaltrends.

Stalin explains that our five year plansare published and that we include incognitoarticles dealing with military technologyproduction, chemical and other industries.

The publication of the plans is essential, ifthe people are to comprehend the scope ofdevelopment. There must be numbers. It isnot advisable to limit oneself by publishingsolely its general trends. There are peoplewho want to know and behold the entirescope of development as specified in the fiveyear plan. That’s why it is necessary toprovide for military production in this plan,though without naming military enterprisesand such. It will be better thus. There mustbe a single, unitary plan that includes bothcivil and military development.

As far as the USSR is concerned, we, asthe provider, must also know in what capac-ity and what type of assistance will be re-quired of us. There is but one source - theUSSR. But we need a reckoning for both thecivil and military sectors. We must knowand calculate every portion of the entiresum.

Let’s say that in 1953 we provide weap-ons for 10-15 divisions. We need to knowhow much steel and other materials will beneeded to fulfill this order. During that sameyear 1953 we must supply a certain amountof equipment for the civil sector. This mustalso be calculated. Then both sums, thecivilian and the military, must be combinedto determine whether we will be able tosupply the entire amount. This is how a planmust be drafted for each and every year.Perhaps our Chinese comrades believe thatall these weapons are lying around some-where in a warehouse. No, they must beproduced.

Zhou Enlai completely agrees with ev-erything laid out by comrade Stalin, and willascertain how the matter of the [weaponsshipments for] 60 divisions will rest. If theywill be billed to credit, then that will alsohave to be specified.

Comr. Mao Zedong had an idea - if thewar in Korea were to continue for anotheryear or two, then would it be possible toextend the duration of shipments for 20divisions to next year?

Stalin says that right now it’s difficult tosay. Perhaps it will have to be shortened,perhaps not. It needs to be calculated. Thecalculation will tell us. Nothing here can bedetermined beforehand.

Zhou Enlai turns to the question ofnaval-military shipments. Asks whetherthese need to be included in the plan or not.Roughly speaking these shipments need tobe delivered over the next six years. Will the

previous arrangement remain in force?Stalin. Everything which we have

agreed to - military and naval-military ship-ments - will remain in force. But this mustbe taken into account when determining thetotal number of shipments. We are notrepealing any loans nor rescinding any agree-ments. In general, we find it unconscionableto run from the responsibilities that one hastaken upon himself. Once an agreement hasbeen signed, it is imperative to abide by it,and we will abide by it.

Zhou Enlai says that comr. Mao Zedonghas entrusted him to present the generaloutline of the five year plan and to ascertainhow much will have to be ordered from theSoviet Union for the civilian and militaryindustries. They project 7,700 mln. rublesfor the civilian industry, and 4,500 mln.rubles for the military. Mao Zedong asked toascertain if this is a suitable ratio, if themilitary portion is not too great.

Stalin. This is a very unbalanced ratio.Even during wartime we didn’t have suchhigh military expenses.

Zhou Enlai says that the 4,500 mln.rubles earmarked for military orders arecomposed of the following: weapons for 60divisions - 985 mln. rbls., military-navalshipments - 2,126 mln. rbls., aviation - 1,200mln. rbls., and others.

Emphasizes that under normal condi-tions the ratio between the military and civil-ian sectors is not so unbalanced. The mili-tary portion is smaller.

Stalin. During wartime our military pro-duction constituted about 40-45%, but Chinadoesn’t have a real war on its hands. How-ever, shipments for the air and naval forcesare necessary. Perhaps Mao Zedong is rightabout the ratio of 7.7 bln. rbls. to 4.5 bln. rbls.

Zhou Enlai informs that in 1950 ex-penses for the military constituted 44% ofthe entire budget (4.2 bln. rbls.), in 1951 -52% (8 bln. rbls.), in 1952 - 27.9% (6.6 bln.rbls.). Says that, according to the five yearplan, investments in the military industry(munitions arsenals, aviation, tank produc-tion, military shipbuilding) constitute 12-13% of all industrial investments. If com-rade Stalin believes that such a ratio is ac-ceptable, then they will use that as the basiswhen drafting their general requisitions list.

Stalin. Good. It is acceptable.Zhou Enlai says that at first they pro-

jected constructing 151 industrial enterprises,but now they have dropped this number to


147, excluding military arsenals (aero-manu-facturing enterprises, tank enterprises, ship-building enterprises). Explains that these147 enterprises are not military, though theyserve military needs.

Stalin. We usually build few new en-terprises; we try to expand existing ones.It’s more economical. However, China willhave to build new ones, since there aren’tenough existing ones. During the war weconverted aero-maintenance shops into aero-manufacturing plants, and automobile fac-tories into tank factories. We frequentlyresorted to inter-enterprise cooperation, pro-ducing parts in various enterprises and thenassembling them. China ought to try thismethod. It is simpler than building specialfactories.

Zhou Enlai says that during the civilwar years they also made use of cooperationamong enterprises in the manufacture oflight weapons, but now they are embarkingupon the manufacture of heavy weapons,and that requires creating a base.

Shifts to the question of how to coverthe cost of the trade imbalance between theSoviet Union and China. Says that there are3 ways to cover this cost: 1) increase Chi-nese exports to the USSR; 2) receive pay-ments in foreign currency - dollars, poundsterling, Hong Kong dollars, Swiss francs;3) credit. Asks which of the three options ismost acceptable.

Stalin. Perhaps it will be necessary tomake use of all three.

Zhou Enlai says that they are planningto increase exports to the USSR to 13 bln.rubles. We can supply cattle, leather, fur,wool, silk, mineral resources, and food-stuffs: beans, fats, tea.

Notes that over five years they couldcollect up to 200 mln. American dollars, aswell as 1.6 bln. British pound sterling, HongKong dollars, and Swiss francs.

Stalin. American dollars are preferable.British pound sterling have limited circula-tion. As for Hong Kong dollars, you shouldconsult our Ministry of Finance.

The Soviet Union needs lead, wolfram[tungsten], tin, and antimony. We wouldlike you to increase the deliveries of these.

Notes that we would also accept lem-ons, oranges, and pineapples which the So-viet Union buys from other countries.

Zhou Enlai says that the loan of 4 bil-lion rubles that they would like to receivefrom the USSR consists of the following:

985 mln. rbls. - weapons shipments for 60divisions; 2,126 mln. rbls. - military-navalshipments; 100 mln. rbls. - caoutchouc; 800mln. rbls. - industrial equipment.

Stalin. We will have to give something,though the exact amount must be calculated.We cannot give four billion.

Zhou Enlai says that this amount doesnot include aviation. They intend to pay cashfor aviation.

Stalin. The question here is not in themonetary amount, but in whether we will beable to produce this much equipment. Allthat will have to be determined, which willtake some two months.

Zhou Enlai shifts to the question ofspecialists. Says that beginning with 1953,China will need new specialists in the fol-lowing fields: financial and economic mat-ters - 190 people, military - 417, medicalschool instructors and others - 140. In addi-tion, they will also need specialists for themilitary industry, though this matter is stillbeing studied.

Stalin. This will have to be examined:what specialists, in which fields and withwhat profiles. We will send some, thoughit’s difficult to say how many.

Have you found the Soviet specialistscurrently working in China useful?

Zhou Enlai responds that they are veryuseful.

Asks whether comrade Stalin has anyremarks to make on the recently submittedreport.

Stalin. The impression is a positive one.China is growing. China must become theflagship of Asia. It must in its turn supplyother countries with specialists.

Zhou Enlai notes that the report containsa footnote, specifying that in the event thewar ends, we would like to create an army of3,200 thousand people, with 102 divisions.

Stalin. That’s good. But that’s the mini-mum. China must be well armed, especiallywith air and naval forces.

Zhou Enlai. We project on having 150air regiments with 13,000 flight personnel.

Stalin. That’s too few. You’ll have toadd some. You should have 200 air regi-ments.

Zhou Enlai. Then we will have to in-crease the number of flight personnel.

Stalin. That’s right. You will probablyhave to shift to three-regiment divisions.That’s more economical - less division staff.

Zhou Enlai asks whether there needs to

be a certain ratio maintained between fighterjets and reciprocating engine planes.

Stalin says that reciprocating enginefighter-planes should be gradually retiredand replaced by jets. Fighter jets have aspeed of 800 kilometers. Pilots should betrained on reciprocating engine planes andthen transferred to jet planes. Reciprocatingengine planes should be completely retiredover the next two years. We will give younew fighters with speeds of 1000-1100 km/h. You must not fall behind in this matter.

Zhou Enlai raises the question of pro-viding China with technical documentationfor the manufacture of the following weap-ons: 122mm howitzers, 37mm guns and67.2mm field guns.

Stalin says that the blueprints can beprovided.

Zhou Enlai asks whether they shouldimmediately begin the construction of tankfactories or build automobile and tractorfactories first, and then convert them to tankproduction.

Stalin responds that some sort of a tankmanufacturing plant should be built. Such aplant could be gradually expanded. As forautomobile factories, you definitely needmore of them.

Zhou Enlai says that they will redrafttheir five year plan and will seek our advice;the redrafted materials will be submitted tocomrade Molotov.

Stalin advises to fix the overall growth[rate] at 15%, and at 20% for yearly plans.Notes that that would be a plan with a reservemargin. Points out the importance of givingthe workers a slogan for overfulfilling theplan. Such a plan can be overfulfilled. Saysthat this is exactly how we draft our plans,with a certain reserve margin, since there isa possibility of having unfavorable circum-stances. You can’t plan for everything.

Stalin expresses interest in the produc-tion of naval mines in the PRC.

Zhou Enlai responds that plans for anaval mine factory are being drafted.

Stalin points out the importance of de-fending Chinese sea ports.

Inquires about the situation in Macao.Zhou Enlai replies that Macao contin-

ues, as before, to be in Portugal’s hands.Stalin says that this scum that has situ-

ated itself on the very entrance to China mustbe driven out.

Zhou Enlai says that in their relationswith Southeast Asian countries they are


maintaining a strategy of exerting peacefulinfluence without sending armed forces. Heoffers the example of Burma, where PRChas been trying to influence its governmentthrough peaceful means. The same in Tibet.Asks whether this is a good strategy.

Stalin. Tibet is a part of China. Theremust be Chinese troops deployed in Tibet.As for Burma, you should proceed carefully.

Zhou Enlai says that the Burmese gov-ernment is concealing its true position withregard to China, but is actually maintainingan anti-China policy, orienting itself withAmerica and Britain.

Stalin. It would be good if there was apro-China government in Burma. There arequite a few scoundrels in the Burmese gov-ernment, who make themselves out to besome sort of statesmen.

Zhou Enlai explains that Chinese troopswere deployed in Tibet a year ago, and arenow at the Indian border. The question ofwhether there should be Chinese troops inTibet is moot.

Emphasizes that maintaining commu-nication with Tibet is difficult. In order tocommunicate with Lhasa one needs 4-motortransport planes, equipped with oxygen tanksand de-icing devices. Could not the SovietUnion provide such planes? 2-motor planescan go 3/5 of the way, but that’s as far asthey’ll go.

Stalin replies that Soviet Union canassist with this.

Zhou Enlai. In that case could Chinarequest 20 4-motor planes from the USSR?

Stalin replies that first we will provide10, and then another 10.

Points out the importance of building aroad to Tibet.

Zhou Enlai says that such a road is beingbuilt, but that its construction will take up allof next year and part of 1954.

Stalin notes that without a road it’sdifficult to maintain the necessary order inTibet. Tibetan Lamas are selling themselvesto anyone - America, Britain, India - anyonewho will pay the higher price.

Zhou Enlai says that, indeed, the Lamasare hostile. This year (February, March,April) they were planning a rebellion, butthe Chinese People’s Government was ableto suppress the rebels.

Notes that as a result of this, the DalaiLama’s brother fled abroad.

Stalin says that a road to Tibet must bebuilt, and that it is essential to maintain

Chinese troops there.

At the end of the discussion a meetingwas arranged for 4 September, at 9 o’clockin the evening.

Recorded by A. Vyshinskii[signature]

N. Fedorenko[signature]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 329, ll. 75-87; translation by Danny Rozas.]

* * * * *

V. Conversation between Stalin andZhou Enlai, 19 September 1952

[Classification level blacked-out:“NOT SECRET” stamped]

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONBETWEEN COMRADE STALIN

AND ZHOU ENLAI19 September 1952

Present: comrs. Molotov, Malenkov,Beria,

Mikoyan, Bulganin, Vyshinskii.

Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian,Su Yu, Shi Zhe

STALIN, opening the conversation withthe Mexican proposal concerning the ex-change of POWs, says that we agree withMao Zedong, that the Mexican proposal isnot acceptable, since it conforms withAmerica’s position at the negotiations inKorea. If Mexico comes forward with itsproposal at the UN, the USSR delegationwill reject this proposal as not conducive tothe cessation of the war in Korea and willstrive towards the following:

“1. Immediate cessation of military ac-tivities of the involved parties on land, seaand air.

2. Return of all POWs to their nativeland in accordance with international stan-dards.

3. Withdrawal of foreign armies, in-cluding the Chinese volunteer units, fromKorea in the course of 2-3 months; a peace-ful settlement of the Korean issue in thespirit of Korean unification, conducted byKoreans themselves under the observation

of a committee with participation of theimmediately concerned parties and othercountries, including those which did nottake part in the Korean war.”

He adds that the question of which andhow many countries should take part in thiscommittee can be further discussed and de-cided.

Regarding the proposal of temporarywithholding of 20% of POWs from eachside, and the return of the remaining POWs,the Soviet delegation will not involve itselfwith this proposal, which will be left in MaoZedong’s hands.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, what is your opin-ion concerning the possibility of the Chinesegovernment entering into a non-aggressionpact with India and Burma [?] Mao Zedongthinks such a pact would be expedient.

STALIN answers that we support com-rade Mao Zedong’s opinion. Of course,there are and there will not be any obstacleshere.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, is it possible todelay the introduction of the second posi-tion, to wait 2-3 weeks[?]

STALIN answers that this is MaoZedong’s business. If Mao Zedong wants,we can introduce in the Assembly the dis-cussion of the second position concerningthe percentage of withheld POWs.

ZHOU ENLAI introduces a questionabout the third position - the possibility oftransferring POWs to neutral countries sothat their subsequent fate can be decidedseparately. He says that this is talked aboutin the international community, and askswhether comrade Stalin considers it pos-sible to support this position.

STALIN answers, that we want the re-turn of all POWs. This also concurs with theChinese position. If an agreement cannot bereached on this basis, we cannot deliver thePOWs to the UN [because the UN is amilitary participant in the war; he asks, inChina’s opinion, which country will the cap-tives be sent to[?]

ZHOU ENLAI answers: Mao Zedongentrusted me to say, that we had in mindIndia.

STALIN asks who will be responsible,in this case, for the expense of maintainingPOWs. It seems, every involved party?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that if the POWsare transferred to India, then after some timethey will be transferred from India to China,and then the Chinese and Korean parties will


pay for the maintenance of Chinese andKorean POWs.

STALIN says that this proposal can beacceptable, but we must keep in mind thatthe Americans will not want to deliver allthe POWs, that they will keep some cap-tives, with the intention to recruit them.This was the case with our POWs. Now weare capturing several of our POWs a day,who are being sent over by America. Theyare withholding POWs not because, as theysay, the POWs don’t want to return - Americaoften refers to this - but so that they coulduse them for spying.

ZHOU ENLAI concedes that this isprecisely so.

He introduces the following scenario:to cease fire and resolve the issue of POWslater. He reminds that comrade Stalin agreedwith this, if no agreement is reached regard-ing the percentage [of POWs] withheld.

STALIN acknowledges that this can beconsidered as one of possible scenarios, butAmerica is not likely to agree to it.

ZHOU ENLAI says that perhapsAmerica will suggest this in the Assembly.

STALIN. This would be good.ZHOU ENLAI says that in the last

discussion comrade Stalin suggested thatChina take initiative in creating a continen-tal or regional UN. He asks whether therewould be any other instructions regardingthis matter.

STALIN answers that he continues tohold his previous point of view. In additionhe says that, besides the current UN, it isnecessary to create separate organizationsfor Asia, Europe, etc., not in lieu of the UN,but parallel to the UN. Let America createan American organization, Europe - a Euro-pean one, Asia - an Asian one, but parallel tothe UN, not contrary to the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI says that China has nointerest in the UN and obviously it is neces-sary to take initiative in creating a continen-tal organization.

STALIN emphasizes that UN is anAmerican organization and we should de-stroy it, while keeping up the appearancethat we are not against the UN; we shouldconduct this with an appearance of respectto the UN, without saying that it should bedestroyed, weakened, but in reality weakenit.

He reminds, that during the warChurchill suggested to create a continentalUN, but America opposed this. We quietly

observed the debate, but then Britain re-jected its position and we supported the pro-posal regarding the creation of the UN.

ZHOU ENLAI asks whether there willbe letters concerning this matter from com-rade Stalin to Mao Zedong.

STALIN explains that it will be betterwithout a letter. He sees that Zhou Enlai istaking notes and he fully trusts him.

ZHOU ENLAI mentioned the PeaceCongress in Peking, scheduled in the end ofSeptember, saying that now it will be neces-sary to move the Congress to the beginningof October. He adds that China is striving forthe participation of Japan and India in thisCongress.

STALIN asks if Pakistan will partici-pate.

ZHOU ENLAI agrees that Pakistanshould participate as well and that Pakistanrepresentatives are invited, but the Pakistangovernment is not issuing them passports.As for India, a part of the Indian delegationhas already arrived, and the Japanese delega-tion will arrive via Hong-Kong.

STALIN says further that we shouldaim for China to have the principal role [inthe Congress], because:

1/ the initiative in assembling the Con-gress belongs to China;

2/ it will be better this way, because theUSSR is only partly located in Asia, andChina is entirely in Asia, therefore it shouldhave the principal role.

ZHOU ENLAI asks what specific ac-tions will be taken by our delegation.

STALIN answers: peace.ZHOU ENLAI talks about Nehru’s pro-

posal concerning the conference of five coun-tries - the Soviet Union, China, England,France and USA.

MOLOTOV explains that this was aproposal of the Committee of the NationalCongress Party.

STALIN says, that this proposal shouldbe supported.

ZHOU ENLAI emphasizes that at sucha conference India, it goes without saying,will speak [in agreement] with England, but,it would seem, that it would be advisable toutilize this proposal.

STALIN agrees with this.ZHOU ENLAI says, that in connection

with the publication of the note about PortArthur, the position which the PRC shouldtake with regard to Japan is completely clear.The PRC should indicate that Japan does not

wish the conclusion of a peace agreementwith China and the Soviet Union.

STALIN adds—and is preparing foraggression. He underscores that our posi-tion was not directed against the Japanesepeople.

ZHOU ENLAI raises the question ofFormosa. He says that since the Japanesegovernment has concluded an agreementwith Jiang Jieshi, it thus has confirmed thatit is ignoring the interests of the Chinesepeople. This excludes the possibility ofconcluding a peace agreement. So long as apeace agreement exists with Formosa, a peaceagreement between the PRC and Japan is notpossible.

STALIN emphasizes that the note onPort Arthur was directed against Americaand not against the Japanese people. Americamaintains a [naval] fleet around Taiwan andexploits Taiwan. He affirms the correctnessof Zhou Enlai’s point of view on the impos-sibility of a peace agreement with JiangJieshi, and indicates that the fact of thesigning of an agreement by Japan with JiangJieshi only worsens its [Japan’s] position.

ZHOU ENLAI asks, what will be thefurther development of events with regard toGermany [?]

STALIN says that it is difficult to fore-cast. It seems, America will not supportGerman unification. They plundered Ger-many; if the West Germany and East Ger-many unite, then it will not be possible toplunder Germany any longer. That is whyAmerica does not want German unification.

ZHOU ENLAI says: in his opinion,even though America is rebuilding the mili-tary forces of West Germany and Japan,hoping to use them, this weapon can turnagainst them.

STALIN says that it is quite possible,even though the German government will becontrolled by nationalists, Hitler’s follow-ers.

ZHOU ENLAI shifts to the situation inXinjiang. He says that the work in Xinjiangis generally going well and that agriculturalreforms are being instituted there. But, thereare also some leftist excesses, which mani-fest themselves in unlawful confiscation ofdomestic animals, in the domain of religion,and the reduction of interest rates and landlease. To eliminate these excesses the CCPlenum was assembled, which released [PLAcommander] Wang Zhen from the office ofSecretary of Xinjiang CC CPC sub-bureau,


and a group of CC members was directed totake care of the excesses. In general discon-tent was eliminated, and cases of defection,including those to USSR territory, have beenhalted.

STALIN says, that the excesses resultedfrom the desire to obtain land and domesticanimals faster, confiscating both from therich.

ZHOU ENLAI notes that as soon as therumors about reforms had spread, the hostileelements began to slaughter domestic ani-mals.

STALIN notes that similar incidentstook place at a certain time in our experienceas well. It is necessary to hurry up with thereform. If the agricultural reform is notinstituted, such looting will continue to oc-cur.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that the agri-cultural reform is being instituted in cropfarming regions, and redistribution and ex-cesses connected with it [are occurring] inthe animal farming regions. Since animalherders participated in the redistribution, theChinese government has decided to improvetheir condition, which should improve thegeneral condition as well.

STALIN says: of course, it is up to you.ZHOU ENLAI says that according to

the Liu Shaoqi report, two representativesfrom the Indonesian communist party shouldarrive at the XIX [Party] Congress, and heasks whether it would be timely to discussparty issues in Moscow with them.

STALIN says that it is difficult to tellyet. It depends on whether they will addressthe CC. He points out, that when the repre-sentatives from the Indian communist partyarrived, they asked us to help in determiningthe party policy, and we had to do it, eventhough we were busy.

ZHOU ENLAI reports that the Japa-nese comrades should arrive as well, and it islikely they will also want to discuss partyissues.

STALIN answers that older brotherscannot refuse their younger brothers in sucha matter. He says that this should be dis-cussed with Liu Shaoqi, who has substantialexperience, and clarified how the Chinesecomrades perceive it.

ZHOU ENLAI points out that LiuShaoqi intends to bring with him appropriatematerial, in order to discuss a number ofquestions.

STALIN notes that if the Chinese com-

rades want to discuss these issues, then ofcourse we will have no contradictions, but ifthey do not want it, then we will not have todiscuss anything.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that the Chi-nese comrades will definitely want to talk.

STALIN answers that, in this case, weshall find the time.

ZHOU ENLAI says that it is possiblethat the comrades from Vietnam will alsoarrive.

STALIN notes that the Vietnamese com-rades are our friends and will be our wel-come guests.

ZHOU ENLAI, ending the conversion,says they would like to receive instructionsconcerning all these issues.

STALIN asks - instructions or sugges-tions?

ZHOU ENLAI answers that from com-rade Stalin’s perspective perhaps this wouldbe advice, but in their perception these wouldbe instructions.

STALIN notes that we give only ad-vice, convey our opinion, and the Chinesecomrades may accept it or not; instructions,on the other hand, are mandatory.

ZHOU ENLAI repeats that from theChinese perspective these are instructions,most valuable instructions. He notes thatthey do not accept these instructions blindly,but consider it necessary to understand andaccept them deliberately.

STALIN emphasizes that we knowChina too little, and that is why we arecautious in giving instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that comrade Stalincertainly is well familiar with the particularissues they are addressing, and asks againwhether there will be any instructions.

Comrade STALIN answers that ouradvice is this: we should remember, thatEngland and America will try to place theirpeople into the apparatus of the Chinesegovernment. It does not matter if they areAmerican or French. They will work toundermine, try to cause decay from within,could even commit such crimes as poison-ings. That is why we must be alert. He sayswe should keep this in mind. Here - these areall the instructions.

ZHOU ENLAI says that these are veryvaluable instructions. He agrees that notonly Americans, English and French cancommit such treacheries, but they also pushthe Chinese into it.

STALIN adds - their agents from the

[Chinese] national bourgeoisie.MOLOTOV, returning to the question

of military credit, the payment for weaponsfor 60 Chinese divisions, asks whether heunderstood Zhou Enlai correctly the lasttime, that the cost of deliveries for 60 divi-sions is not related to the military credit,granted by the Soviet government to Chinafrom 1 February 1951, according to theagreement. The deliveries of weaponry for60 Chinese infantry divisions will be paid infull amount according to the credit, grantedin a special agreement between China andthe Soviet Union.

ZHOU ENLAI answers that comradeMolotov understood him absolutely cor-rectly, and again asserts, that the weaponsupplies for 60 Chinese divisions have to bepaid in full, according to the rates estab-lished for countries other than China, andnot in half.

STALIN says that in this case we shouldsign a special agreement.

He mentions the gifts presented to So-viet representatives by the Chinese govern-ment, and notes that there have been verymany gifts.

ZHOU ENLAI explains that they couldnot present gifts to comrade Stalin for the70th anniversary [of Stalin’s birth]. Theyattended the museum of gifts, saw the giftssent by other countries, and they feel theymust make up for what they were not able todo before.

STALIN says that we also would like topresent the Chinese delegation automobilesmade in USSR. He says that we have auto-mobiles “ZIS”, smaller than “ZIM”, butvery beautiful, and we would like to presentyou with these “ZIMs.”

Then he mentions the question concern-ing Song Qingling [also Soong Chingling;widow of Chinese nationalist Sun Yat-senand then Vice Chairperson of the CentralPeople’s Government of the PRC].

ZHOU ENLAI says that he is workingon getting her closer to him, that she isgradually shifting from bourgeoisie ideol-ogy to our side, that she comes out with goodarticles based on our ideology. She says thatSong Qingling is very proud of being thewinner of the International Stalin PeaceAward.

The conversation started at 10:30, endedat 12:30.


Recorded by: [signature] /A. Vyshinskii/ [signature] /N. Fedorenko/

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 343, ll. 97-103; translated by Danny Rozas withKathryn Weathersby.]

* * * * *

COMMENTARIES

Comparing Russianand Chinese Sources:

A New Point of Departure forCold War History

By Chen Jian

These documents from the RussianPresidential Archives provide significantnew insights into the making and develop-ment of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1949-1950. They usefully complement the ac-count contained in the memoirs of Shi Zhe,Mao Zedong’s Russian language interpreter,who has been one of the main sources of ourknowledge about the relationship betweenBeijing and Moscow during the early ColdWar period. (See Shi Zhe, Zai lishi jurenshenbian: Shi Zhe huiyilu [Together withHistorical Giants: Shi Zhe’s Memoirs](Beijing: The Central Press of HistoricalDocuments, 1992).) As the translator of ShiZhe’s memoirs, I am deeply impressed bythe richness of the information in thesedocuments. I am also surprised, in spite ofsome discrepancies, by the extent to whichRussian and Chinese materials (includingShi Zhe’s memoirs and other sources) are inaccord. I will therefore focus my commentson comparing Chinese and Russian sourceson the same events as reflected in thesedocuments.

Let me start with the meeting betweenMao and Stalin on 16 December 1949. TheRussian minutes of the meeting are highlycompatible with, but more detailed than,Mao Zedong’s own summary of the meet-ing in his telegram to Liu Shaoqi on 18December. Mao’s telegram reads as fol-lows:

(1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the16th, and met with Stalin for two hoursat 10 p.m. (Beijing time). His attitudewas really sincere. The questions in-volved include the prospect of peace,

the treaty, loans, Taiwan, and the publi-cation of my selected works.

(2) Stalin said that the Americansare afraid of war. The Americans askother countries to fight the war [for them],but other countries are also afraid offighting a war. According to him, it isunlikely that a war will break out, and weagree with his opinions.

(3) With regard to the question ofthe treaty, Stalin said that because of theYalta agreement, it is improper for us tooverturn the legitimacy of the old Chi-nese-Soviet treaty. If we are to abolishthe old treaty and to sign a new treaty, thestatus of the Kurile Islands will bechanged, and the United States will havean excuse to take away the Kurile Is-lands. Therefore, on the question of theSoviet Union’s thirty-year lease ofLushun [Port Arthur], we should notchange it in format; however, in reality,the Soviet Union will withdraw its troopsfrom Lushun and will let Chinese troopsoccupy it. I expressed [the view] that tooearly a withdrawal [of the Soviet troopsfrom Lushun] will create unfavorableconditions for us. He replied that theSoviet withdrawal of troops [fromLushun] does not mean that the SovietUnion will stand by with folded arms [ina crisis]; rather, it is possible to find waysthrough which China will not becomethe first to bear the brunt. His opinion isthat we may sign a statement, which willsolve the Lushun problem in accordancewith the above-mentioned ideas, and thatby doing so, China will also gain politi-cal capital [zhengzhi ziben]. I said that itis necessary for us to maintain the legiti-macy of the Yalta agreement. However,the public opinion in China believes thatas the old treaty was signed by theGuomindang, it has lost its standing withthe Guomindang’s downfall. He repliedthat the old treaty needs to be revised,and that the revision is necessarily sub-stantial, but it will not come until twoyears from now.

(4) Stalin said that it is unnecessaryfor the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai] tofly here just for signing a statement. Itold him that I will consider it. I hope thatthe commercial, loan and aviation agree-ments will be signed at the same time,and Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come.It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss

how to solve the treaty problem andoffer its opinions.

(See Pei Jianzhang et al., Zhonghua renmingongheguo waijiaoshi [A Diplomatic His-tory of the People’s Republic of China](Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1994), pp.17-18.)

As far as the meeting between MaoZedong and Stalin on 22 January 1950 isconcerned, the Russian minutes are alsocompatible with the information providedby Shi Zhe’s memoirs. Shi Zhe relates thatMao Zedong and Stalin discussed the prin-ciples underlying the new Chinese-Soviettreaty at this meeting. Mao emphasized thatthe treaty should serve to increase the politi-cal, military, economic, cultural, and diplo-matic cooperation between China and theSoviet Union, while at the same time payingspecial attention to the prevention of a re-emergence of Japanese militarism. On theChina Eastern Railway issue, Shi Zhe re-calls that Mao agreed not to change its jointadministration structure, but proposed thatits administrative head be Chinese and thatChina’s investment in it should be increasedfrom parity to fifty-one percent. However,the Soviets desired to retain a 50:50 ratiobetween Chinese and Soviet investments.On the issue of Port Arthur (Luda), Mao andStalin agreed to establish a deadline for thewithdrawal of Soviet troops to begin afterthe signing of a peace treaty with Japan. Onthe issue of Dairen (Dalian), Stalin claimedthat the Soviets had no intention to retainrights there and that the Chinese should feelfree to manage the city. Shi Zhe also men-tioned that Mao and Stalin discussed issuesconcerning Sinkiang (Xinjiang) and Man-churia, but some “unpleasant feelings”emerged on the Chinese side because theChinese leaders believed that these issueswere their internal affairs. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishijuren shenbian, pp. 445-446.) One finds asimilar record of the discussion of theseissues in the Russian minutes.

Shi Zhe also covers in his memoirsZhou Enlai’s visit to the Soviet Union inAugust and September 1952, describing indetail Zhou’s meetings with Stalin on 20August and 3 September. Shi Zhe recallsthat at the first meeting Zhou Enlai ex-plained to Stalin the Chinese leadership’sassessment of the international situation ingeneral and the Korean War situation in


particular. The two leaders also discussedthe agenda of Zhou’s visit, which includedthe issues of Luda, Soviet support of China’sfirst Five-year Plan, Soviet technologicalsupport to China in establishing rubber treeplantations in southern China, and the con-struction of a railway from Ji’nin, a city onthe Sino-Mongolian border, to Ulan-Bator.The two leaders then had a long discussionon the Korean armistice issue. Zhou Enlaitold Stalin that China would be willing toend the war on acceptable conditions butwould not yield to unreasonable Americanterms. In Mao’s view, Zhou informed Stalin,if the Communists could demonstrate a moreenduring patience than the Americans, theenemy would sooner or later make addi-tional concessions. Zhou particularly em-phasized that it was Mao’s belief that a firmCommunist stand in the armistice negotia-tions might prolong the war in Korea butwould not trigger a third world war. Rather,in Mao’s opinion, the conflict in Korea hadexposed the weakness of the United States,and delayed the coming of a new world war.Zhou also mentioned that the Chinese didhave difficulties in continuing war opera-tions under the current conditions, espe-cially as the Americans held a 9 to 1 superi-ority in artillery pieces over the Communistforces. Stalin expressed his full agreementwith Mao Zedong’s assessment of the situa-tion, offering to increase Soviet militaryequipment delivery to China so that theChinese troops would hold a 20 to 9 superi-ority in artillery fire power against the Ameri-cans. Stalin also advised that the Chinese-North Korean side should take three steps indealing with the Americans on the prisonerissue. First, if the enemy insisted on holdingthirty percent of Chinese-North Korean pris-oners, Beijing and Pyongyang could suggestholding a comparable proportion of theenemy’s prisoners in exchange. The pur-pose of this suggestion was to force theAmericans to change their position. Second,if the first design failed to work, the Chinese-North Korean side could propose a ceasefireto be followed by an exchange of prisoners.Third, if the second proposal was unaccept-able to the Americans, the Chinese-NorthKorean side could make the following pro-posal: if some prisoners did not want to bereturned, they might be temporarily main-tained by a neutral third country, and then,after their intentions were ascertained, theywould either be released or returned. In

order to strengthen the Chinese-North Ko-rean position at the negotiating table, Stalinagreed to send five Soviet anti-aircraft artil-lery regiments to Korea. However, he warnedthe Chinese not to send their air force acrossthe 38th parallel. He believed that the Ameri-cans were not in a position to continue aprolonged war in Korea. If the Chinese-North Korean side remained patient in nego-tiations while at the same time maintaininga powerful position on the battlefield, theAmericans would sooner or later yield toone of the aforementioned three Communistdesigns. (Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian,pp. 510-511, 520-522.)

Again, if one compares Shi Zhe’s de-scription of the meeting with the Russianminutes, they are compatible even in somesmall details. For example, in both records,Stalin said that the Soviets would assist theChinese in establishing a 20 to 9 superiorityin artillery pieces on the Korean battlefield.

Yet these Russian documents do raisequestions about existing Chinese sources inseveral aspects. While these Russian docu-ments are declassified by the PresidentialArchives in their original format, existingChinese sources are usually released on aselective basis, and published in compila-tions rather than made available in theiroriginal form to scholars working in ar-chives. As a result, serious omissions existin the Chinese sources. In the Russian min-utes on the meeting between Zhou Enlai andStalin on 20 August 1952, for example, thetwo leaders discussed the differences be-tween Chinese and North Korean leadersover the Korean armistice issue. In ShiZhe’s memoirs, although he implied thatproblems existed between Beijing andPyongyang, he does not explain what theproblems were and why and how theyemerged. Further, the accuracy of the infor-mation provided by memoirs is subject tothe limits of human memory. In the case ofShi Zhe’s memoirs, even with his marvelousmemory of historical events (enhanced byhis experience of writing “confessions” sev-eral hundred times during the Cultural Revo-lution and assisted by his privileged accessto archival sources), ambiguities exist andmistakes occur. For example, comparingShi Zhe’s account of Mao Zedong’s meetingwith Stalin on 16 December 1949 with boththe Russian records and Mao’s own tele-gram summarizing the meeting, one finds ittoo general and ambiguous in some places.

Shi Zhe also confuses some important datesin his memoirs. For example, Liu Shaoqi,the Chinese Communist Party’s second mostimportant person, visited the Soviet Unionfrom 28 June to 14 August 1949, but Shi Zhemistakenly states in his memoirs that Liu’svisit started on 8 July 1949. Access tooriginal Russian documents will certainlyhelp scholars to establish a more compre-hensive and accurate understanding of thehistorical past.

But even the original Russian docu-ments could also contain important omis-sions. In describing Mao Zedong’s firstmeeting with Stalin on 16 December 1949,for example, Shi Zhe consistently recallsthat when Stalin asked Mao about the goalshe hoped to achieve through the visit, Maoreplied, according to Shi Zhe, that “For thistrip we hope to bring about something thatnot only looks nice but also tastes delicious.”(Shi Zhe, Zai lishi juren shenbian, p.436.)Indeed, this was the single most importantmessage Mao tried to deliver to Stalin attheir first meeting. The Russian minutes,however, do not include this statement. Whynot? A possible answer could lie in thecultural differences between Chinese andRussian interpreters. In Shi Zhe’s memoirs,he mentioned that Mao made the statementat the beginning of the meeting, and that theSoviets did not quite understand Mao’s mean-ing. Shi Zhe recalled that Lavrenti Beria, aSoviet Politburo member, even laughed atMao’s expression. Is it possible that N.T.Fedorenko, who took the Russian minutes,missed the importance Mao attached to thisstatement and treated it only as a part of“greetings” or an insignificant “discussionof general topics”? (See the first paragraphof the Russian minutes.)

This discrepancy or omission remindsscholars that the post-Cold War access topreviously unavailable Communist docu-mentary sources do not offer automatic an-swers to all remaining scholarly questions.They provide us with new research opportu-nities, but they also require us to be morecareful in treating our sources and morecreative in establishing our perspectives. Inthis sense, this is a new point of departure inthe study of the Cold War history.

* * * * *

From Consensus to Strainsin the Sino-Soviet Alliance—


A Palpable Deterioration

by Vojtech Mastny

The two sets of documents about high-level Sino-Soviet conversations, separatedin time by less than three years, illustrate thepalpable deterioration of relations betweenthe two communist powers under the strainof the Korean war. Yet the nature of thedeterioration, as well as its extent—not tomention the personalities of the principles—appear quite different from these contempo-rary Russian records than they do from theretrospective Chinese accounts which haveso far been the main source of informationon the subject and which project the laterSino-Soviet rift into a period when a funda-mental conflict of interest was neither presentnor anticipated.

Even with the allowance made for atendency of the Russian note taker to embel-lish the atmosphere prevailing at the meet-ings, there cannot be a doubt that MaoZedong on his first visit to Moscow treatedStalin as the supreme authority of worldcommunism, with a reverence that was notmerely pretended but rooted in a perceptionof common interests, to which the Chineseleader repeatedly and cogently alluded. Thesame perception determined Stalin’s un-characteristically considerate, even gener-ous, attitude toward his junior partner, somuch in contrast with the condescension heusually displayed in dealing with his easternEuropean lieutenants. The Russian docu-ments hardly bear out the self-serving Chi-nese descriptions of his stinginess and boor-ishness, an image that Mao himself—nodoubt retrospectively embarrassed by theextent of subordination he had once beenwilling to accept in regard to Moscow—later tried to disseminate.

Of course not everything was sweetand smooth between the two ruthless anddevious dictators; still, their ability to dis-pose of potentially contentious issues wasremarkable. Of these, none was more im-portant than the question of whether thetreaty Moscow had concluded with China’sprevious government should remain in ef-fect or be replaced by a new one. During themonth that elapsed between his two meet-ings with Mao, Stalin reversed himself, andon both occasions Mao readily followedsuit. Whereas in mid-December Stalin con-sidered the treaty an outgrowth of the Yalta

agreement indispensable to safeguard Sovietterritorial acquisitions in the Far East, byJanuary 22 he was ready to send Yalta “tohell” and dispense with the treaty on theostensible grounds that it had merely been atemporary expedient required by the waragainst Japan. He proved amenable to Mao’sinsistence that the new pact must be stronger,including the obligation for the two signato-ries to consult with each other on all impor-tant international matters.

This proposed provision is one of thefew possible hints in the record at the im-pending communist aggression in Korea,whose preparation also provides the mostcompelling reason for Stalin’s reversal onthe Sino-Soviet treaty. During their Decem-ber meeting, the two chieftains still gave noinkling of plotting the Korean adventure,despite North Korea’s Kim Il Sung’s persis-tent entreaties to obtain Moscow’s supportfor his plan for a forcible reunification of thecountry. If in December they knew of theplan but did not yet consider it topical, thethrust of their January conversation suggeststhat by then they had begun changing theirminds. Their assessment, in view of recentU.S. public statements and behavior imply-ing a diminished likelihood of effectiveAmerican opposition, offers the most plau-sible explanation of the change.

Besides the decision to proceed towarda tighter Sino-Soviet alliance, the subject ofthe January conversation most relevant to theprospective North Korean action was thepresence of Soviet forces at the naval base ofPort Arthur on the Chinese mainland. Unani-mous in their view that the forces shouldremain there as a deterrent to any possibleAmerican military move against China, Stalinand Mao anticipate keeping the place underSoviet control until the conclusion of whatthey look forward to as a satisfactory peacesettlement with Japan; in the final agreementsigned three weeks later, the transfer to Chi-nese sovereignty was to be fixed to take placein two years’ time. It is difficult to avoid theconclusion that the only reason why theycould possibly expect to achieve a Japanesepeace treaty to their liking was the crushingeffect that a successful unification of Koreaby the communists, presumably within thatparticular time span, would have on the UnitedStates.

* * * * *By the time Zhou Enlai came to Mos-

cow in August 1952, the Korean gamble had

failed, Mao had learned the bitter lesson ofStalin’s reneging on his promise to provideSoviet air cover for the Chinese interventionforce, and the botched war had reached astalemate. Its burden was weighing evermore heavily on the Chinese and NorthKoreans, though not on Stalin, who couldrelish the sight of the United States beingpinned down on the Far Eastern battlefield—unless, to be sure, Washington would decideto expand hostilities in trying to force adecision.

The kind of underlying consensus per-meating Stalin’s conversations with Mao isno longer evident in the record of his talkswith Zhou. These are businesslike talks,where bargaining takes place, though withinthe limits of propriety, and conflict of inter-est matters, even if it is not allowed to comeinto the open. Considering Stalin’s rapidlydeteriorating physical and mental condition,he still shows an impressive command ofeconomic and military facts; only in the latersessions does his reasoning get muddledwhen he tackles the larger questions of di-plomacy and war. For his part, Zhou lives upto his reputation of a cool and deft negotia-tor, never losing sight of what he wants toaccomplish, his deliberate obfuscations not-withstanding.

Zhou’s dual aim was the achievementof an armistice in Korea as quickly as pos-sible while maximizing Soviet economicand military assistance to his ravaged coun-try. Yet he never states these goals so clearlyand sometimes even seems to be contradict-ing them. He affirms China’s refusal toentertain any concessions to the Americans.Indeed, the two conversation partners outdoeach other in their professions of intransi-gence toward the “imperialists” althoughnot all that they say is to be taken at facevalue.

Stalin lectures the Chinese visitor—asif both did not know better—about the sup-posed military flabbiness of the Americansand their inability to subdue even little Ko-rea. He expresses his expectation that even-tually the United States would be compelledto end the war on terms agreeable to thecommunists; accordingly, as a deterrent toany American attempt to expand the war, hecomplies with the Chinese request to keepSoviet forces in Port Arthur beyond thepreviously agreed time limit. It is difficult totell whether Stalin’s expectation was an-other example of his frequent wishful think-


ing, rooted in the ideologically motivatedbelief that sooner or later “objective” forceswould compel the capitalist enemies to be-have that way he wanted them to behave. Itis also possible, and not mutually exclusive,that he was making a disingenuous argu-ment to persuade the Chinese to go on fight-ing, thus perpetuating their dependence onhim while keeping the United States en-gaged. He is certainly not helpful in advanc-ing any practical proposals to induce anarmistice, insisting instead on demands thathe knew were unacceptable to the U.S. side.

Playing a weak hand as a demandeur,Zhou has the difficult task of convincing theSoviet ruler to provide enough material as-sistance for both the prosecution of the warand China’s economic development whiledissuading him from blocking a compro-mise that alone could lead to the terminationof hostilities. By dwelling on China’s deter-mination to fight on for several more years,if necessary, rather than to make any conces-sions, Zhou secures Stalin’s promises ofhuge military and economic assistance. Hemakes good use of the Soviet leader’s fasci-nation with turning China into the “arsenalof Asia” and his support for the Chineseconquest of Tibet, though he sidetracksStalin’s unsolicited advice to expel the Por-tuguese “scum” from the enclave of Macau.At the same time, they both agree not toprovoke the Americans by acceding to theNorth Korean request for the bombing ofSouth Korea—an escalation Stalin refusesto authorize with the priceless explanationthat the air force belongs to the state andcould therefore not be used by the Chinese“volunteers.”

Zhou Enlai fares less well in trying tobreak the deadlock in the armistice negotia-tions caused by the disputes about the dispo-sition of the Chinese and North Koreanprisoners of war unwilling to be repatriated.While professing China’s insistence on thecomplete repatriation of all prisoners, henevertheless outlines to Stalin his plan forthe transfer of the unwilling ones to a neutralcountry, such as India; noting the inconsis-tency, Stalin demurs. Nor does Zhou suc-ceed any better with his alternative proposalthat the armistice be concluded first and thequestion of the captives be settled later. Theinconclusive outcome of the discussion aboutthis key issue was a victory for Stalin, whichZhou papers over by gratefully accepting his“instructions,” which the Soviet leader pre-

tends are merely “suggestions.”Not even Zhou’s diplomatic skills suf-

ficed to overcome the disparity of powerbetween China and its Soviet protector.When later in 1952 he publicly signaledChinese interest in the option of transferringthe prisoners to India, the Soviet delegationat the United Nations preventively torpe-doed the idea. The Korean War was eventu-ally ended in July 1953 by applying ZhouEnlai’s other formula—but only after Stalin’sdeath in March removed the major obstacleon the road to an armistice.

* * * * *

Unwrapping the Stalin-Mao Talks:Setting the Record Straight

by Odd Arne Westad

The records of the 1949/50 Stalin-Maoconversations—the only face-to-face meet-ing between the two dictators—have toppedthe secret documents wish-list of many aCold War historian. As often happens insuch cases, when the parcel is finally un-wrapped the contents prove to be somewhatdisappointing. Gone is the high drama ofvarious memoirs, according to which themonologues of the two giants circled eachother but never touched, each too preoccu-pied with his own agenda to address theconcerns of the other. On the contrary, theseconversations are rather businesslike, notunlike discussions recorded when the headof the new subsidiary is visiting the com-pany president.

But the transcripts help us to set therecord straight. They show the Soviet leaderin the role of the cautious statesman, whoseexperience in international relations and thebuilding of socialism enabled him to dis-pense “advice” to his Chinese friends. Onforeign affairs, Stalin told the Chinese not toengage the United States or other imperial-ists in armed conflict, not on Taiwan noranywhere else. The reference here goesback to Stalin’s unfortunate remarks to Chi-nese communist emissary Liu Shaoqi theprevious summer on the Chinese taking up“the leading position” in making revolutionin the East. When Mao took Stalin on hisword, and in October-November 1949 hadpresented plans for a Chinese intervention inIndochina, he had had his fingers slapped bythe vozhd (supreme leader). While in Mos-

cow, Mao and Zhou Enlai guarded them-selves well against bringing up regional prob-lems unless invited to do so by their hosts.

The most interesting part of the conver-sations concerns Sino-Soviet relations. Stalininitially turned down Mao’s wish for a newtreaty between the two countries, and in-stead proposed limited changes to the 1945treaty, using U.S. and British complicity atYalta in wrestling Soviet concessions fromJiang Jieshi’s [Chiang Kai-shek’s] regimeas his main reason to leave the main part ofthat treaty intact. Only after Mao’s long andidle wait in Moscow over the New Yearholidays and the Chairman’s increasinglydesperate conversations thereafter with vari-ous Soviet officials—Molotov, Vyshinski,Mikoyan, and ambassador Roshchin—didStalin relent.

The January 22 conversation, held justafter Zhou Enlai had arrived in Moscow andtalks on a new treaty had started, showedStalin at his magnanimous best. “To hellwith” the Yalta treaty, Stalin said. He waswilling to restore to China some of the con-cessions Chiang had given him five yearsearlier, even if the imperialists undoubtedlywould protest such an altruistic act on Stalin’sbehalf. (It would have been interesting toknow how this absurd line of argument struckthe Chinese on that winter’s night 45 yearsago.) We can still only guess about Stalin’sreal motives. A wish to keep the advanta-geous provisions of the 1945 treaty? Verylikely. An unwillingness to proclaim theSino-Soviet alliance to the world (and espe-cially to the United States)? Quite possibly,although Stalin’s fears of a confrontationwith the Americans seem to have been at anebb that winter.

The rest of the conversation reallyformed the start of the detailed negotiationsof a new treaty which Zhou Enlai and AndreiVyshinski continued and which ended in theTreaty of Friendship, Alliance, and MutualAssistance and other agreements signed onFebruary 14. Throughout these negotiationsthe Soviets held to a hard bargain, insistingon getting new advantages in return for theireconomic and military assistance and theirrelinquishing of old prerogatives. The So-viet negotiating strategy both offended andpuzzled the Chinese—on the one hand theywere treated like “a vassal, not an ally,” onthe other hand they just could not makeeconomic sense of many of the Soviet de-mands. What really hurt Mao and his col-


leagues were Soviet references to Xinjiang,Mongolia, and (to a lesser extent) Manchu-ria: in Mao’s image six years later theseareas were “turned into spheres of influenceof the USSR.” (See Mao’s conversationwith Yudin, 31 March 1956, reprinted else-where in this issue of the Bulletin.)

The centerpiece of Stalin’s conversa-tions with Zhou Enlai in Moscow in thesummer of 1952 is the search for an armi-stice in Korea, a solution which at this stageboth allies wanted, but which was held up byStalin’s ceaseless maneuvering on the is-sue. The Soviet leader most likely wantedthe Chinese to go firmly on record in re-questing a ceasefire (possibly to be arrangedby Moscow) and to back away from theirposition from the previous summer, whenStalin had wanted an end to the war and Maohad turned him down. In his conversationswith Zhou, Stalin paid lip-service to Mao’sprevious position, while underlining thatthe Chinese and the North Koreans shouldnot undertake further offensives and couldpostpone the contentious POW issues untilafter an armistice had been signed. Butneither Stalin nor Zhou would admit to theother that they were looking for a way out ofthe war against the United States and itsallies.

* * * * *

“To hell with Yalta!”—Stalin Opts for a New Status Quo

by Vladislav Zubok

The two transcripts of conversationsduring the Stalin-Mao talks in December1949-February 1950 provide a unique in-sight into Stalin’s doubts and secondthoughts about the creation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although the groundworkfor holding the summit meeting had beenlaid during an exchange of secret high-levelmissions over the previous year (AnastasMikoyan’s visit to China in February 1949and Liu Shaoqi’s trip to Moscow in July-August), there were still unresolved issuesand obstacles on the path to the new alli-ance. One issue was the matter of Sovietinterests in Northeast China. Another wasthe invisible presence of the Americans atthe Sino-Soviet negotiating table and thepossible consequences of the alliance forvital Soviet broad interests, not only in the

Far East. Many other issues involving Chi-nese and Soviet interests were also on thetable.

But the delicate and complicated ques-tion of establishing a personal relationshipbetween Stalin and Mao also mattered greatly,and the tacit struggle between the two greatrevolutionary personalities is as important inunderstanding the talks between them inMoscow as their substance. At first, Stalinseems to have succeeded in impressing Maowith his posture as world leader and mag-nanimous emperor. Shi Zhe, Mao’s inter-preter, recalls that at the welcoming banquetStalin seemed strongly interested in devel-oping a new relationship with China. “Thevictory of the Chinese revolution will changethe balance of the whole world,” he quotedStalin as saying. “More weight will be addedto the side of international revolution.”1

According to the official Soviet record of the16 December 1949 conversation, Mao askedwhat was the likelihood that a peaceful“breathing spell” would last for the next 3-5years. Stalin seemed to sound even moreoptimistic than the previous July, when LiuShaoqi had asked a similar question. Therewas no immediate threat to China, he said,because “Japan has yet to stand up on its feetand is thus not ready for war; America,though it screams war, is actually afraid ofwar more than anything; Europe is afraid ofwar; essentially, there is nobody to fight withChina....” In the most significant breach withthe framework of Yalta, Stalin suggestedthat “peace depends” on the alliance betweenthe two communist powers. “If we continueto be friendly, peace can last not only 5-10years, but 20-25 years and perhaps evenlonger.”

Shi Zhe recalls that the conversationbecame uneasy, because Mao avoided speak-ing about the terms of a future Sino-Soviettreaty, waiting for Soviet initiative. Maopresented a different version to the USSRambassador to the PRC, Pavel Yudin, sixyears later: “During my first meeting withStalin I submitted a proposal to conclude a[new] state treaty, but Stalin evaded a re-sponse. Subsequently, Stalin avoided anymeetings with me.”2 The official Sovietrecord of the meeting provides a much morevivid picture of this episode.3

When Mao asked about the treaty, Stalinimmediately presented him with three op-tions: to announce the preservation of the1945 treaty, to announce “impending

changes” to the treaty, or (without announce-ment) to proceed with changes “right now.”In other words, Stalin had flatly reneged onhis commitment—relayed to Mao viaMikoyan the previous February4—to dis-card what the Chinese regarded as an “un-equal” treaty. Stalin reminded Mao that the1945 treaty “was concluded between theUSSR and China as a result of the YaltaAgreement which provided for the mainpoints of the treaty (the question of theKurile Islands, South Sakhalin, Port Arthur,etc.). That is, the given treaty was con-cluded, so to speak, with the consent ofAmerica and England. Keeping in mind thiscircumstance, we, within our inner circle,have decided not to modify any of the pointsof this treaty for now, since a change in evenone point could give America and Englandthe legal grounds to put forward a proposalto raise questions about modifying also thetreaty’s provisions concerning the KurileIslands, South Sakhalin, etc.”

Why this sudden change of mind? Oneplausible explanation is that the cautiousSoviet leader still wanted to know moreabout the American reaction to the creationof the People’s Republic of China and to theSino-Soviet talks. While the Truman Ad-ministration and the U.S. Congress copedwith the “loss of China” and nervously moni-tored the news from Moscow, Stalin pre-ferred to wait. However, his last argumentshows that there were not only immediateconcerns at play. Even in late 1949, after theCold War had unmistakably broken out,Stalin still found it pyschologically difficultto part decisively with the Yalta agreements,which had represented a cornerstone of So-viet diplomacy. He understood that the issueof new Soviet borders in the Far East and theexistence of Soviet outposts in Manchuriaconstituted one facet of an indivisible for-eign policy package, linked to the peacetreaty with Japan. To destroy this package,which was the crowning achievement ofStalin as a statesman and a foundation of theUSSR’s international legitimacy, was not aneasy thing to do. For decades after Stalin’sdeath, Soviet leaders from Molotov andKhrushchev to Brezhnev and Gromyko con-sidered themselves duty-bound to safeguardand confirm “the results of Yalta” whichsignified international recognition and ac-ceptance of Soviet legitimacy and the bound-aries of its “external empire.”

The Soviet leader must have known


from previous months of contacts and corre-spondence that it would be hard for theChinese, and Mao in particular, to retain theold treaty which Stalin had concluded withthe Guomindang (GMD). Therefore, hetried to sweeten the bitter pill by telling Maothat it would be possible to preserve theexisting treaty only “formally,” while chang-ing it “in effect,” that is, “formally maintain-ing the Soviet Union’s right to station itstroops in Port Arthur while, at the request ofthe Chinese government, actually withdraw-ing the Soviet Armed forces currently sta-tioned there.” (He quickly added, however,that if the Chinese desired the Soviet troopsto remain, they could do so “by request of theChinese government” for the next 2, 5, 10, oreven 20 years.) Stalin also expressed will-ingness to alter some points concerning theownership and exploitation of the Chinese-Changchun railroad.

Stalin’s new position must have struckMao like a bolt of lightning (the final proof,though, will come only in the Chineseleader’s correspondence surrounding themeeting). But Mao did not explicitly object.Instead, he humbly admitted that during thediscussions in Beijing of a future Sino-So-viet treaty the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) leadership had “not taken into ac-count the American and English positionsregarding the Yalta agreement. We must actin a way that is best for the common cause,”Mao said, according to the Soviet record.“This question merits further consideration.However, it is already becoming clear thatthe treaty should not be modified at thepresent time.” Mao also admitted that So-viet control over Port Arthur (Lushun) andthe Chinese-Changchun railroad “corre-sponds to the interests of China.”

No language, however, could concealthe divergent priorities of the two leaders.When Mao indirectly asked the Soviet leader“to send volunteer pilots or secret militarydetachments to speed up the conquest ofFormosa [Taiwan],” Stalin promised only“to consider” such assistance and advisedMao to “organize an uprising” on the GMD-controlled island as a possible alternative toa military assault. Stalin was careful not toindicate that he wished to curb the national-ist ambitions of the Chinese revolutionaries,yet in essence that was what his words im-plied. Again and again, Stalin repeated thatthe “most important” thing was to avoidgiving the Americans a “pretext to inter-

vene.” At the same time, Stalin encouragedthe Chinese to “frighten the imperialists abit” by probing the positions of the Britishand French in Hong Kong, Burma, andIndochina, i.e. in the South and far from theSoviet security perimeter.

Eventually, in their initial conversation,both leaders decided to drop the issue of thetreaty, and moved to discuss other issues.When Mao inquired whether Zhou Enlaishould travel to Moscow concerning thetreaty, Stalin replied benignly and crypti-cally that this was a question that “youshould decide for yourselves. Zhou may beneeded in regard to other matters.” Theambiguity of this response, perhaps aggra-vated by translation, may well have contrib-uted to Mao’s impression that Stalin did notwant to discuss a new treaty. The meetingended without any specific proposals fromeither side, and in the coming weeks Stalinand Mao engaged in a tacit war of nerves.Some other factors intervened as well, par-ticularly a report from Soviet advisor I.V.Kovalev (who had been a Stalin emissary toMao) stating that Mao was neither a real“Marxist” nor strong enough to resist pres-sure from “the right-wing of the [Chinese]national bourgeoisie, which has pro-Ameri-can inclinations.”5

For whatever reason, Stalin decided tolet Mao cool down (and cool his heels), andto gain more time himself to gauge theinternational response to their meeting, andsuggested resuming talks only on 2 January1950, more than two weeks later. Beforecalling Mao, however, Stalin sent Molotovand Mikoyan for a reconnaissance to hisBlizhnita dacha where Mao was quartered.Molotov recalled that “Stalin hadn’t receivedhim [Mao] for some days after he arrived.Stalin told me, ‘Go and see what sort offellow he is.’” Molotov returned and alleg-edly reported that it would be a good idea toreceive Mao for another meeting. “He wasa clever man, a peasant leader, a kind ofChinese Pugachev [a Russian peasant revo-lutionary]. He was far from a Marxist, ofcourse....”6 The concerns about Mao’s po-litical and ideological face played, however,a secondary role in Stalin’s change of mind—the international situation was far more im-portant. Finally, as Molotov informed Maoon January 2, Stalin decided to jettison theold Sino-Soviet treaty and with it his com-mitment to the Yalta arrangements in the FarEast. Mao jubilantly reported the news to

Beijing: “Comrade Stalin has agreed to Com-rade Zhou Enlai’s arrival here and to thesigning of a new Sino-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship and Alliance, as well as agree-ments on credit, trade, civil aviation, andothers.”7

In Mao’s estimate, the crucial factorwas that Great Britain and India recognizedthe PRC in January. In fact, a more impor-tant development was the conclusion of theTruman Administration’s reassessment ofits Far Eastern strategy. Washington de-cided to keep a hands-off policy towardTaiwan and to focus instead on the defenseof its essential interests in other Pacific areasit deemed critical, particularly Japan andSoutheast Asia, including Thailand, Ma-laya, and Indonesia. The new Americanpolicy was enshrined secretly on 30 Decem-ber 1949 in a classified document, NSC-48/2, announced by Truman in a press confer-ence on 5 January 1950, and spelled outpublicly a week later by Secretary of StateDean G. Acheson in his “defense perimeter”speech at the National Press Club.8 Onemay speculate that Stalin learned about theessence of this new policy before these offi-cial pronouncements, from various leaksand intelligence sources in Washington andLondon. It is even possible that, as with hisreversal of the initial Soviet response to theMarshall Plan in the spring of 1947,9 anintelligence coup might have been a pivotalfactor in prompting Stalin to reassess his FarEastern strategy.

From Stalin’s perspective, all this ap-peared as a new American doctrine for theFar East, a crucial change in the interna-tional situation which seemed to signify aU.S. retreat from the Asian mainland andimplicit acceptance of the Sino-Soviet alli-ance as a new geopolitical fait accompli.Stalin might also have suspected that he nolonger had anything to lose if he openlyrejected a now-outmoded “spirit of Yalta.”On the other hand, Stalin knew from manysources (Kovalev among them) that othermembers of the CCP leadership, such asZhou Enlai, had been enthusiastic about theprospect of balancing Soviet influence inChina with an American presence. By stick-ing to the old treaty, Stalin could only playinto the hands of the British and of Acheson,who eagerly sought to discover an openingthrough which to drive a wedge betweenStalin and his most promising and signifi-cant potential ally in the Far East.


Interestingly, Stalin did not tell his sub-ordinates about this turnabout in his attitudetoward signing a new treaty. On January 6,Mao met with Soviet Foreign MinisterAndrei Vyshinsky, in the presence ofKovalev, the Chinese ambassador in Mos-cow, and interpreters Nikolai Fedorenkoand Shi Zhe, to discuss joint Sino-Soviettactics at the United Nations, where theNationalists continued to occupy China’sseat on the Security Council. When Maomentioned the necessity of a new treaty,Vyshinsky repeated the official line that anychange in the 1945 treaty “could be used bythe Americans and the British as a pretextfor revision of those parts of the treaty,whose change would hurt the interests of theSoviet Union and China. This is undesir-able and must not happen.”10 Soviet ac-tions at the United Nations, however, hadalready begun to reflect Stalin’s new line:the alliance with communist China againstthe U.S.-led coalition of capitalist states.

At the second official meeting withMao (now accompanied by Zhou Enlai,who had arrived in Moscow two days be-fore), on 22 January 1950, Stalin soundedlike a changed man. “We believe that theseagreements [of 1945] need to be changed,although earlier we had thought that theycould be left intact,” he said. “The existingagreements, including the treaty, should bechanged, because war against Japan figuresat the very heart of the treaty. Since the waris over and Japan has been crushed, thesituation has been altered, and now thetreaty has become an anachronism.” Themost salient feature of the discussion wasthe omnipresence of the Japanese threat anda virtual absence of discussion of the UnitedStates and the new American policy; nor didanybody then raise Acheson’s speech ofJanuary 12. Only later, during the discus-sion of the specific provisions of the newtreaty, did the following exchange occur:

Mao Zedong: We must act so as to takeinto account the interests of both sides,China and the Soviet Union.Stalin: True. We believe that the agree-ment concerning Port Arthur is not eq-uitable.Mao Zedong: But changing this agree-ment goes against the decisions of theYalta Conference?!Stalin: True, it does—and to hell withit! If we make a decision to revise

treaties, we must go all the way. It is truethat for us this entails certain inconve-niences, and we will have to struggleagainst the Americans. But we are al-ready reconciled to that.Mao Zedong: With regard to this matter,we are only concerned by the fact that itcould lead to undesirable consequencesfor the USSR.

Stalin sought to convince Mao that theSoviet Union would risk a conflict with theUnited States for the sake of its new Asianally. Yet, he wanted to extract from theChinese a proper price for this willingness,primarily in the form of recognition of Sovietsecurity interests in Manchuria. This timeStalin did not miscalculate. Mao now ac-cepted Stalin’s proposal, put forth at the firstmeeting, that the Soviet Union would retainits legal rights in Port Arthur, at least until apeace treaty with Japan was signed. TheChinese leader also agreed to keep the Dairenport closed to the Americans.

The Chinese attempted to bargain whenit came to Soviet rights to control the ChineseChangchun railroad, the main strategic ar-tery between the USSR and Liaotung (thePort Arthur peninsula). But Stalin andMolotov defended those rights tooth andnail. During the talks on the ministeriallevel, the Soviet side succeeded in imposingon the PRC several secret agreements. TheAdditional Agreement to the treaty stipu-lated that “on the territory of the Far Easternregion and the Central Asian republics, aswell as on the territory of Manchuria andXinjiang,” both the USSR and the PRC“would not provide to foreigners the rightsfor concessions, and would not tolerate ac-tivities of industrial, financial, trade and otherenterprises, communities and organizations,with the participation, directly or indirectly,of the [financial] capital of the third countriesor the citizens of those countries.”11 TheChinese also signed a “Protocol on the unim-peded transportation of Soviet troops andmilitary property on the Chinese Changchunrailroad in case of the threat of war in the FarEast.” This secret agreement allowed theSoviets to transport troops and military equip-ment and supplies quickly, without payingany tariffs to the Chinese and without anyChinese customs control.12

The Sino-Soviet Treaty, signed on 14February 1950, satisfied Stalin’s search forthe preservation of the status quo (where it

benefitted the USSR) in times of upheaval.It also made the CCP leadership feel moresecure in its international isolation. At thesame time, the treaty created a new revolu-tionary-imperial synergy in the Far East.The Chinese communists, backed by Mos-cow, wanted to complete the reunification ofthe country and to carry the banner of revo-lution further, to Burma and Indochina. ForStalin the alliance marked the end of thestatus quo strategy of Yalta and the openingof a second Cold War against the UnitedStates in the Far East. Notwithstanding thefact that in both countries hundreds of mil-lions of people yearned for peace and recon-struction, the new alliance in reality sig-nalled military mobilization and confronta-tion—as events in Korea would soon dem-onstrate.

1. Shi Zhe’s account is quoted in Chen Jian, China’sRoad to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation (New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 1994), 79-80.2. P. Yudin, “Zapis besedy s tovarischem Mao,”Problemi Dalnego Vostok [Problems of the Far East] 5(1994), 105-106.3. This difference was previously noted in Sergei N.Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, UncertainPartners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 85-86, as one ofthe authors, Sergei Goncharov, had seen the minutes ofthe Stalin-Mao talks, which were then still classified, inthe Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow.4. In an undated cable sent to Stalin during the 31January-7 February 1949 talks with Mao, apparentlynear the end of the discussions, Mikoyan reported thathe had told the Chinese leader that the Soviet govern-ment had decided “to repeal this unequal [nespravedlivii]treaty and withdraw its troops from Port Arthur as soonas the peace [treaty] with Japan will be concluded. Butif the Chinese communist party ... would find expedientan immediate withdrawal of [Soviet] troops [from PortArthur], then the USSR was ready to do so. As to theaccord on the Chinese-Changchun railroad, we [theSoviet] do not consider this treaty unequal, since thisrailroad had been built primarily with Russian means.Perhaps ... in this treaty the principle of equal rights isnot fully observed, but we are ready to consider thisquestion and decide it with the Chinese comrades in afraternal manner.” See Archive of the President, Rus-sian Federation (APRF), f. 39, op. 1, d. 39, ll. 78-79, asquoted in Andrei Ledovskii, “Sekretnaia missiia A.I.Mikoyana v Kitai” [Secret Mission of A.I. Mikoyan toChina], Problemy Dalnego Vostoka 3 (1995), 94-105,quotation on p. 100; see also Ledovskii, “Sekretnaiamissiia A.I. Mikoyana v Kitai,” Problemy DalnegoVostoka 2 (1995), 97-111.5. See Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Part-ners, 91, 247-249.6. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Con-versations with Felix Chuev, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago:Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 81; for the original Russian seeFelix Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovim [One hun-dred and forty conversations with Molotov] (Moscow:TERRA, 1991), 114.


7. See the text of Mao’s cable to Beijing of 2 January1950, as reprinted in Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai,Uncertain Partners, 242.8. Goncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners,98, 101; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power:National Security, the Truman Administration, and theCold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,1992), 336-337.9. On the importance of espionage data in the reversalof Soviet policy toward the Marshall Plan, see MikhailM. Narinsky, “The Soviet Union and the MarshallPlan,” in Cold War International History Project Work-ing Paper No. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars, 1994), 45-46.10. See record of meeting in f. 0100, op. 43, d. 8, papka302, ll. 4-6, Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federa-tion (AVPRF), Moscow, cited in B. Kulik, “KitaiskaiiaNarodnaiia Respublika v period stanovleniia (1949-1952) (Po materialam Arkhiva vneshnei politik RF)”[“The Chinese People’s Republic in the founding pe-riod (Materials from the Archive of foreign policy ofthe Russian Federation”], Problemi Danego Vostoka 6(1994), 77.11. AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 235, papka 18, l. 134; alsoin SSSR-KNR (1949-1983): Dokumenti i materiali[Documents and materials on USSR-PRC relations,part one (1949-1983)] (Moscow: Historico-Documen-tary Department and Far Eastern Department, Ministryof Foreign Affairs of the USSR, 1985), 31-32; see alsoGoncharov, Lewis, and Litai, Uncertain Partners, 121.12 . SSSR-KNR (1949-1983), p. 35.

WESTADcontinued from page 7

not received any answer from these governmentsyet. Neither has the Soviet government given itsanswer. Obviously, the government’s proposalhad been inspired by the Americans. The aim ofthis proposal is to present the Nanjing govern-ment as the advocate of the termination of warand a peaceful settlement, while the Communistparty of China would be presented as the advo-cate of the continuation of war, if it would directlyreject peace negotiations with Nanjing.

We think we will give the following answer:the Soviet government was and continues to be infavour of the termination of war and the establish-ment of peace in China, but before agreeing tomediation it would like to know whether the otherside—the Chinese Communist party—agrees toaccept Soviet mediation. Therefore the USSRwishes that the other side—the Chinese Commu-nist party—would be informed of the peace ac-tion by the Chinese government, and that theother side would be asked for its agreement to themediation by the USSR. That is how we areplanning to answer and we ask you to inform uswhether you agree to this. If you do not, give youradvice for a more expedient answer.

We also think that your answer, in case youwill be asked for it, should be something like this:

The Chinese Communist party has al-ways been a supporter of peace in China,because the civil war in China had notbeen started by it, but by the Nanjinggovernment, which should bear all re-sponsibility for the consequences of thewar. The Chinese Communist party isin favour of talks with the Guomindang,but without the participation of thosewar criminals who provoked the civilwar in China. The Chinese Communistparty is in favour of the direct negotia-tions with the Guomindang, without anyforeign mediators. The Chinese Com-munist party especially finds it impos-sible to accept the mediation by a for-eign power which takes part in the civilwar against the Chinese Popular Libera-tion forces with its armed forces andnavy, because such a power cannot beregarded as neutral and impartial in theliquidation of the war in China.

We think that your answer should be ap-proximately like this. If you do not agree, let usknow of your opinion.

As for your visit to Moscow, we think that inthe view of the abovementioned circumstancesyou should, unfortunately, postpone your tripagain for some time, because your visit to Mos-cow in this situation would be used by the en-emies to discredit the Chinese Communist partyas a force allegedly dependent on Moscow, which,certainly, could bring no benefit to the Commu-nist party of China or to the USSR.

We are waiting for your answer.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: Archive of the President of the RussianFederation (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 95-96.]

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Stalin to Mao Zedong, 11 January 1949

As you can see from what you have alreadyreceived, our draft of your reply to theGuomindang proposal is aimed at the undermin-ing of the peace negotiations. Clearly, theGuomindang would not agree to peace negotia-tions without foreign powers’ mediation, espe-cially that of the USA. It is also clear that theGuomindang will not agree to negotiate withoutthe participation of Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] and other war criminals. We assume there-fore that the Guomindang would reject peacenegotiations on CCP terms. The result will bethat the CCP agrees to the peace negotiations andit will be impossible to accuse it of being eager tocontinue the civil war. The Guomindang, how-ever, will receive the blame for breaking thepeace talks. Thus, the peace maneuver of theGuomindang and the USA will be frustrated, andyou will be able to continue your victorious warof liberation.

We are waiting for your answer.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, pp. 97-99.]

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Mao Zedong to Stalin, 13 January 1949

Comrade Filippov,

I received your telegram of January 10.1. We think that the government of the

USSR should give the following answer to thenote by the Nanjing government proposing thatthe USSR accepts mediation in the termination ofthe civil war in China:

The government of the USSR hasalways wished, and still wishes, to seeChina as a peaceful, democratic andunited country. But it is for the peopleof China itself to choose the way toachieve peace, unity and democracy inChina. The government of the USSR,relying on the principle of noninterfer-ence in the other countries’ internalaffairs, cannot accept mediation be-tween the two sides in the civil war inChina.

a divided China. The visit of Soviet Polit-buro member Anastas Mikoyan to the CCPheadquarters later that winter did not domuch to mitigate mutual suspicions; indeed,Mao on several occasions during the dec-ades to come referred to this episode as anexample of Soviet duplicity.

The documents were translated fromRussian by Maxim Korobochkin; see alsoS.L. Tikhvinskii, “Iz Prezidenta RF:Perepiska I.V. Stalina s Mao Tszedunom vyanvare 1949 g.”, Novaya i noveisha istoriya4-5 (July-October 1994), 132-40.

* * * * *


Comrade Mao Zedong.

On January 9 we received a note from theNanjing government, proposing that the Sovietgovernment act as a mediator between the Nanjinggovernment and the Chinese Communist party[CCP] in the termination of war and the conclu-sion of peace. A similar proposal was sentsimultaneously to the governments of the USA,Britain and France. The Nanjing government has


Chinese people.We are deeply concerned by the fact that this

deception will have a large influence on the peopleand make us start another political detour, i.e. torefrain from rejecting peace negotiations with theGuomindang. We are delaying the creation of thecoalition government. Our principal objective isto make the Americans and the Guomindang putall their aces on the table, while we keep our acesuntil the last moment.

We have recently published a list of warcriminals, 43 persons, unofficially (a statement bya person of authority). The PLA has not yet issuedan order to arrest these war criminals.

On January 1 Jiang Jieshi delivered his peaceproposal. We gave an unofficial answer to this,too (an editorial article by a journalist). To sumup, we have left some room for a volte face, to seehow the Chinese people and international opinionwould react to the Guomindang’s deceptive nego-tiations.

But now we are inclined towards rejectingthe peace deception by the Guomindang with fullrighteousness, because now, as the balance ofclass forces in China has already changed irre-versibly and the international opinion is alsounfavourable to the Nanjing government, the PLAwill be able to cross the Yangzi this summer andstart the offensive towards Nanjing.

It looks like we do not have to make one morepolitical detour. In the present situation thismaneuver would be damaging rather than benefi-cial.

4. Thank you for asking for our opinion onsuch an important issue. If you do not agree withmy opinion as expressed here or would introducecorrections, please let me know.

Mao Zedong

* * * * *


To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We received your long telegram on theNanjing peace proposal.

1. Certainly it would be better if the Nanjinggovernment’s peace proposal did not exist at all,if this whole peace maneuver by the USA wasnonexistent. Clearly, this maneuver is disagreable,because it can bring some trouble to our commoncause. But, unfortunately, this maneuver doesexist, it is a fact and we cannot close our eyes onthis fact, we have to accept it.

2. Undoubtedly, the peace proposal byNanjing and the USA is a manifestation of apolicy of deception. First, because Nanjing doesnot really want peace with the Communist party,as the peace with the Communist party wouldmean the rejection by the Guomindang of itsprincipal policy of liquidation of the Communist

party and its troops, and that would lead to thepolitical death of the Guomindang leaders and thetotal disintegration of the Guomindang army.Second, because they know that the Communistparty will not make peace with the Guomindang,as it cannot abandon its principal policy of liqui-dation of the Guomindang and its troops.

So what does Nanjing want after all? Itwants not peace with the Communist party, but anarmistice, a temporary termination of hostilitiesto use the armistice as a respite to restore orderamong Guomindang troops, to fortify the southbank of the Yangzi, to ship armaments from theUSA, to reinforce and then to break the truce anddeliver a blow on the People’s Liberation forces,blaming the Communist party for the breakdownof negotiations. Their minimal wish is to preventthe total defeat of the Guomindang forces by theCommunist party.

This is the basis of the current deceptionpolicy of Nanjing and the USA.

3. How can one respond to this maneuver byNanjing and the USA? Two replies are possible.First reply: to reject the Nanjing peace proposalsopenly and directly, thus declaring the necessityof the continuation of civil war. But what wouldthat mean? That means, first, that you had putyour principal ace on the table and surrendered avery important weapon—the banner of peace—into the hands of the Guomindang. It means,second, that you are helping your enemies inChina and outside China to accuse the Commu-nist party as the advocate of continuing the civilwar, and to praise the Guomindang as the de-fender of peace. It means, third, that you aregiving the USA an opportunity to brainwashpublic opinion in Europe and America on thelines that no peace is possible with the Commu-nist party, because it does not want peace, andthat the only way to achieve peace in China is toorganize an armed intervention by foreign pow-ers like the intervention which had taken place inRussia for four years from 1918 to 1921.

We think that a direct and overt answer isgood when you are dealing with honest people,but when you have to deal with political swin-dlers, like the Nanjing people, a direct and overtanswer can become dangerous.

But a different answer is also possible. i.e.:a) to accept the desirability of a peace settlementin China; b) to conduct negotiations withoutforeign mediators, as China is a sovereign coun-try and has no need for foreign mediators; c) toconduct negotiations between the Communistparty and the Guomindang as a party, not with theNanjing government, [which is] bearing the blamefor starting the civil war and thus has lost theconfidence of the people; d) as soon as the partiescome to an agreement on the problems of peaceand of the government of China, the hostilitieswould be terminated.

Can the Guomindang accept these condi-tions? We think it cannot. But if the Guomindang

2. We think that although the USA, En-gland, and France, and especially the USA, arevery willing to take part in mediation to termi-nate the war in China and thus achieve theirgoal—to preserve the Guomindang regime—thegovernments of these countries, especially theUS government, have already lost their prestigeamong the Chinese public, and as the victory ofthe PLA nationwide and the downfall of theGuomindang regime is already in sight—it seemsquestionable whether they still wish to continuetheir assistance to the Nanjing government andthus further offend the PLA.

Only the USSR has a very high prestigeamong the Chinese people, so if the USSR in itsreply to the note by the Nanjing government willtake the position outlined in your telegram ofJanuary 10, it would make the USA, England andFrance assume that participating in mediation isan appropriate thing, and give the Guomindang apretext for scolding us as warlike elements.

And the broad popular masses, which aredispleased with the Guomindang and hope for anearly victory of the PLA, would find themselvesin despair.

If therefore it is possible for the USSR, inview of overall international relations, to makeits reply along the lines which we are proposing,we would wish very much that you approve ofour proposals. By doing so, you will help usenormously.

3. One should think thoroughly whether it ispossible to let people from the Nanjing govern-ment, including war criminals, take part in peacenegotiations with us. As of now we are inclinedtoward the following position: the unconditionalsurrender of the Nanjing government is neces-sary to give the people of China a real peace assoon as possible.

By starting the war, the Nanjing govern-ment committed a great crime—it has lost theconfidence of the nation. To reach an earlytermination of war and a peace settlement theNanjing government should surrender its powersto the people. It has no reason for procrastinat-ing.

We think that if we now would start peacenegotiations with people like Zhang Zhizhong orShao Lizi and enter into a coalition governmentwith these people, that would be the exact fulfill-ment of the US government’s wishes.

And that would bring much dissent amongthe people of China, the democratic parties andpopular organizations and even within the CCP,and would be very damaging for our currentposition of having all virtue on our side.

Starting from July 1946 we have been cau-tiously paying attention to the deceptive charac-ter of the negotiations which the US governmentand the Guomindang would inevitably start afterthe military defeat of the latter, and to the degreeof influence which this deception has on the


will not accept these conditions, the people willrealize, that the Guomindang and not the Com-munist party is to blame for the continuation ofcivil war. The banner of peace in this case restsin the hands of the Communist party. This issueis especially important now, when a lot of peoplein China are tired of the civil war and are ready tosupport the advocates of peace.

But let us assume the impossible and imag-ine that the Guomindang had accepted theseterms. What should the Communist Party’s plansof actions be like?

First, it would be necessary to refrain fromterminating the hostilities and then to create thecentral coalition government organs in such away that approximately three fifths of seats in theConsultative Council and two thirds of the postsin the government would be retained by theCommunists, and the other seats and posts wouldbe distributed between other democratic partiesand the Guomindang.

Second, it is necessary that the posts of theprime minister, Commander in Chief, and, ifpossible, that of the president, be occupied byCommunists.

Third, the Consultative Council should de-clare this coalition government the only govern-ment of China, and any other government, pre-tending to be the government of China, should bedeclared a rebel group, subject to be disbanded.

And, finally, the coalition government shouldorder both your troops and the Guomindang troopsto swear allegiance to the coalition governmentand that hostilities against the troops which hadgiven the oath would be terminated immediately,while they would be continued against the troopswhich had refused to give the oath.

It seems unlikely that the Guomindang wouldagree to these measures, but if they would not, itwould be also detrimental for them, because theywould be totally isolated, and these measureswould be carried out without them.

4. This is our understanding of the issue andour advice to you. Maybe we were not able topresent our advice clearly enough in our previoustelegram.

We ask you to regard our advice as adviceonly, which does not impose any obligations onyou and which you can accept or turn down. Youcan be sure that your rejection of our advice willnot influence our relations and we will remainyour friends as we have ever been.

5. As for our answer to the Nanjing media-tion proposal, it will be in the spirit of yourproposals.

6. We still insist that you postpone tempo-rarily your visit to Moscow, as your presence inChina is essential now. If you want we canimmediately send an authoritative member of thePolitbureau to Harbin or some other place tonegotiate on issues of interest to you.

Filippov [Stalin]


* * * * *

Mao Zedong to Stalin, 14 January 1949

Comrade Filippov,

1. I was glad to receive your supplementarytelegram of January 11. On the principal line (thebreakdown of large scale negotiations with theGuomindang [GMD], the continuation of therevolutionary war to the end) we agree with youcompletely.

Today we published eight conditions underwhich we [would] agree to enter into peace nego-tiations with the Guomindang. These conditionsare put forward against the five reactionary con-ditions which Jiang Jieshi mentioned in his peaceproposal of January 1.

Several days ago already the Americanssounded out our opinion—whether we wouldwish to conduct peace negotiations with theGuomindang without the 43 war criminals. Sothis sole condition—negotiating without warcriminals—is no longer sufficient to underminethe intrigue of the Guomindang peace negotia-tions.

2. [This point dealt with the work of the CCPradio station.]

3. Since the publication of the Guomindang’speace proposals there has been much fuss in theGMD-controlled areas and the population is enmasse demanding peace from the Guomindang,reproaching the Guomindang that its peace con-ditions are too severe.

The agitation and propaganda organs of theGuomindang are hastily explaining why theGuomindang needs to preserve its legal statusand its army. We think that this disorder in theGuomindang-controlled regions will be increas-ing further.

Mao Zedong


* * * * *


To Comrade Mao Zedong.

We have just received your last short tele-gram, which shows that we now have unanimousopinions on the issue of the Nanjing peace pro-posal and that the Communist party of China hasalready started its “peace” campaign. Thus, thematter is now closed.

Filippov [Stalin]

[Source: APRF, f. 45, op. 1, d. 330, p. 118.]

The Official Statement on the SovietGovernment’s Answer to the Note by the

Nanjing Government (Izvestia, 18 January1949)

On January 8 the Chinese Foreign Ministrypresented a memorandum to the Soviet Embassyin China, containing an appeal by the Chinesegovernment to the Soviet government to act as amediator in the peace negotiations between theChinese government and the Chinese Commu-nist party. As the Soviet Ambassador was in-formed, the Chinese government had sent a simi-lar appeal to the governments of the United Statesof America, Great Britain and France.

On January 17 the Deputy Foreign Ministerof the USSR cmrd. Vyshinsky A. Ya. receivedthe Chinese Ambassador in the USSR Mr. FuBing Ciang and gave him the answer of the Sovietgovernment, which points out that the Sovietgovernment, always loyal to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other coun-tries, does not regard it expedient to accept themediation mentioned in the memorandum.

The answer of the Soviet government notesthat the restoration of China’s integrity as a demo-cratic peace-loving state is the affair of the Chi-nese people itself and that this integrity could beprobably best achieved by the directnegotiatiations between the internal forces ofChina, without foreign interference.

[Source: Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1917-57. Col-lection of documents (Moscow, 1959), p. 209.]

CARTER-BREZHNEV CONFERENCEHELD ON SOVIET INTERVENTION

IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979

On 17-20 September 1995, in Lysebu,Norway, the Norwegian Nobel Institute hostedan oral history conference on the 1979 Sovietintervention in Afghanistan. The gathering,which included scholars and former Sovietand American officials, was a continuation ofthe Carter-Brezhnev Project (see CWIHPBulletin 5 (Spring 1994), p. 140) to explore thecollapse of superpower detente in the late1970s and its possible implications for Rus-sian-American relations. The principal orga-nizer of the Project is Dr. James G. Blight,Center for Foreign Policy Development, Tho-mas J. Watson Institute for International Stud-ies, Brown University. Efforts to obtain de-classified documentation from U.S., Russian,and other sources has been led by the NationalSecurity Archive and CWIHP. A report on theresults of the conference, including transla-tions of newly-available East-bloc documentson Afghanistan, will appear in the next issueof the CWIHP Bulletin.