-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 1
VOLUME 8 | N UMBER 3NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2012
ENGAGING PARTNERS GLOBALLY FOR STABILITY , PEACE &
DEVELOPMENT
PUBLISHED BY
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 122
-
Interview
FromHeadquarters
Evolutions in SecuritySector Reform
ENGAGING PARTNERS GLOBALLY FORSTABILITY , PEACE &
DEVELOPMENT
4 From the Editors Desk5 Presidents Message
28 ISOA Member News & Jobs Board29 ISOA Membership
Directory
GlobalPerspectives
VOLUME 8 | N UMBER 3 NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2012
PICTURE PICTURE PICTURE PICTURE PICTURE
2413118 18
8 Strategy, National Security, and SocialChangeExploring an
Evolving Security EnvironmentDana Eyre, PhD
11 Mentoring with the Goal of StabilityLessons from Afghan
National Army TrainingLee Mersek
13 Sandhurst in the SandBringing British Training to
AfghanistanAlan Capps
18 Post-Conflict Law and OrderShort Takes from a Recent Stimson
StudyFiona Mangan, Dr William Durch and Michelle Ker
24 Ending Human Trafficking in U.S.
GovernmentContractsImplications for Federal ContractorsMichele
Clark
26 A West African Time BombIslamic Jihadists Establish an
Al-Qaeda Franchisein Northern MaliHerman J. Cohen
21 A conversation with Mark KroekerPolice Training in an
Evolving United Nations
HF
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 124
ALL IS A TIME OF CHANGE. Leaves turn yellow and trees become
bare. Students return toschool. Congress comes back in to session.
At ISOA, we hold the Annual Summit. And this year, itwas truly a
changeand definitely one for the better.
The 2012 ISOA Annual Summit took on a new shape and format, and
tried out a new venue. With the themeLearn. Adapt. Grow. it
embraced the many changes that we have seen over the past year, and
anticipate inthe coming year. The focus on partnerships, business
development, and strategic thinking was paramount,and the caliber
of speakers across the board was unprecedented. In fact, the entire
Summit proved to beunprecedented from a historical perspective as
we broke registration and media coverage records.
But the real takeaway was not on the quantifiable side. The real
success of this years event came straightfrom feedback from the
attendees themselves, from industry leaders to field implementers
to policymakers. Ipersonally heard comments from attendees that I
had not heard before. Attendees were saying, Ive neverbeen able to
have conversations with these types of people before, or Ive
learned far more than Iexpected too. Thats when we, the ISOA staff,
knew that we had hit the nail right on the heador at leastas close
as we could get.
So how can we change post-Summit? Weve all heard the old adage,
if it aint broke, dont fix it, and wewholeheartedly agree. But we
are not satisfied with the status quo either. Using quantifiable
data and surveyfeedback from the 2012 Summit, we look forward to
creating a 2013 event that will be even better. Ourmembers and all
of the attendees from the 2011 and 2012 Summits know that this
event isnt just anotherconferenceits an opportunity. Some attend
for the engagement and partnership building; some attend
forbusiness development; and some attend to simply learn something.
And the Summit provides a positive andconducive environment for all
three of those goals. We plan to do it even better next year, and
provide theopportunity for even more people from the wider
stabilization, disaster relief and development community totake
advantage of a substantive and valuable event.
For a full overview of the 2012 ISOA Annual Summit, see the
Event Review on pages 16 and 17 of this issue.
Jessica Mueller is the Director of Programs & Operations at
the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)and the
Editor-in-Chief of Stability Operations magazine. Contact Ms. Vogel
at [email protected].
Reaching the SummitA Bi-Monthly Review of ISOAs
Activities:September & OctoberJessica Mueller
From Headquarters | From the Editors Desk
Copyright 2012 International Stability Operations Association
(ISOA).All rights reserved. The ISOA logo is a trademark of ISOA.
StabilityOperations magazine (SO) and its logo are trademarks of
ISOA.
STABILITY OPERATIONS MAGAZINE IS THE WORLDSONLY PUBLICATION
EXPLORING TOPICS PERTINENT TOPUBLIC, PRIVATE AND NONGOVERNMENTAL
SECTORACTORS PARTNERING IN PEACE AND STABILITYOPERATIONS. SO IS
PUBLISHED 6 TIMES PER YEARBY ISOA, A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP OF
PRIVATESECTOR AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONSPROVIDING CRITICAL
SERVICES IN FRAGILEENVIRONMENTS WORLDWIDE.
Editor-in-ChiefJessica Mueller
Assistant EditorAlaina Monismith
Contributing EditorNaveed Bandali
PublisherDoug Brooks
Business ManagerJason Kennedy
ISOA welcomes submissions for all SOmagazine content. The
editorial teamreserves the right to accept or rejectsubmissions for
print and/or online use.
The opinions expressed herein or on peaceops.comdo not
necessarily represent the opinions of ISOA, itsofficers, Board of
Directors, members or affiliates.ISOA bears no responsibility for
the editorial content.Views expressed in articles are those of the
authors.
No part of this publication may bereproduced in any form without
permissionin writing from the Editor-in-Chief.
ISOA members receive a limited number ofsubscriptions included
in their membership package.Individual annual subscriptions are
available for$30 (US & Canada) and $50 (International).
Advertising packages are available. Contact ISOA forpricing and
information.
Formerly the Journal of International PeaceOperations (JIPO) and
the IPOA Quarterly.
The Publication of theINTERNATIONAL STABILITY OPERATIONS
ASSOCIATION
1634 I St. NW, Suite 800,Washington, D.C. 20006,
[email protected] site..www.peaceops.comISSN
1933-8189
OS ENGAGING PARTNERS GLOBALLY FOR
STABILITY , PEACE & DEVELOPMENT
ISOA Congratulates our 2013 Board of DirectorsFall also means
the annual Board of Directors election. Congratulations to Howie
Lind of Fluor and Patrick
Garvey of Triple Canopy who begin new 2-year terms on 1 November
2012!
2013 ISOA Board of DirectorsChair: Pete Dordal, GardaWorldWill
Imbrie, Dyncorp International
Tom Callahan, PAERob Hood, CH2M Hill
Jeff Grieco, IRDHowie Lind, Fluor
Patrick Garvey, Triple Canopy
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 5
LTHOUGH the Stability OperationsIndustry is best known for
theservices it provides in support of
international operations in places likeAfghanistan, Somalia, the
DR Congo and EastTimor, our industry provides invaluable
servicesfor disaster relief operations as well. The
Haitiearthquake, tsunami in Japan, floods inPakistan, and most
recently HurricaneSandy in the United States.
Many people would be amazed at the numberof services and the
range of capability theprivate sector has available to
addressdisasters. Generators, heavy constructionequipment, modular
housing, water purificationservices a million and one services that
areas useful addressing domestic catastrophes asthey are serving
war refugees and supportingpeacekeeping operations around the
world.
The industry is called on for disaster relief forthe very same
reason they are involved ininternational stability operations
nogovernment or international organization hasthe capacity to
address every contingency orpolicy need; especially on short
notice. Ourindustry specializes in rapid deployment withscalable
capabilities and services. Even better,a government does not have
to spend decadespaying for services it may never need, but onlyfor
their actual deployment and use. Obviously
some services are so vital and necessary thatgovernments prefer
to ensure in-housecapabilities, but some hybrid models also
allowgovernments to pay a small amount to fundcapacity within the
industry that can be on-callat a moments notice, should the need
arise.
This certainly does not bypass or minimize thecentral role of
governments in disastermanagement. Our industry does not
makepolitical decisions. Governments can be of realvalue when they
make the vital preparations for
addressing current and future disas-ters. Governments decide
priorities in disasterrelief, and fund private sector preparations
forcapabilities and services so to be availablewhen disasters such
as Hurricane Sandy hit.At the same time, poor
governmentalmanagement or a lack of governmentalcapacity can have
an extremely negative result,such as we saw in Haiti where billions
of dollarsof international relief were wasted due topolitical
insistence that a devastated Haitiangovernment be the sole
decision-maker. Vastprivate sector resources activated in
prepara-
tion for the relief effort were left unutilized,contributing to
the suffering of the shatteredpopulation. Ultimately the private
sectorresources used in Haiti were only a fraction ofthose
typically utilized in international disasterssuch as the 2004
Southeast Asian Tsunami.Although some have argued that
theinternational community needs to take charge insuch situations
to temporarily direct andmanage emergency services, ultimately
thedecisions will be governmental, not privatesector.
If nothing else, Hurricane Sandy is a powerfulreminder of how
useful this industry can be as atool of policy. From supporting
humanitarianefforts in New Jersey to assisting peacekeepingefforts
in Mogadishu, their role is the same. Inthe end, the industry
provides enormouslyvaluable, cost-effective services that
supportinternational humanitarian policies. And asalways, the
better we ensure a workingpartnership between government and
theirindustry contractors, the better the humanitarianresult.
In the end, the industry provides enormouslyvaluable,
cost-effective services that support
international humanitarian policies.
Doug Brooks is the President of the International Stability
Operations Association (ISOA). Contact Mr. Brooks at
[email protected].
From Headquarters | Presidents Message
Mogadishu to ManhattanAchieving Stability After DisasterDoug
Brooks
Photo
:Hur
rican
eSan
dyma
kesl
andfa
ll.Cr
edit:
NOAA
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 126
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 7
ong term stability in any context ismajorly impacted by the
strength of thesecurity sectorcriminal justice
systems including national armies, police,correctional
facilities, and public access to theservices that they provide. The
struggle for atransparent, accountable, effective andsustainable
security sector calls for constantinnovation paired with effective
monitoring andevaluation of security sector reform (SSR)programs;
especially amid increasingglobalization and an increasing number of
highrisk security environments.
So what does this new security environmentlook like? Dana Eyre
takes an innovative lookat the evolution of national security
paradigmsfrom a broad view, asserting that securitychallenges
worldwide are social change
problems. This new way of looking at securityas being rooted in
sociological and psychologi-cal issues will help those working in
SSR toprogram more effectively in the future.
Focusing on Afghanistan, Lee Mersekrecounts his experiences in
training the AfghanNational Army. He emphasizes the importanceof
tackling security challenges with a focus onsustainability, by
training locals in basic projectmanagement, leadership, and
operating withinrealistic means. Capacity building is the key
tolong term stabilityin SSR, and any stabilityoperations
programming.
Additionally, the Afghan National Army requiresextensive
professional training in order to meetmany national security
challenges. AlanCapps reviews the ongoing process to
establish a professional military training facilitymodeled after
the UKs Sandhurst in Afghani-stan. An officer training program will
allowAfghanistan to develop a professional army thatis sustainable
beyond the 2014 withdrawaljust ask the ANA General who
attendedSandhurst already.
The United Nations has an extensive role inSSR worldwide. Fiona
Mangan, MichelleKer and William Durch review a recentStimson Center
and UN study exploring theincreasing complexity of peace
operationsmandates that include police, justice andcorrections
components. The study finds thatfuture SSR programming must take in
toaccount the unavoidable impact that theoperational environment
has on the level ofeffectiveness and success of such programs.
Evolutions in Security Sector ReformTraining A New Generation
for Sustainable Stability
Photo
:Libe
rianN
ation
alPo
liceg
radu
ation
cere
mony
Cred
it:UN
Photo
/Chr
istop
herH
erwi
g
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 128
HE CHALLENGEIn the decades since the fall of theSoviet Union (a
relatively recentevent that seems as lost in the mists
of time as the Middle Ages) and particularlysince 9/11 there has
been substantial public,and professional, reflection and debate
over acritical set of questions about the pursuit ofnational (or
human) security. Who is the foeand what is his nature? What are the
mosteffective policies for the conduct of struggle?Indeed, what is
the fundamental nature of theproblem we face? What are "security"
and"stability"? How do we attain them? Observersand critics have
variously labeled thecontemporary environment and
particularstruggles within it as the global war onterrorism, the
long war, small wars, globalcounterinsurgency, fourth generation
warfare,war amongst the peoples or the five frontwar. It seems that
although there is noconsensus on the label for the situation there
issubstantial agreement that its not the conflictthat the Western
militaries now fightinganticipated fighting in the days before
9/11.This debate has only gotten more complicatedwith the evolution
of the Arab Spring of 2011;events in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Mali,
Syriaand throughout the region highlight thecomplexity of the
contemporary securityenvironment. This problem only gets
morecomplicated when the focus is expanded toinclude longer-term
challenges, such asPakistan or most notably China,
simultaneouslyAmerica's vital business partner, only realpotential
military rival in the coming decades,and a land subject to enormous
internal socialand political tensions. Whatever one's view onthe
details, it's clear that the contemporarysecurity environment is
definitely not a simpleone.
If there is no consensus on the label, there is atleast
substantial consensus on the characteris-tics of the problems were
facing. Its not 19thor 20th century conflict between states
(anextended violent Olympics: France vsGermany, 1870, US vs Spain
1989, Japan vsRussia 1904, UK & France vs Germany(rematch)
1914, US, UK, France vs Germany,Italy & Japan (rematch) 1945,
US vs USSR,1948-1989) but between a struggle over thenature of
social order, both at the level of theworld (at least in the
fantasies of some violentextremist organization believers) and at
thelocal level in a variety of locations. Thecontenders are a
complex amalgam of states(in an ever shifting mix of unilateral
actions andformal and informal coalitions, with more than afew
participants at least occasionally playingboth sides), nascent and
developing states,social movements, factions, terrorists,
guerillas,militias, bandits, robbers and psychopaths.International
law, far from a "self-imposed,imperceptible limitation hardly worth
mention-ing, is a central preoccupation in todaysoperational
environment, and public opinion,always significant, is even more
important in aworld in which international
non-governmentalorganizations can conduct a by-name audit
ofcivilian causalities in a major operation, asHuman Rights Watch
first did during the NATOcampaign in Kosovo in 2000.
The most fundamental thing sought by ournational security
efforts is not a discrete set ofobjectives, but a broadly
functioning socialorder, a social system in which people - be
theyin London, New York, Mumbai, Kabul, or Kirkuk can go about
their daily lives in peace andstability. And the roots of the
current challengecome not from sovereign states and massed
armies, but from a complex and chaotic mix ofhistory, social
conditions, ideologies andmarginalized states of mind as likely to
befound in individuals living in western democra-cies as they are
under oppressive regimes andin the political and security vacuums
arisingfrom failing states. It is a complex social-psychological
emergent ecology of conflict inwhich concepts such as
globalization, theyouth bulge, narrative and identity are
ascritical to our understanding of the currentproblems as mutually
assured destruction wasto the Cold War. The security problems we
faceare in essence social change problems" theirorigins lie, and
they can only be understood asthe complex product of social
structures, socialdynamics, social and psychological
causes.Addressing these challenges often requiresmilitary forces -
the use of force and violence but they are much more than war.
Reflections on the Contemporary SecurityEnvironment
The dynamics of this environment can becaptured relatively
simply, though they can't beaddressed with equal simplicity.
The problem is glocal, and narrative andemotional, at its core.
The connection betweena preacher and his small church in a
back-woods corner of Florida, USA, and a protestingmob in
Afghanistan isnt physical; its narrativeand emotional. They are
aware of each other(dimly, imperfectly) and act with regard to
eachother, yet at the same time each operates intheir own local
context. The conflict issimultaneously local and global.
Thisphenomenon is clearly enabled by rapidlydeveloping
communications technologies. Witha good story, a cell phone or a
cheap camera,and 5 million YouTube hits anyone can be astar, or
fuel the fire of a revolution on the otherside of the world.
The core dynamics are psychological andsociological. In an era
where deliberatemartyrdom has become a calculated means
ofconducting IO, killing our enemies provides
Dana P. Eyre, Ph.D. is a sociologist specializing in conflict
transformation and strategic communications. He has worked in the
Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and onprojects from Papua New Guinea to
Somalia.
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
Strategy, National Security,and Social ChangeExploring an
Evolving Security EnvironmentDana P. Eyre, Ph.D.
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 9
tactical advantage, but is unlikely to end theirstrategic
campaign or organization. Ultimately,changing the conditions that
generateextremists is the only long-term alternative to anendless
drone-based game of whack-a-mole.We need to counter the enemy in
the criticalpsycho-social space, but perhaps morecritically, we
find our selves seeking to fosterchange in evolving social systems
buildingfunctional, inclusive government, enablingeconomic growth,
healing the wounds of warand the divisions of sectarian and ethnic
strife.We cannot directly bring the world we desireabout through
force, we must help partnersbuild that world for themselves.
These statements clearly imply that thevocabularies and
theoretical frameworksnecessary to understand our problems are
psychological and sociological (in the broadestsense). These
insights are not new everyconfrontation with insurgency or
guerillawarfare offers another opportunity to relearnthis
fundamental lesson. But they are moreurgent now, and more central,
as thetechnology of mayhem (weapons of massdestruction, and the
routine technologies ofeveryday violence explosives and
firearms)becomes more widespread.
Social change is at the center of the problemand must be at the
center of our thinking.
General David Petraeus has observed that wecannot kill our way
out of this endeavor. (IraqCOIN Guidance, 21 June 2008).
Clausewitzoffered the duel of the wrestlers as thefundamental
metaphor for understanding war.
War is nothing but a duel on an extensivescale. If we would
conceive as a unit thecountless number of duels which make up awar,
we shall do so best by supposing toourselves two wrestlers. Each
strives byphysical force to compel the other to submit tohis will:
his first object is to throw his adversary,and thus to render him
incapable of furtherresistance. War therefore is an act of
violenceto compel our opponent to fulfill our will. Notea gap
between the two statements. Whenothers make comments similar to
GeneralPetraeus, such as noting that people are thedecisive
terrain, they too are recognizing afundamental gap between the
problems weface and the inherited vocabulary we employedto confront
them.
The connection between a preacher and his small church ina
backwoods corner of Florida, USA, and a protesting mobin
Afghanistan isnt physical; its narrative and emotional.
Continued on page 10
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector ReformPh
oto:S
outh
Suda
npoli
cere
cruits
attra
ining
.Cre
dit:U
NPh
oto/P
aulB
anks
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1210
Traditional security vocabularies, of states andpolitics,
planning and rational interests, fire andmaneuver, logistics and
operations, defeat andvictory, offer at best fragmentary
understanding;indeed these vocabularies are potentiallyprofoundly
misleading when seeking tounderstand the core dynamics of the
problemswe tackle, be it Afghanistan or China's futurestability and
direction. Is there an alternativeframing, an alternative or
supplementaryvocabulary and theory of our activities, thatgives us
greater clarity on how to addressproblems in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Libya, Bahrain,Yemen, Somalia, the wider threat of terror, andthe
general problem of failed states and ofbuilding positive peace?
Here, in particular, wewould focus on the central question of
social
change. If the problems we confront are rootedin psychological
and sociological dynamics, ifthe solutions require people, and
groups, tolearn new skills, to tell new stories, to
changebehaviors, to cooperate in government, to rejectviolent
ideologies, to embrace neighbors, andultimately to build peace, are
the projects weare engaged in not more fruitfully conceptual-ized
as social change, rather than as war?
The goals we have set for ourselves requirechange; we achieve
success only if societieschange, and societies change only if
peoplechange. We must therefore put the dynamicsof personal and
social change at the center ofour thinking. People must think,
feel, andpractice their way into new behaviors, newmodes of action.
We need to redefine the
concept of victory or success. Stable,sustainable success must
be rooted in a criticalmass of popular disapproval of our
opponentsand the rejection of their ideology, as well as apositive
will to reject them and to embracesustainable, stable peaceful
forms of socialorder and governance.
Some may object to labeling what we are doingas social change
noting that social changecannot be simply managed, that it is
difficult, orthat it is not our job. We acknowledge all ofthese
questions. But we would observe that thejobs we have undertaken, in
response to thesecurity environment we have found ourselvesin, at
the core require social change. Embracinga new government,
rejecting an extremistreligious ideology, resisting recruitment
toviolence, all are acts of individual and collectivechange. They
do not become easier byignoring the dynamics of change.
Social change, particularly the form of mostinterest to
militaries and their colleagues -conflict transformation (as a
specialized form ofchange - moving violent conflict into
non-violentpolitical conflict, as described in The Quest forViable
Peace: Covey, Dzeidzic and Hawley,editors, US Institute of Peace),
isnt easy, butits certainly easier to do if we have avocabulary
that helps us understand thedynamics of the problem and
articulatemeaningful solutions. Alfred North Whiteheadsobservation
clearly articulates the challenge:the art of progress is to
preserve order amidchange and to preserve change amid order. Iwould
argue that were not engaged in the longwar but the long change.
References
Clausewitz, Carl von. 1989. On War. Reprint.Princeton University
Press. P76
Human Rights Watch, Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in theNATO Air
Campaign, 1 February2000, D1201, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a86b0.html [accessed 3
May2011]
Continued from page 9
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 11
N AN EFFORT to promote long-term stability in a failed or
failing state, many stabilityoperations companies provide services
that involve training and advising foreign counterparts.Even for
the companies with functions that dont normally incorporate foreign
advisory, there
always exists the potential to pass on knowledge and abilities
to foreign partners. It often may beeasier to conduct our stability
efforts without being hindered by untrained, ill-equipped
localcounterparts, yet much of that hindrance may be attributed to
the difficulty of undeveloped countriesto comprehend and maintain
our more advanced concepts. We can actually overcome
thesedifficulties and create sustainable solutions towards
long-term stability by encouraging our hostnation partners to
develop their own stability efforts, use locally available
resources and takeresponsibility for implementing their own
operations.
Local Development
A story was passed on to me in Afghanistan about a project
conducted by a Western organization. Inone particular village, the
women walked one hour to the nearest water source and then
walkedanother hour on the return trip. The kindhearted Westerners
built a well in the village to reduce thewomens burden, but when
they returned to the village they received scornful looks from the
women.What the organization didnt realize was that the two hours
spent retrieving water was the time thatthose women used to
socialize away from the men of the village, and where they often
arrangedmarriages and resolved disagreements between families.
All concepts or programs that we conduct with host nation
partners must be developed by themunder our mentorship. When we try
to impart large budgets and advanced technologies on
emergenteconomies and security services, we forget the progressive
steps that our economy and security
Lee J. Mersek is currently working for New Century U.S., and is
assigned overseas to conduct security stability operations.
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
Mentoring with the Goal ofSustainabilityLessons from Afghan
National Army TrainingLee J. Mersek
services had to make in order to reach our ownadvanced
capabilities. This inflexibility causesus to overlook inexpensive
and simplisticsolutions that may better address instability,and may
even prolong it when our operationslack local support.
Participation from our counterparts will ensurethat local
capabilities and environmentalconsiderations we might otherwise
ignore arefactored into the development of our stabilityoperations.
This increases the sustainability ofour efforts because our host
nation partnersare more likely to comprehend and accept aprogram
that is developed at their skill leveland within their societys
framework. Theseoperational concepts will thus be masteredmuch
quicker than anything our counterpartshavent developed themselves.
The finalproduct may not precisely mirror what weutilize in our own
country, but it will be adaptedto our partners country, and will
outlastconcepts not tailored to their political,economic and
cultural environment.
Local Resourcing
As a U.S. Marine Corps embedded infantryadvisor to the Afghan
National Army (ANA), myteams mission was to pass on knowledge
andskills rather than funding and materials.However, other
coalition forces made plans tobuild operations centers for the ANA.
Thesebuildings, filled with computers and flat screentelevisions,
would be paid for by the U.S.government. Although the Afghans
agreed tothis plan, we later conducted a successfulbrigade-level
mission with an operations centerconsisting of a carpet, a radio, a
map, and apot of tea. Our counterparts gainedconfidence in their
ability to conduct a large-scale mission with materials they could
easilyrequisition themselves.
Utilizing local funding and readily availableresources can
minimize the costs for moststability efforts while ensuring that
our partners
Continued on page 12
Phot
o:UN
MIL
peac
ekee
pert
alksw
ithyo
ung
girlC
redit
:UN
Phot
o/Em
man
uelT
obey
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1212
can sustain themselves. Our host nationcounterparts will more
readily master a methodthat involves equipment they can
procurethemselves, rather than struggle to operate andmaintain
equipment beyond their means. Inmany impoverished societies, money
serves tobe a distraction, and the fuel for corruption.Teaching our
partners new concepts within theirown budget removes these
distractions, limitsopportunities for corruption and increases
theircommitment to the solutions they havedeveloped. Very often,
the most basicconcepts prevent a reliance on foreignsubsidies,
equipment and maintenance.
Local Implementation
In Afghanistan, the abilities of ANA leadersoften reflect the
amount of responsibility that isassumed by their mentors. While
some officers
have gained confidence in their abilities andauthority, others
who have had impatientadvisors develop and execute solutions
forthem lack this self-reliance. A common mistakeof some mentors is
to focus on implementingtheir own perfectly envisioned plan rather
thanfocus on developing their counterparts. This ofcourse raises
the concern that some Afghanofficers may be unable to conduct their
jobswithout foreign assistance.
The old adage of give a man a fish and he eatsfor a day; teach a
man to fish and he eats for alifetime certainly holds true. Rather
thanconducting stability operations ourselves,training a cadre of
host nation supportersmultiplies our own efforts in that country
withcounterparts who contribute to their ownstability. Host nation
leaders learn basic projectmanagement and leadership through
ourmentoring, while the work force involved in our
operations develops skills from our training.Encouraging our
partners participation providesopportunities for them to assume
responsibilityfor their countrys stability.
Once a capability has been developed with hostnation concepts
and resources, our partnersmust implement it to break over-reliance
onforeign support. The involvement, andownership, of our
counterparts in stability effortsserves to improve their abilities
as they learnfrom their mistakes. As they gain proficiencyand
confidence, our partners can win supportand legitimacy from their
own countrymen.Sustainability is achieved when our mentoringand
training enables our partners to maintaintheir own stability.
Conclusion
The notion of developing sustainable solutionsis not limited to
any particular stabilityoperations sector. A military or security
servicemust first learn how to conduct missions on footbefore they
can incorporate aircraft into theiroperations. Foreign medics must
learn tooperate without advanced medical technology,and foreign
construction companies must beable to work with tools and materials
they canreadily supply. The ultimate goal may beimproved
life-saving abilities and saferengineering standards, but a country
facinginstability must first develop and maintain itsown methods in
order to create the foundationfrom which to learn advanced
techniques.
While a failed or failing states dependence onforeign assistance
may promote business forstability operations companies,
progressivelydeveloping host nation partners actually
createsbusiness opportunities for advanced trainingand equipment.
With open minds and a focuson training and mentoring, we may
evendiscover new concepts from our partners andtheir methods. By
developing tailored solutions,utilizing host nation resources and
encouragingthe local implementation of those solutions,
ourmentoring capabilities can increase thesustainability of our
work and more effectivelyfoster long-term stability in foreign
nations.
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
Continued from page 11
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 13
developing core military skills in Officer Cadets.
This is what Lt. General Sher MohammadKarimi, current Chief of
the Army Staff of theAfghan National Army, remembers about histime
at Sandhurst. He graduated in 1967following a two-year course, at
that point intime only the second Afghan ever to attend theacademy.
Now, 45 years later General Karimiwants his country to establish an
officeracademy modeled on Sandhurst, a project thathas already
acquired the sobriquet ofSandhurst in the sand.
Relating his experiences at Sandhurst to theDaily Telegraphs
Kabul correspondent, BenFamer, in March of 2012, General Karimi
said,:I sometimes joke with my non-commissionedofficers these days,
I say I will believe in youwhen you have a yard stick in your hand
likethose British NCOs and walk on the drill squareto measure the
steps and give the command ofquick march! and slow march! The
twinpillars of ceremony and tradition, still anomnipresent and
integral part of the BritishArmy, also left their mark on General
Karimi.We were not allowed to go to the dining hall inthe evening
without a tie or proper jacket ofevening dress, he recalled. In the
BritishArmy these traditions are very, very welldeveloped and well
observed. Many peoplemay not like formalities and ceremonies, but
Ilove to see it. Its part of the military life.
General Karimis idea initially won the approvalof American and
British commanders with theInternational Security Assistance
Forces(ISAF). U.S. Army General William B. Caldwell,who held the
post of Commander, NATOTraining Mission Afghanistan, as well
asCommanding General, Combined SecurityTransition Afghanistan from
2009-2011, wasa strong supporter of General Karimis goal.Commenting
on the plan in a story in TheGuardian newspaper in May 2011,
GeneralCaldwell said, General Karimi would verymuch love to build
Sandhurst in Afghanistan.
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
O OFFICER CADET who has graduated from the Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst(RMAS) in the United Kingdom forgets his or her
time at RMAS. Sandhurst creates, in thewords of Sir Arthur Bryant,
the noted British historian and columnist, the martial habits
of
discipline, courage, loyalty, pride and endurance. Its motto is
Serve to Lead, and since itsestablishment in1947 as the British
Armys newly re-organized post World War II officer cadetacademy,
Sandhurst has continued a tradition and history of training the
British Armys officer corpsthat dates back to 1741 when the
original Royal Military Academy was first established.
The parade ground at Sandhurst has always been the great
leveler. Regardless of whether a cadetcomes from royal lineage
British or foreign or has a family history with a particular
regiment, orincreasingly in recent years, enters RMAS with a
university degree in -hand, no one escapes theeagle eyes of the
Academy Sergeant-Major and his staff of experienced Warrant
Officers and seniorNon-Commission Officers (NCOs). They form the
bulk of the instructing staff and command afearsome reputation for
their level of professionalism, experience, and abilities in
teaching and
Alan Capps is currently writing his PhD dissertation in US
History at George Mason University.
Sandhurst in the SandBringing British Training to
AfghanistanAlan Capps
Photo
:Afgh
anHo
nour
Guar
dCon
duct
Train
ingEx
ercis
eCre
dit:U
NPh
oto/E
ricKa
nalst
ein
Continued on page 14
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1214
Im supporting him. He thinks so highly ofSandhurst, he would
love to model it and build ithere. The idea also won the approval
ofAfghan Defense Minister, General Abdul RahimWardak, and
subsequently President HamidKarzai.
During a trip to Afghanistan in late March of2012, UK Defencce
Secretary Philip Hammondsigned a statement of intent with
GeneralWardak on Britain taking the lead in establish-ing an Afghan
National Officers Academy,which will be modeled on Sandhurst. The
newacademy will be located in the Qargha district ofKabul and is
currently planned to be operationalin 2013.
It is projected that at least two thirds of theinstructors,
possibly up to 200 members of theBritish Army, will form the core
of the initialinstructing staff. A budget for the project has
notyet been disclosed. In an interview with BBCRadio, the Defence
Secretary also pointed out
that this project continues to reaffirm Britainscommitment to an
effective transition to Afghannational security forces, and that
the UKs rolein officer training would continue after 2014, aswould
financial support for the new facility toillustrate its commitment
to Afghanistans long-term stability.
While no specific plans for any proposed coursestructure have
yet been announced, it is fair tosay that the Commissioning Course
atSandhurst will in all likelihood form the basis,albeit with
modifications where appropriate, forthe Afghan National Armys new
officeracademy course of study. The British Armyswebsite page on
the Sandhurst course statesthat its purpose is to develop an
OfficerCadets character, intellect and professionalskills. At the
end of the course a newlycommissioned Officer will be qualified to
leadand manage soldiers while at the same timeupholding the British
Armys core values ofselfless commitment, respect for others,
loyalty,integrity, discipline and courage.
The Commissioning Course is 44-weeks inlength and divided into
three terms. The firstterm sees Officer Cadets acquiring
basicmilitary skills with introductions to leadership,tactics, map
reading, living in the field, weaponhandling and extensive physical
training. Thereis also an emphasis on personal administrationsuch
as polishing of boots and ironing kit, whichought to bring a wry
smile to General Karimisface, as will the exposure of new Afghan
OfficerCadets to the hallmark of Sandhursts trainingregime the
Non-Commissioned Officerinstructors who are among the best in
theBritish Army and bring with them uniqueexperience, skills and
insights into the trainingof potential officers. The pressure is
intensewith very little free time.
Apart from the daily rigors of the first term thefirst major
hurdle to continuing on the course isthe drill test known as
Passing Off the Square,which occurs at the end of Week Five.
Theremainder of the term continues to build on thebasics of the
first five weeks with a marked
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector
ReformPhoto:RoyalMilitaryAcademy,SandhurstCredit:Flickr/EwanM
Continued from page 13
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 15
emphasis on Adventure Training outside of theAcademy and
physically testing exerciseswhere teamwork and confidence building
arekeys.
Term Two revolves around an emphasis onbuilding leadership
initiative and moving cadetsalong the path from being raw recruits
tocommencing to gain an understanding of therole of an Army
Officer. It is at this juncture thatacademics begin to be brought
into the overallcurriculum with classroom subjects such
asconventional war studies, international affairsand leadership
being taught. Classroomassignments do not, however, mean alessening
of the physical activities whichcontinue including physically
demanding fieldexercises.
The third term sees Office Cadets beingassigned more
responsibilities. There is also ashift towards topics such as
unconventionalwarfare and counter-insurgency. The
physicalactivities continue unabated although theemphasis is
increasingly placed on theindividual to maintain the appropriate
level offitness through personal exercise and teamsports. Arduous
field exercises also continueincluding live-fire exercises. The
termconcludes with the Passing Out Parade, knownat Sandhurst as the
Sovereigns Parade, andthe awarding of a Commission.
From the perspective of the British Army aftercompleting the
Commissioning Course all newofficers attend a Young Officers
coursewherein they learn the disciplines and craft oftheir chosen
part of the Army. Completion ofthis course results in the new
officers going offto assume a Platoon Commander assignment.How this
stage will be handled from theperspective of the Afghan National
Army willhave to be thought through to decide whether itremains a
separate course after commissioning
or is built into the overall CommissioningCourse. Equally, the
selection process to gainentry to the proposed academy will also
have tobe given a great deal of thought. Whether theBritish Armys
well-honed three and a half dayOfficer Selection Board process will
beemployed as a template, will have to bedecided upon.
General Karimi understands that to replicate aninstitution such
as the RMAS with its richhistorical legacy, traditions, ethos and
culture oftraining officers will be far from easy. General
Karimi also understands, however, frompersonal experience, that
if the Afghan NationalArmy is to survive post-2014 and the
finalwithdrawal of ISAF, the ANA must be a modernand highly
professional force designed toenhance Afghanistans long-term
stability andsecurity. That requires a professional officercorps
whose motto must reflect that of RMASand one which General Karimi
learned as ayoung officer cadet in the late 1960s; they mustServe
to Lead.
General Karimi also understands, however, from personal
experience, that ifthe Afghan National Army is to survive post- of
ISAF, the ANA must be a modern and highly professional force
designed
to enhance Afghanistans long-term stability and security.
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1216
ISOA Thanks all of the 2012 AnnualSummit Sponsors for
supportingour most successful Summit yet! G
OL
D
SIL
VE
R
HE 2012 ISOA ANNUAL SUMMIT washeld in mid-October at the
National PressClub in Washington, D.C., bringing together
experts and practitioners in the stability
operations,development, and foreign policy fields to discusslessons
learned and challenges ahead. This yearsconference followed a
unique two-track format, withone set of breakout sessions themed
Policy &Strategy catering to CEOs, COOs, GeneralCounsels,
Government Relations professionals, andCompliance Officers, , while
the other track themedNew Realities & Demand focused on
budgets,funding, cost and procurement topics, aimed atBusiness
Development Directors and ContractOfficers.
The entire 2 day program encompassed poignantviews from more
than 55 speakers, and gaveacademic, nongovernmental, public, and
privatesector attendees the opportunity to network,
shareexperiences from working in fragile environmentsworldwide, and
discuss best practices. Notablespeakers included Dr. James Schear,
DeputyAssistant Secretary of Defense for PartnershipStrategy and
Stability Operations; Ambassador JohnNegroponte; Assistant
Secretary General EdmondMulet of the UN Department for
PeacekeepingOperations; and Ambassador Princeton Lyman,Special
Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan. The range
of expertise and opportunity for dialogue at the 2012Summit
would not have been possible without thesupport of the Summit
sponsors, ISOA membercompanies, and industryleaders in
attendance.Collectively, attendeesand speakers openlyshared their
practicalknowledge to addresschallenges as well assuggest
innovative ideas for future success in thestability operations
community.
A RAINY OPENING LEADS TOBRIGHT DISCUSSION
The Summit kicked off with a rooftop networkingreception in
downtown Washington, D.C. thatprovided attendees the opportunity to
meetprofessionals from a variety of sectors within thestability
operations community. Despite the inclementweather and inevitable
downpour, attendees fromSouth Africa to the United Kingdom to just
down thestreet in Virginia discussed partnerships andcommon
goals.
The following morning, day one began with a keynoteaddress
delivered by Dr. James Schear, in which helaid out key ingredients
for improving stability
operations. These included supporting the civil
affairscommunity, growing regionally aligned forces, andrefining
law enforcement to fill critical gaps, among
others. The subsequent breakout panel ontransitions in
development and security inAfghanistan was of particular interest
tomany attendees looking to conduct newbusiness there, and boasted
an impressivelineup of panelists including Undersecre-tary of State
for Management, Patrick
Kennedy; Marc Grossman, Special Envoy toAfghanistan and
Pakistan; and Mohammad HaneefAtmar, former Minister of the Interior
for Afghanistan.Ambassador Kennedy praised the Afghan govern-ments
use of private security contractors tostrengthen non-diplomatic
missions as a symbol ofAfghan sovereignty. Mr. Atmar was not so
optimistic,reminding the audience that all of the progress madeto
date in Afghanistan is fragile and reversible, andthat good
governance is crucial to continued growth.
The afternoon kicked off with a luncheon keynoteaddress from
Ambassador John Negroponte, drawingfrom his over 50 years of
experience in diplomacyand foreign policy. Subsequent breakout
sessionswere held, discussing DCAA Compliance, andcongressional
appropriations trends for foreignassistance and stability
operations specifically, theadvantages and disadvantages of Lowest
Price
SPONSORED SECTION: 2012 ISOA ANNUAL SUMMIT REVIEW
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 17
BR
ON
ZE
SU
PP
OR
TIN
G
Technically Acceptable (LPTA) versus Best Valuecontracting.
The afternoon wrapped up with a fascinating panel,Strategic
Rebalancing: From the Arab Spring to thePivot to Asia. After a
brief networking receptionencouraging more intimate discussion and
reflectionon the days panels, Assistant Secretary General,Edmond
Mulet, engaged Annual Summit Dinnerattendees on trends, challenges,
and opportunities inUN peacekeeping missions.
LEARNING, ADAPTING, GROWING
Day two kicked off bright and early, with BreakfastWorkshops on
the technical issues of Complianceand the ANSI PSC
Standard.Afterwards, Jessica Mueller,ISOA Director of Programsand
Operations, delivered anISOA Year-In Review,followed by an update
on theISOA Middle East Chapterfrom Pete Dordal, SeniorVice
President of ISOA Member GardaWorld andincoming ISOA Board
Chairman, and TobiasBeutgen, President of ISOA Member American
GlassProducts. Following these remarks, panelistsdiscussed the
return on investment of stability
operations, especially for long-term economic growth.Jim
Bullion, Director of the Task Force for Businessand Stability
Operations at the Department ofDefense, summed up this goal well
when he posed,Lets try to get Afghanistan off of the front pages
andonto the business pages, a strong call for economicgrowth after
over a decade of conflict. Subsequentbreakout sessions included a
focus on lessonslearned and challenges ahead in Iraq, as well
asprocurement needs for the UN and US government.
The lunch keynote address, delivered by AmbassadorPrinceton
Lyman, Special Envoy to Sudan and SouthSudan, provided the audience
with a comprehensiveoverview of the ongoing struggle between Sudan
andSouth Sudan. Ambassador Lyman discussed how the
international community, threat ofeconomic downturn, and
ongoingnegotiations backed by the AfricanUnion paved the way for
dialogueto begin between Sudan and SouthSudan. He expressed
optimismabout the opening of the borderbetween the two countries,
which
gives people a unique prospect for better livelihoodsand
promotes new business opportunities.
After lunch, breakouts focused on the future ofcontingency
contracting, and assessing and
mitigating risk in frontier environments. The afternoonclosed
with a unique debate-style panel featuring DanRunde, Co-Chair of
the International Assistanceworking group for the Romney-Ryan
Campaign, andDoug Wilson, Co-Chair of the Defense WorkingGroup for
the Obama-Biden Campaign. Bothcampaign representatives gave their
perspectives onU.S. policy for stabilization, development,
potentialsequestration cuts, and foreign assistance in the
nextpresidential administration.
LOOKING FORWARD TO 2013
This years panels fostered a dynamic discussionabout the most
prominent topics facing the stabilityoperations community today. As
we move forward,success in the industry will be drawn from the
sharingof ideas and building of partnerships that isencouraged at
the Summit, and elsewhere throughoutISOAs programming. Stability is
derived from thepositive relationships built between
governments,private companies, nongovernmental
organizations,military professionals, academics, and the
ultimatebeneficiaries of stabilization: citizens living in
fragileenvironments. The ISOA staff looks forward to evengreater
success for the stability operations communityand its beneficiaries
in 2013, as we continue to learnfrom past experiences, adapt to
current changes, andgrow for the future.
PHOTOS: NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, NATHAN MITCHELL
15-17 OCTOBER 2012NATIONAL PRESS
CLUBWASHINGTON D.C.
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1218
Photo:UNPOLonpatrolinHaitiCredit:UNPhoto/LoganAbassi
VER THE LAST DECADE OR SO, the UN Security Council has issued
increasinglycomplex peace operation mandates for police support and
development, assistingrestoration of criminal justice systems, and
advisory support to corrections systems.
Growing complexity, however, has not always been matched by
careful analysis of what approachesdo and dont work in these three
areas, and under what conditions.
Stimson's Future of Peace Operations Program worked with the
Office of Rule of Law and SecurityInstitutions (OROLSI) in the UNs
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and, in particular, itsPolice
Division and Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service, to begin
to answer these questions(Durch et al. 2012). This article
discusses some of its key findings. (The full report is available
fromthe Stimson Center website.)
The study was set up to search for "minimum essential tasks" -
those that 1) always seem needed incomparable ways across missions;
and 2) seem to consistently have the desired effects on the
hostcountry's approach to police, justice and corrections. It found
that while certain tasks may always beneeded, their implementation
often depends on characteristics of a mission's operational
environ-ment, which the mission cannot exert direct control over.
Missions face difficult dilemmas in being
asked to deploy quickly into places wherepolitics can prevent
the quick actions thatpeacebuilding precepts dictate, or
withresources inadequate to substitute for criticalpublic security
capacities that governmentlacks. It is, in turn, difficult to
attribute changeto particular actors where many have been atwork,
but the study does identify areas wherethe imprints left by UN
missions are larger thanthose of other players. How lasting
thoseimprints may be is a separate question. Wedefined short-term
impact for this study as anoutcome that persists while a mission
isdeployed; long-term impact is an outcome thatpersists after a
mission departs. Since most ofthe missions examined in the study
are stilldeployed, most of the studys findings relate toshort-term
impacts.
Factors Enabling or Inhibiting Impact
In post-conflict societies, governance mayhave severely eroded,
presenting challengesfor UN peace operations to engage with
centralgovernments, at the local level and withcustomary
institutions. National and localownership of reform and rebuilding
the state inthe wake of violent conflict are keys to long-term
impact. However, ensuring localownership of new policies and
processes canbe challenging when leaders are focused onshoring up
power and control, balancing theinterests of competing groups, and
trying tomanage instability and prevent violentoutbreaks.
Physical environments into which missionsdeploy often pose their
own challenges.Decisions on mission resources are difficultand
logistics are often stretched whereinfrastructure is limited,
damaged or insecure.
UN Headquarters (HQ) support and missionrelations are important
determinants of missioneffectiveness. HQ needs to upgrade its
abilitiesto provide the right kind of support, analysesand tools to
be most helpful to missions.Missions and HQ must ensure quality
flow ofessential information and, smart systems tomanage knowledge,
process data, provide
Fiona Mangan, Program Officer at United States Institute of
Peace and former Field Analyst with Stimson Center, Dr William
Durch, Director of Future of PeaceOperations Program at Stimson
Center, Michelle Ker, Research Associate, Future of Peace
Operations Program at Stimson Center.
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
Post-Short Takes from a Recent Stimson StudyFiona Mangan, Dr
William Durch and Michelle Ker
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 19
helpful feedback, and track progress. Buildinginstitutional
memory requires comprehensivehandover protocols and assignment
overlaps,especially for positions with frequent turnover,such as UN
Police (UNPOL) on six- to twelve-6-12 month rotations. Neither was
apparent in themissions studied.
Police Components
UNPOL mandates have broadened significantlysince 1999, with
mission responsibilities nowextending to all aspects of host state
policedevelopment and elements of police operations.The resulting
comprehensive picture of UNpolicing is of an enterprise that is
overextended,under-resourced and lacking sufficientinstitutional
support.
Police development often requires difficultdecisions and
prioritizations, since limitedresources are competing with
overwhelmingneed. Supporting the development of individualhost
state police capacities fits within currentUNPOL capabilities,
although Police Contrib-uting Countries (PCCs) have tended to
secondgeneral-duty police officers to serve in UNoperations, rather
than specialists in training orinstitutional development. Police
withspecialized operational and training skills are inshort supply
even within PCCs, so general-dutyofficers end up in complex roles
as mentors andinstitution-builders. Secondments are often forsix-
to twelve-6-12 month rotations and goodprocedures for capturing
field experience andbuilding UNPOL institutional memory
aregenerally lacking. The secondment system issimply not prepared
or resourced to consistent-ly support either institutional capacity
building orits essential counterpart, institutional integrity.
In the short term, UN Police Division and fieldcomponents need
to address fundamentalissues of necessary skill sets and abilities
toplan and manage support to host state policing.Some of this need
has been met by creating
specialist civilian posts within some missionspolice components.
But mission plans shouldfocus more on early support for
institutionalintegrity building encouraging basic accounta-bility
mechanisms through vetting, basic trainingand probationary periods
for new officers andtransparency mechanisms for fundamentalssuch as
budget and payroll.
Second, mission police components shouldsupport stronger
foundations for institutionalgrowth. Research indicates that giving
500 hoststate officers quality, locally-driven, long-termbasic
training has more likelihood of generatingsustained, positive
impact than giving 2,000officers short-term training. Host state
policealso need locally developed and maintainable,simple
recordkeeping systems from the outset.
Third, the Police Division needs to find UNPOLleadership who
support and enable adaptivechange in police components approaches
tosolving the multiple and shifting problems thattheir people face
daily. The success ofUNPOLs work depends on its ability to adapt
tocontext, to return any temporary policingresponsibilities as soon
as judged prudent andto accelerate that process with the
regulartransfer of knowledge.
In the longer term, UN HQ needs to fundamen-tally rethink: a)
its approach to recruiting anddeploying international police
whether asindividual officers or as formed police units; b)the
tools they provide to help UNPOL meetmandated goals, including
strategic leadership,planning and models; and c)
definitions,implications and limitations of UNPOL roles
incomprehensive mandated tasks such asprotection of civilians and
in advising andmentoring. In these areas, UNPOL must lowerits
expectations as well as the expectations ofthe international
community and host stategovernment and people regarding what can
beachieved with the resources made available tomost peace
operations in seven years, the
duration of the average contemporarypeacekeeping operation.
Justice and Corrections Components
Justice and corrections components in missionshave generally
increased in size in the last fewyears as the UNs approach toward
rule of lawhas grown ever more holistic. Although theytend to be
mentioned and treated in the samespace, justice and corrections
institutions havedifferent characteristics that strongly affect
theirpredisposition to and interest in externallysuggested reform
or advice.
The justice sector is relatively impermeable tointernational
intervention, partly because itsstock in trade is confidentiality.
Judges prizetheir independence and legal systemsformaland
informalvary a great deal acrosscountries.
In most countries where the UN sendsmissions, investigative
capacity is marginal atbest and the historical alternative has been
self-incrimination by the accused. Post-conflictcriminal justice
systems are often characterizedby combinations of arbitrary arrest,
the absenceof concepts of bail or parole, poor recordkeep-ing,
sluggish or dysfunctional case flow throughthe courts and
prevailing assumptions thatarrest equals guilt. In most of the
countriescovered by this study, such factors have led toprison
populations with 80 percent or more inthe pre-trial and/or
pre-charge phase.
Faced with decayed and overcrowded prisonsrun by untrained
volunteers, political appointeesor prisoners themselves, alert UN
correctionsadvisers have in a number of cases improvedprison
conditions, helping to keep moreprisoners among the living. Several
missionshave provided transport and logistical supportto mobile
courts whose sittings inside prisonshave the potential to reduce
prison populations,
Continued on page 20
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector Reform
since limited resources are competing with overwhelming
need.
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1220
if they work expeditiously. Increasing thenumber of public
prosecutors and defendershas had some success in improving rates
ofcase flow. Ultimately though, it remains difficultto convince
host governments to dedicateadequate resources to prisons when
theiraverage citizen lives in poverty.
Strategic planning is an area where missionshave the potential
to impact justice andcorrections systems. UN missions have
accessto, and potential leverage with, senior politicalleadership,
while being viewed as morepolitically neutral than other
international actors.In countries where host state officials
engagedin strategic planning and where a correspond-ing action plan
was developed for timedprogram implementation, these practices
wereobserved to diffuse across the broader nationalframework of
government, as well as NGOs.
Support to legislatures and national reformcommissions is among
the most difficult butpotentially most important elements of
UNmissions support for rule of law. Law reformhas the power to
provide long-term solutions toissues that host governments and
missions findthemselves hard-pressed to address. Forexample, law
reform can reach some of the root
issues in pre-trial detention and prisonovercrowding by
introducing alternatives toincarceration, adjusting or tightening
sentencingguidelines. However, the best technical advicecannot
overcome political or proceduralobstacles to enactment of reformed
laws nor isthe missions leverage alone likely to do so.
Mission programming to improve access tojustice mainly focuses
on improving capacityand processes of the formal justice system.
Itseems time that UN peacebuilding efforts paygreater attention to
informal justice systems, asfunctioning customary justice reflects
the socialties that bind communities and is the form ofdispute
resolution that large majorities of thepopulations in mission
countries use day to day.Customary justice may be the only remnant
ofeffective governance left when the mission firstdeploys. The do
no harm principle alonesuggests that greater time and effort
bedevoted to understanding the post-conflict rolesof these
institutions.
Finally, if donors could be made to overcometheir prisons-last
mentality, prison assistanceoffers potentially big and reasonably
quick winsfor UN operations. Investments in long-termprison guard
training, in-house mentoringprograms, prison farms, mobile
courts,
paralegal training programs and publicdefenders have led to
improved prisonertreatment and substantial drops in
prisonpopulations over time.
This article has given a snapshot of some of thefindings from
Stimsons study of the impact ofpolice, justice and corrections in
UN peaceoperations. The full report is available in PDFform on the
Stimson website at
http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/understanding-impact-of-police-justice-and-corrections-components-in-un-peace-operations/.
References
Durch, William J., Madeline L. England and FionaMangan, with
Michelle Ker. Understanding Impact ofPolice, Justice and
Corrections Components in UNPeace Operations (Washington, DC: The
StimsonCenter, 2012),
http://www.stimson.org/books-reports/understanding-impact-of-police-justice-and-corrections-components-in-un-peace-operations/.
Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (OECD/DAC, UNEG, World
Bank IEG, and the InternationalOrganization for Cooperation in
Evaluation), NONIEGuidance on Impact Evaluation, 2009,
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/nonie/guidance.html.
Continued from page 19
Feature | Evolutions in Security Sector
ReformPhoto:UNPOLtrainingsessionwithLiberianNationalPolice
Credit:UN
Photo/StatonWinter
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 21
ark Kroeker is Senior VicePresident for Justice andRule of Law
at PAE.
Following thirty two years of servicein the LAPD, Mark served as
DeputyCommissioner of the InternationalPolice Task Force in the UNs
Missionin Bosnia and Herzegovina. He laterbecame Portland Oregon's
PoliceChief.
How has the quality of UN police trainingevolved over time?
Kroeker: The evolution has been significant.I have watched it
for more than 20 years now,and I have seen a big shift. The major
way Iwould describe this shift is from monitoring tomentoring, from
a simple training to capacitybuilding. It has moved from
peacekeeping inmissions, civilian police as part of the
militarystructure, to a much more sophisticatedcapacity building,
mentoring, advising andtraining in the broadest of functions.
Does the international community putadequate emphasis on police
training?
Kroeker: It does and it doesnt. I would sayyes, in a certain way
it does put emphasis ontraining. But, the problem is that it
defines itimprecisely. In other words, sometimes wehave a tendency
to measure all the wrongthings precisely. The measurement of
trainingis not in the numbers of people trained or thenumbers of
hours of training or the numbers ofcourses offered. But rather what
is the state ofthe learner? What is the state of the institutionthe
learner represents? Because we have atendency in post-conflict
situations to want tobuild institutions very rapidly, we measure
thewrong things, and we come to the things thatare most easy to
measure. You can quicklymeasure what is the size of the police?
What isthe size of the population? Theres a ratiothere. That is
very deceiving. The other thingwe measure easily is how many people
havebeen through a certain training. For example,Afghanistan. You
read reports in thenewspapers saying we have trained this
manypolice. And always behind that there is aquestion to be asked.
To do what? How arethey doing?
What would be a better measurement?
Kroeker: The more relevant measurement inmy view comes from a
more sophisticatedapproach to looking at the institution, at
thepolice itself. What are the various competenciesof a police
organization, and how are they doingin those competencies? How are
the individualmembers of the organization performing as aresult of
the training they are getting? Is thisperson who has been
recruited, selected,
trained and deployed operating understandards of internationally
approved lawenforcement capacity, or have we just made anassembly
line where we put that person outthere and they leave the
organization, theydont show up to work, they fail in
somesignificant way, go back to old habits or reallyshow a clear
failure to learn whatever is wasintended for them to learn?
How can the international community betterutilize private sector
capabilities for security
sector reform?
Kroeker: As you consider the internationalcommunity, much of it
is private, non-governmental organizations. The contractorsthat
work there, the business interests thatseem to follow a conflict as
contractors come in.The idea is not necessarily what sector
isrepresented, but the authenticity of thepartnership involved.
When we look ateveryone engaged, for example, the Depart-ment of
State, the Department of Defense, theUnited Nations, the
non-governmentalorganizations, contracting organizations,
civilsociety, all of these have played different roles.I think
sometimes people have a tendency todisparage any one of those.
Disparage NGOs,disparage government, disparage contractors.All
contractors are this. All DoD is that. AllNGOs are this. The fact
is that every one ofthem, if working together on a commonpurpose, a
common objective, with individual-ized lanes they can work to a
common synergythat produces monumental results after war andafter
the military engagement winds down.Unfortunately there is a
tendency to pointfingers rather than join hands. Theres atendency
to occupy very sequestered rolesrather than looking for ways to
have mutualconsolidated objectives. When that happensthen we have
dysfunction that has marked a lotof post-conflict situations in the
history of the 20years or so that I have been watching it.
PAE, Inc. is a company that conducts contractual activities in a
wide range of disciplines in 65 countries.
Q&A | A Conversation with Mark Kroeker
Police Training in an EvolvingUnited NationsA Conversation with
Mark KroekerISOA Editorial Team
Phot
o:M
arkK
roek
erCr
edit:
PAE,
Inc.
Continued on page 22
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1222
Which do you think were the mostsuccessful police training
programs, and
why were they particularly successful?
Kroeker: I think of Kosovo as a primeexample. The Kosovo police
today, if you lookat them, are a fairly well-regarded
policeorganization. As one police officer said to mewhen I was
there on my last visit over theyears, this Kosovo police has earned
therespect of their neighbors in the region. So youmight even say
that they are the best policeorganization in the Balkans. That, I
think, is asubstantial remark, although its not anempirical remark.
Its an anecdote based onone police officer telling me something.
But as Iobserved the Kosovo police and looked at itsvarious
functions in the various times Ive beenthere, I concluded that
there is something tothese observations. This is a very
goodorganization. What Kosovo did was have anexecutive mission with
the United Nationswhere the UN police was the police, and where
the Judicial arm and correctional arm was doneby international
engagement. So internationaljudges were hired, and so forth. When
thatexecutive function took over, and then a carefulphased
transition to local ownership took place,while the construction was
going on, the resultwas a phased ownership that today if you lookat
Kosovo would still international engagementthere. To a substantial
degree, the engage-ment is less and the local ownership is more.The
capacity of that organization is strong. Oneof the reasons that
they are strong is becausethe linkage was made right at the start
betweenthe Kosovo Police Service and its rule of lawpartners, the
correctional side and the judicialside.
Theres another one that stuck out in my mind.Ill give you the
Liberia model. I happen to knowsomething about the Liberia model
because Iwas police commissioner of the UN Mission inLiberia right
after the war. That war took some250,000 lives and stretched over
14 years, andit rendered the police entirely dysfunctional and
all of their assets were looted during the war.When I arrived,
we truly started from zero.With the launching of the UN mission, we
hadfive police officers and me. That was the policecomponent. When
I left, there were about1,100 or 1,200 UN police officers. That
wasabout a year and a half later and we had gottenstarted. I was
just there last week in Liberia,and I have seen the growth in the
LiberianNational Police. I met with its Police Director,its Police
Chief, and with several of the policeofficers. I saw the police
academy that I helpedto start when I was there now under
fullownership of the Liberian National Police. Iheard about the
Judiciary operating morecapably. I heard of the various
competencies ofthe police: salaries being paid, promotionsbeing
made on the basis of merit. The secret tothat success was not only
the military thathelped stabilize the nation that was part of theUN
peacekeeping force, but we had foreignpolice units that arrived.
The Formed PoliceUnits (FPU), under the UNs Police Componenthelped
put out those disturbing civil unrestbrush fires that could have
led to largerdisastrous effects. The Formed Police Unit thatcame
later that I recruited when I was at the UNheadquarters was from
India, an all-womanFPU. That FPU unit brought a lot of credit
notonly to India, but to the idea of crowd control,the fact that an
entire unit can be not only malebut all female and made significant
points inthat arena. But the FPUs work across theyears stabilized
the nation while law enforce-ment development capacity building
policetraining was taking place, one of the reasonsLiberia National
Police is on the right tracktoday. They are not what they should or
couldbe, but incrementally the movement has beenvery positive and
it has been substantial.
What have been the greatest impedimentsto successful police
training?
Kroeker: Number one, I think, always iscorruption. Corruption is
an impediment and itstands as a show-stopper, or slow down lever,on
many different fronts: the political front, thegovernments front
the legislative front, the ruleof law front, including the police,
especially withlow salaries and a vacuum of leadership. Since
Continued from page 21
rather than join hands. Theres a tendency tooccupy vary
sequestered roles rather than lookingfor ways to have mutual
consolidated objectives.
Q&A | A Conversation with Mark
KroekerPhoto:Afghanpolicetraining
Credit:Flickr/DVIDSHUB
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 23
Photo
:UN
peac
ekee
pers
day
Cred
it:UN
Photo
/Gon
zalez
Farra
n
the first and most visible face of government islaw enforcement,
where corruption is rampantin law enforcement, it is hard to
produce thattransparency that we speak about, thecommitment to
integrity that we train, and theabsorption of core values that we
believe andtry to imbue. Its hard to institutionalize thesethings
when the common enemy is alwayscorrupt power structures that
present analternative to accountability to the community,to
government, to peace and to ethicalstandards of police operation.
Corruption is astrong impediment.
The other strong impediment is the internationalcommunity. As
much as we like to think wework together and solve problems,
sometimesthe dysfunction that we have as a communityserves to hold
things back as impediments. Weoperate on different channels. We
cant work inauthentic partnerships, we work against eachother. The
result is not incentivized. We havea tendency to hold ourselves
back by ourinability to work together toward a common
objective. I see the international donors, forexample, being in
what I call a problem of donorinterference rather than donor
support. In otherwords, Im going to give this particular productor
this particular construction project and itdoesnt really fit with
an overall plan.
In places like Afghanistan there is aconstant friction between
those who
advocate focusing on military skills that will helpthe police
survive in areas of conflict, and policeskills that make them
effective and welcomedmembers of the community. How do you seethis
tension?
Kroeker: Well I see the tension as tangible. Itis real. It is a
tension that arises out of a classicdisparate view of post-conflict
situations.Theres a tendency among the military to viewlaw
enforcement as an exit strategy. So thequestion is how soon can we
stand up a lawenforcement structure so that we can leave.The other
view is that law enforcement capacitybuilding is generational. It
cannot be done by
Christmas. It cannot be done by next year, or2013 in August.
This is a generational sort of athing. Like raising your family.
Its a 20 yeartransformational challenge. That doesnt meanthat
significant things cant happen right away,but I think the most
important thing in lawenforcement, and where the conflict exists,
isthat law enforcement structures have to bedemilitarized. They
have to be depoliticized.They have to move away from the political
andmilitary dominance that seems to take place, orfrom warlords and
handed over to thecommunities. Yes political oversight in thegood
and proper way, but not politicalinterference in the corrupt way.
So theres theconflict. The helpful effective members of
thecommunity are not found in counterinsurgencyfighters. They are
found in local police officerswho will provide access to justice,
who willmake arrests of low level violators, who willsolve
community problems together with thecommunity. That is a tension
and it is thetendency in training to measure the numberstrained
rather than the capacities built.
Q&A | A Conversation with Mark Kroeker
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1224
N SEPTEMBER 25, 2012,President Barack Obama signed anexecutive
order designed to end
human trafficking among governmentcontractors overseas. This
order, StrengtheningProtections Against Trafficking in Persons
inFederal Contracts, together with pendingCongressional
legislation, the End Trafficking inGovernment Contracting Act of
2012, changesthe way U.S. contractors do business overseas.
Federal contractors will be required front-loadhuman trafficking
prevention programs into theirproposals before a grant is awarded.
Theexecutive order ups the ante on monitoring andaccountability
while the legislation strengthenscriminal sanctions against
offenders. Now,prime contractors are liable for the actions oftheir
subcontractors all the way down thesupply chain. These initiatives
are timely andnecessary.
Background
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act(TVPA) of 2000 marked the
United StatesGovernments official declaration of war againsthuman
trafficking. Originally intended to guideU.S. foreign policy in
combating humantrafficking internationally, and provideassistance
to foreign victims inside the UnitedStates, the Act has been
fine-tuned at each ofits three subsequent reauthorizations to
keeppace with increasingly complex humantrafficking practices.
Following the brutalkillings of twelve Nepalese contract workers
inIraq and allegations of large-scale laborexploitation, the 2005
Trafficking VictimsProtection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)introduced
provisions related to extraterritorialjurisdiction over federal
contractors, making
U.S. contractors working overseas liable foracts of sex and
labor trafficking.
Unfortunately, little has changed. Reports fromthe Commission on
Wartime Contracting andthe inspectors general of the Defense and
StateDepartments provided detailed accountsindicating that Third
Country Nationals (TCNs)in the employ of U.S. contractors notably
in Iraq
and Afghanistan have been subject toexploitative treatment
equating to debt bondageand human trafficking. The
Commissiondelivered a resounding censure of anti-TIPmeasures
currently on the books by declaringExisting prohibitions on such
trafficking havefailed to stop it. In response to such
criticism,the House Subcommittee on Technology,Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relationsand Procurement Reform held its first of
twohearings on November 2, 2011. In hisintroductory remarks, Rep.
James Lankfordstated that the goals of the hearing were toanswer
two questions: Whether or not the U.S.Government has become an
enabler of humantrafficking, or if we have knowingly turned ablind
eye to trafficking? According to expertwitnesses, the answer was a
resounding yesto both.
Liana Wyler, Senior Analyst with the Congres-sional Research
Service of the Library ofCongress, outlined ten years of USG
anti-trafficking legislation including the TraffickingVictims
Protection Act (TVPA), threereauthorizations, a Zero-Tolerance
Policy, anda Presidential Directive, and concluded bysaying that,
Despite ongoing efforts to combathuman trafficking associated with
governmentcontractors, recent annual reports on traffickingin
persons by the U.S. Department of Stateacknowledge that government
contractors andsubcontractors continue to be implicated
inallegations of forced labor and sex trafficking.
Sustained Indifference
The primary reason for ongoing instances ofabuse is that
contractors have not beendirected or expected to abide by the
standardsof existing legislation. The numbers ofcontracts released
without clear anti-traffickingclauses allows for endemic
indifference toexploitative practices in the supply chain.
NickSchwellenbach, Director of Investigations,Project on Government
Oversight (POGO)remarked that The DoD IG has found that
asubstantial percentage of the contracts theyhave audited do not
have a mandatorytrafficking in persons clause. As one
businessdevelopment specialist for a large contractortold this
author, I remember seeing somethingabout trafficking in the
solicitation, but we neverdid anything about it and no one asked
for it. Itjust wasnt on the radar.
Another challenge is that many acts oftrafficking take place
throughout a labyrinthinesupply chain, beginning with the
recruitment ofTCNs in their home countries by third party
andoften-unlicensed recruitment firms. Traditional-ly, the prime
contractors have not been liablefor acts of trafficking at the end
of the supplychain.
According to Sam McMahon, a formergovernment fraud prosecutor
now focusing ongovernment contracting and corporate
Michele Clark is an Adjunct Professor of International Affairs
at the George Washington University and CEO of Third Space
Creative, LLC, developers of web-basedlearning and training
solutions with a focus on human rights, social change, and
education.
U.S. Government ContractsImplications for Federal
ContractorsMichele A. Clark
Photo:AnIraqimancarriesiceataworksite.Credit:Flickr,USAirForce
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 12 25
compliance, there has been no incentive inprevious years for the
prime contractors to getinvolved. Doing nothing carried few
riskswhereas reporting a human trafficking violationopened the door
to complex investigations,rendered even more so by
conflictinginterpretations of responsibility; if
reprehensiblepractices were being carried out by subcontrac-tors
and labor recruiters, the primes did not feelobliged to accept
blame. Furthermore, theharm, as is the case in most instances
ofhuman trafficking, was largely invisible. TNCswere housed in
separate labor camps andaccess was heavily controlled. Language
andculture created barriers of silence between theworkers and the
rest of the base populations.Those military and contract personnel
who didquestion certain practices often did not knowwhere to report
allegations of abuse, or weretold to mind their own business if
they tried.
New Requirements
On March 27, 2012, the same Subcommitteeon Technology,
Information Policy, Intergovern-mental Relations and Procurement
reform helda follow-up hearing, with a different cast ofcharacters.
The purpose: to introduce the EndTrafficking in Government
Contracting Act of2012.
The Executive Order and the legislation sharesimilar objectives.
They both focus onprevention of trafficking and
increasingaccountability among prime contractors andsubcontractors.
The legislation also imposescriminal penalties beyond the scope of
theexecutive order. The legislation provides forstronger
enforcement mechanisms that expandthe criminal prohibitions against
fraudulent labor
practices and make clear remedial actionsshould acts of
trafficking occur. These includeremoving the employee from the
exploitativeworking conditions, suspending paymentsunder the grant,
terminating the contract fordefault or cause, or referring the
matter to theagency for disbarment or suspension.
Contractors will now be required to takeproactive measures to
prevent trafficking inpersons throughout their supply chain and
todisplay evidence of such plans prior to receivingan award. These
measures will indicate howthey intend to prevent all forms of
trafficking, oracts that directly support or advance traffickingin
persons. Contractors will be responsible forpreventing actions such
as destroyingimmigration papers, failure to repatriate anemployee
upon termination of employment,making fraudulent job offers,
chargingexorbitant recruitment fees and providinginhumane living
conditions.
Implementation carries with it many newchallenges including
significant implicationsfor compliance, contract and human
resourcesoffices with recruitment posing the mostimmediate
problems. Industry is asking thequestion: How far does the
accountability go?And the answer is: very far. All recruitment
andrelated practices, including advertising ofoverseas positions,
contracts in diverselanguages, wages, terms and scope of work,and
transportation of workers must now besubject to intense scrutiny to
ensure fairpractice and informed consent.
These new anti-trafficking initiatives establish aroad map for
contractors to addressing humantrafficking in a systematic and
effective manner.
Addressing the potential for noncompliance inthis new
environment establishes the duty ofcontractors to set clear
expectations throughouttheir subcontracting networks that a
businessculture that tolerates trafficking will not survivefor
long.
References
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq andAfghanistan, Final
Report to Congress: TransformingWartime Contracting: Controlling
Costs, ReducingRisks, August 2011
Rep. James Lankford (R-Okla.): Are GovernmentContractors
Exploiting Workers Overseas? ExaminingEnforcement of the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act:Introductory remarks before the
Subcommittee onTechnology, Information Policy,
IntergovernmentalRelations and Procurement Reform of the
Committeeon Oversight and Government Reform. November 2,2011
Liana Wyler (Senior Analyst, Congressional ResearchService): Are
Government Contractors ExploitingWorkers Overseas? Examining
Enforcement of theTrafficking Victims Protection Act.: Testimony
givebefore the house Subcommittee on Technology,Information Policy,
Intergovernmental Relations andProcurement Reform of the Committee
on Oversightand Government Reform. November 2, 2011
Nick Schwellenbach, Director of Investigations,Project on
Government Oversight (POGO): AreGovernment Contractors Exploiting
WorkersOverseas? Examining Enforcement of the TraffickingVictims
Protection Act: Testimony give before theHouse Subcommittee on
Technology, InformationPolicy, Intergovernmental Relations and
ProcurementReform of the Committee on Oversight andGovernment
Reform. November 2, 2011
-
NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1226
SLAMIC JIHADISTS affiliated withAQIM, the Al-Qaeda franchise in
NorthAfrica and the Sahel region, are in control
of northern Mali. Their intention is to spreadtheir control to
the rest of Mali and then on toneighboring Mauritania and Niger.
Everyoneagrees on what needs to be done. There mustbe a military
intervention to defeat theinsurgents, known as Ansar Dine, who
controlthe key towns of Kidal, Gao and Timbuctu.Negotiations are
neither possible nor desirable.
The governments comprising the EconomicCommunity of West African
States (ECOWAS)have identified 3,000 military personnel whocould
participate in such an intervention. All ofthe governments have
agreed that such anoperation must take place as soon as
possible.But organizing to undertake the operation in anarea that
is so far away from military bases, andso vast, with limited
logistical capacity, appearsto be a daunting objective at the
present time.
The French government, which maintains closeeconomic, diplomatic
and military ties with theFrench-speaking countries in ECOWAS,
has
openly expressed the intention to support anintervention by
African forces, but has notoffered to put French fighters on the
ground.
The United States administration has also ruledout any direct US
involvement in a re-conquestoperation, but is apparently keeping
the dooropen to intelligence and logistical cooperationvia its
geographic command AFRICOM. Indeed,
we know that AFRICOM surveillance of AnsarDine is already taking
place from temporarybases in neighboring Burkina Faso, a
countrythat is also threatened by the Islamic Jihadistsnext
door.
ECOWAS leader in military interventions in theWest African
sub-region has traditionally beenNigeria. This oil rich country has
the largestmilitary establishment. But the Nigerian armycurrently
has its hands full with a home grownIslamist insurgency known as
Boko Haramthat has been spreading terrorism in thecountrys northern
Moslem majority states. Sofar, the Nigerian army has not yet gotten
thesituation under control, and is therefore likely tohave neither
the troops nor the commandstructures available for an operation in
northernMali.
French military sources tell me that thefrancophone African
countries have a way to gobefore they can gear up to intervene in
northernMali, but they understand the necessity to actquickly.
Public statements by the American administra-tion have been
somewhat ambiguous. On theone hand, the US recognizes the need to
actmilitarily in northern Mali. On the other hand,the US wants to
see the restoration ofdemocratic legitimacy in Mali as the
highestpriority. In other words: democracy first,military
intervention second.
What does the US administration mean by itsinsistence on the
restoration of democraticlegitimacy to the government of Mali?
Back in February-March 2012, Malian Touaregfighters, who had
been mercenaries in theLibyan army of Moamar Gaddaffi, came back
toMali with their arms and vehicles after thesuccessful Arab Spring
uprising in Libya. Innorthern Mali, they found the Malian
armytotally unprepared for the defense of the threemain cities.
They were able to take over thecities easily, with the Malian army
retreating tosouthern Mali via the border town of Gao. TheTouareg
fighters returning from Libya declaredindependence for their
northern region as theRepublic of Azawad. Their political
movementwas called the Movement for the Liberation ofAzawad
(MNLA).
In view of their humiliation, which they blamedon their corrupt
political leaders, youngerMalian army officers staged a coup in
thecapital of Bamako on March 22, 2012 and tookover the government.
President AmadouAmani Toure was forced to flee the country onemonth
before a scheduled presidential electionin which he was not
eligible to run. Underpressure from ECOWAS, the military
officersagreed to turn over power to an interim civiliangovernment
led by the democratically electedPresident of the National
Assembly. However,it is clear that the military officers continue
toexercise the real governmental power with thepoliticians as front
men. Moreov