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Srebrenica: a safe area

Part III - The fall of Srebrenica


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Contents

Chapter 1 The military and political situation in spring 1995 .......................................................................... 51. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 52. Force Commander general Bernard Janvier............................................................................................... 63. Commander UNPROFOR general Rupert Smith in Sarajevo .............................................................. 104. The differences between Smith and Janvier............................................................................................. 135. The Split meeting: split visions?.................................................................................................................... 156. The strategic field of forces spring 1995, seen from UNPROFOR ..................................................... 187. After the end of the cease-fire ................................................................................................................... 268. Boutros-Ghalis move in the Security Council ........................................................................................ 299. Janvier in the Security Council and in consultation with the troop contributing nations ................. 3610. The air strikes on Pale ............................................................................................................................... 4111. Direct consequences of the air strikes for UNPROFOR .................................................................... 4212. The report from the UN Secretary-General .......................................................................................... 4813. Response to the air strikes on Pale: formation of the Rapid Reaction Force ................................... 5414. The situation on the ground for UNPROFOR in June 1995 ............................................................. 6715. At the political front in Bosnia after the air strikes: the situation in June 1995 ............................... 7416. The strategy of the Bosnian Muslims in the fighting ............................................................................ 7917. The strategy of the Bosnian Serbs in the fighting ................................................................................. 8518. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 97

Chapter 2 Air power: Close Air Support and air strikes ................................................................................. 991. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 992. Backgrounds of the differences of opinion between NATO and UN .............................................. 1003. Air strikes in practice: the second half of 1994 ..................................................................................... 1094. Discussions on air strikes in spring 1995 ............................................................................................... 1175. After the OGrady incident: air power in July 1995 .............................................................................. 1216. Discussions on air power between UN and NATO at the highest level ........................................... 1257. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................. 128

Chapter 3 No air actions on release of the hostages: a deal between Janvier and Mladic? ...................... 1311. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1312. Rumours in the media about a deal ....................................................................................................... 1313. Further investigation into a deal in New York and Paris ..................................................................... 1344. The rumours on the Bosnian side ........................................................................................................... 1375. The report on the meeting with Janvier and Mladic ............................................................................. 1396. External interference with the hostage crisis ......................................................................................... 1417. Visions from later days .............................................................................................................................. 1448. Continuing the use of air power, also during the hostage crisis? ........................................................ 1469. Conclusion: deal or no deal? .................................................................................................................... 148

Chapter 4 The mood in the enclave: May - July 1995 ................................................................................... 1521. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1522. Dutchbats mood ....................................................................................................................................... 1533. The home straight was the heaviest for Dutchbat ................................................................................ 1634. Bosnia in the Netherlands domestic political arena - June 1995......................................................... 1685. The relief of Dutchbat III......................................................................................................................... 1716. The morale of ABiH and the population ............................................................................................... 1877. VRS propaganda in the enclave ............................................................................................................... 1928. The absence of Naser Oric ....................................................................................................................... 195


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9. The humanitarian situation in Srebrenica ............................................................................................... 20010. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................. 208

Chapter 5 The period from 25 May 1995 to 6 July 1995 .............................................................................. 2101. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 2102. The position of the Dutchbat observation posts (OPs)....................................................................... 2103. The days of late May and early June 1995: the VRS threaten around OP Echo .............................. 2174. Developments in June: an imminent VRS attack? ................................................................................ 2325. The NATO withdrawal plan .................................................................................................................... 2386. The ABiH offensive at Sarajevo .............................................................................................................. 2407. The situation around Srebrenica in mid June ........................................................................................ 2428. Individual skirmishes between ABiH and VRS ..................................................................................... 2459. The final two weeks before the attack .................................................................................................... 25910. The motivation for starting the attack .................................................................................................. 26311. VRS plans for the attack on Srebrenica ................................................................................................ 27112. Signs of an impending attack? ................................................................................................................ 276

Chapter 6 The Fall of Srebrenica: 6 to 11 July 1995 ...................................................................................... 2811. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 2812. Investigative problems related to the period of the fall and thereafter .............................................. 2813. A closer look at the headquarters and chain of command .................................................................. 2884. Procedures for the request of Close Air Support .................................................................................. 2955. Combat action and Close Air Support from day to day: 6 July .......................................................... 2986. Combat action and Close Air Support from day to day: 7 July .......................................................... 3077. Combat Action and Close Air Support from Day to Day: 8 July ....................................................... 3098. Combat Action and Close Air Support from Day to Day: 9 July ....................................................... 3219. A Line in the Sand: The Blocking Positions .......................................................................................... 33710. The Early Morning Hours of 10 July: Dutchbat Activities at the Blocking Positions .................. 35311. Close Air Support: A Third Request from Dutchbat ......................................................................... 35912. Further Activities of the Blocking Position on 10 July ...................................................................... 36213. The Night of 10 July: The Fourth Request for Close Air Support .................................................. 36614. The Start of the Refugee Stream ........................................................................................................... 37215. The Evening of 10 July: Emergency Meetings in Various Locations .............................................. 37416. The Night of 10 to 11 July: Last Meeting between Karremans and the Opstina ........................... 37917. 11 July: No Air Strikes ............................................................................................................................ 38618. The Situation in the Early Morning Hours of 11 July ........................................................................ 39319. The Morning of 11 July: Is Close Air Support Coming? ................................................................... 39520. Close Air Support Approved ................................................................................................................. 40121. The VRS occupy the city the population moves to Potocari ......................................................... 41222. From Srebrenica to Potocari .................................................................................................................. 41423. The fate of the remaining OPs .............................................................................................................. 41624. The ABiH reaction to the VRS attack .................................................................................................. 425

Chapter 7 6 - 11 July 1995 retrospective accounts ..................................................................................... 4371. DCBC: Defence Crisis Management Centre and the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff(RNLACrisis Staff) ...................................................................................................................................................... 4372. Discussions at the Defence Crisis Management Centre up to 11 July 1995 ..................................... 4403. Discussions at Defence Crisis Management Centre: 11 July 1995 ..................................................... 4454. Meeting of the Ministerial Council at the Defence Crisis Management Centre on 11 July ............ 4505. Calling a halt to further air support on 11 July ...................................................................................... 4536. The discussions in Zagreb on 11 July ..................................................................................................... 460


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7. Prior knowledge of the attack in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ............................................... 4628. Retrospective accounts relating to air support: Zagreb, The Hague, Mons, Naples, Washington etc............................................................................................................................................................................ 4639. The non-arrival of air strikes .................................................................................................................... 47010. Close Air Support at the large debriefing in Assen, and later in The Hague ................................ 48711. A retrospective at the blocking positions and the Rules of Engagement ........................................ 49412. First impressions of Dutchbat action ................................................................................................... 50913. Later criticism of Dutchbat .................................................................................................................... 51714. The Dutchbat command ........................................................................................................................ 52315. Military honours for Karremans and the Forward Air Controllers? ................................................ 53216. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................. 535

Chapter 8 Plans to re-take Srebrenica .............................................................................................................. 5441. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 5442. The French proposals................................................................................................................................ 5443. UN Resolution 1004: formulation and consequences .......................................................................... 5494. Military plans for retaking Srebrenica after the UN resolution ........................................................... 5555. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 558

Chapter 9 The departure of Dutchbat from Srebrenica ............................................................................... 5601. Plans for the departure of Dutchbat ....................................................................................................... 5602. No withdrawal, stay put ............................................................................................................................ 5643. The hard truth: Mladic dictates whether and how Dutchbat withdraws ........................................... 5694. The Hague, Zagreb and New York deliberate on the departure of Dutchbat ................................. 5715. Is a withdrawal in sight after all? The birth of the Smith-Mladic Agreement ................................... 5726. The arrangements for the withdrawal and the route ............................................................................ 5747. Consultations between Mladic and Nicolai on the Dutchbat equipment .......................................... 5778. The Dutchbat withdrawal as a public issue ............................................................................................ 5789. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 581


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Chapter 1The military and political situation in spring

19951. Introduction

A proper understanding of the series of events that resulted in the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 isnot possible without a further discussion of the political and military-strategic developments since thespring of that year. Even within the United Nations some heated discussions took place. After all, thereare arguments to support the conclusion that the Safe Area policy had become a failure. The Safe Areashad not been demilitarized as intended but, on the contrary, the warring factions were misusing themfor military purposes.

That also made the UNPROFOR mandate and organization subject of discussion once again.

In May 1995, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, and Force Commander General Janvier,presented their ideas to the UN Security Council. However, their ideas stranded in the interplay ofpolitical forces in New York and in the capitals of the troops-supplying countries. Nevertheless theideas of Janvier as well as those of Boutros-Ghali will be discussed further because they provide aninsight into the situation of the mission at the time and into the ambiguities in the UNPROFORmandate as laid down in the various Security Council resolutions. Those ambiguities influenced theeffectiveness of the UNPROFOR mission and the warring factions perception and the public opinionregarding the UN presence.

The matter will be approached from the Bosnian angle. That means hardly any attention will begiven to developments in Croatia and Republika Srpska Krajina, the serb Republic proclaimed by theCroatian Serbs in the Krajina.

This chapter focuses on the military operational and strategic aspects. That is because after therejection of the Contact Group plan by the Bosnian Serbs, political activities to end the conflict inBosnia were on the backburner. The cease-fire agreed on 31 December 1994, known as the Cessationof Hostilities Agreement, that should have lasted until 1 May 1995, had not put a stop to the fighting.On the contrary, the hostilities continued with renewed intensity, also before the end of the Cessationof Hostilities Agreement. The political vacuum in which UNPROFOR found itself will also bediscussed in detail. The political activities that did continue, such as the creation of the Rapid ReactionForce, will also be addressed.

In spring 1995 the military-strategic balance between the warring factions in Bosnia wasshifting. That had two causes: firstly the creation of a military alliance within the Muslim-CroatFederation but, more importantly, the shift in balance between the military forces of the Bosnian

Muslims (the ABiH) and those of the Bosnian Serbs (the VRS). This balance shifted in favour of theBosnian Muslims: the ABiH had considerably more manpower than the VRS and over the course oftime they became better armed, equipped and trained, while the VRS became more and moreexhausted.

Also from an economic point of view the Serb Republic in Bosnia, Republika Srpska,proclaimed by the Bosnian Serbs, was taking a beating. The effect of the sanctions became apparentand fuel shortages had an impact on the mobility of the VRS.

In addition to visions of the military-strategic situation that prevailed in Zagreb, Sarajevo andother capitals, this introduction will also discuss the strategy of the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian-Serb intentions. Particularly the latter was an unknown element for UNPROFOR, just like for the

ABiH. A major cause of that was that UNPROFOR did not have a properly functioning intelligence

organization. Interviews by UNPROFOR representatives with politicians and soldiers of the warringfactions, and interpretations of those, had to lead to the best possible assessment of the intentions of


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the warring factions. In several cases that caused differences of opinion between the UN headquartersin Zagreb and Sarajevo.

Moreover, since 1995 these UN headquarters were under new command. Newcomers in 1995were the French general Bernard Janvier, as Force Commander of UNPROFOR based in Zagreb, and

the British general Rupert Smith in Sarajevo as Commander Bosnia-Hercegovina Command. They hadto find their role at the Yugoslav scene amidst the players who were already there, including: the SpecialRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General (abbreviated: the SRSG), Yashusi Akashi from Japan;general Ratko Mladic at the Bosnian-Serb side; and general Rasim Delic on the side of the BosnianMuslims. For UNPROFOR an important official within NATO was the American admiral LeightonSmith (not to be confused with general Rupert Smith). As Commander in Chief Allied Forces SouthernEurope he was one of the people holding the key to Close Air Support.

Their visions, the differences between those, and the resulting disputes regarding theassessment of the military-strategic situation will receive special attention in this chapter. That isbecause these visions had an impact on the policy and its implementation. For that reason we will start

with a characterization of the main players on the military-strategic stage. The two newcomers in

Zagreb and Sarajevo have a prominent position among them: generals Janvier en Smith.

2. Force Commander general Bernard Janvier

Opinions differ widely on the French general Bernard Janvier who took office in February 1995. Hisway of acting can be described as careful and cautious, for which he was both praised and abused.

Among journalists, Janvier would soon be regarded as the man who later refused SrebrenicaClose Air Support, thus causing the onset of the fall of the enclave. That left a mark on theappreciation for Janvier in later days.

However, on such qualifications it was often too easily forgotten that Janvier had a militaryresponsibility that not only covered Bosnia, but also included Croatia and Macedonia. That means his

assessments were also based on conditions outside Srebrenica.There was more admiration for Janvier in Dutch military circles. That was caused by the fact

that the safety of the peacekeepers, who of course had not been sent to Bosnia to fight, had hiscontinuous attention. On various occasions Janvier pointed out that the safety of the UN personnel

was more important than the implementation of the mandate; that also determined his attituderegarding Close Air Support. Janvier always tried to protect the soldiers on the ground. That was one ofthe reasons why for instance his substitute (Deputy Force Commander), the Canadian General-MajorBarry Ashton, highly respected him.1

Other people in Janviers staff did show a more critical attitude towards the Force Commander.Nobody had any doubts that Janviers concern for the UNPROFOR troops was genuine, but at thesame time some people of his Zagreb staff saw it as an excuse to do nothing.

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Also within NATO for instance, criticisms of Janviers attitude could be heard, though thosecould partly be explained by the differences in roles between NATO and UN. NATO Secretary-General Claes resented the fact that Janvier - and with him Akashi and Boutros-Ghali - werecontinuously holding back when it came to military action, though according to Claes it had not beenmuch different with Janviers predecessors Cot and De Lapresle. De Lapresle took the position that thepeacekeeping character of the mission had to be maintained and, moreover, he did not want to put histroops at risk. For that reason he too resisted NATOs call for air strikes.

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1Interview Barry Ashton, 30/05/00.

Claes thought that firmeraction had to be taken towards the Bosnian Serbs, but he got irritated by the lingering and the

willingness to compromise on the part of Janvier and Akashi, the more so because Janvier had once

2Interview Tony Banbury, 05/06/00.3UNNY, UNPROFOR, Box 87302, File 3200-5, Vol. I, Air Strikes, 6 Aug 93-19 Dec 94. Interoffice Memorandum, DeLapresle to Akashi (Only), 25/11/94, UN Confi.


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told him: I dont owe you an explanation: I am the UN. Janvier could sometimes really pull rank,according to Claes.4

Janvier spent about half his time in Zagreb and the other half travelling. The latter for talks inthe UN framework in Geneva or New York, with his subcommanders in Sarajevo, or in Croatia or

Macedonia.In addition to strictly military aspects, Janvier was also expected to be engaged in the link with

the political-strategic decision-making process. Janvier considered his staff in Zagreb to be suitable formilitary affairs only. The military staff in Zagreb was hardly or not consulted regarding negotiations ordirect contacts with Mladic or others. Janvier handled that with Akashis political advisor.5

The language barrier

Generally speaking, the performance of French officers in peacekeeping operations and internationalstaffs could sometimes be a problem, because mainly the higher officers in many cases did not speakany foreign languages. That hampered their performance in the communication with other members of

international staffs. Working with interpreters was not always a solution.6

For instance, generalGobilliard, substitute of general Smith in Sarajevo and acting commanding officer of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command at the time of the fall of Srebrenica, did not speak any English at all.7Janvierdid not speak English fluently either, which had consequences for his work: meetings were in English,but Janvier apparently did not understand English as medium of communication sufficiently to takecontrol of discussions and to recognize subtle differences. For that reason he surrounded himselfoutside official meetings with a number of confidants who did speak French.8

That mechanism also made itself felt more widely: also in New York Janvier had close relationswith UN Undersecretary-General Annan and Director of Communications and Special Projects,Tharoor, mainly because the latter spoke French fluently. Conversely, people at the UNPROFOR headoffice in Zagreb who spoke English, preferred to discuss matters outside meetings with other English-

speaking people and within the staff there was a strong tendency to quickly discuss minor matters withthe Deputy Force Commander or the Chief of Staff without calling in an interpreter. Maybe that alsoresulted in Janvier not being aware of all ins and outs. But whatever could be said about Janvier:according to the military advisor to the UN Secretary-General, general-major F.H. van Kappen, he didnot manipulate.

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One of Akashis assistants, Tony Banbury, even went as far as stating that the language problemalso influenced Janvier with regard to his perception of the Bosnian-Serb way of thinking. Partly due tothe language problem, Janvier would hardly be able to handle the day-to-day affairs, according toBanbury. On occasions he would not have understood the situation because he often refused to use aninterpreter at meetings and briefings so he could not properly follow the discussion and made fewcontributions

10. EU negotiator Carl Bildt also mentioned Janviers English as a problem. Sometimes he

could not follow a line of thought and, according to Bildt, that caused him to become isolated. Janvierspredecessor De Lapresle didnt have Janviers language problem.11

However, not everybody considered Janviers inadequate knowledge of the English language aproblem for his performance. The Canadian major David Last, Military Assistant to the Deputy ForceCommander, for instance, who often accompanied Janvier, thought positively about Janvier. According

4Interview W. Claes, 12/03/00.5Interview Michel Guesdon, 07/06/006Interview Michel Guesdon, 07/06/007Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00.8Interview H. de Jonge, 27/09/99.9Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00.10Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00.11Interview Carl Bildt, 12/12/00.


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to him the general was mentally fine. He saw a connection with the circumstances: everybody inZagreb was exhausted in those days in July, said Last. They made days from six in the morning to lateat night, while in many cases they were on the telephone with their international capitals till all hours.Last had never seen Janvier not alert or concentrated as a consequence, yet when Janvier was tired, his

English gradually deteriorated and he had more trouble following the discussions.12Yet Janvier didrealize that he had his shortcomings in this field. He insisted on appointment of an English-speakingDeputy Force Commander, after his predecessor De Lapresle pointed out to him that the position

would no longer be held by a Canadian officer, but that it would be offered to the Netherlands. Forthat reason Janvier wrote to Annan: I have a personal requirement for a native English DFC, due tomy present lack of fluency in English. As a result, the Netherlands contributed the Chief of Staff(Kolsteren, as from June 1995), and Canada kept the position of Deputy Force Commander (Ashtongot that post).13

In Kolsterens perception, Janvier didnt miss much despite the language barrier and if he didmiss anything, he asked his Military Assistant or his translator. Once when Janvier was accompanied bya different interpreter who still had to learn the jargon, he said: No, that is not how I said it. That

would lead the conclusion that he did have a reasonable command of English, but did not feelcomfortable enough to speak it. Important briefings, such as those Janvier arranged for Akashi as hismilitary adviser, were held by Janvier personally and alone, usually with an interpreter, Kolsteren said.

Janvier did speak English with Kolsteren himself, but as soon as an Englishman or American waspresent, he didnt, apparently for fear of being at a relative disadvantage due to the language problem.

Then Janvier would speak French and his interpreter translated for him.

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Janvier as Force Commander

There have been speculations about the extent to which Janviers policy was spoon-fed by the Frenchgovernment. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Akashi, declared to the NIOD

that Janvier was under some pressure from his government.15

Consequently, Janvier would haveshown little initiative and would have followed the national line too closely. Other French ForceCommanders, who adopted an attitude that was more independent from the French government,

would have operated more effectively: generalCot would have achieved more, and someone like DeLapresle would even have had Akashi and Boutros-Ghali in his pocket. In addition, he would havebeen able to direct the minds of these two to a great extent because they had no military experience,according to UN Assistant Undersecretary-General Manfred Eisele.16Bildt too called de Lapresleextremely knowledgeable and intellectual.17

However, when judging Janvier it should not be forgotten that he had great doubts about theeffectiveness of Close Air Support, as he had to deal with it in more difficult circumstances than Cotand De Lapresle. The use of Close Air Support did not yield much tactical advantage in the opinion of

Janvier, but did entail substantial risks for the UNPROFOR units.

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12Interview David Last, 05/06/00.

A similar story was heard from theDutch military adviser to the UN Secretary-General, Van Kappen. In his opinion Janvier set great storeby the proportionality and subsidiariness principle, and his judgement on requests for Close AirSupport were based on that principle. Janvier adhered to the concepts thought out in New York, said

Van Kappen. Only when UNPROFOR was under fire from heavy weapons and there were no othermethods to solve the problem, Janvier was prepared to call in air power. In his opinion Janvier was

13UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Code Cable Janvier to Annan, 06/03/95, No. Z-376.14Interview A.M.W.W. M. Kolsteren, 07/10/99.15Interview Yasushi Akashi, 25/11/99.16Interview Manfred Eisele, 14/10/99.17Interview Carl Bildt, 12/12/00.18Confidential interview (4).


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strongly focused on doing things right rather than on doing the right thing. He wanted to remainimpartial as long as possible and not be carried away by the emotions of the moment. Janviers staff, as

well as Smith in Sarajevo, were prepared to go much further than Janvier.19However, Janvier himselfwas not a Machiavellian and he felt a strong responsibility for the soldiers.20

The ideas about this attitude of Janvier seem to be obscured, at least in his environment. Therethe image prevails that Janvier had great problems taking part in the discussions and had little tocontribute. That way Janvier created the impression that he didnt have much to say. Yet that was notcorrect. Janvier did prove to be a good analyst, but he could not show it very often due to the languagebarrier.

Of course Janviers personality also had an impact. He had problems gaining peoplesconfidence21and he was not easy to approach.22Neither should he have been a man with beaucoup definesse who was always in control of the situation.23

This meant that Janvier was of a whole different breed than general Smith in Sarajevo whocame under him. Differences of opinion between Zagreb and Sarajevo were not purely of a strategicnature. Philip Corwin, Head of Civil Affairs in Sarajevo, pointed out the differences in background and

character of the leading military figures. According to Corwin, Smith had known nothing but successesas a soldier. He had been shaped by his experience in the Gulf War and the Falklands War. In bothoperations the use of military force against a military inferior opponent had paid off. As an advocate ofmore forceful action, Smith felt supported by popular sentiments and the international press.

Janvier on the other hand, felt the pressure of the international community in Zagreb strongerthan Smith felt it in Sarajevo. In addition, Janvier was wary of what he called Smiths American-typecowboy diplomacy and he was strongly influenced by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. TheFrench were shaped by a less glorious military past and the experience of Dien Bien Phu. According toCorwin, Dien Bien Phu had not been a coincidence and Janvier was aware of that, just like general

Andr Soubirou, the Commander of the Rapid Reaction Force, on which more in section 13. Soubirouhad emphasized the considerable similarity between the geographical circumstances in Sarajevo and

Dien Bien Phu. That was because both Sarajevo and the three eastern enclaves were situated in valleyssurrounded by mountains and, consequently, they were indefensible.24

Janvier adopted a more cautious attitude regarding forceful action against the Bosnian Serbsthan the other leading figure at the UNPROFOR stage, general Rupert Smith. There were majordifferences between the ways of thinking of the two leading figures. Bildt judged that general Smith wasfar more intellectual than Janvier. He was an intellectual who could also command troops.

25Occasionally, the two generals had differences of opinion. Still Janvier said not to have harboured anyanimosity towards Smith but, on the contrary, spoke highly of him. Smith was in favour of hard actionbut never succeeded in convincing Akashi and Janvier. Smith wanted to fight and to take the side of theBosnian Muslims, among other things by using force to open a corridor to Sarajevo. However, Janvierdid not want to do that because UNPROFOR was not adequately equipped for such actions. The two

had carried on a fundamental debate on the subject and, according to Janvier, Smith had known thatJanvier would refuse.26

19Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00.20Interview H. de Jonge, 30/05/00.21Interview Emma Shitaka, 11/05/00.22Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00.23Interview Michel Guesdon, 07/06/00.24Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 160.25Interview Carl Bildt, 12/12/00.26Mission d Information commune sur les vnements de Srebrenica, Audition de M. Bernard Janvier, 25/01/01.


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3. Commander UNPROFOR general Rupert Smith in Sarajevo

The British lieutenant-general Rupert Smith, Commander in Bosnia after his predecessor, the alsoBritish general Sir Michael Rose, was the latters counterpart in a number of respects. Rose mainly

relied on his British personal staff and tended to ignore the rest of staff. Smith on the other hand diduse his staff, which made the work pleasant for a Chief of Staff. That at least kept the staff informedand people could keep a grip on things. Apart from the fact that Smith was an extremely pleasantsuperior, he also was at a very nice human being, according to his Chief of Staff, the Dutch Brigadier-general C.H. Nicolai.27

Also as regards vision and policy, Rose and Smith were somewhat on opposite sides. One ofAkashis policy officers called Rose a general who was not very receptive to advice: once he had takenin decision, he refused to deviate from it.

28One of Akashis other policy officers confirmed that Smithhad been the better general of the two. Rose had continuously been busy embellishing theUNPROFOR image.29He would rather talk to the media than enter into a meaningful discussion. ForSmith this was exactly the other way round.30Rose used Close Air Support with care31while Smith

advocated the use of more extensive force. In Smiths analysis UNPROFOR was the hostage of theVRS. That continuously put UNPROFOR in an inferior position while Smith on the other hand wastrying to reach a superior position. According to Smith a psychological battle against the VRS wasrequired rather than just military force. He wanted to take a number of subsequent measures to get themessage across to the VRS that he was not be trifled with.32

Shortly after he took office on 23 February 1995, Smith explained his way of thinking to hissubcommanders during a Force Commanders Conference. He wanted them to think ahead and toelaborate on ideas on what could be done. Only few people had to be involved because of thesensitivity of the matter. His message was be creative, think and work options out. Smith wanted topromote the following lines of though about the VRS: if they do this, they might already have done

what they could do if we would do something which they wouldnt like. So we should do this, because

they played their cards already while we have ours in hand. Realization of the actions was not so muchhis department: for actual implementation of an action he at least had to involve Janvier and Akashi.

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One of Akashis assistants considered Smith a wonderful analyst, a great soldier andintellectually dangerous. In that respect he was no match for Akashi or Janvier, she admitted. Akashi

was afraid that Smith was provoking a war. Smith would have made an excellent team with Janvierspredecessor, De Lapresle. He was brilliant as well, he grasped the current situation of UNPROFORand the negotiating process and in fact he was more than a troops general.

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Smith versus Mladic: a war of nerves

General Smith and general Mladic were well-matched. A true war of nerves was going on between

these two diehards. An example of the way Smith operated at the time of operation Deliberate Force(the operation against the Serbs that after the fall of Srebrenica brought the change that eventuallywould result in the Dayton Peace Accord) was, that he used six artillery guns (howitzers) for selected

27Interview C.H. Nicolai, 11/06/99.28Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00.29Interview Tone Bringa, 13/07/99.30Interview Manfred Eisele, 14/10/99.31Interview George Joulwan, 08/06/00.32Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00.33UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 117, Civil Affairs SNE. Memorandum, Notes from Force Commanders Conference, 23-02-95. Compiled by colonel NLA J.H.M. Engelen.34Interview Emma Shitaka, 11/05/00.


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targets, and every time had a separate howitzer fire two grenades on Mladics native town. This wouldnot have remained without effect.35

Meetings between the two generals could be rather heavy. After the air strikes at Pale late May,Smith said that it was not proper for a professional soldier to expose unarmed observers and to

threaten them with televised death. He demanded release and decent treatment, but did not want tonegotiate about it. Smith urged Mladic to impose restrictions upon himself and his soldiers, and he alsourged Mladic to think about the dangers of his course of action. Mladic urged Smith to do the same.

When two days later Smith took the opportunity to explain on the telephone that he did notcommand the NATO forces, but that he could only recommenced an action, and once more pointedout to Mladic what the difference was between air strikes and Close Air Support, Mladic hung up thephone. He said he didnt want to listen to these monstrous thoughts. Yet two days later Mladic stillaccepted Smiths offer to let the situation cool off, casually advising Smith to take a tranquilizer toenable him to take reasonable decisions.

Another illustrative moment in their relation happened when the French retook the Vrbanjabridge at Sarajevo. A number of Bosnian-Serb soldiers were killed there, after which Mladic said that

Smith did not have the right to kill VRS soldiers. It werent Africans like Smith had killed earlier in hiscareer, Mladic said. If Smith were a civilized human being, he would have to write letters of condolenceto the families of the dead VRS soldiers, after which Smith asked Mladic if he had done the same to thefamilies of the French soldiers who were killed. After all, it had been the VRS that started the action.36

The two were not only matched, but in a sense they were also condemned to each other. Therewas little development in the relations between the two generals. Late June for instance, in an interviewin Srpska Vojska Mladic lashed out to UNPROFOR and general Smith. Because the West did not wantto send troops to Bosnia, the Croatian and Muslim forces were executing the Western policy in theBalkans, Mladic alleged. UNPROFOR had made it clear that it considered the VRS as the enemy,encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to continue fighting and provided them with food, fuel andammunition. Mladic described Smith as a person who did not understand the situation. He came to

Bosnia as an arrogant man, showered with glory from the Gulf War. According to Mladic he neededtime to switch from fighter to peacemaker. Mladic also contended that Smith had recommended theMuslim-Croat Federation to jointly wage war, and that the Bosnian Serbs were the enemy.

37The latterwas exactly what UNPROFOR was frenetically trying to avoid. On the contrary, it had to become clearto the Bosnian Serbs that UNPROFOR was not at war with them and had no wish to be so. TheBosnian Serbs seemed to live in a world of their own and to have confidence in their ability to resistNATO and the UN.38

After some time Mladic understood that Smith was something entirely different than Janvier.He may have thought he would be able to overcome Janvier, unlike Smith. For that reason Mladicdecided not to talk to Smith anymore, but to Janvier.

39Smith on this part also refused to do businesswith Mladic for some time, for a number of reasons: out of principle; because of the hostages that were

being held; because Smith himself was holding four VRS soldiers; and because he believed that theVRS would not be interested in talking to him.40After the last hostages were released in June, Janviersubsequently asked Mladic to resume normal relations with Smith and his staff.41

35Interview Emma Shitaka, 11/05/00.36UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Telephone Conversation Gen Smith / Gen Mladic: 28/05/95 UN Confi, attached to CodeCable Akashi to Annan, 29/05/95, No. Z-883.37NIOD, Coll. Smith. Telegram Belgrade to FCO, 2616161Z June 95.38UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Fax Deyan Mihov, Acting D-SRSG/CAC BH Command Sarajevo to Yasushi Akashi and MichelMoussali, HCA Civil Affairs, HQ Zagreb, Situation Assessment May 29 1995 mailed with Code Cable Akashi to Annan,

29/05/95, No. Z-889.39Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00.40NIOD, Coll. Banbury. SRSGs Meeting in Split, 09/06/95, Confi.41DPKO, UNPF Code Cables 14 June 1995-30 June 1995. Code Cable Akashi to Annan, 20/06/95, No. Z-1025.


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In fact the opposite was going on of what Mladic observed in the interview. UNPROFORgenerally did not behave as an enemy of the Bosnian Serbs, but generally showed willingness to cometo arrangements. For that reason a Western ambassador in Sarajevo concluded: UNPROFOR tendedto side with the Serbs. UNPROFORs tendency to do business with the VRS rather than with the

ABiH can partly be explained from the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had an organized army (uniformsand regular units), according to the standards of the soldiers who were in command of UNPROFOR.

The VRS were soldiers like us, unlike the moderately equipped and less organized ABiH army.Another reason for that implicit choice was the continuous complaining by the Bosnian Muslims.

In fact, Smith was the first of the UNPROFOR Commanders who adopted a different attitudeand chose the side of the victim: de Bosnian Muslims. Smith qualified this intervention with the words:I have broken the machine and nobody can repair it. However, saying this he overestimated his ownrole a little; Smiths problem was that the Force Commander in Zagreb, Janvier, took the decisions andin many cases ignored the advice from the Bosnia-Hercegovina Commander, Smith.42

Smith and politicians

Smith had some reservations regarding politicians, who according to him did not always really have anidea of what was actually happening in Bosnia, and regularly failed to consult the military when takingdecisions that did have military consequences. Before he was appointed in Bosnia, Smith in his positionof British Operations Officer in London had become involved in the possible deployment of NATOforces in the former Yugoslavia. He had opposed it: in his opinion it was impossible for UN andNATO to operate at the same time in the same area. According to him, at the time no politician hadconsulted the UN desks or the military on declaring the No-Fly-Zone above the former Yugoslavia.

That was an invention by politicians and, said Smith, the soldiers were then left to implement it.Those politicians did make themselves heard in the meantime; Smith indeed had the problem

that time and again he had to convince the government in London that his vision was correct, and that

was not always easy.43

Yet Smith was very open about those contacts with London. He quite regularlyshowed his Chief of Staff Nicolai messages he had exchanged with London.44

An example of Smiths vision regarding political plans was that already at an early stage formilitary-operational considerations he was not enthusiastic about the plans NATO was designing to getUNPROFOR out of Bosnia in case of an emergency. The question he repeatedly asked was: how fastcan we get away? His experience in the Gulf War had taught him that it could take four to six monthsto remove all vehicles and heavy equipment from the operating area. Another worry with regard to this

was whether sufficient staging areas for the troops and the equipment could be found, i.e. places to takethe troops and equipment on board, and whether sufficient vessels were available.

45

Another example of the different approaches of politicians and the military which Smith wasdismayed at, was that the UN did not allow him to move artillery to Sarajevo. The British had artillery

available, but that had to remain embarked on vessels in the Adriatic Sea and the UN did not allow it tobe put ashore. In his opinion artillery would have been more useful than airplanes. Smith adopted apragmatic approach in military affairs.

46

42Confidential interview (3).43Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00.44Interview C.H. Nicolai, 09/07/99.45UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 117, Civil Affairs SNE. Memorandum, Notes from Force Commanders Conference,23/02/95. Compiled by Colonel NLA J.H.M. Engelen.46Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.


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4. The differences between Smith and Janvier

That also had an impact on his relation with Janvier. A clear example happened as regards the politicaldecision to set up what was called the Rapid Reaction Force for Bosnia in June 1995. This Rapid

Reaction Force will be discussed in more detail in section 13; what it roughly comes down to is that thisRapid Reaction Force was a forceful military unit read: with artillery and attack helicopters - with theobjective of strengthening UNPROFOR in order to reduce the missions vulnerability. Janviersestimate was that the Rapid Reaction Force could be used for defensive purposes, but that it would beof little use for offensive action.47

However, it was also clear that a considerable risk existed that this Rapid Reaction Force wouldnot be able to keep away from the battle that was going on. For instance sending supplies to the easternenclaves was of course in conflict with the attrition strategy pursued by the Bosnian Serbs for theseenclaves. It was also clear that general Smith anticipated extensive discussions on the exactimplementation of the Rapid Reaction Force. For that reason Smith took the following clear position

on this force: if I cant use it to fight, I dont want it.

Janvier at least showed to be prepared to help thinking about thedeployment of this unit.

48

The - very broad - idea was that Smith mainly took the position of a soldier who thought thatpoliticians did not sufficiently allow for the military reality in taking their decisions. Janvier on the otherhand in his position of Force Commander had to take into account the political reality to a greaterextent. Smith did not feel supported by Janvier and Akashi either, but as an exception he did by Annanin New York, although he said not to have sought support from the UN in New York. Smith admittedthat there were differences between him and Janvier, although these were not in the first place personalaccording to him.

49

Differences of opinion between Smith and Janvier remained, but according to Smith they onlyreally disagreed on two occasions. The first time a conflict between them developed about beingforceful regarding the use of helicopters for supplying the enclaves; see the extensive Appendix

supplying by air to this report. The second time the problem was the solution of the crisis regardingUN personnel taken hostage in May/June 1995. Smith thought that Janvier should not make a deal

with the Bosnian Serbs who had taken UN people hostage. More about this alleged deal in Chapter3.

50

However, the fact remained that Smith and Janvier fundamentally differed in their ideas about amore forceful course of action against the Bosnian Serbs. For instance when the VRS stopped UNconvoys, Smith wanted to use force to get them to their destination, but Akashi and Janvier preventedthat.

51

47NIOD Coll. Banbury. SRSGs Meeting in Split, 09/06/95, Confi.

More in general Smith opted for a tougher course of action against the Bosnian Serbs, and heexpected results from that. He thought that UNPROFOR had lost much of its credibility, and hecertainly had a point there. For instance, the Bosnian Serbs (as well as the Bosnian Muslims) had set upmany checkpoints for UN personnel. It had started with one checkpoint, but at a certain moment all of

Bosnia was riddled with checkpoints. As a consequence, UNPROFOR had lost its Freedom ofMovement, one of the starting points of the mission. More and more UN vehicles were seized.UNMOs were taken from their vehicle, undressed and robbed, and then they came walking backbarefoot. All the time there were shooting incidents and these also deteriorated into shooting incidentstowards UNPROFOR. And on top of all that it not only became impossible to supply the population,but it even became impossible to send supplies to the own UN personnel. For that reason Smith

wanted to take a stand in order to change things radically. In his opinion there was only one languagethe Bosnian Serbs would understand: the hard hand. However, Janvier en Akashi were afraid of

48Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.49Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.50Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.51Interview Tone Bringa, 13/07/99.


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hostage-takings. The political leaders in Zagreb preferred the solution of bringing in a new negotiatorto keep the staff in Sarajevo quiet for some time. People had to accept that, certainly while there still

were hostages.52According to Philip Corwin, Head of Civil Affairs in Sarajevo, Smith would rather facethe battle with the Bosnian Serbs and he felt that he had the moral weight of the international

community behind him.53There is no agreement on the question how far the opinions of Janvier and Smith differed.

Akashi for instance thought that messages about major differences of opinion between Janvier andSmith were exaggerated.

However, it would appear that having a case was not the same as winning it.

54He saw no reason to let his judgement on the relation between the generalsbe influenced by newspaper messages about major differences between Janvier and Smith.55Yet otherpeople said that Janvier and Smith did not hit it off. Also according to a UN spokesman Smith and

Janvier had a normal relationship, although he remarked on Janvier that rank and intellectual capacitydid not match and that this had also been heard from French circles.56Swedish UN officers on theother hand were positive about Janvier: brilliant, honest, the safety of the troops always came first andhe was a good Commander.57

EU negotiator Carl Bildt analyzed that Janvier was mainly a troops Commander. Smith was less

of a troops man than Janvier. He tried to be more analytical, to take everything in and to makeproposals. Sometimes that clashed, but the lines between Sarajevo and Zagreb were open andoperative. There was no other possibility, because the UN headquarters in Sarajevo could do nothing

without that in Zagreb, for instance when calling in Close Air Support, for which the key was inZagreb.

58According to the American admiral Leighton Smith the relation between Smith and Janviercould be described as reasonable, although the two generals did have heated debates from time totime.59

In practice the difference in attitude between Janvier and Smith appeared to solve itself becausemost decisions were taken in Zagreb. For that problem Smith, like Rose before him, tried to find amodus vivendi , for instance because he did not fully report on his thinking to Akashi and Janvier

60.Zagreb took the decisions and several times Smith had to face the fact that he was overruled by Janvier

or that his advice was ignored. Janvier, and other Force Commanders before him, should have beeninsufficiently open to the special situation in Sarajevo and the rest of Bosnia. For instance only after thefall of Srebrenica a UN office was established in Sarajevo with an own Mission Chief, which restoredthe balance somewhat and a more or less customized policy for Bosnia could be pursued. On takingdecisions, Zagreb strongly depended on the reports supplied by Smith from Sarajevo and the events inSector North East were far away.61

Smith confirmed to the NIOD that this had put Zagreb out of the loop as regards the eventsin Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves. Consequently, information about the situation in Sarajevo and theeastern enclaves reached Zagreb less and less adequately. There was not much contact between Smithand Janvier or Akashi, and Smith himself did not go to Zagreb very often. Moreover, contacts werehampered by the fact that the UN satellite connections were not secure;

62

52Interview C.H. Nicolai, 11/06/99.

once the UN had lent a UN-

secured fax machine to the VRS to enable them to maintain secure connections with the Bosnian-Serbregime in Pale. Later the Bosnian Serbs had refused to return this fax machine

53Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 160.54Interview Yasushi Akashi, 25/11/99.55Interview Yasushi Akashi, 25/11/99.56Confidential interview (56).57Interview Jan Inge Svensson, 04/11/99.58Interview A.M.W.W. Kolsteren, 07/10/99.59Interview Leighton Smith, 06/06/00.60Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/0061Interview K. Bache, 29/10/99.62Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.


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In conclusion it can be said about the relation between Smith and Janvier that in general Smithwas advocate of a hard line towards the Bosnian Serbs, because he thought they were not sensitive tosofter means; Janvier was much more cautious with a view to the safety of the UN troops. On thebasis of his responsibility, Janvier also had to take into account the political world in which the

decisions on UNPROFOR were taken. Smith from his responsibility also didnt have to worry so muchabout the political Umwelt of UNPROFOR than Janvier had to. In addition, Janvier seemed to have aless analytical attitude than Smith, but his analyses and the resulting solutions were in many caseschecked by Janviers cautiousness and political reservations. Eventually Smith increasingly appeared tohave seen it correctly, but that was not until after the fall of Srebrenica. During the preceding period

Janvier repeatedly overruled Smiths military initiatives. To sum up: differences of opinion remained,but it was not impossible for them to work with each other. There was not much consultation, also dueto a lack of properly secure means of communication.

5. The Split meeting: split visionsBy way of illustration of the various ideas within the UNPROFOR top, first an explanation followsabout the meeting in Split on 9 June 1995. That was a highly important meeting because that was whereSmith, Janvier and Akashi were going to synchronize their watches. The meeting took place in anatmosphere that was crisis-like for UNPROFOR. That was mainly caused by the fact that since the endof May UN personnel had been held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs. That had happened after NATOhad carried out air strikes on ammunition depots in Pale, the capital of the republic in Bosnia that hadbeen proclaimed by the Bosnian Serbs. The meeting was intended to ensure that the analysis of thesituation in Bosnia and its approach by these three leading figures (and then mainly between Smith onone side and Janvier and Akashi on the other) would be the same, but in fact it only illustrated thedifferences between their way of thinking.

The discussion was mainly carried on between Smith and Janvier, with Smith playing first fiddle.

The few times Akashi contributed to the discussion, it would be typical of his attitude: he did notcommit himself. Akashis only real contribution to the discussion was that it would be a problem to getthe hostages released, unless the Bosnian Serbs would get the assurance that no more air strikes wouldfollow, and that was impossible. Small numbers of hostages had been released earlier, but now thesituation was different, said Akashi. In his opinion the Bosnian Serbs were more isolated than they usedto and the scale of air strikes had been more massive than ever before. Not much had changed to theframework in which UNPROFOR operated. Modifications to the Safe Areas regime had appeared acontroversial issue in the Security Council, Akashi reported (later in this Chapter the cautiousness ofthe Security Council will be discussed in detail). Any proposed new actions had to be acceptable to theSecurity Council and the troop contributing nations. New proposals also had to fit in within the contextof peacekeeping. Akashi once more listed the relevant requirements: consent of the warring factions,

impartiality, use of force only in self-defence and freedom of movement.If elements of peace enforcing were to creep into the mission, it would reach the edge of the

Mogadishu line, according to Akashi. He said that with reference to the failed UN operation inSomalia; since then crossing the Mogadishu line meant crossing the border between peacekeeping andpeace enforcing. Crossing this border results in chaos and unpredictable consequences for thepeacekeepers, or forced withdrawal.

As peacekeeper UNPROFOR had to talk to all parties, and small steps were better than acombative approach, said Akashi. If UNPROFOR would not cross the Mogadishu line, it would beaccused of being too mild and pro-Serb. On the other hand, if the line was crossed, they would beaccused of recklessness and endangering the peace process. That way Akashi merely described theproblem for UNPROFOR, without giving much indication for a solution to it.

At this meeting Smith recognized the major problems UNPROFOR was facing as aconsequence of the current hostage crisis. He also reported major problems in the enclaves, in thesense that it was not possible to send supplies to the population there. Moreover, in Zepa and


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Srebrenica there were UNPROFOR observation posts (OPs) that could easily be run over. ManyUNPROFOR compounds, including those in the eastern enclaves, were within artillery arrange of the

VRS. Every form of endorsement by the Bosnian Serbs for the UNPROFOR actions was a lost case.The Bosnian Muslims cooperated less and less too. In fact the UN had been neutralized and the Safe

Areas were under increasing threat. The VRS still held UNPROFOR by the throat and Smith didntbelieve that the VRS wanted a cease-fire. He believed that the VRS would no longer tolerateUNPROFOR in its vicinity and would also continue neutralizing NATO. The Bosnian Serbs would

want to show the international community that they were not to be kept under control. That couldstrengthen the hold of the VRS on Sarajevo or lead to an attack on the eastern enclaves.

The Bosnian Muslims too were increasingly fed up with the UN, said Smith. When Pale wasbombed, they hoped that the world came to their rescue, but now they saw that such was not the case.

Their army, the ABiH, would want to continue what they started in May: entering into battle with theVRS, and in the meantime at the political front sticking to the Contact Group plan. All in allUNPROFOR had gradually been marginalized and developments for further marginalization wentfaster than UNPROFOR could keep up with. Things were looking bad for air strikes as well. More in

general the Air Power instrument had been neutralized because the air strikes at Pale had not had thedesired effect; on the contrary, it had caused the hostage crisis.

Despite the described problems, Smith still showed a certain amount of optimism. It would alsobe possible to take advantage of the situation that had developed. The air strike on Pale had surprisedthe VRS for various reasons. For once the UN had done what they said they were going to do. Also thescope and precision of the bombings had surprised the VRS. Advantage could be taken from that.

Nevertheless Smith thought that this action had failed because the VRS had not returned theheavy weapons around Sarajevo to the Weapon Collection Points. But that was a failure that could beconverted into a gain. It was no longer necessary to deal with the VRS, after they had suspended theirendorsement of the UNPROFOR operation in response to the bombings. Smith saw a wide range ofopportunities: the fact that the UN was also holding four VRS soldiers gave UNPROFOR something

to barter with and at least they showed the Serbs that they could not get away with everything. Smithdid not seem to worry so much about the UN people who were being held hostage.

Janvier had a gloomier view of the situation than Smith. UNPROFOR was being frustratedmore than ever, said Janvier. The Bosnian Serbs were master of the situation. Janvier was not amusedthat he had to ask permission from Mladic to let convoys pass. For him the main issue was to get thehostages released and to send supplies to the enclaves. Mladic now considered UNPROFOR as theenemy, although he had said that he would not fire at the UNPROFOR positions. Mladic knew thatthis was not in his interest.

However, Smith thought that Mladic did not see UNPROFOR as the enemy as long aseverything happened on his terms, but that entailed the problem that if actions were carried out onMladics terms, he would succeed in neutralizing UNPROFOR. If UNPROFOR would just show its

teeth, Mladic would make concessions, in Smiths opinion.Janvier on the other hand considered UNPROFOR a peacekeeping force whether they wanted

it or not. That also caused the scheduling problems for the Rapid Reaction Force, that had a moreforceful character which would be at odds with the peacekeeping character of UNPROFOR. It washighly important that the political process would start, said Janvier. As long as it did not, aconfrontation was out of the question. If UNPROFOR should leave the enclaves, that would meangiving the Bosnian Serbs what they wanted, said Janvier.

Smiths analysis of the intentions of the Bosnian Serbs was different than Janviers. Janvierthought that the Bosnian Serbs had a military-strategic advantage, and were not going to overplay theirhand. Smith remained convinced that the VRS wanted to end the war that same year and would doeverything in their power. As long as the sanctions along the Drina against the Bosnian Serbs were

maintained, the VRS gradually weakened compared to their opponent, but the Bosnian Serbs wouldonly accept a cease-fire when their political identity was guaranteed. Smiths analysis also was that thePale regime would realize that the main issue now involved the hostages, not the solution of the


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Bosnian problem. For that reason Smith supposed that the Bosnian Serbs could now gain more by amilitary offensive attitude, also to emphasize their political identity, than by sitting down at thenegotiating table and letting a political process start. Though Bildt had been appointed as negotiator, it

was not clear what his mission was and for that reason Smith did not really expect that Bildt would be

able to achieve anything through negotiations. Moreover, it was difficult to make military peacekeepingplans as long as it was not clear what the peace UNPROFOR should support was going to look like.

Janvier shared Smiths analysis that Bosnian Serbs felt the need for international recognition andthe lifting of the sanctions along the Drina. In view of the gravity of the situation, Janvier hoped thatthis would soon be realized. However, Janvier did not believe that the Bosnian Serbs were trying tocreate a crisis. He believed that they were prepared to adjust their behaviour and to become gooddiscussion partners. For that reason the discussion with them had to be continued to show howimportant it was to behave normal. Yet Smith didnt believe either that the Bosnian Serbs wanted toforce a crisis. What they did want was to neutralize the UN and NATO to be able to fight the ABiH tocreate a military advantage.

For Smith the problem remained that he didnt know what the political course was going to be.

Therefore, he was at a loss what to do with the announced Rapid Reaction Force. Could it be used tofight or couldnt it? He reiterated that if the unit was not allowed to fight, it wasnt very welcome as faras he was concerned, because it would create expectations it could not live up to.

How to go on?

Smith feared that after the bombings on Pale the status quo would return, but then with UNPROFORas demanding party. There had not been freedom of movement before the air strikes either, and nowthat should have to be realized, Smith urged. At least it should be possible to supply food to theenclaves.

Smith wanted two things to stabilize the situation. Smith thought that the risk of provocations

by the ABiH was controllable. Therefore, now first of all the Bosnian Serbs should be tackled, but thatwas only sensibly possible if the risk that the UN people were taken hostage was reduced and theirsafety would be guaranteed. That would require UNPROFOR to withdraw from the eastern enclaves tosafe positions that could be defended until help was available. In the field only some UNMOs(military observers) should remain with what was known as Forward Air Controllers, necessary to guideNATO aircraft to their target. Smiths intention also was to hold out the prospect of massive air strikesin the event the VRS would subsequently still attack a UN base. That would greatly reduce the threat ofthe new hostage-takings.

However, this plan had considerable consequences for the UNPROFOR mandate and Smithdid not have the authority to decide on the subject. In the Security Council, Janvier and Boutros-Ghalihad already advocated a plan to withdraw UNPROFOR, but that had not been accepted (see sections 7

and 8). Smiths military ideas were politically water under the bridge.Smith also wanted to have the Security Council determine routes along which the UN couldmove freely, comparable to the routes to Berlin during the Cold War. Janvier rejected that idea too: hesaw no possibility to impose a corridor upon the Bosnian Serbs. That could only be achieved throughpolitical negotiations.

Smith considered negotiations on the subject a loss of time. New York had to impose the rules.If UNPROFOR was not prepared to fight, the VRS would get the best of the situation, he estimated.

The fact that in that event the Mogadishu line would be passed, was not a problem for Smith. In hisopinion this line had already been passed because the Bosnian Serbs no longer saw UNPROFOR aspeacekeepers. Turning back across that line was only possible either by doing nothing, gettingUNPROFOR increasingly in the power of the Bosnian Serbs, or by showing the will to fight, which

would mainly come down to bluff because it would not be possible to implement this will.Janvier didnt want to hear about the fighting option: I insist that we will never have thepossibility of combat, of imposing our will on the Serbs.


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Smith repeated that he considered the situation around Exclusion Zones, Weapon CollectionPoints and the Safe Areas a major problem, because military-strategically the Serbs had a veryadvantageous position in an absolute sense. This could cause crises, even before the Rapid ReactionForce would be available. Smith predicted actions, mainly by Bosnian Serbs, who would make a fool of

his political superiors. He anticipated situations in which UNPROFOR would be forced to ask forClose Air Support.

Janviers approach was different. Janvier wanted to reinstate contact with the Bosnian Serbs toexplain that there were things they just couldnt do. Smiths assessment remained that they wouldnt

want to listen. Janvier argued that the Bosnian Serbs were in a politically favourable situation whichthey wouldnt want to compromise. They would realize that cooperation had its advantages. Unlessprovoked by the ABiH, the Bosnian Serbs wouldnt act, Janvier thought.

The end of the discussion was that Janvier saw no other option than going back to thenegotiating table, to realize a cease-fire and to resume the UNPROFOR operations.

Smith predicted that in that event UNPROFOR would be forced to take decisions within amonth. Smith assessed the situation as in the interest of the Bosnian Serbs. All this would also confirm

the belief of the Bosnian government that they would rather see the arms embargo lifted (that wasbeing discussed mainly from the American side) than to rely on UNPROFOR. Smith considered all thisshort-term decisions, which would have implications for the long-term, but of which no one knew whatthey would lead to. As long as the enclaves remained in existence, UNPROFOR remain neutralized toa certain extent.

Janvier then took the position that the ABiH rather than UNPROFOR would have to defendthe enclaves in the event of an attack by the VRS. They were strong enough to be able to do that. Hehad also said that in New York, but that idea was not appreciated.63

It was remarkable that Akashis contributions to the discussion remained minor. He didnt drawconclusions and didnt indicate a direction. This is surprising because exactly Akashi emphasized theimportance of a uniform analysis of the situation and approach of the problem. On the other hand

there was not so much difference of opinion between Akashi and Janvier regarding their approach:adhere strictly to the practice of peacekeeping, and believe in negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs.

Even if history would prove Smith to be more or less right, he was their inferior and had tocomply with the judgement of Zagreb and New York.

6. The strategic field of forces spring 1995, seen from UNPROFOR

The rather hopeless situation in which UNPROFOR found itself at the time of the meeting in Split,had not appeared out of the blue. In spring 1995 there were numerous developments that indicated a

worsening situation for UNPROFOR.Incidentally, the name of UNPROFOR was changed on 31 March 1995 because on that date

the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions on the subject. The overall command (for all ofYugoslavia) of general Janvier in Zagreb, called UNPROFOR until that moment, was given the nameUNPF (United Nations Peace Forces). The UN operations in Croatia and Macedonia were givendifferent names and no longer came under UNPROFOR but under UNPF. The term UNPROFOR

was reserved for the UN operation in Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, old names were still being usedfor a long time. To prevent confusion, the name Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BH-Command) orsarajevo will still be used hereinafter, although it officially had been transferred to UNPROFOR on 31March 1995. The sector division in Bosnia-Hercegovina remained unchanged.

Consequently, in the rest of this report UNPROFOR in a general sense refers to the UNoperation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the (former) Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (sarajevo) of

63NIOD, Coll. Banbury. SRSGs Meeting in Split, 09/06/95. Confi.


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general Smith was in charge. When reference is made in the text to Zagreb, that refers to generalJanviers UNPF command.

The state of affairs in the struggle between ABiH and VRS

Late 1994 at headquarters of Sector North East of BH Command in Tuzla they were taking stock ofthe situation. In a general sense they concluded that a stalemate situation had developed in East Bosnia.

The warring factions along the confrontation line made little progress. Neither party had the militarypower to impose its will on the other or to force a breakthrough. Little indicated that the stalematecould be broken.

However, it was important that the VRS were at a relative strategic disadvantage: time was infavour of the Bosnian Muslims. The VRS had lost the initiative in North and East Bosnia. Whether that

was the consequence of the fuel shortages that the VRS were confronted with, remained unclear to theUN. In any case it seemed that VRS had had to change their tactics and could not longer deploy the fullpotential of its mechanized forces.

This strategic advantage also had a political impact for the Bosnian Serbs. That is because theBosnian Serbs became increasingly politically isolated after the rejection of the Contact Group plan. Asa result of the embargo measures the Bosnian Serbs also got more and more economically isolatedfrom Yugoslavia. The economic situation in the Republika Srpska, bad as it already was, made itimpossible to mobilize more men and to tip the military scales, a situation that could cause frictionbetween political and military leaders.

In absolute terms the VRS did maintain its superiority regarding heavy weapons andammunition supplies. However, the VRS had the problem that they had won more terrain than theycould control. With 60.000 men they had to hold a front that stretched over 1600 km and,consequently, the VRS troops were overstretched. Sector North East identified the following areas asstrategically the most important to the VRS in East Bosnia (see map East Bosnia):

the Ozren mountains; controlling the northern approach to Sarajevo from Tuzla; the Posavina corridor at Brcko; a corridor of only a few kilometres wide that formed a vitalconnection between the western and eastern part of the Republika Srpska;

the communication tower of Stolice, north of the Majevica hills; this tower was an indispensablechain in the communication network of the Republika Srpska;

the corridor north of Zvornik; here the ABiH front line was not even 10 kilometres from theDrina, which made it possible to drive a wedge into the territory of the Republika Srpska and tosever the connections between the northern and southern parts of Eastern Bosnia.

The prospects for the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims improved over the course of time. The ABiHgradually got more and better equipment available. Fuel was not a limiting factor for the ABiH, unlike

for the VRS. The ABiH increasingly took the offensive, but lacked the heavy weapons the VRS didhave to gain real strategic advantage. In addition, at the operational level they lacked capacity toadequately support military operations.64

All in all the military-strategic balance between ABiH and VRS and the resulting politicalrelations between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs were anything but static late 1994. In absoluteterms the VRS still had a major military-strategic advantage, but they were increasingly experiencingproblems to control the area they had taken. The ABiH used the time to build its military strength andcould take advantage from the political vacuum in which the other party found itself.

64NIOD, Coll. Brantz. HQ SNE, Chief G2/G3 (Lt Col. C.A. Le Hardy). Revision of HQ Sector North East OperationInstruction, 05/12/94.


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The cease-fire as dead letter

In the meantime the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Akashi, was worried aboutthe position of UNPROFOR in relation to the warring factions. He reported on the subject to the UNin New York on 1 March.

In a general sense Akashi concluded that the Bosnian government was increasingly resisting thepeace process and UNPROFOR. He stated that the attitude of the Bosnian government regarding

UNPROFOR was changing. Because there was no prospect of a political solution it was not likely thatthe Bosnian Muslims would be prepared to renew the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Throughradio and television the Bosnian government in Sarajevo made it clear that certain cities in Bosnia hadto be retaken.

This change in attitude of the Bosnian Muslims had already started in January 1995. Akashithought he detected an orchestrated campaign of obstruction. An indication of that Akashi saw in thefact that though the ABiH had accepted the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, they still obstructedattempts by UNPROFOR to separate the troops of ABiH and VRS and to observe the confrontationlines. In addition, the ABiH imposed limitations upon UNPROFORs freedom of movement, said

Akashi. He also concluded that not only did the Bosnian Serbs impose restrictions on sending fuelsupplies to UNPROFOR, but the Bosnian Muslims were doing the same: supplying the troops in the

Sapna Thumb (were a Dutchbat company was stationed) and Srebrenica was hindered by therestrictions imposed by the ABiH.The ABiH were getting ready for an offensive, Akashi concluded. He saw numerous

indications: the pace of restructuring, training and supplying had been increased; fuel and logisticconvoys that had not been seen before were moving towards the north of Sector North East;mobilization took place in Zenica and Tuzla; hospitals had been warned to expect wounded people;and lives of VRS officers had been threatened.

Of course an ABiH offensive would mean a violation of the Cessation of HostilitiesAgreement. However, Akashi got the impression that violating this agreement had a wider impact, alsotowards UNPROFOR: the ABiH refused to implement the arrangements of the Cessation ofHostilities Agreement. Indication for that was the circumstance that everywhere where the ABiH were

preparing for battle, UNPROFOR were under pressure and their Freedom of Movement was limited:the ABiH refused the UN access to the front line. On the other hand UNPROFOR did not haveaccess to the areas controlled by the VRS either. In addition, the VRS liaison officers stationed in Tuzla


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and Gorni Vakuf were told by the ABiH that they had to clear out. These liaison officers should haveplayed an important role in determining the demarcation lines and the separation of the troops.

In Akashis opinion everything was aimed at an ABiH offensive as soon as the weatherconditions would improve. The Bosnian government had not explained the reasons for this obstruction

against the arranged Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, but Akashi did have the impression that theBosnian government wanted to make it clear to the international community that the Cessation ofHostilities Agreement had no effect, with the purpose of discrediting the Bosnian Serbs. However, inreality it was the Bosnian government that failed to fully comply with it. That had put UNPROFOR ina deadlock. In addition, the Bosnian government used the relatively quiet period to financially squeezeUNPROFOR for rent of facilities (buildings for accommodation and logistic installations).65

There were many more signs like this that a continuation of the Cessation of HostilitiesAgreement for the period after 1 May 1995 was not very likely. In the middle of March 1995 it began tobecome clear that Akashis attempts to achieve a continuation of the Cessation of Hostilities

Agreement after 30 April were going to fail. Both the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs werepreparing for a continuation of the war. General Smith expected that already by the end of March the

ABiH would take the offensive. The VRS should first want to find out which way the wind would beblowing, to determine a central area where they could best send their troops, and also to avoid beingconsidered the party violating the cease-fire.

In Sarajevo general Smith already saw it coming that the hostilities would be resumed. Smithtook precautions: he tried to prepare his troops for the end of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement:commanders had to be prepared that as soon as the fighting started, the ABiH would be carrying outoperations from the Safe Areas. In addition, pending UN guidelines, Smith issued a Directive for theBosnia-Hercegovina Command. In it, he voiced his opinion that, in so far as practically possible in

wartime, the population ought to be protected. Finally Smith tried to define a number of criteria, underthe heading: avoiding. Avoiding a worsening of the situation for the population through UN actions;avoiding that the conflict would spread further or that the violence level would increase; avoiding that

the UN would get involved in the fighting; and avoiding that UN personnel would be put at risk. Smithreiterated that UNPROFOR did not have a mandate to fight a war on the side of one of the warringfactions. The safety of the UN personnel was of the highest importance, according to Smith. So in thisregard Smith agreed with Janvier. Taking action to enforce a Safe Area was only permitted if thepopulation was under threat, and if the criteria for avoiding were observed.66

Recommencement of the hostilities by the ABiH

The ABiH strategy appeared to be aimed at gaining ground over a wide front, before the end of theCessation of Hostilities.That could be intended to increase the distance of the VRS guns to the area ofthe Bosnian Muslims in the Tuzla area; it could also have the limited objective of keeping the VRS

occupied over the widest possible front, without the ABiH exhausting itself. The ABiH possessed themanpower for this strategy. This tactic stemmed from weakness, but if it were to succeed, it wouldkeep the VRS with its weaker manpower busy along its much too long front lines. The strategy alsoinvolved compensation for the lack of artillery and mobility, the ABiH took advantage of the adverse

weather conditions and favourable mountainous terrain, which slowed down the VRS response.In March the ABiH indeed resumed the battle, and that at one of the four places that were

strategically important to the VRS: the communication tower of Stolice, north of the Majevica hills.However, this attack revealed the limitations of the ABiH and the superiority of the VRS in fire power.

Although they did achieve surprise, the operations were badly planned, commanded and executed. Thatcaused major losses for the ABiH that affected morale.

65UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Code Cable Janvier to Annan, 01/03/95, No. Z-341.66NIOD, Coll. Smith. Commander BHC Directive 1/95, 15/03/95, Confi.


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These ABiH operations elicited a worried reaction from general Smith. It was not only aviolation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, an attack had been set up from the Safe AreaTuzla. That had to trigger a countermove by the VRS. Smith feared that the ABiH action would causemore civilian victims and that it would endanger the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement elsewhere in

Bosnia.67Indeed the VRS reacted in the usual manner by firing at villages in the area.68The BosnianPrime Minister Siladjzic called the ABiH attacks a counteroffensive and stated that all ABiH actions

were self-defence.69

In addition, the Bosnian government justified the ABiH attacks in the Tuzla region by referringto the Bosnian-Serb interference with Bihac. That worried Akashi, but what annoyed him the most wasthat the Security Council hardly reacted to these violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

The effect was that both warring factions were starting to consider UNPROFOR an irrelevant factor,Akashi warned.

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Does the VRS also take the initiative?

Indeed that was exactly what happened.

In the meantime, the question remained whether the VRS would also take the offensive, in particularagainst the three eastern enclaves, including Srebrenica. Assessments on the subject differed. TheSenior UNMO in Bosnia, colonel G.M. Mohatarem, didnt consider it very likely in March 1995 thatthe VRS would start an offensive to reduce the size of the enclaves Gorazde and Srebrenica. In view ofthe difficult terrain and a considerable ABiH presence, an offensive would cost them dearly, heestimated. It was more likely that the VRS would try to gradually break the will of the ABiH by ablockade with second-rate troops.71

General Smith on the other hand was not so sure that the eastern enclaves would remain inexistence. On 7 March Mladic had said to

Srebrenicareportniod en Part03

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