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http://cap.sagepub.comCulture & Psychology
DOI: 10.1177/1354067X05058586 2005; 11; 431 Culture
Psychology
Corina Voelklein and Caroline Howarth British Debate
A Review of Controversies about Social Representations Theory:
A
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Abstract Since its inception more than forty years ago,
socialrepresentations theory has been subjected to several
criticisms,
particularly within British discursive psychology. This
paperreviews four major controversies that lie in the areas of
(a)
theoretical ambiguities, (b) social determinism, (c)
cognitivereductionism and (d) lack of a critical agenda. A
detailed
discussion and evaluation of these criticisms reveals that
whilesome can be regarded as misinterpretations, others need to
be
treated as serious and constructive suggestions for extending
andrefining the current theoretical framework. The main
argument
underlying this review is that many of the criticisms are based
onthe difficulty in understanding and integrating the complex,
dynamic and dialectical relationship between individual
agencyand social structure that forms the core of social
representations
theory. Engaging with the critics is thus thought to
provideclarification and to initiate critical dialogue, which is
seen as
crucial for theoretical development.
Key Words cognitive reductionism, critical power,
socialdeterminism, social representations
Corina Voelklein and Caroline HowarthLondon School of Economics,
UK
A Review of Controversies aboutSocial Representations
Theory:
A British Debate
Social representations theory, originally developed by Serge
Moscovici(1961), is certainly one of the more controversial
concepts in contem-porary social psychology. Despite its continuing
attraction to manyresearchers and theorists around the world, it
has received extensivecriticism, particularly within the British
context. While these critiquesdemonstrate that the theory of social
representations is taken seriouslyenough to debate (Billig, 1987),
we consider a thorough discussion ofthese objections essential for
the conceptual development of the theory.It will be shown that
whereas some of the criticisms can be regardedas misunderstandings,
others need to be treated as serious andconstructive points for
improving or extending the current theoreticalframework.
Furthermore, engaging with these criticisms may promote
Culture & Psychology Copyright 2005 SAGE
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Vol. 11(4): 431454 [DOI: 10.1177/1354067X05058586]
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a more critical version of social representations theory that
invites asocial psychology of conflict, resistance and social
change relevant totodays world.
On the whole, most critics recognize the importance of social
repre-sentations theory within social psychology and are
sympathetic to itsaims and general propositions. In particular,
many regard it as a necess-ary challenge to dominant US social
psychology, which they character-ize as individualistic,
behaviourist and experimentally driven (e.g.Jahoda, 1988; Parker,
1987; Potter & Wetherell, 1998). However, it is bothin the
details of its conceptual elaboration and in its practical
appli-cation that critics find weaknesses. Since problems in the
theoreticalformulation of social representations are seen as
responsible for allegeddifficulties in its application (Litton
& Potter, 1985; Potter & Litton,1985), it is on these
theoretical controversies that we will focus. We pointto four
central issues that need to be clarified or developed: (a)
ambi-guities in defining social representations, (b) social
determinism, (c)cognitive reductionism and (d) the apparent lack of
a critical agenda.
What we argue in this paper is that many of the criticisms
relate tothe complex and dynamic relationship between social
structure andindividual agency put forth in the theory. It is this
dialectical conceptof social life and social cognition that is so
much in contrast to theCartesian dualism still haunting social
psychology today (Farr, 1996;Markov, 1982). This makes social
representations theory difficult tointegrate into both US and
British social psychology. In many socialpsychological theories,
the relationship between the psychological andthe social is
depicted as a separation of individual perception and cogni-tion,
on the one hand, and culture and social context, on the other.
Theunusual position of social representations as simultaneously
betweenindividuals and the societies they live in (Howarth, 2001)
has led to thecontradictory criticisms of social determinism and
cognitive reduction-ism. These conflicting critiques call for a
detailed review of the theoryand its propositions, going back to
Moscovicis seminal work La psych-analyse: Son image et son public
(1961). This is where we start.
A Brief Introduction to the Theory of SocialRepresentations
Moscovici developed the theory of social representations from
hisstudy of the diffusion of the scientific concept of
psychoanalysis amongthe French public in the 1960s. In the preface
of the accompanyingbook, Lagache (1976) asserts that Moscovicis
ideas should stimulateand invite social psychological dialogue.
Clearly this purpose has been
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achieved, given the critical discussions and defensive replies
that thetheory has since provoked. In this research, Moscovici used
a combi-nation of questionnaires, interviews and content analysis
of the Frenchpress and complex sampling procedures with different
subgroups ofFrench society in order to capture a comprehensive
overview of diversebodies of opinion. He did not attempt to
construct a unified picture butrather to hold central the
heterogeneity and tension that he found inthe data.
Moscovici takes Durkheims notion of collective representations
asthe starting point for his theoretical development. For
Durkheim(1898), collective representations are a very general
category thatincludes broad elements such as science, ideology,
worldview andmyth. However, he does not distinguish between these
different formsof organized thought, which is why, for Moscovici
(1961), the conceptof representation loses its distinction and
clarity. Moreover, the conceptof collective representation does not
reflect the mobile and hetero-geneous nature of contemporary
societies (Howarth, 2001). As Jovche-lovitch (2001) outlines, the
Durkheimian notion refers to a form ofknowledge that is produced by
a single source of authority that isstrongly resistant to change
and that functions to bind societiestogether. Yet, as Moscovici
(1988) makes clear:
It seems to be an aberration, in any case, to consider
representations ashomogeneous and shared as such by a whole
society. What we wished toemphasize by giving up the word
collective was this plurality of represen-tations and their
diversity within a group. (p. 219)
Moscovici (1961) is interested in the relationship between
socio-cultural intersubjectivity and the psychological organization
of knowl-edge, and so emphasizes that we need to move towards an
activeunderstanding of representations. A representation is not a
mere reflec-tion or reproduction of some external reality. There is
symbolic spacein the development and negotiation of
representations, which is whyall human beings hold creative power
and agency in their formationand use. By transforming the
Durkheimian notion into the concept ofsocial representations,
Moscovici deliberately allows for the coexis-tence of competing and
sometimes contradictory versions of reality inone and the same
community, culture and individual (Howarth, Foster,& Dorrer,
2004).
This emphasis on the plural or hybrid nature of social knowledge
isalso found in the concept of cognitive polyphasia (Moscovici,
1961),which is currently receiving renewed interest from social
representa-tions theorists (e.g. Jovchelovitch, 2002; Wagner,
Duveen, Verma, &
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Themel, 2000). This concept implies that different and
incompatiblecognitive styles and forms of knowledge can coexist
within one socialgroup and can be employed by one and the same
individual. Depend-ing on the tasks and social settings prevalent
at a particular time, humanbeings can draw on conflicting
representations. Cognitive polyphasiathus refers to a state in
which different kinds of knowledge, possessingdifferent
rationalities, live side by side in the same individual or
collec-tive (Jovchelovitch, 2002, p. 124). In this way, so-called
traditional andmodern representations, which appear contradictory,
may actuallyconfront rather than replace each other (cf. Wagner et
al., 2000).
The concept of cognitive polyphasia already indicates that the
natureof a social representation closely relates to its social and
psychologicalfunctions. But what is the main function of
representation? To put itsimply, social representations are ways of
world making (Moscovici,1988, p. 231). A more detailed definition
that is commonly referred todescribes social representations as
a
. . . system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold
function; first, toestablish an order which will enable individuals
to orientate themselves intheir material and social world and to
master it; and secondly to enablecommunication to take place among
the members of a community byproviding them with a code for social
exchange and a code for naming andclassifying unambiguously the
various aspects of their world and their indi-vidual and group
history. (Moscovici, 1973, p. xiii)
This definition highlights that social representations help us
to makesense of our world and to interact within it with other
societalmembers. They have the main function of familiarizing the
unfamiliarsince it is the unknown or incomprehensible that may
constitute athreat to our socially constructed realities
(Moscovici, 1984a). In otherwords, social representations are
triggered by the realization of a gapbetween what one knows and
what one does not understand or cannotexplain (Moscovici, 1961).1
Every representation can thereby be under-stood as being situated
inside a dynamic semiotic triangle, as proposedby Moscovici
(1984b). This triadic relation specifies the three import-ant
dimensions of social psychology generally and of every
represen-tation in particular: the object that is represented, the
subject thatundertakes the representation, and the social group
towards whom thesubject is positioning him- or herself in
undertaking this representa-tion. The subjectobject opposition is
not enough to fully understandthe fundamentally social nature of
representation. We need to be inrelationship with others to give
meaning to the object and to be able todevelop an intersubjective
reality that serves as a common code forcommunication and social
interaction (Jovchelovitch, 2002).
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The creation of such an intersubjective reality through social
repre-sentation implies both human agency and social influence. On
the onehand, social representations are created by human beings in
order toconventionalize objects, persons and events by placing them
in afamiliar social context (Moscovici, 1984a). On the other hand,
onceestablished, these representations influence human behaviour
andsocial interaction by often subtly imposing themselves upon us
and solimiting our socio-cognitive activities. Social
representations are there-fore not only a product of human agents
acting upon their society butare equally prescriptive and coercive
in nature. They become part of thecollective consciousness,
especially once they are fossilized in traditionand taken for
granted in social practice (Moscovici, 1984a, p. 13).
Yet this does not mean that social representations cannot be
chal-lenged or changed. In the same way that they are created by
humanbeings, they can be modified by them. Jovchelovitch (1996)
highlightsthat since they act as reference points in every social
encounter, socialrepresentations are inseparable from the dynamics
of everyday life,where the mobile interactions of the present can
potentially challengethe taken-for-granted, imposing pockets of
novelty on traditionscoming from the past (p. 124). It is these
dialectics between agency andstructure, tradition and change, that
have led to different criticisms ofsocial representations theory.
Let us now turn to these.
Controversies about the Theory of SocialRepresentations
Theoretical Ambiguities?Certainly the most frequent criticism of
the theory of social represen-tations is that it is too broad and
too vague. Moscovicis writings havebeen severely criticized as
being fragmented and sometimes contra-dictory (Potter &
Wetherell, 1987, p. 139), as demonstrating a polem-ical style of
argument by anecdote (McGuire, 1986, p. 103) or as apot-pourri of
contradictory ideas, seasoned with some pieces of spec-ulative
cognitive psychology (McKinlay & Potter, 1987, p. 484).
Potterand Litton (1985) do not even give social representations the
status ofa theory but rather refer to it as a concept in search of
theory (p. 82).More recently, Valsiner (1998) has reiterated this
point in stating thatits actual theoretical elaboration has yet to
take place (p. 149). Withoutgreater conceptual precision, critics
warn, social representations isdoomed to become a background
concept (Billig, 1988, p. 8), a catch-all term (Litton &
Potter, 1985, p. 385) or a kind of pseudo-explanation(Jahoda, 1988,
p. 206).
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Despite claims to the contrary (Potter & Litton, 1985),
definitions ofsocial representations are available in the
literature. For instance, Billig(1988) highlights that as early as
1963 Moscovici states that socialrepresentation is defined as the
elaborating of a social object by thecommunity for the purpose of
behaving and communicating(Moscovici, 1963, p. 251). Another
often-cited definition has been givenin the brief introduction
above. However, Moscovici is keen not toapply a definition that is
too restrictive, as complex social phenomenacannot be reduced to
simple propositions (Moscovici & Markov,2001). Rather than
using a hypothetico-deductive model that formu-lates clear
guidelines for testing and operationalizing a theory, hefollows a
more inductive and descriptive approach in the study ofsocial
representations.
Another reason why it makes more sense to characterize rather
thandefine social representations is their inherent dynamics. Given
theirposition inside the triadic asymmetry of self, other and
object, socialrepresentations can be very volatile and will
transform over time.Thus, attempts to provide an exhaustive
definition of such phenom-ena are based on a misconception of their
nature (Markov, 2000,p. 430). Such misconceptions could stem, in
part at least from languagedifferences and translation.
In its early years, the theory was predominately elaborated in
French,starting with the work of its founding father Moscovici
(1961) followedby studies by Herzlich (1969) and Jodelet
(1989/1991). Moscovicisoriginal work, which lays down the basic
concepts and theoretical foun-dation of social representations, is
still not available in English and soremains largely inaccessible
to Anglo-Saxon social psychologists. Rtyand Snellman (1992) explain
that this has resulted in the theory notentering Anglo-Saxon
literature before the early 1980stwenty yearsafter its inception.
Markov (Moscovici & Markov, 2001) particularlyregrets the lack
of an English translation of the second and lesser knownpart of La
psychanalyse which explores the relationship between
socialrepresentations, language and communication. Also more recent
workwithin the area of social representations has remained in
French,German or Spanish (e.g. Aebischer, Deconchy & Lipiansky,
1991;Banchs, 1996; Flick, 1991; Wagner, 1994), adding to the
language barrierfor many English-speaking academics. Moreover,
every translation intoEnglish inevitably involves a loss or change
in meaning, due to theconnection between language and culture. For
example, one possiblereason for misunderstandings in the
Anglo-Saxon world lies in a differ-ent understanding of the word
representation. Representation inEnglish is approximate to
reflection or reproduction, whereas in
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French the word carries a more active and purposeful
component(Wagner, 1998).2
Linguistic differences may explain some of the contentions;
however,we still need to address the specific criticisms of
over-generalizationand contradiction. Jahoda (1988), for example,
criticizes the overlapbetween the concept of social representation
and other categories suchas common sense, ideology or culture.
Eiser (1986) goes further inaccusing Moscovici of caricaturing
other cognitive theories in order topreserve the distinctiveness of
his own theory, thus implying that thetheory has little substance
or originality. Billig (1988) highlights aspecific inconsistency in
the use of social representations, in terms ofbeing described as
both a universal and a particular concept. While auniversal sense
derives from treating social representations as aconcept that
exists in every society, a particular sense is evident inseeing
social representations as peculiar to modern societies.
It is very true that the broader a concept becomes the less it
can helpus to focus on very specific phenomena. In the context of
social repre-sentations theory, this means that in order to reduce
its vagueness andoverlap with similar concepts we need to clarify
what is distinctiveabout social representations. This is precisely
what Moscovici (1961)does in his seminal work: he develops the
notion of social representa-tion by comparing and contrasting it to
existing sociological andpsychological concepts. He discusses how
the notions of ideology,science and worldview are too general and
global to account for thesociocultural specificity of a
representation as a form of knowledgeparticular to a certain group.
This discussion helps resolve the seem-ingly inconsistent use of
social representations that Billig (1988) hasnoted. Our reading of
Moscovici points towards a universal under-standing of social
representations as indispensable features of social lifein all
cultures. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that both
traditionaland contemporary societies have the capacity to
re-present differentforms of social knowledge (de-Graft Aikins,
2003). The point is, ofcourse, that conditions of late modernity
profoundly impact on the paceat which social representations
develop, merge and oscillate. Moscovicinever argued that social
representations could not exist in traditionalsocieties, but that
in late modern times they take on a more diverse andfragmented
form. This is due to the emergence of multiple sources ofpower,
authority and knowledge (Foucault, 1980). What has changedtoday is
the structure of society and thus the lifespan, diversity
andfragmentation of social representations, not their existence,
creation orinfluence on social interactions.3 Thus, the social
world has a funda-mental impact on not only what we think but,
crucially, how we think.
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Another reason for Moscovicis (1961) rejection of the
sociologicalnotions of ideology, science or worldview is that they
cannot capturethe psychological organization of that socially
produced knowledge.He wants to move beyond a sociological
understanding of social repre-sentations as explanatory devices
irreducible by any further analysis(Moscovici, 1984a, p. 15).
However, turning to existing psychologicalnotions is equally
problematic. Moscovici (1961) points out that withinpsychology as a
whole the term representation is mostly equated withthe internal
seemingly biased reflection of an external reality. ForMoscovici an
object is not simply reproduced in the mind of an indi-vidual but
given life through the socio-cognitive activity of its user,which
embeds it in a cultural and historical context. It is not a
cogni-tive process or a social process; it is simultaneously
both.
Looking at the field of social psychology, Moscovici (1961)
finds thatexisting notions do not achieve such an integration of
the sociologicaland the psychological. He concludes that it is
necessary to develop aconcept that is distinct from notions such as
opinion, attitude or stereo-type, which he describes as short-term
responses towards objects inde-pendent of social actors and their
intentions. Hence the aim ofdeveloping a distinct social
psychological concept marks the beginningof social representation
and, indeed, has been followed by social repre-sentations theorists
in their elaboration of its relation to other conceptssuch as
social identity (Breakwell, 1993; Duveen, 2001; Howarth,2002a),
attributions (Hewstone, 1983; Hewstone & Augoustinos, 1998)or
attitudes (Gaskell, 2001; Jaspars & Fraser, 1984).4 Clearly the
theor-etical ambiguities discussed here do not seem to have caused
a rejec-tion of social representations within the discipline but
rather provokedinterest in refining and developing it, as
demonstrated by its richhistory of more than forty years of
stimulating research and debate.
Social Determinism?A more specific criticism of social
representations theory relates to analleged overemphasis of social
influence (e.g. Parker, 1987) that is saidto neglect the human
capacity of reflexivity (e.g. Jahoda, 1988). Jahodaasserts that
people are not described as active agents but as passiveentities
unable to break free from the existing framework of social
repre-sentations. As such he claims that the theory indicates a
revival of thenotion of group mind, whereby the ideas of an elite
dominate laythinking. It is this prescriptive influence on human
activity whichMoscovici (1984a) stresses in saying that social
representations imposethemselves upon us with an irresistible force
(p. 9) that McKinlay andPotter (1987) find equally unjustified.
They argue that as representations
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are guided by history and tradition, there is not adequate room
forsocial change within the theory of social representations:
The reality of yesterday controls the reality of today, says
Moscovici, suchthat intellectual activity constitutes a mere
rehearsal or representation ofwhat has already gone before, in that
our minds are conditioned by repre-sentations which are forced upon
us. (McKinlay & Potter, 1987, p. 475)
The demand for more consideration of change and dynamics
hasrecently been taken up by Hermans (2003). He questions how far
socialrepresentations theory is able to capture individual
responses to thecommon stock of knowledge and the dynamic
multiplicity of indepen-dently organizing self-positions.
The argument that social representations theory paints an
overlydeterministic picture of human relations is closely linked to
the criti-cism of the notion of consensus. It is claimed that the
theory presentssocial representation as a process where every mind
is infiltrated withthe same images and explanations and thus
individuals come todevelop a consensual view of reality. This
depiction is unsurprisinglycriticized for being an unrealistic
version of psychology (Parker, 1987;Potter & Litton, 1985).
Billigs (1988, 1993) objection relates to themarginalization of the
psychological and social importance of argu-mentation. His main
point is that an (over)emphasis on the commoncharacter of cognition
runs the risk of dismissing the dialogic orconflicting character of
our psychology. To put it simply, withoutcontradiction and conflict
there is no food for thought since there isnothing to argue about
both with others and with oneself. For Billig(1987), thought is
necessarily dialectic and involves dilemmas anddisputes to remain
alive.
What is problematic about these criticisms is that they reduce
socialrepresentations theory to one of its major elements, which is
the influ-ence of society on the individualthe impact of culture on
cognition.However, as a consequence of its dialectical
epistemology, one elementof the theory cannot make sense without
its interrelated counterpart.Culture and cognition exist in a
symbiotic relationship to one another.A representation is not
simply a repetition or replication of some ideapresented by a
dominant social group; it involves the deliberate actionof those
involved. This is something described in depth in discussionson the
interrelation between social representations and social identity.In
their examination of representations of gender in young
children,Duveen and Lloyd (1990), for example, specifically
describe howhuman beings evolve in relation to a net of already
established socialrepresentations. Duveen (2001) explains that
these representations
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underlie the childs interactions with parents, teachers and
thecommunity. Once confronted with the representations that
circulate inthe community in which the child grows up, however, he
or she doesnot simply absorb and internalize them as they are, but
comes to re-interpret, to re-construct, and so to re-present them
to him- or herself(Howarth, 2002a, p. 156). Thus, in the process of
taking on socialrepresentations, there is always the possibility of
re-negotiation and sotransformation and change.
Voelklein (2003) emphasizes that it is exactly through the
contactwith conflicting social representations that human beings
begin toreflect on their own views and realize what is distinctive
about therepresentations they hold. It is through such dialogue and
conflict thatexisting representations are revisited and adjusted.
Hence, the theorycannot be seen as overly deterministic, but
rather, as Markov (2000)has argued, conceives of the dynamics of
thought, language and socialpractices as interdependent
socio-cultural and individual phenomenawhich are co-constructed by
means of tension and polarization ofantinomies (p. 419). Such a
dialogic understanding of social represen-tations also helps us to
address the criticism of consensus. Rose et al.(1995) make clear
that the idea of consensus as agreement at the levelof specific
conversations would contradict social representationstheory by
rendering the concept of social representation entirely staticand
by making communication de facto obsolete. While there must bea
certain degree of consensus based upon a common language,tradition
and rituals for cognition, recognition and communication totake
place, there is also the argumentative level of immediate
socialinteraction that is characterized by fragmentation,
contradiction andthus social change.
One possible explanation for this misinterpretation is the
equationof the adjective social in social representations with
their consensu-ally shared nature. However, the social nature of
these representationsis based upon a number of points outlined by
Moscovici (1961). First,representations make up the common culture
and so construct thesymbolic boundaries and thereby identities of
social groups andcommunities (cf. Howarth, 2002a). Secondly,
representations are socialin the sense that they are always
collectively created and validatedthrough processes of
communication and social interaction and thuscannot be seen to
belong to one individual alone (cf. Rose et al., 1995).Thirdly,
representations are social since their content and specific formare
influenced by the historic or economic climate as well as the
socialpractices and general cultural context (cf. Jovchelovitch
& Gervais,1999). A certain degree of consensus, then, is not
the sole defining
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feature of social representations, but rather the product of
thecollaborative creation, negotiation and use of social
representations.
Indeed, Moscovici (1985) has made clear that he holds a
dynamicand holistic understanding of consensus that is not
synonymous withuniformity. Echoing Billigs (1987) rhetorical
approach to socialpsychology, he argues that social representations
always presuppose amixture of diversity and agreement. However,
what we can concede isthat conflict and argumentation are still
under-theorized within socialrepresentations theory, as argued by
Potter and Billig (1992). It is there-fore time to address social
representation as dispute and ideologicalconflict (Howarth, in
press), as, without such development, the theorycould be seen as
weak in terms of its power in social critique.
Cognitive Reductionism?A third major criticism maintains that
social representations theorycharacterizes representation as a
overly cognitive phenomenon that canchiefly be explained by
psychological processes with scant reference tosocial influence
(Jahoda, 1988; Parker, 1987; Semin, 1985). McGuire(1986), for
example, describes social representation as a process ofabstracting
small units of information received and assimilating theminto
pre-existing cognitive (rather than socially constructed)
categories.He claims that while social representations introduce
serious errorsin cognition through the oversimplification they
produce, they arenonetheless cost effective (p. 102) since they
enable coping with anotherwise unmanageable complexity due to the
(assumed) limitednature of human information-processing.
For Semin (1985), the problem lies in introducing
psychologicalprocesses into a theory of social knowledge and
societal change.According to him, the main problem derives from the
conflict betweenMoscovicis aim to shift the level of social
psychological analysis fromthe individual to the collective while
proposing anchoring and objecti-fying as the two key psychological
processes, which, for Semin, can bereadily subsumed under cognitive
psychology and again used as aninformation-processing metaphor.
Billig (1993) explains that the reasonfor this (mis)understanding
is that the processes of anchoring and objec-tification are similar
to cognitive psychologists descriptions ofcategorization and
schemata. The real mistake is depicting anchoringand objectifying
as purely cognitive processes, or even assuming thatthere can be
purely cognitive processes. Rigorous social representa-tions
research has highlighted that anchoring and objectification
areindeed social, cultural and ideological as much as cognitive
(e.g. Jodelet,1989/1991; Voelklein, 2004; Wagner, Elejabarrieta,
& Lahnsteiner, 1995).
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Rather constructively, Billig (1988, 1993) warns social
representationstheorists not to become trapped in the one-sidedness
of cognitivepsychology, which has neglected particularization by
exclusivelyfocusing on categorization. The same could happen to
social represen-tations theory, he argues, if the theorization of
anchoring does not takeinto account the human abilities to negate
and particularize. Moreover,he remarks, anchoring is not an
automatic process but might lead toarguments and debate in groups.
More critically, Potter and Billig(1992) assert that the processes
of anchoring and objectification channelsocial representations
theory into cognitive reductionism and subsumeit under the
decontextualized, desocialized and uncultured universeof laboratory
experiments (p. 16). Instead of concentrating on thoughtsand
beliefs, they argue, social psychology should focus on the
prag-matics of discourse and how social representations are
achievedthrough talk in practice. More recently, Potter and Edwards
(1999) haverelated this criticism to an opposition between
cognition and action.They claim that while discourse theories are
oriented towards accom-plishing particular tasks in relation to
others, social representationremains on a perceptual-cognitive and
therefore individual level. Simi-larly, Potter (1996) states that
social representations are ways of under-standing the world which
influence action, but are not themselvesparts of action (p.
168).
To remedy this alleged overemphasis on cognition, Potter and
Litton(1985) would like to re-establish social representations as
linguisticrepertoires, which they define as recurrently used
systems of terms forcharacterizing actions, events and other
phenomena, consisting of alimited range of lexical items and
particular stylistic and grammaticalconstructions, combined with
specific metaphors and tropes (p. 89).They suggest that this
reinterpretation would emphasize that represen-tations are
linguistically constituted and constructed in specificcontexts, and
it would have the advantage of not assuming any directlink to
identity and social categories.
Despite these criticisms, social representations theorists would
bewrong to hastily reject the cognitive dimension of social
representations.On the contrary, as one of the central aims of
social representationstheory, it is important to reconstitute the
essentially socio-historicalnature of cognition. This would release
the term cognitive from itsrather unhelpfully negative
connotations. Markov (2000) takes up thisissue in detail: she
explains that cognition, from a social representationalperspective,
is based upon a dialogical understanding of the mind thatis rooted
within a Hegelian paradigm and the tradition of dialogism.Social
representations theorists regard cognition as socio-cultural,
as
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dynamic and, hence, as something that cannot be simply reduced
tothe level of the individual (Markov, 2000). Moscovici clearly
rejectsindividualistic versions of cognition. He argues against
treating mindsas black boxes (1984a, p. 15) and so, instead, looks
at the content ofthoughts and how these are historically and
socially constituted andcommunicated.
What is often overlooked by critics of this approach is that
socialrepresentations theory clearly goes further in integrating
culture andcognition than approaches of shared or distributed
cognition thathave been proposed in other areas of social
psychology (cf., e.g.,Resnick, Levine, & Teasley, 1991). Unlike
these approaches that retainthe separation of individual cognition
and social interaction and onlyconsider possible relations between
them, social representations theorydescribes cognition as
inherently and inevitably social and cultural.Consequently, the
theory moves beyond the narrow definition of socialcognition as
individual cognition about others or influenced by others(Verheggen
& Baerveldt, 2001).
A possible reason for the charge of cognitive reductionism from
theperspective of British discursive psychology could lie in the
latterscharacterization of cognition and action as oppositional. It
appearshere that cognition is equated with something that happens
insideindividual minds without due attention to its social and
ideologicalproduction. It is precisely such a dichotomy of mind and
society thatsocial representations theorists seek to challenge.
Having challenged the depiction of social representations as
meremental templates, it needs to be made clear that many social
represen-tations theorists also object to the interpretation of
social representa-tions as purely linguistic resources. As
Moscovici (1985) has clearlystated, a discourse is not a
representation, even if every representationis translated into a
discourse. All that is image or concept does notentirely pass into
language (p. 92). While representations maymanifest themselves in
language, they do not necessarily have to. Wemay find social
representations objectified in photographs, drawings,films,
newspaper articles and the media generallyin any socialpractice
(e.g. de Rosa, 1987; Jodelet, 1989/1991; Livingstone,
1998;Moscovici, 1961; Voelklein, 2004; Wagner, Kronberger, &
Seifert, 2002).Howarth (in press) emphasizes that social
representations are oftenonly apparent in action . She gives
examples from her research intoblack British pupils experiences in
schools, which illustrate how therepresentation of black youth is
not so much expressed in actualdialogue but permeates the
institutional cultures of schools, informingthe actions of
teachers, particularly in their social practices of gaze in
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looking and not looking at black pupils (Howarth, 2004). A
linguisticreinterpretation of social representations is less
likely, we wouldassume, to capture the institutionalized and
historical nature of theserepresentations. By concentrating
exclusively on what talk does, thatis, by taking a functional
stance, British discursive psychology alsorisks letting
individualism in through the backdoor (Jovchelovitch,1995, p. 83).
The concept of linguistic repertoires underemphasizes thesocial
origins of talk and text and overemphasizes the content
andimmediate context of the conversation or document under
study.Therefore, it marginalizes not only the wider relational and
socio-cultural factors but also the actual social production and
contestation ofrepresentation. This would in turn limit the
critical potential of socialrepresentations theory.
An Acritical Agenda?Social representations theory has also been
charged with being acriti-cal, in failing to seriously address
issues of power and ideology(Ibaez, 1992; Jahoda, 1988). Parker
(1987), for example, asserts that theway Moscovici treats the term
ideology blunts any critical cuttingedge (p. 458) as it is turned
into a harmless label for a system ofbeliefs (p. 465). Moscovicis
(1984a) conceptualization of ideologyrelates to his distinction
between the consensual and the reifieduniverse, which has been
equally criticized. The consensual universeis the world of common
sense. This is often seen as the space in whichsocial
representations are created, negotiated and transformed. Thereified
universe, by contrast, is inhabited by experts, often seen
asscientists, who base their judgements of reality on
experimentation,logic and rational choice. Moscovici (1984a) has
described ideology asa mediator between these two universes:
We see more clearly the true nature of ideologies, which is to
facilitate thetransition from the one world to the other, that is,
to cast consensual intoreified categories and to subordinate the
former to the latter. Hence theyhave no specific structures and can
be perceived either as representations,or as sciences. (p. 23)
For the case of psychoanalysis, Moscovici (1984a) discusses
howcommon sense can be turned into an ideology by being
appropriatedby a party, a school of thought or an organ of state so
that a product,created by the society as a whole, can be enforced
in the name ofscience (p. 58). This distinction between the
consensual and reifieduniverse has been fiercely debated both by
critics (e.g. Jahoda, 1988;McKinlay & Potter, 1987; Potter
& Billig, 1992; Wells, 1987) and byadvocates of social
representations theory (e.g. Flick, 1998; Foster, 2003;
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Howarth, in press; Purkhardt, 1993). As echoed in a recent
article byvan Bavel and Gaskell (2004), McKinlay and Potter (1987)
point outthat there is a conceptual contradiction between, on the
one hand,stating that all individuals use social representations to
make sense oftheir worlds and, on the other hand, separating the
world of sciencefrom the world of common sense. Given the fact that
Moscovici (1984a)has acknowledged himself that science is equally
subject to historicaland social influence, he obviously must
recognize that scientists, likethe rest of us, rely on social
representations in their daily interactionsand activities. It
would, therefore, be a profound mistake to think ofscience as an
unproblematically asocial realm of activities in whichknowledge of
pure fact is generated; the scientist is as much trappedin his
social world as is the layman (McKinlay & Potter, 1987, p.
479).
Potter and Edwards (1999) claim that one negative implication of
thisdichotomy is that it has prevented social representations
theorists fromconsidering the impact of their own representations
in the productionof research itself. This last point, at least,
does not appear to be justi-fied. Social representations theorists
have been critically aware of thepossible influences of their own
representations and have discussedthe impact of these and of their
own identities on both the process andproducts of research (e.g.
Farr, 1993; Howarth, 2002b; Voelklein, 2004).
Another criticism of the relationship between the two universes
isthat it is often described as a one-way process of influence from
thereified to the consensual. We can see this in research into the
publicunderstanding of science and biotechnology, for example, that
exploreshow scientific or technical concepts become familiarized in
commonsense (e.g. Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Wagner et al., 2002).
However, socialrepresentations theorists rarely investigate this
relation in the oppositedirection: that is, how common sense
influences the content and struc-ture of science (Howarth et al.,
2004). This clearly deserves attention,as both Howarth (in press)
and Purkhardt (1993) discuss. If all knowl-edge is socially
constructed, so is scientific knowledge.
Yet the formation of scientific and everyday concepts can be
quitedistinct due to the different conditions and structures of
authority andpower in both universes. One way of understanding how
these twouniverses can coexist within one and the same social world
is in termsof different modes of thought. Bruner (1985)
distinguishes between thenarrative and the paradigmatic cognitive
functioning or mode ofthought that can each be performed by the
same person at differenttimes. Whereas the paradigmatic mode of
thought is a systematic,abstract way of thinking that is based on
logic, rigorous analyses,consistency and the establishment of
facts, the narrative mode of
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thought is very concrete, particular and concentrated on
humanintentions and actions. Myths, well-formed stories, images and
richmeanings play an important part in this narrative way of
sense-making.
Conceptualizing the reified and the consensual as two coexisting
andinteracting forms of knowledge has also been proposed by Duveen
andLloyd (1990) and Flick (1998). As Foster (2003) outlines, there
isevidence in Moscovicis work that he did not want to treat the
twouniverses as strictly separate from one another. She comes to
theconclusion that the distinction between the reified and the
consensualis less central to the theory of social representations
than has beengenerally assumed, and supports this claim by pointing
to his conceptof cognitive polyphasia.
A second way out of this overemphasized dichotomy has
beenproposed by Howarth (in press). She argues that the
differencebetween the consensual and the reified universe points us
to the processof reification that positions certain social
representations as expertknowledge. Reification infuses social
representations with ideologicalpower by legitimizing their
dominant and dominating position overalternative representations.
Howarth argues that in order to fullydevelop the theorys critical
potential, social representations theoristsneed to analyse the ways
in which different knowledge systemsbecome reified in different
situations. Developing Jovchelovitchs(1997) assertion that some
groups have more access to resources andthus a better chance of
imposing their versions of reality and truth,Howarth (in press)
invites us to study the role of power and conflictwithin the
process of social re-presentation. By examining the politicsthat
influence the hegemonic construction of social representations
wecan gain a better understanding of the interests that are at
stake andthe alternative representations that may be marginalized.
This perspec-tive also deconstructs the problematic unidirectional
depiction of therelationship between common sense and science.5
A critical approach to social representations obviously needs
aclearer grasp of ideology. We need to analyse how representations
maybe infused with ideological power to justify the status quo and
somaintain systems of inequality and exclusion (Howarth, 2004) as
wellas investigate how the public take on, appropriate and contest
existingideologies in their representational work (Voelklein,
2003). An ideo-logical perspective emphasizes that in the practice
of social life, repre-sentations are never neutral but constantly
permeated by powerrelations. Such a critical approach to social
representations theorywould provide us with the tools for
evaluating representations in terms
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of their ability to legitimize and sustain unequal and
oppressive powerrelations and marginalizing practices.
Conclusion
Throughout the paper, we have tried to demonstrate that the
complex-ity of the dynamics between society and self that are
inherent in socialrepresentations theory is at the root of many of
the criticisms andmisunderstandings to which the theory is subject.
We have elaboratedthis peculiar position of social representations
theory with reference tofour major areas of criticism: (a) the
claim of theoretical ambiguities;(b) the portrayal of the theory as
socially deterministic; (c) the contrast-ing critique of it as
cognitive reductionism, as well as (d) the chargethat it follows an
acritical agenda. Through a detailed evaluation ofthese criticisms,
certain points could be revealed to be misinterpreta-tions of
social representations theory, such as those charges regardingthe
lack of distinction from other conceptualizations, the notion
ofconsensus or the nature of language and cognition. However,
otherpoints of critique were shown to be important and constructive
ideasfor theoretical refinement and extension: for example,
criticisms withregards to the problematic distinction between the
consensual and thereified universe and the underdevelopment of the
influence of argu-mentation, conflict, ideology and power on social
representations.
A starting point for investigating the void in treating ideology
andpower issues in social representations theory could be to
examinewhether there is some intrinsic characteristic of social
representationstheory that prevents researchers from approaching
these issues. Oneproperty of the theory as it is currently applied
that could be maderesponsible for this situation is its primary
concentration on thecontent and structure of a social
representation as opposed to itsfunction and broader societal
implications. Bauer and Gaskell (1999)assert that social
representations research has generally emphasizedstructure over
function (p. 173), and they take it for granted thatresearch on
social representations will continue to foreground thecomparative
analysis of common sense, the contents of representa-tions (p.
175). While we appreciate that an understanding of thenature and
content of a representation is a prerequisite for discussingits
political or ideological consequences, it is this extra step in
theanalysis that is often omitted and that we regard as crucial
forstrengthening the theorys critical power. In order to follow a
criticalagenda, we need to move beyond a mere description of the
status quoto a consideration of the historical roots, the immediate
social function
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and the future implications of particular representations. That
is, weneed to examine what social representations do in social and
politicalrelations.
Besides recognizing areas for future development, theorists
andresearchers in this tradition may also want to consider how far
theycontribute themselves to the misunderstandings and criticisms
voicedtowards social representations theory. Employing concepts and
termsthat are predominantly associated with a highly
individualizedpsychology, such as cognition or representation,
without elaboratingon how they are to be understood within the
context of their use mayeasily mislead the casual reader of
writings on social representations.In addition to a lack of
definition and elaboration, social representa-tions theorists and
researchers have also been criticized for incorpor-ating these
individual psychological terms uncritically and for hidingbehind
the cognitive label of unfamiliarity reduction that frees themfrom
sufficiently engaging with social and historical contexts
(Guerin,2001). Markov (2000), for example, asserts that many social
represen-tations researchers give key social psychological concepts
an individ-ualistic and static instead of a socio-cultural and
dynamic meaning. Inthis way, they do not do justice to the theorys
dialectical and dynamicfeatures and foster stagnation and
misconception rather than theoreti-cal development.
Focusing on the dynamic and dialectical aspects of social
represen-tations theory is also desirable in terms of widening
participation inthis theoretical approach. If social
representations theory comes to beperceived as static and
descriptive, it is less likely to appear suitablefor explaining the
heterogeneity, tension and flux of modern social lifethat Moscovici
(1961) set out to explore. It is, then, no surprise thatdiscourse
theory becomes an attractive alternative. As Potter andEdwards
(1999) make clear, what they consider an advantage of adiscursive
approach over social representations theory is its
actionorientation and its focus on the immediate dynamics of the
communi-cative situation. While a discursive approach has its own
limitations,to which we have briefly alluded, a stronger
involvement with andreflection on the dynamic conceptual features
of social representationsand their methodological exploration as a
socio-cultural practice couldopen further possibilities for
theoretical development.
As we have stressed throughout this paper, social
representationstheorists need to challenge both our critics and
peers who marginalizethe role of power, dialogue and resistance in
the development andcirculation of representations. We would suggest
that empirical workin the field should build up a more explicitly
critical agenda that
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promotes a social psychology of conflict, resistance and social
partici-pation in our understanding of the interconnections between
socialstructures and subjectivities, culture and cognition, the
social and thepsychological. It is in this spirit of theoretical
advancement and criticalengagement in social representations
theorizing and research that thisreview should be understood.
Notes
We would like to thank Wolfgang Wagner, Hubert Hermans and
Juliet Fosterfor reviewing this paper and providing very
constructive suggestions. We arealso thankful to Ama de-Graft
Aikins, Alexandra Kolka, Anne-Katrin Schlagand Mike Bartholomaei
for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of thispaper.
1. Studies into the development of social knowledge about
previouslyunknown or threatening social objects demonstrate the
representationalprocesses involved in taming the unknown. These
include extensiveresearch into representations of science and new
technologies (e.g. Bauer &Gaskell, 1999; Wagner et al., 2002),
of HIV-AIDS (e.g. Campbell, 2003; Joffe,1996) and of mental illness
(Jodelet, 1989/1991; Schmitz, Filippone, &Edelman, 2003).
2. The Oxford Dictionary (1995) defines a representation
primarily as animage, likeness, or reproduction of a thing e.g. a
painting or drawing, thusclearly referring to the mirroring
function of representation.
3. Conversely, an emphasis on diversity and fragmentation does
not meanthat there cannot be widely shared or hegemonic
representations withincontemporary societies (Howarth, in press;
Moscovici, 1988).Representations of gender, for example, are
remarkably resistant tohistorical change (Voelklein, 2003) and
contextual factors (Lloyd & Duveen,1992).
4. However, as we discuss below, with Moscovicis use of the
notion ofideology, Jahodas (1988) criticism of an unnecessary
overlap of certaincategories seems to be at least partly
justified.
5. Such an approach resonates with recent work within the
sociology ofscientific knowledge (e.g. Latour, 1991) that is
concerned with identifyingthe different actors that take part in
the legitimization of certain ideas asscience.
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Biographies
CORINA VOELKLEIN is a doctoral candidate in the Social
PsychologyInstitute at the London School of Economics (LSE). Her
research examinessocial representations of womanhood held by
contemporary East Germanwomen and their relation to the former
state socialist ideology. She alsoteaches postgraduate students in
the Social Psychology of Economic Life andworks as Qualitative
Software Instructor with the Methodology Institute atthe LSE.
Alongside her research and teaching and based on her background
inbusiness studies and organizational social psychology, she works
as freelanceconsultant in organizational psychology on different
change and evaluationprojects. Her research interests centre on
societal change, socialrepresentations, ideology and gender, as
well as novel approaches toqualitative research methodology.
ADDRESS: Corina Voelklein, Institute ofSocial Psychology, London
School of Economics, Houghton Street, LondonWC2A 2AE, UK. [email:
[email protected]]
CAROLINE HOWARTH is Lecturer in Social Psychology at the
LondonSchool of Economics. Her research and teaching seek to push
socialpsychology in general and social representations theory in
particular in amore critical direction by addressing questions of
racism, power, exclusionand resistance. This has demanded the
conceptualization of the role of re-presentation in identity
formation, in the marginalization and racializationof specific
communities and in the possibilities of belonging, resistance
andtransformation. Together with Derek Hook (LSE) she is
establishing aResearch Network on Racism and Critical Social
Psychology. She is also on theeditorial boards of the Journal of
Community and Applied Social Psychology andPapers in Social
Representations. ADDRESS: Caroline Howarth, Institute ofSocial
Psychology, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, LondonWC2A
2AE, UK. [email: [email protected]]
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