Sputniks = ICBMs • 4 October 1957 • 3 November 1957 • Unspecified launcher and site • 1120lbs to LEO equals 2000lb warhead to 5- 6,000nm ballistic • No surprise
Jan 19, 2016
Sputniks = ICBMs
• 4 October 1957• 3 November 1957• Unspecified launcher
and site• 1120lbs to LEO equals
2000lb warhead to 5-6,000nm ballistic
• No surprise
Test Ranges
Imagery – but what else?
• HUMINT – Popov?• HUMINT – travellers• Open Sources• Extrapolation from US• IRBM part-testing• No radar or TELINT• SIGINT
A Dodgy Dossier?
• SNIE 11-10-57 dated 10 December 1957
• “IOC mid-1958 to mid-1959 with 10 prototypes”
• 20-50 flight tests needed…
• BUT fragmentary launch evidence admitted
• No idea of ICBM configuration
• “100 ICBMs one year after IOC”
• “500 ICBMs two-three years after IOC”
• BUT No knowledge of production facilities admitted
• (Guidance OK…Warheads OK…Economy OK)
1958
• No U-2 overflights
• Reduced countdown durations
• Sputnik 3 on 15 May 1958
• No more launches that year…
• …but three Luna 3-stage failures
• NIE 11-5-58 dated 19 August 1958
CIA Rethink
24 October 1958 by ORR for GMIC
• 2-3 million sq ft production plants x 2• Engine test facilities• 1,000 subcontractors• “A heavy flow of communications, travellers, material…
between factories, launch sites, and military organisations, and the central authority controlling the program”
• WHERE IS ALL THIS ?!
Where are the launch sites?
1959
• Plea for more U-2 flights
• First Luna success 2 January
• Khrushchev Feb59: “in serial production”
• Test-firings resumed in March
• US TELINT improvements
• Sverdlovsk? Kyubyshev? Dnepropetrovsk?
• Polyarnyy Ural launch site?
U-2 mission constraints
• illegal provocation• avoid radar detection• host countries• range v altitude• camera settings• cloud cover• 9 July 1959 mission• 6 Dec 1959 mission
Knowns + Unknowns
• Kerosene + LOX
• 5,500 nm range
• 6,000 lb warhead
• Not a ‘crash’ program
• Still no imagery of configuration
• Still no launch site(s) identified
• Ten prototypes have achieved IOC?
Nuclear Ransom?
• Symington, Alsop, JFK, 1960 election
• Latest NIE identified a window of opportunity for USSR in 1961
• Intel community consensus fell apart: - Army + Navy versus USAF
• But the Soviet Intent…
No more TALENT
• Two more missions…• …then 1 May 1960• Coverage 650,000 sq
miles BUT: - only 13.6% of Soviet territory
deemed suitable for ICBM deploy
- 3.6% of the eight priority areas
- 8.5% of railroads within them
CORONA
• 9009 18 Aug 1960• 9013 7 Dec 1960• 9017 16 Jun 1961• 9019 7 Jul 1961• 9023 30 Aug 1961• 9022 12 Sep 1961
PLUS• Col Oleg Penkovsky
1961 Estimates
• IOC of ‘a few’ missiles was January 1960
• Kerosene fuel is non-storable
• Five main engines, parallel-staged
• First production was Kaliningrad 88
• Too cumbersome for major deployment
• 10-25 launchers, five possible sites (three seen)
• threat to US is ‘limited’ – USAF still disagreed!
• Follow-on ICBM tests in progress; IOC late 1962
• 250-300 IRBM launchers in western USSR
And the Truth was…
• Orderly programme, space and ICBM launches interspersed
• IOC was late 1959/early 1960
• Only four R-7 launchers deployed – at Plesetsk
• Follow-on ICBM was R-16 from different design bureau
• 24 October 1960 disaster
• Slow progress in 1961
Concluding Thoughts
• Analyst’s experience of under-estimating the Soviet progress to A-bomb and H-bomb drove over-estimates of ICBM programme?
• Highest US estimates required USSR to produce ICBMs x5 faster than US
• US Atlas ICBM was an appropriate analogue to R-7• SIGINT role still not fully appreciated (classification)• Technical collection matured quickly, but…• …there’s no substitute for all-source analysis…• …including HUMINT, especially to understand Intent