Sport, moral interpretivism, and football's voluntary suspension of play norm

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Sport, moral interpretivism, andfootball's voluntary suspension of playnormAlun R. Hardman aa Cardiff School of Sport , University of Wales Institute Cardiff ,Cyncoed Rd., Cyncoed, Cardiff, CF23 6XD, UKPublished online: 12 Mar 2009.

To cite this article: Alun R. Hardman (2009) Sport, moral interpretivism, and football's voluntarysuspension of play norm, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, 3:1, 49-65, DOI: 10.1080/17511320802685113

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SPORT, MORAL INTERPRETIVISM, AND

FOOTBALL’S VOLUNTARY SUSPENSION OF

PLAY NORM

Alun R. Hardman

In recent years it has become increasingly the norm in football1 to kick the ball out of play when a

player is, or appears to be, inadvertently injured. Kicking the ball out of play in football represents

a particular instantiation of a generally understood fair play norm, the voluntary suspension of

play (VSP). In the philosophical literature, support for the VSP norm is provided by John Russell

(2007) who claims that his interpretivist account of sport is helpful for evaluating complex moral

issues in sport in general and issues related to injury in football in particular. This paper examines

whether Russell’s interpretivist-backed account of autonomy can adequately inform football

players as to the nuanced and ambiguous moral considerations that arise in relation to the VSP

norm. The paper goes on to identify the highly complex dynamic circumstances football players

need to consider in order to better discharge their moral responsibilities when faced with

inadvertent injuries.

Resumen

En anos recientes se ha vuelto cada vez mas comun en futbol la norma de chutar el balon fuera

del campo de juego cuando un jugador es, o parece haber sido, lesionado involuntariamente o sin

querer. El chutar el balon fuera del campo de juego representa un caso particular de una regla de

juego limpio comprendida en sus rasgos generales: la suspension voluntaria del juego (VSP) [VSP,

siglas en ingles de ‘voluntary suspension of play’]. En la literatura filosofica, el apoyo a la norma

del VSP viene proporcionada por John Russell (2007), quien alega que su version interpretivista del

deporte es util para evaluar los complejos asuntos morales en el deporte en general y las

cuestiones relacionadas con las lesiones en el futbol en particular. Este artıculo examina si la

postura de Russell, donde el interpretivismo respalda a la autonomıa, puede resultar instructiva

para a los jugadores de futbol en cuanto a las consideraciones morales matizadas y ambiguas

que surgen en relacion con la norma del VSP. El artıculo pasa a identificar las circunstancias

altamente complejas y dinamicas que los jugadores de futbol necesitan considerar a la hora de

descargar sus resposabilidades morales cuando encaren lesiones involuntarias.

Zusammenfassung

In den letzten Jahren hat es sich im Fußball zunehmend zum Standard entwickelt, den Ball ins Aus

zu spielen, insofern ein Spieler versehentlich verletzt wurde oder es zu zumindest den Anschein

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2009

ISSN 1751-1321 print/1751-133X online/09/010049–17

ª 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/17511320802685113

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hat, dass er verletzt sei. Im Fußball den Ball ins Aus zu schießen, ist eine besondere Form der

allgemeinen Fair-Play-Norm, die freiwillige Unterbrechung des Spiels. In der philosophischen

Literatur findet sich mit John Russell (2007) Unterstutzung fur diese Norm der freiwilligen

Spielunterbrechung, denn er behauptet, dass sein interpretatorischer Zugang zum Sport hilfreich

ist fur die Bewertung von komplexen moralischen Fragen im Sport im Allgemeinen und fur Fragen

im Zusammenhang mit Verletzungen im Fußball im Besonderen. Der vorliegende Artikel

untersucht, ob Russells interpretatorisch gestutzter Zugang zur Autonomie Fußballspieler

angemessen belehren kann – insbesondere im Hinblick auf die differenzierten und mehrdeutigen

moralischen Erwagungen, die sich in Bezug auf die Norm der freiwilligen Spielunterbrechung

ergeben. Des Weiteren werden hier die sehr komplexen dynamischen Umstande aufgezeigt, die

Fußballspieler zu beachten haben, um mit ihrer moralischen Verantwortung bezuglich

unbeabsichtigter Verletzungen besser umgehen zu konnen.

Resume

Dans un passe recent, faire sortir la balle du terrain lorsqu’un joueur est – ou semble – blesse

accidentellement est devenu une norme en football. Faire sortir la balle constitue une forme

particuliere de la norme du fair-play telle qu’on peut la comprendre : l’arret volontaire du jeu

(AVJ). Dans la litterature philosophique, des arguments en faveur de l’AVJ sont fournis par John

Russell (2007) qui declare que son analyse interpretative du sport est utile pour evaluer les aspects

moraux complexes du sport en general et ceux qui sont lies aux blessures en football en

particulier. Cet article se demande si l’analyse interpretative de Russel sur l’autonomie peut

informer les joueurs de maniere adequate sur les considerations morales nuancees et ambigues

qui se developpent en relation a la norme de l’AVJ. Il s’attache a identifier les circonstances

complexes et dynamiques que les joueurs doivent considerer afin de mieux se decharger de leur

responsabilite morale lorsqu’ils font face aux blessures accidentelles.

KEYWORDS football; fair play; injury

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Introduction

In this paper I examine more fully the moral aspects associated with the widespread

soccer norm which advocates that a player in possession should kick the ball out of play

when another player is, or appears to be, inadvertently injured.2 The behaviour instantiates

a more generally understood fair play norm – the voluntarily suspension of play (VSP) –

which aims to safeguard participants by allowing medical staff on to the field of play to

attend to an injured player as soon as possible.3 Such action may also be viewed positively

because it ensures that equality in contesting conditions, which otherwise would be

restored only after a stoppage in play, is maintained.

My project is divided into three distinct sections. The first provides support at the

general level for John Russell’s view that moral interpretivism as an account of sport can

provide an effective means for deliberating obdurate ethical issues (or what Russell calls

‘hard cases’). The second section constitutes a critical re-examination of Russell’s moral

interpretivism and argues that Russell’s emphasis on the role of consent, which he argues

reflects the importance of the ‘principle of autonomy’, is underdeveloped and, as a

consequence, normatively ambiguous when applied to the VSP norm. In the third and final

section I re-examine football’s VSP norm and suggests how players can scrutinise

effectively the moral landscape in advance of deciding how to act.

The VSP Norm, Moral Interpretivism and the Principles of Sport

Essays in the Journal of the Philosophy of Sport (D’Agostino 1981, Morgan 1987) and

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy (Kretchmar 2007) argue that standard formalist and

conventionalist accounts of fair play present limited and unpersuasive means for assessing

ethical issues in sport. In response, some authors have offered an alternative theoretical

approach broadly understood as ‘moral interpretivism’, a framework which seeks to both

explain and solve the adjudged rule-based narrowness of formalism and the alleged

sociocultural relativism of conventionalism. The writings of John Russell (1999; 2004; 2007),

Bob Simon (2000; 2002), and Graham McFee (2002; 2004) are particularly instructive here

and though all three push an interpretivist line for sport, it is the work of Russell in

particular that informs much of the interpretivist take on the VSP norm presented here.

I focus on Russell’s work because, of the three authors identified, he arguably offers the

most sustained and comprehensive account of interpretivism, and in addition he argues

expressly that the VSP norm is well-supported by an interpretivist point of view.

Russell’s interpretivist account of sport is inspired by Ronald Dworkin’s (1997; 1986)

work on jurisprudence. Dworkin argues that an overly narrow view of the nature of law

held by legal positivists is the root cause of many problems encountered in the legal

system. Russell sees a similar narrowness with regard to an understanding of the nature of

sport. In practice, what this means for judicial officials (i.e. judges) is that the exercise of

discretion is a moral and practical necessity. The need for such discretion becomes

palpably clear in cases where there are ‘uncertainties regarding the purposes that rules are

designed to serve’ (Russell 1999, 32). Dworkin recognises that there are cases where the

law varies in the degree to which it is clear in meaning, purpose and scope. As a result it

may fail to govern conduct authoritatively because a lack of clarity may exist if the law is at

odds with, or unable to articulate some underlying principle of the legal system of which it

is a part. His response to the problem in jurisprudence is to argue that in addition to legal

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rules which make up the law, there are also legal principles which have normative force

within the legal system.

The interpretivist approach can be extended to what Dworkin calls non-municipal

legal systems which, according to Russell (1999, 35), include sport. In the sporting context,

officials, coaches and participants have obligations to decide hard cases of ethical

significance. In football, for example, referees will always be required to judge whether a

defender who intentionally fouls an attacker has thereby prevented a clear scoring

opportunity and, as a consequence, deserves a yellow or red card. In such cases Russell

argues the referee’s decision will be a matter of interpretation which should recognise that

behind the formal rules there are basic moral principles that are constitutive of the

integrity of sport.

In Russell’s interpretivist account, the integrity of sport is safeguarded by two kinds

of principles. First and foremost, there are those that he considers ‘external’ to sport in the

sense that they set the moral boundary of permissible conduct in sport. Here, he suggests

that the ‘external’ principle ‘reflects the idea that games are institutions grounded in a

principle of consent and thus embody a basically Kantian idea of respect for persons, at

least in the sense that games are voluntary activities for game participants’ (Russell 2007,

58). In addition there are principles ‘internal’ to sport which guide participants toward the

goal of ‘promotion of respect for persons and of human flourishing’ (Russell 2007, 59). The

internal principle ‘governs the behaviour of participants’ in ways that ensure that ‘rules

should be interpreted and applied so that the context in which the excellences the game

makes possible are not undermined but are maintained and fostered’ (Russell 2007, 58).

The general gist of Russell’s interpretivist position should be endorsed and in

particular its claim that underlying principles play a crucial role in articulating fair play

issues in sport. In the next section of the paper, however, I re-examine the effectiveness of

Russell’s theory as an account of fair play in general and football’s VSP norm in particular.

Moral Interpretivism, the VSP Norm and the Principle of Consent

It is evident that Russell’s interpretivist backing for the VSP norm depends

significantly on the principle of consent, which is derived ostensively from the concept of

autonomy. In general, theories of autonomy will involve weighing up contributions from

two groups of conditions: competency conditions and authenticity conditions. Compe-

tency points to capacities for rational thought, self-control and freedom from

incapacitating pathologies, self-delusion and so on. Authenticity conditions include the

ability to reflect on and justify one’s wishes, values and preferences. Though these notions

are common to all debates on autonomy, deciding where the balance lies between the

differing sets of conditions is complex and contested. It also means that in different moral

and political contexts significant differences exist as to how the concept of autonomy will

function. While I will not attempt to detail all differences of opinion and their implications

here, two are particularly relevant to the VSP issue.

First, there is the contrast between ‘basic’ and ‘ideal’ autonomy. Basic autonomy

speaks more to competency conditions and suggests that autonomous persons must have

minimal levels of responsibility, independence and the wherewithal for self-representation.

It implies that all adults should not suffer from debilitating conditions or that they be

oppressed and coerced. Ideal autonomy, on the other hand, focuses more on matters of

authenticity and aims for persons to free from all kinds of manipulation. This view of

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autonomy strives for authenticity of a maximal kind which may not be achievable for all.

Unlike basic autonomy which is seen as a moral necessity, ideal autonomy serves more as

an aspirational goal rather than a tangible end.

Second, it is important to consider whether autonomy should aim at ‘procedural

independence’ such that there is no interest in stipulating the content of the desires,

preferences, values and so on, in virtue of which autonomy is conferred. By contrast, if

‘substantive independence’ is central, then circumstances that are considered to limit

choice severely are viewed as inconsistent with autonomy and therefore disqualified, no

matter how the individual came to choose such circumstances. As Mill (1978, 101) put it,

‘the principle of freedom cannot require that he [sic] should be free not to be free’.

With these distinctions in hand, we are better able to scrutinise which aspects of

autonomy Russell has in mind in his interpretivist-framed discussion on the morality of the

VSP norm. In his initial discussion on the ‘external principle’, Russell argues that persons

unfortunate to sustain inadvertent injuries in football cannot consent to play the game

because to be meaningful, consent presupposes a capacity or competence of some sort. In

the case of football, he suggests that

Consent to play a game with no capacity or competence at all to play is not interesting or

meaningful consent, just as consent in medicine or law without capacity or competence

is not genuine consent. Furthermore, there is a presumption that that absence of

capacity or competence vitiates consent and thus the incapacitated player can be

presumed to be no longer a game player according to the external principle. (Russell

2007, 60).

From this we can surmise that the account of autonomy operating here, because it focuses

on footballing capacities and competencies, moves beyond basic and procedural matters

towards ideals and stuff of substance. We get a sense of what these substantive qualities

are where he adds that the VSP norm has moral salience with respect to the ‘internal’

principle of human flourishing because he argues that when building a community among

sports players, it is important to foster the distinctive excellences that provide for the goals

of sport in morally acceptable ways.

Russell then goes on to suggest that when inadvertent injuries occur in football, our

understanding as to which sporting excellences are proper to human flourishing (i.e. the

internal principle) must be framed out of respect for persons (i.e. the external principle):

That is, it would hardly foster a context where the excellences of a game could be

displayed if players knew that injuries derived from the acts of pursuing those

excellences were unlikely to be treated in a timely fashion (or would be ignored

altogether). Knowing that one would be left for dead if one gets injured in the course of

play is surely no incentive to take chances displaying, let alone extending, the more

demanding physical skill required by a sport. (Russell 2007, 60–1).

In contrast to his earlier comments, this passage points to concerns about more

fundamental aspects of autonomy, those which emphasise that consent here is based on

concerns other than the injured player’s capacity or competence to play. It suggests that in

order to safeguard autonomy, participants involved in the game should first and foremost

ensure respect for persons through avoiding actions that deliberately cause, or make

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worse, an injured sportsperson’s infirmity – the loss of playing competence or capacity to

play now appears to be a secondary moral concern to which players consent.

What follows, and what is important from this, is that we are left unsure as to which

version of autonomy (ideal/substantive or basic/procedural) underpins the normative basis

of consent. Is the VSP norm justified because the kind of consent players give involves

restoring an injured individual’s competence or capacity to play as Russell’s presentation

of the external principle would have it? Or is the VSP norm justified because what players

consent to is the more fundamental aspects of health and safety, as his internal principle

suggests? If it is the former, then it suggests that in the event of injury, meaningful

consent is based on preserving the individual’s competence or capacity qua football

player, whereas if it is the latter, consent entails preserving something else constitutive of

the individual qua person.4

The underlying problem with Russell’s account of consent is that it fails sufficiently

to take into consideration the nature of inadvertent injury in the context of particular

sports, particularly those that involve contact such as football, rugby and ice hockey. It is

evident that when we assess the inherent character of such sports, inadvertent injury and

the concomitant loss of capacity or competence to play is a distinct probability. This state

of affairs is both known and accepted by players prior to and during the game – they give

their consent to participate in an activity in which it is likely that injury will result in, to

varying degrees, a loss of capacity or competence to play. By doing so, players readily

acknowledge that the unity they seek between their projected visions of themselves as

football players and their lived experiences as such may be stymied by aspects of (football)

life which are beyond their control.

It follows from this that for those who suffer inadvertent sporting injuries, what one

wants and what one can reasonably expect, despite the help of others, is often out of

one’s control. For all but minor game injures, specialised treatment and substantial time

away from the competitive environment may be needed for recovery to take place, and

even then it may be incomplete, perhaps to the point that the player can no longer play at

his or her previous level. As a result, what one can ask of others in relation to inadvertent

injuries in the context of contact sports may be considerably less than what one may

otherwise expect in different circumstances. With this understanding in mind, prescribing

what is or is not an appropriate response to inadvertent injury should not based on the

goal of restoring competence or capacity to play because it is highly dependent on

empirical uncertainties (i.e. the aetiology, diagnosis and prognosis of injury) which mean

that restorative efforts cannot be assumed to be boundless. Unfortunately, Russell does

not specify at what point actions directed at achieving the more substantive and ideal

aspects of a football player’s autonomy pass a morally acceptable threshold around which

consent is to be established. Ordinarily perhaps the most we can aim for, and therefore

consent to, is that injured players are treated in a timely and concerted way. Beyond that,

as nothing more can be predicted, nothing more is required. In such circumstances, the

end result may be that one’s substantive interests qua football player may be diminished,

and in the case of career ending injuries, lost forever. Matters of autonomy here will always

be subject to practical realities.

In the context of football and other contact sports, a more plausible and preferable

account of consent is one to be understood in basic terms related to having control over

choosing, and being able to self-direct, one’s decisions. What is meant exactly by control

and self-direction of course is difficult to pin down, and it is certainly not my intention to

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develop a full and convincing account of basic autonomy here. Nevertheless, as such

matters play a role in preserving respect for the moral importance of the uniqueness and

separateness of persons, they serve in a deeper, more fundamental way to safeguard

autonomy. Shiffren (2004) supports this view, arguing that the basic procedural aspects of

autonomy are more important because they can be seen as standing apart from, and in

advance of, the interests that full-blown autonomy subsequently acquires. Thus, though

this version of autonomy does not present itself in terms of specific interests, values and

life-visions, there is important moral significance attached to the simple exercise of control

and self-determination.

With this in mind, it is now apparent that serious injuries do pose a threat to the

more basic aspects of autonomy because they may temporarily or permanently eliminate

some or all capacities or competencies. When a player is knocked unconscious, or where

there is clear evidence of serious pain and suffering (i.e. a broken leg), the demands of

morality entail there are obligations on others to protect, to a sufficient degree, a broad

range of capacities needed to structure coherent and unified (but not necessarily football-

playing) life-fulfilling choices. Here then, are clear cases where the VSP norm is justified

and play should cease immediately in order for the injured player to receive medical

attention.

It is important to recognise here, however, that the moral actions of others are

likely to be motivated primarily by the serious nature of the injury sustained by a

fellow player rather than concerns about autonomy. In the case of serious injuries,

safeguarding the welfare of the seriously injured player is perhaps more properly

understood then as a matter of avoiding harm and the more relevant principles that

apply are those of non-maleficence or non-injurious action rather than autonomy.

Matters of autonomy can said to have a dependent relational connection to more

immediate concerns associated with avoiding further harm and therefore the principle

of autonomy is better seen here as a more distant contingent consequence of this

moral priority.

So far I have argued that is important to recognise that there is a distinctive

difference between two types of autonomy which are relevant to how we think about the

VSP norm. I claim that the more basic procedural aspects rather than ideal and substantive

of autonomy should underpin player consent. This in turn means players’ actions should

take into account the seriousness of inadvertent injuries and suggests that the VSP norm

should be restricted to a more narrow class of game situations than at present. Where

serious injuries occur, the suspension of play is necessary, but is justified in principle as

primarily an attempt to avoid further harm to an injured player rather than out of concerns

for autonomy.

My position is at odds with both the prevailing ethos in sport, and Russell’s

interpretivist account which supports a more liberal account of the VSP norm. Our

differences, I think are probably linked to two related issues. The first problem is a

philosophical one where his interpretivist account suggests that the VSP norm is also

ethically relevant for a broader range of situations than I am willing to concede. The

second argument is an empirical one in which it could be argued that my position makes

unrealistic demand on players’ ability to evaluate the severity of injuries. I will now develop

and respond to these criticisms in more detail.

The first counter-argument is that I draw a line that is too narrow and restrictive

because though my position establishes minimal moral requirements, it should not

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preclude players from kicking the ball out of play in the event of less serious

injuries. This counter-view suggests that in cases of minor injury, the VSP norm can be

justified morally as a supererogatory act that is beneficent in nature. As such, it is an

act that, though not morally required, helps the game go along nicely as it sweetens

the moral atmosphere between opponents (Fraleigh 1984). Russell’s interpretivist

account, influenced by Kantian philosophy, supports this moral outlook.

To justify the VSP norm as a supererogatory act is problematic for two key

reasons. The first is that viewing the VSP norm in this way may further discourage

players from interrogating sincerely the seriousness of the injury and with it an

appreciation of the VSP’s obligatory as well as its discretionary dimensions. In addition,

if the VSP is to be regarded as a supererogatory act it means that players must also

assess whether kicking the ball out of play involves relinquishing a significant

competitive advantage that has been legitimately and skilfully achieved. This view

suggests that in addition to matters of beneficence, players also should consider how

the VSP norm may impact the game. The VSP norm may only have supererogatory

status if play is in a ‘neutral’ phase where there is no clear competitive advantage to

either team. By contrast, where a team has an opportunity to press home an

advantage that has been legitimately earned it is dubious as to whether the VSP norm

is justified given the (in)significance of the injury. In such situations the VSP norm may

remove a legitimately acquired, significant and potentially game-changing advantage

and in so doing introduces an altruistic dimension to the norm which is unwarranted.

My view differs here from Russell’s who, drawing on Arnold (1983), argues that

‘sportsmanship is altruistic to an important degree’ which may mean that competitive

advantages voluntarily relinquished and not compensated are a ‘prudential cost to

being a good sport’ (Russell 2007, 61). The problem, as O’Neill (1993, 179) suggests, is

that if such an attitude has moral salience in such matters, we should also be mindful

of the problem that comes with over-compliance with the norm. Unreflective

application of the VSP norm may at times lead to excessive altruism and self-sacrifice

and with it a ‘systematic failure to develop one’s own potential’. She concludes that

such an attitude ‘amounts to disrespect for humanity and its capacities for rational

agency ‘‘in one’s own person’’’.

The second, related criticism in support of a more charitable application of the VSP

norm argues that the VSP norm should be applied more liberally because players are

primarily interested in winning games, and therefore it is unrealistic to demand of them

highly nuanced moral deliberations that are dependent on accurate empirical evaluations.

This position argues that if all outward signs suggest that a player is in significant pain, in

order to err on the side of caution, all one can reasonably expect of players in such

situations is to allow qualified medical staff to attend to the injured player as soon as

possible.

A further factor complicating the reality of the situation is an increase in ‘shamming’ –

the growing tendency of either faking or exaggerating injury following contact with an

opponent. Such poor sporting behaviour is used primarily as an attempt to con officials

into calling a foul or yellow-carding an opponent, but at times is used to prompt to

conform to the VSP norm. When used for this reason, ‘clever’ players who ‘sham’

recognise that the VSP norm can bring about strategic benefits to their team by

preventing critical passages of play from developing, halting the flow of the game in

general, or time-wasting.

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Despite such difficulties, I consider unreserved support for the VSP norm as a

supererogatory act does more harm than good because such an approach merely serves

to overlook the significant moral implications that are involved in decision-making one

way or another. Mere compliance here also means capitulation, for when players no longer

interrogate significantly the underlying moral dimensions for the norm, they cannot said

to be acting on moral principle. A more forthright approach is to acknowledge that

‘shamming’ makes it more difficult for players to assess appropriately the actual facts of an

inescapable moral landscape – it should be seen as just one more matter to disentangle

when assessing the efficacy of the VSP norm as a moral response to injury. It demands that

players be extra-vigilant rather than blase with their moral interrogations. It means that, in

addition to assessing the seriousness of the injury, before performing the VSP norm

players should also consider both the motives of their opponents and how the beneficent

nature of their actions will have an effect elsewhere in relation to the game’s competitive

state.

To summarise, a more liberal application of the norm, though it may appear to

lessen the burden on players having to judge the nature of football injuries, does not

actually diminish the need for exercising complex moral deliberations. Indeed, there is no

inherent reason why we should expect to find easy solutions to such moral matters, and

that in all reality in sport, as in life, that’s just the way things are. Rather than seek out easy

but imperfect responses to what are genuinely hard cases for sport, if interpretivist moral

deliberations are to find any purchase in sport they will need to endorse the full and dense

complexity that hard cases such as inadvertent injury in football present. In the final

section of the paper, I will examine in more detail how interpretivism can account for the

contextual particularities which football’s VSP norm contains.

The VSP Norm Reconsidered

In this final section I will suggest how football players, coaches and administrators

can best revive the VSP norm as an upstanding act of good sportsmanship. My ideas are

mindful of the arguments presented in the earlier sections of the paper and are guided by

the idea that the moral demands players face are dependent upon the seriousness of

injury. This in turn requires me to consider carefully how players are better able to

distinguish injuries of a serious and minor nature.

My analysis is underpinned by moral interpretivism, but emphasises how the theory

must also be capable of the kind of reflexive and contextual moral particularity which my

analysis demands. There is a level of irony here, for expressing such ideas on paper cannot

hope to capture the moral intricacies that such situations require and harder still is the

ability to convey the emotional and psychological influences that attend such real-life

events. More important still is that, even if it is possible to provide some sense of the kind

of moral complexities through which players must negotiate, the extent to which such an

analysis is of benefit elsewhere is open to question. If I am correct in thinking that the

contextual moral particularity I have identified captures accurately the difficulties that

sportsmen and -women face in sport, it means that where inadvertent injuries are

concerned each set of new circumstances will require agents to undertake careful

considerations as to what constitutes the right thing to do on a case-by-case basis.

Arguably, perhaps the best means of addressing the issue given the inherent

problems identified, is through an example that can best serve to capture the tensions

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and complexities that moral decision-making will involve. The chosen example comes

from an English Premiership match between West Ham United and Everton in

December 2000. The following newspaper report captures some of the important

contextual elements:

The game, tied at 1–1, had gone into stoppage time when the Everton goalkeeper Paul

Gerrard fell to the ground clutching his knee some distance from his goal. As he lay in

obvious discomfort, the West Ham winger Trevor Sinclair whipped a cross over into the

penalty area where Paolo Di Canio, West Ham’s Italian star-forward was standing some 16

yards from what was a largely unprotected target. Di Canio would probably have scored

but, instead of heading, volleying or dribbling home, he reached up and caught the ball,

shaking his head as he pointed at the prone goalkeeper.5

The Di Canio example is noteworthy for a number of reasons and at the time was heralded

as an extraordinary act of good sportsmanship.6 His act went on to receive the FIFA 2000

Fair Play award, and arguably as a consequence did much to establish of the VSP norm as

the standard response to inadvertent injury. It serves to illustrate three considerations

regarding the VSP norm which are relevant in all cases. The first is the nature or

seriousness of the injury, the second is the sincerity and honesty of the injured player and

the third is the status or context of the contest. I consider Di Canio’s actions in this case to

be misguided in terms of these important considerations, each of which will now be

discussed in turn.

Severity of Injury

Judging the severity of injuries is difficult. Nevertheless, there are at least two key

indicators that can help. The first relates to the site of injury – head injuries such as a

clash of heads or a boot to the face are of particular concern because of the potential

loss of consciousness. The second is the response of the injured player. Generally,

players whose responses are less animated and flamboyant have more serious injuries.

Players in severe pain and generally able to move less, and those who have no

demonstrable outward signs of consciousness require greater consideration than those

whose apparent discomfort is marked by extravagant gestures. While this may not be

true in all cases, it is likely that over time and through experience, from witnessing a

range of injuries, players will be able to discern, more than most, those which tend to

be more or less serious.

The nature and the severity of the injury in the Di Canio case did not warrant the VSP

as it was not of a life-threatening kind which demands immediate attention. Television

footage at the time shows Gerrard in some discomfort on the ground clutching his knee

and rolling from side to side.7 All outward signs suggest that no significant further harm

would have befallen the injured player had play continued. Gerrard would have received

medical attention soon after Di Canio had made an attempt on goal. As it was, after the

premature stoppage, following a short pause for treatment to a slight knee sprain, he was

able to resume play.

Recently football’s authorities have attempted to clarify the problems associated

with over-conformity to the VSP norm with the following rulebook directive aimed at

differentiating how officials should respond to injury:

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Referees must follow the instructions below when dealing with injured players:

. Play is allowed to continue until the ball is out of play if a player is, in his [sic] opinion,

only slightly injured.

. Play is stopped if, in his [sic] opinion, a player is seriously injured.8

At the beginning of the 2006–7 season, the English Premier League issued the following

guidelines aimed at bolstering the rulebook statement:

If there is a serious injury then the referee can, of course, take immediate action in the

interests of player safety, but if it’s a run-of-the-mill knock then play should go on. It’s

never been part of the rules, so that makes it all the more important to get the League

Managers’ Association (LMA) and the Professional Footballers’ Association (PFA) on

board. We need both organisations’ support to communicate this to their members –

and fans also need to be aware. This will remove the pressure on players who are

wondering at the back of their mind ‘is he really injured?’ What people don’t like to see is

when an attack gets stopped because someone goes down grabbing their knee and

then, a minute later, he’s sprinting around and putting tackles in. It’s important for the

integrity and honesty of the game, as well as the flow.9

While these developments begin to address the issues involved, the rulebook provides no

detailed guidance as how the seriousness of injuries can be determined, and is noticeably

silent as to how players should act. The inference is that players have no role to play in

such situations. This is both troubling and impractical, for it presumes that officials have

more of an obligation to act when injuries occur than players do, and that officials are

better placed and able to evaluate and provide an effective response. The officials now

face the prospect of having to decide quickly whether an injured player, who may be some

distance away, requires urgent and immediate attention just as a crucial game-changing

play is developing. However, as players may be better placed to recognise and respond to

genuine injury, shifting the burden of judgement and responsibility entirely to the officials

may be taken as overly paternalistic and potentially absolves players from responding to

inadvertent injury in a morally appropriate way. Though such directives may be motivated

by a legitimate attempt to establish a degree of consistency and impartiality, it provides an

imperfect remedy because it discourages players from exercising their moral agency when

they genuinely perceive a serious injury may have occurred. Players may have an

important role to play where serious injuries are concerned, and the VSP norm should

remain a legitimate course of action where appropriate. Furthermore, the administrative

intervention fails to consider the likely problems that will be encountered as players make

a transition from adhering to the VSP norm to one in which they ‘play to the whistle’. It is

open to question whether transition will be a smooth and linear or erratic and inconsistent

as players attempt to get to grips with reshaping the game’s ethos.

Sincerity of the Players

A crucial factor that prevents players being able to determine the seriousness of an

injury is the increased incidence of ‘shamming’. We should not be surprised that the VSP

norm should be manipulated to achieve strategic ends, for such behaviour represents one

more way in which ‘radical instrumentalism’ (Morgan 1994, 147) bares itself as the

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predominant outlook on games. What is noteworthy about this case is how the kind of

instrumentality that has heretofore been equated to a particular attitude towards the

formal rules of the sport now becomes parasitic on an aspect of the game’s ethos. The clear

problem here is that when players ‘sham’ for strategic purposes, it places in jeopardy the

willingness from others to respond to genuine pain and suffering in a sincere and

benevolent way. For this reason, where there is clear evidence of ‘shamming’ it should be

condemned by all as reprehensible behaviour as its presence clearly presents a barrier to

players wishing to act judiciously.

The solutions I offer to remedy ‘shamming’ go in a number of directions. The first

approach is for officials to penalise such behaviour when it is exposed. Unfortunately, this

in turn requires boldness and certainty of referees who will have to judge the honesty of

players. As ‘shamming’ by its nature aims at the deliberate deception of officials and

players alike, decisions on such matters will be a matter of interpretation, difficult to make,

and referees will not always get it right.

A second approach is to legislate against ‘shamming’ by developing more formally

and fully the present regulation aimed at preventing ‘stalling’, which requires an injured

player to leave the field of play once the referee has authorised medical staff to come onto

the pitch to treat a player.10 In such circumstances, the injured player must receive

treatment off the field of play, and can only re-enter with permission from the referee. The

same ruling should apply following the VSP norm to ensure appropriate assessment and

treatment of injury. Thus, injured players who are treated beneficently by VSP acts should

normally not expect to re-enter the field of play immediately and, based on the principle of

non-malificence, both medical staff and officials should be seen as assiduous in their duty of

care by insisting on the removal of the injured player from the field of play for an extended

period of time. How long the assessment and treatment of injuries take will of course vary,

but guidelines issued by healthcare professionals should provide the basis upon which such

decisions are to be made. The upshot of this change means that where injuries are a ‘sham’,

players will now have to balance the immediate short-term benefits that may accrue from

their opponents’ altruistic compliance to the VSP norm against the potential cost of playing

a player short for a prolonged period of time. In addition, as the prospect of being a player

short following the VSP is known to all, teammates and coaches will more willing to

condemn ‘shamming’ as a strategy because of the potential disadvantages involved.

This legistlative change also highlights a third approach, which relates to the

important role that coaches and fellow players have in redeveloping a more wholesome

ethos. The VSP norm should be presented from an early age as an act that demands

players recognise they have a responsibility to respond in morally appropriate ways to the

serious injuries of fellow competitors and in addition, that such consideration demands

from all a duty to respect one’s opponents by behaving with sincerity.11 To ensure this

happens, players and coaches in particular have an important responsibility to discourage

‘shamming’, not only because it may ultimately be poor strategy but, more importantly,

because it is bad sportsmanship.

Contesting Conditions and Game Advantage

The final matter to discuss relates to those contextual aspects that are related to the

changing competitive flux of the game. These considerations are relevant for those minor

injuries which ordinarily do not require the suspension of play on moral grounds, but may

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in certain circumstances justify the VSP norm as a supererogatory act. Consider the moral

implications of what might have happened had Di Canio not interrupted play in the manner

he did. The first and most likely outcome would have been a prompt stoppage in play

following an attempt on goal and with it an opportunity to attend to the injured player. It is

questionable therefore whether Di Canio’s actions would have hastened treatment in this

event. But now suppose Di Canio’s attempt on goal had been deflected away, but the ball

had stayed in play – what should the players have done then? If an Everton player had

gathered the ‘loose ball’ then a sensible move would have been to kick the ball out of play

because strategically, there is little to gain and much to lose by playing a man down, in

front of one’s goal, particularly if the incapacitated player is one’s goalkeeper. However, if

the change in game conditions did lead to an immediate and significant opportunity for

Everton to score, then there seems no reason to suspend play. For example, it seems

reasonable for Everton to have played-on if a ricochet from a blocked Di Canio shot had

propelled the ball deep into West Ham territory and resulted in a foot race on goal for an

Everton forward. If however, it had been West Ham who regained possession and another

scoring opportunity in front of the Everton goal, then once again that immediate and

significant advantage should have been pressed home. The general idea is that where a

legitimately accrued game advantage continues for either side, that competitive advantage

should be pursued. As there is no transition to a ‘neutral’ phase in both of these scenarios,

play should continue rather than be voluntarily suspended, for this would entail the loss of

a legitimately earned advantage. My underlying contention is that in the case of minor

injuries, teams should not give up a legitimately accrued advantage, for doing so

introduces an altruistic dimension to the VSP norm that I find objectionable.

What however, are we to make of the situation had the play entered a ‘neutral’

phase with West Ham in possession? This situation presents the most appropriate

opportunity for the VSP norm to be performed as a supererogatory act because no

immediate and legitimate advantage has to be relinquished.

I do not consider the VSP norm especially objectionable in such situations. The

crucial issue here, however, is that the moral imperative in such cases mean that players

should rather than ought to kick the ball out of play. What may further influence the

decision to carry out the VSP is whether there is culpability on the part of the injured

player. One is inclined to think that the VSP should be less likely in situations where injury

is due to poor conditioning (e.g. muscle cramp) or a failed attempt at a reckless tackle or

following a collision between teammates, and events of a similar nature. In the Di Canio

case, though the cause of the injury is unexplained, it occurred after Gerrard had made a

rash attempt to intercept a ball on the edge of his penalty area – arguably, his poor

decision-making contributed to his mishap and therefore his opponents should feel less

inclined to respond in a supererogatory way.

In addition, the team in possession should also consider a more fundamental issue,

which is whether the ongoing pursuit of a contesting advantage due to an opponent’s

injury undermines the point, purpose and value of the sport contest. If we take here

Simon’s view (1991, 23) that sport is about a ‘mutually acceptable quest for excellence

through challenge’, prolonged uneven contesting may cast into doubt whether advantages

gained under such circumstances are really a mark of excellence or have come about

through an appropriate challenge. Furthermore, the treatment and substitution of injured

players seem to instantiate this general principle such that the pursuit of excellence is

contingent upon an adequate challenge, fundamental to which is that teams are equal in

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number. Attempting to win a game against an opponent who isn’t at full strength due to an

injury may diminish significantly the value of the contest. It is perhaps this idea which may

partly explain Di Canio’s extraordinary actions. Perhaps the idea of scoring a goal with no

goalkeeper to beat was unbearably hollow and meaningless. I think there is something to

this, and were such a scenario to arise, there would be something particularly ungracious

about a team who relentlessly attempted to press home a numerical advantage with wave

upon wave of attacks while a member of the opposition hobbled around in discomfort. To

my mind, however, the Di Canio example does not reach such a nadir, as Everton could still

have responded effectively to their goalkeeper’s misfortune in a number of legitimate ways:

they could have put defenders on the goal line, brought all their forwards back to defend,

and have been more aggressive (but fair) in trying to win back possession. There are of

course more flagrant ways in which they could halt play too, but my previous comments

with regard to radical instrumentalism mean such tactics ought not to be sanctioned.

One final consideration tied to performing the VSP norm as a supererogatory act has

to be the degree to which it will be followed consistently. Whether it is possible to develop

such an understanding is questionable given that when play enters a neutral phase the

overall competitive context will vary significantly within, and between, each game. Acting

in such a supererogatory way in the opening minutes of the contest, or when the game is

long won or lost, is a lot easier than when one’s team is a goal down in the last few

minutes of a crucial match. For this reason, relying on a tacit assumption that all

participants share a common understanding as to when the VSP norm should and should

not be performed during neutral phases of play for minor injuries is perilous. The more

likely outcome is that there will be great variations in practice such that the VSP norm may

become a flashpoint for confrontations about standards of fair play. I can see no easy

solution to such inconsistencies, but perhaps players and coaches might clarify matters by

articulating their position beforehand. They could state their general policy as to what

they intend to do should a minor injury occur to an opponent and they have possession

during a neutral phase of the game. While such an approach may not eliminate all

problems and misunderstandings, at least it would then stimulate both greater discussion

on the morality of the VSP norm in general, and move towards some shared expectations

between opponents specifically. It would also require players to pay greater attention in

exercising the kinds of judgements I have advocated.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that interpretivism proves to be a useful approach for

working through difficult sports issues because it demands of sportspersons the ability to

justify their actions beyond the normative mandates provided by the rules of a game and its

social conventions to matters related to deeper underlying principles. My analysis of the

VSP norm has argued that it is important to develop an ability in sportspersons to respond

to the inadvertent injuries of others in ways that do not involve mere conformity to moral

principles, but instead should foster the capacity to exercise moral judgements that fully

consider the complex issues that such misfortunes involve. My position – that approval of

the VSP norm should be guarded and conditional – has practical implications, particularly

with regard to how coaches and players need to develop the capacity to recognise and

judge for themselves the highly nuanced situational variations that emerge on each

occasion injury occurs to a fellow competitor. Though observance of the VSP norm rightly

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ensures that players will err on the side of caution where serious injury is concerned, its

performance should not be automatic or unexamined. Instead, the VSP becomes a laudable

response to injury only if we inculcate in sportspersons from an early age the capacity both

to act in a good way and to act for the right reason. In the case of the VSP norm in soccer,

therefore, we need to revisit both which underlying principles are relevant and what moral

good they claim to uphold. A failure to do means that the current prevalence of the VSP

norm in soccer, often taken as a beacon of virtue, will remain indicative more of an

imperfect, confused sporting environment than a reflective and upstanding one.

NOTES

1. For North American readers, football here equals soccer.

2. The acts that lead to inadvertent injuries can be assumed to be those that take place

during the constitutive phase of the game and are deemed acceptable by the officials. As

such injuries are the result of the legitimate but unintended acts of the participants, play

could continue as no foul has been committed.

3. The VSP is common to other team sports such as field hockey, lacrosse and netball, as

well as individual sports such as fell-running, mountain biking and rallying. Perhaps most

noteworthy, such a norm is powerfully understood in extreme endurance events such as

ocean racing, where it is implicitly recognised that the safety of fellow competitors

depends on a full and complete acceptance of the VSP norm. See ‘Leg 7 Review’, 1 June

2006, Volvo Ocean Race website (Fareham, Hants, UK), available at http://www.volvo

oceanrace.org/features/article/2006/june/leg7review/, accessed 18 April 2007.

4. It is also curious here as to why more fundamental moral concerns regarding basic

autonomy are not indicative of the external principle at work, and at the same time why

the more substantive moral values associated with excellences of a game are not aligned

with internal principles. While such matters should not be seen as a fundamental criticism

of Russell’s interpretivism, in his treatment of the VSP norm example at least the

alignment of interpretive principles with substantive moral content seems logically

counter-intuitive.

5. T. Haylett, ‘DiCanio Catches Mood’, Daily Telegraph (London) online, 16 Dec. 2000,

available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/main.jhtml?xml¼/sport/2000/12/16/sfgeve

17.xml, accessed 12 March 2006.

6. Di Canio has had a chequered career. He is famous for pushing referee Paul Alcock to the

ground after being sent off while playing for Sheffield Wednesday against Arsenal in

1998. He made Fascist salutes to celebrate his team, Lazio, winning a Rome derby against

arch-rivals Roma. He repeated the gesture in the matches against Livorno (whose

supporters are markedly Communist) and Juventus in December 2005. He was

suspended for one game by the Italian Football Federation and fined 10,000 euros. He

is also known to have been part of the Ultras, a neo-Nazi fan group (Lazio’s Irriducibili) in

his youth and travelled with the group to away matches, which is quite uncommon

among professional football players.

7. ‘Fair play’, YouTube (website), available at http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v¼9NQ1GFGSY-

KY, accessed 5 Dec. 2005.

8. English Football Archive, ‘The rules of association football’, online, 12 March 2005,

available at http://www.the-english-football-archive.com/laws/law*21.htm, accessed 12

Jan. 2006. See The English Football Archive 2005. The full instructions to referees are as

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follows: ‘Play is allowed to continue until the ball is out of play if a player is, in his opinion,

only slightly injured. Play is stopped if, in his opinion, a player is seriously injured. After

questioning the injured player, the referee authorises one, or at most two doctors, to

enter the field to ascertain the type of injury and to arrange the player’s safe and swift

removal from the field. The stretcher bearers should enter the field with a stretcher at the

same time as the doctors to allow the player to be removed as soon as possible. The

referee ensures an injured player is safely removed from the field of play. A player is not

allowed to be treated on the field. Any player bleeding from a wound must leave the field

of play. He may not return until the referee is satisfied that the bleeding has stopped. As

soon as the referee has authorised the doctors to enter the field, the player must leave

the field, either on the stretcher or on foot. If a player does not comply he is cautioned for

unsporting behaviour. An injured player may only return to the field of play after the

match has restarted. An injured player may only re-enter the field from the touchline

when the ball is in play. When the ball is out of play, the injured player may re-enter

from any of the boundary lines. The referee alone is authorised to allow an injured player

to re-enter the field whether the ball is in play or not. If play has not otherwise been

stopped for another reason, or if an injury suffered by a player is not the result of a breach of

the Laws of the Game, the referee restarts play with a dropped ball. The referee allows for

the full amount of time lost through injury to be played at the end of each period of play.’

9. ‘Premiership issues new edict telling players to end the practice of kicking the ball out of

play to allow an injured player to be treated’, Professional Footballers’ Association, 16

Aug. 2006, available at http://www.givemefootball.com/pfa.html?newsID¼961, accessed

21 Dec. 2006.

10. FIFA (2008) Laws of the game 2008/2009, available at http://www.fifa.com/mm/

document/affederation/federation/81/42/36/lotg–en.pdf, accessed Jul. 2008.

11. To this end, there are signs that growing pressure upon coaches, players and their

professional bodies is having an educative effect. In December 2005, Jose Mourinho,

Chelsea’s flamboyant Portuguese coach, feeling that an opposing player’s injury, after

losing possession in a tackle, was not genuine, instructed his players not to give the ball

back to their opponents, even though the ‘injured’ player’s teammate had allowed the ball

to run out of play for treatment to be received. Mourinho later commented emphatically:

‘We all know what fair play is and when a player is injured we give the ball back. When a

player is cheating, we are not stupid. So because the player was cheating and seconds later

stood up and was running again, I told [a Chelsea player] not to give them the ball back. It

is my responsibility and I will do it again. Fair play is not to cheat. So if someone is guilty of

unsporting behaviour – it is them. It happened two metres in front of me and all my bench

was completely sure about it. . . . It is one thing to be injured and another to pretend to be

injured. This matter was my responsibility and I will do it again.’ See ‘Mourinho Attacks

Mcculloch’, Football.co.uk, online, 21 Oct. 2005, available at http://www.football.co.uk/

chelsea/mourinho_attacks_mcculloch_212998.html, accessed 5 Dec. 2005.

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