DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700 Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des Regierens? DFG Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance? Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood Ulrich Schneckener Spoilers or Governance Actors? SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 21 • October 2009
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DFG Sonderforschungsbereich 700 Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit - Neue Formen des Regierens?
DFG Research Center (SFB) 700 Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?
Engaging Armed Non-State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood
Ulrich Schneckener
Spoilers or Governance Actors?
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series • No. 21 • October 2009
SFB-Governance Working Paper Series
Edited by the Research Center (SFB) 700 „Governance In Areas of Limited Statehood - New Modes of Governance?“
The SFB-Governance Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication
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Copyright for this issue: Ulrich Schneckener
Editorial assistance and production: Philipp Haaser/Jule Jürgens/Moritz Konradi/Christine Rollin
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Aglanceatthedatadelineatesthequantitativedimensionoftheproblem:TheUppsalaCon-flictDataProgram(UCDP)registeredatotalof124armedconflictsbetween1989and2007,ofwhich91wereintrastateand26internationalisedintrastateconflicts.2Intheseconflictsatleastonearmednon-stateactorisinvolvedbutnormallymultiplemilitantgroupswillbeimplica-ted.Lookingonlyatrebelsfightingagovernment,theresearchersconcludethat,forexample,in2002and2003morethan30%oftheactiveconflictsinvolvedmorethanonerebelgroup(Harbom/Melander/Wallensteen 2008: 697).Moreover, theUCDP has introduced“non-stateconflict”asanewcategory,whichreferstoviolentencountersbetweennon-stateactorsonly.In2002,36“non-stateconflicts”wereregistered(comparedto32conflictsinvolvingastateactor),in2006thefigurewas24(comparedto33withstateinvolvement)(seeHumanSecurityCentre2007).3Intheabsenceofareliabledatabasethatshedslightontheapproximatetotalofarmedgroups,theIISSMilitaryBalance2007mayserveasanillustration:Itlists345armednon-stateactorsworldwide,50ofwhomareactiveinIndiaalone,25inIraq,21inPakistanandhalfadozenineachBangladeshandNigeria(seeHackett2007:422-438).
1 Thepaperdidprofitfromaresearchproject(2008-2010)fundedbytheGermanFoundationforPeaceResearch on the role of NGOs in dealing with armed groups. I therefore would like to thank theFoundationforitssupportandinparticularmycolleagueClaudiaHofmannforhelpfulcommentsatvariousstagesofthedraftingprocessofthispaper.
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Thedebateabouttheroleofnon-statearmedgroupsisbyandlargeshapedbytwoopposingangles:Thefirstperspectivewhichdominatesthepoliticaldiscourseandtheliteratureoncoun-ter-insurgencyperceivestheseactorsmainlyasa“problem”.Theyarenotonlyseenasactorswhomaycauseandtriggerviolentconflicts,butalsoasactorswhomakeitincreasinglydifficulttoendwarsandrestorepeaceandstability.Afterarmedconflicts,theystillactas“spoilers”whohavethepotentialtodisturb,undermine,orcompletelytruncateprocessesofpost-conflictstatebuilding,leadingtoviolenceflare-ups.4Thereby,theseactorsconstantlyquestiontheconceptofthestate’smonopolyoftheuseofforce.Moreover,inmanyinstances,suchasSomalia,DRCongo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Palestine, Iraq,Afghanistan or Pakistan armed groups are notonlya“local”affair,buttheyactacrossbordersandmaydestabiliseentireregions;some–suchastransnationalterroristnetworks–evenposethreatstointernationalsecurity.And,finally,externalactors,rangingfromUNpeaceoperationstodevelopmentNGOs,areinmanywaysdirectlyaffectedbythetheseactorswhomayattackorthreateninternationaltroops,policeoffi-cersoraidworkers:theymaytakeforeignersashostages,preventhumanitarianaidfrombeingdeliveredtothepopulation,orcausealackofinternationalinvestmentandofdevelopment.Theunderlyingassumptionofthe“spoiler”perspectiveisthattheseactorsshownointerestsinpeaceprocessesandstatestabilitybecauseofvariouspoliticalandsocio-economicreasons.However,intheliteraturereferenceismadetovarioustypesofspoilers(Stedman1997)aswellastovariousmethodsofspoiling(e.g.theselectiveortheindiscriminateuseofviolence,seeKalyvas2006:146-209).
Bothperspectivesleadtodifferentformsofengagementwitharmedgroups.Inthefirstcase,military,policeandlaw-enforcementmeasuresorcontainmentstrategiesseemtobeapprop-riate,whereasfromthesecondperspectiveattemptsforintegrationandsocialisationofthe-segroupsmaybeseenasmorepromising.However,armednon-stateactorsareusuallyboth–spoilersaswellasgovernance-actors–atonce.Withregardtosomeissuesorparticularactorstheymaybehaveasspoilers,whereasinotherareastheyhaveaninterestindeliveringtolocalconstituencies,cooperatingwithothersandshowingcompliancewithcertainagreements.Inotherwords,itremainsanempirical–andnotaconceptual–questionunderwhichcircum-stancesarmedgroupsbehaveinonewayoranother.Theaimofthispaperisnottoanswerthisquestionbuttopresentageneralframeworkforanalysingarmednon-stateactors,theirtypicalcharacteristicsandbehaviouraswellaspossibleformsofengagementforinternationalactors,beitagovernment,aninternationalorganisationoranNGO.Therefore, thepaperwillfirstdescribevariousarmedgroups,whichneedtobedistinguishedinordertohighlightspecificprofiles,asidealtypes.Secondly,anumberofstrategiesfordealingwiththesegroupswillbeintroducedanddiscussedbyreferringtorealist,institutionalistandconstructivistapproaches.Thirdly,theconclusionwillpointtokeyproblemsandlimitsoftheseapproacheswhenaddres-sing the spectrum of armed groups.The paper, however, does not link particular strategieswithparticulartypesofnon-statearmedgroups.Thiswouldnotseemtobeappropriate,sinceanumberoffactorswhichcannotbediscussedinthispaperindetailwoulddeterminethesuccessorfailureofthesestrategies,thetypeofarmedgroupbeingjustoneofthem.Theargu-menthereismuchmoremoderateinstatingthattheseapproaches–despitetheirdifferences–byandlargearedirectedtosimilarprofilesofarmedgroupswhileotherformsofnon-stateviolencearesystematicallyneglected.
2. The “Universe” of Armed Non-State Groups
Generallyspeaking,armed non-state groupsare(i)willingandcapabletouseviolenceforpursuingtheirobjectivesand(ii)notintegratedintoformalisedstateinstitutionssuchasregulararmies,presidentialguards,policeor special forces.They, therefore, (iii)possess a certaindegreeofautonomywithregardtopolitics,militaryoperations,resourcesandinfrastructure.Theymay,however,besupportedorusedbystateactorswhetherinanofficialorinformalmanner.Mo-reover,theremayalsobestateofficialswhoaredirectlyorindirectlyinvolvedintheactivitiesofarmednon-stateactors–sometimesbecauseofideologicalreasons,butnotseldomduetopersonalinterests(i.e.corruption,familyorclanties,clientelism,profit).Finally,they(iv)areshapedthroughanorganisationalrelationshiporstructurethatexistsoveraspecificperiodof
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Rebelsorguerrilla fighters,sometimesalsoreferredtoaspartisansorfranc tireurs,arethearche-typeofarmednon-stateactors.Theyseekthe“liberation”ofasocialclassorapoliticalcommu-nity(“nation”).Theyfightfortheoverthrowofagovernment,forthesecessionofaregionorfortheendofanoccupationalorcolonialregime.Inthatsense,theypursueapoliticalagenda,mostoftenbasedonasocial-revolutionary,ethno-nationalisticorreligiouslyinspiredideolo-gy.Theyseethemselvesas‘futurearmies’ofaliberatedpopulationorcommunity.Hencetheysometimeswearuniformsandemblems,theyhaveacommandandrankstructureaswellasinternalrulesoftheconductofviolentactions.Intheirmilitaryoperationstheyavoiddirectconfrontationwiththeiropponents;therefore,guerrillawarfaretypicallybeginsinruralareas,mountainous regions or in remote areas that are beyond the central government’s control.7Somewritershavepropagatedtheconceptofanurbanguerrillathatissupposedtofunctionasavanguardfortheruralguerrilla.8Accordingtothedoctrineofguerrillawarfareasdevelo-pedbyMao Tse Tung, Ernesto Che GuevaraorFrantz Fanon,guerrillafightersdependonthelocalpopulation for logistic andmoral support. In reality, however, themost significant supportcomesfromforeigngovernmentsorvariousnon-stateactorsthatprovidesafehavens,weapons,equipmentandknow-how.HistoricalexamplesareamongothersthepartisansduringWorldWarIIwhofoughtagainstGermanoccupation,theanti-colonialmovementsafter1945aswellastheVietCongandtheRedKhmerinthe1960sand1970s.MorerecentexamplesareRENA-MOinMozambique,theFMLNinElSalvador,UNITAinAngola,theZapatistaEZLNinMexico,theFARCandtheELNinColombia,theMaoistrebelsinIndiaandNepaloranumberofrebelmovementsinDRCongo,supportedbyRwandaandUganda.AlsoseparatistmovementssuchastheSPLAinSouthernSudan,POLISARIOinWest-Sahara,GAMinAceh/Indonesia,theLTTEinSriLankaortheUÇKinKosovodevelopedrebel-stylepolitics.
8 OneofthemostprominentproponentsofurbanguerrillawastheBrazilianCarlos Marighela,whoseHandbook of Urban Guerrilla Warfare(1969)inspirednumerous(mostlyleftist)guerrillasandterroristgroups.MarighelahimselffoundedtheALN(Ação Libertadora Nacional)thatbecameknowntoalargerpublicthroughtheterroristattacksitlaunched.
Spoilers or Governance Actors? | 10
actunderwrittenandtransparentprovisions.9Theirtaskisoftentofightrebelsorcriminals,tothreatenspecificgroups(i.e.minorities)ortointimidatemembersofoppositionparties.Onbehalfofthegovernmenttheymayhandlethedirtybusinessoftargetedkidnappingsandkil-lings,massacres,ethniccleansingorevengenocideasinthecaseoftheHutuextremistgroupInterahamwé in 1994, sponsored by the government of Rwanda. Nevertheless militias oftenevadegovernmentcontroland,inthecourseofaconflict,developtheirownagenda.Onepro-minentexamplewouldbethedevelopmentoftheanti-rebelmovementAutodefensas Unidas de Colombia(AUC)inColombia(seeRichani2007).Self-proclaimeddefendersofastatusquosuchas ‘protection forces’ (Schutzbünde or Heimwehren), political party militias or armed vigilantegroups(e.g.KuKluxKlanintheUS)alsofallintothiscategorywhentheyprotectthe(reported)interestsofsegmentsofthepopulationthatbenefitfromthecurrentpoliticalsituationanddonotwanttoloosetheirpoliticaloreconomicstatus(suchaslandowners,formercombatants,officers,dominantethno-nationalgroups).Someofthesegroupsmaythereforealsoattackthepoliticalestablishmentorstateinstitutionswhentheirprivilegesorsuperiorroleareputintoquestion.Anothersub-typeisself-helpdefenceforcesoranti-gangmilitiaswhoclaimtotrytoprotectacertaincommunityagainstcrimeandcorruptionbecausethestateisunableorun-willing.Often,however,thesegroupsthemselvesposeathreattotheirneighbourhoodbyigno-ringlawsandviolatinghumanrights–anexampleistheSouth-AfricangroupPeople Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad),mainlybased inWesternCapeandKwaZulu-Natal,whowereresponsibleforanumberofattacksonlocalANCpoliticiansreportedlyinvolvedinorganisedcrimeorcorruption(Ero2000:26-27).Duetotheelusivenessofthemilitiaconcept,avarietyofgroupscanbesubsumedunderthisheadingsuchastheright-wingextremistWhiteHandinGuatemala,theArgentineTripleA(Alianza Anticommunista Argentina),theanti-KurdishTurkishRevengeBrigade(TIT),theprotestantUlsterDefenceAssociation(UDA)inNorthernIreland,thepro-SerbianArkanTigersinBosniaandKosovo,thepro-IndonesiangroupsAitarak(thorn)andBesi Merah Putih(red-and-whiteiron)inTimor-Lesteorthegovernment-backedJanjaweedmilitiainWesternSudan(Darfur).
Warlordsarelocalpotentateswhocontrolaparticularterritoryduringoraftertheendofavio-lentconflict.12Theysecuretheirpowerthroughprivatearmieswhicharerecruitedandpaidbythewarlordhimself.Therelationshipbetweenwarlordandfightersisthereforeprimarilybasedonpersonalloyaltyandtoamuchlesserdegreeonethnictiesorideology.AnearlydefinitionofthetermreferstothehistoriccaseoftheChinesewarlords(junfa)inthe1910sand1920s:Awarlordisamanwho“exercisedeffectivegovernmentalcontroloverafairlywell-definedregionbymeansofamilitaryorganisationthatobeyednohigherauthoritythanhimself ”(Sheridan1966:1,quotedinVinci2007:315).Moreover,warlordsthemselves–MaxWeberusedthetermKriegsfürst–areindependentfromanyhigherauthority(seeGiustozzi2003:2;Jackson2003:134).Modernwarlordsareatypicalby-productoflong-standingcivilwars.Someofthem,however,managetoperpetuatetheirpositionalsoaftertheendofcombatactivitiesandshapethepost-warorder.Quiteoftentheyattempt to legalise thebenefits theyacquiredduringthewarbyrunningforpublicoffice.Generally,warlordsbenefitinparticularfromthelackorthebreak-downofstatestructures.Theyusewarorpost-wareconomiesbyexploitingresources(suchaspreciousmetals,tropicaltimber,commoditiesordrugcultivation)and/orthelocalpopulation(forinstance,throughlootingorlevying‘taxes’).Indoingso,theyfrequentlycapitaliseoncross-bordertiesandlinkstoglobalnetworksandillicitmarkets.Inparticular,thiskindofpoliticaleconomyhighlightstheir“parasiticnature”whichseparatesawarlordorganisation“fromthestate,tribe,orotherformofpoliticalcommunity” (Vinci2007:327-328).Prominentexamplesofwarlords–someofthemlaterassumedhigh-rankingpoliticalpositionsinthegovernment–areMohammedFarahAidid(Somalia),CharlesTaylor(Liberia),Laurent-DésiréKabila(Zaire/DRCongo)andAbdulRashidDostum(Afghanistan).
Terroristsuseviolentmeans forspreadingpanicandfearamongthepopulation inorder toachievepoliticalgoals,betheybasedonleft-orright-wing,onsocial-revolutionary,ethno-na-tionalor religious ideologies (seeGuelke1995;Waldmann1998).Theyuseviolencenotonlytoshockandintimidatesocietybutalsotomobilisesympathisersandsupportersaswellastocontributetotheradicalisationofaconflict.Inthissense,terrorismisa“communicationstrategy” conveying political messages to friends and foes alike (Waldmann 1998: 13).Terro-ristgroupsaretypicallyorganisedinaclandestineway,mostofteninsmallgroupsandcells,sometimesalso in largercross-bordernetworks.Most long-standingterroristgroupshaveacertaindegreeofhierarchywithaleadershipandcommandlevelatthetop;however,thecell
11See the classic analysis by Sahlins (1963). For more recent examples of clan politics see Englebert(2002);Ssereo(2003);Collins(2004,2006);Schatz(2004).
12On warlordism see Reno (1998); Nissen/Radtke (2002); Jackson (2003); Giustozzi (2003, 2005);Vinci(2007).
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structureisoftenorganisedinanetworkstylewithvariousnodeslinkingratherautonomouscellsorgroups.Onemaydistinguishbetweenlocalterroristswhoaimprimarilyatchanginganexistingpoliticalorderatthenationallevel(e.g.changeofpoliticalregime,separatism)andtransnationalterroristssuchasAlQaidaorJemaahIslamyyahwhoaddresstheinternationalorder or the state-system in a wider region and who are linked by a transnational ideologywhichbridgesnational,ethnic,geographicalorlinguisticdifferences(seeSchneckener2006).Militarilyspeaking,terroristsarerelativelyweakactorswhouseterroristattacksprimarilyasameansforgettingattentionfortheirideologyandgrievances.Typicaltacticalmeansincludekidnapping,hostage-taking,sabotage,murder,suicideattacks,vehiclebombsandimprovisedexplosivedevicesaswellaspotentiallytheuseofmaterialforweaponsofmassdestruction(e.g.“dirtybombs”).Potentialtargetsrangefrommilitarysites,policestationsandofficialgovern-mentbuildingstocompanies,airports,restaurants,shoppingmallsandmeansofpublictrans-port.HistoricandcurrentexamplesofgroupsandorganisationswhoprimarilyuseterroristmeansaretheRedArmyFactioninGermany,theActionDirecteinFrance,theBasqueETA,theNorthernIrishIRA,theKurdishPKK,theIslamicJihadinEgyptorthevariousIslamicgroupsinIndia,PakistanandIndonesia.
Criminals are systematically involved in illegal activities inorder to gainmaterial benefits.13TheyareoftenorganisedinMafia-typestructures,syndicates,gangsorlargernetworks.Thelistofpossiblecrimesandoffencesislongandincludessmuggling,robbery,fraud,blackmailing,piracy,contractkilling,moneylaundering,traffickingofhumanbeings,productpiracyand,inparticular,illegalcross-bordertradingofdrugs,weapons,nuclearmaterial,humanorgans,tim-berandcommodities.Mostgroupstodayarenotspecialisedinoneareabuttendtobeinvolvedinvariousfields,dependingontheopportunitystructureathand.Organisedcrimegroups,atleasttheirleaders,sometimesseekpoliticalinfluenceinordertosecuretheirprofitinterests.Forthatmatter,theyusemeanssuchasbribery,blackmailing,intimidationandmurderagainstpoliticians,policemenandjudges.14Therefore,criminalsdonotfightagainstthestateorapar-ticulargovernmentbutratheraimatinfiltratingandunderminingpublicauthorities.Usuallycriminalsuseviolentmeansselectivelysoasnottoreceivetoomuchattentionfromlawen-forcementbodies.However,insomeinstances,violencemayescalatetoawar-likelevel,inparti-cularwhencompetingcriminalgroupsfighteachotherandthestatereactsbyactivatingspecialforcesorthemilitary.Forexample,themostrecentdrug-relatedstruggleinMexico,involvingfourdrugcartels (Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juárez andGulf), causedmore than10.000deathsbetween2006and2008(seeHoffmann2009).Prominenthistoricandcurrentcasesofmanifestcriminalstructures,sometimesdevelopedoverdecadesandgenerations,aretheUS-AmericanLa Cosa Nostra, the Italianmafias (the SicilianCosa Nostra, the Calabrian Ndrangheta, the NeapolitanCamorraandtheApulianSacra Cordona Unita),variousJapaneseYakuzas,theChineseTriadsand
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theAsianBig Circle Boys,theRussianmafiyagroupings(e.g.Solntseva,Tambov),theTaiwaneseUnited Bamboo GangordrugcartelsinColombia/USA(e.g.Cali, Medellin, Norte del Valle).OtherexamplesaretheA.Q.KhannetworkinPakistan,whichdealtillegallywithmaterialandknow-howaboutweaponsofmassdestruction(seeHeupel2008)ortheactivitiesoftheRussianarmstraderVictorBoutwhohadbuiltupanetworkoffirmsinordertoprovidearmsinanumberofconflicts(e.g.Angola,WestAfrica,Afghanistan)despiteinternationalsanctions(seeFarah/Braun2007).Mostcriminalorganisationsoperateacrossborders,theyhavelinksandpresencesinanumberofcountries,frequentlybasedonfamilyties,ethnicnetworksormigrationpatterns.Theyareneverthelessoftenorganisedhierarchicallywithasinglepatronora“committee”ofgangleadersatthetoplevel.
Mercenaries and private security/military companies(PSCs/PMCs)arevolunteersusuallyrecruitedfromthirdstateswhoareremuneratedforfightingincombatunitsorforconductingspecialtasksontheirown.Theycanservedifferentmasters,rangingfromthearmyofastatetowarlordswhopromiserewards.Therefore,incivilwarsmercenariesarefrequentlyfoundfightingonallsides.Oftenthesemercenariesaredemobilisedsoldiersorformerrebelfighterswhonowoffertheirknow-howtootherwarringparties.Mercenarismhasalong-standingtradition:AmongitsfamousprecursorsaretheCondottieri–contractorswholedbandsofmercenarieshiredforprotectivepurposesbyItaliancity-statesorprincesfromthe15thcenturyonwards.Otherhisto-ricexamplesaremercenariesinthe30YearsWar(1618to1648)orduringthepost-WW2periodofdecolonisation,e.g.theactivitiesofformerGermanWehrmachtofficersinCongo(‘Kongo-Müller’).Thiscategoryalsoincludesprofessional‘bountyhunters’whohuntdownwanted(war)criminalsorterroristseitheronbehalfofagovernmentorontheirownaccountinreturnforfinancialrewards.Whiletraditionalmercenariesarebannedunderinternationallaw,modernprivatesecurityormilitarycompaniesusuallyactonalegalisedandlicensedbasis.Theyhaveprofessionalisedandcommercialisedthebusinessofprovidingcombatants,trainersoradvi-sers,orotherformsofoperationalorlogisticalsupport,andarecontractedbygovernments,companiesorothernon-stateactors.15Moreover,someareactivelyinvolvedincombatsitua-tions,oftenforcounter-insurgencypurposes.Becauseofthedifferentservices,Kümmel(2005:146-151)distinguishesbetween“militaryproviderfirms”,“securityproviderfirms”,“militaryandsecurityconsultantfirms”and“militaryandsecuritysupportfirms”.Alargenumberofthesecompanies,typicallysetupbyformerarmyorpoliceofficersaswellasintelligenceandsecurityexperts,arebasedintheUS,GreatBritain,SouthAfrica,France,CanadaorIsrael(seeKinsey2006:4-6).Prominentandwell-documentedexamplesaretheactivitiesof theSouthAfricancompanyExecutive OutcomesinAngolaandSierraLeone,theBritishDefence System Ltd.inCo-lombia,theUSfirmMilitary Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI)inCroatiaandBosniaorUScompaniessuchasDynCorporBlackwaterinIraqandAfghanistan.
Maraudersbycontrastaredemobilisedorscatteredformercombatantswhoengageinlooting,pillagingandterrorisingdefencelessciviliansduringoraftertheendofaviolentconflict.Theydisplayarelativelylowleveloforganisationalcohesionandmovefromoneplacetoanother.Aparticularversionistheso-calledsobel,aneologismcombiningthewordssoldierandrebel(soldiers by day, rebels by night).As described paradigmatically in the case of Sierra Leone,sobels aremembersof anunder-funded,disorganisedarmy; afterwork theyaimatmakingprivateprofitoutofcriminalandcommercialactivitiessuchaslooting,robbery,thecollectionofprotectionmoney,abductions,lynching(seeRichards1996).Maraudersarethereforebenefi-ciariesofachaoticsituationtriggeredbythecentralgovernment’slossofcontrolover(partsof )itsterritory.Insomecases,however,maraudersmaybedeployedstrategicallybyregulararmedforces,paramilitariesorpoliticalmovementsasauxiliariestohandlethe“dirtybusiness”ofeth-niccleansing,massacresofthecivilianpopulationorthepersecutionofpoliticalopponents.
2.1 Similarities and Differences
Despitetheirdifferentprofile,thereisanumberofcommonfeatureswhichmakesitincrea-singlydifficulttodistinguishanalyticallybetweenthesetypes.Inparticular,threetrendshavecontributed to this: First, most of these armed non-state actors frequently use– albeit to adifferentdegreeandbydifferentmeans–violenceagainstunarmedcivilians.Sometimesthishappensaccidentallybutinmostcasesthisispartofastrategyinordertoexploit,intimidateordeterpeople,toprovokereactionsfromthegovernmentandtounderminetheauthorityandlegitimacyofstateinstitutionswhoareapparentlynotabletoprotectthepopulation.Inotherwords,non-statearmedactorsgenerallydonotcareagreatdealforthedistinctionmadebyhumanitarianinternationallawbetweencombatantsandnon-combatants.Ifanything,suchadistinctionmayhaveplayedaroleforclassicalrebelorguerrillamovements,whoavoidedusingexcessiveviolenceagainstthecivilianpopulation,sincethelatterrepresentedasourceof–atleasttemporary–supportfortheinsurgents.Theyprimarilyattackedmembersoftheregulararmedandsecurityforces;however,theytendedtoviewas‚combatants‘allrepresentativesofthestateapparatus(e.g.politicians,policemen,judges)andtherebyextendedthenotionofcom-batantfarbeyondtheratherstrictdefinitionbyinternationallaw.Mostoften,thereferencetothisdistinctionispurelyrhetoricalandanactofpropaganda.Incontemporaryconflicts,espe-ciallyintra-stateones,mostpartiesdonotrespectthedifferencebetweencombatantsandnon-combatants.Onthecontrary,farfromreceivingspecialprotection,thecivilianpopulationhasforanumberofreasonsbecometheprimarytargetofvariousarmednon-stateactorspursuingpoliticalandeconomicgains.
Closelylinkedtothetransnationalisationissue,athirdtrendcanberecognised:Armednon-stateactorsmovemoreandmorefromahierarchicalorganisationintothedirectionofratherloosenetworkstructures.Onecanconclude:Thisseemstobemorelikely,themorethegroupsactacrossborders.Again,terroristandcriminalnetworksaretheprecursorsofthistrend,aswell as rebels, warlords, marauders and to a lesser degree other groups, which increasinglyshowelementsofnetworkstructuresthatincludeflathierarchies,ahighdegreeofflexibilityandratherautonomoussub-units linkedtoeachother.Inotherwords,actorsbecomemorefragmentedandtheleadershipandcommandlevelsbecomelessabletoachievecoherenceinstrategicandideologicalterms.
Change versus status quo orientation: Some armed non-state actors seek a (radical) changeof the status quo; they demand a different government, a different political system, thesecessionofaregion,anewworldorder,etc.Bycontrast,othergroups–whetherdrivenbyowninterestsorinstigatedbythoseinpowerwhomtheyserve–aimatsecuringandconsolidatingthestatusquo.Theformerpositionappliestoterroristsaswellasrebelsandguerrillafighters,whereasthelatterappliestowarlordsandcriminalswhogenerallyseektosecuretheirachievedpoliticalandeconomicprivileges.Thesameisoftentrueforclanchiefsandbig men,inparticularwhentheyareintegratedintothepoliticalsystembymeansofco-optiveruleorneo-patrimonialstructures.Theprototypesofastatusquomovement,however,aremilitiasorparamilitaryorganisations,whicharedeployedtoprotecttheruleofaregimeorthedominanceofparticulargroups.Mercenariesormarauders,bycontrast,behaveratheropportunistically;sometimestheymayservetheinterestofstatusquoforces,whileatothertimestheymaychallengethem.
Territorial control versus non-territorial tactics:Inhowfararearmednon-stategroupsabletocontrolalargerterritoryand,thereby,providesomekeygovernancefunctionsforthepopu-lationconcerned?Bothguerrillamovementsandwarlords,inprinciple,aimattheconquestofand–ifpossible–thepermanentcontroloverterritoryinordertoestablishstate-freeregions.Mercenariesandprivatemilitarycompaniesareusuallyemployedforsimilarpur-poses.Clanchiefsarealsooftenconnectedtoaparticular“homeland”orregion.Terrorists,
Physical versus psychological use of violence:Eachactofviolenceentailsaphysicalandpsycho-logicalaspect;however,forsomegroupsoneaspectmaybemoreimportantthantheother.Rebels andguerrillamovementspursue theirgoalsprimarilyby relyingon thephysicaldimension.Theiraimistoweakentheiropponent’smilitarystrength,defeatitorforceittosurrender,andsubsequentlytakeitsplace.Terrorists,bycontrast,useviolencebecauseofitspsychologicaleffects.Betweenthesetwoextremesotherarmednon-stateactorsaretobefound:Clanchiefsormercenariesprimarilyusephysicalviolenceinordertodefeatrivalsoropponents,whileformaraudersandcriminalsthethreatanduseofviolenceisoftenmerelyameansofintimidation.Finally,militiasandwarlordsareratherambivalentwithregardtothetypeofviolencetheyuse;dependingonthegroupitselfandthegeneralcircumstancestheymakeuseofbothformsofviolence.
Political/ideological versus profit-driven motivation:Whereasguerrillamovements,militias,clanchiefs,bigmenandterroristgroupspursue–atleastrhetorically–asocio-politicalagen-da,oftenbasedonideologieswhichtheyneedeconomicresourcesfor,thereverseusuallyholdstrueforwarlordsandcriminals.Theyareprimarilyinterestedinsecuringeconomicandcommercialprivilegesandpersonalprofits.Politicalpowerandpublicofficesaswellastheuseofviolenceservetherealisationoftheirselfisheconomicinterests.Inthatsensewarlordsandcriminalsarenot“apolitical”actors;yet,theirmotivationforjoiningthepoli-ticalstruggleforpowerisdifferentfromthatofotherpoliticalactors.Similarly,mercenari-esandmaraudersprimarilypursuenarrowlydefinedprofitinterests.
3.
4.
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Table 1: Types of Armed Non-State ActorsChange vs. Status Quo
Territorial vs. Non-Territorial
Physical vs. Psychological Use
of Violence
Political/Ideological vs. Profit-Driven
Motivation
Rebels, Guerrillas
Change Territorial Physical Political
Militias Status quo Territorial Non-territorial
PhysicalPsychological
Political
Clan Chiefs, Big Men
Status quo Territorial Physical Political
Warlords Status quo Territorial Physical Psychological
Profit-driven
Terrorists Change Non-territorial Psychological Political
Criminals, Mafia, Gangs
Status quo Non-territorial Psychological Profit-driven
Inotherwords,armednon-stateactorsarenotonlypartoftheproblembutmust,asstatedinthebeginning,sometimesalsobepartofthesolution(forcasestudies,seeRicigliano2005).Inparticularwithregardtoalreadyestablishedpara-statestructuresbywarlords,rebels, big menormilitias,thequestioniswhetheritispossibletousethesestructuresastemporarysolutionsandbuildingblocsforreconstructingstatehood,orwhetherthiswouldsimplyincreasetheriskofstrengtheningandlegitimisingthemsothattheestablishmentofthestate’smonopolyontheuseofforcebecomesevenlesslikely.Inotherwords,thoseactorswhointheoryhavethegreatestpotentialforstate-buildingandsecuritygovernancearealsotheoneswhocanmobilisethegreatestspoilingpower.Moreover,theinternationalcommunityrunstheriskofsendingthewrongmessage(“violencepays”)bydevotingtoomuchattentionorbygrantingprivilegestoarmednon-stateactorswhohavealreadybenefitedfromwarandshadoweconomies.Thismaynotonlytriggerincreasingdemandsbytheseactorsbutalsoseriouslyharmthecredibilityandlegitimacyofexternalactorsvis-à-visthegeneralpublic(“moralhazard”problem).Thetaskbecomesevenmoredifficultthemorethethreetrendsmentionedaboveprevail:Ifanactorhasbeenorisinvolvedingrosshumanrightsviolations,ifanactorbecomestransnationalisedandcanexploitopportunitiesacrossborders,andifanactor ischaracterisedbya loosenetwork
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3.1 Options for Dealing with Armed Non-State Actors
Clearly,therearenosatisfyinganswerstothesequestions.Consideringpastexperience,con-text-specific,flexiblearrangementsindealingwitharmednon-stateactorswillalwaysbeneces-sary.However,morebroadlyspeaking,inprincipletheinternationalcommunityhasanumberof options for“spoiler management” at its disposal. One prominent attempt to systematisestrategies fordealingwithnon-state armedgroups isStedman’s (1997),whichdistinguishedthreeso-calledspoilermanagementstrategies:positivepropositionsorinducementsinordertocounterdemandsmadebynon-statearmedgroups; socialisation inorder tobringaboutsituationalorevennormativechangesofbehaviour;andarbitrarymeasuresinordertoweakenarmedgroupsor force themtoacceptcertainterms.AstudyconductedbytheGermanDe-velopmentInstitute(DeutschesInstitutfürEntwicklungspolitik,DIE)identifiedavoidanceofengagement,disregard/observation/involuntaryengagement,apoliticalaction/equidistance,ex-clusion,andcooperationaspossiblecoursesofactionfordevelopmentagencieswhendealingwithnon-statearmedgroups(seeGrävingholt/Hofmann/Klingebiel2007).Undercloserscru-tinyhowever,theseapproacheslacktheoreticalsubstantiationanddonotcoverthecompleterangeofoptionsavailable.
ThebenefitofusingInternationalRelationstheoryinthisrespectisthatdifferentcampsandstrategicorientationsindealingwitharmedgroupscanbebetterstructuredandunderstood.Aseachoftheseapproachesislinkedtoparticularparadigmsandworldviews,whichexplicitlyorimplicitlycarrywiththemassumptionsaboutthecharacteroftheunderlyingconflictaswellasaboutthenatureandthetypicalbehaviourofarmedgroupswhentheyareconfrontedwithparticularsituations,meansandactions.Firstly,realist approaches,whichultimatelyfocusontheeliminationof,thesuppressionof,orthecontrolovernon-statearmedgroupsinordertoforcethemtoadapttoanewsituation;secondly,institutionalist approaches,whichaimatchangesofinterestsandpoliciesofthesegroups;andthirdly,constructivist approaches,whichconcentrateonachangeinnorms(suchasnon-violence)andinself-conception(identity)oftherespectiveactor.Thus, thedirectionsdonotonlydiffer regarding strategies and instruments,but alsoshowdifferentunderlyingassumptionswithrespect to learningprocessesofarmedgroups,rangingfrompureadaptationtochangesofpreferences tochangesof identity.Accordingly,the approachesbase themselvesondifferentmechanismsand result indifferentdegreesofbehaviouralchange:Therealistapproachmainlyrestsontheapplicationofforceandtheuseofleverage,whichmayprecipitateabehaviouralchangeonlyaslongasforceisapplied.Undersuchpressurefromtheoutside,non-statearmedgroupsmaychangetheirpoliciesbutusuallyinherentpreferenceswill remainunchanged–on thecontrary, theirpositionsmaybecomeevenmorehard-linethanbefore.Theinstitutionalapproachfocusesonbargainingasitskeymechanism,whichmayachieveasustainableresultbutreliesheavilyontherespectiveactorremainingapartofthebargainingsystem.Onlythecontinuousapplicationofaninstitutional
Table 2: Approaches for Dealing with Armed Non-State GroupsApproach Key Mechanism Behavioural Change
Based onResult
Realist Force/Leverage AdaptationNon-Sustainable
(based on the constant application of force)
Institutionalist BargainingAdaptation;
Policy/Preference Change
Sustainable(within institutional
framework)
Constructivist PersuasionAdaptation;
Policy/Preference Change;Identity Change
Sustainable
3.2 Realist approaches
Coercion:Internationalactorsmayusecoercivemeasures,includingtheuseofforceandco-ercivediplomacy(seeArt/Cronin2003;George1991,1996).Typicalinstrumentsaremilitaryorpoliceoperationsaimedatfightingorarrestingmembersofarmedgroups,thedeplo-ymentofinternationaltroopsinordertostabiliseapost-warsituationortheimplemen-tationof internationalsanctions (e.g.armsembargoes,no-flyzones,economicsanctions,freezingofforeignassets,travelsanctions,warcriminaltribunals),whichcouldharmtheinterestsofatleastsomenon-statearmedgroups,inparticularparamilitaries,rebelleaders,warlordsandclanchiefs.Thisapproachisoftenaccompaniedbylawenforcementmeasuresat national and/or international level.An example for the latter are the activities by theInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)orotherinternationalcourtsagainstwarcriminalsorpersonscommittingseriouscrimes(e.g.useofchildsoldiers).16
Control and containment:Thisstrategyaimsatsystematicallycontrollingandcontainingtheactivitiesofarmednon-stategroupsand, thereby, reducing their freedomtomanoeuvreandcommunicate.Theaim is tomaintaina certain statusquoand toput thesegroupsunderstrictsurveillance(byusingpoliceandintelligencemeasures).Thiscanbedonein
16Forinstance,theICChasissuedwarrantsofarrestagainstfiveleadingmembersoftherebel-styleLord Resistance Army (LRA) inUganda, includingitscommander-in-chiefJosephKony,aswellasvariouswarrantsofarrestagainstleadersofarmedgroupsintheDRCongoin2005.
1.
2.
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Marginalisation and isolation:This approach is concernedwith reducing thepolitical andideological influenceofarmedgroups.The idea is tomarginalise theirworldviewsanddemandsinpublicdiscourseandtoisolatethem–politicallyaswellasphysically–fromactualorpotentialfollowersandtheirconstituencies.Forthatscenario,abroadconsensusisneededamongpoliticalelitesandsocietalgroupsnottodealwiththeseactorsandnottoreacttotheirviolentprovocations,buttocontinueanagreedpoliticalprocess.Thisap-proachisanoptionparticularlyforratherweakoralreadyweakenedactorssuchassmallerrebelgroups,terroristsormarauders.
Enforcing splits and internal rivalry:Anotheroptionaimsatfragmentingandsplittingarmedgroupsbetweenmoremoderate forcesandhardliners.Thiscanbeachievedbydifferentmeans,beitthethreatofusingforceindiscriminately,byofferingsecretdealstosomekeyfiguresorbyinvolvingtheminapoliticalprocess,whichwouldencouragethemtoleavetheirgrouportotransformitintoapoliticalmovement.Thestrategy,however,canresultintheestablishmentofradicalfringeandsplintergroups,whichmaybeevenmoreextremethantheformerunifiedgroup.Suchfragmentationprocessescanoftenbeobservedwithrebelorterroristgroups.
Bribery and blackmail:Membersofarmedgroupsbeingcorruptedinacertainway–theymaybeforcedorinducedtocooperateorsilencedthroughtheofferingofmaterialincentives,i.e.economicresourcesorwell-paidposts.Insomecases,thismayalsoinvolveattemptstoblackmailortointimidateleaders(e.g.threateningfamilymembers)inordertomakethemmore likely to acceptmoneyorotheroffers.This strategy ispolitically andnormativelyquestionable;however,insomecasesitisindispensableforgettingapeaceprocessstartedinthefirstplace(seeAfghanistan).Inparticular,profit-drivenactors,suchaswarlordsorcriminalshaveoftenbeenreceptivetosuchastrategy.
Mediation and negotiation:Usingthisapproach,externalactorsaimprimarilyatfosteringanegotiationprocessamongdifferentparties,includingarmednon-stateactors,inordertofindapoliticalsettlement(seeBercovitch2002;Touval/Zartman1985;Zartman/Rasmussen1997; Zegveld 2002).As facilitators ormediators theywould try to urge armed actors torefrainfromtheuseofforceandtoabandonmaximalistpoliticaldemands.Forthatpur-pose, informal contacts, multi-track diplomacy and extensive pre-negotiations are oftennecessary, inparticularwhendirect contactsbetween the conflictingparties (e.g. a localgovernmentandarebelgroup)areunlikely.Usually, insuchaprocessprosandconsofpossiblesolutionshavetobeweighed,incentivesanddisincentives(e.g.possiblesanctions)havetobetakenintoaccountandacompromiseacceptableforallsideshastobefound.Oftentimesarguingandbargainingmethods (includingcost-benefitanalysis)needtobecombinedinordertoachievesuchanoutcome.Theseapproachesobviouslyimplyalong-termengagement,sinceduringtheimplementationofagreementsmediationmaystillbenecessary.Thisscenarioappliesmainlytogroupswithapoliticalagendawhicharestron-glytiedtoadefinedconstituency(e.g.tribe,clan,ethnicgroup,politicalparty).Themostlikelycases,therefore,areclanchiefs,bigmenorrebelleaders;insomeinstancesterroristsorwarlordsmayalsobepartofsuchaprocess,inparticularwhentheyseektotransformthemselvesinto“politicians”.
Cooptation and integration:Herethebasicideaisthatnon-statearmedgroups,andinparticu-lartherespectiveleadership,canbeco-optedandslowlyintegratedintoapoliticalsetting,forexamplebydistributingresourcesandsharingpoliticalresponsibility.Therefore,thisapproachimpliesacertaindegreeofinformalorformalisedpower-sharing,beitatnatio-nalorlocallevel,whichwouldinvolveleadersofarmedgroupsinday-to-daypolitics(seeHartzell/Hoddie2007;ICRC2003;O’Flynn/Russel2005;Jarstad2008).Inotherwords,theattemptwouldbetogivethemaroletoplay,whichmaythenchangetheirattitudesandpreferences.Thisstrategyissometimesbasedonaformalagreement,brokeredbyoutsi-ders,butitisoftenpursuedbyeffortsofbuildingalliancesandcoalitionsamongdifferentlocalgroups.AgoodillustrationforthatapproachwastheattempttograduallyintegrateAfghanwarlordsintothenewlyestablishedpoliticalsystem,notleastbyofferingpostssuchasgovernorsorministersbutalsobygrantingthemacertainpoliticalstatusquo.SimilarprocessescanbeobservedinvariousAfricansocietieswithregardtoclanchiefs,bigmen,orcertainmilitiagroups.
Naming and shaming: Theattempthereistoorganisesocialpressureandtocampaignpu-blicly,atnationaland/orinternationallevel,againstcertainpracticesofarmednon-stateac-torsinordertoharmtheirlegitimacywithinandoutsideoftheir(actualorpotential)cons-tituencies.Theaimisusuallytopersuadethemtoacceptandrespectcertainagreementsandnorms,inparticularnormsofhumanitarianinternationallawandtofosterthemtore-frainfromcertainviolentmethods(suchasterroristacts)andfromusingparticularmeans(e.g.landminesorchildsoldiers).OftenthesecampaignsareconductedbyinternationalNGOs.Again,thisapproachmaybeusefulincasesinvolvinggroupsthatneedmoralandmaterialsupportfromabroad.
The strategies and methods discussed above have their downsides and limitations. In mostinstances,acombinationofapproacheswillbenecessarysincetypicallybothincentivesanddisincentivesareneededtoachievebehaviouralchanges,whichwouldeventually leadtothereductionordenunciationofviolentmeans.Thisrendersalinkingofparticularstrategieswithparticularideal-typesofnon-statearmedgroupsimpossible.Moreover,thereisanumberofotherfactorswhichmaydeterminetheoutcomeofthestrategies.Atleastfourdifferentcate-goriesoffactorsneedtobeaddressedinmoredetail:(i)thegeneralenvironmentinwhichtheengagementwitharmedgroupsdoestakeplace(e.g.before,duringorafteraviolentconflict),(ii)thecharacteristicsoftheactorthatappliescertainstrategies(e.g.aninternationalorganisation,astateoraNGO?),(iii)kindandqualityofinteractionbetweenthethirdpartyandanarmedgroup(e.g.pre-existinglinks,long-termversusshort-termrelationship)and(iv)thecharacteris-ticsofthespecificarmedgroups,includingtheconditionswhichenablethegrouptoexistandtoperform(i.e.accesstoresources,recruitmentpatterns,outsidesupport,capableleadership,organisationalskills,transnationalties).
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