Spinoza's Liberalism

Spinoza’s Liberalism

While Spinoza’s political philosophy is often described as

liberal, it is not always clear what this label means or whether

it is warranted. Commentators who refer to Spinoza as liberal

generally do not intend to claim that he upholds the collection

of views now identified as political liberalism. This would be

anachronistic, since this way of classifying political theories

did not emerge until the nineteenth-century (Merquior 2), and

plainly false, since no seventeenth-century philosopher defended

what have become minimal requirements for liberalism today, such

as universal suffrage. Rather, calling Spinoza liberal implies

that he belongs to a historical tradition of political

philosophers, who formulated and defended claims, which later

became identified as central to political liberalism. This

explains why the question of Spinoza’s liberalism is important:

it asks us to clarify the relationship between Spinoza’s

political philosophy and one of the most important political

developments of our time.

Given what it means to call Spinoza a liberal, it follows

that whether and how Spinoza qualifies as liberal depends on how

one understands liberalism today, which is a contested issue. It

also follows that Spinoza may be liberal in one sense and

illiberal in another, for he could uphold some commitments which

are important to the development of liberalism while rejecting

others. Consequently, we should not expect the question of

Spinoza’s liberalism to admit a single, univocal answer. Rather,

specifying how Spinoza is or is not liberal means articulating

the complex ways that Spinoza’s politics anticipates and

suggests, but also resists and excludes the variety of claims

associated—rightly or wrongly—with liberalism. This paper aims,

first, to provide an overview of the ways that Spinoza’s

philosophy has been explicitly connected to liberalism. Due to

considerations of length, the paper does not consider how we

ought to understand liberalism and, consequently, does not take a

stand on whether the various interpretations of Spinoza’s

liberalism properly conceive of liberalism. The paper aims,

second, to move the debate forward by pointing out an important

and overlooked way that Spinoza resists a view commonly

associated with liberalism. In doing so, I do not intend to cast

doubt on the value or historical significance of Spinoza’s

politics, since it merits interest not only for anticipating

liberalism, but also for calling into question and offering

alternatives to liberalism.

I. The Main Debate: Valuing Freedom

Liberalism is most commonly characterized as asserting the

political value of individual liberty (Gaus and Courtland), a

commitment which became increasingly important during the early

modern period.i In this vein, Spinoza is most frequently

described as a liberal because his politics emphasizes the value

of freedom by arguing that states should protect freedom of

thought and speech (Smith, Jewish Identity 23; Feuer 65, 83; West

290; Strauss 16; Steinberg, ‘Curious Defense’ 210, 230).

If no man, then, can give up his freedom to judge and

think as he pleases, and everyone is by absolute

natural right the master of his own thoughts, it

follows that utter failure will attend any attempt in

a commonwealth to force men to speak only as

prescribed by the sovereign despite their different

and opposing opinions…. Therefore the most tyrannical

government will be one where the individual is denied

the freedom to express and to communicate to others

what he thinks. (TTP 20, 567)ii

Spinoza’s argument here is based on two of his most famous

political claims. The first is that “the purpose of the state

is, in reality, freedom” (TTP 20, 567). What Spinoza means by

this is that people agree to the covenant for the sake of

promoting their freedom. It follows that, if the government were

to restrict people’s freedom excessively, then it would lose the

support of the people, from whom it derives its power. On this

basis, the passage above concludes that the state lacks the power

to deny freedom of thought and speech. The second claim is that

political right is determined by power: “the right of the

individual is coextensive with its determinate power” (TTP 16,

527). This implies that the state lacks not only the power to

control thought and speech, but also the right to do so.

On the other hand, it is not clear how deep Spinoza’s

commitment to individual liberty runs. Spinoza recognizes few

constraints on the sovereign power, which suggests that there are

few obstacles to authoritarian states restricting individual

freedom. The basis for this concern is Spinoza’s account of the

social contract, which holds that people transfer all their

rights to the sovereign.iii

The sovereign power is bound by no law, and all must

obey it in all matters; for this is what all must have

covenanted tacitly or expressly when they transferred

to it all their power of self-defense, that is, all

their right. If they intended that there should be

anything reserved to themselves, they should have

taken the precaution at the same time to make secure

provision to uphold it. Since they did not do so, and

could not have done so without the division and

consequent destruction of the state, they thereby

submitted themselves absolutely to the will of the

sovereign. (TTP 16, 530)

Of course, Spinoza does not take this to imply that sovereigns

will exercise their power to undermine freedom; in fact, he does

not think that sovereigns can restrict freedom of speech and

thought without bringing about their downfall. Nevertheless, it

is an open question whether Spinoza is right about this and,

consequently, the extent to which his state actually promotes

freedom.

Berlin has also called into question whether Spinoza’s

politics protects individual liberty from a different direction.

Berlin criticizes political philosophies that are based on

positive conceptions of freedom, among which he includes

Spinoza’s (151). Whereas negative freedom consists in an absence

of obstacles or impediments to action, positive freedom consists

in realizing some capacity or acting in some way. Berlin

criticizes positive conceptions on the grounds that they open up

the possibility of states imposing some particular conception of

the good life in a way that restricts individual liberty, while

insidiously disguising such restrictions as promoting liberty.

Berlin is correct that Spinoza’s politics defends a positive

conception of freedom. While there has been some controversy over

how to understand Spinoza’s conception of political freedom

(Steinberg ‘Civil Liberation’), recent scholars have shown that

Spinoza’s politics aims to promote the freedom described in the

Ethics: metaphysical self-determination, more specifically, acting

from one’s essential power, her conatus or striving to persevere

in existence and increase her power (Steinberg ‘Civil

Liberation’; Kisner 216). This explains why Spinoza holds that

the state’s aim of promoting freedom requires it to help people

develop, first, their power—their “mental and physical

faculties”—and, second, what most increases their power: their

rationality, “to keep men within the bounds of reason, as far as

possible” (TTP 16, 531). Thus, political freedom, for Spinoza,

involves exercising a capacity, acting from one’s own power.

However, it is less clear whether this definition of freedom

empowers Spinoza’s state to impose a particular conception of the

good life. In this vein, West replies to Berlin, first, that

Spinoza conceives of our individual essences as our conatus, which

varies according to the individual. It follows, according to

West, that there is not a single good way of living for all

individuals, which the state could impose on subjects (292), a

conclusion which is also endorsed by Smith (Book of Life 149).

While it is true for Spinoza that we benefit from different

things and, consequently, can lead different kinds of good lives,

Steinberg points out that the most important goods for Spinoza’s

ethics do not vary by individual (‘Curious Defense’ 215-6). All

humans benefit from virtue and the intellectual love of God

(5p32c). Furthermore, human beings share a rational nature, in

virtue of which we benefit from the rationality of others (4p45-

7). Consequently, it is unclear whether Spinoza is sufficiently

pluralist about the good life to rule out the justification for

the state imposing such a conception.

West offers a second reasons for thinking that Spinoza’s

conception of freedom rules out the possibility of the state

imposing what it deems a free or rational way of life: Spinoza

identifies freedom with rationality, which cannot be coercively

inculcated (294). While it is true that the state cannot force

people to be rational, it can nevertheless promote their

rationality, for instance, by minimizing the influence of

irrational superstitious religious authorities and encouraging

democratic participation in the state and civic life. In this

vein, Kisner defends a republican reading of Spinoza’s politics

as upholding democratic participation on the grounds that it

promotes our virtue (217-8). Rosenthal also argues that

Spinoza’s politics pursues the republican aim of instilling

citizens with virtue, specifically the virtue of toleration

(‘Tolerance’). Consequently, West’s view is indirectly supported

by those who take a critical stance toward such republican

readings (Smith, Jewish Identity 164; Prokovniak 209, 216).

Others have argued that Spinoza’s politics is liberal on the

basis of his universal religion (TTP 14, 515-9). Spinoza holds

that the sovereign has the authority to regulate religion and,

furthermore, recommends that the sovereign legislate a universal

religion.iv Since the universal religion directs people away from

superstition and helps them to develop their moral capacities, it

appears to help people develop their rationality. On this basis,

Slyomovics argues that Spinoza’s commitment to the universal

religion indicates his commitment to the value of promoting

people’s rationality and, consequently, their freedom, since

people attain freedom by becoming rational. Slyomovics concludes

that this commits Spinoza to liberalism. While Levene and Hunter

do not mention liberalism, they also conclude on the same grounds

that the universal religion contributes to individual liberation.

A possible difficulty for this line of argument is that

Spinoza’s universal religion is not entirely rational.

Slyomovics points out that the universal religion is based on

more rational textual interpretation (511) and that it directs us

to act in accordance with moral teachings (501), such as treating

others with benevolence, which Spinoza regards as rational.

Nevertheless, Spinoza does not regard the main beliefs of this

religion, the seven dogmas of the universal religion, as

consistent with reason: for instance, the first dogma asserts

that God is “supremely just and merciful” (TTP 14, 517), which

contradicts Spinoza’s claim that God is impersonal (1app).

Furthermore, Spinoza denies that the universal religion requires

knowledge: the universal religion “requires not so much true

dogmas as pious dogmas, that is, such as move the heart to

obedience, even if many of those beliefs contain not a shadow of

truth” (TTP 14, 516). It follows that the universal religion

does not require reason, since Spinoza defines reason as having

knowledge, what Spinoza calls “adequate ideas” (2p40s2). Of

course, Spinoza holds that these irrational dogmas promote

rationality in the sense of directing us to more rational action,

such as benevolence. Nevertheless, since Spinoza identifies

rationality with having adequate ideas, actions arising from

these false and inadequate ideas would not count as strictly

rational, though they would be consistent with reason and could

help us to develop more rational ideas.

II. Two Other Liberal Commitments

The foregoing discussion has focused on whether Spinoza’s

politics is liberal in the sense of promoting freedom. This is a

somewhat trivial claim by today’s standards, since no plausible

political theory would deny the value of freedom. The rest of

this paper considers reasons for thinking that Spinoza upholds

more contentious claims associated with contemporary liberalism.

The first revolves around the previously mentioned debate about

whether Spinoza’s state aims to promote a single conception of

the good life. Mara claims that it does not, thereby siding with

West and Smith, against Kisner, Rosenthal and Steinberg. Mara

argues that this commitment alone is sufficient to qualify

Spinoza as a liberal, independent of what it says about Spinoza’s

view on the value of freedom. Mara’s reasoning here supposes

that liberalism aims for political conditions that help people to

promote their own conception of the good, rather than imposing a

particular conception of the good, derived from a rational

analysis of human nature and perfection. In fact, Mara suggests

that liberalism is skeptical about the possibility that different

ways of life can be evaluated and compared on a rational basis

(129). Mara points out that Spinoza opposes liberalism on this

point to some extent since his political recommendations are

based on an analysis of what best promotes our nature or conatus

(131). Nevertheless, Mara argues that Spinoza regards political

efforts to help us perfect our nature by becoming more rational

and virtuous as ineffective; rather politics can only hope to

curb and redirect our passions (142-3).

Second, Smith has argued that Spinoza’s state is liberal in

the sense that it creates a “new kind of liberal citizen” (Jewish

Identity 20). Smith is interested in the question of why Spinoza

denigrates Judaism in the TTP. Rejecting the notion that

Spinoza’s criticism of Judaism was based on self-hatred, Smith

counters that Spinoza’s criticism aims to divest Jews of an

identity based on their distinctive culture and religion. Smith

concludes that Spinoza intended to create a secular Jewish

identity based on participation in civil life. This qualifies

Spinoza as a liberal on the assumption that liberalism conceives

of subjects as defined foremost by their rights and

responsibilities as citizens, rather than their cultural and

religious identities.

A possible difficulty with this view is that Spinoza does

not clearly conceive of citizens or the state as secular. As we

have seen, Spinoza advocates that the state endorse a universal

religion, which suggests that people’s religious identities are

important to their identities as citizens. Furthermore, the

universal religion is based to some extent on Christianity, for

its seventh dogma asks us to believe that God forgives sins,

which Spinoza describes as “knowing Christ according to the

spirit” (TTP 14, 518). Of course, Smith is correct that the

universal religion is more ecumenical, since it is supposed to be

based on principles accepted by all Christians regardless of

their sect. It follows that the universal religion discourages

individuals from focusing on their distinctive religious

identities, which is an important step toward a secular civic

identity. Nevertheless, since Spinoza understands the general

populace as necessarily committed to irrational religious dogma,

it is unclear whether he could admit the possibility of a

populace united by a truly secular civic identity.

III. The Fundamental Liberal Principle: A Spinozistic

Illiberalism

This section considers whether Spinoza’s politics upholds a

view sometimes associated with liberalism, what Gaus and Cortland

call the fundamental liberal principle (hence forth FLP).v It

holds that “freedom is normatively basic, and so the onus of

justification is on those who would limit freedom, especially

through coercive means.” In other words, the FLP regards liberty

as having presumptive value, such that any restriction on freedom

requires justification. Mill expresses the principle when he

writes: ‘the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are

against liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition….

The a priori assumption is in favour of freedom…’ (262).

At first glance, one would expect Spinoza to endorse the FLP

because it asserts the value of freedom and Spinoza regards

freedom as extremely valuable. Since freedom amounts to acting

from one’s essential power, increasing one’s freedom also

increases her virtue, which Spinoza identifies with power

(4def8). Consequently, freedom is valuable in the same way as

virtue, which is why Spinoza’s ethics exhorts us to become free.vi

However, the FLP asserts that freedom has not ethical value, but

rather a very particular sort of political value: it is presumed

to be valuable when determining the appropriate constitution of

the state and the exercise of its power. Thus, the FLP is best

understood as a thesis about how freedom functions in political

arguments and theories. It is surprising, then, that while

Spinoza places such a high premium on the value of freedom, his

political arguments refrain from presuming its value, or so I

will argue. It follows that Spinoza does not accept the FLP, and

thus, that liberty plays a different role in his politics than in

liberalism, as it is often conceived.

The remainder of this section considers and rejects two

reasons why one might think that Spinoza accepts the FLP. The

main reason is Spinoza’s commitment to a social contract theory.

Social contract theories aim to justify political authority, such

as a sovereign power or laws by considering the political

conditions to which people would consent in a hypothetical state

of nature. These theories usually hold that political authority

requires this sort of justification because it restricts our

freedom, specifically a natural or pre-political freedom to

govern oneself independently of another’s authority. This

implies that restrictions on freedom require justification, which

is equivalent to the FLP.vii While this reasoning explains why

most social contract theories imply the FLP, it does not hold in

the case of Spinoza because, as I will show, he does not believe

that the covenant restricts our freedom. Consequently, his move

to justify the sovereign power does not imply that restrictions

on our freedom must also be justified, nor that freedom has

presumptive value.

To understand why Spinoza does not see the covenant as

restricting freedom, it is helpful to consider a few claims from

Pettit. Pettit distinguishes republican conceptions of freedom

from another, which he identifies as liberal (9-10).viii According

to Pettit, the liberal conceives of freedom as an absence of

interference from others—a state where one is able to choose

one’s actions without impediments or coercion—whereas republicans

conceive freedom as an absence of domination by others, not being

subject to the will or power of others. Pettit argues that

republican conceptions of freedom do not regard our freedom as

inconsistent with the presence of laws and a sovereign power to

enforce them; in other words, republican conceptions of freedom

imply the consistency of liberty and law (35). For the

interference imposed by law may be consistent with our freedom,

according to the republican account, if the laws do not imply

domination. In particular, laws are consistent with and even

conducive to freedom when they are an expression of the people’s

will.ix Pettit contrasts this to the liberal conception, which

regards the existence of laws as necessarily restricting our

freedom because they impede certain courses of action.x

While Spinoza’s conception of freedom may not entirely fit

Pettit’s description of republican freedom, Spinoza accepts the

republican notion that freedom involves an absence of domination

rather than interference, as is evident in his distinction

between a citizen and a slave.

If the purpose of the action is not to the advantage

of the doer but of him who commands, then the doer is

a slave, and does not serve his own interest. But in

a sovereign state where the welfare of the whole

people, not the ruler, is the supreme law, he who

obeys the sovereign power in all things should be

called a subject, not a slave who does not serve his

own interest. And so that commonwealth whose laws are

based on sound reason is the most free, for there

everybody can be free as he wills, that is, he can

live whole-heartedly under the guidance of reason.

(TTP 16, 531)

In other words, whether we are free or slaves is determined not

by whether we are subject to laws, but rather by whether the laws

serve our interests. It follows that freedom requires an absence

of not interference, but rather domination, the sort of

interference that reflects the interests of another, rather than

our own. This passage also shows that Spinoza accepts what

Pettit argues is the consequence of this view: the consistency of

liberty and law. For the passage claims that laws can promote

our freedom when they protect our interests; in fact, we are most

free under laws “based on sound reason,” a point echoed in the

Ethics: “the man who is guided by reason is more free in a state

where he lives under a system of law than in solitude where he

obeys only himself” (4p73).

Because Spinoza sees the sovereign and laws as consistent

with freedom, he does not regard the covenant to institute these

powers as infringing on our freedom. This conclusion is

supported by Spinoza’s distinctive conception of the covenant.

On a common view, upheld by Hobbes and Locke, the covenant

requires individuals to transfer certain natural rights to the

sovereign in the sense of giving them up or surrendering them.

For instance, Hobbes holds that the covenant requires

surrendering our right to follow our own judgments when it

disagrees with the sovereign (112).xi Spinoza, however, conceives

the transfer of rights to the sovereign in a different way, as

pooling them into a central power, over which we all have some

say.

They [parties to the covenant] therefore arranged that

the unrestricted right naturally possessed by each

individual should be put into common ownership, and

that this right should no longer be determined by the

strength and appetite of the individual, but by the

power and will of all together. (TTP 16, 528).

Thus, Spinoza does not conceive the transfer of rights to the

sovereign as giving them up, since we become part of the

sovereign power and retain common ownership of our combined

rights.xii Spinoza is explicit on this point when he claims that

the covenant forms a community “without any infringement of

natural right” (530).xiii Consequently, while Spinoza sometimes

describes the transfer of right with the Latin cedere as giving

them up or surrendering them (4p37s2; TTP 16, 530), he should be

understood as speaking loosely, since he does not believe that

the covenant requires people to part with their natural rights.xiv

This conception of the covenant is most evident in Spinoza’s

defense of democracy. One of Spinoza’s most perplexing claims

about democracy is that it “is the most natural form of state”

(TTP 16, 531). Spinoza means by this is that all states begin as

democracies. In fact, Spinoza defines democracy as the power

formed through the covenant: “such a community’s right [the

community created by the covenant] is called a democracy, which

can be defined as the united body of men which corporately

possess sovereign right over everything within its power” (TTP

16, 530). Thus, there is an analytic connection between the

covenant and democracy, such that covenants necessarily produce

democracies, which only subsequently change into other regimes.

The basis for this connection is the notion that the covenant

requires subjects to transfer rights in the sense of pooling them

for collective use, rather than giving them up. For this entails

that the covenant creates a situation where all individuals

participate in their governance, which is a democracy: “for in a

democratic state nobody transfers his natural right to another so

completely that thereafter he is not to be consulted; he

transfers it to the majority of the entire community of which he

is a part” (TTP 16, 531).

One might respond by pointing out a second argument for

claiming that social contract theories imply a commitment to the

FLP. This argument revolves around the notion that the sovereign

power derives legitimacy from the consent of the governed. This

entails that political authority can only be justified because it

is freely chosen and, thus, because it is consistent with our

freedom. According to this view, freedom regulates the

legitimate exercise of sovereign power by restricting and

constraining the kind of political authority that can be

justified. In order for freedom to play this role, it must have

value prior to and independently of the state. The most likely

reason why freedom has this prior value, the argument concludes,

is that freedom has presumptive value.xv

Does this second argument show that Spinoza’s social

contract theory implies a commitment to the FLP? The answer

might seem to be yes, since Spinoza accepts that freedom

regulates the legitimate exercise of state power. As we have

seen, Spinoza’s argument for why states should protect freedom of

thought and speech implies that people agree to the covenant for

the sake of promoting their freedom, such that the state loses

power if it excessively restricts freedom. According to this

view, freedom regulates the state’s power in the sense that

people’s desire for freedom places limits on the state’s power.

Since Spinoza holds that right is coextensive with power, it

follows that freedom also regulates the legitimate use of state

power.

Nevertheless, this line of reasoning does not imply that

freedom has presumptive value, as the FLP asserts. Remember, the

second argument asserts that freedom must have value prior to and

independently of the state in order for it to regulate and

constrain the sovereign power. According to foregoing

discussion, however, Spinoza holds that freedom regulates state

power not because of its value, presumptive or otherwise, but

rather because people value it so strongly that excessive efforts

to restrict freedom meet with opposition, which diminishes the

state’s power to restrict freedom. Thus, Spinoza’s reasoning for

claiming that states are not justified in excessively restricting

freedom supposes only that people regard freedom as valuable, not

that it actually is valuable.

We should also consider a second reason to think that

Spinoza upholds the FLP: his defense of freedom of speech and

thought, described in the first section above. Those who read

this defense as indicating a commitment to liberalism are likely

motivated partly by its general resemblance to Locke’s defense of

toleration, which is associated with liberalism. While Locke’s

defense of toleration does imply the FLP, a close look reveals

that Spinoza’s view does not. It’s worth examining this

difference in detail because it shows how differently freedom

functions in Spinoza’s politics than in Locke’s, a standard model

of liberalism.

Locke offers many reasons for toleration, though the main

argument from the Letter concerning Toleration revolves around the

notion that it would be irrational for the state to attempt to

control people’s religious beliefs through coercion, since such

attempts are ineffective, changing only the outward expression of

belief, one’s practices and professions of faith, not the beliefs

themselves (46). This argument for toleration resembles

Spinoza’s because it concludes that the state should not attempt

to control belief on the grounds that it lacks the power to do

so. Furthermore, both arguments hold that the state’s lack of

power to control belief creates a free zone surrounding people’s

beliefs, where they have the right to their beliefs without

interference.

Despite this similarity, Spinoza’s argument for toleration

is importantly different.xvi While one could read Locke’s

argument as defending tolerance entirely on the grounds that it

is impossible to control people’s beliefs (Waldron), Creppell

(221) shows that doing so overlooks Locke’s insistence on the

inviolable relationship between the individual and God, which

guarantees the right to worship: “the care of each Mans Salvation

belongs only to himself” (47); “Liberty of Conscience is every

mans natural Right, equally belonging to Dissenters as to

themselves; and… no body ought to be compelled in matters of

Religion, either by Law or Force” (51). These remarks suggest

that the argument proceeds as follows: God entrusts each person

with her own salvation by according her the power to choose her

own beliefs. Consequently, respecting God’s will requires us to

respect the right to conscience, that is, to believe in

accordance with her own judgment. The state should only violate

this right if there is good reason to do so. Since the state is

not capable of coercing belief, the argument concludes, it has no

such reason; it would be “irrational” to do so. The important

point is that this argument is based on the right to believe in

accordance with one’s conscience, which is justified by our

relationship with God and, consequently, exists prior to and

independently of the state. In other words, the argument is

based on the claim that we have a natural right to conscience.

In contrast, Spinoza’s argument that we have a right to

freedom of thought and speech does not appeal to a natural right

to conscience or any other (see Steinberg ‘Curious Defense’ 217-

8). Rather, Spinoza defends the right to these freedoms on the

grounds that states lack the power to restrict them effectively.

To be clear, I do not mean to deny that, for Spinoza, people

possess natural rights and that these rights include the right to

free speech and thought. Rather, I am arguing that the existence

of these natural rights plays no role in Spinoza’s argument that

we have a political right to freedom of thought and speech. In

other words, Spinoza’s argument does not conclude that we have a

political right to these freedoms on the grounds that they are

guaranteed or implied by a natural right.

Because of this important difference between the arguments,

Locke’s implies the FLP, whereas Spinoza’s does not. Locke’s

argument concludes that the state should tolerate people’s

religious beliefs and practices on the grounds that they have a

natural right to follow their conscience, which the state cannot

restrict without good reason. In this way, the argument implies

that the freedom to follow one’s conscience has a value that

cannot be restricted without justification, in other words,

presumptive value. Since Spinoza’s argument, in contrast, does

not appeal to a natural right as the grounds for toleration, it

does not suppose that people’s freedom can be restricted only

with justification. In fact, Spinoza’s argument generally

resists the notion that political rights can be determined

independently of considerations of power. For Spinoza, our

political rights are determined by the limits of the state’s

powers, not by what would be right or wrong, independently of

such considerations. This way of thinking about rights closes

off the possibility of justifying political rights by appealing

to rights that people possess independently of the state’s power,

that is, natural rights. Consequently, it also closes off the

possibility that his argument for a right to free thought and

speech would be based on the notion that freedom has value

independently of the state, that is, presumptive value.

This discussion indicates an important strategic difference

between Spinoza’s philosophy and liberalism, at least, insofar as

Locke characterizes liberalism generally. Because Locke assumes

that freedom is valuable, he is able to determine the legitimate

exercise of state power by analyzing justifiable restrictions of

our freedom. Since Spinoza’s politics does not assume that

freedom is valuable, it argues for the protection of freedom only

on the grounds that people happen to value it. Consequently,

while Spinoza may ultimately agree with liberals that states

should protect freedom, he arrives at this conclusion by a very

different route.xvii

Acknowledgment

Thanks to Sam Rickless and an anonymous referee for their helpful

comments on previous drafts of this paper.

iNotes

In other words, liberalism is characterized by a commitment to the liberty of individuals in the state, rather than the liberty of the state.ii Quotations from Spinoza’s Ethics, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [TTP] and Tractatus Politicus [TP] are taken from Spinoza Opera, ed. C. Gebhardt, 4 vols (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925). Translations generally follow Shirley’s translation. Quotations are cited by chapter number and page number in Shirley’s translation. I adopt the following abbreviations for the Ethics: the first numeral refers to parts; ‘p’ means proposition; ‘c’ means corollary; ‘s’ means scholium; ‘app’ means appendix; e.g. 2p40s2 refers to Ethics, part II, proposition 40, second scholium.iii Spinoza asserts his commitment to the social contract in the TTP: “in order to achieve a secure and good life, men had necessarily to unite in one body,” by forming a “covenant” (16, 528). Spinoza later offers an example of such a covenant in the history of the Hebrew people under Moses:“it was necessary that every one of them should first surrender his naturalright, and that all should by common consent resolve to obey only what was revealed to them by God through prophecy” (559). In the Ethics, 4p37s2 also offers an account of the social contract. There is some question about whether Spinoza’s commitment to the social contract tradition persisted in the TP; for an overview of this question, see Steinberg “Political Philosophy.”iv Spinoza claims that the sovereign has absolute power to control religion: “When I said that the possessors of sovereign power have rights over everything, and that all laws are dependent on their decree, I meant not only civil but religious law; for in the case of the latter too they must be both interpreters and guardians” (TTP 19, 557-8). This view is justified partly by Spinoza’s interpretation of the Hebrew state, accordingto which the state ultimately collapsed because the power of interpreting scripture was entrusted to a separate priestly caste, the Levites. Given the pervasiveness of Lockean attitudes today, it is natural to blame the resulting problems on the fact that the state intervened in religious matters by assigning the power to interpret scripture. We must remember, however, that Spinoza understands religious power as, by its nature, political: according to Spinoza, there is no religion in the state of nature; religion only acquires power, like political entities, from contracts (TTP 16, 533-4). For Spinoza, the existence of an independent religious authority is tantamount to an independent political authority, which essentially divides the political power of the state. Thus, the mistake of the Hebrew state was not that it intervened in religion, but rather that it gave up control of religion. The result was that the Levites used their monopoly on scriptural interpretation as a way of increasing their own power in opposition to the state. The resulting

political struggle undermined the sanctity of religion in the eyes of the people, which led to widespread disillusionment with the religious beliefs and practices that were necessary to the maintenance of the state (TTP 17).v Gaus and Courtland’s essay provides the most comprehensive effort to define liberalism in a way that captures the essential commitments shared by the many varieties of liberalism.vi An anonymous referee has pointed out that freedom may even have an unconditional value for Spinoza. For Spinoza, all things have value—in other words, are good or bad, virtuous or vicious, perfect or imperfect—according to how they promote our power. Since freedom amounts to acting from one’s power, it seems that everything of value contributes to our freedom, which implies that the value of freedom can never be superseded. It is interesting that Spinoza could uphold such a view, yet still reject the FLP.vii For example, Locke writes: “The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but thatestablished, by consent, in the common-wealth; nor under the dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what the legislative shall enact, according to the trust put in it” (17). This passage distinguishes naturalliberty, which arises only from governing oneself in accordance with reasonand is inconsistent with being under any external authority, from the liberty we possess in a state, which is consistent with being subject to the authority of another, provided that it arises from consent. This passage indicates that being subject to the authority of another and, thus,restricting our natural freedom, can only be justified when the restrictionarises from consent. In this way, the passage indicates that restricting our freedom requires justification, in other words, that freedom has presumptive value. This view on the value of freedom is a central reason why Locke is commonly described as a member of the liberal tradition. For instance, Grant portrays Locke’s politics as a liberal on the grounds that it “takes its bearings from the thought that all men have an equal right togovern their actions as they see fit” (1; see also Seliger). viii This identification is somewhat problematic. Larmore questions whetherwe should regard these conceptions of freedom as indicating a commitment toliberalism or republicanism (106-12). He points out that Locke defends a republican conception of freedom, but incontestably qualifies as a liberal (108). Taking a stronger stance, Ghosh denies that the distinction betweenthese two conceptions of freedom is evident in the historical literature.ix In Pettit’s words, laws do not infringe freedom “so long as they respectpeople’s common interests and ideas and conform to the image of an ideal law: so long as they are not the instruments of any one individual’s, or any one group’s arbitrary will” (36).

x Consequently, philosophers working with this conception of freedom, such as Hobbes (79), are inclined to regard all laws as necessarily restricting our freedom. For instance, Hobbes tends to conceive of freedom as an absence of law: “The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Sovereign hath pretermitted”(264).xi Locke’s acceptance of this view is evident in his claim that “men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty and executive power they had in the state of nature,” (68). In fact, it is precisely because Locke accepts this view that he is so concerned that subjects not transfer all of their rights.xii In further support of this reading, Spinoza claims that the covenant requires subjects to transfer rights not to an individual or a third party,as in Hobbes, but rather to the community, of which we are a part: “A community can be formed and a contract be always preserved in its entirety in absolute good faith on these terms, that everyone transfers all the power that he possesses to the community, which will therefore alone retainthe sovereign natural right over everything, that is, the supreme rule which everyone will have to obey either of free choice or through fear of the ultimate penalty” (TTP 16, 530).xiii This claim is echoed in Spinoza’s much cited remark that his covenant, unlike Hobbes’, “preserves the natural right intact” (letter 50).xiv Spinoza’s view on the transfer of rights in the covenant is explained partly by his distinctive understanding of individuals. Spinoza holds thatthe essence of each thing is its conatus, a striving to persevere in existence and increase its power. It follows that when different things act together to preserve the group, the group has a power to preserve itself and, thus, a conatus, in virtue of which it constitutes an individual. Consequently, collective entities such as sports teams and corporations form individuals to the extent that their members work collectively for the survival and power of the whole, in much the same way that the organs and limbs of a person’s bodies, all contribute to the conatus of the person and, thus, form one person. Spinoza’s commitment to this conclusion is evident in his claim that people, who obey reason’s commands to act for their common good, form a single individual: “Men can wish for nothing more excellent for preserving their own being than that they should all be in such harmony in all respects that their minds and bodies should compose, as it were, one mind and one body, and that all together should endeavor as best they can to preserve their own being” (4p18s). For the present purposes, the important point is that this way ofthinking about individuals entails that when people come together to form astate, they form an individual with its own conatus. In doing so, they gainsome power in governing the collective power, of which they are a part. Inthis way, entering the covenant actually increases our power, which

explains Spinoza’s insistence that the covenant preserves our natural right. My view here that the state counts as an individual is controversial, as explained by Campos.xv Thus, the argument is weaker than the first, for it does not entail thatfreedom has presumptive value. There may be other explanations for why freedom has prior value.xvi This line of argument is consistent with Rosenthal, who also defends that Spinoza’s defense of toleration is different from a liberal defense (‘Republican Argument’).xvii This discussion shows that Spinoza departs from liberalism in this way largely because of his naturalistic view that normative political claims are derivable from a descriptive analysis of our power.

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