Specpro digests

JUDGE CALDONA SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

DIZON | LORESCA | LUMINARIAS | SANTOS, K. | SY | TY | VILCHES 3-D || Ateneo Law School

1 Ad astra per alia fideles

EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN HEIRS, WHEN ALLOWED

Ernesto Guevara v. Rosario Guevara (12/29/1943) D: Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a

will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the

will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will

and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of

his property by will may be rendered nugatory Facts:

1. Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter, respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter

2. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased- to wit, a portion of 423,492 sqm of a large parcel of land with an OCT issued in the name of Ernesto

3. It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino Guevara executed a will which he made certain bequests- devises and legacies

4. He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed of either by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to defray his expenses and those of his family us to the time of his death

5. Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra executed whereby he conveyed to him the southern half of the large parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed by the will above mentioned, inconsideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and

obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses

6. Later on, an OCT was issued in the name of Ernesto which also included the northern half of the large parcel of land above (see fact no. 5)

7. On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case

8. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father

9. In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will

10. But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose of recovering the property; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter

11. RTC and CA both sustained this theory: Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded

12. CA allowed the procedure or the action taken by Rosario: “The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed




ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, incovenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same criterion (Leaño vs. Leaño, supra), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode of procedure may be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.”

Issues: WON the procedure adopted by respondent is legal WON the deed of sale to Ernesto was effective Held: No and Yes Ratio:

1. The pertinent provisions are the ff: (the law in force at that time) Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver. — The person who has the custody of a will shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will. Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. — A person named as executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testor, or within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of the testor, present such will to the court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and shall, within such period, signify to

the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known in writing his refusal to accept it. Sec. 628. Penalty. — A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two proceeding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court, shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. Sec. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed. — If a person having custody of a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.

2. The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court

3. It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will

4. SC looked into the rationale of CA (see fact 12). Section 1 of Rule 74 provides as follows:

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.




5. SC believes that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not sanction the non-representation of a will for probate and much less the nullification of such will thru failure of its custodian to present it in court for probate

6. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letter of administration." It does not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two different things, although both may be made in the same case. The allowance of a will precedes the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration

7. Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory

8. As for the deed of sale, the court held that the sale to Ernesto of the southern part is valid. But although the whole title of the land is issued under the name of Ernesto, the northern part still belongs to the estate of Victorino

9. Thus, SC reversed and set aside the decision of CA and ordered the parties to present the will for probate.

AFFIDAVIT OF SELF-ADJUDICATION BY SOLE HEIR

Portugal v Portugal Beltran (8/16/2004) D: if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special

proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should

be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and

terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration

as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the

estate of the deceased. Justice Carpio-Morales

Facts:

1. Jose Q. PORTUGAL first married PAZ LAZO in 1942 2. Subsequently, PORTUGAL contracted a second marriage with ISABEL

in 1948 3. ISABEL had a son named JOSE DOUGLAS Portugal 4. A year after that, PAZ gave birth to a girl named ALELI 5. Meanwhile, PORTUGAL’s father died leaving him and his 4 other

siblings a parcel of land in Caloocan 6. By means of a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and waiver of rights,

the siblings ceded their rights over the land to PORTUGAL. The RD of Caloocan issued a TCT in PORTUGAL’s name

7. PAZ died and eventually so did PORTUGAL died intestate. Claiming to be the sole heir, ALELI then executed an Affidavit whereby she adjudicated for herself the Caloocan property. A TCT in her named was subsequently issued.

8. ISABEL and JOSE DOUGLAS who only learned of late the death of PORTUGAL, filed in RTC of CALOOCAN a complaint for the annulment of affidavit of adjudication and TCT in ALELI’s name. They claimed that ALELI perjured herself and made false representations.

9. TC issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows: a) Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?; b.) Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?; c.) Whether or not




TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.; d.) Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.

10. TC: without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario: The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue

11. ISABEL and PORTUGAL DOUGLAS appealed to CA citing Carino v Carino1

12. CA: affirmed TC. Carino is inapplicable to the present case as the issue in the former is the validity of the two marriages, the issue in the present case however is the annulment of title to property.

Issue: whether ISABEL and JOSE DOUGLAS have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name. Held: No Ratio:

1 Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked

for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage

void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for

purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected

marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void.

However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage

an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,

legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a

criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the

death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of

said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such cases, evidence

must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a

previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final

judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

1. Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay A. Therein petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the

estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, “owners-claimants” of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss.

B. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[ and Solivio v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that “the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.” i. LITAM: Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for

issuance of letters of administration before CFI of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, “the surviving spouse of the decedent.” The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.

- While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a




list of properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.

- TC rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.

- SC held that “the lower court should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding

ii. In Solivio: there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court’s order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir.

- The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

- RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.

- Celedonia:“whether RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court,”

- SC: “[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with [estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court,” citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.

2. RULE: common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that A. if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special

proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.

B. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

C. CASE, ALELI believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. i. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a

person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

D. ISABEL and JOSE DOUGLAS claim however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

E. CASE, it appearing that the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which




assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

F. the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating.

In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of Delgado v. Heirs of Rustia Vda. de

Damian (01/27/2006)

Justice Corona

Facts:

1. This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.

2. The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.

3. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s life. Before him was Ramon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

4. Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.

5. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina

Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

6. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.

7. On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction." The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.

8. Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.

9. On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC. This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz; (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.

10. On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987. On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.

11. On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice.




Issues:

1. Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.

2. Who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are.

3. Who should be issued letters of administration.

Held:

1. Yes. There was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.

2. Refer to the Ratio for the answers.

Ratio:

1. In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."

2. Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place.

3. To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed. Little was said of the cohabitation or

alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).

4. All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado, were her natural children.

5. The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.

6. Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since




they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

7. We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code.

8. Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate.

9. Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. She, however, claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect. There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by

which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.

10. The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of

both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato.

11. An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person

dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

12. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here. It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.




WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.

2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.

3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by the trial court.

Cua v Vargas (10/31/06)

Justice Azcuna

D: Persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon, and not after such an agreement has already been executed

as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

Facts:

1. Paulina Vargas died and left a 99sqm lot. In February 4, 1994, the heirs of Paulina executed a notarized Extra-judicial Settlement. Each of the 9 heirs got 11sqm of the lot. All the heirs signed except Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria. The Settlement was published in the Catanduanes Tribune.

2. In Nov. 15, 1994, the same heirs executed another Extra-judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale over the same lot (with same partition). Only the five other heirs who signed the first settlement sold the lot (collectively only 55sqm of the lot) to Cua.

3. According to Gloria, she learned of the sale to Cua only on November 16, 1994 and was not aware of the publication of the first Extra Judicial Settlement at the Catanduanes Tribune.

4. After knowing of the sale of the 55sqm to Cua, Gloria offered to Cua the redemption of the property. Cua refused and the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.

5. Gloria filed a case for the annulment of the Extra Judicial Settlement and for the Redemption of the lot before the MTC of Virac, Catanduanes. The heirs of the primitive owners of the lot filed a petition for intervention.

6. Gloria claims that as a co-owner of the lot, she may subrogate the purchaser upon reimbursement of the purchase price. Also, there was no written notice sent by the other co-heirs to effectuate the 30-day redemption period. She argues that the Settlement is null and void.




7. MTC: dismissed the case and the complaint-in-intervention. It upheld the validity of the sale arguing that the sale occurred after the partition, hence the parties as owners of their specific share in the lot could freely dispose of their respective shares. It stated that the actual knowledge Gloria cured the deficiency of the notice requirement for the right of redemption to take effect.

8. RTC: affirmed MTC 9. CA: Reversed lower courts stating that the Settlement was void hence

the sale to Cua was likewise void. With a denied MR, Cua filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON the publication in the Catanduanes Tribuen constitutes as notice as required by Rule 74. Held: No Ratio:

Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate. Since Gloria and her other co-heirs never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present complaint, they are not bound by such Settlement and the partition made

without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

However, the other heirs who sold their hereditary shares are not precluded from doing so. They are free to dispose of their respective aliquot shares in the lot. They are bound by the sale they executed with Cua.

Nevertheless, Gloria and the other heirs still have the right to redeem the property given that no notice IN WRITING of the sale to Cua was ever given to them, a requirement for the 30-day redemption period would commence under Article 1088 of the Civil Code. The very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing and in a position to repurchase the share sold.

Issue: WON the other heir who signed the Settlement are indispensible

parties to resolve the issue of Gloria et. al’s right to redemption

Held: No

Ratio:

The complaint filed by Gloria et. al. ultimately prayed that they be allowed to redeem the shares in the property sold by their co-heirs. Significantly, the right of the other heirs to sell their undivided share in the property to Cua is not in dispute. Gloria et. al. concede that the other heirs acted within their hereditary rights in doing so to the effect that the latter completely and effectively relinquished their interests in the property in favor of Cua. Cua thus stepped into the shoes of the other heirs to become a co-owner of the property with respondents. As a result, only petitioner’s presence is absolutely required for a complete and final determination of the controversy because what respondents seek is to be subrogated to his rights as a purchaser.

REMEDIES OF AGGRIEVED PARTIES AFTER EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

OF ESTATE

Pereira v. CA (6/20/1989)




D: Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not,

are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an

administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are

superfluous and unnecessary proceedings FACTS:

1. Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of PAL, passed away on January 3, 1983 without a will. He was survived by his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, and his wife, Victoria Bringas Pererira

2. Rita (the sister) instituted a Special Proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration in her favour pertaining to the estate of her deceased brother. In the petition, she alleged that she and Victoria are the only surviving heirs of Andres, that the deceased has no creditors, and that the deceased left several properties (death benefits from PAL, savings deposits with several banks, and a land located in Las Pinas)

3. Victoria filed her opposition and a motion to dismiss the said petition alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for the purpose administration and praying that if an estate does exist, she should be appointed as administrator

4. The RTC ruled in favour of Rita and was appointed as administratrix upon a bond posted by her. Victoria appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the RTC decision

ISSUE: WON a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent HELD: No RATIO:

1. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from

the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

2. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons

3. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings

4. The Court held in this case that there is no need to settle the estate judicially. The present situation does not constitute a “good cause” as provided for by law and jurisprudence

5. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been




extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered

Alaban v. CA (9/23/2005) D: A person instituted as a sole heir in the Will of a decedent is entitled to

petition for the probate of the said Will and such instituted heir has no legal obligation to mention those who are not compulsory or testate heirs

in the probate of the Will

Facts: 1. Nov. 8, 2000 – Francico Provido filed a petition for the probate of

the Will of deceased Soledad Provido Elevencionado before an RTC in IloIlo. Provido alleged that he is Soledad’s heir and is the executor of her Will. The notice of hearing was published as required in the Rules of Court

2. Later, on May 30, 2001, the court allowed probate and directed the issuance of letters testamentary to Provido

3. October 4, 2001 – More than four months thereafter, Alaban and others filed a motion to reopen the probate proceedings claiming that they are intestate heirs of Soledad, contesting the extrinsic validity of the Will, and alleging that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding in item no. 1 because of non-payment of correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs

4. RTC: a) Denied the motion in number 2 b) Held that Alaban, et al. were deemed notified of the hearing

by publication c) Held that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not

a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the deficiency

d) Held the RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen

5. Motion to Annul Judgment of RTC before CA on the ground of extrinsic fraud:

Alaban, et al. filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA seeking the annulment of the RTC’s decision and claimed that after Soledad died, they actually had a compromise agreement with Francico but that he later refused to sign the agreement and feigned ignorance about it. They then claimed that they only learned about the probate proceeding in IloIlo in July 2001, which is why they filed a motion to reopen the proceeding

6. This motion to annul the judgment of the RTC was denied by the CA 7. The SC found that while the probate proceeding was pending in

IloIlo, one of the petitioners, Flores, filed a petition for letters of administration with an RTC in General Santos City claiming that Soledad died intestate and without issue, survived by five sets of collateral heirs. She was then armed with an SPA from most of the petitioners authorizing the appointment of administratrix.

a) Denied by said court because of the pending probate proceeding in IloIlo, where the jurisdiction is proper because that is where Soledad died

b) Denial was also in accordance with rule that first court acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other courts

8. On January 2002, Flores filed a Notice of Appeal of the judgment in number 7 before the CA

9. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari from the CA decision in number 6, the petitioners allege that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that respondent’s offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the RTC’s judgment

Issue: WON despite all the allegations of Alaban, et al., Francico is a proper party to petition for the probate of Soledad’s Will Held: Yeeeeeees Ratio:

1. The SC began its discussion with some of the remedies that Alaban, et al. could have availed of but didn’t:




a) Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should be filed within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order

b) A petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months after entry thereof

c) A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered and that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from judgment

2. The SC ruled that the petitioners actually became parties to the probate proceedings, thus —

a) Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's

jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent

b) Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing

c) As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory

3. For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence

4. Now to the topic of SpecPro, regarding who may petition for probate, Alaban, et al. allege that as a result of Francico’s deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that Francico’s offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate

5. The SC, in not giving merit to these allegations, stated that according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the Will shows that Francico was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Francico had no legal




obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. Besides, even if petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite

REPROBATE; REQUISITES BEFORE WILL PROVED OUTSIDE ALLOWED IN THE PHILIPPINES; EFFECTS OF PATIENCE.

In the Matter of the Intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Isabel Cojuangco Suntay (1/16/2010)

D: In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of

preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties

or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here

Facts: 1. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),

married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico

2. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

3. Emillio III (petitioner) is an illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico but he was reared by the spouse since he was a baby and was later on acknowledged as a natural child of Emilio I (son of Federico) (Later, the fact also stated that Federico himself legally adopted Emilio III)

4. While respondent in this case is a legitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico as she was born when Emilio I legally married

5. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for the intestate estate of Cristina alleging among others that she was a legitimate granddaughter of Cristina

6. Federico then filed his opposition alleging preference over administering the estate of Cristina being the surviving spouse and that the list of heirs of respondent was incomplete as it did not include Emilio III

7. After a failed attempt of the parties to settle amicably, Federico filed a manifestation nominationg his adopted son, Emilio IIII as administrator of Cristina’s estate on his behalf

8. RTC rendered a decision appointing petitioner Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate

9. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and revoked the letters of administration issued to petitioner. Petitioner’s MR having been denied, he appealed to SC by certiorari

Issue: Who between petitioner and respondent is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate Held: Both. They were appointed as co-administrators of the decedent’s intestate estate Ratio:

1. CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that “under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership.”

2. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving




husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

3. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case

4. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate

5. In Uy v. CA, SC upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate

6. In the same vain, the case of Delgado Vda dela Rosa v. Heirs of Vda de Damina held that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

7. According to SC, since the subject SC calls to the succession other putative heirs, (other grandchildren of Cristina and Federico)and considering the conflicting claims of such heirs, the SC was impelled to move in joint administration of the estate of Cristina

Note: I did not include the discussion relating to Art 992 of CC since it’s a Succession issue and not a SpecPro issue.

Fleumer (appellant) v. Hix (appellee) (03/17/1930) Ponente: Malcolm

DOCTRINE:

The special administrator of an estate is a person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will

FACTS:

1. Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix , appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased.

2. Annie Hix (appellee) contends that the Fleumer as a mere special administrator is not authorized to carry on this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether Fleumer, as a special administrator, can appeal the denial of the probate of the deceased’s will. HELD: YES (but will was not allowed for probate) RATIO:

Appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will

Other issues:

On Jurisdiction o It is the theory of the Fleumer that the alleged will was

executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Virginia govern.

o It was necessary for Fleumer to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands.




The only evidence introduced to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in the beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine Islands, Fleumer violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands

o It is to be noted that the application of or the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the ancillary administration. However , there was no attempt to comply with the provisions of sections 637, 638, and 639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.

On due execution of the will o In addition, the due execution of the will was not established.

The only evidence on this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then be the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means

On the issue of divorce o Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce

purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West Virginia.

o The present proceedings do not call for any specific pronouncements on the validity or invalidity of this alleged divorce.

ORDER OF PREFERENCE

Angeles v Magalaya (9/2/2005) D: The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family

Codemay be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else,

the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not rise. Justice Garcia

Facts:

1. ALELI MAGLAYA, claiming to be sole heir and legitimate daughter of her alleged father FRANCISCO, filed a petition praying that she be appointed as the administrator of the estate of FRANCISO.

2. Second wife of Francisco, Belen ANGELES filed an opposition arguing that ALELI is not really a legitimate daughter of Francisco. Although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. She contends that it she ANGELES who is the proper person to be appointed as the administratrix.

3. ALELI: offered her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears on the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”; pictures taken during her wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.

4. TC:ALELI failed to prove her legitimate filiation 5. CA: reversed and ordered that ALELI be appointed as administratrix

Issue: whether CA erred in finding for ALELI Held: Yes, Ratio:




1. Article 164 of the Family Code: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

2. CA relied heavily on Tison vs. Court of Appeals: since petitioner opted not to present any contrary evidence, the presumption on respondent’s legitimacy stands unrebutted.

A. Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of such child cannot be attacked collaterally.

3. RULE: A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. A. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact

thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved

B. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a child is legitimate does not arise.

4. CASE, CA did not categorically state from what facts established during the trial was the presumption of ALELI’s supposed legitimacy arose. A. But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done

so. For, save for ALELI’s gratuitous assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedent’s marriage to ALELI’s mother.

B. no marriage certificate or marriage contract was offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage.

C. At best, their testimonies proved that respondent was Francisco’s daughter but NOT the VALID marriage

5. Article 172 of the Family Code: legitimate filiation of a child can be established by any of the modes2 therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed parents

A. CASE, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having attended the birth of a child.

B. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child.

C. Jurisprudence: teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.

D. Legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself. It cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother, with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative father’s name in the appropriate space in the birth certificate

6. ALELI can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty. Maglaya and from her student and government records which indicated or purported to show that Francisco Angeles is her father.

2 Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following: 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments;

or 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate

child; or 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.




The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco giving respondent’s hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.

San Luis v. San Luis (02/06/2007)

Justice Ynares-Santiago

D: Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to

file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were

acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Facts:

1. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

2. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

3. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

4. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

5. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo was joined by his sister Linda in seeking the dismissal of the petition based on the same grounds.

6. Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the

marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.

7. Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss.

8. On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the motions for reconsideration.

9. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. Respondent moved for




reconsideration and for the disqualification of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.

10. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court. The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent.

Issues:

1. Whether venue was properly laid.

2. Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

Held:

1. Yes. The venue was properly laid. The subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the RTC which as territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

2. Yes. Respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration

Ratio:

1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile."

2. In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also

maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc.

3. From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.

4. Republic v. Orbecido III: Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. TheVan Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

5. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

6. Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.




7. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

8. Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

9. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

10. In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been

obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

APPOINTMENT OF CO-ADMINISTRATOR

Uy v. CA (03/16/06) Justice Ynares-Santiago

D: A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited.

Facts:

1. Jose Uy died intestate. Lilia Hofilena was appointed as special administrator, but this was later on revoked and was granted to Wilson Uy, the petitioner and one of the heirs.

2. Johnny Uy filed to intervene in the case be declared as the administrator of the estate since he was the brother and creditor of the decedent. Also, he had knowledge of other properties which should form part of the estate of Uy.

3. RTC: Earlier denied Johnny Uy’s motion to intervene. The Cout later on made Johnny Uy a co-administrator.

4. Wilson Uy moved that Johnny bring to the estate properties belonging to the deceased. Unsatisfied with Johnny, Wilson filed for the removal of Johnny as co-administrator.

5. The court denied the removal of Johnny as co-administrator finding that the latter substantially complied with his duties. The CA affirmed the RTC.

6. Wilson Uy is asserting that his appointment as a regular administrator is already final, unassailable or res judicata; that the inferior court has no authority to re-open the issue of the




appointment of an administrator without removing the incumbent administrator; that private respondent is not only alien to the estate, but has a conflict of interest with it; that the trial court’s appointment of private respondent as co-administrator constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

Issue: WON the RTC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it appointed Johnny as co-administrator Held: No. The RTC was correct in appointing a co-administrator Ratio: The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. In the case at bar, the trial court granted letters of administration to petitioner and thereafter to private respondent as co-administrator.

Under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the preference to whom letters of administration may be granted are as follows:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:


(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

The order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances.

It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

In the instant case, the order of preference was NOT disregarded by the trial court. The court deemed it proper to appoint Johnny Uy, a creditor, as co-administrator since the estate was sizeable and petitioner was having a difficult time attending to it alone. In fact, petitioner did not submit any report regarding the estate under his administration except those involving the cases he filed and/or intervened in other branches. This may be due to his being inexperienced, but this fact will not be reason enough to remove him from the administration of the Estate as Judicial Administrator thereof. However, considering that the Intervenor is claiming to be the patriarch of the Uy family and who claims to have enormous knowledge of the businesses and properties of the decedent Jose K.C. Uy, it is the feeling of the court that it will be very beneficial to the Estate if he be appointed co-administrator (without removing the already appointed Judicial Administrator) of the Estate of Jose K.C. Uy, if only to shed more light to the alleged enormous properties/businesses and to bring them all to the decedent’s Estate pending before this Court.




A co-administrator performs all the functions and duties and exercises all the powers of a regular administrator, only that he is not alone in the administration. The practice of appointing co-administrators in estate proceedings is not prohibited.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons:

1. To have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to

have different interests represented;

2. There justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;

3. Where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;

4. To have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and

5. When a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.

Issue: WON the trial court can re-open the issue of appointment if administrator.

Held: Yes

Ratio:

In probate proceedings, considerable latitude is allowed a probate court in modifying or revoking its own orders as long as the proceedings are pending in the same court and timely applications or motions for such modifications or revocations are made by the interested parties. In the instant case, the estate

of the deceased has not yet been settled and the case is still within the jurisdiction of the court.

Gabriel v. CA (8/7/1992) D: Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the

benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the

deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and

(5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office

FACTS

1. Roberto Dindo Gabriel filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for letters of administration alleging that he is the son of Domingo Gabriel, who died 9 months earlier. He mentioned 8 other next of kin and heirs of the decedent

2. The trial court issued an order setting the hearing of the petition, on which date all persons interested may show cause, why the petition should not be granted. The order even appeared in a newspaper of general circulation. However, no opposition was filed despite publication of the notice of hearing. Hence, Roberto was allowed to present his evidence exparte

3. The probate court issued an order appointing him as administrator after giving a bond of 30,000 pesos. Subsequently a notice to creditors for filing claims against the estate was published in Metropolitan News. As such, Aida Valencia, mother of Roberto filed a “Motion fo File Claim of the intestate estate of Domingo Gabriel”

4. Another opposition was filed by Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Matibel (all surnamed Gabriel) praying that the letters of




administration be instead issued to Nilda Gabriel, being the legitimate daughter of the deceased. However, this was denied by the probate court

5. As such, they filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, This was denied by the CA on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused

6. In the present petition for review on certiorari with the SC, petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant

ISSUE: WON the correct was correct in appointing Roberto as administrator despite the fact that Rule 78, Section 6 provides for an order of preference for the appointment of an administrator HELD: Yes, however, the Court ordered that a co-administrator be appointed (surviving spouse of Domingo) RATIO

1. In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 783 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of

3 Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:


(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select

administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.

2. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.

3. On the other hand, the SC felt that they should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

4. While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the

administrator.

5. Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency




which may arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.

6. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office

7. Under the circumstances obtaining herein, the court ruled for the co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and Roberto Dindo Gabriel

Delgado Vda. De Dela Rosa v. Heirs of Rustia Vda. De Damian

(1/27/2006) D: In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is

the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,

especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates

Facts: Really more of a Succession case so guys, I’ll just discuss the SpecPro part that was only mentioned in the last few sentences of the Decision

1. This is about the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In its Ratio, the Court held that these two are

married so let’s settle with that, that Guillermo and Josefa are legally married. This is important because this is one of the determining factors of who their legal heirs are (yeah, memoirs of Mison)

2. Now, here is the family tree:

1st partnership 2nd partnership Ramon not legally married Felisa not legally married Lucio

Luis

Guillermo legally married Josefa Five other siblings: Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio

Illegitimate child of Ampun-ampunan (not legally adopted by the couple): Guillermina and Nanie Guillermo with one Amparo: Guillerma

3. From this point on, refer to the tree above in case of confusion. Let us discuss the antecedent proceedings:

a) On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of the “spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia” with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. This petition was opposed by:

the sisters of Guillermo: Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz

the heirs of Guillermo’s late brother, Roman Rustia, Sr.




the ampun-ampunan Guillermina b) The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa

Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado

But later it will be settled that Ramon and Felisa were not legally married so let’s settle that now – Luisa and the other claimants are also illegitimate children and so not barred by Art. 992 of the Civil Code to inherit from Josefa since they’re all illegitimate children anyway

c) In November of 1975, Guillerma filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted

d) On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of evidence

e) Carlota later substituted her sister, Luisa, in 1988 because Luisa died already. And in 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota as administratrix of both the estates of Guillermo and Josefa

f) Much later, after some procedural bumps (not really important), the CA held, among others, that the letters of administration of the intestate estate of Guillermo in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the requisite bond (P500,000)

Issue: Who here is entitled to letters of administration AND will the appointment of a co-administrator violate the Rules of Court as to the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator? Held: Appointment of co-administrator allowed. As to who should be the administrator, check Ratio

Ratio: 1. An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the

intestate estate of the decedent 2. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of

preference in the appointment of an administrator: Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select

3. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is

the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed 4. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-

administrators, especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation that obviously exists here!

So the SC eventually appointed as joint administrators Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa and Guillermo, respectively




In the Matter of the Intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay v. Isabel

Cojuangco Suntay (1/16/2010) D: In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is

the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators,

especially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation

which obtains here Facts:

10. On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico

11. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay

12. Emillio III (petitioner) is an illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico but he was reared by the spouse since he was a baby and was later on acknowledged as a natural child of Emilio I (son of Federico) (Later, the fact also stated that Federico himself legally adopted Emilio III)

13. While respondent in this case is a legitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico as she was born when Emilio I legally married

14. On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for the intestate estate of Cristina alleging among others that she was a legitimate granddaughter of Cristina

15. Federico then filed his opposition alleging preference over administering the estate of Cristina being the surviving spouse and that the list of heirs of respondent was incomplete as it did not include Emilio III

16. After a failed attempt of the parties to settle amicably, Federico filed a manifestation nominationg his adopted son, Emilio IIII as administrator of Cristina’s estate on his behalf

17. RTC rendered a decision appointing petitioner Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate

18. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and revoked the letters of administration issued to petitioner. Petitioner’s MR having been denied, he appealed to SC by certiorari

Issue: Who between petitioner and respondent is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate Held: Both. They were appointed as co-administrators of the decedent’s intestate estate Ratio:

8. CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the decedent’s estate. As Federico’s adopted son, Emilio III’s interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even declared that “under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership.”

9. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; (b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.




10. However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on

the attendant facts and circumstances of each case 11. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies

in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother’s, Cristina’s, estate

12. In Uy v. CA, SC upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedent’s son and the decedent’s brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent’s estate

13. In the same vain, the case of Delgado Vda dela Rosa v. Heirs of Vda de Damina held that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

14. According to SC, since the subject SC calls to the succession other putative heirs, (other grandchildren of Cristina and Federico)and considering the conflicting claims of such heirs, the SC was impelled to move in joint administration of the estate of Cristina

Note: I did not include the discussion relating to Art 992 of CC since it’s a Succession issue and not a SpecPro issue.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; restriction on the powers

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon (06/08/2006)

Ponente: Austria-Martinez

DOCTRINE: Anchata’s omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC

Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

FACTS:

1. Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years.

2. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). 3. On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she

bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.

4. The will was admitted to probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment.

5. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.

6. In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

7. On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of Rizal

8. As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property) (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97 (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5

9. On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his




rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.

10. The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

11. Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.

12. On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.

13. Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.

14. The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988.

15. The trial court also issued an Order directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.

16. Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in the other Special proceedings also filed a project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children.

17. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy." Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.

18. The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition and disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.

19. CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s orders

ISSUE: Whether the Petioner Ancheta did not commit fraud, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in the performance of his duties as ancillary administrator of Audrey o’Neil Guersey’s estate in the Philippines. HELD: NO RATIO:

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.

A party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have




distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.

Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will

was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law,

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign law in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law . In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.




Specpro digests

Documents

ernesto guevara

victorino guevara

rosario guevara

fact ernesto

large parcel of land

death of victorino

legitimate son ernesto

deceased victorino