Specific Projects for Peacebuilding, Reconciliation and Justice in N. Uganda

Conflict and Conflict and Peacebuilding in Peacebuilding in Northern UgandaNorthern Uganda

Dennis Martins OKWIRDennis Martins OKWIRProgramme ManagerProgramme Manager

Empowering Hands – UgandaEmpowering Hands – UgandaMobile: +256(0)777488377Mobile: +256(0)777488377

Email: Email: [email protected]

1. Reception and psychosocial support

• Started in 1994 (GUSCO and World Vision) due to massive return of LRA abductees

• Child Protection Unit (CPU) by the UPDF and Save the Children – Denmark

• KICWA in Kitgum and Rachelle Rehab Center in LiraHow?• Basically reception centers• Data collection and storage• Medical attention• Trauma counseling• Vocational trainings • Family tracing and reunions• CPU was used to gather intelligence in disguise

of counseling

Reception and PSS Continued...

Any Flaws?• The CPU seems to have deepened trauma, as opposed to addressing it (intelligence data collection)

• Unskilled personnel at the reception centers

• Methods used never took care of individual needs

• Families and communities were not well prepared to receive their returnee children

• Inadequate follow – up of returnees to communities of reunion

• Many returnees were able to elude the reception centers and hence went straight home without PSS

2. Livelihood and economic empowerment

• This was taken up by most NGOs and GoU• Trainings in vocational skills (tailoring, brick laying & concrete practice, and carpentry)

• Revolving loan schemes, especially for women groups for business start ups

• NUSAF I and II• Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda

• Saving and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS)

Livelihood and economic empowerment continued...

What could have been done better?• Restricted scope of choices for vocational training

• Group livelihood and economic empowerment disempowered the individual

• GoU interventions were and are rife with corruption and politicization (scope of Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP))

• Proliferation of microcredit companies without proper regulation

• Rampant recurrences of trauma to date• EHU livelihood model example…

3. Dialogue and reconciliation

• Interfaith – Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI)

• Traditional leaders campaigned for forgiveness and reconciliation based of traditional ideals (Mato Oput, Kayo Cuk, Iluc etc)

• Most I-NGOs were/are involved in capacity building of local NGOs and communities on dialogue and reconciliation

• Most local NGOs are engaged in community dialogue processes

• Media role – local FM radio stations (“Dwog Paco” radio programs)

Dialogue and reconciliation continued...

Opportunities for improvements?• Limited consensus and teamwork among actors in the sector

• Ethical issues with actors, eg ARLPI – “mutants” – forgiveness

• Forgiveness was at rhetorical levels rather than at community level

4. Reintegration of returnees into communities

• Most actors were involved in this – NGOs, traditional leaders, interfaith, communities, government, (national and local) etc

• Mobilization campaigns – open air, radio stations etc

• Traditional leaders handled Mato Oput, and traditional cleansing ceremonies

• Organizations supported the formation of community based structures to support reintegration of rerurnees

• Most recipient families were supported with basic household items and food rations at the initial stage of reintegration

Reintegration of returnees into communities continued...

Any mistakes?• Stigmatization, isolation and abuse of ex –

combatants continued• Ethical concerns about Dwog Paco radio program• Interventions were rife with duplication due

to inadequate coordination• Programs are seen by affected communities to

be rewarding perpetuators and neglecting victims, eg “mutant” in Atiak sub - county

• Land loss by many returnees in Acholi sub – region most manifest to date

• Unaccompanied children and children born in captivity

• Marriage/ relationships challenges of returnee child mother

5. Amnesty (Amnesty Act – 2000)

• This came as a result of the failure of military interventions and pressure on GoU from traditional leaders and religious leaders (ARLPI)

• ““Amnesty” means a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution or any other form of punishment by the State”

• Targets combatants, returnees, collaborators etc

• Resettlement package (money and personal effects)

Amnesty continued...

Any concerns?• Conflicted with popular interest of the subalterns for justice and accountability

• Package created power imbalance in families and triggered intra – family conflicts

• Parallel application with the ICD now is a major concern/ contradiction

• Selective application of amnesty, looking at Thomas Kwoyelo’s trial, while leaving other rebel commanders seen to be more senior to go scot - free

• It’s being given to children who are actually victims and not perpetuators.

6. GoU – LRA peace talks process (Juba Peace Talks)

• Started in 1993/4 – “The Bigombe Talks”, which failed

• 2004 – GoU referred the LRA to the ICC• 2005 – ICC issued arrest warrants against LRA top

commanders (Joseph KONY, Vincent OTTI, Okot ODHIAMBO, Dominic ONGWEN and Raska LUKWIYA)

• 2006 – Juba Peace Talks commences, due to military pressure and the ICC arrest warrants, plus local and international pressure on GoU for dialogue

• All agenda items (cessation of hostilities, accountability and reconciliation, permanent ceasefire, and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration were signed in 2008, except the final Comprehensive Peace Agreement

• Process had great support from the affected communities in the greater north

• See JRP’s website (www.justiceandreconciliation.com) for details

Juba Peace Talks continued...

Any challenges?• The ICC arrest warrants/ indictment, while it

partly led the LRA to the negotiating table, later dampened their spirits of negotiation

• Consolidating cantonment of LRA fighters to designated areas was a major challenge due to LRA’s legitimate security concerns the were not addressed

• Consolidating the ceasefire agreement was a challenge as there were many armed groups who were not parties to the negotiation and hence were not bound by agreements of the process

• The role of “spoilers” (collaborators, supporters, conflict entrepreneurs)

7. Justice and accountability

• The International criminal Court (ICC) involvement

• International Crimes Division (ICD) of the High Court of Uganda

• The “traditional justice mechanisms”• Many NGOs involved in access to justice programs by way of awareness creation, referrals, legal representations, legal aid clinics

• The drive for reparations and truth telling (Uganda Reparations Coalition)

• Uganda Victims Foundation (UVF) brining out the voice of victims in northern Uganda

Justice and accountability continued...

• Any concerns?• The ICC arrest warrants received mixed reactions at home in northern Uganda – the issue was politicized

• The ICC failed to exhibit neutrality – seemed to have been directed towards LRAs, eg investigations turned a blind eye to crimes committed by state actors

• The ICD is also preoccupied with exonerating state perpetuators

• To date there is no legal framework for reparations

• Most local NGOs working in areas of justice have limited skills in the thematic area

8. Research ...A few organizations are involved in research

• UN bodies• JRP• RLP• Gulu University (IPSS)• Federation of Uganda Female Lawyers (FIDA)• Inquest Center for Humanitarian Studies (ICHS)Any issues?o Findings not always widely disseminated, especially to actors and even affected communities

o Skills gap(s)o Ethical concerns about most researchers, especially concerning respondents handling

The End...

Thank You…

Dennis Martins OKWIR+256 (0) 777 488 377

[email protected]