Specialization and Exchange. What is the economic problem in the Robinson Crusoe story? ▪ Before Friday comes in? ♦Optimization Robbins: allocating.

Specialization and Exchange

What is the economic problem in the Robinson Crusoe story?

▪ Before Friday comes in? ♦ Optimization Robbins: allocating scarce

recourses…: what to produce, how, for whom?

▪ After Friday comes in? ♦ Hayek: information: transmission + discovery♦ Coase: transaction costs

• Coordination

• Motivation

On the nature of the economic problem

▪ Reach specialization advantages (Smith’s “division of labor”)♦ Comparative advantage higher productivity

• Origin: previous investment

• Ambiguity of purpose: e.g., mafia

▪ Obstacle: “transaction” (i.e., exchange) costs♦ Coordination information♦ Incentive alignment information asymmetry

(aside) Promises as objects of exchange Information asymmetry cheating

How to cope with it?

▪ Mistake: to take as a default the sequence self-interest opportunism “safeguarding”

▪ Need of a broader view instead:♦ Safeguarding = “farsighted contracting” à la Williamson♦ Screening types when previous commitment is viable♦ Providing cooperative starting points motivate employees to

start cooperating♦ “Educating” to mold types, viable at least at social (including

firm) level

Solutions to the economic problem

▪ Politics♦ Coercion♦ Centralization♦ Representative decisions

by agents♦ Weighting of information

according to voting rights

▪ Markets♦ Voluntary♦ Decentralization♦ Direct decisions by

owners♦ Weighting of information

according to individuals’ participation in the market

“Market” = Price System + Market institutions

▪ Price system = Microeconomic abstraction♦ Calculating machine allocation of resources

▪ Information processing♦ Prices have nice properties as signals: minimal,

selective & relevant information ♦ Information has to be discovered

▪ Market institutions, at least:♦ Property rights, both allocation & enforcement

incentives♦ Law & independent judiciary transaction costs

Combining markets & politics

▪ Political failures♦ Break b/w individual and social optimality

• Use of violence• Inevitable agency• Public goods (e.g., poor weighting of info)• Monopolies (parties, barriers to entry)• Herding (e.g., formation of beliefs, emotional reactions)

♦ Rationality (how do we take sides in politics?)

▪ Market failures♦ Break b/w individual and social optimality

• Externalities (pollution)• Public goods (army)• Monopolies (utility)• Herding (e.g., speculative bubble)

♦ Rationality no even individual optimum (children)

Combining markets & politics: The Coase Theorem

▪ If transaction costs are zero, initial allocation of rights does not affect ♦ final allocation of resources or ♦ production level

▪ Example: Noisy firm causes externality on neighbors ♦ With positive transaction costs may affect both political

decisions should focus on reducing transaction costs by • Clarifying allocation of property rights (who has right to what) and

• Securing their enforcement (no expropriation)

Coase theorem example*

Initial allocation of

rights

Profit for firm

Loss for neigh-bors

Firm’s decisionCompen-sation, C

Final allocation of rights

Neighbors 40 60 Closes to avoid paying compensation 60 > 40

0 Neighbors

Firm 40 60 Closes because neighbors would compensate

40 < C< 60 Neighbors

Neighbors 60 40 Continues after compensating the neighbors

40 ** Firm

Firm 60 40 Continues 0 Firm

* Costs and benefits in current values** Assuming that the legal system considers damages as an upper limit of compensation

The Fable of the Bees

▪ Pollination as an externality

▪ Contracting bees for pollination ♦ Visit http://www.beepollination.com/

• “We provide services to California. Almond   growers by locating strong, healthy  beehives   for almond pollination.

• We also provide services to Beekeepers by  locating suitable almond contracts for their  particular bee business.”

♦ See a simple pollination agreement at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/AA169:

• “The beekeeper shall supply the grower with _______ hives (colonies) of bees to be delivered to the (cucumber, watermelon field, etc.) as follows: ....”

Sources of transaction costs

▪ Unclear allocation of property rights♦ Commons and anti-commons problems♦ Land titling: why are mortgages impossible in most countries?

▪ Number of parties Solution: legal fictions ♦ E.g. firms as “nexus of contracts”

▪ Restrictions on trade♦ Wealth constraints♦ Endowment effect

• Example: few reallocating agreements after litigation

• Biological rationale behind possessory instinct

♦ Artificial• Licenses for taxis, pharmacies, musicians, TVs, etc.

The lighthouse in Economics

▪ Public goods market underprovision♦ No rivalry b/w users♦ Impossible to exclude users♦ e.g., defense♦ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_good

▪ Empirical evidence on lighthouses♦ Coase art.: exclusion “club” good: private building and

operation of lighthouses♦ Marginal cost = 0

• “Inefficient” if price > 0?

• “Inefficient” with respect to what? Need to compare real options

The “tragedy of the commons”

▪ Unrestricted access to a resource leading to over-exploitation

▪ Reason: individual benefits, social costs

▪ Examples: fishing grounds, air pollution, road congestion, etc.

▪ Solutions: ♦ exclusion (private or communal property) & trade♦ regulation

▪ Exercise ♦ Visit www.perc.org on the interaction of politics and markets in

solving environmental problems

“Anticommons”

▪ Too many restrictions to access a resource leads to underutilization

▪ Misleading analysis: ♦ The problem is not too many “property” rights but♦ High costs of gathering the “consent” of

rightholders• The case of mortgages …

Why are mortgages irrelevant* in most countries?

(* i.e., they hardly reduce default risk & interest rates)

▪ Property right based on consent ♦ Consent Enforcement♦ Survival of property right Transaction costs

▪ Need institutions and organizations to reduce the cost of “gathering consents”: Titling: ♦ Publicity rule: priority of property rights on the

basis of the date of publicity , not private contract♦ Public registers to facilitate information on rights♦ Works on this topic

Needed: empirical comparative analysis

▪ Do not see neither the State nor the market as ideal solutions

▪ Starting point: use consistent assumptions about human beings in private & public spheres♦ i.e., avoid this common mistake:

• Selfishness of market participants leads to market failure

• Solution: public regulation that often assumes …. altruistic regulators and silly regulated

▪ Markets and Politics not only fail—they also interact: ♦ Can we use politics to get more efficient markets? ♦ Can we use markets to get more efficient politics?

2008 Crisis

▪ Market of political causes?

▪ Mixed nature of financial markets♦ Monopoly of money♦ Role of central banks

• Banker of last resort

• Price fixing: interest rate– Example: in a bubble, interest kept too low (Spain, -3%) How does

this distort lending decisions?

♦ Mortgage market: • subprime lending partly mandated by law in the US, to the extent

lenders had to grant % of loans to people below average income

• Everywhere, home buying was subsidized by Governments

Case on regulation: Stores’ opening hours

▪ Possible market failures♦ Externalities?♦ Monopoly?♦ Public goods?♦ Rationality?

▪ Possible political failures♦ Preferences’ transmission?♦ Regulatory capture? Who benefits?♦ ???

Organization as solution to economic problem: The nature of the firm

▪ Why do organizations (firms) exist?

▪ Minimization of transaction costs♦ There are not market failures but business

opportunities—e.g. Carmax♦ Other ‘explanations’ do not explain—e.g.,

economies of scale can be contracted• example: trucking: intermediaries reach economies of

scale and network, specially with respect to returns, but they contract in the market with owner-operator

♦ But within-firm exchanges also suffer transaction costs …

Transaction costs are present in both organizations and markets

▪ A familiar example: ♦ Babysitting by older child or by hired person different

exchange (coordination and motivation) costs are present in each solution, but both are positive in both cases

▪ “Make or buy” decisions in a firm:

x

P

Pf0

Po0

x0

Performance and organizational choice:For each level of x, firms choose the organizational form that optimizes performance. In principle, only these optimal choices are observed—for instance, vertically integrated units when x > xo.

Firm A

Individual XFirm B

Manager Z Government

Individual Y Individual M

Firms as nexus of contracts

The nexus is not merely “contractual”Source: Arruñada, B., Foundation of Impersonal Exchange, Univ. of Chicago Press, forthcoming.

Example: The market for “lemons”

Contract b/w principal P &

agent AEx ante

Judicial decision

Ex post

Contract b/w principal P &

agent AEx ante

Judicial decision

Ex post

Contract b/w principal P &

agent AEx ante

Judicial decision

Ex post

Originative contract b/w

Er & EEx ante

Subsequent contract b/w

E & B

Judicial decision

Ex post

Employee sells car to B

Originative contract b/w

P & AEx ante

Subsequent contract b/w

A & T

Judicial decision

Ex post

Originative contract b/w

B1 & OEx ante

Subsequent contract b/w

O & B2

Judicial decision

Ex post

Double sale of land

Originative contract b/w

LP & GPEx ante

Subsequent contract b/w

GP & CC

Judicial decision

Ex post

Borrowing by a hidden LLP

Originative contract b/w P1 … Pn & M

Ex ante

Subsequent contract b/w

M & Pn+j

Judicial decision

Ex post

Sale of new shares

Originative contract b/w P1 … Pn & M

Ex ante

Subsequent contract b/w

M & T

Judicial decision

Ex post

Representation

Problem

▪ Secure property rights not enough♦ Growth requires investment

• Secure rights: enforcement property rule: consent

♦ Good allocation of resources • Transferable rights: low transaction costs liability rule

♦ Specialization delegation• Multiple rights: many people on each asset

▪ Property (real, in rem) rights: good enforcement but high transaction costs if multiple rights

Solution: Voluntary and verifiable dilution of property rights

▪ “Contract” rule: protected by consent: e.g., Merchant Law♦ Ruling in favor of the uninformed party (the acquirer) makes the

information asymmetry irrelevant

▪ “Property” rule: requiring publicity: e.g., real property♦ Publicity makes the information asymmetry manageable♦ Registration makes the information asymmetry irrelevant

▪ Preserving the role of consent keeps the enforcement advantage of property rights ♦ Consent in choosing agent♦ Consent in property rule

▪ Ensuring commitment and publicity by independent intervention ex ante. This:♦ Avoids opportunistic choice of rules ex post by P♦ Obviates information asymmetry to T

Originative contract b/w

P & AEx ante

Subsequent contract b/w

A & T

Judicial decision

Ex post

Originative contract b/w

P & AEx ante

Subsequent contract b/w

A & T

Judicial decision

Ex post

Judges apply market-enabling “contract” rules

when adjudicating subsequent contracts,

protecting innocent third parties

Originative contract b/w

P & AEx ante

Subsequent contract b/w

A & T

Judicial decision

Ex post

+

Automatic contract publicity

OR

“Formalized” publicity

Market-enabling rules used when adjudicating the

subsequent contract

Objectives of the firm

▪ Individuals have objectives—firms do not♦ Firms (as well as markets) just “behave” as a consequence of

individual decisions pursuing these objectives♦ They reach equilibriums, more like markets than individuals

▪ Profit maximization♦ Also an abstraction, an analytical tool♦ Profit maximization as a competitive constraint, not an objective

• Competition only firms with adaptive decisions will prosper and survive

• Competition also in political market (e.g. subsidies)

▪ Consequences for strategic management: ♦ normative: what “the firm” should do?♦ positive: why the firm is behaving in a certain way?♦ Are firms “rational”? Do they commit suicide? Why?

Boundaries of the firm

▪ The concept of “boundary” in firms and markets♦ Market’s boundaries? Useful to study the

economy♦ Firm’s boundaries? Useful to study the market

▪ Cases♦ McDonald’s♦ Trucking & construction♦ Resale price maintenance♦ ‘Pampered for free’:

• Firms are not necessarily the relevant competitive unit for competition policy? (see below)

Pampered for free

C O N S U M E R S

HOSPITALSD I S T R I B U I TORS

Other Cos., mostly without own brand

TVAUSONIA

INDAS

ARBORA

¿Is zero pricing predatory?

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