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University of Cebu
College of Law
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
ATTENTION EVERYONE:
ASSIGNMENT for TUESDAY
(January 6, 2015)
A.Cases for Rule 76
1. Leviste v. CA, G.R. No. L-29184, January
30, 1989 (169 SCRA 580)
G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989
BENEDICTO LEVISTE,petitioner,
vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE LUIS B.
REYES, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE
GUZMAN-MARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON
R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and
ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN,respondents.Benedicto Leviste for and in his own behalf.
Gatchalian, Ignacio & Associates for respondents de
Guzman.
GRIO-AQUINO,J.:
The issue in this case is whether or not an attorney whowas engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to
collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's
refusal to appeal the decision of the trial court.
On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing
attorney, entered into a written agreement with the
private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her
counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of
the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of
real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was
bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that
petitioner's contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent
(35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the
probate of the will (Annex "A", p. 59, Rollo).In accordance with their agreement, Leviste performed
the following services as Del Rosario's counsel:
(1) Thoroughly researched and studied
the law on probate and succession;
(2) Looked for and interviewed
witnesses, and took their affidavits;
(3) Filed the petition for. probate is
Special Proceeding No. 58325;
(4) Made the proper publications;
(5) Presented at the trial the following
witnesses:
a) Eleuterio de Jesus
b) Lucita de Jesus
c) Purita L. Llanes
d) Rita Banu
e) Jesus Lulod.
On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms.
Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his
services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This
consisted, according to the letter, in petitioner's moral
obligation to protect the interest of his brother-in-law,
Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other
parties in the probate proceeding intended to eject as
lessee of the property which was bequeathed to Del
Rosario under the will (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo).
On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to
Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional
Services." (Annex "B", p. 60, Rollo.)
In an order dated November 12, 1965 the trial court
denied his motion on the ground that he had "not filed a
claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien."
(p. 3, Rollo.)
On November 23, 1965, petitioner filed a "FormalStatement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and Recording of
Attorney's Lien,' which was noted in the court's order of
December 20, 1965 (Annexes "D" and "E", pp. 63 & 64,
Rollo).
Although the order denying his motion to intervene had
become final, petitioner continued to receive copies of
the court's orders, as well the pleadings of the other
parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings.
The case was submitted for decision without the
respondents' evidence.
On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the
special administratrix-legatee, filed a "Motion To
Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosariowaived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed
that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed
her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties
left by the decedent. (Annex "F", p. 65, Rollo.)
In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the
motion to withdraw the petition for being contrary to
public policy (Annex "G", pp. 66-67, Rollo).
Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed
the will, holding that the legal requirements for its
validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified
that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the
handwriting of Maxima Reselva.
The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and
record on appeal. The private respondents filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was
not a party in interest.
The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal,
claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the
decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be
substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former
client, Ms. Del Rosario.
On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal
and denied petitioner's motion for substitution.
The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition
formandamus(CA-G.R. No. 41248) praying that the trialcourt be ordered to give due course to his appeal and to
grant his motion for substitution.
On May 22, 1968, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for being insufficient in form and substance as
the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to
appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325
(Annex 1, p. 77, Rollo).
Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed by certiorari to this Court, assigning
the following errors against the Court of Appeals'
resolution:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding
that the petitioner appears not to be theproper party to appeal the decision in
Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
2. Assuming the petitioner's right of
appeal is doubtful, the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing his petition for
mandamus; and
3. The Court of Appeals erred in not
reversing the decision in Sp. Proc. No.
58325 denying the probate of the
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March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things,
that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paraaque,
Rizal, and died without leaving a will and
praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as
Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on
March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court forthe probation of the will delivered by them on
March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties
that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paraaque, Rizal;
that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church
of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to
the time of his death in 1963; that he was
buried in Paraaque, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and
Bulacan.
The movants contend that since the intestate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963
while the petition for probate was filed in theCourt of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M.
on the same date, the latter Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate,
citing as authority in support thereof the case
ofOngsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja,
G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.
The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the
other hand, take the stand that the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery by them of the will to
the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that
the case in this Court therefore has precedence
over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
The Court of First Instance, as previously stated denied
the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of
a few hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference
over the other; that, as early as March 7, movants were
aware of the existence of the purported will of Father
Rodriguez, deposited in the Court of Bulacan, since they
filed a petition to examine the same, and that movants
clearly filed the intestate proceedings in Rizal "for no
other purpose than to prevent this Court (of Bulacan)
from exercising jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings". Reconsideration having been denied,
movants, now petitioners, came to this Court, relyingprincipally on Rule 73, section 1 of the Rules of Court,
and invoking our ruling inOngsingco vs. Tan and De
Borja, L-7792, July 27, 1955.
SECTION 1.Where estate of deceased persons
settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any
province which he had estate. The court firsttaking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, as far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
We find this recourse to be untenable. The jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested
upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father
Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon the will
being deposited the court could,motu proprio, have
taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,
and issued the corresponding notices conformably to
what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised
Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):SEC. 3.Court to appoint time for proving
will.Notice thereof to be published. When a
will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance
of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction,
such Court shall fix a time and place for proving
the will when all concerned may appear to
contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause
notice of such time and place to be published
three (3) weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.
But no newspaper publication shall be made
where the petition for probate has been filed bythe testator himself.
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is
delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the
mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if
no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the
petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will,
the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when
the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr.
Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of
Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only
on March 12, eight days later, the precedence and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court is
incontestable.1wph1.t
But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old
Rule 77) speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court
having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan
court did not have it because the decedent was domiciled
in Rizal province. We can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's
33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy,
Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and consider
that he retained throughout someanimus revertendito
the place of his birth in Paraaque, Rizal, that detail
would not imply that the Bulacan court lackedjurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to
settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all
courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator
only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the
Court (In reKaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73
Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676). Neither
party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or
that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of
Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex
"H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case
before us.
In theKaw Singcocase (ante) this Court ruled that:
"... If we consider such question of residence asone affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that
the whole proceedings including all decisions on
the different incidents which have arisen in
court will have to be annulled and the same case
will have to be commenced anew before another
court of the same rank in another province. That
this is of mischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require
comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co.,
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26 May 1964, in accord with the latters prior decision in
Fernandez, etc., Et. Al. v. Maravilla, L-18799, 31 March
1964, 1 which settled the question of appellate
jurisdiction in favor of the Supreme Court over that of
the Court of Appeals, on the appeal from the
appointment of a special co-administrator in the same
Special Proceeding No. 4977 in view of the value of the
estate.
Appellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner andhusband of the decedent, died on 16 July 1966, after the
case was submitted for decision. Upon motion for
intervention filed by Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and
Rose Mary Kohlhaas, this Supreme Court allowed their
intervention on 24 July 1967, upon showing that their
interest as substitute heirs was vested definitely upon
the death of Herminio Maravilla, and that said movants
for intervention merely adopt the pleadings and briefs
filed in behalf of the deceased Herminio Maravilla so that
the intervention will not delay the disposition of the
case. 2
Appellees Pedro, 3 Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed"Maravilla," who are allegedly the brother and sisters of
the deceased Digna Maravilla and oppositors to the
probate, had moved to require the P. C. Laboratory to
submit explanations of the photographs of the will and
the signatures thereon previously filed, 4 but this Court,
considering that such explanation would amount to new
evidence not heard at the trial, denied the motion on 3
August 1967. 5
Herminio Maravillas petition for probate was opposed by
the appellees in an amended opposition filed in the
course of the trial in the court below and admitted
without objection. The opposition alleged the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged
testatrix and the instrumental witnesses did not sign the
alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the presence
of each other;
"b) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, the alleged
testatrix, affixed her signature to her alleged will under
undue and improper pressure and influence and/or
duress brought to bear upon her by the petitioner, for his
own personal benefit and advantage and that of hisnieces, Adelina Sajo and Rose Marie Kohlhaas and his
half-sister Conchita Maravilla Kohlhaas;
"c) That the deceased, Digna Maravilla, at the time she
affixed her signature to her alleged will was not of sound
and disposing mind;
"d) That the alleged will, now being offered for probate
had already been revoked by the deceased, Digna
Maravilla." 6
After trial, the court below rendered judgment, holding
as unsubstantiated the last three (3) grounds above-enumerated, but sustaining the first, that is, that the
will was not executed in accordance with Section 618 of
Act 190, and, therefore, denied the probate of the will.
The petitioner and one Adelina Sajro, who was named a
devisee under the questioned will, appealed the
judgment, as aforesaid, assigning errors of fact and law.
The oppositors-appellees did not appeal but counter-
assigned errors their brief.
There is no controversy that the late Digna Maravilla
died in Manapla, Negros Occidental, on 12 August 1958,
leaving an extensive estate. Prior to her death, she was a
resident of Saravia, same province. It is, likewise,
undisputed that, at the time of the probate proceedings,
only one (1) (Aquilino Mansueto) of the three (3) attesting
witnesses to the will had survived, the two (2) others
(Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) having died
previously.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "A," which is
typewritten in the Spanish language, purports to have
been executed in Manila on the 7th day of October,
1944; it consists of five (5) pages, including the page on
which the attestation clause was completed. The
purported signatures of the testatrix appear at the
logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin
of all the other pages. The attestation clause reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"CLAUSULA DE ATESTIGUAMIENTO
"Nosotros, TIMOTEO HERNAEZ, AQUILINO MANSUETOy MARIANO BUENAFLOR los abajo firmantes todos
mayores de edad y sin impedimento alguno para ser
testigo de este testamento, certificamos y atestiguamos:
Que en la fecha y lugar arriba mencionados Da. DIGNA
MARAVILLA ha otorgado el presente documento como su
testamento y ultima voluntad que consta de cinco
paginas utiles incluyendo esta pagina de
atestiguamiento, escrito a maquinilla en una sola cara
de cada hoja, todas paginadas correlativamente en letras
de puo y letra de la testadora, habiendo dicha
testadora, despues de leido el mismo en nuestra
presencia, firmado por triplicado al pie de este
testamento y al margen izquierdo de cada una de las
cinco paginas de que se compone en presencia de todos
y cada uno de nosotros que tambien firmamos en el
margen izquierdo de cada pagina y al pie de este
atestiguamiento los unos en presencia de los otros y
todos en presencia de lo testadora, quien en el acto del
otorgamiento y firma de este documento se halla en
plena capacidad intelectual, amenazada ni enganada par
otorgar y firmar este testamento.
"Asi lo atestiguamos y firmamos por triplicado de
nuestro puo y letra en Manila hoy a siete de Octubre de
mil novecientos cuarenta y cuatro."cralaw virtua1awlibrary
At the bottom thereof appear the purported signatures of
Timoteo Hernaez, Aquilino Mansueto and Mariano
Buenaflor, attesting witnesses. Their signatures appear
also on the left margin of all the five (5) pages. The
paging of the will is by handwritten words, such as
"Pagina Primera," "Pagina Segunda," etc., written at the
top of each page. On the lower half of the third page,
before the name "CONCEPCION P. MARAVILLA," is the
typewritten word "hermana," which was crossed out, and
over it was handwritten the word "cuada," bearing, at
the left hereof, the initials "D. M."cralaw virtua1awlibrary
After the legacies in favor of herein appellant Adelina
Sajo, a niece of Digna Maravilla, the latters sister-in-law,
Concepcion P. Maravilla de Kohlhaas, and Concepcions
daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, the will named appellant
Herminio Maravilla as universal heir and executor. In
case of the heirs death, or if he should not become heir
for any reason, he is to be substituted by the legatee
Adelina Sajo in one-half of the properties bequeathed,
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the other half to pass collectively to legatees Concepcion
P. Maravilla and the daughter of the latter, Rose Mary
Kohlhaas. All previous wills are declared revoked.
In view of the trial courts decision of 8 February 1960
(Record on Appeal, pages 25-51) refusing probate of the
will, the instituted heir, Herminio Maravilla, and the
legatee, Adelina Sajo, perfected their appeal, assigning as
errors the findings of the trial court that (a)
instrumental witness Aquilino Mansueto did not actuallysee Digna Maravilla sign the will; (b) that Digna
Maravilla was not present when Mansueto signed the will
as witness; (c) that Mansueto "most probably" did not
see Mariano Buenaflor sign as witness to the will; (d) the
testimony of attorney Manuel Villanueva on the due
execution of Digna Maravillas testament was biased and
not deserving of credit; and (e) in refusing probate to the
alleged will for not having been executed with the
requisites prescribed by Section 618 of Act 190.
At the hearing before the court a quo, only one of the
three instrumental witnesses, Col. (ret.) Aquilino
Mansueto, appeared and testified, inasmuch as the othertwo witnesses (Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor)
concededly died prior to the trial of the case. Col.
Mansueto identified his own signature and those of Dr.
Timoteo Hernaez and of Digna Maravilla, and asserted
that the latter did sign in the presence of all three
witnesses and attorney Villanueva; 7 that Hernaez
signed in his presence and in the presence of the other
witnesses and of Digna Maravilla and that present at the
signing were "Dr. Timoteo Hernaez, Mr. Mariano
Buenaflor, attorney Manuel Villanueva and both
Herminio Maravilla and Mrs. Digna Maravilla, (the
testatrix) and identified his signature and those of Digna
and Hernaez 8 although, subsequently, the witness
admitted that he could not remember very well whether
Mr. Maravilla was there at the time he signed the will.
The witness explained that he could not remember some
details because fourteen years had elapsed, and when he
signed as a witness, he did not give it any importance
and because of the time he (Col. Mansueto) was very
worried because of rumours that the Japanese
Kempeitai would arrest officers of the USAFFE who did
not want to collaborate. 9
Colonel Mansuetos testimony was supported by that of
the husband of the testatrix, Herminio Maravilla, and ofattorney Manuel Villanueva. Herminio Maravillas
evidence is that a week before 7 October 1944 his wife,
Digna Maravilla, told him of her desire to "renew" her will
because of the critical period in Manila before the
liberation; 10 he invited Buenaflor, Hernaez and
Mansueto to attest to the will; 11 sent his messenger,
Mariano Buenaflor, to ask attorney Manuel Villanueva to
come to his house at Mabini, Ermita, Manila, in order to
prepare the will; 12 at his wifes request, he gave the list
of properties to Villanueva; 13 he knew that the will was
executed in the dining room while he remained in the
sala; 14 and Villanueva, Mansueto, Hernaez and
Buenaflor were in his house in the morning of 7 October1944 and sat with his wife around the table in the
dining room, with Villanueva at one end, Digna beside
him and the witnesses facing each other; 15 and after
the signing they had lunch, at his invitation, and when
they were eating, petitioner Maravilla saw the three (3)
copies of the will on the dining table. 16 However, he did
not see there sign. 17
Attorney Manuel Villanueva, as third witness for the
proponent asserted that he had been the lawyer of the
Maravillas; that 5 or 6 days before 7 October 1944 he
had been summoned through Mariano Buenaflor to the
house of the Maravillas at 222 Mabini, Ermita, Manila,
and there met Digna who requested him to draft a new
will, revoking her old one, to include as additional
beneficiaries Adelina Sajo, Concepcion Maravilla, and
the latters youngest daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, who
lived with her (Digna) and whom she considered as her
real children, having cared for them since childhood.
Digna gave Villanueva instructions concerning the will,and handed him her old will and a handwritten list of
the certificates of title of her properties, which list she
asked and obtained from her husband. Before leaving,
Villanueva asked Digna to look for three witnesses; their
names were furnished him two or three days later and
he sent word that the will could be executed on 7
October 1944 (as it actually was); on that day he brought
one original and 2 copies with him, and handed them to
Digna; she read the document and while doing so the
witnesses Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor came.
Villanueva talked with them and satisfied himself that
they were competent, whereupon all proceeded to the
dining room table. Attorney Villanueva sat at the headthereof, Digna at his right, and Hernaez at the right of
Digna; at his left was first Mansueto and then Buenaflor.
At the lawyers behest Digna Maravilla read the will in
the presence of the witnesses; after reading she called
his attention to a clerical error on page 3, at the second
to the last line of paragraph 9, where Concepcion
Maravilla was designated as "hermana" ; the word was
cancelled by the testatrix who wrote "cuada" above the
cancelled word, and placed her initials "D. M." beside it.
She also wrote on top of each page the words "Pagina
primera," "Pagina Segunda" and so on, upon Villanuevas
instructions, and then Digna and the witnesses signed
in the presence of one another and of attorney
Villanueva. 18 The latter did not ask the husband
(Herminio) to join the group when the will was executed,
and Herminio remained near the window in the sala. 19
Digna appeared to the witness very healthy and spoke in
Spanish intelligently. The signing ended around 12:30
p.m., and after it all ate lunch. 20
Upon the evidence, the trial judge concluded that
Mansueto did not actually see Digna Maravilla sign the
will in question, basing such conclusion upon the fact
that while Mansueto positively identified his own
signature ("I identify this as my signature") but not thatof the testatrix, his five answers to the questions of
counsel, in reference thereto, being "this must be the
signature of Mrs. Digna Maravilla."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In our opinion, the trial courts conclusion is far fetched,
fanciful and unwarranted. It was but natural that
witness Mansueto should be positive about his own
signature, since he was familiar with it. He had to be
less positive about Digna Maravillas signature since he
could not be closely acquainted with the same: for aught
the record shows, the signing of the will was the only
occasion he saw her sign; he had no opportunity tostudy her signature before or after the execution of
Exhibit "A." Furthermore, he witnessed Dignas signing
not less than fourteen years previously. To demand that
in identifying Dignas signature Mansueto should display
a positiveness equal to the certainty shown by him in
recognizing his own, exceeds the bounds of the
reasonable. The variation in the expressions used by the
witness is the best evidence that he was being candid
and careful, and it is a clear badge of truthfulness rather
than the reverse.
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The trial courts error gains no support from Mansuetos
statement on cross-examination that "I remember and (I)
signed the will in the presence of all the witnesses and in
the presence of attorney Villanueva" (page 29, Volume 1,
T.s.n., Amago). In the absence of an assurance that no
one else was present, this assertion does not really
contradict Mansuetos testimony in chief that "I have
read the entire document before I signed it in the
presence of the other witnesses, Digna Maravilla andAttorney Villanueva" (t.s.n., Amago, Volume 1, pages 18-
19). It is well to note that the cross examiner did not ask
Mansueto if no one else besides those mentioned by him
had seen him sign. Any contradiction inferred from both
statements is purely conjectural; it did not come from
the witness and is insufficient to impeach his veracity,
the difference in the answers being due to no more than
an accidental lapse of memory. A will may be allowed
even if some witnesses not remember having attested it,
if other evidence satisfactorily show due execution (V. Act
190, Section 632), and that failure of witness to identify
his signature does not bar probate. 21
That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together with
the testatrix and the lawyer, sat next to one another
around one table when the will was signed is clearly
established by the uncontradicted testimony of both
attorney Villanueva and Herminio Maravilla; and that
detail proves beyond doubt that each one of the parties
concerned did sign in the presence of all the others. It
should be remembered, in this connection, that the test
is not whether a witness did see the signing of the will
but whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do
so. 22
The trial court rejected the evidence of both Herminio
Maravilla and Manuel Villanueva, giving as a reason that
they were biased and interested in having the probate
succeed. The reasoning is not warranted: for Herminio
Maravilla certainly stood to gain more under the
previous will of his wife (Exhibit "G") where he was made
the sole beneficiary, As to attorney Villanueva, while he
had been a friend of Herminio from boyhood, he also had
been the family lawyer, and his intervention in the
execution of the will of one of his clients became
inevitable, for it is not to be expected that the testatrix
should call upon a stranger for the purpose. If
Villanueva wished to perjure in favor of Herminio, all heneeded was to color his testimony against the due
execution of the will (Exhibit "A") and not in favor
thereof, since, as previously observed, Dignas first will
(Exhibit "G") was more advantageous to the widower.
We find it difficult to understand the trial courts
distrust of a lawyer who did no more than discharge his
professional duty, or its readiness to attribute improper
motives to proponents witnesses. This Court, in Sotelo v.
Luzan, 59 Phil. 908, has remarked that
"It is hardly conceivable that any attorney of any
standing would risk his professional reputation byfalsifying a will and then go before a court and give false
testimony."cralaw virtua1aw library
And in the Fernandez v. Tantoco, 49 Phil. 380, 385, We
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to
a will, the statements of a competent attorney, who has
been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the
proper execution of the instrument, is entitled to greater
weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no
motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to
prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney,
being conversant with the requisites of proper execution
of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on
details, and he is more likely than other persons to
retain those incidents in his memory." (Italics supplied)
Appellees endeavoured to sustain the courts refusal toprobate the will by referring to the evidence of their
witness Marino Tupas, a man of "no permanent job", 23
who narrated that on the last week of September, 1944
one Mariano Buenaflor had been introduced to him by
one Lt. Garaton at his guerrilla outpost in Montalban
and described as a man wanted by the Japanese. Tupas
patently exaggerated testimony is that this Buenaflor
stayed with him at his outpost camp until January,
1945, living and sleeping with him, and was never for a
single moment out of his sight. 24 Why a civilian refugee
should remain at a guerrilla outpost for four months;
without engaging in any particular helpful activity on his
part, was not explained. Shown photographs and askedto identify Buenaflor, Tupas hedged by pleading that the
Buenaflor who stayed with him had a long beard. Thus,
oppositor-appellees reverse alibi for the instrumental
witness, Mariano Buenaflor, was not only patently
mendacious but did not establish any reliable
connection between the instrumental witness of Dignas
will and the Buenaflor who, according to Tupas, stuck to
him as a burr in 1944. No wonder the trial court gave no
credit to such evidence.
Oppositors attempts to establish that the testatrix Digna
Maravilla was mentally incompetent to validly execute
the will in question met no better fate in the court below.
They introduced one Eufrocina Berja who qualified
Digna Maravilla as insane because she saw Digna
Maravilla acting strangely one morning in 1921 (23 years
before the will was executed). In Berjas own words
"Would you not call a person insane who is waving a
bunch of flowers and singing along a road, especially
taking into consideration their reputation in the
Community?" (t.s.n., 21 May 1959, page 19)
Even if to this ridiculous appraisal were to be added the
fact that (according to this witness) Digna saw her in1946, but would not answer her questions and "was in a
deep thought (sic) and her tongue was coming out of her
mouth" (Do., pages 14-15), her evidence would certainly
not justify a finding that Digna Maravilla was not
competent to execute the testament in 1944. By Berjas
standards, any one could be held insane.
Nor is the case for the oppositors improved by the
evidence of their witness Eleazar Lopez, who asserted
having visited his aunt, Digna Maravilla (whom he had
not seen since he was four years old), two days after the
first bombing of Manila by the American planes in
September, 1944. Lopez claimed to have seen Digna onthat occasion laughing and crying and then staring
blankly at the ceiling, without recognizing the witness;
and that he visited her again toward mid-October of the
same year and she had worsened. 25 Coming from a
nephew who expected to succeed if the will in question *
were denied probate, and who sought to become
administrator of the estate, even offering to resign from
his position in the government if appointed, 26 this
testimony of Lopez was evidently colored by his monetary
interest, thus leading to its correct discrediting by the
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trial court. His recollection after 15 years of the alleged
symptoms of his aunt is very suspicious, as it does not
even appear that Lopez at the time bothered to inquire
from other persons what caused his aunts alleged
abnormal condition. Moreover, the courts duty to
reconcile conflicts of evidence should lead it to hold that
the symptoms described by Lopez were due to a
temporary disturbance of the nerves caused by the
unsettling effect of a bombardment not previously
experienced, compatible with the due execution of thewill on 7 October 1944. As between the testimony of
Lopez and that of attorney Villanueva, who repeatedly
visited and talked to the testatrix around the time her
will was executed, We have no hesitation in accepting the
latters view that Digna Maravilla was competent to make
the will when it was signed. The law itself declares that
"To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the
testator be in full possession of all his reasoning
faculties or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired or unshattered by disease, injury or other
cause." (Civil Code, Article 799; Bugnao v. Ubag, 14 Phil.163.)
We are satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to
the effect that the testament, Exhibit "A," was duly
executed by a qualified testatrix and competent
witnesses, in conformity with the statutory
requirements.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decree of the court
below denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna
Maravilla (Exhibit "A") is reversed and the said testament
is hereby ordered probated. Let the records be returned
to the Court of origin for further proceedings
conformable to law. Costs against oppositors-appellees.
Concepcion,C.J., Dizon, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar,JJ., concur.
Makalintal,J., did not take part.
4. Labrador v. CA, G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5,
1990 (184 SCRA 170)
G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE
THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO
LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA
LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL
LABRADOR,petitioners-appellants,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,1GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and
JESUS LABRADOR,respondents-appellees.Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.
Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.
PARAS,J.:The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged
holographic will of one Melecio Labrador isdated, as
provided for in Article 8102of the New Civil Code.
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On
June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the
Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was
residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as
Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-
1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica,
Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria
and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic
will.
On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but
substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal
Labrador, filed in the courta quo
a petition for the
probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the
alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.
Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador
(now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and
Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petitionon the ground that the will has been extinguished or
revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on
September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for
the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos,
testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale,
selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors
Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter
of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T.
No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador
sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand
(P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)
Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against
his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment ofsaid purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of
land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by
devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a
holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the
complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-
I, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of
Absolute Sale is fictitious.
After both parties had rested and submitted their
respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint
decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate
of the holographic will and declaring null and void the
Deed of Absolute sale. The courta quohad also directed
the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I)
to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00
representing the redemption price for the property paid
by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest
thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to
vendeea retro.
Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of
Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint
decision of the courta quoby denying the allowance of
the probate of the will for being undated and reversing
the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by
the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988.Hence, this petition.
Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by
respondent court, to wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE
PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL
OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO
LABRADOR; and
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE
LOWER COURT DIRECTING THEREIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING
THE REDEMPTION PRICE WAS
ERRONEOUS.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano
translated into English, is quoted as follows:
ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE
WILL OF THE
LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN
IN ILOCANO
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BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ
I First Page
This is also where it appears in writing
of the place which is assigned and
shared or the partition in favor of
SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the
fishpond located and known place as
Tagale.
And this place that is given as the share
to him, there is a measurement of moreor less one hectare, and the boundary at
the South is the property and
assignment share of ENRICA
LABRADOR, also their sister, and the
boundary in the West is the sea, known
as the SEA as it is, and the boundary on
the NORTH is assignment belonging to
CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is
also their brother. That because it is
now the time for me being now ninety
three (93) years, then I feel it is the right
time for me to partition the fishponds
which were and had been bought oracquired by us, meaning with their two
mothers, hence there shall be no
differences among themselves, those
among brothers and sisters, for it is I
myself their father who am making the
apportionment and delivering to each
and everyone of them the said portion
and assignment so that there shall not
be any cause of troubles or differences
among the brothers and sisters.
II Second Page
And this is the day in which we agreed
that we are making the partitioning and
assigning the respective assignment of
the said fishpond, and this being in the
month of March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or
instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this
writing is no other than MELECIO
LABRADOR, their father.
Now, this is the final disposition that I
am making in writing and it is this that
should be followed and complied with in
order that any differences or troublesmay be forestalled and nothing will
happen along these troubles among my
children, and that they will be in good
relations among themselves, brothers
and sisters;
And those improvements and fruits of
the land; mangoes, bamboos and all
coconut trees and all others like the
other kind of bamboo by name of Bayog,
it is their right to get if they so need, in
order that there shall be nothing that
anyone of them shall complain against
the other, and against anyone of thebrothers and sisters.
III THIRD PAGE
And that referring to the other places of
property, where the said property is
located, the same being the fruits of our
earnings of the two mothers of my
children, there shall be equal portion of
each share among themselves, and or to
be benefitted with all those property,
which property we have been able to
acquire.
That in order that there shall be basis of
the truth of this writing (WILL) which I
am here hereof manifesting of the truth
and of the fruits of our labor which their
two mothers, I am signing my signature
below hereof, and that this is what
should be complied with, by all the
brothers and sisters, the children oftheir two mothers JULIANA
QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA
AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father who
made this writing (WILL), and he is,
MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p.
46,Rollo
)
The petition, which principally alleges that the
holographic will is really dated, although the date is not
in its usual place, is impressed with merit.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator
himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. It is
worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second
page of the holographic will,viz:And this is the day in which we agreed
that we are making the partitioning and
assigning the respective assignment of
the said fishpond, and this being in the
month of
March, 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or
instruction of mine is the matter to be
followed. And the one who made this
writing is no other than MELECIO
LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis
supplied) (p. 46,Rollo)
The law does not specify a particular location where the
date should be placed in the will. The only requirements
are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the
hand of the testator. These requirements are present in
the subject will.
Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the
will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered
into an agreement among themselves about "the
partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of
the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of
the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an
"agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries
thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like
the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply withArticle 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a
person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by
law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his
estate, to take effect after his death."
Respondents are in error. The intention to show17
March 1968
as the date of the execution of the will is
plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the
paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an
agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who
plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The
act of partitioning and the declaration that such
partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be
followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware ofthe nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of
the character of the testamentary act as a means to
control the disposition of his estate.
Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of
the P5,000 representing the redemption price as
erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect.
When private respondents sold the property (fishpond)
with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were
actually selling property belonging to another and which
they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null
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and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from
Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession of the
property for its disposition in accordance with the will.
Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the
P5,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED.
The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED
and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are
directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of FiveThousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
5. De Jesus v. De Jesus, G.R. No. L-38338,
January 28, 1985 (134 SCRA 245)
G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OFANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE
JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE
JESUS,petitioners,vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.,respondent.Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.
Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.
Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa
and A. R. de Jesus.
GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order ofrespondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the
probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus.
The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this
petition are undisputed.
After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No. 81503
entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres
G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by
petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas wasappointed administrator. After Letters of Administration
had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the
lower court a document purporting to be the holographic
Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26,
1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of
the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.
Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his
appointment as administrator, he found a notebook
belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that
on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win
addressed to her children and entirely written and
signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de
Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " andstates: "This is my win which I want to be respected
although it is not written by a lawyer. ...
The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by
the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel
Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter
dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their
deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized
the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified
her signature. They further testified that their deceased
mother understood English, the language in which the
holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 "
was the date when said Will was executed by their
mother.
Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir
filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported
holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was
not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed
through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue
influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged
testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, norcould have intended the said Will to be her last Will and
testament at the time of its execution.
On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco
issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic
Will which he found to have been duly executed in
accordance with law.
Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for
reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus
was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil
Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will
should contain the day, month and year of its execution
and that this should be strictly complied with.On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco
reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate
of the holographic Will on the ground that the word
"dated" has generally been held to include the month,
day, and year. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, the document purporting
to be the holographic Will of Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for
not having been executed as required by
the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is
hereby set aside.
The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 "
appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the
Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 810. A person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out
of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the
Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code
require the testator to state in his holographic Win the"year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil
Code omitted the phrase Ao mes y dia and simply
requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The
petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the
holographic Will should prevail.
Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that
the purported holographic Will is void for non-
compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that
the date must contain the year, month, and day of its
execution. The respondent contends that Article 810 of
the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the
California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code
whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that therequired date includes the year, month, and day, and
that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is
invalid. The respondent further contends that the
petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article
810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the
formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic
Wills are strictly construed.
We agree with the petitioner.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs
from a strict and literal application of the statutory
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requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We
should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in
the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which,
in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy
The underlying and fundamental
objectives permeating the provisions of
the law on wigs in this Project consists
in the liberalization of the manner of
their execution with the end in view of
giving the testator more freedom inexpressing his last wishes, but with
sufficien safeguards and restrictions to
prevent the commission of fraud and the
exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the
testator.
This objective is in accord with the
modem tendency with respect to the
formalities in the execution of wills.
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 103)
In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs
ofRaymundo Castro v. Bustos(27 SCRA 327) he
emphasized that:xxx xxx xxx
... The law has a tender regard for the
will of the testator expressed in his last
will and testament on the ground that
any disposition made by the testator is
better than that which the law can
make. For this reason, intestate
succession is nothing more than a
disposition based upon the presumed
will of the decedent.
Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of
the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud
and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of testamentary privilegeIcasiano v.
Icasiano
, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with the formalities of the law,
and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise
thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to
probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,
xxx xxx xxx
... More than anything else, the facts
and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any
given rule. If the surrounding
circumstances point to a regularexecution of the wilt and the instrument
appears to have been executed
substantially in accordance with the
requirements of the law, the inclination
should, in the absence of any suggestion
of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean
towards its admission to probate,
although the document may suffer from
some imperfection of language, or other
non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v.
Leynez 68 Phil. 745).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply
with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal,it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be
accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by
the form followed by the testator.
The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of Wills has been expounded by this Court
inAbangan v. Abanga40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:
The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide
against such contingencies as that of two competing
Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming
insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco
v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in
this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and
found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its executionnor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments.
There is no question that the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written,
dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a
language known to her. There is also no question as to
its genuineness and due execution. All the children of
the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic
Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary
capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The
objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz
Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective
because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the
holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to
be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should
include the day, month, and year of its execution.
However, when as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and
pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established
and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61"
appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the
holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova
and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
6. Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720,
September 15, 1994 (236 SCRA 488)
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA
AJERO,petitioners,vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE
SAND,respondents.Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.
Montilla Law Office for private respondent.
PUNO,J.:This is an appeal bycertiorarifrom the Decision of the
Court ofAppeals1in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30,1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
questioned decision of November 19,
1988 of the trial court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
petition for probate is hereby
DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 94,2in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
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Considering then that it is a well-
established doctrine in the law on
succession that in case of doubt, testate
succession should be preferred over
intestate succession, and the fact that
no convincing grounds were presented
and proven for the disallowance of the
holographic will of the late Annie Sand,
the aforesaid will submitted herein must
be admitted to probate.3
(Citationsomitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition
for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court
of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet
the requirements for its validity."4It held that thedecedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of
the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions
appearing in a holographic will are
signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and date,
such date validates the dispositions
preceding it, whatever be the time of
prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will, the testator must
authenticate the same by his full
signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were
either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It
also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated
by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that
will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as
required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or
otherwise mentally incapable to make a
will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or
the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary, or of some other
person for his benefit;(e) If the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick, and he did
not intend that the instrument should
be his will at the time of fixing his
signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil
Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in
any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities
required by law have not
been complied with;
(2) If the testator wasinsane, or otherwise
mentally incapable of
making a will, at the
time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed
through force or under
duress, or the influence
of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by
undue and improper
pressure and influence,
on the part of the
beneficiary or of some
other person;
(5) If the signature of
the testator was
procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted
by mistake or did not
intend that theinstrument he signed
should be his will at the
time of affixing his
signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to
disallow a will.5Thus, in a petition to admit aholographic will to probate, the only issues to be
resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2)
whether said will was executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent
had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the
will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of thewill and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the
holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held
that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code,ante
,
were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate
of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held inAbangan vs.Abangan, 40
Phil. 476, 479 (1919),that:
The object of the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills is toclose the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on
this subject should be interpreted in
such a way as to attain these primordial
ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and
curtail the exercise of the right to make
a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that addsnothing but demands more requisites
entirely unnecessary, useless and
frustrative of the testator's last will,
must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these
formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation,
and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805
and 806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what
assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself,7as provided under Article 810 of the New CivilCode, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator
himself.It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will
not result in the disallowance of a holographic
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will that is unquestionably handwritten by the
testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that
its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If
the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositionscannot
be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render
the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted toprobate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the
provisions of Article 814. In the case ofKalaw
vs.Relova
132 SCRA 237 242(1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures,
corrections, and interlineations made by
the testator in a holographic Will have
not been noted under his signature, . . .
the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the
particular words erased, corrected or
interlined. Manresa gave an identical
commentary when he said "la omission
de la salvedad no anula el testamento,segun la regla de jurisprudencia
establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril
de 1985."8(Citations omitted.)Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations,
cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature,9their
presence does not invalidate the will itself.10The lack ofauthentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of
authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814)separate from that which provides for the necessary
conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and
688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which the present
provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They
read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic
when the testator writes it himself in the
form and with the requisites required in
Article 688.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be
executed only by persons of full age.
In order that the will be valid it must bedrawn on stamped paper corresponding
to the year of its execution, written in its
entirety by the testator and signed by
him, and must contain a statement of
the year, month and day of its execution.
If it should contain any erased,
corrected, or interlined words, the
testator must identify them over his
signature.
Foreigners may execute holographic
wills in their own language.
This separation and distinction adds support to the
interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810
of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles
813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the
probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie
Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety.
This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are
limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated. However, in exceptional
instances, courts are not powerless to do what the
situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain
provisions of the will.11In the case at bench, decedentherself indubitably stated in her holographic will that
the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late
father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero
to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety).
Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares
with her father's other heirs.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the
disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-
37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate
the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is hereby
REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards
the Cabadbaran property. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
7. Kalaw v. Relova, G.R. No. L-40207
September 28, 1984 (132 SCRA 237)
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
ROSA K. KALAW,petitioner,vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of
the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, andGREGORIO K. KALAW,respondents.Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.
Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO
K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of his deceased
sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa
City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on
December 24, 1968.
The holographic Will reads in full as follows:My Last will and Testament
In the name of God, Amen.
I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and
a resident of Lipa City, being of sound and disposing
mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last
will and testament.
1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the
catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance with the
rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter
named provide and erect at the expose of my state a
suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.
xxx xxx xxx
The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K.Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, on
November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed
probate alleging, in substance, that the holographic Will
contained alterations, corrections, and insertions
without the proper authentication by the full signature
of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil
Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion,
cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will the testator must
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authenticate the same by his full
signature.
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first
written, should be given effect and probated so that she
could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order,
dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was
submitted to the National Bureau of
Investigation for examination. The NBIreported that the handwriting, the
signature, the insertions and/or
additions and the initial were made by
one and the same person. Consequently,
Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the
decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The only
question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C',
should be admitted to probate although
the alterations and/or insertions or
additions above-mentioned were not
authenticated by the full signature of
the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the
Civil Code. The petitioner contends thatthe oppositors are estopped to assert the
provision of Art. 814 on the ground that
they themselves agreed thru their
counsel to submit the Document to the
NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is
untenable. The parties did not agree,
nor was it impliedly understood, that
the oppositors would be in estoppel.
The Court finds, therefore, that the
provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code
is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the
insertions, alterations and/or additions
in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by
the full signature of the testatrix
Natividad K. Kalaw, the Court will deny
the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".
WHEREFORE, the petition to probate
Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of
Natividad K. Kalaw is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration
arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions were
the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic
Will would be contrary to her right of testamentary
disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order,dated November 2, 1973, on the ground that "Article 814
of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires
no necessity for interpretation."
From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying
probate, and the Order dated November 2, 1973 denying
reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on
certiorari on the sole legal question of whether or not
theoriginal unalteredtext after subsequent alterations
and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix,
should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
Ordinarily, when anumber
of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Willlitem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is
not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as
respects the particular words erased, corrected or
interlined.1Manresa gave an Identical commentarywhen he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida
en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895."2
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in
dispute had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another,
but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the
effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked
for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will
after that which could remain valid. To state that the
Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix.
But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature,The ruling inVelasco, supra,must be held confined to
such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in
a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the
altered words themselves but not the essence and
validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures,
cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix
herein, her real intention cannot be determined with
certitude. As Manresa had stated in his commentary on
Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814
of the new Civil Code was derived:
... No infringe lo dispuesto en este
articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia
que no declara la nulidad de untestamento olografo que contenga
palabras tachadas, enmendadas o entre
renglones no salvadas por el testador
bajo su firnia segun previene el parrafo
tercero del mismo, porque, en
realidad,tal omision solo puede afectar a
la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y
nunca al testamento mismo
, ya por estar
esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de
aquel que determine las condiciones
necesarias para la validez del
testamento olografo, ya porque, de
admitir lo contrario, se Ilegaria al
absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no
salvadas, que en nada afectasen a la
parte esencial y respectiva del
testamento, vinieran a anular este, y ya
porque el precepto contenido en dicho
parrafo ha de entenderse en perfecta
armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de
la ley del Notariado que declara nulas
las adiciones apostillas
entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y
tachados en las escrituras matrices,
siempre que no se salven en la formaprevenida, paro no el documento que las
contenga, y con mayor motivocuando
las palabras enmendadas, tachadas, o
entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia
ni susciten duda alguna acerca del
pensamiento del testador, o constituyan
meros accidentes de ortografia o de
purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia
alguna(l).
Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina
de excepcion contenida en este ultimo
fallo,es preciso que las tachaduras,
enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin
salvar saan de pala bras que no afecter4
alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la
express voluntad del testador manifiesta
en el documento. Asi lo advierte la
sentencia de 29 de Noviembre de 1916,
que declara nulo un testamento olografo
por no estar salvada por el testador la
enmienda del guarismo ultimo del ao
en que fue extendido3(Emphasis ours).
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WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the
Decision of respondent Judge, dated September 3, 1973,
is hereby affirmedin toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
Relova, J., took no part.
8. Vda. de Perez v. Tolete, G.R. No. 76714, June
2, 1994
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ,petitioner,vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan,respondent.Natividad T. Perez for petitioner.
Benedicto T. Librojo for private respondents.
QUIASON,J.:
This is a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of theRevised Rules of Court to set aside the Order dated
November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, Bulacan presided by respondent Judge Zotico A.
Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-
Cunanan, who became American citizens, established a
successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The
Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey,
Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18;
Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will
and testament, bequeathing to his wife "all the
remainder" of his real and personal property at the time
of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo
, p. 35). In the
event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his
property to his children and grandchildren with Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife
as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael
G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his
will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN,
and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is notsufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be
presumed that I predeceased her, and
my estate shall be administered and
distributed, in all respects, in
accordance with such presumption
(Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan
executed her own last will and testament containing the
same provisions as that of the will of her husband.
Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and
I shall die under such circumstancesthat there is not sufficient evidence to
determine the order of our deaths, then
it shall be presumed that he
predeceased me, and my estate shall be
administered and distributed in all
respects, in accordance with such
presumption. (Rollo
, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family
perished when they were trapped by fire that gutted
their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee and substitute executor of the two wills, filed
separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York.
On April 7, these two wills were admitted to probate and
letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother
of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed
with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein,
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a
petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to theprobate proceedings in New York. She also asked that
she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate
of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm
land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16,
Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la
Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters
of special administration in favor of petitioner upon her
filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner
posted the bond and took her oath as special
administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a
motion, praying that the Philippine Life InsuranceCompany be directed to deliver the proceeds in the
amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy taken
by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan
and their daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial
court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance
Company then filed a manifestation, stating that said
company then filed a manifestation, stating that said
company had delivered to petitioner the amount of
P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life
insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a
Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in
savings deposit, and the Family Savings Bank time
deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of
appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla
Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F.
Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan
heirs). He also manifested that