Sp 3.2 session 4 spanish american war

American Sea Power Unprecedented Global Reach

session iv Spanish-American War

“Roosevelt had long been a strenuous supporter of the navy…”

Peter Padfield, Maritime Dominion and the Triumph of the Free World; Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1852-2001. pp. 62-63.

6Aspirant Navies: The United States

“Roosevelt had long been a strenuous supporter of the navy. He had read Mahan’s first volume in two days when it first appeared [1890] , and enthused over it. He believed, like the historian, Frederick Jackson Turner,• that since the US’s westward drive had ended at the Pacific coast, the expansion that had been the main fact of American life since the first settlers landed could only be continued overseas. This fitted the teachings of Mahan who stressed that Britain’s wealth and influence derived from the ‘three interlocking rings’ of sea power, namely colonies, maritime trade, and battle-fleet command of the seas. Roosevelt, who was representative of powerful forces within the American commercial-financial community, had resolved that the US should follow a similar path.

“The US had acquired ‘points of vantage’ in 1898 as a consequence of war with Spain fought ostensibly in support of Cuban rebels seeking to free their island from Spanish colonial rule.…”

Peter Padfield, Maritime Dominion and the Triumph of the Free World; Naval Campaigns that Shaped the Modern World, 1852-2001. pp. 62-63.

6Aspirant Navies: The United States

…if we are to hold our own in the struggle for naval and commercial supremacy, we must build up our power within our own borders. We must build the isthmian [Panama] canal, and we must grasp the points of vantage which will enable us to have our say in deciding the destiny of the oceans of the East and West.

The “Splendid Little War” ?

"a splendid little war, begun with the highest motives... favored by that Fortune which loves the brave." — Secretary of State John Hay to Theodore Roosevelt, 1899

The phrase had become ironic as soon as it was made public. Resistance to the war and its subsequent fruits had begun two months after its declaration. The Anti-Imperialist League contained some of the most famous names in America. It would remain in existence until 1920.

Kipling, the poet laureate of Imperialism, was so concerned that he wrote his poem, The White Man’s Burden, to counteract their effect on American public opinion.””

Twain had begun as a supporter of the war but turned against its later phase, repression of the ‘Philippine Insurrection.” Lurid reports of “the water cure (torture),” forerunner of water-boarding, and other harsh measures, led him to write his anti-war classic, The War Prayer.

Most poignant to me is McKinley’s heart-felt if naive description to his fellow Methodists of how he resolved his doubts about keeping the Philippines.

jbp

The poem of "The White Man's Burden" was first published in the 10 February 1899 edition of the New York Sun, a McLure's newspaper.—Wikipedia

Take up the White Man's burden, Send forth the best ye breed Go bind your sons to exile, to serve your captives' need;To wait in heavy harness, On fluttered folk and wild— Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child….Take up the White Man's burden, Ye dare not stoop to less— Nor call too loud on Freedom To cloak your weariness;By all ye cry or whisper, By all ye leave or do, The silent, sullen peoples Shall weigh your gods and you….

Kipling’s Famous(Much-mocked)

Poem

The global distribution of the races who are "the white man's burden", racialism presented in The Rising Tide of Color: The Threat Against White World-Supremacy (1920), by Lothrop Stoddard.—Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lothrop_Stoddard

"The War Prayer" was written in 1905, and is believed to be a response to both the Spanish–American War and the subsequent Philippine–American War. It was left unpublished by Mark Twain at his death in

April 1910, largely due to pressure from his family, who feared that the story would be considered sacrilegious. Twain's publisher and other friends also discouraged him from publishing it. According to

one account, his illustrator Dan Beard asked him if he would publish it anyway, and Twain replied, "No, I have told the whole truth in that, and only dead men can tell the truth in this world. It can be published after I am dead." Mindful of public reaction, he considered that he had a family to support and did not want to be seen as a lunatic or fanatic.["The War Prayer" was finally published in the 1923 anthology

Europe and Elsewhere..—Wikipedia

“Lord our Father, our young patriots, idols of our hearts, go forth into battle — be Thou near them! With them — in spirit — we also go forth from the sweet peace of our beloved firesides to smite the foe. O Lord our God, help us tear their soldiers to bloody shreds with our shells; help us to cover their smiling fields with the pale forms of their patriot dead; help us to drown the thunder of the guns with the shrieks of their wounded, writhing in pain; help us to lay waste their humble homes with a hurricane of fire; help us to wring the hearts of their unoffending widows with unavailing grief; ….

Twain’s FamousShort Story

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish%E2%80%93American_War

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish%E2%80%93American_War

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_Carter_Beard

McKinley’s Faith-basedSolution

“As a last resort, McKinley turned to prayer. He, himself, later confessed to a group of his Methodist brethren:

The President’s patience was finally rewarded.

The truth is I didn’t want the Philippines and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do about them….I sought counsel from all sides—Democrats as well as Republicans—but got little help. I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.

And one night late it came to me this way—I don’t know how it was, but it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly.12

______ 12 Christian Advocate, (New York), Jan. 22, 1903, as quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People., 6th ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.) 1958. pp. 473-474.

Major Topics

I. Opening Events

II. The Philippine Campaign

III. The Caribbean Campaign

IV. The Sampson-Schley Controversy

V. Lessons and Consequences of the War

Opening EventsThe battle for circulation between Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst

Dueling Headlines, February1898.—Bing

Editorial cartoon by Leon Barritt. Newspaper publishers Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst, full-length dressed as the "Yellow Kid" (a popular cartoon character of the day), each

pushing against opposite sides of a pillar of wooden blocks that spells WAR. This is a satire of the Pulitzer and Hearst newspapers' role in rousing public opinion for war with Spain. First published

29 June 1898.—Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leon_Barritt

“If any single event be selected to mark the emergence of the US as a major power,

perhaps no better choice could be made than the Spanish-American War of 1898. Lasting a little over a hundred days and costing some 3,000 American lives, this brief, one-sided conflict involved the US in the complex problems of the Far East and served notice on the European powers that henceforth American military strength would have to be reckoned with. For the Americans themselves it marked a turning point toward greater participation in world affairs. “Although the first major sea battle of the Spanish-American War was fought half a world away in the Philippines,.…”

Potter & Nimitz, eds., Sea Power, p. 346.

20:The Spanish-American War

“…the Philippines, the conflict arose out of the anarchy in Cuba. Here a chronic state of revolution against Spanish misrule finally erupted into fiery rebellion in 1895.• The insurrectos, vying in cruelty with their Spanish masters, set about a policy of deliberate devastation in which the property of American citizens was not spared unless protection money was paid, and this in turn was expended to finance the revolt or to spread propaganda.…” Ibid.


“…spread propaganda. Indeed, a major reason for the US intervention was to protect the largely American-owned cane plantations and sugar mills. [“…in 1800, we were consuming 18 pounds of sugar a year. By 1900 that number had risen to 90 pounds per year, and in 2012, the average American consumed 168 pounds of sugar a year.” Latest USDA stat :78 pounds.—lots of tendentious, fuzzy data here] These interests were not inconsiderable, amounting to $50,000,000 in investments and $100,000,000 in annual volume of trade. Determined to put an end to the intolerable conditions in Cuba, the Spanish government early in 1896 sent Gen Valeriano Weyler to Havana, with orders to apply stern measures….”


Ibid.

“…stern measures. Weyler’s solution was to herd civilians into reconcentration areas, where they could not support the rebels. Here unhygienic conditions brought death to thousands, mainly women and children. The American public, already stirred by the skillful efforts of the Cuban junta in NYC, reacted violently against the inhuman methods of ‘Butcher Weyler,’ and many urged that the rebel ‘government’ be accorded recognition. Responding to the clamor, Congress passed a resolution demanding recognition of Cuban belligerency….”


Ibid.

“…Cuban belligerency. Anti-imperialist President Cleveland ignored the resolution as an intrusion upon his executive powers,• declaring that he would refuse to call out the army rather than go to war with Spain, but to the Spanish government he intimated that American respect for Spanish rule in Cuba might be ‘superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.’• “When a new, liberal Spanish ministry in 1897 recalled Weyler,• modified the reconcentration system, and granted the Cubans a certain degree of autonomy, Americans began to lose interest in the Cuban cause. Then in Feb 1898 there occurred two events which aroused a storm of public indignation in the US. One was the publication in the NY Journal of an indiscreet private letter written by Dupuy de Lôme, Spanish minister on Washington, and somehow obtained by the Cuban junta. In his letter the minister hinted at Spanish duplicity in discussions on impending trade agreements and referred to President McKinley as a ‘small time politician.’….”


Ibid.

“…time politician.’A week later the BB Maine, which had been ordered to Cuba to protect American lives and property, was torn apart by an explosion that killed 260 of her crew.• The American public believed that the explosion was external, caused by a mine planted and set off by the Spaniards. The NY Journal offered a $50,000 reward, never claimed, for the apprehension and conviction of the perpetrators. Though subsequent studies have shown [Wikipedia carries the history through a National Geographic study in 1999—results still uncertain] that the explosion might well have been internal and accidental, the US was brought to the brink of war. “Because, in event of armed conflict with Spain, Cuba would be the primary military objective and Puerto Rico a secondary one, the bulk of the US Fleet was concentrated in the Atlantic. To strengthen forces already there, the BB Oregon made her celebrated voyage from Puget Sound around South America to the Caribbean, a 15,000-mile passage completed in66 days at an average speed at sea of nearly 12 kts. Her arrival raised the strength of the North Atlantic Squadron to five BBs, and two ACs, plus smaller types. Meanwhile, the Navy Department maintained only a small Asiatic Squadron of CL types in the Pacific, which was generally regarded as an area of lesser naval significance….”

op. cit., pp. 366-367.


“…naval significance. “The effect of the Maine disaster was not lost upon the Spaniards, who tried to appease American wrath, but at the same time, prepared for war. Upon learning of the explosion, the Spanish Minister of Marine alerted the fleet and advised Adm Pascual Cervera,• commanding the main home force, to be ready to destroy the American base at Key West and then to blockade the American coast.…”

op. cit., p. 367.


“…American coast. “To Cervera, constitutionally pessimistic, such an assignment appeared fantastic in the extreme, for his operational strength consisted only of four CAs and two DDs, all in poor shape. He pointed out his naval inferiority in comparison to the Americans, the absence of powerful Spanish bases beyond the Atlantic, and the probable lack of adequate logistical support for his fleet in Cuba and Puerto Rico. He expressed the opinion that the most practical naval strategy for his country in the event of war would be to retain forces for defense of the homeland and asserted that his fleet could make the American coast a profitable military objective only if Spain could enlist a powerful naval ally capable of furnishing assistance.…”

op. cit., p. 367.


“…furnishing assistance. The Ministry thereupon modified its directive but insisted that the naval forces should least defend Puerto Rico. On 8 Apr 98 Cervera, still regarding his mission as hopeless, steamed from Cadiz and advanced to the Cape Verde Islands to await further political developments.…”


Ibid.

“…political developments. “Word of the sortie of the Spanish home fleet caused a tremendous war scare along the American East Coast. Badly informed citizenry everywhere had visions of coastal bombardment and invasion by the enemy. Both Army and Navy received frantic calls for coast defense. SecWar Russell Alger afterwards remembered that ‘The calls made upon the department for immediate rescue from the advancing Spanish fleet were pathetic in their urgency. Telegrams, letters, and statesmen representing the imperiled localities poured into the War Department. They wanted guns everywhere; mines in all the rivers and harbors on the map.’ 1…”


Ibid.

______ 1 Russell A. Alger, The Spanish-American War, (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1901), 38.

“…the map.’ Theodore Roosevelt later recalled that nervous Boston financiers, fearful for the safety of their investment securities, removed them fifty mi inland to Worcester for safer keeping. “No harm was done, and some nerves were calmed, by a general trundling out of obsolete Civil War guns to point along the coast, whence they were aimed futilely at the empty Atlantic. But demands for fleet protection simultaneously for all parts of the East Coast were something else again, for a fleet is by reason of its mobility a weapon of attack. Even when its mission is defensive in purpose, its units should never degenerate into static platforms for guns. “The Navy Department was well aware that the North Atlantic Squadron ought in the circumstances operate as a unit.• Even if Cervera should strike elsewhere than in the Caribbean, where he was expected, a fleet with its integrity preserved could still strike a retaliatory blow.…”


Ibid.

“… retaliatory blow. Spreading the fleet thin along the coast could prove military suicide; yet the clamor of the coastal cities for naval protection had to be satisfied in some manner. The solution was a compromise—the North Atlantic Squadron was divided into two main parts. One, under Acting RAdm William T. Sampson,• was based at Key West, poised and ready for offensive ops against Cuba and Puerto Rico. The other, the so-called Flying Squadron, was organized at Norfolk under the command of Commodore Winfield Scott Schley,• as a mobile fortress fleet for the roving protection of the Atlantic seaboard. A smaller Northern Patrol Squadron of obsolete and generally useless vessels guarded the coast from the DL Capes northward. “Meanwhile, the Spanish Ministry was vacillating over American demands that Spain grant an armistice to the insurrectos and put an end to reconcentration—fearful of revolution at home if they capitulated—and of war with the US if they did not. By 9 Apr the Ministry had given in on both points. It was already too late however,…”


op. cit., pp. 367-368.

“…too late however, for President McKinley had now come to realize that the Democrats with their cry of ‘Free Cuba!’ would defeat him in the next elections unless he put a definitive end to the wretched conditions in the Spanish colony. So he sent a war message to Congress on the 11th, requesting authority to use the Army and Navy. A week later Congress passed a joint resolution declaring Cuba free and independent, demanding the withdrawal of Spanish forces, and directing the President to use armed force to put the resolution into effect. A final clause, the so-called Teller Amendment, pledged that whatever the outcome the US would not annex Cuba. “On 22 Apr the Navy Dept directed Sampson to establish a blockade of Cuban waters from Havana around the western tip of the island to Cienfuegos on the south coast. On 25 Apr Congress declared a state of war to have existed since 21 Apr.• On the 29th Cervera’s fleet left the Cape Verdes and steamed to the defense of Puerto Rico. Cervera was given ‘entire freedom of action as to route, port, and cases and circumstances in which battle should be sought or eluded.’2


op. cit., p. 368.

______ 2 Office of Naval Intelligence, Notes on the Spanish-American War, 10 v. (Washington, 1899), VII, 65.

The Philippine Campaign

McKinley’s SecNav was a political appointee who was happy to leave day-to-day navy matters to his ebullient assistant, TR. —jbp

“No cries for coastal protection split the small American naval force in the Pacific. Indeed many Americans were scarcely aware that Spain had possessions in that area. One man in Washington however knew very well that the Spaniards owned the Philippines and had a fleet of sorts there. That was TR, Asst SecNav. When trouble with Spain loomed, Roosevelt decided that the US must be prepared to strike in the Pacific as well as in the Atlantic.3 Casting about for a man capable of striking a quick and effective blow against naval forces in the Philippines, he selected Commodore George Dewey and had him appointed CinC of the US Asiatic Squadron. “Dewey at the time of his appointment was holding the routine administrative post of President of the Board of Inspection and Survey, but he had experienced extensive combat duty in the Civil War and had a reputation for aggressiveness. Dewey was much more than merely aggressive, however….”


Ibid.


______ 3 Note that Roosevelt made this decision eleven years before he wrote the letter to Taft quoted on page 364.

“…aggressive, however. Like his old CO,• David Glasgow Farragut, he combined a keen eye for tactical situations with a capacity for meticulous attention to detail. Before leaving Washington he read everything he could find on the Philippines and studied all available charts of the surrounding waters. Urgently requesting the Navy Department to forward ammunition ASAP, he left for Japan in early Dec 97. A month later he boarded Olympia, [C-6, a protected cruiser] at Nagasaki and assumed his new command….”


Ibid.


“…new command. “Dewey soon moved his squadron to Hong Kong in order to be nearer Manila. Here he received a cablegram from Roosevelt, then Acting Secretary: ‘Keep full of coal. In the event…of war your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive ops in the Philippine Islands.’ Dewey needed no such prompting, for he was already furiously at work in preparation for his coming task. He purchased a collier and a supply steamer to serve as fleet train. He had his warships docked, the machinery overhauled, the underwater hulls scraped, and the white sides painted battle gray….”


Ibid.


“…battle gray. The Commodore personally inspected all details, seeing to it that crews underwent daily drill and that all machinery was ready for sustained ops at a moment’s notice. Lacking information on the Spanish fleet and fortifications in the Philippines, he sent a spy to Manila and disguised his own aide as a tourist to pick up data from travelers arriving in Hong Kong. To by-pass British neutrality rules once war was declared, he arranged for a temporary anchorage at Miss Bay in Chinese waters some distance up the coast. [“The first precept of a naval officer is forehandedness.”—Cdr John R. Powers, USNR, to his son] “On 25 Apr came a cable from SecNav: ‘War has commenced between the US and Spain. Proceed at once to PI. Commence ops at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.’ Dewey waited 36 hours until the American consul arrived from Manila with the latest word concerning Spanish preparations. On the 27th Dewey sailed for the conquest of the Philippines. “The American squadron comprised four PCs, including the flagship Olympia (5,870 tons), the Baltimore, the Raleigh, and the Boston; two gunboats, the Petrel and the Concord; and the revenue cutter McCulloch….”


op. cit., pp. 368-369.


“…cutter McCulloch. These vessels totaled about 20,000 tons and carried some 100 guns, only half of them larger than 4-inch. Six hundred mi away in the Philippines waited the fleet of RAdm Don Patricio Montojo.• Montojo’s only modern vessel of any real consequence was the Maria Christina of about 3,500 tons , mounting six 6.2-inch guns. Another of his CLs, the old wooden Castilla, was unable to move under her own power. In addition, he had five ships of 500 to 1,100 tons. Estimating that he would have no chance of defeating the American squadron in a battle of maneuver, Montojo planned to fight at anchor using his ships as a fortress fleet to supplement shore batteries. “En route to the Philippines, the American squadron made final preparations for action, including battle drills in daylight and darkness, practice in fire fighting and damage control, and removal of practically all woodwork to lessen fire hazards. In the afternoon of 30 Apr, after reconnoitering Subic Bay and finding the Spanish fleet not there, Dewey remarked, ‘Now we have them,’ and headed for the passage S of Corregidor leading into land-locked Manila Bay….”


op. cit., p. 369.


“…Manila Bay. “Despite his outward assurance, the Commodore had inward qualms. Manila was regarded throughout the Far East as impregnable. The passages into the bay had been mined. Thirty years before, his old commander Farragut had damned the torpedoes, in deed if not in word, and steamed into Mobile Bay. Since then of course mines had greatly improved, but Dewey, judging that there were no engineers in Manila skillful enough to place mines properly in the deep waters off Corregidor, determined to take his fleet in under cover of darkness….”


Ibid.


“…of darkness. ‘Whenever I have been in a difficult situation, or in the midst of such a confusion of details that the simple and right thing to do seemed hazy,’ he wrote afterward, ‘I have often asked myself, “What would Farragut do? [WWFD? ;-)]” In the course of preparations for Manila Bay I often asked myself this question, and I confess I was thinking of him that night when we entered the bay, and with the conviction that I was doing precisely what he would have done.’ 4

“On 1 May 1898, a little after midnight, when the American squadron had almost completed its passage into the bay without encountering any live mines, a few of the batteries on shore opened fire….”


Ibid.


______ 4 Autobiography (New York, 1916), 50.

“…opened fire. But shells from the American ships quickly silenced the guns and the entire line passed through the strait unscathed. At dawn, Dewey’s squadron was off Manila looking for the Spanish fleet.• The city batteries opened fire but made no hits.• “To spare the city bombardment by American guns,• Montojo had placed his squadron off Cavite. Here Dewey found him and closed to 5,000 yards to conserve ammunition, since there was no nearby source of replenishment. At 0540 the Commodore said to the captain of the Olympia, ‘You may fire when ready, Gridley.’ ….”


op. cit., pp. 369-370.


Detail of a painting in the Vermont State House depicting Dewey on the USS Olympia during the Battle

of Manila Bay—Wikipedia

“…ready, Gridley.’ Firing steadily,• the Americans passed and re-passed the Spanish ships in a series of countermarches reminiscent of DuPont’s • tactics in Port Royal Sound. Several Spanish ships, including the Reina Christina, made futile attempts to advance but were sunk or driven back. When Dewey temporarily withdrew at 0735 because of an erroneous report of an ammunition shortage, the Christina and the Castilla had already been abandoned. At 1100 Dewey resumed battle and in another hour of firing completed the annihilation of the Spanish squadron. When he ceased fire all of Montojo’s were burned, sunk, or abandoned….”


op. cit., p. 370.


“…or abandoned. “Spanish casualties, in the fleet and ashore on Cavite, were 381 killed or wounded. Dewey’s squadron had suffered no fatalities and only seven wounded. The Americans, who had drilled regularly at gunnery, had made at least 170 hits; the Spaniards, who had no practice at all, made only 15. The American victory was as much a result of superior preparation as of superior power. ‘The Battle of Manila,’ said Dewey, ‘was won in Hong Kong harbor.’ He might have added that it was a timely victory, for had he not promptly located and defeated Montojo’s force, his supply situation would have become precarious.• “With no Spanish naval power left in the area, Dewey anchored off Manila to hold the Philippines against outside interference. His problem was complicated by the arrival of five German warships on the lookout for a chance to pick up the Philippines for colony-hungry Germany, should the US not be interested. The US however was very much interested….”

20:The Spanish-American WarThe Philippine Campaign

Ibid.

“…much interested. Some 11,000 Army troops were soon on the way from San Francisco to seize Manila and occupy the islands. Enroute to the Philippines the PC Charleston C-2 ,• escorting the troop convoy, made a bloodless capture of Spanish Guam,• where the governor had not even heard of the war.…”


Ibid.

“…the war. Less than a month later, the US, with visions of growing empire, at long last annexed the Hawaiian Islands. “On 13 Aug 98, under combined army and navy bombardment, Manila capitulated after a token resistance. Thereafter the Army and the Navy faced the three-year task of putting down an insurrection among the Pilipinos, who had hoped for independence and not merely an exchange of imperial masters. Nearly half a century would pass before the US would deem the Pilipinos ready to govern themselves. Meanwhile, with the cession of the Philippines by the treaty of peace, the US became permanently involved in the affairs of the Far East.”


Ibid.

The Caribbean Campaign

Probably the most celebrated event in the “splendid little war.” —jbp

Charge of the Rough Riders at San Juan Hill by Frederic Remington—Wikipedia

“Adm Sampson, intellectual, somewhat remote, but by no means lacking in aggressiveness, proposed opening hostilities against Spain with an amphib assault upon Havana. By capturing the capital and military stronghold, he hoped to bring the conflict to an early end. SecNav Long disapproved Sampson’s proposal because the Army was far from ready and also because he considered it unwise to risk the American fleet against the guns of Havana while an enemy fleet was still at large. The accumulated experience of warfare suggested that before exposing one’s ships to the perils of attack against a fortified coast one must either have gained command of the sea by destroying and enemy forces which might interfere or else one must have the equivalent of two fleets, a Support Force to attack the coast and protect the invasion troops and a Covering Force to act as a shield to the beachhead and Support Force, fending off any approaching enemy fleet….”


Ibid.


“…enemy fleet. “With the North Atlantic Squadron divided between Norfolk and the Caribbean, Long simply did not feel that Sampson had sufficient strength for amphib ops while Cervera’s fleet remained intact. In this opinion he was seconded by the new Naval War Board. This board, composed of Adm Siccard, retired commander of the North Atlantic Squadron, Adm Crowninshield, Chief of BuNav, and Capt Mahan, the naval historian and philosopher, was intended originally as a mere intelligence agency but came in time to act as a central strategy board. As such, it served to unify the efforts of the Navy, though it sometimes embarrassed local commands when it ventured into tactical directives. The Board was a great step forward from the somewhat hit-or-miss central direction of earlier wars, but no machinery had yet been developed which, like the JCS in WW II, could coordinate army and naval ops.• “When Cervera, on orders from Madrid, cleared the Cape Verde Islands on 29 Apr, he was as gloomy as ever….”


op. cit., pp. 370-371.


“…as ever. He knew he was hopelessly outmatched. Moreover, his best C, the Cristóbal Colón, lacked her two 10-inch guns, and another, the Viscaya, was slowed by a badly-fouled underwater hull. “Sampson soon learned of Cervera’s sortie and at once conceived the plan of going out to meet him in San Juan, Puerto Rico where he believed the Spanish fleet would have to put in for coal. Mahan also had estimated that the Spaniards would touch first at San Juan and had suggested placing scout Cs in that area to detect Cervera and notify Sampson. The American fleet would then advance to San Juan and seek a decisive naval action. However, Sampson partially lifted his blockade of Cuba on 3 May and headed for Puerto Rico with BBs Iowa and Indiana, and AC New York, two monitors, and a torpedo boat. Slowed down by the monitors, which had to be towed, he did not reach San Juan until the 12th. Finding no signs of Cervera, he bombarded the port for an hour, taking eight personnel casualties from shore guns and doing only minor damage.


op. cit., p. 371.


“…minor damage. “Mahan condemned Sampson’s advance to Puerto Rico. The main objective of American ops in the Caribbean was capture of Cuba by invasion, following defeat or blockade of the Spanish fleet. Until Cervera was located, therefore, Cuba was the strategic center of the campaign. In the circumstances Sampson in abandoning Cuba was, in Mahan’s terms, sacrificing his position at the strategic center for an eccentric op of dubious advantage.• “As a matter of fact, Cervera had outguessed Sampson by estimating that Sampson would do exactly what he did. While the North Atlantic Squadron was widely scattered, with Schley at Norfolk,• Sampson at San Juan, some at Key West, others on blockade off Cuba, and the Oregon en route from the Pacific, the Spaniards successfully eluded them all and slipped into Cuba’s back door. After crossing the Atlantic at less than seven knots, Cervera had applied for coal at Martinique. Refused assistance there by the French, he had proceeded to Curaçao, where the Dutch authorities proved more hospitable. Thence he proceeded straight to Cuba….”


op. cit., pp. 371-372.


“… to Cuba. “Sampson was already returning from his fruitless advance to San Juan when he learned of Cervera’s arrival in the Caribbean. He thereupon dropped his monitors and made full speed for Key West, arriving on 18 May,• a few hours after Schley’s Flying Squadron had arrived from Norfolk. Believing that the Spanish fleet was bringing ammunition for the defense of the capital, Sampson strengthened his blockade of Havana and sent the Flying Squadron, reinforced by the Iowa, around to the south coast to blockade Cienfuegos,….”


op. cit., pp. 371-372.


“… to Cuba. “Sampson was already returning from his fruitless advance to San Juan when he learned of Cervera’s arrival in the Caribbean. He thereupon dropped his monitors and made full speed for Key West, arriving on 18 May,• a few hours after Schley’s Flying Squadron had arrived from Norfolk. Believing that the Spanish fleet was bringing ammunition for the defense of the capital, Sampson strengthened his blockade of Havana and sent the Flying Squadron, reinforced by the Iowa, around to the south coast to blockade Cienfuegos, which was connected to Havana by rail. In the meantime, once more outguessing Sampson, Cervera had made directly for the isolated port of Santiago, far to the SE. Here on the morning of the 19th He was received with congratulations when he steamed through the narrow channel into the harbor. Merely reaching Santiago safely was a real achievement. But now he could think of nothing better to do than remain anchored in the harbor until the American blockade closed in on him nine days later….”


op. cit., pp. 371-372.


“… days later. “Meanwhile Schley was taking his time getting to Cienfuegos. Once there he found he could not see inside the harbor,• but he did see smoke and from that assumed that the Spaniards might be present. With evidence piling up that Cervera was elsewhere, Sampson sent Schley word by fast dispatch boat: ‘If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port.’5 On the 24th Schley made contact with Cuban insurgents ashore and determining at last that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, headed for Santiago.• Keeping down for a while to the 6-knot speed of one of his gunboats, which was having trouble in the mounting seas, he did not complete the 315-mi run until 26 May. While still 26 mi from Santiago he made contact with three American scout CLs, none of which had sighted Cervera….

op. cit., p. 372.______ 5 Winfield Scott Schley. Forty-Five Years under the Flag (New York, 1904), 270.

“…sighted Cervera. “Schley now began to worry about the state of his coal supply, and though he had a collier with him, the rough seas made coaling at sea impossible….”


Ibid.


“…sighted Cervera. “Schley now began to worry about the state of his coal supply, and though he had a collier with him, the rough seas made coaling at sea impossible. So that night he ordered his squadron to head back toward Key West for recoaling.• Delayed by engine trouble in his collier, he was overtaken by a scout CL next morning with a terse message from Washington: ‘All Departments information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without decisive action.’ To which Schley replied: ‘Much to be regretted, cannot obey orders of the Department; forced to proceed for coal to Key West, by way of Yucatan Passage; cannot ascertain anything respecting enemy.’6….”


Ibid.


______ 6 Schley communicated with the Department via dispatch CL to nearby Haiti, which had cable telegraph connections with Washington. The dispatches are quoted from Schley, op. cit,, 278-9.

“…sighted Cervera. “Schley now began to worry about the state of his coal supply, and though he had a collier with him, the rough seas made coaling at sea impossible.• So that night he ordered his squadron to head back toward Key West for recoaling.• Delayed by engine trouble in his collier, he was overtaken by a scout CL next morning with a terse message from Washington: ‘All Departments information indicates Spanish division is still at Santiago. The Department looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without decisive action.’ To which Schley replied: ‘Much to be regretted, cannot obey orders of the Department; forced to proceed for coal to Key West, by way of Yucatan Passage; cannot ascertain anything respecting enemy.’6 Luckily the seas soon calmed so that the Flying Squadron was able after all to take on coal. Schley therefore returned to Santiago and took station off the harbor in the evening of 28 May….”


Ibid.


______ 6 Schley communicated with the Department via dispatch CL to nearby Haiti, which had cable telegraph connections with Washington. The dispatches are quoted from Schley, op. cit,, 278-9.

“… 28 May. The following morning the Cristóbal Colón was clearly visible anchored at the entrance where she had been for the past four days….”



op. cit., pp. 372-373.

“… 28 May. The following morning the Cristóbal Colón was clearly visible anchored at the entrance where she had been for the past four days.• On 1 Jun Sampson arrived off Santiago, his squadron strengthened by the newly-arrived Oregon,….”



op. cit., pp. 372-373.

“… newly-arrived Oregon, and assumed over-all command. At last the various parts of the North Atlantic Squadron had been brought together. “The American vessels now took blockading stations, with the five BBs in a semi-circle four to six mi off the entrance and smaller craft patrolling closer inshore. At night the ships closed in somewhat and a searchlight from one of the BBs played upon the harbor mouth. During the month-long blockade the fleet frequently bombarded the Morro and other shore batteries guarding Santiago harbor, and at night the experimental C Vesuvius participated spectacularly but not very effectively, firing 1,500-pound dynamite shells by compressed air from three fixed 15-inch tubes….”



op. cit., pp. 372-373.

“…15-inch tubes. In order to secure an advanced base near Santiago for coaling, supply, and general maintenance of the blockading vessels some 650 marines seized Guantanamo, Cuba on 10 Jun and in a week of fighting made good their position. These were the first Americans to fight on Spanish soil.….”


op. cit., p. 373.


“…Spanish soil. “Cervera in the land-locked harbor of Santiago was harmless enough, yet his squadron still constituted a fleet-in-being that exerted a restraining influence on American ops elsewhere because there always existed the possibility that he might escape. The US could not exercise unchallenged command of the seas around Cuba so long as there was any likelihood that Spanish warships might interfere with landing or other ops. Sampson’s fleet could not however penetrate the narrow, winding channel into the harbor because of mine fields planted there,….”


op. cit., p. 373.


“…Spanish soil. “Cervera in the land-locked harbor of Santiago was harmless enough, yet his squadron still constituted a fleet-in-being that exerted a restraining influence on American ops elsewhere because there always existed the possibility that he might escape. The US could not exercise unchallenged command of the seas around Cuba so long as there was any likelihood that Spanish warships might interfere with landing or other ops. Sampson’s fleet could not however penetrate the narrow, winding channel into the harbor because of mine fields planted there, and the nearby shore batteries. Any attempt to run through the mines might result in a vessel in the middle of the attacking column being sunk and so splitting the fleet by blocking the ships already inside from those still outside. The alternative to going in and destroying Cervera’s squadron was to close the harbor entrance with a sunken hull that could not be by-passed at night or blown away by storms….”


op. cit., p. 373.


“…by storms. For such a stopper Sampson chose a small collier with a picked crew of seven under Naval Constructor Richmond P. Hobson• to blow her up in the narrowest part of the channel. But the collier was detected by the Spaniards, whereupon shore batteries opened fire and so smashed her steering gear that she drifted past the narrows and sank in a position where she was only a minor obstacle….”


Ibid.


Mass Media Hero Fabrication 1890s-style

Magazine Illustrations

The collier Merrimac under a murderous rain of Spanish fire

Chivalrous Admiral Cervera himself pulls the heroic Hobson onto his steam launch

The failed blockship

Hobson traveled west by train en route to San Francisco and the Philippines. Crowds greeted his train at many stations, and his enthusiasm for kissing admiring young women made him a sex symbol of the Victorian age.[1] He became a sort of celebrity during the rise of popular journalism at the turn of the century and was referred to as "the most kissed man in America.”—Wikipedia______ 1 Shaw, Barton C. “The Hobson Craze” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, February 1976, pp. 54-60.

“…minor obstacle. “With the failure of the harbor-blocking experiment, it became clear that if the danger was to be removed, the Spanish squadron would have to be induced to come out and fight or Sampson’s fleet would have to go into the harbor after it. Sampson therefore called on Washington for sufficient army troops to capture the shore batteries so that he could send in boats to clear the mines. “Meanwhile the Army, eager to take part in the war which up to then had involved only the Navy and a few Marines, quickly assembled 16,000 soldiers at Tampa under command of MGen William R. Shafter, USV •….”


Ibid.


“…Shafter, USV. On 31 May the War Dept sent Shafter his orders which read in part:

“Shafter thus had been given considerable latitude, including the right to exercise his own judgement and, if he saw fit to do so, initiate a campaign against the city of Santiago and the main Spanish army. The fact that he was given a choice of ops when the Navy had asked for one specific task to be done, reveals serious lack of liaison between the War and Navy Depts. Moreover, Shafter and Sampson, who would have to work together closely in mutual support, had no common superior below the level of President of the US. “Sailing from Tampa in mid-Jun in commercial transports escorted by naval vessels, the expeditionary force reached Santiago on the 20th….”


Ibid.


Proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place E or W of that point as your judgement may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there and cover the Navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the Navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago harbor.7

______ 7 Annual Report, Secretary of War, 1898, I, 87.

“…the 20th. Present were Gen Leonard Wood’s • Rough Riders, including TR,• who could not bear to remain behind his desk at the Navy Dept when fighting was in prospect. Four days were consumed in leisurely, laborious landing ops….”



op. cit., pp. 373-374.

SampsonShafter

TROOPS OF GENERAL SHAFTER’S COMMAND LANDING FROM TRANSPORTS AT DAIQUIRI—DRAWN BY T. DE THULSTRUP

“…landing ops at Daiquiri, 18 mi E of Santiago, with the Navy standing by to lend support and boats to ferry troops ashore. “On 20 June Adm Sampson, together with Gen Garcia and other Cuban officers, held his only conference with Gen Shafter….”



op. cit., pp. 373-374.

“…Gen Shafter. There appears to have been no firm decision reached, but Sampson left the conference satisfied that Shafter had accepted the harbor batteries as his objective. Shafter left equally convinced that the Adm had agreed to the city of Santiago as the Army’s proper objective. The General afterward asserted that his decision to attack Santiago was included in a memorandum he dictated to a member of Sampson’s staff. In any event, when Shafter directly afterward plunged into the interior with his troops, Sampson seems to have regarded the move as a feint, to be followed by an early attack on the batteries….”



op. cit., pp. 373-374.

“…the batteries. He was astounded a few days later when the General informed him by message that the city was the true objective of his march. “Meanwhile, hampered by rough bridle paths and barbed wire, the soldiers had advanced slowly under the blazing tropical sun, many dropping out with hear stroke or typhoid fever. At San Juan Hill • or El Caney the Spaniards took a stand and inflicted on the invaders casualties amounting to nearly 10%….”


op. cit., p. 374.


“…nearly 10%. Alarmed, on the verge of retreating, Shafter,• who was 63, weighed more than 300 pounds,• and was confined to his tent with fever, sent Sampson an urgent message: ‘Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is strongly entrenched ¾ of a mi from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses to my men.’ Thus the Army, halted by a variety of causes at the city’s outskirts, was now requesting the Navy to enter over live mine fields in order to assist the land forces in a campaign the Admiral regarded as a misconception of the Army’s proper mission….”


op. cit., p. 374.


“…proper mission. Exasperated by his inability to reach an agreement with Shafter by messenger regarding the respective roles the Army and Navy should play, Sampson on 3 Jul steamed eastward along the coast in his flagship New York [ACR-2] for a personal interview with the General. Sampson’s departure from the Santiago blockade set the stage for a subsequent dispute involving Schley….”


Ibid.


“…involving Schley. “Before Sampson could set foot ashore, his differences with Shafter were resolved by Cervera himself.• Though the situation looked grave enough to the Americans, it looked graver still to the Spaniards, who were convinced that Santiago was about to be captured and the fleet with it. Rather than see that happen, Governor General Blanco, at Havana, telegraphed Cervera to get out of port at any cost, and Cervera seized the opportunity of making his sortie while Sampson was off station in the New York and the Massachusetts [BB-2] was coaling at Gitmo….”


Ibid.


USS Massachusetts (BB-2) was an Indiana-class battleship and the second United States Navy ship comparable to foreign battleships of the time. Authorized in 1890 and commissioned six years later, she was a small battleship, though with heavy armor and ordnance.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana-class_battleship

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battleship

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy

“…at Gitmo. The Spanish flagship Maria Teresa led the way at 0935 followed by the Cs Viscaya, Cristobal Colon, and Oquendo and two DDs….”


Ibid.


“…two DDs. Sighting the smoke of the Teresa as she approached the entrance, the New York promptly came about,.….”


Ibid.


“…two DDs. Sighting the smoke of the Teresa as she approached the entrance, the New York promptly came about, hoisted the signal for action,…”


Ibid.


“…two DDs. Sighting the smoke of the Teresa as she approached the entrance, the New York promptly came about,• hoisted the signal for action, and sped westward…”


Ibid.


“…two DDs. Sighting the smoke of the Teresa as she approached the entrance, the New York promptly came about,• hoisted the signal for action, and sped westward trying to catch up…”


Ibid.


“…two DDs. Sighting the smoke of the Teresa as she approached the entrance, the New York promptly came about,• hoisted the signal for action, and sped westward trying to catch up with the running battle being fought by Schley,..”


Ibid.


“…two DDs. Sighting the smoke of the Teresa as she approached the entrance, the New York promptly came about,• hoisted the signal for action, and sped westward trying to catch up with the running battle being fought by Schley, whom Sampson had left in tactical command…”


Ibid.


“…two DDs. Sighting the smoke of the Teresa as she approached the entrance, the New York promptly came about,• hoisted the signal for action, and sped westward trying to catch up with the running battle being fought by Schley, whom Sampson had left in tactical command during his absence….”


Ibid.


“…his absence. “Off Santiago harbor, the blockaders closed in, firing at the Teresa as she emerged. The Brooklyn, Schley’s flagship,• with the Teresa approaching as if to ram, swung to starboard across the bow of the nearby Texas, which had to back all engines to prevent a collision. Making almost a complete circle the Brooklyn finally headed W with the rest of the ships….”


Ibid.


BROOKLYN TEXAS

IOWA OREGON

INDIANA

NEW YORK

STATUTE MILES

SANTIAGODE CUBA

BLANCABATTERY

CATALINA BATTERYESTRELLA BATTERY

MORRO CASTLE

BATTERY

GLOUCESTER

CABAÑAS

BAY

OQUE

NDO

A

SHOR

E 10

35

TERE

SA

ASH

ORE

1015

PLUT

ON

ASH

ORE

FURO

R

SU

NK 10

30

“…the ships. These were already pursuing the Spaniards, who had broken through the blockade….”


Ibid.


“…the ships. These were already pursuing the Spaniards, who had broken through the blockade. Why the Brooklyn first turned E instead of W, whether to avoid being rammed,….”


Ibid.


“…the ships. These were already pursuing the Spaniards, who had broken through the blockade. Why the Brooklyn first turned E instead of W, whether to avoid being rammed, to unmask the batteries of other American ships, or to open the range, was never satisfactorily explained even by Schley,..”


Ibid.


“…the ships. These were already pursuing the Spaniards, who had broken through the blockade. Why the Brooklyn first turned E instead of W, whether to avoid being rammed, to unmask the batteries of other American ships, or to open the range, was never satisfactorily explained even by Schley, who stated merely that ‘it was the proper military maneuver under the circumstances,’ and that ‘it saved the day beyond any doubt.’8….”


Ibid.


______ 8 Schley, Forty-Five Years, 302.

“…any doubt.’8

“Soon the swift Brooklyn made good her loss in range and took the lead among the pursuers, with the Oregon, Iowa, Texas, and Indiana following. At the same time the little converted yacht Gloucester closed on the two Spanish DDs. Coming under concentrated fire from the American battle line, the Teresa, hit about 30 times, her steam lines severed, her wooden decks on fire, turned toward shore and beached six mi W of the harbor mouth.•….”


Ibid.


“…harbor mouth. The Oquendo and Viscaya next came under heavy fire, began to blaze, and likewise grounded….”



op. cit., pp. 374-375.

“…likewise grounded. Only the Colón, last and swiftest of Cervera’s Cs, outran the range of American shells and made a gallant bid to escape.• Her stokers spurred to extraordinary exertion by libations of cognac, she steamed west award at 14 kns. After a 55-mi chase, when the alcoholic stimulation of her black gang had turned to drowsiness, the Brooklyn and the Oregon finally caught up with her and began making hits….”



op. cit., pp. 374-375.

“…making hits. At that, the Colón, only slightly damaged, struck her colors, steered for the beach, and surrendered….”



op. cit., pp. 374-375.

“…and surrendered. Meanwhile, the two Spanish DDs,• hotly engaged by the little Gloucester,• had come under fire of the Indiana as she sped by. One DD was almost cut in two by a 13-inch shell; the other, heavily damaged by a smaller shell, sank after lowering her colors to the Gloucester….”



op. cit., pp. 374-375.

“…the Gloucester. “As in the Battle of Manila Bay an inferior fleet had been annihilated by a superior, better-managed fleet. Spanish losses in the Battle of Santiago were 160 KIA and 1,800 POW including Cervera himself. American losses were 1 KIA and 1 WIA. “The defeat of Cervera had far-reaching effects. Within a fortnight, Santiago, under naval bombardment and running short of food, became untenable,• whereupon Gen Toral formally surrendered the city to Gen Shafter..….”


op. cit., p. 375.


“…Gen Shafter. Spain’s few remaining warships, en route to attack Dewey in Manila Bay, turned around in the Red Sea and headed back to defend Spanish shores from a possible attack by the victorious North Atlantic Squadron. Now that the US was in undisputed command of Caribbean waters, American expeditionary forces, with naval support,…”


op. cit., p. 375.


“…naval support, landed in Puerto Rico and headed for the capital. By the end of Jul, with US forces victorious everywhere, the Navy laid plans for a cruise against the Spanish mainland, whereupon the Spaniards promptly sued for peace. In the final treaty, 10 Sept 98 in Paris, Spain relinquished all claims to Cuba and ceded Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines to the US.….”


op. cit., p. 375.


The Sampson-Schley Controversy

When the Edison Company makes a silent film ridiculing you, you know that things have gotten out of hand.—jbp

Library of Congress website

“For their services in the Spanish-American War, Dewey, Sampson, and Schley were made permanent RAdms. It would appear that there was glory enough for each, but bitter recriminations arising between the adherents of Sampson and Schley served in some measure to dim the renown of both.• “In the first newspaper stories of the Battle of Santiago, genial, obliging Schley, a favorite of the press, received almost unanimous credit for the victory, though the preliminary planning had been done by Sampson,•who, unluckily, was off station when the enemy fleet emerged. As newspapers began to reach the fleet off Santiago a week after the battle, Schley went to Sampson with a message which he asked him to transmit to SecNav Long: ‘Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of 6 Jul have attributed victory on 3 Jul almost entirely to me. Victory was secured by the force under the command of CinC, N Atl Station [Sampson] , and to him the honor is due.’ After reading the message, Sampson said, ‘Schley, this is kind and generous; I will transmit it at once.’….”



op. cit., pp. 375-376.

“…at once.’ He did, but that same day he wrote a secret message of his own to the SecNav in which for the first time he complained about Schley’s procrastination in locating and blockading Cervera more than a month earlier. ‘This reprehensible conduct,’ wrote Sampson, ‘I cannot separate from his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him ample justice on this occasion.’ “Sampson’s secret letter came out several months later when the promotions to RAdm were being considered for confirmation by the Senate, and SecNav Long advocated that Sampson be advanced several numbers over Schley. [For future promotional consideration an officer’s ‘number’ is usually reckoned from his date of prior promotion.] Schley defended his conduct so well in a letter to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee that the inequity was cancelled. Two years later however Schley’s indignation was again aroused • by the appearance of a third volume of Edgar Maclay’s History of the United States Navy,…”


op. cit., p. 376.


“…States Navy, the first two volumes of which were in use as textbooks at USNA. Maclay not only put the severest interpretation upon Schley’s actions preceding the blockade but implied that Schley’s turnaway to starboard • in the Brooklyn was an act of cowardice. At this Schley requested a Court of Inquiry to determine what his war record had been. “For 40 days the Court the Court held session under the chairmanship of Adm Dewey.• After 2,000 pages of testimony and findings had been assembled, the Court issued a majority and a minority report. The majority found that Schley’s conduct prior to 1 Jun ‘was characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise’ and concluded that ‘the turn of the Brooklyn eastward was made to avoid getting her into dangerous proximity to the Spanish vessels.’ The brief minority report just as vigorously praised and defended Schley’s conduct. “Schley protested the majority findings to TR, then President. Roosevelt concluded that there was ‘no excuse whatever from either side for any further agitation on this unhappy controversy.’ So the matter rested.”


Ibid.


When individuals do what is necessary to achieve high rank and status, their reputations become very important to them. Perhaps nowhere more so than the profession of arms. The class motto which we selected in the summer of 1958 was “honor.”•

jbp


When individuals do what is necessary to achieve high rank and status, their reputations become very important to them. Perhaps nowhere more so than the profession of arms. The class motto which we selected in the summer of 1958 was “honor.”

Then, there is Shakespeare’s fourth of the Seven Ages of Man: Then a soldier,

Full of strange oaths, and bearded like the pard,Jealous in honor, sudden and quick in quarrel,

Seeking the bubble reputationEven in the cannon’s mouth.

There is quite a lot written on the Sampson-Schley controversy—the right or wrong of who said/did what. I was unaware of it until I read the Wiki article on the subject. That’s where I found the link to the LoC silent film item on it.

The Wiki article is a model of scholarship. Some unidentified author believed the controversy was significant enough to do impressive research on it.

jbp


https://genius.com/William-shakespeare-the-seven-ages-of-man-all-the-worlds-a-stage-annotated#note-1783743

“The war dramatized for the American public and for the world the emergence of the US as a major naval power…”


Ibid.

Lessons and Consequencesof the War

“…naval power. Previously, American eyes had been focused on the western frontier and the development of the continent. Nourished on the ‘minute man’• and ‘gunboat’ theories of military and naval policy for over a century, Americans had been unwilling to bear the expense of a substantial defense establishment…”


Ibid.


“…defense establishment. But the overwhelming and apparently easy victories of Dewey and Sampson • and the epic 15,000 mile voyage of the Oregon…”

Ibid.

“…the Oregon furnished a popular point of departure for acceptance of a ‘big navy’ policy. “Meanwhile American officers with characteristic pragmatism combed the experiences of their first naval war in a long generation for lessons—technical, tactical and strategic. Among their more fruitful findings were the following:…”

Ibid.

“…the following:



op. cit., pp. 376-377.

(1) American fire control techniques needed improvements. At Santiago, for example, the North Atlantic Squadron had made only 42 major-caliber hits out of 1,300 rounds fired at point-blank range.

(2) In warships, wood and other inflammables should be reduced to an absolute minimum in exposed positions. Under fire the pitch-seamed decks of the Spanish ships had turned into sheets of flame.

(3) Especially needed by the US armed forces was a sound amphib doctrine. The amateurish Daiquiri landings would have failed against a properly defended beach.

(4) Outlying coaling and repair bases were needed to extend the radius of American fleet actions.

(5) The first use in war of refrigerator ships, a hospital ship, and a hull repair vessel demonstrated the value of such auxiliaries, and suggested the desirability of further developing logistic fleet support afloat.

(6) The need of more effective liaison between Army and Navy was clearly demonstrated.(7) The political pressures put on the Navy to divert mobile forces to static harbor

defense illustrated the need of a better public understanding of the Navy’s role….”

“…Navy’s role. The division of force resulting from such demands was compounded by the Navy’s tendency to scatter its fleet units in strategically eccentric ops. Clearly the time had come for statesmen and officers of the US to acquire a clearer understanding of the principles of naval warfare. Luckily,• Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power upon History and subsequent works were already at hand to fill the need.

“The thoughtful student of the Spanish-American War was forced to the conclusion that the USN, though performing creditably, still showed much room for improvement. It was not likely to repeat the sweeping victories of Manila and Santiago without better material, better techniques, and better understanding of principles. ‘We cannot,’ warned Mahan, ‘expect ever again to have an enemy so entirely inapt as Spain showed herself to be.’9

“The most important long-term consequence of the war was that the US had acquired an overseas empire….”


op. cit., p. 377.


______ 9 Lessons of the War with Spain, (Boston, 1899), 157.

“…overseas empire. The occupation of Puerto Rico and Gitmo would actually aid the Navy in its mission of defense of the continental US. But the new Pacific possessions posed far more problems than they solved. Attempts to find solutions to these problems, as we shall see, dominated much of the Navy’s thinking and planning for the next 40 years. Most perplexing was the question of how to defend the great Philippine archipelago—7,000 mi from the US but only 1,000 mi from Japan and less than 300 mi from Japanese-held Formosa. Against a militaristic, expansionist Japan, the Philippines could be defended only by maintaining effective fleet superiority in Far Eastern waters. Once lost to Japan, or any other strong Oriental power, they could be recovered only by securing effective control over most of the Pacific. Either alternative would require fortified base facilities far beyond anything the US possessed in 1898. In the chain of events leading to America’s involvement in WW II, her acquisition of the Philippines forms an indispensable link.”


Ibid.


The Age of Theodore Roosevelt Continues

There was never a greater navalist president than TR… jbp


There was never a greater navalist president than TR

he set the stage for Adm Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay, he led his Rough Riders to glory, and himself to the bottom of McKinley’s 1900 re-election ticket…



he set the stage for Adm Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay, he led his Rough Riders to glory, and himself to the bottom of McKinley’s 1900 re-election ticket

Sept, 1901—an assassin’s bullet made that “damn cowboy” our youngest President…


he set the stage for Adm Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay, he led his Rough Riders to glory, and himself to the bottom of McKinley’s 1900 re-election ticket

Sept, 1901—an assassin’s bullet made that “damn cowboy” our youngest President

From the White House he would wield his aquatic ‘Big Stick’…


Sept, 1901—an assassin’s bullet made that “damn cowboy” our youngest President

From the White House he would wield his aquatic ‘Big Stick’

and when “the bandits of Bogota” wanted too much $ for Panama, well…


From the White House he would wield his aquatic ‘Big Stick’


a new home for the midshipmen…



he set the stage for Adm Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay, he led his Rough Riders to glory, and himself to the bottom of McKinley’s 1900 re-election ticket •

Sept, 1901—an assassin’s bullet made that “damn cowboy” our youngest President •

From the White House he would wield his aquatic ‘Big Stick’•


a new home for the midshipmen

then there was the Great White Fleet…

So on to the next story… jbp

Next, America comes of age as one of

Padfield’s mercantile naval

powers

Sp 3.2 session 4 spanish american war

Education