SONDROL Paraguay and Uruguay Modernity Tradition and Transition (TWQ 1997)

8/3/2019 SONDROL Paraguay and Uruguay Modernity Tradition and Transition (TWQ 1997)

1/18

Paraguay and Uruguay: Modernity, Tradition and TransitionAuthor(s): Paul C. SondrolSource: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 109-125Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992904

Accessed: 06/05/2009 14:31

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the

scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that

promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Third World

Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992904?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3992904?origin=JSTOR-pdf


2/18


3/18

PAUL C SONDROL

before coastal Uruguaywas establishedin 1726. Paraguay s one of the poorestcountriesper capita in LatinAmerica;Uruguay,one of the richest. Paraguayanpolitical culture remainslargely subject-centred nd authoritarian;Uruguay's isoverwhelmingly participatoryand democratic.'Uruguay's democraticexperience throughoutmost of the twentieth centurywas exceptional in Latin America, and light-years from anything familiar toParaguay'sdrearyhistory of despotism.Uruguay experiencedat least 60 yearsof democracy in this century; longer overall than Costa Rica, Colombia orVenezuela. Yet it is ironic that Uruguay's 'polyarchyof exception' was largelyattributable o the contributionsof one caudillo. PresidentJose Batlle y Ord6niez,who overshadowed nationalpolitics between 1903-1929, engineered the inte-gratingcoparticipacionpower-sharingmechanismsbetween the dominant, eud-ing Colorado and Blanco parties.2Uruguay's Colorado and Blanco (National) parties, along with Paraguay'sColorados andLiberals,3 ormperhaps he most enduring wo-partysystems thatdate from the 19th century. However, a distinction having enormous conse-quences for the dissimilarpolitical evolution of Paraguayand Uruguaywas thedevelopmentand institutionalisation f Uruguay's co-participation ccord,incor-porating minority interests and labour into a unified governmentalhierarchy.Incorporating abour peacefully through the party system and political partyco-existence allowed Uruguayto stabilise and ultimately democratiseby inte-grating disparateparty elites, their followers, and engenderinga strongsocietalconsensus about the rules of the electoral game.By the late 1930s, Uruguayseemed destined towards a bright,shining futureof social democracy.The country was enjoying or aspiringto a middle-classstandardof living via progressive welfare policies, work in the huge admini-strativebureaucracyor nationalised industries.Instead, Uruguay began a sloweconomic and political decline beginning in the 1940s. Over-relianceon tra-ditional commodity exports (wool, mutton, cattle and grains), coupled witha small domestic economy worked against industrialisation;Uruguay wassimultaneously a modem, yet distinctly non-technological society, and onedependent on a more traditional agro-export economy, subject to all thefluctuationsin price and demand in the capitalist world economy. Economicdegenerationacceleratedby the mid-1950s, when exports decreasedin responseto shrinkingworld demand, competitionfrom sheep-raisingNew Zealand,andthe introductionof syntheticfibres all conspired o expose Uruguay'svulnerable,export-dependent conomy. A growingtradedeficit led successive governmentsto borrow ncreasinglyand to expandthe money supply, triggeringbothdebt andinflation.4Economic pressures thus slowly rotted Uruguay's carefully crafted politicalbalance,polarisingclass conflict as workers' demands ncreasedon the Coloradoand Blanco political/patronageparties, which proved unwilling or unable toresist escalating sectoral pressures for increased wages, services, subsidies andpublic employment. The cumulative nature of this distributionalprocess in-evitably collided with the limited capacities of the Uruguayan state, as thecompetitionfor dwindling economic benefits destroyed the consensualBatllistalegacy and accelerated political disorder.110


4/18

PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY: MODERNITY AND TRANSITION

As tradeunion strikes and riots enveloped society, a leftist guerrillamovement(the Tupamaros), spawned by disillusionment with governmental inefficiencyand corruption,reached major proportions n the 1960s. While urban guerrillasbattledpolice, the ruling Coloradoparty,backed by the military, respondedtothe spiral of violence by moving sharply to the right. Uruguay's uniquecolegiado (a weakened 'collegial' executive system modelled on Switzerland'sbegun in 1952 and designed to preventcaudillismo) was blamed for immobilismand replacedin 1966 by a uni-personalpresidential orm with greatly expandedpowers. A series of increasing political restrictions portended the gradualmilitarisationof Uruguayan society throughout he late 1960s and early 1970s.By 1973, the military had assumed predominatepolitical power in response tothe absence of cohesive, adaptableprogrammatic artiesand civilian paralysisinthe face of rising civil violence. The demise of Uruguayan democracy in the1970s thus illustrates the type of econo-political factors that can doom poly-archy,even where long-standingsocial conditions are auspicious.Paraguayanhistory and culture have been the antithesis of Uruguay's. Sinceindependence in 1811, Paraguay has experienced two protracted periods ofextreme tyranny (1816-1870; 1940-1989) sundered by one semi-democraticintermission (1870-1940). In fact, even though Paraguay's founding 19th cen-tury leaders-Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia, Carlos Antonio Lopez andFrancisco Solano L6pez-were extreme despots, they are promoted today asarchetypesof Paraguayannationalism and independence. Paraguay's involve-ment in two of Latin America's three great inter-state wars (the TripleAlliance War, 1865-1870; the GranChaco War, 1932-1935) also enhanced theposition of the armed forces, perhaps to an exaggerated degree, as nationalsaviours.Political leaders in Paraguayconstantly play up the historic reality ofParaguayanresistance to foreign aggressors and the Paraguayan military isprobably more highly regardedby civilians than soldiers are anywhere else inLatin America.The decidedly fascist cast to the military regimes headed by Major RafaelFranco, Marshall Felix Estiggaribiaand GeneralHiginio Morinigo throughoutthe 1930s and 1940s reinforced the traditional xenophobia permeatingParaguayanpolitical culture andenshrinedauthoritarianalues amongelites andmasses. These caudillos buttressedthe norms of resistance to and suspicion of'foreign' democraticideas not gearedto the realities of the Paraguayanexperi-ence.5 An extreme brand of Paraguayan patriotism, an ethos justifying anamplified military role in politics, and a monotonousheritage of dictatorshippunctuated by only brief and chaotic interludes of open government, areunderlyingfactorsnurturingand sustaininga soldierlyelite vested in militarismand a public habituated o authoritarianism.Having rarely experienceddemoc-racy, Paraguayans an only comparean historical recordassociating strong-manrule with autonomousprogress,andopen politics (as duringthe so-calledLiberalera between 1904-36) with foreign domination and governmentalineffective-ness.6Moreover,in contrastto Uruguay's congenial two-party system of incorpora-tion, co-participation,non-violent competition and power-sharing, Paraguay'sdominantColorado andLiberalpartieshave long remainedvenal and repressive

111


5/18

PAUL C SONDROL

towards one another. Whereas Uruguay's model of labour incorporationandparty co-participationhelped spawn a profoundlydemocratic value structure,Paraguayan lites sought only to penetrate,controlor crushorganised abour;toexile and exclude oppositionists from the spoils system that is government obsand contracts. As a result, party hatreds are fanned along with the incessantdenunciations, conspiring and vicious double-crosses that characterise partypolitics in Paraguay.7GeneralAlfredo Stroessnerdescended fromthis lineageof despotism,politicalintrigueand military ntervention.His politicallife spannedanera of Paraguayanhistory characterisedby internationalconflict, civil war (in 1947) and militaryintromission. Following the Chaco War with Bolivia, Stroessner watched orcollaboratedwith various factions of the Paraguayanmilitary as they seizedpower with mundaneimpunity:in 1936, 1937, 1948, three times in 1949, in1954 when he seized power, and finally in 1989 when Stroessnerhimself wasoverthrown.In sum, throughoutmost of the twentieth century, Uruguayansutilised thestabilising aspects of an interpartyco-participationaccord, giving opponentsapower-sharingrole in government, until economic crisis and social unrestdestroyedthe civic culture.Paraguayans,however, historically played a muchmoreexclusionary,zero-sumpolitical game. Out-of-powergroups,facing virtualmonopoly party/military ontrol over positionsandpatronage,could expect littleexcept repression,exile or execution. Stroessnerdid not invent this system, butplayed these rules as he found them.

Authoritarian regimesThe Uruguayanand Paraguayandictatorshipswere discrete from one another,andparticularo the region. Manyscholarshave arguedthatamongthe SouthernCone tyrannies in the 1970s, Uruguay's was the closest approximation o atotalitarianstate. Similarly, Paraguayunder Stroessnerwas overidentifiedwithvariousmilitary dictatorships.These portrayalsare incorrect,and fail to capturethe essence of these two hybridforms of authoritarianism.8Uruguay's military regime was neither a totalist movement fusing a utopianideology with an official party, nor a more traditional-personalistdictatorshipsuch as Stroessner's.Uruguayanauthoritarianismwas similar to the develop-mentalist, non-personalistic bureaucratic-authoritarian'egimes (Brazil, 1964+85; Argentina, 1966-73) and perhapseven more analogous to the extremelyrepressive, demobilising 'neo-conservative' systems modelled in Argentina(1976-83) and Chile (1973-89).9Militaryrule in Uruguay focused on hyperstablegovernance;the dictatorshipwas not a revolutionarymovement bent on drivingcitizens towards some bravenew world. The armed forces intended to demobilise and depoliticise thepolitical environment n the face of civil unrest.Once in power, army officersand civilian technocratsapproachedpolitics fromthe military's perspective:withan emphasison hierarchy,authority,discipline and solidarity. For authoritarianelites, democracy had meant compromise, immobilism, the substitution of112


6/18


political criteriafor efficiency, and a myriadof special-interest egislation, for arational integrated plan. 'Antipolitics' and an aversion to 'lazy and pettypoliticking' characterisedmilitaryrulein Uruguay.10 ut the lack of participationandrepresentativenstitutionsalso blighted regime attempts o form a mass-baseof support,either through the existing Colorado and Blanco parties,or throughestablishment of a new official, military party, as in authoritarianBrazil.Uruguayan officers, out of mutual distrust and lack of political acumen, werealso hamperedby the absence of a clear-cutmaximum eader, such as Stroessnerin Paraguay, or General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. The military corporationruled Uruguay, not a caudillo. Uruguay's generals remained a rather facelessjunta.ll

Stroessner'sParaguay s ill suited to comparisonswith the various develop-mentalist, technocraticor military dictatorships that descended across the farSouth of Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. While exercising control andcoercion akin to the authoritarian egimes in Argentina,Brazil and Chile, theParaguayanArmed Forces possessed no moderuisingagenda. Rather, the mili-tary under Stroessnerremained a regressive, repressive institution, more rep-resentative of what Almond and Powell termed 'conservative authoritarianism':preoccupiedwith the maintenanceof existing social and institutional arrange-ments and having no transformativegoals. Stroessner had no larger utopianvision than keeping himself in power.12Moreover,neither the military nor theofficial Colorado partyruled Paraguay:Alfredo Stroessner did. Stroessner wasnot simply primus interpares within a contemporaryunta like Pinochet in Chileor General-PresidentGregorioAlvarez in Uruguay.Stroessnerwas the classic'strongman',totally dominatingthe political regime for 35 years.13Stroessner' autocracy-like Uruguay' -certainly lacked any full-blowntotalitarian deology. But it was also an exception to the general principle thatauthoritarianegimes lack ideationalself-justificationsand mass legitimation,asfew contemporarydictatorships ndure a thirdof a centuryrelying on ham-fistedrepressionalone. While Stronismo never became a comprehensive ideology, avaguer,emotional attitudeor programmatic onsensusgave spiritto the regime'sdoctrine.Key elements included loyalty to the persona of Stroessneras presi-dent, a virulent nationalism bordering on xenophobia, an almost maniacalanti-communism and a distinctive communitarian,populist tenor. Stroessnerthus secured a popular base for his regime. Mass acceptance of Stroessnerstemmed from Paraguay's long tradition of personalist-authoritarianism,Stroessner'smanipulationof the ultra-nationalistmythsand values of the nation,the penetrationandpoliticisationof the militaryandcivil society andcorruption,which glued regime elites together. A personalitycult developed in Paraguayunder Stroessnerthatresembled GeneralFrancisco Franco's in Spain, and evencertainaspectsof EasternEuropeanCommunistregimes (particularlyn NicolaeCeausescu's Romania).14Yet the armedforces were a mainstay of Stroessner'sregime and, togetherwith the official Colorado party, acted as interlocking twin pillars of anauthoritarianystem that neverthelesspossessed certainorganisational eatures,impulses and leanings, found in more advanced mobilisational systems. The1992 discovery of fastidious documentation from the regime's intelligence

113


7/18

PAUL C SONDROL

agencies reveals the pervasivenesswith which the dictatorshippenetratedalmostall social institutions,and belies the stereotypicalnotion that Stroessner's wassimply an old-fashioned, poorly organised personalistregime.'5The Uruguayanand Paraguayan ictatorshipswere differentfromone another,and from their more developmentalistcounterparts n Argentina, Brazil andChile. Yet, ironically, the machineryof dictatorshipwas much more sophisti-cated in Stroessner'sParaguay hanin Uruguay's militaryregime. The waves ofauthoritarian istory that have washed over Paraguaynot only erodedincipientdemocratic ideals, but also sharpened the authoritariantendencies. GivenParaguay's violent history of mass-involvementin politics (notably the 1947civil war), the Coloradoparty and its ancillary organisationscame as close tobecoming a totalitarianmovement as Paraguay'srudimentary echnology andStroessner'slimited aims would allow.16

Re-democratisation in Uruguay and liberalisation in ParaguayIn similar anddiffering ways, UruguayandParaguayparticipatedn the wave ofpolitical liberalisation hatappeared o sweep the globe, beginningin the 1980s.Analogous (but not identical) variables acceleratingthe demise of these twoautocracies included: (1) regime failure of political and economic policy; (2)popularmovementsacceleratingregime change;and (3) the role of the militaryin political withdrawal (Uruguay), or reconstructing governmental elites(Paraguay).Uruguay's generals proved as ill suited in dealing with the nation's politico-economic crisis as were the civilian political institutions, whose ineffectualresponses originally politicised Uruguayanofficers in the 1960s. Moreover,theUruguayanmilitary created still newer problems that continue to haunt thenation. Thejuntaclaimed it came to powerto builda 'new' Uruguay; o cleansesociety of subversionand restorepatriotismand traditionalvalues and to be the'guardiansof the permanent'.17

Yet virtuallyall the military'sattemptsat political andeconomic re-engineer-ing failed. Most of the old politicos, as well as the traditionalBlanco andColorado parties, survived the dictatorshipand reemerged in the mid-1980sfirmly committed to democracyand civilian rule. Unions were never restruc-tured, foreign debt quadrupled nstead of falling, and privatisationof money-draining state-sponsoredindustries remained limited, despite the neoliberalblandishments of military and technocratic elites. Instead, the military's longdrawn-outpolitical withdrawal-beginning with the 1980 defeat of its consti-tutional referendumand ending with the successful Naval Club pact in 1984-led to a general restoration of a status quo ante (government giganticisim,presidentialismand fractionalisedparty politics).'8In Paraguay, adverse economic conditions also accelerated Stroessner'spolitical demise. The boom years of the 1970s, fuelled by constructionof thegiant Itaipuihydroelectric project with Brazil, gave way in 1983 to seriousrecession stemming from the fall-off in construction activities. Thereafter,inflation,unemploymentand debt intensified. The boom had nurtureda nascent114


8/18


Paraguayanmiddle class and mobilised greater popular expectations. The bustleft in train a Paraguayanpopulationmore alienatedand less passive towardstheoppressive, seemingly interminableStroessner regime. Institutionalisedcorrup-tion, long an integral aspect of Stroessner's web of patronageand predatorysultanism, began to strain political relationshipswithin the regime. Businesselites, for example, traditionally quiescent towards-if not supportive of-Stroessnerin a Faustianbargainfor peace and prosperity, began to resent theenormousrake-offs and graft among military and Colorado party elites and tohanker for a less politicised judiciary and bureaucracy.As Stroessner and theenduring clique aroundhim aged, the regime gradually deteriorated,becomingantiquatedand unable to conjugatemore than minimal levels of legitimacy andeffectiveness.19Militaryroles held certainsimilarities,but also differences in the authoritarianbreakdowns in Uruguay and Paraguay. In Uruguay, civilian opposition tomilitarism was collective, organised and sustained. In a remarkable 1980referendum,Uruguayansresoundingly rejected military attempts to institution-alise theirrule via a new, highly repressiveconstitution.This starkdefeat-andthe military's acceptance of that rejection-uncovered (even among officers)Uruguay's latent commitment to democracy and the basic illegitimacy ofmilitaryrule. From 1980 on, oppositionto the authoritarianegime, though stillperilous, was public. Thus began the long dialogue of military extricationbetween officers and civilian politicians, culminating in the 1984 nationalelections and democratic restoration.20Uruguay's redemocratisation, long with Argentina'sand Brazil's, left auth-oritarianParaguay solated and buffetedby liberalisinggales fromexiles, humanrights groups and the United States Embassy in Asuncion. Unfortunately forStroessner, the Carter administration's human rights policy had become anessential component of US foreign policy not easily reversed by the Reaganadministration,which subsequentlysaw an opportunity or criticising and pres-suring Stroessner without fear of a 'communist' takeover, as a means oflegitimisingthe Reagananti-leftist'dictatorship'policy in SandinistaNicaragua.Moreover,Stroessner' small and remotedespotismnever had the public supportwithinright-wingUS circles that Chile's high-profileAugustoPinochetenjoyed.Paraguay's pariahstatus eroded Stroessner's ability to suppressdissent and tomaintainelite consensus,since US support in the name of anti-communism)hadlong remaineda pillar of regime legitimacy.21Unlike Uruguay, however, in the final analysis it was not any brawn withinParaguayan ivil society that forced Stroessner rom power. Stroessner's declin-ing health anddetachment romday-to-daydecision making,a succession crisis,and most importantly, nstabilitywithin the ruling Coloradoparty, led an armyfaction to interveneviolently and overthrowhim, paving the way for a politicalliberalisation.22Uruguay's militarythus presentsa much clearerpictureof praetoriandisinte-gration than does Paraguay's.The significance of Uruguay's prior democraticculture, illuminated in the surging empowermentof civil society from 1980onwards,eroded the military'sresolve to maintainpower. The 1984 election ofPresident Julio Maria Sanguinetti of the Colorado party restored Uruguay's

115


9/18

PAULC SONDROLdemocracy after 11 years of militaryrule. The 1989 victory of Blanco partypresidentialcandidate,Luis Lacalle, furtherconsolidated Uruguay's democracy.By contrast, Paraguay's prolonged praetorian egacy displays no sustainedprecedent of the military accepting as normal a relatively narrow scope ofprerogatives, nor of civilians governing military affairs. On 3 February, 1989,the Stroessner dictatorship ended as it began: in a coup. Unlike Uruguay'snegotiated transitionbetween the armed forces and leaders of the major oppo-sition parties, Paraguayancitizens played little role in Stroessner's ultimatedemise; the army revolted in a classic golpe. Unlike Uruguay's popular-basedtransition, Paraguay's rupturewas an elite 'transitionfrom above' with themilitary as the major, controlling actor, maintaining he same symbioticalliancewith the dominant Coloradoparty.The major difference between these two cases is implied in the sectionsubheading. Democratisation and liberalisation stand as discrete transitionalprocesses. Liberalisationdoes not necessarily imply movement towardsa demo-cratic polity, since it is by no means certain that those who have presided overor promotedParaguay'srecent liberalisationefforts are seeking to transform hepost-Stroessnerpolitical system into a Western-style democracy.The Rodriguez coup was designed to correct contradictions n Paraguay'sauthoritarianystem, not abolish it. The transitionbegan as partof a strategy,orchestratedby the military,to restorethe balance of power along more liberallines, not to pursuea genuinelydemocraticoutcome. Changecame to Paraguayin the traditionalway: from the top, via an 'indispensable'military leader, andwithout the participationof averagecitizens.Rodriguez is a wealthy beneficiary of three decades of collaboration withStroessner,and a productof the authoritarianystem from which he emerged.He-like so many rankingmilitares and Colorados-has been involved, duringhis entire professional life, in a whole series of parasitic ventures, involvingrake-offs, graftand cronyism,that remaineda cornerstoneof his power. This isbecause corruptionwas an essential component which bound elite loyalty toStroessner or a thirdof a century.High-rankingmilitaryofficers, partymembersand bureaucrats njoyed lucrativeside interestsinvolving rich sinecuresin statemonopolies that controlledmajor commercial areas, and which often served asfronts for less respectable, but more lucrative, businesses like narcoticstrafficking,contrabandand prostitution.23 he blackmarket ystem of rake-offsand graft bought complicity, support,and a convergenceof elite interests-thusdecreasing the likelihood of inter-elite conflict since so many had a personalstake in the continuationof Stroessner'sspoils system.The decision to liberalise Paraguay was more the result of a 'Dahlian'calculation by elites of the perceived risks in maintaining government byrepressionin the face of: (1) divisions in the once-monolithicColorado partywhich threatenedits symbiosis with the military, and (2) a changing inter-national environment(democratisation,end of the Cold War and US supportfor anti-communistdictatorship),than any ideal implemented by enlightenedpolyarchs. In order to retain their power and enormousperquisites, Coloradoand militaryelites determined hat things had to change if they were to remainthe same.24116


10/18


Authoritarian legaciesDictatorship left indelible scars and multiple meanings across the culturalpsyches of Uruguayansand Paraguayans.For Uruguayans,the military regimeutterly destroyed the carefully structurednational mythology. The halcyon daysof the late 1980s following the democratic restorationhave given way in the1990s to the sober realisation that the consensual welfare state is illusory.It should be stated plainly that in Uruguay, as in most nations, civil societyhelped destroy its own social democracy. The old dole system was destroyed asmuch by inept political corporatismundercivilian politicians unwilling to say noto powerful group demandsfor services and subsidies, as by continuedeconomicmismanagementunder the junta.By the late 1960s democratic institutions and elites reacted to Uruguay'sgeneralised systemic crisis and found themselves unable to contain mountingconflict. By the early 1970s sectors of both major political parties were disloyalto democracy. The parties abdicated responsibility in the face of economicmalaise and an urbanguerrilla nsurgencyby factionalisingandrefusing to formcoalitions, thus leadingto imobilismo.Civiliansalso failed to come to the aid ofPresidentJuan Maria Bordaberry,when he was faced with a rebellious military.Most political groups encouragedmilitaryrole expansionat one pointor another,believing they could utilise the militaryto their advantage.25

Currently,over one quarterof all Uruguayansare dependent on pensionsworth only a fraction of their former value. A jaded counter-imagery nowpervades Montevideo, constructed upon a ratherinsipid foundation that JuanRial terms 'inverse Hobbesiansim'.Ever-risingstandardsof living and advancedsocial programmes hat once madeUruguaysuch a happyandunique nation, arenow sacrificed upon the alter of 'democracy at any cost'. Too much socialupheaval over the perennial question of cui bono might usher in a new,revanchistmilitarism.A commoncommitmentexists to protectthe rathershabbysocioeconomic statusquo against any societal tumultenticing the militaryfromthe barracks.26This societal reticence revealed itself in a 1989 referendum, to annul acontroversial aw exemptingthe armyand police from Nuremburg-like evengetrials for humanrightsabuses committedunderthe dictatorship.That referendumwas defeated and army immunity upheld by a marginof 57% to 43%. Anotherplebiscite (December 1992) soundly thwarted President Lacalle's economicprivatisation scheme to sell off Uruguay's state-controlled industries.Uruguayansvoted by 72%against privatisation,despite the prevailingneoliberaleconomic reformssweeping Latin America. The defeat was an enormous blowto the prestige of Lacalle, and sapped any remainingmomentumfor economicreformduringthe remainingtwo years of his term.The defeat of the privatisa-

tion referendumsignalled Uruguayans' overwhelming desire to reject a neweconomic path, promising long-termeconomic goals (low inflation and balance-of-paymentsequilibrium). nstead,the nation turnedto the traditionsof the past;inept political corporatism,complex bureaucracyand the satisfaction of moreimmediatesocial wants/demands healthcare and public housing). The processof political and economic regeneration n Uruguay provides lessons for other117


11/18

PAUL C SONDROL

re-democratising egimes where the ethics of securitycan override the ethics ofchange. The intense longing for a return o somethinglike the pre-authoritarianpast can overshadowand obviate historicalopportunitiesor political innovationprovided by regime rupture. The outcome of these particular, transitional'moments' becomes the vehicle which determinesthe precise timing, style andcircumstancesof regime change.In Paraguay,General AndresRodriguez'scoup and subsequentrubber-stampelection as president n May 1989, nevertheless leavened democraticyeast budsin civil society. To his credit,Rodriuezput some distance between himself andhis consuegro (Rodriguez's daughterwas marriedto one of Stroessner'ssons)and the patronthathe had supported or so long. Press restrictionswere lifted,political prisonersreleased fromjails andpoliticalexiles were allowed to return.Rodriuez even thwarted the Paraguayanhabit of continuismo, by peacefullyturningover power to his (chosen) successor.The August 1993 inaugurationofColorado party candidate Juan Carlos Wasmosy saw a civilian president inParaguayfor the first time in almost 40 years.Clearly, Rodriguez initiated something of a Paraguayan glasnost, as theStronato(Stroessnerregime) has given way to a society brimmingwith upstartstudents, haranguingnews editorialsand stubborn rade unions. But scepticismregardingParaguay'spotentialdemocraticconsolidationexists given the natureand degree of authoritarianismhere.Democracyhas never been the norm, noreven the clear-cut preference in Paraguay,and the sheer durationof a half-century of military/Coloradodomination makes any democratic transitiondifficult. Aside from purgingsome die-hardStronistas,most of the traditionalpolitical elite remain in place-within the leadershipof the Colorado party,senior army officers, and the state bureaucracy.Most continue to owe theirpositionsto amiguismo(cronyism)and view these sinecuresas a sort of personalandprivatefiefdom from which to plunder.A long process of socialisation mustbe sustainedif a more democratic culture is eventuallyto emerge.The 1993 nationalelections were the 'cleanest, dirty'vote in 48 years.But theprocess clearly did not representa breakthroughor democracy.The climate ofintimidationagainstopposition partiesthatprecededthe plebiscite made it clearthat the military would only accept a Coloradovictory. The ruling Colorado/Military/Bureaucraticriad controlled the guns, money, patronageand electoralmachinery.The vote was not surprisinglymarredby prematureprojectionresultsproclaiming a Colorado victory, convenient communications failures and agrenade and machine-gunattack on the only oppositiontelevision station.27Wasmosy, a rich industrialist and political neophyte, appears incapable ofcultivating or imposing loyalty and unity among disparate politico-militaryfactions a la Stroessner. His weakness is evident in the constant politicalre-alignments and plotting, public denunciations,power struggles and militarymeddling that characterisethe swirling vortex of Paraguayanpolitics in the1990s. Paraguay'stransitioncontains significantauthoritarian lements and anoverlay of newer democratic features. It is not fully one or the other.28For its part, Uruguay no longer conforms to the old stereotype as a sort ofpolar opposite of Paraguay. Uruguay today is more similar to ParaguaythanUruguayansever thoughtin the past: indebted,corporate,underdeveloped,and118


12/18


veiled by the dangerousprecedent of a politicised military.Yet, in contrast toParaguay, Uruguay's prior commitmentto democracy and more sophisticatedcitizenry inspires a certain optimism. Whatever its failings, Uruguay's is a'pacted' democracy; one honed throughcompromise, give and take, bargainingand revision, between contendingcivil and military elites, congruentwith theold Battlistalegacy of coparticipation. n Uruguay, at least, political competitionis almost always about increments;in Paraguay it is normally about wholes.In Uruguay, politics is about something;in Paraguay, politics is about every-thing.Paraguay's is not a 'pacted' democracy;it is an 'imposed' liberalisation inwhich a tolerantand accommodatingcivic culture akin to Uruguay's has yet todevelop. A half-centuryof Colorado/military omination,as well as their almostcomplete control over the transition,bolsters a naturaldispositionof these elitesto co-govern unilaterally, without any compulsion to push for greater partici-pation and contestation. Reflecting the mood, currentarmy strongman,GeneralLino Oviedo, has stated that the Colorados, together with the military, willcontinue to rule Paraguay 'por se'culaseculorum [sic].. .whether anyone likes itor not'. ParaguayanVice-PresidentAngel Seifart echoed this point, stating 'theColoradoparty'spatiencehas its limits' if confrontedby threateningoppositiondemands defying historicalparameters.29In Uruguay, the foundationalpact that led to military withdrawal has atleast laid the basis for a degree of mutual trust among contendinggroups (themilitary, parties,business associations,tradeunions, etc), if only because thesegroups are now socialised to proceduralbargaining. It is difficult to imagineanythingsimilaroccurring n Paraguay.Preciselybecause the military/Coloradosexercised such control over the transition, hey have neverfully agreed,norbeencompelled, to compromise.The dimensions of political space are expandinginboth nations. But in Paraguay,governmental oleranceof and responsivenesstoescalating oppositionand societal demands show less adaptionthanin Uruguay.Harsheconomic conditions also continueto impact politics in both nations.InParaguay,a decade of stagnant iving standards nd frustrated ising expectationscannot long continue without serious repercussionsfor political stability, letalone democracy. A Paraguayanversion of Mexico's 'Chiapas syndrome',replete with rural protests throughoutthe country in 1994, demonstratedthatcampesinosare no longer overwhelminglyatomised andpassive, and that issuessuch as rural land reform can no longer remain submerged by Paraguay'spredominantlyurbanpolitics. The government'sknee-jerkreaction to peasant-blocked roads and land seizures (in responseto revelations that 15 million acreshad been given to Stroessner cronies) was simply to dust off the shop-worn'communist-inspirednsurgency' cliche and orderin the police and militaryinfull battle-gear. Still, the peasant protests struck a responsive chord withParaguay'sthree umbrellalabourorganisations.These unions, protestingwork-ers' falling wages (shrunkby 42% over the last six yearsin the face of inflation),coordinateda general strike on 12 May 1994; the first to be held in Asuncionsince 1959.In Uruguay,anaemic economic growth (currentlyunder2%), coupled with a50% rate of inflation,now requires majorcut-backsin the alreadyemasculated

119


13/18

PAUL C SONDROL

social welfare system. Uruguaytoday has one pensionerfor every two workingcitizens. The perennial Uruguayanquestion of 'who benefits' clouds expecta-tions that developmentcan be sustained without addressingfundamentalstruc-turalreform of politics (factionalismin political parties) and economics (ineptcorporatismand statism).The November 1994 national elections brought former President JulioSanguinettiback to power, but he must now work closely with his rivals in theBlanco party and a leftist coalition. Sanguinetti's Colorado party failed tocapturea majority n the 30-memberSenate, winning only 10 seats (the same asoutgoing President Lacalle's Blanco party). The leftist Progressive Encountercoalition won nine seats. In the 98-seat Chamberof Deputies, the breakdownwas much the same: 32 seats for the Colorados,31 for the Blancos and 30 forProgressiveEncounter. n orderto preventgridlockin a congress almostevenlydivided three ways, Sanguinettihanded out six of 12 cabinet positions to theopposition Blancos and smaller parties in March 1995. Nevertheless, theseelections-the third in a decade-confirm that Uruguayanshave returnedtoparticipatorydemocracy, enabling very different political groups to expressthemselves.

ConclusionsThe Uruguayan and Paraguayancases teach broader, comparative lessonsregarding he vexing questionof democratisationn the ThirdWorld. One lessoncautions against the temptationto apply concepts (democratisation,militarydictatorship, otalitarianism, tc) to a broaderrange of cases than is warranted,leading to a stretchingor distortion of meaning associated with the originalconstruct.The Paraguayancase suggests that civil-military elites in Asunci6nare overseeing a controlled liberalisation from the top down, as a means ofmaintainingthe military-Colorado-bureaucraticriad that has ruled the nationfor 50 years.

Certain special characteristicsof the Paraguayanexperience also suggest aproto-totalitarian one going beyond the usual authoritarianmode. Paraguayhints that non-democraticregimes vary in direction, intensity and totality.Stroessner's dictatorship mplies that the larger taxonomies are more ordinalthannominal;not final, immutable orms.Paraguay'scurrent ransitional ystemlikewise defies normalcategorisation.To put it awkwardly,Paraguay s some-where between a less-than-democratic nd less-than-truly-authoritarianegime.Empirical understandingof comparative politics requires the use of morediscretecategories. Simply to termall systems as 'authoritarian' r 'democratic'obscures important distinctions.30Paraguay is 'liberalising'; perhaps even'democratising'. Paraguay appearsto be attemptingto blend newer tenets ofliberal pluralism with older authoritarian lements. Appearances,however, arefar from meaningless, as they sometimes create opportunities for furtherchanges.Thus a second lesson from both Uruguay and Paraguayconcerns the interac-tion of social movements and elite reformersin shaping newer democracies.120


14/18


While liberalisation s a cosmetic exercise in granting selected concessions as ameans of preserving the status quo, liberalisation sometimes provides strategicaperturesfor social movements to force democratisationwell beyond eliteintentions.31In the Uruguayancase, a military dictatorshiporganised a plebiscite it hopedto win in 1980, was shocked to lose it, but found it impossible to set aside theelection. Instead of provided a controlled, limited opening, Uruguay's generalsacceded to the vote count and returned power to civilians. Political scientistSamuelHuntingtonasserts that these 'stunningelections' arebecoming a patternin the breakdown of modern authoritarian egimes. Other recent examples inLatin America include the votes in Pichochet's Chile (1988) and SandinistaNicaragua (1990).32The whole notion of culturalexplanationsof national differences in politicalpractices emerges as a third lesson from these two cases. The cultural variableevokes almost violent debatein academic circles. Cultureexpresses the unique-ness of each nation, thus limiting generalisability across cases. Perhaps mostdamning,'culture'becomes an easy residualtautologicalcategorywhen no otherseems convenient, implying a certain fatalism regarding change. Research, forexample challenges the notion of a fundamentallyauthoritarian olitical culturein non-democraticregimes as 'natural'to the milieu.33If Uruguay's polyarchy was exceptional and thus not to be compared with amore Spanish-American, Indian, authoritarian,or 'backward culture' as inParaguay, what, then, led to the 1973 democratic breakdown?The Uruguayancase reminds us that more is at work in the demise of democraticregimes thansimply culture. A crucial factor in political development and decay remains apolitical system's response capacity in relationto demands.34Clearly,culturalexplanations,utilised sloppily, can lead to gross stereotypingand oversimplification.But the importanceof culture cannot be ignored. Care-fully utilised as one among several importantvariables (political institutions,class, exogenous factors) political culture illuminates other societies, non-ethno-centrically, by examining patternsof orientations.

Utilising the Paraguayancase as an example, one can argue that clientelism(interpersonal,dyadic 'contracts'binding individualsin asymmetricalrelation-ships of faithfulness and obligation)is both a cause and effect of authoritariancaudillismo;at least partly responsiblefor creatingan intellectual and politicalenvironmentconducive to the steady ascendancyof executive-caesarism,at theexpense of countervailing institutions (congresses, courts, pressure groups).Lower rankingmembers of a camarilla (political clique) anticipate aid, protec-tion and patronage while higher status individuals (patrons) expect loyalty,deference and service from their clients. Paraguayan society is composed ofgenerallyinterwovenchainslinkingthousandsof patron-clientrelationships hatare organised hierarchically.In this way they cut across class lines to separatethe peasantryand otherlower-class sectors from one another,while reinforcingthe status and power of elites. Moreover,distinctive to Paraguayanclientelismis the syndrome's linkage to the nationalpolitical party system. This effects thepoliticisation of the masses, yet directs their supportto reactionaryelites notacting in their interests.35

121


15/18

PAUL C SONDROL

In the end, any understanding f Paraguay's ransitionmust take into accountthe nation's sustained egacy of extremetyranny.Its culturedictatescircumspec-tion regarding he short-termhabituationof newer democraticnormsin the faceof long-standing personalist,militarist and elitist structuresand routines. Thecuartelazo by Senior Army Commander,General Lino Oviedo, in April 1996,only highlights the fact that the Paraguayanarmed forces may not govern atpresent, but they are never far from power. Since at least the Chaco War, noParaguayanregime has remained in power withoutmilitary backing.36A fourth lesson drawn from these cases concerns the issue of definingcivil-military relations,unresolved n ParaguayandUruguay,as elsewhere in thedevelopingworld. As a matterof definition,what, precisely,constitutes'success-ful' or 'permanent' military disengagement? Like the larger authoritarian,totalitarianor democratictaxonomies,the case studies imply that 'demilitarisa-tion' is more or less militarisation,rather than either civilian control of themilitary, or military interventionin politics. Does a shift from overt military'participation'n governmentdecisions to intermittent influence' mark success-ful withdrawal?In the Paraguayancase, how does a 'civilian' regime operatethat is characterisedby near-completemilitary jurisdictionover certainpolicymatters, with the army as a permanent actor in any calculus of power?Lastly, Paraguayand Uruguay teach us somethingof the issue of corruptionin developing societies. Corruptionn developingcountries is misunderstood nthe First World; there exist functional attributesto corruptionas a crucialmechanism in politics. By allocating spoils, corruption buys complicity andsupport from elites with a personal stake in the continuation of the system.Corruptions utilised as a purgingmechanism and scapegoat device; displacingblame for systemic, governmental failures and assigning culpability to lessdestabilisingindividuals('a few bad apples').37But corruptioncan become dysfunctionalif it assumes an ever-heighteningspiral beyond all rational boundaries.Corruptions pervasive in Paraguay.TheParaguayan orm of corruptionclosely approximates hat found in Mexico, butdiffers completely in magnitudeand nature from that found in Uruguay. TheUruguayan variety is a malodorous lubricant for local political bosses andentrepreneurs hat get public housing, highways, resorts and shopping centresbuilt. Paraguayancorruptionis incapacitating;a malignancy that poisons anentire political and social system in which people rapaciously prey upon oneanotherwith little thoughtof ultimateconsequences.38The Paraguayanand Uruguayancases clarify and suggest new questions andcrossnationalcomparisons regardingsuch diverse issues as civil-military rela-tions, personalistrule, clientelism, corruption, eformismand liberalisation,andhow value orientationsshape social structures.These are all universal phenom-ena, but their meaning is infinitelyvariableacross time and space. At present,no consensus exists among scholars as to which conditions, variables, orcharacteristics are most essential in understandingpolitics in the developingworld;no single, universalandteleological 'grand heory'of developmentexists.But this shifting focus in the literature,brimmingwith eclecticism and 'islands'of middle-range heories of change, represents ess fractureand more a vibrantmaturation of development studies. Paraguay and Uruguay illuminate the122


16/18


changes afoot in the Third World and the paradigms with which to betterunderstand hose changes.

Notes1Kenneth Johnson, 'Measuring the scholarly image of Latin American democracy, 1945-1985', in JamesWilkie, ed, Statistical Abstract of Latin America, 26, Los Angeles, UCLA Latin American Center, 1988,p 198. Johnson shows Paraguay ranking either 18th or 19th out of 20 Latin American states in ninesuccessive surveys of democraticdevelopment at five year intervals.Uruguay, however, consistently rankedas the most democratic nation in Latin America from 1945 until the mid-1960s.2Thus, to one degree or another, an underlying currentof authoritarianism nd personalism may be foundthroughoutLatin America, but its incidence and permanencevaries across time and space. Viewed in thislight, Paraguay'sGeneral Andr6s Rodriguez and Uruguay's Battle y Ord6fiezare not particularlydifferent.The more formal name for Uruguay's Blancos is the National Party. Paraguay'sColorado party is formallytermed the National Republican Association, or ANR.4See Herman Daly, 'The Uruguayan economy: its basic nature and current problems', Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 7, 1965, pp 316-30; Luis Costa Bonino, Crisis de los partidostradicionales y movimiento revolucionario en el Uruguay, Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental,1985.5See Alfredo Seiferheld, Nazismo y fascismo en el Paraguay: visperas de la II GuerraMundial, 1936-1939,Asunci6n: Editorial Historica, 1985, ch 4.6Paraguay had three strong dictatorsbetween independenceand the Triple Alliance War in 1865. After 1870,the next 80 years brought dozens of cuartelazos (barracks revolts), overt threats of coups and sevensuccessful ones. Between 1870 and the 1930s Paraguayhad 32 presidents, two of whom were assassinated

and three overthrown.In the decade 1901-11 Paraguayhad 10 presidents, including four in 1911.The parties emerged from the ashes of Paraguay's crushing defeat in the Triple Alliance War (1865-70).Those claiming to be the heirs to Francisco Solano L6pez formed the Colorado Party. The Liberals,fashioned from survivors and descendants of exiles who fled Paraguay during the father/son L6pezdictatorship, onstitutethe main opposition.As a result of their collaborationwith the occupying Braziliansafter the war, the Liberals suffered from an anti-patrioticstigma applied by the Colorados. See HarrisGaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The post-war Decade, 1869-1878, Austin, TX:University of Texas Press, 1978.On 'totalitarian'Uruguay,see Alfred Stepan, RethinkingMilitary Politics, Princeton, NJ: University Press,1988, p 14; and MartinWeinstein, Uruguay:Democracy at the Crossroads, Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1988, p 56. On Paraguay's 'military' dictatorship,see Roy Macridis, Modern Political Regimes, Boston,MA: Little, Brown, 1986, p 216.9On distinctions between bureaucratic-authoritariannd neoconservative military regimes, see Hector ESchamis, 'ReconceptualizingLatin American authoritarianismn the 1970s', ComparativePolitics, 23(2),1991, pp 201-20.10The term 'antipolitics'comes from Brian Loveman & Thomas JDavies, Jr, eds, ThePolitics of Antipolitics:the Military in Latin America, Lincoln, NB: University Press, 1989. The quote was translatedfrom themilitary communique,Juntade Comandantes n Jefe, Las FuerzasArmadas al Pueblo Oriental:el ProcesoPolitico, Montevideo:Las FuerzasArmadas, 1978, p 247.1 Paul C Sondrol, '1984 revisited? A re-examinationof Uruguay's military dictatorship',Bulletin of LatinAmericanResearch, 11 (2), 1992, pp 187-203.

12 Gabriel Almond & G Bingham Powell, ComparativePolitics: A Developmental Approach, Boston, MA:Little, Brown, 1966, pp 280-84.13 See R Andrew Nickson, 'Tyrannyand longevity: Stroessner'sParaguay',Third WorldQuarterly, 10 (1),1988, pp 237-59; Paul C Sondrol, 'Authoritarianism n Paraguay: an analysis of three contendingparadigms',Review of Latin AmericanStudies, 3 (1), 1990, pp 83-105.4 Stronismoshould not be confused with Coloradismo.By 1967 Stroessner had completely converted thecentury-oldpartyinto a personalistvehicle to develop a mass base of support.To the preexistingColorado'mentality' (traditionalhatredof the Liberals, a contempt for formal procedures,ratherpopulist in partyappeals to poor farmers), Stroessnermelded authoritywith control and representation nto a leadershipprinciple (Ftihrerprinzip) nd absolutistregime (Ftihrerstaat).Stroessner hus became 'El Continuador', nthe tradition of Francia and the L6pezes. See Robin Theobald, 'Patrimonialism:research note', WorldPolitics, 34, 1982, pp 548-549; FrederickHicks, 'Interpersonal elationshipsand caudillismoin Paraguay',Journal of InterAmericanStudies and WorldAffairs, 13, 1971, pp 89-111.

123


17/18

PAUL C SONDROL15 The totalitarianfeel of Stroessner's Paraguaywas evident in the Colorado party's systematisationoftraditionalhatreds nto a kind of ideology, mass-linepenetrationof societal life, and the politicisationof themilitary. What is particularly nterestingregardingStroessner is that his personalistrule rested upon nocharismaticelements. See Paul C Sondrol, 'Totalitarian nd authoritarian ictators:a comparisonof FidelCastroand AlfredoStroessner',Journalof LatinAmericanStudies,23 (3), 1991, pp 599-620. On the recentrelease of secret-police files, see R Andrew Nickson, 'Paraguay'sArchivo del terror', Latin AmericanResearch Review, 30 (1), 1995, pp 125-129.16 See Paul Lewis, Paraguay Under Stroessner, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press,17 pp 225-30.General Luis Queirolo,El Soldado, 74, August 1980. (El Soldado is a monthly periodicaland unofficialvoice of the officer corps published by the Centro Militar in Montevideo).18 See Charles G Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1991.19Corruption,as Stroessner once said, was 'the price of peace'. See Carlos Maria Lezcano G, 'Lealtad alGeneral-Presidente',Asunci6n:Investigaci6nesSociales Educaci6nComunicaci6n, 1986; Tomas Palau,ed,

Dictadura, Corrupcion y Transici6n, Asunci6n: BASE/InvestigacionesSociales, Programa de Estado ySociedad (ISPES), 1990. On the Paraguayaneconomy, see Bejamin Arditi, Recesion y estancamento: laeconomfaparaguaya duranteel periodo post-'boom' (1981-1986), Asunci6n: Centrode Documentaci6nyEstudios, 1987; Melissa H Birch, 'El legado econ6mico de los atios de Stroessnery el desaffo por lademocracia', in Diego Abente, ed, Paraguay en transicio'n,Asunci6n: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1993,2 pp 31-52.0 For analysis of the cronogramaof military withdrawal,see Luis E Gonzdlez, 'Uruguay, 1980-1981: anunexpectedopening', LatinAmerican Research Review, 19, 1983, pp 63-76.21 See ThomasCarothers, n the Name of Democracy: US Policy TowardLatin America in the Reagan Years,Berkeley, CA: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1991, pp 163-66. On Paraguay's nternationalsolation, seeJose Luis Sim6n, 'Aisalmiento politico internacionaly desconcertacion:El Paraguayde Stroessner deespaldas a America Latina',Revista Paraguaya de Sociologia, 25, 1988, pp 185-243.22 A more detailed examinationof background actorsleadingto the 1989 coup is provided n Paul C Sondrol,'The Paraguayanmilitary in transition and the evolution of civil-military relations', Armed Forces andSociety, 19(1), 1992, pp 105-22.23 The Cox newspapergroup, citing a classified US State Department eport,said Rodriguezwas consideredby US law enforcementauthorities o be Paraguay'snumberone narcotraficantero.See TheArizonaDailyStar (Tucson), 5 February 1989, p 11.24 RobertDahl, Polyarchy, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.25 Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy, p 239.26 JuanRial, 'The social imagery:utopianpoliticalmythsin Uruguay', n Saul Sosnowski & Louise B Popkin,eds, Repression, Exile, and Democracy: Uruguayan Culture, Durham,NC: Duke University Press, 1993,27 pp 85-86 (uncorrectedpage-galley proofs).See Jan Knippers Black, 'Almost free, almost fair: Paraguay's ambiguous election', NAcLA: Report onDemocracy, 27 (2), 1993, pp 26-8.28 Paul C Sondrol, 'The emerging new politics of liberalizing Paraguay:sustained civil-military controlwithout democracy',Journal of InteramericanStudies and WorldAffairs, 34 (2), 1992, pp 127-63.29 LatinAmerican WeeklyReport, 13 May 1993, p 213; 27 May 1993, p 1.30 In LarryDiamond,Juan Linz & SeymourMartinLipset, eds, Democracyin Developing Countries,Boulder,CO: LynneRiennerPublishers, 1990, p 8, the authorsoffer terms to indicate the mixtureof democraticandnon-democraticelements thatcan be found in the developing world. One generic hybrid regime is termed'pseudo-democracy',given the existence of democratic institutions and procedures (multipartyelections,new constitutions, etc) enshrined in law that often mask a de facto authoritarian egime as a way oflegitimising it. Paraguay's system, along with Mexico's, closely resembles this typology. But Paraguay'smilitaryoccupies a far greater place in politics than does Mexico's, thus Paraguayalso parallels the lessinstitutionalised, typically more personalistic and unstable Central American systems of El Salvador,Guatemalaor Honduras.31 ShahidQadir,et al, 'Sustainabledemocracy: ormalismvs substance', ThirdWorldQuarterly,14 (3), 1993,32 pp 415-22.Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK:University of OklahomaPress, 1991.33 See, for example, John A Booth & Mitchell Seligson, 'The political cultureof authoritarianismn Mexico:a reexamination',LatinAmericanResearch Review, 19 (1), 1984, pp 106-24; and Susan Tiano, 'Authoritar-ianismandpolitical culture n Argentinaand Chile in the mid-1960s', Latin AmericanResearch Review,21(1), 1986, pp 73-98.3 At the sametime, one could add that a militarycoup would surely have occurred-much earlier-in the longprocess of economic deteriorationand political delegitimation in any number of other Latin American/African/Asian cases that lacked the depth of Uruguay's democraticculture.124


18/18

PARAGUAYAND URUGUAY:MODERNITY ND TRANSITION35 Hicks, 'Interpersonal elationshipsand caudillismo in Paraguay'.36 On GeneralOviedo's attemptedputsch, see Wall Street Journal, 29 April 1996, p 1.37 Stephan D Morris, Corruptionand Politics in ContemporaryMexico, Tuscaloosa, AL University ofAlabamaPress, 1991.38 This observation s not empirical,nor universal;clearly thereare many honest, dedicatedpublic servants nParaguay.But low salaries commonlyjustify utilising one's office to 'supplement'one's income, if for noother reason than, 'everyone else does it'. These impressions were gleaned during extended visits toParaguayand Uruguayin 1989, and a year in Paraguayas a Fulbrightscholarin 1994 (includinga monthin Montevideo).

Contemporary South AsiaEDITORS

GowherRizvi,NewYork,USARobertCassen,QueenElizabethHouse,Oxford,UKThere s a growing ealizationhatSouthAsiahas to be bothtreated nd studied s aregion.ContemporaryouthAsia doesjustthat.Thepurpose f thejournals tocultivate nawarenesshatSouthAsia is more hana sumof its parts: fact of greatimportanceotonly to thestatesandpeoplesof theregion,but to theworldas awhole. It alsoaddresseshemajorssuesfacingSouthAsiafroma regional ndinterdisciplinaryerspective.ContemporaryouthAsia focuses on issuesconcerningheregion hatarenotcircumscribedy thenational orders f the states.Whilenational erspectivesrenot ignored,hejournal's verriding urposes to encouragecholarswithinSouthAsiaand n theglobalcommunityo search ormeans both heoreticalndpractical)by whichourunderstandingf thepresentproblems f cooperation ndconfrontationn theregioncan be enhanced.

Volume , 1997,3 issues.ISSN0958-4935.CarfaxPublishingCompanyPOox25*AbingdonOxfordshireX14 UE UK* Tel:+44(0)1235521154 Fax:+44(0)1235 01550 _ _1CARFAX E-mail:[email protected] WWW: ttp://www.carfax.co.uk CARFAX

125

SONDROL Paraguay and Uruguay Modernity Tradition and Transition (TWQ 1997)

Documents