Solving the Tibet Question: The Three-state Solution

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<Essay #1: Tibet>

C. Now that you know so much about the Tibet Question, come up with a workable solution that

addresses all the following problems:

-- How to give Tibetans their desired autonomy without splitting China.

-- Where to draw the boundaries

-- What to do about the rights of minorities in what becomes Tibet

-- How to defuse the claims and emotions of Chinese nationalists, who will see any compromise as a

total sellout

-- How to defuse the claims and emotions of independence-minded Tibetans and other Free Tibet

people who will see any compromise as a total sellout.

==================================================================

Solving the Tibet Question: The Three -state Solution

SISEA 470: Minority Peoples of China

Professor Steven Harrell

February 29th , 2012 (Wednesday)

Yoon Ju Kim #1039024

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The Question of Tibet, a dispute between those who support Tibet’s independence

and those who do not, has been going on for decades. In order to find middle ground between

independence-supporters and objectors, the Dalai Lama has numerously reiterated his

“Middle-way Approach1” as a solution to the Tibet Issue, asking the Chinese government to

give Tibet “genuine autonomy” (or “meaningful autonomy”) instead of outright

independence2. Realizing the gravity of the Tibet issue spurred by the 2008 March Incident,

and to finally resolve it through dialogue with the Chinese side, an envoy of the exiled-

Tibetan government presented the “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan

People3” to the representatives of the Chinese central government on November 2008 during

the 8th

round of discussions between the two governments, only to be rejected on the grounds

that what the exiled Tibetan government claimed as “genuine autonomy” was actually de

facto independence4. In response to the Chinese government’s objections of the original 2008

memorandum, in February 2010, a follow-up note5 was delivered to the Chinese government

during the 9th

round of Sino-Tibetan discussions.

Nonetheless, despite the efforts of the exiled Tibetan government to solve the Tibet

issue, protests have not died down. To make matters even worse, the Sino-Tibetan discussions

are currently at a stalemate due to the Chinese government’s refusal to come to the

negotiation table. Then what is the fundamental reason why this issue has not been settled for

so long? What is the best way to solve the issue? This paper argues that instead of asking for

“genuine autonomy,” the exiled government of Tibet should employ Hue Slater’s “Three-

state Solution6” because it is able to diffuse the claims and emotions of extremist

independence-seekers and naysayers. This paper introduces the key components that

constitute “genuine autonomy” and why the writer believes that the “Three-state Solution” is

the most ideal solution to the Tibet issue. In addition, the writer elaborates on how the

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proposed three states should be governed.

Territorial Boundaries of Tibet: Different Perceptions

Currently, the Chinese government identifies Tibet as the equivalent to the Tibet

Autonomous Region (TAR). Although, they have designated areas with a heavy population

(in many cases a dominant amount) of Tibetan inhabitants as “Tibetan” Autonomous

Prefectures (TAP) and “Tibetan” Autonomous Counties (TAC) (See <Map 1>), these

administrative-level autonomous areas are not officially recognized as part of “Tibet”. The

TAPs and TACs are parts of other provinces, namely, Qinghai, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Gansu

Province. Simply put, the Chinese government renders Tibet’s territorial boundaries strictly

according to administrative division.

On the other hand, the exiled Tibetan government sees “Tibet’s” current territorial

boundaries as ethnic or cultural. They argue that Tibet’s territorial boundaries coincide with

the outside boundaries of what used to be U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo (parts of southern and

western Qinghai, western Sichuan, southern Gansu, and northern Yunnan provinces plus the

Tibet Autonomous Region) (See <Map 2>), or otherwise known as the Tibetan Plateau,

Greater Tibet, or Ethnographic Tibet7.

Like other territorial disputes such as the “Diaoyu Islands/Senkaku Islands Dispute,”

the crux of the disagreement of what “Tibet” is derived from conflicting views on the history

of Tibet. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that both sides will come to an agreement on

Tibet’s history. Thus, it is best to approach the issue from a pragmatic angle. As <Map 3> and

<Map 4> show us, protests between 2008 and 2009, plus the recent self-immolations have

occurred in areas which used to be Amdo and Kham. Strong antagonism toward the Chinese

Party-state in these areas tell us that expanding the current Tibet territorial boundary from the

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TAR’s to those outlying the TAPs and TACs can help solve the Tibet Question.

Administrative Division of Greater Tibet Traditional Three kingdoms of Tibet

<Map 18> <Map 2

9>

<Map 310

>

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Tibetan self-immolations from 2009-2012

<Map 411

>

On “Genuine Autonomy”

The most fundamental reason why the exiled Tibetan government has been

constantly asking the Chinese government for Tibet’s “genuine autonomy” is because they

believe that it is crucial for preserving Tibetans’ cultural identity12

– an identity of which

religion is an integral part of. By forcing Tibetans to relinquish their religion, the Party-state

has been trying to wipe out the cultural identity of Tibetans.

In addition, in order to achieve “genuine autonomy,” organs of self-government (the

people’s congresses and people’s governments13

) have to be able to carry out their true

functions. It is stipulated in Article 11 of the Law of the PRC on Regional National

Autonomy (LRNA)14

that “the organs of self-government should guarantee the freedom of

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religious belief to citizens of various nationalities.” Furthermore, in Article 119 of the

Constitution, it is stated that “the organs of self-government of the national autonomous areas

independently administer cultural affairs in their respective areas, sort out and protect the

cultural legacy of the nationalities and work for the development and prosperity of their

cultures.”

However, by comparing TAR, TAPs and TACs to China’s provinces, we can see that

these autonomous areas have even less autonomy than provinces. For example, Article 116 in

the Constitution and Article 19 in the LRNA states that the autonomy regulations and specific

regulations of autonomous areas have to be “submitted to the Standing Committee of the

NPC for the TAR and LPC of respective provinces for TAPs and TACs to receive approval

before they go into effect.” On the other hand, Article 100 states that “LPCs of provinces

directly under the Central Government can adopt local regulations” without receiving

approval from the Standing Committee of the NPC to be enacted. All they have to do is report

the adopted regulations to the Standing Committee of the NPC for the record15

. Thus, we can

see that there exists a contradiction of content in the Chinese Constitution itself. In reality,

Tibetan autonomous areas’ organs of self-government are bound to the authority of higher

state organs and ultimately, the CCP. Also, in contrast to the “high-level autonomy” that the

Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of PRC (LHKSAR)16

bestows its

residents, the Law of the PRC on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) limits the scope of

autonomy for Tibetan autonomous areas.

Furthermore, notwithstanding what is written in China’s legal documents, the

Chinese government and the CCP frequently wield their discretionary power over the

documents, neglecting the Chinese legal system. In addition, implementation of the existing

laws and regulations has been slow. Thus, it is difficult for Tibetans to invest much trust in

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the Chinese legal system. Had the Chinese Party-state been more committed in reinforcing

the “rule of law,” resistance against the Chinese Party-state would not have been so strong.

“Genuine autonomy” also requires a “popularly-elected legislature and executive

selected through a democratic process” and “an independent judicial system17

.” In addition,

the exiled government is asking for a single administration for the newly autonomous Tibetan

nation18

. If the Chinese government grants “Tibet” the above, the exiled government has

promised to give China sovereignty over Tibet by handling “Tibet’s” international relations

and defense19

. Articles 2, 12, and 14 of the LHKSAR mention these components. Thus, we

can say that “genuine autonomy” is an amalgam of the provisions in the LHKSAR, PRC

Constitution, and LRNA.

The “Three-state Solution”

Hue Slater argues that asking the Chinese government to give Greater Tibet a single

administration in addition to the components mentioned above may be misinterpreted as

asking for de facto independence. In order to ensure the Chinese government and extremist

independence-naysayers that all the exiled government is asking for is “genuine autonomy,”

Slater proposes a separation of the (Greater) Tibetan nation into three separate local states

equivalent to the territorial boundaries of what used to be U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham.20

Separating administrative institutions can appease the worries of the Chinese government and

extreme independence-naysayers. He goes on to say that if the three newly autonomous areas

of Tibet can be “truly” and “autonomously” administered, then the emotions and claims of

extremist independence-seekers will die down.

All the same, Slater has not given any specific details on how he thinks these three

states should be governed. Thus, the writer proposes a mixture of EU-type legal institutions

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and an “Asian Values” sense of coming closer together through a common culture (The Dalai

Lama has tried to convince the (Han) Chinese that China and Tibet both have a common

culture: Buddhism) in addition to some components of “genuine autonomy” and a Hong

Kong-style “high-level autonomy.” Having a single regional administration with a separate

set of administrations for each state can help solve problems and issues between the three

states and increase co-existence with the whole of China as well. Furthermore, the newly

formed Tibetan nation must be politically linked to the central administration of the Tibetan

nation and the Chinese central government as well.

In addition, a separate Basic Law21

which caters to the different needs of non-

Tibetan minorities is needed to ensure their basic rights. Amdo and Kham’s population is

dominated by Tibetans and Han people, whereas over 95% of U-Tsang’s inhabitants are

Tibetans. Amdo and Kham have a different ratio of non-Tibetans. Amdo has a relatively large

population of Huis and Mongols, whereas Kham has a larger proportion of Lisu, Yi, Qiang,

and Naxi.22

Laws considering the minorities of what becomes “Tibet” will help maintain

stability in the newly constructed Tibet.

Conclusion

Tibetan ethnic nationalism has never been any stronger than in the recent years since

the 2008 March 14th

Incident. Han Chinese nationalism has strongly reacted to these

uprisings as well and conflict is at its highest point. As Dr. Lobsang Sangay says, “Now is the

time to find a solution to the Question of Tibet. Mutual understanding and trust must be the

first priority, but require both sides to take some risk.23

”

Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama’s “genuine autonomy” lacks content that ensures the

Chinese side that Tibet will not break away from China. Thus, the proposal of “genuine

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autonomy” has not been able to bring the Chinese government back to the negotiation table.

Moreover, it was not able to mitigate the strong emotional cries of independence-seekers and

naysayers. Therefore, Hue Slater has proposed a “Three-state Solution” to temper the

emotions and claims of strong independence supporters and objectors. The writer of this

paper argues that Hue Slater’s idea is a better solution compared to “genuine autonomy.”

However, all else equal, she believes that the “Three-state Solution” needs to be more

thoroughly examined and reified in order to bear fruition. Thus, the writer has proposed the

addition of EU-style legal institutions and using Buddhism to create a certain type of

commonness between the Han and Tibetans like the “Asian Values” discourse has done. In

addition, she has suggested the construction and implementation of a separate Basic Law to

protect the rights of minorities of what becomes the newly created autonomous Tibet.

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Notes

1 http://www.dalailama.com/messages/middle-way-approach\ (retrieved on February 20th

, 2012)

2 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/04/03/clarity-on-negotiating-the-tibetan-issue/

(retrieved on February 12th, 2012)

3See “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.” at

http://www.freetibet.org/about/memorandum-genuine-autonomy-tibetan-people

(retrieved on February 15th, 2012)

4 Ibid.

5 See “Note on the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” at

http://www.tibetpolicy.eu/resource-center/official-documents/321-note-on-the-memorandum-on-genuine-

autonomy-for-the-tibetan-people (retrieved on February 20th, 2012)

6 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/22/tibetan-autonomy-a-compromise-three-state-solution/

(retrieved on February 12th

, 2012)

7 Jeon, Jae-Woong. “Modernization Project in T.ibet: Focusing on China’s Policy Changes.” Diss. Seoul

National University, 2008: 8. Print.

8 http://blog.snowliontours.com/2010/04/map-of-tibet/ (retrieved on February 12th, 2012)

9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tibet_provinces.png (retrieved on February 12th, 2012)

10 http://www.savetibet.org/policy-center/topics-fact-sheets/tibet-maps (retrieved on February 22nd

, 2012)

11 http://www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-news-reports/map-tibetan-self-immolations

(retrieved on February 22nd, 2012)

12 See “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.”

13 See Article 112 of “PRC Constitution.”

14 See “Law of the PRC on Regional National Autonomy.” at

http://www.novexcn.com/regional_nation_autonomy.html (retrieved on February 12th, 2012)

15 See “Note on the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People”

16 See Article 2 of “The Basic Law Of The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”

http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text.pdf

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17 See http://www.dalailama.com/messages/middle-way-approach

18 See “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” and “Note on the Memorandum on

Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People.”

19 See http://www.dalailama.com/messages/middle-way-approach

20 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/22/tibetan-autonomy-a-compromise-three-state-solution/\

21 A Basic Law like the LHKSAR which is the constitutional document of Hong Kong Special Administration

Region

22 I was unable to find specific census data so I used data from Wikipedia. I added up the population percentage

of the leading ethnic groups in the TAR and all the TAPs and TACs for the three regions of U-Tsang, Kham and

Amdo.

23 See “Dr. Lobsang Sangay on Situation in Tibet” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68TXUsUXd-k,

2008. Web. 27 Feb. 2011.