Solvay secure application layer v2015 seba

Secure the Application Layer

Sebastien Deleersnyder

OWASP Foundation

March 2015

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Overview

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Sebastien Deleersnyder?

– 5 years developer experience

– 15+ years information security experience

– Consultant & managing partner Toreon

– Belgian OWASP chapter founder

– OWASP volunteer

– www.owasp.org

– Co-organizer www.BruCON.org

OWASP World

OWASP is a worldwide free and open community focused on improving the security of application software.

Our mission is to make application security visible so that people and organizations can make informed decisions about application security risks.

Everyone is free to participate in OWASP and all of our materials are available under a free and open software license.

The OWASP Foundation is a 501c3 not-for-profit charitable organization that ensures the ongoing availability and support for our work.

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Agenda

• Why application security matters

• OWASP top 10 v2013

• Mobile, Cloud, IoT Security

• Software Assurance Maturity Model

• Application security resources

Why application security matters?

Web Application Security Problem

• 75% of attacks are aimed straight at the application layer (GARTNER)

• 92% are application vulnerabilities instead of network vulnerabilities (NIST)

• Recent examples (2011-2012):

Citibank breached using simple URL manipulation. 200,000 customer accounts compromised.

Rabobank knocked offline by DDOS attackCaused outage of Dutch central payment system

Elantis held to ransom over hacked customer data Target Shares Tumble As Retailer

Reveals Cost Of Data Breach (148M $) – 70 M customer data leaked

Hacktivism

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e-Crime Inc

• Online Extortion

• Phishing

• Denial of Service

• Credit Card Stealing

• Bot Infection

• Bot-net pharming

• Sell phishing tools

• ...

See the Web Hacking Incidents Database on

http://www.webappsec.org/projects/whid/

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State actors

• Track users

• Drive-by downloads

• Social engineering

• Tapping Telcos

• Hacking Telcos (BICS)

• Crypto backdoors

• Industrial espionage

"Electronic devices are increasingly embedded in everything from vehicles to guided missiles, and are often integrated into systems which are difficult and costly to update or upgrade as new threats or vulnerabilities are identified with increasing speed and widely ranging tempo," he explained. "These factors represent malefactors impacting our warfighting systems.“ …Army.mil/News - Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon

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Myth

Myth: we are secure because we have a firewall

75% of Internet Vulnerabilities are at Web Application Layer *

*Gartner Group (2002 report)

|12Source: Jeremiah Grossman, BlackHat 2001

last century technology

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• Myth 2 - we are secure because we use SSL

– only secures data in transit

– does not solve vulnerabilities on:

• Web server

• Browser

Myth

|15Firew

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Hardened OS

Web Server

App Server

Firewall

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Application CodeAPPLICATION

ATTACK

You can’t use network layer protection (firewall, SSL, IDS, hardening) to stop or detect application layer attacks

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Your security “perimeter” has huge holes at the application layer

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Trends

• Business demands more bells and whistles

• Internal applications get ‘web-enabled’ and are exposed to Intranet or Internet

• Increasing complexity of software

• Rush software out without adequate testing

• Poor security training and awareness

OWASP Top 10

OWASP Top 10

• OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks

• 2013 Release

• A great start, but not a standard

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OWASP Top Ten (2013 Edition)

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OWASP Top 10 Risk Rating Methodology

ThreatAgent

AttackVector

Weakness PrevalenceWeakness

DetectabilityTechnical Impact Business Impact

?Easy Widespread Easy Severe

?Average Common Average Moderate

Difficult Uncommon Difficult Minor

2 1 1 2

1.3 * 2

2.6 weighted risk rating

XSS Example

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A1 – Injection

•Tricking an application into including unintended commands in the data sent to an interpreter

Injection means…

•Take strings and interpret them as commands

•SQL, OS Shell, LDAP, XPath, Hibernate, etc…

Interpreters…

•Many applications still susceptible (really don’t know why)

•Even though it’s usually very simple to avoid

SQL injection is still quite common

•Usually severe. Entire database can usually be read or modified

•May also allow full database schema, or account access, or even OS level access

Typical Impact

example : SQL-injection attack

Select user_informationfrom user_tablewhere username=’input username’ and password=’input password’

Web Server Application Server

User DatabaseUser

https

Select user_informationfrom user_tablewhere username=’’ or 1=1 -- ‘ and password=’abc’

DEMO

Go shopping …

• … A federal grand jury on Monday indicted Albert Gonzalez and two unidentified Russian accomplices on charges related to data intrusions at Heartland, Hannaford Bros., 7-Eleven and three other retailers. Gonzalez is alleged to have masterminded an international operation that stole a staggering 130 million credit and debit card numbers from those companies.

• … Court documents filed in connection with Monday's indictment spelled out how Gonzalez and his accomplices used SQL injection attacks to break into Heartland's systems and those of the other companies.

http://www.computerworld.com/article/2527185/security0/sql-injection-attacks-led-to-heartland--hannaford-breaches.html

A2 – Broken Authentication and Session Management

•Means credentials have to go with every request

•Should use SSL for everything requiring authentication

HTTP is a “stateless” protocol

•SESSION ID used to track state since HTTP doesn’t

•and it is just as good as credentials to an attacker

•SESSION ID is typically exposed on the network, in browser, in logs, …

Session management flaws

•Change my password, remember my password, forgot my password, secret question, logout, email address, etc…

Beware the side-doors

•User accounts compromised or user sessions hijacked

Typical Impact

Session Fixation Attack

DEMO

A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• Raw data from attacker is sent to an innocent user’s browser

Occurs any time…

• Stored in database

• Reflected from web input (form field, hidden field, URL, etc…)

• Sent directly into rich JavaScript client

Raw data…

• Try this in your browser – javascript:alert(document.cookie)

Virtually every web application has this problem

• Steal user’s session, steal sensitive data, rewrite web page, redirect user to phishing or malware site

• Most Severe: Install XSS proxy which allows attacker to observe and direct all user’s behavior on vulnerable site and force user to other sites

Typical Impact

XSS Definition

• XSS = Cross-site Scripting

• Web application vulnerability

• Injection of code into web pages viewed by others

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Example:User input is retrieved from the “name” parameter

http://myserver.com/XSS.jsp?name=Pieter

Result (HTML returned to the browser):

...

<h1>Hello Pieter</h1>

...

Input is embedded inside the HTML response:

..

Out.print(“<h1>”+request.getParameter(“name”)+”</h1>”);

..

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)Abused by the attacker:Attacker inserts javascript code at the “username” parameter

http://myserver.com/XSS.jsp?name=<script>code</script>

Result (HTML returned to the browser):

...

<h1>Hello <script>code</script></h1>

...

Input is embedded inside the HTML response:

..

Out.print(“<h1>”+request.getParameter(“name”)+”</h1>”);

..

DEMO

XSSED.ORG

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Browser Exploitation Framework

A4 – Insecure Direct Object References

• This is part of enforcing proper “Authorization”, along with A7 – Failure to Restrict URL Access

How do you protect access to your data?

• Only listing the ‘authorized’ objects for the current user, or

• Hiding the object references in hidden fields

• … and then not enforcing these restrictions on the server side

• This is called presentation layer access control, and doesn’t work

• Attacker simply tampers with parameter value

A common mistake …

• Users are able to access unauthorized files or data

Typical Impact

Insecure Direct Object References Illustrated

• Attacker notices his acct parameter is 6065

?acct=6065

• He modifies it to a nearby number

?acct=6066

• Attacker views the victim’s account information

https://www.onlinebank.com/user?acct=6065

A5 – Security Misconfiguration

• All through the network and platform

• Don’t forget the development environment

Web applications rely on a secure foundation

• Think of all the places your source code goes

• Security should not require secret source code

Is your source code a secret?

• All credentials should change in production

Configuration Management must extend to all parts of the application

• Install backdoor through missing network or server patch

• XSS flaw exploits due to missing application framework patches

• Unauthorized access to default accounts, application functionality or data, or unused but accessible functionality due to poor server configuration

Typical Impact

Hardened OS

Web Server

App Server

Framework

Security Misconfiguration Illustrated

App Configuration

Custom Code

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Test Servers

QA Servers

Source Control

Development

Database

Insider

Serving up malware

A quick Google Safe Browsing search of TechCrunch Europe's site shows suspicious activity twice over the last 90 days. "Of the 128 pages we tested on the site over the past 90 days, 58 page(s) resulted in malicious software being downloaded and installed without user consent.”(sep 2010)

Reason: unpatched WordPress

A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure

•Failure to identify all sensitive data

•Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data gets stored

•Databases, files, directories, log files, backups, etc.

•Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data is sent

•On the web, to backend databases, to business partners, internal communications

•Failure to properly protect this data in every location

Storing and transmitting sensitive data insecurely

•Attackers access or modify confidential or private information

•e.g, credit cards, health care records, financial data (yours or your customers)

•Attackers extract secrets to use in additional attacks

•Company embarrassment, customer dissatisfaction, and loss of trust

•Expense of cleaning up the incident, such as forensics, sending apology letters, reissuing thousands of credit cards, providing identity theft insurance

•Business gets sued and/or fined

Typical Impact

Insecure Cryptographic Storage Illustrated

Custom Code

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1Victim enters credit card number in form

2Error handler logs CC details because merchant gateway

is unavailable

4 Malicious insider steals 4 million credit card numbers

Log files

3Logs are accessible to all members of IT staff for

debugging purposes

Leaking customer data?

• customer data, 77 Million compromised.(potentially CCs as well)

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Ook in België!

http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datalek

A7 – Missing Function Level Access Control

• This is part of enforcing proper “authorization”, along with A4 – Insecure Direct Object References

How do you protect access to URLs (pages)?

• Displaying only authorized links and menu choices

• This is called presentation layer access control, and doesn’t work

• Attacker simply forges direct access to ‘unauthorized’ pages

A common mistake …

• Attackers invoke functions and services they’re not authorized for

• Access other user’s accounts and data

• Perform privileged actions

Typical Impact

Failure to Restrict URL Access Illustrated

• Attacker notices the URL indicates his role

/user/getAccounts

• He modifies it to another directory (role)

/admin/getAccounts, or

/manager/getAccounts

• Attacker views more accounts than just their own

https://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccountshttps://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccounts

A8 – Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

• An attack where the victim’s browser is tricked into issuing a command to a vulnerable web application

• Vulnerability is caused by browsers automatically including user authentication data (session ID, IP address, Windows domain credentials, …) with each request

Cross Site Request Forgery

• What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your online banking application?

• What could they make you do?

Imagine…

• Initiate transactions (transfer funds, logout user, close account)

• Access sensitive data

• Change account details

Typical Impact

CSRF Illustrated

page 44

Browser

example.bank.com bad.site.com<img src=“…”>

<img src=

"https://example.bank.com/transfer?

account=Pieter&amount=1000000&for=Attacker">

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$$$

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CSRF Illustrated

DEMO

SAMY XSS Worm

A9 – Using Known Vulnerable Components

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• Some vulnerable components (e.g., framework libraries) can be identified and exploited with automated tools

• This expands the threat agent pool beyond targeted attackers to include chaotic actors

Vulnerable Components Are Common

• Virtually every application has these issues because most development teams don’t focus on ensuring their components/libraries are up to date

• In many cases, the developers don’t even know all the components they are using, never mind their versions. Component dependencies make things even worse

Widespread

• Full range of weaknesses is possible, including injection, broken access control, XSS ...

• The impact could range from minimal to complete host takeover and data compromise

Typical Impact

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1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

10,000,000

100,000,000

Everyone Uses Vulnerable Libraries29 MILLION vulnerable

downloads in 2011

Libraries 31

Library

Versions

1,261

Organizations 61,807

Downloads 113,939,358

Vulnerable Download

26%Safe

Download

74%

https://www.aspectsecurity.com/news/press/the-unfortunate-reality-of-insecure-libraries

Automation Example for Java – Use Maven ‘Versions’ Plugin

Output from the Maven Versions Plugin – Automated Analysis of Libraries’ Status against Central repository

Most out of Date! Details Developer Needs

This can automatically be run EVERY TIME software is built!! 49

A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

• And frequently include user supplied parameters in the destination URL

• If they aren’t validated, attacker can send victim to a site of their choice

Web application redirects are very common

• They internally send the request to a new page in the same application

• Sometimes parameters define the target page

• If not validated, attacker may be able to use unvalidated forward to bypass authentication or authorization checks

Forwards (aka Transfer in .NET) are common too

• Redirect victim to phishing or malware site

• Attacker’s request is forwarded past security checks, allowing unauthorized function or data access

Typical Impact

Unvalidated Redirect Illustrated

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2

Attacker sends attack to victim via email or webpageFrom: Internal Revenue ServiceSubject: Your Unclaimed Tax RefundOur records show you have an unclaimed federal tax refund. Please click here to initiate your claim.

1 Application redirects victim to attacker’s site

Request sent to vulnerable site, including attacker’s destination site as parameter. Redirect sends victim to attacker site

Custom Code

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4 Evil site installs malware on victim, or phish’s for private information

Victim clicks link containing unvalidated parameter

Evil Site

http://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006&… &dest=www.evilsite.com

Jobs by CNN?

• http://ads.cnn.com/event.ng/Type=click&Redirect=http:/bit.ly/cP–XW

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Mobile, Cloud, IoT Security

Mobile Threat Model

• Platforms vary with mileage

• Very different from traditional web app model due to other use cases and usage patterns

• Must consider more than the ‘apps’

• Remote web services

• Platform integration (iCloud, C2DM)

• Device (in)security considerations

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Mobile Attack Surface

Mobile Threat Model

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Mobile top 10 risks

Only 1% of consumers feel safe using mobile payments

* http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=17767

work in progress

• OWASP Mobile Security Project

• Roadmap:– Threat Model

– Top 10 Mobile Risks

– Top 10 Mobile Controls

– Platform-Specific Guidance

– Training (goat droid)

– Cheat Sheets

– Security Testing Methodologies

Critical threats to cloud security:1. Data Breaches 2. Data Loss 3. Account Hijacking 4. Insecure APIs 5. Denial of Service 6. Malicious Insiders 7. Abuse of Cloud Services 8. Insufficient Due Diligence 9. Shared Technology Issues* The Notorious Nine 2013 - CSA

Cloud hacks / incidents

Considering cloud storage / services?

Mandatory reading:

• Security Guidance 3.0

• Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) 3.0

by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) cloudsecurityalliance.org

Internet of Things Top 10 - Complete IoT Review

• Review all aspects of Internet of Things

• Top Ten Categories

• Covers the entire device

• Without comprehensive coverage like this it would be like getting your physical but only checking one arm

• We must cover all surface area to get a good assessment of overall security

Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)

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“Build in” software assurance

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Design Build Test Production

vulnerability

scanning -

WAF

security testing

dynamic test

tools

coding guidelines

code reviews

static test tools

security

requirements /

threat modeling

reactiveproactive

Secure Development Lifecycle

(SAMM)

We need a Maturity ModelAn organization’s

behavior changes slowly

over time

Changes must be iterative while

working toward long-term goals

There is no single recipe that

works for all organizations

A solution must enable risk-basedchoices tailored to the organization

Guidance related to security

activities must be prescriptive

A solution must provide enough details for non-security-people

Overall, must be simple, well-defined, and measurable

OWASP Software Assurance

Maturity Model (SAMM)

SAMM Security Practices

• From each of the Business Functions, 3 Security Practices are defined

• The Security Practices cover all areas relevant to software security assurance

• Each one is a ‘silo’ for improvement

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Under each Security Practice• Three successive Objectives under each Practice define how it can be

improved over time

• This establishes a notion of a Level at which an organization fulfills a given Practice

• The three Levels for a Practice generally correspond to:

• (0: Implicit starting point with the Practice unfulfilled)

• 1: Initial understanding and ad hoc provision of the Practice

• 2: Increase efficiency and/or effectiveness of the Practice

• 3: Comprehensive mastery of the Practice at scale

Per Level, SAMM defines...

• Objective

• Activities

• Results

• Success Metrics

• Costs

• Personnel

• Related Levels

Three successive Objectives under each Practice

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Education & Guidance

Resources:

• OWASP Top 10

• OWASP Education

• WebGoat

Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day;

Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.

Chinese proverb

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Secure Coding Practices Quick Reference Guide

• Technology agnostic coding practices

• What to do, not how to do it

• Compact, but comprehensive checklist format

• Focuses on secure coding requirements, rather

then on vulnerabilities and exploits

• Includes a cross referenced glossary to get developers and security folks talking the same language

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Secure_Coding_Practices_-_Quick_Reference_Guide

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Code Review

Resources:

• OWASP Code Review Guide

SDL Integration:

• Multiple reviews defined as deliverables in your SDLC

• Structured, repeatable process with management support

• Reviews are exit criteria for the development and test phases

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OWASP Cheat Sheets

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets

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Code review tooling

Code review tools:

• OWASP LAPSE (Security scanner for Java EE Applications)

• MS FxCop / CAT.NET (Code Analysis Tool for .NET)

• Agnitio (open source Manual source code review support tool)

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Security Testing

Resources:

• OWASP ASVS

• OWASP Testing Guide

SDL Integration:

• Integrate dynamic security testing as part of you

test cycles

• Derive test cases from the security requirements

that apply

• Check business logic soundness as well as

common vulnerabilities

• Review results with stakeholders prior to release

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Security Testing

• Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP)• Automated & manual scanner to find

vulnerabilities

Features:• Intercepting proxy• Automated scanner• Passive scanner• Brute force scanner• Spider• Fuzzer• Port scanner• Dynamic SSL Certificates• API• Beanshell integration

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Web Application Firewalls

Network

Firewall

Web

Application

Firewall

Web

Server

Web client

(browser)

Malicious web traffic

Legitimate web traffic

Port 80

– ModSecurity: Worlds No 1 open source Web Application Firewall

– www.modsecurity.org• HTTP Traffic Logging• Real-Time Monitoring and Attack Detection• Attack Prevention and Just-in-time Patching• Flexible Rule Engine• Embedded Deployment (Apache, IIS7 and Nginx)• Network-Based Deployment (reverse proxy)

– OWASP ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project, generic, plug-n-play set of WAF rules

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https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_ModSecurity_Core_Rule_Set_Project

The OWASP Enterprise Security API

Custom Enterprise Web Application

Enterprise Security API

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Existing Enterprise Security Services/Libraries

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Enterprise_Security_API

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SAMM Quick Start

ASSES

questionnaire

GOALgap analysis

PLAN roadmap

IMPLEMENT

OWASP resources

Asses

• SAMM includes assessment worksheets for each Security Practice

Goal

• Gap analysis

• Capturing scores from detailed assessments versus expected performance levels

• Demonstrating improvement

• Capturing scores from before and after an iteration of assurance program build-out

• Ongoing measurement

• Capturing scores over consistent time frames for an assurance program that is already in place

Plan

• Roadmaps: to make the “building blocks” usable.

• Roadmaps templates for typical kinds of organizations

• Independent Software Vendors

• Online Service Providers

• Financial Services Organizations

• Government Organizations

• Tune these to your own targets / speed

150+ OWASP Projects

PROTECT

Tools: AntiSamy Java/:NET, Enterprise Security API (ESAPI), ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project

Docs: Development Guide, .NET, Ruby on Rails Security Guide, Secure Coding Practices - Quick Reference Guide

DETECT

Tools: JBroFuzz, Lice CD, WebScarab, Zed Attack Proxy

Docs: Application Security Verification Standard, Code Review Guide, Testing Guide, Top Ten Project

LIFE CYCLE

SAMM, WebGoat, Legal Project

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Application security resources

Hard Copy

Hard Copy• The Web Application Hacker's Handbook: Finding and Exploiting Security Flaws -

Dafydd Stuttard• Secure Programming with Static Analysis – Brian Chess, Jacob West• The Art of Software Security Assessment – Mark Dowd, John McDonald , Justin Schuh• The Security Development Lifecycle – Michael Howard• Threat Modeling – Frank Swiderski, Window Snyder• Securing Web Services with WS-Security – Rosenberg & Remy• Core Security Patterns – Steel, Nagappan & Ray Lai• Security Metrics – Andrew Jaquith• Secure Programming with Static Analysis – Brian Chess, Jacob West• The Art of Software Security Assessment – Mark Dowd, John McDonald , Justin Schuh• The Security Development Lifecycle – Michael Howard• Threat Modeling, designing for security – Adam Shostack• Securing Web Services with WS-Security – Rosenberg & Remy• Core Security Patterns – Steel, Nagappan & Ray Lai• Security Metrics – Andrew Jaquith

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www.owasp.org

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Other web sites

• www.webappsec.org• www.cgisecurity.com• buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov• www.cert.org• www.sans.org• samate.nist.gov

• Tools– www.owasp.org/index.php/Phoenix/Tools

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Mailing Lists

• OWASP Project Mailing lists

• Secure Coding List

• [email protected]

• [email protected] (WASC)

• SANS NewsBites

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AppSec RSS Feed

feeds.feedblitz.com/OWASP

Twitter• @owasp_be• @ivanristic• @johnwilander• @briankrebs• @psiinon• @krvw• @0x6D6172696F• @mikko• @jeremiahg• @DinisCruz• @w3af• @owasp• @pdp• @vanderaj

OWASP 24/7

https://soundcloud.com/owasp-podcast

OWASP Video

www.youtube.com/owaspglobal

SAMM Roadmap

Friday – User Day

• Talks

• Training

• Topic roundtables

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Saturday – Project Day

•Publish SAMM v1.1

•Workshops

•Road map

owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_SAMM_Summit_2015

Key notes:

• Troy Hunt

• Simon Bennets

• Frank Breedijk

• Joshua Corman

• Tobias Gondrom

• Jim Manico

• Steve Lord

• Matt Tesauro

Belgium Chapter

• Meetings

• Local Mailing List

• Presentations & Groups

• Open forum for discussion

• Meet fellow InfoSec professionals

• Create (Web)AppSec awareness

• Local projects?

http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Belgium

Get involved

• Use and donate (feed)back!

• Attend chapter meetings

• Contribute to projects

• Donate resources

• Sponsor chapters / projects

• Become Member

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That’s it…

[email protected]@SebaDele

[email protected]

Thank you!