Soldier of All (Special Issue July 2010) - Indispensable Role of LGUs in Counterinsurgency (PH)

8/9/2019 Soldier of All (Special Issue July 2010) - Indispensable Role of LGUs in Counterinsurgency (PH)

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THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF LGUsIN COUNTER-INSURGENCYBrigadier General Francisco N Cruz Jr AFP

Special Issue Ofcial Publication of the Civil Relations Service, AFP July 2010


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SOLDIER OF ALLOfficial Publication of

The Civil Relations Service,Armed Forces of the Philippines

1 Preface

3 The CNN Insurgency

7 Center of Gravity

9 Good Governance:The Silver Bullet

13 The Peace andOrder Counci l

17 Bohol and Cebu as Models ofMilitary and Civilian Unity of

Efforts

17 1. Bohol

21 2. Cebu

23 Insurgency isDeclining

Steadfast ly

25 Conclusion

The cover depicts different membersof society pushing a symbolic CPP-NPA-NDF (CNN) effigy towards a cliff and

away from a progressive community.

This is an illustration of the need to

unify civilian and military efforts in

ending insurgency with the Local Chief

Executives leading the campaign.


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Civilianizing the

insurgency war:

The Indispensable Role of

LGUs In Counter-insurgency

CNN insurgency is an armedrebellion by CPP-NPA-NDF(CNN) against the government.

Its ultimate goal is to overthrow currentregime and then establish a communiststate which it would call the PeoplesDemocratic Republic of the Philippines.

A

fter 41 years of violent struggle,CNN failed to grab politicalpower, and will never succeed,

for varied reasons:

a. It is still in the defensive stage of theprotracted war, it failed to advance into stalemate

stage where its military power should be at par

with that of the government forces.

b. It has no state sponsor. Communist

Russia, China and Vietnam declined to interfere

in the internal security affairs of the country.

c. It has extinct ideology manifested by the

collapse of USSR.

d. CNN is losing peoples support due to

its unthinkable sins against the Filipino people,

ranging from murder, extortion to economic

sabotage.

Brigadier General Francisco N Cruz Jr AFPCommander, Civil Relatons Service

June 2010

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Essential though it is, the military action issecondary to the political one, its primary purpose

being to afford the political power enough freedom

to work safely with the population.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 1964

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In the words of Che Guevarra, It is not possible tomake a successful revolution against a state that isdemocratic the ballot box is the cofn of insurgency.

For as long as our democracy remains vibrant and our elections

credible and free, the CNN cannot achieve victory.

e. Land reform has drained its pondof peasant supporters.

f. Governments anti-poverty programsare helping impede CNNs recruitment.

g. Lastly, CNN can never succeed in ademocracy like the Philippines.

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BUT CNN CANENDURE... It has nationwidepresence, its strongholds are ungoverned andmisgoverned areas. It has become a politicalforce that can inuence policy. It has a well builtpropaganda machinery. Some political leadersare allied with the insurgents. The social andpolitical ills of the society fuel the insurgency,like poverty, ignorance and deprivation.Lastly, the military is thinly spread, and hasto confront other serious threats, namely theMuslim separatist insurgency and the AbuSayyaf terrorism.

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The support of the people is thesine qua non of success in COIN efforts.

The people and not the NPAghters is the center of gravity in theinsurgency war, for it is the people

that give life to the insurgent. Accordingto Mao Tse Tung, Because guerillawarfare basically derives from the massesand is supported by them, it can neitherexist nor ourish if it separates itselffrom their sympathies and cooperation.

For British Field Marshal Sir GeraldTemplar, The shooting side to thebusiness (of counterinsurgency)

is only 25% of the trouble, the other75% lies in getting the people of thiscountry behind us. Moreover, TELawrence of Arabia stresses; Rebellionscan be made by 2% active in a strikingforce and 98% passively sympathetic.

The people and

the center of gravity

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Therefore, the support of the people is themost critical in countering insurgency.Without it, the CNN is dead. We

need to measure the effectiveness of our

counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, not bybody counts by the sum of cooperation andsupport given by the people. Thus, the peoplehave to be convinced that they are better off withthe government than with the rebel movement.

...the people have

to be convinced

that they are

better off with the

government thanwith the rebel

movement...

the NPA fghters is

he insurgency war...

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We have to civilianize this war and allownon-military methods to dominate theCOIN strategy. To civilianize the war

is to let the Local Chief Executives (LCEs) lead thecampaign, and to use less force--more carrots thansticks. An ideal campaign plan is conceived andimplemented in harmony with all stakeholders, andwith the LCEs leading the ght. The AFPs main roleis to secure communities and allow development toprosper.

General Emilio Ponce of El Salvador observes,Ninety percent of countering insurgency ispolitical, social, economic and ideological

and only 10% military. The governments responseto insurgency requires a holistic approach to addressthe root causes of insurgency, not just its symptoms. The governme

approach to addr

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Failed governance is at the heart of continuing internal armed conicts in thePhilippines. Managing these conicts requires increased government effectiveness

in delivering basic services, especially in poor conict-areas of the country, as well

as better administration of justice.

-2008 Conerence Report,

Can The Philippines Break Out o Its Afiction?


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esponse to insurgency requires a holistic

e root causes of insurgency, not just its symptoms...

We have to civilianize this war

and allow non-military methods

to dominate the COIN strategy...

90% ofcounteringinsurgencyispolitical,social,economicand

ideologicalandonly10%military.

-GeneralEmilioPonce

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AFP can only ad

capability but LGUs people join the rebe

Political warfare should take precedenceover physical warfare or combat.Political warfare may encompass

everything other than military opeartions.

These would include Social IntegrationProgram or SIP under OPAPP, amnesty,rural development and poverty reductionprograms, information efforts (improvingimage of government), peace advocacies bycivil society, sustainable land reform, andmost importantly a peace process

A

s former NSA Jose Almonte said,Killing the insurgents will not killinsurgency. One of objectives of the

counterinsurgent therefore is to persuadethe rebels to come out and join mainstream

society, through a mixture of military andnon-military methods. As one British ofcerwrote: Persuading a man to join you is far cheaper than

killing him. by killing him you merely deprive anenemy of one soldier. If he is persuaded to join thegovernment forces, the enemy becomes one less,but the government forces become one more, a gainof plus two.

Invariably, our military campaign called BantayLaya cannot win this war by itself. The COINchain is only as strong as its weakest link. We

need the LGUs and other agencies of the governmentto take active role. AFP can only address insurgentmilitary capability but LGUs can address thereasons why people join the rebel movement. TheStrategy of Holistic Approach confronts both rebelcapabilities and motivations. The bottomline of

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the National Strategy to Overcome Insurgency isGood Governance, focused on poverty reductionand suppressing injustice.

The heart of the matter is, to gain peoplessupport, encourage rebel surrender and

thwart insurgent recruitment, we needto govern more effectively, bring hope to thepeople, and for our political leaders to take thelead. Good governance is the silver bullet thatwill kill the insurgency.

insurgent military

address the reasons whyement...

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T

he Peace and Order Council (POC) hasbeen put in place to unify military andcivilian efforts in defeating insurgency.

It is in this light that EO 773 is formulated---to achieve unity of efforts or convergence.Among the salient points of EO 773 are: In theprovincial level: the Provincial Governor actsas POC Chairperson; three representativesfrom the private sector are members of theCouncil; creation of Regional Internal SecurityOperations (ISO) Convergence Ofce; and theKBPlist drawn by DND may be amended toconform to the specic needs of the province.

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mong the responsibilities of Sub-nationalPeace and Order Councils are:

a. Provide a forum for dialogue on issuesaffecting peace and order, including Insurgency;b. Recommend measures to enhance peaceand order, including counterinsurgency;c. Initiate and oversee the convergence of ISOefforts;d. Apply moral suasion against local chiefexecutives supporting the rebels; ande. Monitor the provisions of livelihood andinfrastructure development programs in remoteand indigenous areas.

In short, counterinsurgency has become anormal function of governance.

The guidance of PGMA in 2009 is quiteclear: The AFP shall actively engage theLGUs. Establish a more active network with

them through the Peace and Order CouncilsIhave reorganized the POCs to underscore thatinsurgency is the primary responsibility of every

LGU with the AFP and the PNP assisting them.

As embodied in EO 773, the governors andthe mayors counterparts in the AFP are theInfantry Brigade Commander and Infantry

Battalion Commander respectively.

Any idea that the business of normal civil government

and the business of the Emergency (counterinsurgency)are two separate entities must be killed for good and all....

The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated.

-Sir Gerald Templar

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The Peace and Order Council(POC) has been put in place to

unify military and civilian efforts indefeating insurgency...

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T

o succeed, POC needs leadership, not justoversight, and unbending commitment

by all members. Our people deserve peaceand better quality of life.

We believe, for the Local Chief Executiveto lead effectively, he should beempowered. To this effect, we suggest

the following activities:

a. Formal Handover of ISO lead role to LGUb. Governor/PPOC to declare his province

insurgency-free;c. ISO campaign plan to be signed by POC/LGU;d. LGU to lead rebel surrender rites andprovide for former rebels;e. Formation of an Anti Insurgency Task Forceled by the governor;f. AFP to report accomplishments to POC/LGU regularly;g. Joint POC/LGU-AFP ISO assessment;h. LGUs to openly denounce armed struggleor declare NPA persona non grata; andi. LGUs to promote local peace talks andsupport the Social Integration Program.

To succeed, POC needs leadership, not justoversight, and unbending commitment by allmembers.

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The SIP has been effective in reducing the numberof rebels. More than 2000 former rebels availedof the program in 2009 and more than P60 M re-

leased by OPAPP for rebel benets.

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Revolutionary war is 80 percent political action and only

20 percent military.Mao Tse Tun

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Bohol, previously the hotbed of insurgencyin Central and Eastern Visayas, is aperfect example of convergence of LGU,

AFP, PNP and civil society in counteringinsurgency. It was led by an aggressive, wellmeaning governor, Governor Aumentado. He

declared the province insurgency-free in 2005after an extensive poverty reduction and rebelreturnee programs. He believed military effortsalone will not solve the insurgency problem inthe province.

Some of these programs include LetsHelp Bohol animal dispersal program,health and education, livelihood and job

generation. He established Team Bohol to unifymilitary and civilian efforts. He also supportedmilitary operations in many ways. In tandemwith the AFP Peace and Development Teams(previously known as Special Operations Team/SOT), he deployed community organizersin conict areas to organize residents intocooperatives and to immerse with them tofacilitate the needs of the barangay folks. Theidea was to bring back public condence.Bohol Governor Erico B

Aumentado

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Other COIN initiatives undertaken by

Bohol LGU include:

a. Monthly civic action by the Provincial

POC and joint information drives to win heartsand minds and stomachs of the people;b. Support Local Peace Forum as a venuefor dialogues to address issues raised by leftistand interest groups;c. Installation of a Local Monitoring Board tooversee implementation of the ComprehensiveAgreement on Respect for Human Rights andInternational Humanitarian Law (CARHIHL);d. Rehabilitation and reintegration of rebelreturnees, some have been organized intocooperatives, others into Speakers Bureau toexpose deceptive tactics of the CNN;e. Legal assistance to AFP and law enforcerscharged with offenses while performing theirduties;f. Deployment of Fact Finding Missionscomposed of PPOC members to investigatereports of human rights abuse by securityforces; andg. Food support for the uniformed men

and CAFGUs.

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Today, Team Bohol has broken the backboneof NPA insurgency in the province which isnow enjoying peace and progress. Bohol is

now a major tourist destination. Gov Aumentadosays in 2007 during a Local Peace and SecurityAssembly:

Our people woke up from their sleepwith insurgents after realizing that thegovernment is indeed sincere in helpingthem out of poverty and that the militaryhas a humane face in the campaign. Thebarangay folks in the (insurgent) affectedareas refuse to give sanctuary to theinsurgents who used their barangays asbases of operations in the past.

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Sukad karon, kining (From now on, this)Provincial Government of Cebu will do allthat it can to address the insurgency problem.

We will support unequivocally this war againstcommunist-terrorists, and when I say total all-outwar, I recognize, as I have repeatedly stated before,that this is not a mere military solution, that we mustaddress other phases that have been the root causesof the discontent among our people, says Cebu GovGwen Garcia during her rst year in ofce.

She further adds, I could not even hope to makea signicant difference in the other points inmy 12-point agenda if I could not even assure

investors outside of this Province, outside of thiscountry, that here in the Province of Cebu we havethe best peace and order record in the entire country.The aggressive and brave governor formed in 2006 aProvincial Anti-Insurgency Task Force to eliminateinsurgency in her province.

The task force has four divisionswhich manifest her multidimensionalapproach in eradicating insurgency:

a. Information, Rewards and IncentivesDivision for effective information gathering,with a rewards scheme for individuals whoassist the task force in achieving its objective;

b. Public Relations Division which devises

ways and recommends measures to promotebetter public relations;c. Socio-Economic Division which draftsmeasures to promote social and economicupliftment so people would not be swayedby communist propaganda; and

d. Legal Division which assists the task forceand other bodies in attaining the objective oferadicating insurgency.

Among her concrete programs relating

to peace and order and insurgencyinclude:

a. Distribution of military jeeps to policestations and retrucks to towns and cities;

b. Construction of the P10-million newheadquarters for the Cebu Provincial PoliceOfce, and request for the release of P10 millionfrom the Philippine National Police for theimprovement of provincial police capabilities;

I recognize, as I have repeatedly stated before,

that this is not a mere military solution, that we

must address other phases that have been the

root causes of the discontent among our people,

-Cebu Governor Gwen Garcia

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c. Continued logistical support suchas communication systems and otherequipment not only for the CPPO but alsofor the Regional Mobile Group, the 78thInfantry Battalion, and the Special ReactionUnit, the rst of its kind among provinces;

d. Steering the thrust for the maintenanceof peace order by being head of the RegionalPeace and Order Council, wherein shepushes for an all out war against insurgentsby focusing on improving economy in thecountryside and offering second chanceto those who turn themselves in; and

e. Through a private partner, distributionof close circuit television (CCTV) orsecurity cameras to each police station.Cebu was formally declared insurgency-freein March 2010. Our comprehensive efforts to

see to it that basic services reach the remotestcommunities through the Social IntegrationProgram of former rebels and surrendereescreated the necessary government impactamong the peopleWe cant just sit back, wehave to continue to guard our peace, becausepeace is the ingredient and the foundationof our economic growth and development,states Gov Garcia during the ceremony.Invariably, both governors governedeffectively and knew quite well their powersand responsibilities under SEC. 16 (General

Welfare) of the 1991 Local Government Code:

Every local government unit shallexercise the powers expressly granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, aswell as powers necessary, appropriate,or incidental for its efcient and effectivegovernance, and those which areessential to the promotion of the generalwelfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government unitsshall ensure and support, among otherthings, the preservation and enrichmentof culture, promote health and safety,enhance the right of the people to abalanced ecology, encourage and supportthe development of appropriate andself-reliant scientic and technologicalcapabilities, improve public morals,enhance economic prosperity andsocial justice, promote full employmentamong their residents, maintain peaceand order, and preserve the comfort

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CNN insurgency strength has declinedover the years. There has been a consistent

reduction of CNN affected barangays. At theend of 2009, NPA presence can be felt only in 1,077barangays, or merely 2.6% of the 42,000 barangaysnationwide, compared to 20% (8,500 brgys) in 1986.There has been a consistent reduction of CNNstrength. From its peak of 25,000 in 1987, it is nowdown to just 4,702 in 2009. More rebels are comingout each year to embrace the SIP. The widening riftinside the CNN over strategy and funds is dividingthe organization. Many have gone above ground asa result. CNN is losing peoples support and supplynetworks mainly due to its criminal/extortionand terrorist acts. It is also losing its cadres andideologues. More LCEs are cutting its links withthe CNN. Government anti-poverty programs areholding back insurgent recruitment.

The AFP has also shifted its efforts todevelopment or soft power approachto win peoples hearts and minds.

In fact, it has dispatched more than 300Peace and Development Teams or PDTs(formerly called Special Operations team

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nationwide) as a means tohelp fast-track the deliveryof governments basicservices and development

projects especially inremote communities.It has also created theNational DevelopmentSupport Command orNADESCOM to undertakerural developmentprojects in conict areasunder the KalayaanBarangay Program (KBP),like constructing school

buildings, water systems,farm to market roads,bridges etc.

But again CNN canendure.

81 % decrease compared

to the peak strength of

25,200 in 1987


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only 2.6% of the42,022 barangays

in the country

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CNN is either absent or weak inmajority of the provinces na-tionwide. It has strong presence

only in some parts of Bicol, Samar, Ne-

gros, Surigao and Davao regions. Be-ginning in Dec 2008, 14 PPOCs haveformally declared their provinces in-surgency free, meaning the threat of in-surgency in those areas is non-existentor too insignicant to affect the lives ofthe residents and the COIN lead role istransferred to the POC or LCE. Theseprovinces were Guimaras, Siquijor,Biliran, Marinduque, La Union, NuevaVizcaya, Romblon, Bohol, Apayao, Au-

rora, Cebu, Quirino, Cavite and Tarlac.The more provinces freed from themenace of CNN insurgency, the moreapparent its defeat becomes.

VII. INSURGENCY-FREE PROVINCES

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Indeed, insurgency is a governance problemthat least requires a military solution.CNN has weakened over the years but

theres more to be done to nally defeat it.

CNN insurgency will persist unless the entiregovernment, with its enormous resources, uniteand get its act together towards confrontingthe root causes of conict and winning publiccondence. Counterinsurgency must thereforebe well led at national and local levels, leadersare driven by a sense of purpose and urgency,and the non-military, political efforts dominatethe COIN strategy.

VIII. CONCLUSION

About the Author

BGen Francisco N Cruz, Jr. AFP is an intelligence and civil military operation professional. He was conferred the GoldCross Medal and meritoriously promoted to Captain after he led a daring raid against MNLF rebels in 1983. He also received the Philippine Military Academy Cavalier Award for Air Force Operations in 1995 and the most coveted The Out

standing Philippine Soldier (TOPS) award in 2002. He studied strategic intelligence at the US

Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington DC. He served three years in Singapore as Defenseand Armed Forces Attache (DAFA) and was given the Outstanding DAFA Post Award fortwo consecutive years in 2004 and 2005. He completed two Masters degrees: Master in PublicManagement at the University of the Philippines, and Master in Strategic Studies at the prestigious Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies of Singapore under its scholarship programHe now heads the AFP Civil Relations Service where he leads a hearts and minds campaignHis penchant for community work gave him two Sagisag ng Ulirang Kawal and two Gawad saKaunlaran awards and also made him Adopted Son of Pasay City and Mabalacat, Pampanga.

For comments, please email: [email protected]

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When a country isbeing subverted, it is not

being outfought; it is being

outadministered.

-Bernard Fall


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Soldier of All (Special Issue July 2010) - Indispensable Role of LGUs in Counterinsurgency (PH)

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