Social Media and Statecraft: Turning Boycotts Into Grassroots Sanctions

Table of Contents

Table of Contents 1

Introduction 2

Literature Review 6

On Sanctions 7 On Social Media 11

Theoretical Framework 17

Definitions 17International Societies 18Social Constructivism 21

Methodology 23

Data and Findings 27

Social Media: Consumer Generated Information 27Buycott Application 30Superstars and Soda Pop 32Ripple Effects 35Block the Boat: Enhanced Outcomes In Traditional

Protest 38Israel and Grassroots Sanctions: Defy or Comply? 40

Conclusion 44

Endnotes 48

1

Introduction

There has been great discourse over the decades regarding

the efficacy of economic sanctions. As cases of trade

embargoes and economic sanctions are prolonged, their

objectives can often appear futile. Nations such as Cuba,

North Korea, and Iran have suffered continuously from

economic sanctions while changes in their respective

internal political institutions have been negligible. Other

nations, like South Africa, had massive international public

backlash to their policies, which created a global

atmosphere that insisted on change. However, it was not

until the governments of the UK and the US officially

sanctioned Apartheid South Africa that the world saw the

official end of the regime in 1994.

Hitherto, there have been only two methods to launch

sanctions against any nation: through the UN Security

Council or at the national level such as the US Department

2

of State. In recent years, however, with the rise of social

media and the use of smart phone applications, international

communities can act in solidarity and effectively launch a

sanctions movement regardless of their respective

governments’ policies. One of the most used applications is

called “Buycott.” With this application, users can scan

universal bar codes on products with their smartphone

cameras to determine whether actions of the product’s

producers are consistent the consumer’s politics. Use of the

application is a growing phenomenon; for example, one

boycott campaign called “Free Palestine” gained 403,246

users in only five months. With use of such applications,

global political-economic prowess is being technologically

diffused to the population.

Grassroots activist groups exist in a decentralised

system with no hierarchical leadership with whom nation-

states can create dialogue and negotiations. Lack of

centralisation creates a scenario where leaders of targeted

states will be beholden to their constituents, and forced to

eventually respond to global boycott actions. The central

3

argument of this paper is the following: if individuals use

social media and boycott-oriented smartphone applications to

launch grassroots sanctions, then targeted nations will be

forced to react. Furthermore, the reaction will be dictated

by the structure of the activism; with use of social media,

individual activists functionally differentiate themselves

from their respective state systems, engaging in a new

transnational international society that can practice

economic statecraft.

This paper seeks to explore the potency of social media

and boycott applications vis-à-vis comparative case studies,

specifically comparing the Boycott Divest Sanctions movement

targeting Israel with the grassroots movements that

challenged the government of South Africa during the

Apartheid Era. This study also looks to find some measure of

technological enhancement of the boycott efforts. We can

judge the effect of grassroots sanctions using three

metrics: first, we can study the degree to which social

media enhances organisation on the grassroots level; second

we can measure the impact of grassroots sanctions on

4

businesses churches, and communities while examine their

subsequent reactions; and third, we can gauge the how

targeted governments react to grassroots sanctions

movements. In the following pages, this paper will examine

how grassroots sanctions have been enhanced through

technology and what ultimate effect they have on societies

where one group is elevated at the expense of another, using

contemporary Israel and late twentieth century South Africa

as the primary case studies.

Apartheid and ethnic cleansing campaigns are

inextricably linked to concepts of nationalism.

Historically, Zionism (Jewish nationalism) and Afrikaner

nationalism (White Dutch South African nationalism)

originated at the same period when concepts of nationalism

were spreading throughout Europe and Asia Minor. During the

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries local culture

rather than an overarching empire formed identities. These

identities were often less formed by who they include than

who is excluded. Identity based superiority is thus a

5

hallmark of nationalism, including the Jewish nationalist

movement, also known as Zionism.

When early Zionists arrived in Palestine in the early

twentieth century, they primarily purchased land from

absentee landlords living abroad, and expelled the

Palestinians inhabitants. This destroyed the livelihoods of

many Palestinians, sinking them deeper into poverty.

Similarly, Dutch settlers had a long history of taking over

native lands in the Cape of Africa through over grazing.

This dramatically hindered self-sufficiency of natives in

the land. By the twentieth century, white South Africans

began creating legislation to limit the rights of Black

natives. Israeli and South African nationalist systems were

so similar that in 1961, Henrik Verwoerd, one of the

architects of Apartheid, declared that European Jews “took

Israel from the Arabs after they had lived there for a

thousand years,” and “Israel, like South Africa, is an

apartheid state.”1

In 1917 the British, seeing the forthcoming collapse of

the Ottoman Empire, promised the Zionists a Jewish homeland

6

within Palestine. Three years later, the British controlled

Palestine and allowed increasing waves of immigration.

During the British mandate period many Jews were fleeing

Eastern Europe, then eventually Western Europe due to

pogroms, and later, the Nazi Holocaust that that killed six

million Jews. The British mandate ended in 1948 and in its

wake Jewish paramilitary forces moved to cleansed

Palestinians from the land, creating a massive Palestinian

diaspora. The number of Palestinians refugees registered

with the UN for aid in 1950 numbered 960,000.2

The year 1948 is also of historical significance for

South Africa; it was the year the segregation system of

Apartheid was introduced in that country. Under the new

system, non-white people were forced to live in separate

areas and banned from White locations unless they had

permits to come in to work. Separate Black governments

(Bantustans) were set up as municipalities for Black

homelands. The system of apartheid also built in petty

apartheid strategies similar to those used in the Southern

US during the Jim Crow era.

7

Although the system of apartheid ended in South Africa

in 1994, the apartheid-type system in Israel has expanded

over time. Through four wars with its neighbours, Israel has

advanced its territory and increasingly controlled more

Palestinian lands. Most notably, in the 1967 war Israel

annexed Jerusalem, occupied the Golan Heights, the Sinai

Peninsula, the West Bank, and Gaza. Although Israel

eventually agreed to withdraw from the Sinai in 1975, Israel

has continued to increase settlement activity in East

Jerusalem and the West Bank to this day.

South African Apartheid ended in 1994, but the

situation between Israel and the Palestinians became

increasingly difficult with time. As West Bank settlements

multiply on the best available land, Palestinians continue

to lack an internationally recognised nationality and

political representation while enduring restricted movement,

imprisonment, and other humiliations by the occupational

government that rules over them. Clearly, Palestinians are

in an apartheid-type state with no foreseeable remedy.

Israel has put increasing pressure on Palestinians in recent

8

years through the building of a separation wall and the

creation of “Jewish only” roads that divide the West Bank

into virtual Bantustans.

As a response to the Israeli occupation, failed peace

talks, continued settlement of Palestinian land by Israelis,

and the on-going displacement of Palestinians who have been

exiled since 1948, the Boycott Divestment Sanctions (BDS)

movement began in 2005.3 Based on a similar model of boycott

used against South Africa during apartheid, BDS seeks to

accomplish the following goals through economic and academic

boycotts of Israel.

1. Ending [Israel’s] occupation and colonisation of all Arab lands and dismantling the wall.

2. Recognising the fundamental rights of Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel with full equality.

3. Respecting, protecting, and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties, as stipulated in UN Resolution 194.4

This paper sets out to judge the potential capability

of the South African boycott model when used in conjunction

with modern technology against Israel. The following pages

9

will contain several sections. First, there will be a review

of literature on sanctions and social media. This will be

followed by theoretical framework, then methodology. The

paper will then go into the findings of the data and

analysis, followed by a conclusion.

Literature Review

This paper seeks to look at three factors. The first factor

is the dependent variable, which for the purpose of this

paper is apartheid, but could be represented by any social

or political condition that should be changed on grounds of

human rights. The second factor, which is an independent

variable, is sanctions. The third factor, also an

independent variable, is social media. Although there are

other factors associated with social-political change and

development of human rights, this paper seeks to find the

impact of social media in conjunction with grassroots

sanctions on the dependent variable, in this case,

apartheid. For this reason, the reviewed literature focuses

10

on the two independent variables. The first section of the

literature review is on sanctions. The second section is on

social media.

On Sanctions

One of the most cited academic books on economic sanctions

is Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, originally published in 1985

with a third edition published in 2007. In this book, Gary

Clyde Hufbauer and other scholars from The Peterson

Institute For International Economics use empirical

methodology and case studies to assess the effectiveness of

economic sanctions. They also establish a formula for

predicting the effectiveness of such sanctions.

Stripped to the bare bones, the formula for a successful sanctions effort is simple: The cost ofdefiance borne by the target must be greater than its perceived cost of compliance. That is, the political and economic costs to the target must begreater than the political and security costs of complying with the sender’s demands. The difficulty lies in accurately predicting the magnitude of those costs and how the target will perceive and weigh them.5

Based on the stated formula, if a state is sanctioned with

the intention of regime change—or any purpose that might

11

threaten the security of the state—such as an intervention

in military operations, then the demands of the sanctioning

state are less likely to be met.

Taking into account a considerable number of variables,

including the political environment within the target

country and the motivating factors that led to sanctions

(regime change or military interruption, for example), the

study found that sanctions yield a thirty-four per cent

chance of effectiveness or partial effectiveness.6 If a

nation launches sanctions against the target state in order

to interrupt military action, the effectiveness drops down

to one in five.7

Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at

the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

wrote a book called The Sanctions Paradox, which evaluates

concessions offered by nations that had been targeted for

sanctions. Looking at different metrics than the Hufbauer et

al, Drezner distinguishes between allies and adversaries,

calculating the opportunity costs of sanctions for both the

sender and receiver of the sanction. According to Drezner:

12

If the Sender and target are adversaries, then the sender will be willing to impose sanctions under conditions that would be rejected if the two states were allies. However, the sender’s eagerness does not translate into significant concessions. Heightened conflict expectations limit the number of concessions the target will make.8

Conversely, allied states will ask for fewer concessions

when introducing a sanction, thus increasing the odds of a

successful outcome.

Previous studies, such as Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,

have primarily focused on internal factors such as the

political atmosphere in the target state, as well as the

reason for the sanctions. However, Drezner contends that

those “explanations of economic sanctions are incomplete

because of selection bias.” Furthermore, many of the cases

studied are “those where conflict expectations are the

greatest.”9 In order to come to a better conclusion

regarding the effect of sanctions, one must compensate for

conflict expectation as well as other previously studied

factors.

13

Economist Ernest H. Preeg focuses on the issue of

sanctions from another angle in his 1999 book, Feeling Good Or

Doing Good With Sanctions. In this study, Preeg employs a

normative approach and examines five case studies of

unilateral US sanctions: Cuba, Iran, Vietnam, Myanmar, and

China. Preeg hypothesises that there are six inherent

downsides to unilateral US sanctions:

1. The adverse economic impact of economic sanctionsis likely to fall predominantly on the people in the targeted country, especially the poorest, while an authoritarian government tends to becomeeven more repressive.

2. Unilateral sanctions, in any event, inflict relatively modest economic pain on the target country compared with multilateral sanctions.

3. Domestic political pressures build to extend U.S.unilateral sanctions to third countries, creatingproblems with friends and allies.

4. Sanctions are used as propaganda by the target country governments.

5. Adverse impact on other U.S. foreign policy interests and on the US leadership role.

6. The loss of US private sector engagement in the target country as a positive force for political as well as economic change.10

According to Preeg, if the US imposes unilateral sanctions

on a target country, then we are likely to find the above

listed scenarios. What Preeg learned “from the five detailed

14

case studies and other recent experience, is that during the

1990s unilateral economic sanctions, have failed to achieve

their intended foreign policy objectives.”11

Preeg’s conclusion is that sanctions do not work. His

conclusion is not necessarily inconsistent with the findings

of Hufbauer et al, who argue that sanctions do not work well

and are largely dependent upon the states that impose them.

Drezner would argue that the study is limited because it

only looks at the most noteworthy sanctions at play during

the time period while ignoring economic coercion among

allies.

R.T. Naylor, a political economist at McGill

University, wrote an aptly named book on economic warfare

called Economic Warfare: Sanctions Embargo Busting and Their Human Cost.

The purpose of his book is to “dissect such a widely

practiced and little understood aspect of statecraft,”

specifically, economic sanctions and other such economic

attacks and coercion. A secondary purpose of Naylor’s book

is to examine the various methods of economic statecraft.

According to Naylor, these endeavours in economic warfare

15

ultimately lead to economic crime.12 In other words, Naylor

theorises that when sanctions are put into place, they do

not lead to successful coercion of a target state by a

sender state, but in fact lead to black markets and

international criminality.

Naylor’s work uses a historical methodology to

chronicle economic warfare. His narrative begins in

sixteenth century Britain and continues through the Cold

War, while chronicling the decades of endeavours by Israel

to economically restrain the Palestinian population in the

West Bank. Naylor then fleshes out the first US-Iraq war and

the fighting in the Balkans in the late 1990s. Naylor’s book

is normative but thorough, providing considerable

perspective that in many ways complements the authors

mentioned above.

In spite of Naylor’s focus on economic sanctions, his

book does not directly speak to the previously mentioned

authors’ writings, with the exception of Preeg who writes

that sanctions attack the poorer citizens, rather than the

head of state. Ultimately, Naylor concludes that sanctions

16

result in wealthier citizens in the target state abandoning

their currency for stronger currency or metals, followed by

massive inflation, capital shifts by those who have the

means to do so, a degradation of infrastructure and,

ultimately crime.13 Although Naylor’s book is critical of

sanctions, his position on their influence is based on

different factors than the other authors.

The general consensus within the literature suggests

that nations employing sanctions enjoy a modicum of success

at best or no measurable success at worst. Overall, there

have been numerous methods of calculating the performance of

international economic coercion. The literature mentioned

above focuses almost exclusively on economic sanctions

between nation-states, with the exception of Naylor’s work,

which cites other historical examples of economic coercion

between groups outside of that category. Nonetheless, we

have hitherto looked at the subject of sanctions as an

exclusively interstate relationship.

The gap in the literature exists where sanctions meet

social media and international grassroots sanctioning

17

activities. Considerations must be made, in an era of

technological interconnectedness, as to the future of

individuals enacting their own form of economic statecraft

across international boundaries. The question has to be

asked whether, as people are able to organise

transnationally, future multinational groups made up of

common citizens will be able to have more success with

economic coercion.

On Social Media

Although various forms of economic coercion have been used

for ages between nation-states, empires, and other groups

looking to impose their will on one another, the use of

social media in international relations is probably the

newest innovation in statecraft. One academic who has

studied social media in detail is Mahmood Monshipouri, a

Middle East and Islamic studies expert and professor of

International Relations at San Francisco State University.

In his book, Democratic Uprisings In The New Middle East, Monshipouri

studies the effect of information technology on the Arab

Spring. Monshipouri does not directly credit the use of

18

technology with the successes of the Arab uprisings,

pointing out that other revolutions throughout history have

been successful with less advanced media. Rather, he calls

information technology an “intervening variable.”14 That is

to say, information technology may have facilitated the

revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain,

but it was not the cause, nor was it the primary factor in

the successes associated with launching or sustaining such

movements.

People with palpable grievances did the real work on

the ground in the Middle East during the Arab Spring.

Monshipouri asserts, “Technology is not a remedy; it is a

tool that connects people and disseminates information to

the masses, but it cannot create social change on its

own.”15 In other words, if people are motivated to achieve

social justice, then they can use information technology to

facilitate their endeavours, but technology is a means and

not an end.

19

Monshipouri does not diminish the role of social media

in the Arab uprisings. He concludes with the following

findings:

It is worth noting that modern technologies of communication and social media entail both opportunities and constraints. They are crucial toorganizing, instigating, and holding nonviolent movements aimed at seeking representation, democracy, and human dignity. On the flip side, online activism is likely to turn into a visionaryplatform unless it can generate movement on the street. This was evident in the 2011 uprisings in Egypt when shutting down access to the Internet failed to hinder the political activities that theMubarak government wished to extinguish.16

Ultimately, the Internet does not have the teeth to create

social change on its own. Conversely, social justice

movements are capable of maintaining their momentum even in

the absence of Internet technology.

Journalist and author Malcolm Gladwell wrote an article

in The New Yorker that supports Monshipouri’s position with

data. In his article, “Small Changes,” Gladwell compares the

new era of social activism to the Civil Rights movement in

the US. He notes the lunch counter sit-ins in Greensboro,

North Carolina, as changing the rights of black people in

20

the US without use of the advanced media we have today. The

crucial factor in social activism of that period, as today,

is the personal connectedness and commitment to the cause.17

Gladwell writes:

The kind of activism associated with social media isn't like [the Greensboro sit-ins] at all. The platforms of social media are built around weak ties. Twitter is a way of following (or being followed by) people you may never have met. Facebook is a tool for efficiently managing your acquaintances, for keeping up with the people you would not otherwise be able to stay in touch with.That's why you can have a thousand "friends" on Facebook, as you never could in real life.18

To clarify, posting something on Facebook or Twitter

does not have the inherent risk that other activities might

have. Social media creates loose associations of people with

limited commitment.19 Just as Monshipouri writes that the

people of Egypt were deeply connected to a cause that

transcended the high-tech tools used to implement protests

in Tahrir Square, Gladwell suggests that it is the personal

stakes in the issues at hand that make the difference in

social justice movements. If there are people committed to

the cause who are willing to expose themselves to risk, then

21

you will have a social movement. Otherwise, you simply have

thousands, if not millions of people talking about something

while doing almost nothing.

Gladwell illustrates this point with data from

“Save Darfur” organisations on Facebook:

The Facebook page of the Save Darfur Coalition has1,282,339 members, who have donated an average of nine cents apiece. The next biggest Darfur charityon Facebook has 22,073 members, who have donated an average of thirty-five cents. Help Save Darfur has 2,797 members, who have given, on average, fifteen cents.20

There is an abundance of people on the bandwagon but little

real commitment in the example above. In fact, it

illustrates the disconnectedness people have while using

social media for activism. In the case of the Civil Rights

movement in the US, people had a close and dear connection

to the issue that led them to act regardless of personal

risk. However, when it came to online activism vis-à-vis

Darfur, most of those who support the movement tended to be

risk-averse.

Social media undoubtedly allows masses of people to be

interconnected in ways previously unimaginable. However,

22

Gladwell finds, “It makes it easier for activists to express

themselves, and harder for that expression to have any

impact.”21 More people will spread political messages, but

there is little motivation to actually go into the street

and do anything about the problem at hand. Conversely, if

there is low-risk action that people can take, then social

media networks are indeed effective. The example Gladwell

gives for low-risk social media success is a bone marrow

donor drive that took place; it was low-risk, cost nothing,

and highly successful.22

Clay Shirky, a professor at New York University wrote

an article for Foreign Affairs called, “The Political Power Of

Social Media: Technology, The Public Sphere, And Political

Change.” In the beginning of Shirky’s article, he explains,

“The use of social media tools — text messaging, e-mail,

photo sharing, social networking, and the like — does not

have a single preordained outcome.”23 His assertion is

consistent with Monshipouri’s claim that modern social media

is an intercepting factor but not the cause of social

action. In fact, he goes onto say, “social media tools are

23

not a replacement for real-world action, but a way to

coordinate it.”23 As Monshipouri noted, the Egyptians

maintained their protests after the government shut down the

social media in the nation.

Shirky suggests an association between social media use

and a lack of commitment. For example, he compares the

Iranian Green Movement to the One Million Signatures women’s

movement in Iran. Shirky observes how easily the Green

Movement—a movement characterised by the use of Twitter and

Facebook—was quelled, while One Million Signatures enjoyed

some moderate success. Because the Green Movement was

organised in an impromptu fashion due to questionable ballot

counts, and the One Million Signatures campaign was a long-

term movement with more committed actors, the latter enjoyed

successes where the former failed.24 In other words, as

Gladwell contended, the success comes down to the commitment

of the actors.

Shirky mentions Gladwell’s idea that social media

dilutes the process of activism, noting, “Gladwell’s

critique is correct but not central to the question of

24

social media’s power; the fact that barely committed actors

cannot click their way to a better world does not mean that

committed actors cannot use social media effectively.” 25

Furthermore, Shirky outlines the effect social media has on

civil society. He contends political thought manifests in a

two-step process. First, information is disseminated by

media or otherwise; then it spreads through conversation. It

is the latter that changes minds and engages people. In

Shirky’s view, conversation is more important than access to

information, and social media is an effective tool in

exchanging ideas, both publicly and privately.26

Shirky’s conclusion does not promote social media as a

uniquely strong mechanism for change, particularly against

despotic regimes. He states, “It would be nice to have a

flexible set of short-term digital tactics that could be

used against different regimes at different times. But the

requirements of real-world statecraft means that what is

desirable may not be likely.”27 In essence, one should not

expect drastic changes in regimes around the world just

25

because there is an increase in information sharing and

social media.

Another author insists that credit given to Twitter and

Facebook, specifically regarding the Green Movement in Iran,

was little more than hyperbole and misrepresentation. Golnaz

Esfandiari, a writer for Foreign Policy indicates that hype

about the use of social media in the Green Movement was

quite overstated. In her article, “The Twitter Devolution,”

she notes:

A number of opposition activists have told me theyused text messages, email, and blog posts to publicize protest actions. However, good old-fashioned word of mouth was by far the most influential medium used to shape the postelection opposition activity. There is still a lively discussion happening on Facebook about how the activists spread information, but Twitter was definitely not a major communications tool for activists on the ground in Iran.28

Although most of the above mentioned literature agrees that

social media is a useful tool, the authors unanimously

indicate that it does not replace the work of activists on

the ground. Esfandiari writes that the use of social media

was insignificant when it came to the Green Movement in

26

Iran. She does not claim that social media played no role at

all in the movement, only that the media presents its impact

as being a central issue when, in fact, it was not.29

All of the literature reviewed regarding sanctions

suggests that the effectiveness of their use is limited.

Similarly, the literature on social media shows that it has

the small role, simply replacing older types of

communication. Gladwell specifically notes that people will

join a cause in online social media but will not contribute

to it in any significant way. All indications are that

people will only endure risks that are endemic to fighting

for a cause if they have a vested interest in the outcome.

What has not been addressed in the literature is the use of

social media to promote the low-risk activity of boycotting.

This type of international citizen boycott could be a new

type of sanction, which has not yet been fully studied.

Theoretical Framework

Definitions

27

Within the limited scope of this paper, the primary

variables are grassroots sanctions, social media, and

apartheid. Before examining the interaction of these

variables, we must first establish working definitions. For

the purposes of this paper, grassroots sanctions are any

economic activity used by groups of individuals in order to

economically impede a nation state. In order for these

boycotts to be considered grassroots sanctions they must

extend beyond state boundaries. Activities can include but

are not limited to boycotting of products, withdrawal of

foreign investments, and any other activism that is used

with the intention of disrupting commerce.

Social media shall be defined as any informal

electronic communication that can be utilised to spread

information to large audiences with relatively horizontal

access. This includes but is not limited to online

networking groups such as Tumblr, Reddit, Facebook, and

Twitter among others. These types of media differ from older

forms in that they give ordinary citizens access to large

28

audiences and allow for the spread of news and ideas that

are not represented by mainstream sources.

Apartheid will be defined as "inhuman acts committed

for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination

by one racial group of persons over any other racial group

of persons and systematically oppressing them."30 Just as in

South Africa before the end of Apartheid, in Israel and the

Palestinian territories exists a system wherein Jewish

people are elevated above Arabs. Although there are

different statuses of Palestinians within Israel and the

Palestine territories, none enjoy the full rights of Jewish

citizenry, even those with Israeli citizenship. In fact,

most live under occupation with virtually no self-

determination.

International Societies

In order to examine the subject of grassroots sanctions, it

is important to use a theoretical perspective. Most classic

international relations scholars take a state-centric view

of international relations. Realists often see a world

wherein state power and relative gains are the most

29

important variables. Contrarily, many modern liberals

subscribe to institutionalism; although states are the

primary actors, the institutions and international

organisations play an important role. For this particular

study, when looking at the power of individuals acting

across state boundaries, these schools of thought are

neither explanatory nor predictive. In order to explore and

understand the impact of grassroots sanctions, the subject

must be examined from a more novel perspective.

International Society (English School) scholars look

toward individual actors within society. Instead of taking a

strict view of institutions or states, International Society

theorists utilise approaches closely linked to anthropology

and sociology. The central argument of this paper, as

mentioned above, is that individuals using social media and

boycott oriented smartphone applications can launch

successful grassroots sanctions. Because this thesis deals

with individual actors banding together across state lines

International Societies theory is the most explanatory.

30

In the era of Internet technology and social media,

societies form across state boundaries through ideology and

activity. Using Facebook, Twitter, and other forms of social

media, these groups become cohesive in a way that allows

them to exercise power. With interconnectedness and power

comes a new type of social arrangement. Whereas before,

people in different nations might be relatively ignorant of

one another, today they can act with solidarity in order to

achieve various gains. These groups of people are

differentiated from other groups within international

society by function. Differentiated groups make up a

subsystem within the larger international context.

Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert define functional

differentiation as “subsystems [that] are defined by the

coherence of particular types of activity and their

differentiation from other types of activity, and these

differences do not stem simply from rank.”31 This definition

explains the existence of groups who band together across

international boundaries through shared values. With the

interconnected nature of the modern world through

31

technology, these differentiated groups can quickly grow in

a horizontal direction without centralisation or

stratification. They, in essence, disintegrate the

relationship between the citizens and state, creating a

tertiary group with a distinct social dynamic.

The primary change in international society that

allowed for social reorganisation was WWII. Up until the

second Great War, international relations were “dominated by

imperial states formed primarily through dynastic ties and

military contests.”32 The world operated within classical

realist parameters in an age where global lines divided

empires rather than smaller nation-state units. According to

one scholar, Jack Donnelly, democracy and self-rule became

the norms as people became citizens rather than subjects in

the post-war period.33 Concepts and values related to

hierarchy were then replaced by ideals and norms surrounding

equality.

When taking into account the changing nature of

international order after WWII and the growing norm of

equality, it is natural for an international rejection of

32

apartheid-type systems both in South Africa and Israel. When

new norms of equality are coupled with societal groups that

are differentiated and bound together by shared values in an

era where these groups can coalesce across great distances,

a new unit of power is created. In the new paradigm, brought

on by post-imperialist thought and technological

interconnectedness, groups come together and practice

economic statecraft. Thus, equality and technology have

cleared a path for the formation of functionally

differentiated groups pressing for expanded equality and

human rights.

Although the concept of functional differentiation can

be used to describe the grouping of people by behaviour and

norms, there are other more noticeable examples we see

globally. Banking, for example, was once considered part of

the sovereignty of the state. Now, however, banking

institutions are now less connected to individual states as

the industry operates as a semi-independent international

society. The same is true of transnational corporations

(TNCs) and even non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Each

33

group forms out of mutual interests and has limited ties to

individual nation-states; they have become disintegrated

from the state and take on separate identities. This paper

takes the concept a step further; social activist groups

disintegrate from their respective states and form

differentiated groups based on activity.

In the case of both Israel and South Africa during

Apartheid, activists with a common cause are differentiated

by function from the rest of society. They are a singular

group that, like a TNC, that maintains a certain function

across national boundaries in order to achieve certain aims.

While international bankers may be concerned with

influencing global policies and trade in order to allow

capital to flow more freely, individual activists may form a

group that seeks to slow the flow of capital to and from a

targeted nation.

Social Constructivism

An alternative approach to this topic is Social

Constructivist Theory. This theory surmises that states

34

develop identities and interests based on their interaction

with other states. The quality of the interaction then

defines state interests. Alexander Wendt writes, “Actors do

not have a portfolio that they carry around independent of

social context; instead they define their interests in the

process of defining situations.”34 In other words, state

interests and identities are social constructs based on

interaction; two states that have not previously interacted

develop the friend or foe relationship and define their

interests through their interactions with one another.

Social constructivism may not be adequate for

explaining the role of grassroots sanctions or social media;

in international relations it is primarily used to look at

interactions between states. However, social constructivism

does explain the complex relationships between indigenous

peoples in South Africa and Israel/Palestine and those who

have ruled over them. It also explains the relationships

between other nation-states and Israel or South Africa.

The relationship between states can appear random, not

reflective of any inherent or essential nature of the

35

peoples or governments involved. According to Wendt, there

is often a view that, “if humans or domestic factors cause A

to attack B, then B will have to defend itself.”35 However,

interstate relations can be more complicated; if A comes to

attack B, then B might have to decide whether A is

posturing. Perhaps B can bluff A, or some other sort of

negotiation can be reached.36 These options are important

considerations between societies, whether two states are

interacting for the first time or indigenous people are

interacting with recent colonisers. How states interact in

the moment will define their identities and interests.

In looking at grassroots sanctions, this theoretical

perspective cannot apply; the decentralised nature of an

international group that has differentiated itself from

individual states renders attacks on the group futile. The

target would be too vast and the lack of hierarchy prohibits

cutting the head off of the organisation; there is no head

to cut off. There is no bluff to be had nor is there any

leader to negotiate with. Furthermore, the group will not

necessarily respond uniformly; they may not form an entirely

36

cohesive identity. In this sense, the parameters of social

constructivism may not extend far enough for this study.

Wendt illustrates his theoretical perspective using the

example of an alien civilisation coming to Earth for the

first time. If Aliens came down to Earth, Earthlings would

have to decide how best to interact with them. This decision

would primarily come down to the first interactions. If they

shot laser beams at the cities of earth, we might try

(probably to no avail) to attack these interstellar beings

who clearly have superior technology. If they came and cured

AIDS and cancer, our relationship would be considerably

different.37

For our purposes, we would have to consider the idea of

many star ships coming from many different planets. In this

scenario, most of them are different species with different

languages and cultures. Some of these space aliens might

want something specific and others might want something

else. Certain space aliens with a particular objective might

form a loose and leaderless coalition without hierarchy.

This group may push for certain concessions from the

37

Earthlings. Perhaps some of them are withholding medicines

or other resources that could save the planet. If the people

of Earth could not obtain enough medicine from the other

aliens, then humans would have to respond to the agenda of

the decentralised alien group. If this were the case, then

constructivist theory might find new limitations.

Methodology

How can social media and grassroots sanctions affect state

systems such as apartheid? My hypothesis is that if

sanctions are taken out of the arena of traditional

statecraft and used by individuals with the aid of modern

technology, then this will create a new form of grassroots

sanctions that will be more effective than traditional

sanctions. I chose two cases to examine this issue. The

first case is Israel and the second case is South Africa.

The state of Israel is the only global case with which

I can thoroughly examine all three variables together,

assuming the current situation between Israel and the

Palestinian people fits the definition of apartheid.

38

Although there has been a social media campaign against

Israel over the treatment of the Palestinians for some time,

it has never been stronger than in 2014. While the BDS

movement has been around since 2005, Israel’s recent actions

have stirred a considerable online backlash in this year.

The recent Israeli action in Gaza, Operation Protective

Edge, has resulted in more online chatter and formation of

online groups than the previous Operation Cast Lead in 2008-

2009. This is likely a result of increasing development and

use of social media.

Aside from use of Twitter and Facebook, there has also

been the development of new applications, specifically the

Buycott application, which has revolutionised the way that

people can screen the products that they purchase. Current

technology allows information to spread quickly and aids

activists in acting upon the information available. In

essence, social media and applications can facilitate such a

vast boycott of Israel that it amounts to a grassroots

sanction. Thus, in the case of Israel/Palestine, the two

independent variables, sanctions and social media, act upon

39

the dependent variable, the apartheid-type system that

Israel has adopted.

The term “apartheid” is adopted from the system of

discrimination and separation that was used in South Africa

between 1948 and 1994. Therefore, this era in South African

history is suiting as a case study. However, the timeline of

Apartheid South Africa excludes examination of social media,

as it would not be developed until after this period. Due to

the lack of social media in between 1948 and 1994, Israel is

my primary case and Apartheid Era South Africa acts as a

control study. In this paper I will look at the pressures on

Israel and contrast them with some of the conditions leading

to the end of Apartheid in South Africa. Although it is

impossible to prove causality in many of these cases, I hope

to add some modest considerations to this issue.

My hypothesis, that social media and technology will

allow individuals to practice effective statecraft, is based

on the idea that the relationship between individuals and

business is considerably different than the relations

between two states. Moreover, business can have powerful

40

influence on the state. With money as a motivator, ideas

spread and policies change when there is a distinct business

advantage or disadvantage. With grassroots sanctions, the

ultimate target is the state. However, the immediate target

is individual businesses. In traditional sanctions, states

or international global organisations (IGOs) target the

state as a whole.

With the grassroots model, people boycott businesses

and businesses can boycott and divest from state projects.

As businesses change their behaviour grassroots sanctions

will have a more profound impact on the target state. This

is particularly true when modern applications can trace not

only the practices of one particular business but also the

business practices of their partners. A consumer-based

approach to statecraft can therefore create greater ripple

effects than traditional sanctions. If business A loses

market-share through interaction with business B, then

business A may stop doing business with business B. Perhaps

then business B will change their business practices and

reconsider their business relationships as well. Traditional

41

state-originated sanctions are unlikely to have such a broad

impact.

This marks a change in perspective from several authors

mentioned above. While some grassroots sanctions, such as

port protests that blockade shipments, can be aided by

technology as an intervening factor for social activism, as

Monshipouri suggests, when it comes to the efficacy of large

international consumer boycotts, social media and

applications can be primary. Although South Africa was

successfully boycotted in the 1980s, the breadth and reach

of new technologically enhanced boycotts give them superior

power.

In the following pages I will first examine changes in

social media use, comparing the amount of social media use

during an Israeli incursion on Gaza in 2009-2009 to the

amount of social media used during the attack on Gaza in

2014. I will then compare the global reaction and

performance of the BDS movement in these two periods. If

increased social media usage is consistent with increased

economic activism, then there may be a correlation between

42

these two factors. This will be followed by an examination

of the Buycott smartphone application to establish whether

it is a significant and sustainable factor in establishing

grassroots sanctions.

I will test my hypotheses looking using normative and

historical approach. I will primarily focus on the year 2014

due to its currency and the recent growth of the BDS

movement within the last year. I will use published reports

on business earnings and activities of companies associated

with the target country and examine how they coincide with

BDS activities proliferated on social media. I will compare

the apparent results of BDS action against Israel to boycott

activities against South Africa, using South Africa as the

“norm.”

I will then look at the ripple effects of grassroots

sanctions activity. In doing so, I will attempt to establish

whether boycotts filter through other aspects of society. I

will look to see how the boycotts of a single business can

influence a secondary business. Furthermore, I will look at

how BDS can spread in both lateral and horizontal

43

directions. Another objective of this section is to

determine whether boycotts originating with individuals are

likely to leap to institutions and governments. Therefore, I

will study BDS actions wherein municipalities target

corporations.

In examining grassroots sanctions activity, I will also

look at the impact of public embargo activities on the West

Coast of the United States, specifically, the 2014 Block The

Boat campaign, which was largely spread through social

media. I will look at the various dynamics of this campaign

and how it affected the target business. I will compare this

to a similar campaign against South Africa that took place

in 1984. In this section I will try to establish the

differences in similar movements, one aided by the use of

social media, the other absent of social media.

In the final section of data and analysis, I will

examine at governmental reactions to grassroots sanctions.

The purpose of this section is to discover whether the

targeted government reacts positively or negatively to

economic activism spread by social media. Primarily, I will

44

focus in the Israeli government’s activities during the

ladder half of 2014. I justify looking specifically at this

period because of increased BDS activity during this time.

The evidence I will be evaluating will primarily come

from newspaper articles, periodicals, and other online

sources. I will also use personal observation from my

presence at the Block the Boat protests. Furthermore, I will

rely on tertiary historical works for a comparison with

South Africa. I intend to use a wealth of sources and

perspectives to create a mosaic of the current situation and

to analyse the effects of social media and grassroots

sanctions against Israel.

Data and Findings

Social Media: Consumer Generated Information

Until recently, information was relatively localised by

region. The information that was available was filtered

through editors and management before being disseminated in

a way that supported a narrow world-view, the perspective of

45

the most powerful news agencies. Small groups of people

determined content relevance and its ability to sell

newspapers or cable television subscriptions. With an

inequality of voices, information proliferated with an

agenda other than informing the public.

Social media changes the power dynamic. Issues of

locality are negated because people can now pull from a

large variety of sources and repost news articles better

representing their views. Social media users take the role

of editor, determining which articles and information are

important. Users of social media, instead of seeing only a

few headlines while passing newsstands, now see a larger

aggregate of information from a variety of viewpoints,

decentralising media. Exposure to large and varied amounts

of information is potentially changing global culture and

interest in international issues.

As social media spreads globally, we can observe the

differences in international reactions to similar events. In

late 2008 and early 2009, Israel launched a twenty-two day

attack in Gaza called Operation Cast Lead. During the

46

attack, approximately 1,400 Palestinians were killed, and

300 children were among the dead.38 A little over five years

later, in 2014, Israel launched Operation Protective edge, a

fifty-one day attack that would leave 2,192 Palestinians

dead, mostly civilians. Of the dead, 519 were children.

Approximately 18,000 homes were destroyed, and 108,000

residents of Gaza were left homeless.39

There have been countless complaints about the way the

mainstream American media covers events taking place between

Israel and the Palestinians. Typically, major news groups

tend to be slanted toward the Israeli perspective. In 2014,

however, the Palestinian perspective seems to have had a

much farther reach than it did in 2008. This is evident by

the international protests that took place in many major

cities around the world. In Paris, London, San Francisco,

and New York, people took to the streets en masse to show

solidarity with the people of Gaza. The extent of the

protests against Israeli actions was unprecedented. Along

with civil protest, there was a notable acceleration in the

47

Boycott Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement, which I will

expand upon in the pages below.

The differences in the reaction to the two events

mentioned above appear to coincide with increasing use of

social media. In the beginning of 2008, approximately 30 per

cent of adult Internet users engaged in social media.

Between 2008 and 2009, that number jumped to approximately

50 per cent. As of January 2014, 74 per cent of adult

Internet users were using social media, as illustrated in

Figure 1 below.40 This increased Internet usage appears to

correlate with international action taken in response to

Israel’s military adventures in Gaza.

(Figure 1)

48

Current data on use of social media for political

action shows significant trends. According to a report

published in 2013, 72 per cent of adults using social media

engaged in some sort of online political activity. In fact,

social media users appear to be more engaged than people who

are not using social media, as illustrated in Figure 2

below.41 Greater availability of information available vis-à-

vis social media, in conjunction with the increased civic

engagement among social media users, appears to explain why

there was greater activist reaction during Israel’s 2104

attack on Gaza than there was during Operation Cast Lead.

(Figure 2)

49

One of the most striking pieces of data that shows a

correlation between social media and Internet activism comes

from Facebook. Facebook is the most widely used social media

on the planet today. In 2008, during Operation Cast Lead,

Facebook only had about 100 million users. In 2014, this

number has grown to an astonishing 1.35 billion active

users. Facebook members are connected across the continents,

allowing easy sharing of information around the globe. It is

not uncommon for someone in Copenhagen to post the same

article as someone in Sri Lanka or San Francisco. The use of

Facebook allows individuals to differentiate themselves from

their respective societies along political lines, creating

an international society of sorts. It seems likely that the

growth of Facebook alone between 2008 and 2014 is

responsible for the recent global reaction to Israel’s

attack on Gaza.42

Buycott Application

The implications of social media’s growth and its

relationship to political activity are important to

understanding the dynamics of grassroots sanctions. This

50

paper looks to investigate a specific aspect of social media

activism and present the growth and evolution from boycott,

to what is effectively a grassroots sanction. A new tool

that can facilitate such boycotts is the Buycott

application. This application allows users to avoid products

that are not in line with their political ideology. The

application is relevant to the conversation because it

provides user-friendly service to those looking to engage in

economic activism.

Buycott was developed by a twenty-six year old

programmer to allow consumers to boycott business that they

deem unethical. It became available for use in 2103.43 The

application is downloaded from the Internet and allows

shoppers to scan items with their smart phones. The various

campaigns available on the application range from saving

rain forests to avoiding genetically modified crops. With

the Buycott application, campaigns are user-generated and

the application itself is neutral, giving no advantage to

any one particular perspective.

51

On April 13, 2014, a sixteen-year-old Britton named

Luke Burgess created a campaign for the Buycott application

called “Long Live Palestine Boycott Israel.”44 For almost

three months, Burgess’ application saw little activity. On

July 8, the day that Israel began Operation Protective Edge,

the campaign only had 470 followers.45 By October of 2014

the campaign, mostly spread through social media, had grown

to over 400,000 members.

(Figure 3)

Figure 3 above graphs followers of the “Free Palestine

Boycott Israel” campaign. We can see by this chart that the

campaign gained membership rapidly as soon as Operation

Protective Edge began. By the time the fighting stopped, on

52

August 26, 2014, however, this graph begins to show a

decline in growth and finally levels off by October. This

rapid growth and levelling off trend suggests that this

campaign can only sustain growth when Israel and the

Palestinians are engaged in major conflict.

The Buycott application is a potentially effective tool

in the BDS movement. However, its growth seems limited to

periods of conflict. In global terms, the number of

subscribers to the “Long Live Palestine Boycott Israel”

campaign has little significance. At just over 400,000

members, the subscribers to this campaign are likely a

fraction of the overall participants in the BDS movement.

Nonetheless, this may develop into powerful tool in the BDS

arsenal.

Technological Advances from the 1980s to Present

The 1980s marked the beginning of a new period of global

interconnectedness as technology advanced international

media and communications. Cable television allowed cultural

influences to spread globally before the availability of the

Internet. Although apartheid in South Africa had been in

53

place since 1948, little international pressure had been

applied to counter it. There existed a cultural disconnect

between the seemingly remote nation of South Africa and the

rest of the industrialised world. As people throughout the

world felt more connected to the plight of black South

Africans, individuals around the world moved to promote

social through economic activism. One of the ways anti-

apartheid messages were spread was through music, an

increasingly global industry at the time.

Musician Peter Gabriel released “Biko,” a song about a

martyred black South African activist in 1980. Gabriel’s

lyrics have a clear purpose of highlighting the human

tragedy of Apartheid. Sometime later, actor and musician

Steven “Little Stevie” Van Zandt was inspired by Biko and

decided to create an anti-apartheid collaboration called

“Artists United Against Apartheid.” The group released a

single called “Sun City” in 1985. Sun City was the name of

an elite resort in South Africa where many famous musicians

played for wealthy white tourists. The single encouraged

musicians to boycott the Sun City venue by refusing to

54

perform there. The project also served to shame other

artists who did not honour the boycott. The single is now on

Rolling Stone’s 100 Best Albums of the Eighties list.46

In the 1980s other artists followed suit and joined the

bandwagon against apartheid songs. For example British Ska

band, The Special A.K.A., wrote a song called “Free Nelson

Mandela” in 1984. Despite the lack of social media, cable

television and Music Television was a strong new medium for

spreading the anti-Apartheid message. Although South African

Apartheid began in 1948, the technology to apply global

pressure to the regime did not arrive until much later. As

communication technology increased in the 1980s, people

became aware of social issues abroad. Businesses were

suddenly susceptible to a new paradigm requiring them to

maintain a higher level of ethics in their transactions

abroad. International boycotts, spurred by musicians and

activists led Coca-Cola, for example, to announce that they

would cut ties with South Africa in 1986.47

To date, many artists have spoken out against Israel as

well, although, they have done so at great risk to their

55

careers and reputations. Such actions are almost always met

with accusations of anti-Semitism. In the summer of 2014

actors Javier Bardem and Penelope Cruz published an open

letter that was critical of Israel. They later were forced

to “clarify” a portion of their statement and revert to a

softer stance.48 In spite of the catch twenty-two of being

labelled an anti-Semite for speaking out about human rights,

one actor recently (although unintentionally) propelled BDS.

The young movie star Scarlett Johansson unwittingly

became the catalyst who bolstered the BDS movement in 2014.

In January of that year Johansson accepted a position as

spokesperson for SodaStream, an Israeli company that

manufactures carbonated beverage home-systems in an illegal

factory in the West Bank. Since 2007, Johansson had been

serving as global ambassador for Oxfam, a British famine

relief organisation.49 The apparent hypocrisy of these two

roles was well noticed by Facebook and Twitter users,

leading to viral memes criticising the actor. Whereas ten

years ago, Johansson may have taken on both roles unnoticed,

56

in the age of social media she found herself under a

microscope.

The unwanted social media attention surrounding

Johansson and SodaStream significantly damaged the company’s

profits. SodaStream faced massive divestment, and company

shares fell fifty-three per cent from the same period the

previous year. Their third quarter revenue fell by 13.5 per

cent. Although SodaStream offered a variety of reasons for

the decline in their stocks, they omitted BDS as possible

factor.50 However, SodaStream’s subsequent actions appear to

confirm BDS as the primary element responsible for the

lacklustre sales and decline in stock prices.

On October 30 of 2014, The New York Times reported that

SodaStream would be closing their factory in the West Bank,

confirming suspicions that BDS was responsible for the

decline in their stock prices.51 In analysing the chain of

events regarding Scarlett Johansson and SodaStream between

January and October of 2014, it appears social media is the

primary agent of change, damaging stock prices and forcing

closure of the West Bank factory. Furthermore, the evidence

57

also suggests that the BDS movement makes the most notable

headway when precipitated by a scandal or an Israeli

military adventure. Noteworthy events that increase user-

generated activity on social media lead to increased BDS

activity and support.

Use of social media and events such as the Scarlet

Johansson scandal allow for quick normalisation of ideas in

ways that were not possible during South African Apartheid.

The African National Congress, for example, called for

boycotts in 1958; however, boycotts had no significant

impact until the 1980s, as mentioned above.52 The call for

change in South Africa finally resonated when values became

more interconnected through pop culture and media. As the

age of computer technology and user-generated media

overtakes the cable television twenty-four hour news cycle,

social values and actions can filter through international

society at a much quicker pace than ever before. People

around the world are not only more aware of social justice

movements abroad, but they are also endowed with an

opportunity to act through economic activism.

58

Ripple Effects

Boycotts, which are now being promoted on the Internet

through social media, stopped consumers from purchasing many

Israeli products particularly by the beginning of Operation

Protective Edge. Once consumers began to stray from Israeli

goods in July of 2014, merchants began cancelling orders for

Israeli products. By August of 2014, Ireland’s largest food

distributor, SuperValu, announced that it was withdrawing

Israeli produced goods from the shelves of its 232 stores.53

While it might be expected that some in a country like

Ireland, with its own colonial history, might support the

boycott of Israeli products, Israeli produce growers also

suffered order cancellations from France, UK, and

Scandinavian countries.54 As consumers take part in the

grassroots sanctions, retailers are forced to respond to

their demand.

One major online retailer has illustrated the ripple

effects of BDS by choosing to no longer distribute products

produced in the West Bank. Online shopping site, GILT, which

has more than six million members, has removed Ahava Dead

59

Sea cosmetics from its website. Ahava, a Jewish Israeli

company, harvests minerals from Palestinian land on the Dead

Sea for international sale in the form of beauty products.

Although GILT elimination of Ahava from their product line

was largely a result of correspondence with Code Pink, we

can assume that increased BDS awareness was at least

partially responsible for the action.55 GILT, after all,

utilises three social media campaigns for its advertising.56

Grassroots sanction campaigns can filter up and

infiltrate every area of life, as we can see with the United

Methodist church’s divestment form Israel. The church’s

website defines apartheid and thoroughly explains how Israel

fits the definition.57 As a result, the church refuses to

invest in firms that they deem to support apartheid in

Israel or the West Bank in their business practices. This

type of filtering up becomes economically dangerous to large

corporations, effectively issuing an ultimatum to choose

between Israel and the world.

One corporation that has responded to such an ultimatum

is Africa Israel Investments. A subsidiary of the company,

60

Danya Cebus, has been a major builder of illegal settlements

in the West Bank and East Jerusalem for years. Between

protests and divestments from the company over their

practices, however, the company realised that it cannot be

considered a legitimate business partner in the

international community so long as it maintains

controversial practices. As of October, the company

announced that it would no longer be in the illegal

settlement business.58

A major lightening rod in US-Israel relations is in the

ever-growing security industry. Many citizens find multiple

problematic elements to the security aspect of the

relationship between the two states. In September of 2014,

an annual trade show occurred in Oakland, California called

Urban Shield. This trade show, which pushes advanced

weaponry for use on civilian populations, was met with a

significant protest, spread largely via Facebook and

Twitter. Although the protests were largely based out of

concerns that Oakland Police were far too militarised and

had violated human rights in the past, one of the most

61

significant complaints was that part of the Israeli security

apparatus was involved in the event. The protests were

ultimately successful, and Mayor Jean Quan announced that

Oakland would no longer host the event.59

BDS also filtered upward when the people of Durham,

North Carolina came together to collectively exercise the

power of their community, collectively rejecting a security

company that perpetuated and profited from the oppression of

Palestinians. G4S, a security contractor, has been doing

business in Israel since 2007, providing both equipment and

personnel. The company works in illegal settlements and

impedes Palestinian freedom of movement at West Bank

checkpoints. The people of Durham, in spite of the cosy US-

Israel relationship, rejected a one million dollar contract

with G4S to police civic buildings.60 Based on the

difference in the international reactions to Israeli attacks

on Gaza in 2005 and 2014, Durham seems to have reacted to

the global change in the flow of information via social

media.

62

In the Internet era, the desires and political

motivations of individuals can affect the way large

corporations do business. The promotion of grassroots

sanctions via social media can not only affect businesses

but can have an expanding effect that filters horizontally

as well as vertically. In the digital age, political

boycotts can start as a seed in a church’s membership and

grow into church policy. They can grow organically in a

community and become city or state policy. Boycotts cause

businesses to reconsider their relationships with partners

and venders in order to maintain broader appeal to the

consumer. Large businesses that are not consumer driven can

be forced to change their activities in order to maintain

credibility in the international business community.

Block The Boat: Enhanced Outcomes In Traditional Protest

Until now, this paper has primarily focused on economic

action that can be taken via social media wherein people in

one state divest or boycott a target state. In this section

63

I will discuss the use of social media to conduct direct

action. Specifically, this section is about using social

media to block commerce. Whereas the previous pages speak of

relatively passive and risk-free actions, this section is

about actions taken by people who are less risk-averse. In

essence, this seeks to show that media can enhance the

outcomes of traditional protests.

The BDS movement has largely adopted methods used

against South Africa in the 1980s. In 1984, longshoremen

from the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU),

local 10 in San Francisco, refused to unload South African

cargo from the Dutch vessel, Nedlloyd Kimberly. For ten days

local activists protested at Pier 80 in San Francisco while

the South African cargo remained on the boat, untouched.

Only after the federal government threatened an injunction

was the cargo finally unloaded. One of the dynamics leading

to success in this situation may have been the ethnic and

racial makeup of the ILWU workers. About half of the union

members were black, possibly indicating a vested interest in

the plight of other black people elsewhere in the world.61

64

Using this model, on August 16th, 2014, several

thousand activists marched to the port of Oakland on in

efforts to keep the Israeli ship Zim Piraeus from

unloading.62 The Arab Resource and Organising Centre

organised and promoted the action called “Block the Boat”

through social media. There were also handbills alerting

individuals of the impending protest, which were handed out

at weekly demonstrations taking place in San Francisco

during Operation Protective Edge. Throughout the action,

organisers made regular posts on Facebook and twitter to

alert individuals of any attempt the boat made to dock. They

also used a text message alert system.

At the port, protestors picketed on the sidewalks and

workers refused to pass the picket line. For four days, the

boat remained unable to unload.63 According to some sources,

the Zim Piraeus was only able to partially unload.64 In the

months to come, similar actions took place in Los Angeles,

Seattle, and Tacoma, but with limited success. On October

26, 2014, another ship, the Zim Beijing, was headed to

Oakland and protesters were ready to declare another

65

victory. The Beijing eventually diverted its course, never

unloading in Oakland.65 The Block the Boat movement was so

successful that by October 28, 2014 Zim had cancelled future

dockings at the ports of Oakland and Los Angeles.66

There has been substantial commentary regarding social

justice actions and the role of social media. Typically,

those involved with social justice movements have vested

interests, and social media is indeed an intervening

variable.67 The protests against the Mubarak regime in

Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring were made up of

Egyptians seeking justice in Egypt; those involved in the

Green movement were Iranians seeking justice in Iran. In

both Egypt and Iran, as in so many other places, local

people did crucial work on the ground because they would

ultimately be the ones affected by the outcome. Although the

protests may have been aided by use of social media, they

certainly were not a product of the new technology.

Block the Boat was somewhat different because,

although many of the organisers and participants were

Palestinian, the action was largely comprised of local

66

people working to affect the policies of a foreign state.

Many involved did not have a clear personal interest. This

stands in contrast to the 1984 San Francisco action against

South Africa, where many of those involved were of African

descent and may have felt a sense kinship toward black South

Africans. Thus, there is a gap between local actions and

actions taken for an audience abroad. There is a gap between

those with direct interest and those without.

In the world of social justice activism, specifically

activism that seeks to boycott, divest, sanction, or

otherwise interrupt commerce, social media can bridge this

gap. Through social media, people who are not directly

affected by a foreign government can passively boycott or

actively participate in commerce interruption. When widely

cast information appeals to moral sensibilities, even risk-

averse people can divest. Those who are willing to take

risks in solidarity with people abroad can be rallied with

social media to participate in commerce disruption.

Israel and Grassroots Sanctions: Defy or Comply?

67

The previous pages of analysis examine the relationship

between social media, individuals who practice grassroots

economic activism, and businesses associated with the target

country. We already know that the South African Apartheid

government fell in 1994. I have also established a

relationship between social media and increased BDS

activity, particularly during Operation Protective Edge in

2014. The actions of the Israeli government from the end of

Operation Protective Edge, at the end of August 2014,

through December of that year are of particular relevance.

The purpose of this section is to look at any possible

correlation between peak of the BDS movement at this time

and the implementation of Israeli policy.

Days after the end of Operation Protective Edge, the

Israeli government showed that it was in no mood for

compromise. Although they were facing international scorn

for the thousands recently killed by the Israeli incursion

in Gaza, the government immediately moved to confiscate more

Palestinian lands for Jewish settlement. In the largest

land-grab in thirty years, Israel announced that it would

68

take four square kilometres of land in the West Bank for the

expansion of the Gevaot settlement.68 Being that Israel’s

West Bank settlements are already a violation of

international law, the move appears to be a flippant

response to global consensus, particularly after the tragedy

of Gaza.

The reallocation of Arab land in the West Bank to the

Jewish settlement was followed by an announcement in late

October of 2014 by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu that

Israel will also build over one thousand homes on

Palestinian land in East Jerusalem. The area in question was

annexed by Israel in 1967, but Israel’s sovereignty over

greater Jerusalem is not recognised under international

law.69 The move adds to existing housing pressures for

Palestinians living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem,

further degrading already intolerable living situations.

The impossibility of the housing situation in East

Jerusalem and the West Bank depletes the Palestinian people

in the area of any sense of emotional or physical security.

While the Israeli government often gives a green light to

69

home building in Jewish neighbourhoods and settlements, it

is virtually unheard of for Arabs to acquire building

permits. As Palestinian families expand, the only option is

to build without permits. In response, Israel retaliates by

demolishing Palestinian homes. In fact, since 1967, Israel

has destroyed 27,000 Palestinian buildings.70 In late 2014,

the Israeli government stepped up demolitions of Palestinian

homes as a form of collective punishment for violence

committed in Jerusalem. Although the demolitions often

target the homes of suspected attackers, they often leave

tens of people homeless and destitute.71

Israel often leaves Palestinians with very little

choice, maintaining an ethno-racial system that deprives

them of basic human rights positing Jewish people, often

immigrants, above them. Few legitimate channels exist for

rectification of Palestinian grievances. The result can be

uprisings, which often include rock throwing. In efforts to

mitigate Israeli concerns over rock throwing, Israeli

ministers have passed a draconian law, which would allow

sentencing Palestinians to twenty years in Prison for

70

throwing stones.72 Jewish settlers in the West Bank often

throw stones at Palestinians, butare not subject to the same

harsh military laws.73

While taking more land, demolishing Palestinian homes,

and pushing laws that further discriminate against and harm

Palestinians, the Israeli government is also engaging in

post-ceasefire attacks on Gaza. According to one NGO, there

was at least one attack per day on Gaza in September of

2014.74 In November of 2014, the Israeli navy fired upon and

injured three fishermen from Gaza.75 Another man was

murdered in November by Israeli forces in Gaza while

searching for songbirds.76 Under the circumstances, it does

not appear that BDS has curbed Israel’s belligerence toward

Palestinians.

The increasingly harsh approach toward Palestinians

appears to be accompanied by a rise in nationalist attitudes

within the Israeli government. In November the Israeli

cabinet passed nationality legislation, which encodes the

Jewish identity of the state of Israel into law.77 While it

is uncertain what the end result of this legislation may be,

71

it appears threatening to the non-Jewish minorities, who

would essentially be denied national identity. History has

shown that when nations begin passing laws to define

national identity and exclude minorities, atrocities often

follow.

Further indicating this trend toward nationalism, on

November 28, 2014, Israeli foreign minister Avigdor

Lieberman proposed paying Arab citizens to abandon their

Israeli citizenship and leave the state of Israel.78

However, Lieberman also still maintains the revisionist

ideology of Greater Israel, that Israel should acquire all

Palestinian lands in the West Bank and Gaza.79 Paying Arabs

to leave would be mere steppingstone in the process of

creating an expanded Jewish state with a guaranteed Jewish

majority; in the meantime it is an avenue to push more Arabs

into Palestinian Bantustans. Moreover, the proposed policy

solidifies a radically separatist ideology, possibly

impeding any peace process and strongly countering the goals

of the BDS campaign.

72

Extreme nationalism, particularly when unchecked, can

lead to rifts within right wing parties. In the 1969 the

South Africa’s nationalist party experienced inner turmoil

and purged members from its ranks who did not vote with

along party lines on specific issues.80 Similarly, in late

2014, Netanyahu fired two ministers for not falling into an

extreme right wing Zionist line.81 It appears far right

nationalism may be a catalyst for dysfunction in governments

that push policies of discrimination. If, as some scholars

suggest, sanctions lead to increased nationalism—and extreme

nationalism is inherently unstable—then bolstered

nationalism is a step toward the objective of the sanctions.

It is impossible to know what the future holds for

Israel in the coming years. However, it is evident that

during the latter part of 2014, as BDS activity has

increased globally, Israel is defiant. Israel’s actions show

that their policy makers are refractory to the grassroots

economic activism. Furthermore, at the time of this writing,

Israeli actions appear to confirm the assertion that “an

authoritarian government tends to become even more

73

repressive” 82 when sanctions are imposed. However, this

repression may cause internal conflict. Although we can see

the profound effect that economic activism has on individual

businesses, so far there appears to be no positive change in

Israeli policy. The hardliners are clinging to oppression

while stifling more moderate voices.

Conclusion

My original central argument in this paper was that with use

of social media and new boycott oriented applications,

activists can now engage in economic statecraft. As access

to greater information and the utility of technology

increases, boycotts emerge as grassroots sanctions.

Furthermore, I hypothesised that targeted states would then

be forced to react due to the decentralised nature of

grassroots sanctions. In my analysis, I found my hypothesis

to be partially supported. Although social media appears to

turn boycotts into sanctions, and while there is great

potential for boycott applications, it is questionable

74

whether such boycotts will have significant impact on

policies within the target state.

The data appears to show that use of social media has

increased awareness and international participation in

social justice actions. This growth of social awareness and

activism vis-à-vis social media is particularly apparent when

comparing international reactions to two similar Israeli

attacks—one attack on Gaza in 2008-09 and the other in the

summer of 2014.We can also gauge how activism is enhanced by

social media when we compare the boycotts against SodaStream

in 2014 with those against Coca-Cola in the 1980s. The

SodaStream case is particularly interesting, with all the

intrigue of a gossip magazine and the geo-political

implications typically reserved for political or economic

publications. Aside from having a farther reach than the

boycott of Coca-Cola, the manner in which the SodaStream

boycott spread transcended traditional media formats and

filled a unique Internet niche.

The data also suggests that international ripple

effects spread from business to business and from local

75

government to business. We saw business to business BDS

impact when online shopping store GILT dropped Ahava Dead

Sea Cosmetics from their webpage. This was also illustrated

when Africa Israel Investments abandoned the illegal

settlement business in order to maintain global credibility.

Community to business ramifications were seen when Oakland,

California refused to host Urban Shield and when Durham,

North Carolina rejected a contract with Israeli company G4S.

This paper has also shown that social media can enhance

direct action against a target country’s freight lines.

Although in 1984 protesters and dockworkers temporarily kept

South African cargo from being unloaded for several days in

San Francisco, Block the Boat, which relied heavily on

social media, was more successful in disrupting commerce.

Moreover, Block the Boat showed that social media can rally

supporters to come out and physically engage in an activist

cause even when they lack a personally vested interest.

The effect on Israeli policy is less clear. If

anything, it appears that BDS has encouraged the Israeli

government’s belligerence. Grassroots sanctions certainly do

76

not seem to hinder the current right-wing Israeli government

from ruffling the feathers of those who disagree with their

policies. However, at the time of this writing there is a

rift in Netanyahu’s cabinet. This appears to support the

pervasive view in the literature that sanctions have limited

application, even when they are grassroots sanctions.

Grassroots sanctions may become a growing force within the

aggregate of forces pushing for policy change in Israel but

this will require future data to assess.

Grassroots sanctions may prove more valuable if they

can capture the popular imagination. Unlike the Save Darfur

campaign, economic activism does not require massive

funding; contrarily, it requires divestment. This type of

sanction scheme may prove successful where there is

complementary opposition within the target state. As

Palestinians resist Israeli oppression on the ground,

popular culture may influence state policy to isolate

Israel. This is of particular importance in regard to US

foreign policy due to the massive foreign aid given to

Israel, roughly 3.6 billion dollars in 2013.83

77

Going forward, pro-Palestinian activists should

continue to pursue BDS efforts and work with IT

professionals in order to continuously build Internet

presence and distribute information using social media.

Interested parties should promote the Buycott application

and its “Free Palestine Boycott Israel” campaign.

Individuals and groups should look for hypocrisies among

businesses and public figures and seize upon opportunities

to spread provocative Internet memes. Also, because Israel

utilises paid Internet propagandists (usually college

students with multiple false accounts), activists should

organise means to dwarf their voices with the counter

narrative.84

Although this paper focused on external economic

factors, a potential focus of future studies could be

internal factors using Israel and South Africa as case

studies. As mentioned above, grassroots sanctions are only a

part of the overall aggregate and perhaps a growing force.

However, useful information could be obtained by comparing

various factors within South Africa at the end of Apartheid

78

to current political and social conditions within Israel.

These could include, but should not be limited to, civil

society groups, such as labour unions, militant groups,

peace activist organisations, and clergy. Close examination

and comparison of the political environments within both

respective governments might also offer insight.

Comparisons in economics and demography are also

important. The difference between both sides of each

conflict in terms of population size and economic output may

be telling. Some insight could be gleaned by examining the

cohesiveness of opposition groups. Potential questions could

be drawn regarding how ideologically close Hamas and Fatah,

the two political groups with the strongest support among

Palestinians, are. How do rifts between them compare to the

divides among black South African parties? Although there

are many metrics that can be applied to the selected case

studies, these represent just a few considerations. While

there exist many approaches, perhaps these works on

grassroots sanctions may be integrated into the larger study

of movements toward social justice and equality.

79

End Notes

80

1Sasha Polakow-Suransky, “The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.41, No. 1 (Autumn 2011), 113-115.2 William Cleveland, and Martin Bunton, A History of The Modern Middle East. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2013), 332.3 “Palestinian BDS National Committee,” BDS Movement, accessed November 30, 2014http://www.bdsmovement.net/bnc.4 Omar Barghouti. Boycott Divestment Sanctions (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011), 6.5 Gary C. Huffbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberley Ann Elliot, and Barbara Oegg. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered 3rd edition. (Washington DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2007), 50.6 Ibid, 158.7 Ibid, 159.8 Daniel Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 308.9 Ibid.10 Ernest H Preeg, Feeling Good Or Doing Good With Sanctions, (Washington DC: CSIS Press, 1999), 7-9.11 Ibid, 200.12 R.T Naylor, Economic Warfare: Sanctions, Embargo Busting and Their Human Cost, (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1999), 2-4.13 Ibid, 382.14 Mahmood Monshipouri, Democratic Uprisings In The New Middle East: Youth, Technology, Human Rights, And US Foreign Policy, (Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers, 2014) 8.15 Ibid, 9.16 Ibid.17 Malcolm Gladwell, "SMALL CHANGE." New Yorker 86, no. 30: 42. MAS Ultra- School Edition, EBSCOhost, accessed October 5, 2014.18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 Clay Shirky, “The Political Power Of Social Media: Technology, The Public Sphere, And Political Change,” Council On Foreign Relations, (2011) : 0-12, accessed October 6, 2014 http://www.bendevane.com/FRDC2011/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/The-Political-Power-of-Social-Media-Clay-Sirky.pdf.

24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 Golnaz Esfandiari, “The Twitter Devolution” Foreign Policy. June 7, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/07/the_twitter_revolution_that_wasnt.29 Ibid.30 Roberto Bellelli, International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to Its Review, (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 249.31 Buzan, Barry and Mathias Albert ,“Differentiation: A Sociological Approach To International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations, 16, no. 3 (2010) : 832 Barry Buzan and Mathias Albert. Bringing Sociology to International Relations,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 104.33 Jack Donnelly, “The Differentiation of International Societies: An Approach to Structural International Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2012): 166.34 Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 398.35 Ibid, 395.36 Ibid, 404.37 Ibid, 405.38 “Israel/Gaza: Operation ‘Cast Lead’: 22 days of death and destruction,” amnesty.org, 2009, http://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/MDE15/015/2009/en/8f299083-9a74-4853-860f-0563725e633a/mde150152009en.pdf.39 “Families Under The Rubble: Israeli Attacks On Inhabited Homes,” Amnesty.org, 2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/032/2014/en/613926df-68c4-47bb-b587-00975f014e4b/mde150322014en.pdf.40 “Pew Research Internet Project,” Pew Research Internet Project, Accessed November 22 2014, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/#.41 Aaron Smith, “Civic Engagement in the Digital Age,” Pew Research Internet Project, last modified April 25 2013, http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/04/25/civic-engagement-in-the-digital-age/.

42 “Number of monthly active Facebook users worldwide from 3rd quarter2008 to 3rd quarter 2014 (in millions),” statista.com, accessed November22 2014, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/43 Calire O’Connor, “New App Lets You Boycott Koch Brothers, Monsanto And More By Scanning Your Shopping Cart,” Forbes, May 14, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2013/05/14/new-app-lets-you-boycott-koch-brothers-monsanto-and-more-by-scanning-your-shopping-cart/44 Jonah Lowenfeld, “How one 16-year-old Brit mobilized a mobile app against Israel,” Jewish Journal, July 29, 2014, http://www.jewishjournal.com/thenon-prophet/item/how_one_16_year_old_brit_mobilized_a_mobile_app_against_israel.45 Patricia Sabga, “Campaign to boycott Israel gains ground,” Al Jazeera, August 13, 2014, http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/real-money-with-alivelshi/articles/2014/8/13/campaign-to-boycottisraelgainsground.html.46 “100 Best Albums of the Eighties,” Rolling Stone, accessed November 24,2014, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/100-best-albums-of-the-eighties-20110418/artists-united-against-apartheid-sun-city-20110330.47 Bill Sing, “Coca-Cola Acts to Cut All Ties With S. Africa,” New yorkTimes, September 18, 1986, http://articles.latimes.com/1986-09-18/news/mn-11241_1_south-africa.48 Loulla-Mae Eleftheriou-Smith, “Penelope Cruz and Javier Bardem face'fury' of Hollywood following 'genocide' letter condemning Israel,” The Independent, August 10, 2014, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/cruz-and-bardem-face-fury-of-hollywood-following-genocide-letter-condemning-israel-9659707.html.49 Vijay Prishad, “Scarlet Johansson is right—the face of SodaStream doesn’t fit with Oxfam,” The Guardian, January, 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/30/scarlett-johansson-sodastream-oxfam-israeli-settlement.50 Samantha Sharf, “SodaStream Shares Plunge To All-Time Low On 53% Income Decline,” Forbes, October 7, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthasharf/2014/10/07/sodastream-shares-plunge-to-all-time-low-on-53-income-decline/.51 Jodi Rudorin, “Israeli Firm, Target of Boycott, to Shut West Bank Plant, New York Times,” October 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/31/world/middleeast/sodastream-to-close-factory-in-west-bank.html?_r=0.

52 Adrian Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 195-196).53 Joyce Fegan, “SuperValu Boycotts Israeli Products,” Herald.ie, August 5, 2014, http://www.herald.ie/news/supervalu-boycotts-israeli-products-30483160.html.54 Michael Deas, “Ireland’s Biggest Food Retailer Drops Israeli Produce As European Boycotts Surge,” Electronic Intefada, August 15, 2014, http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/michael-deas/irelands-biggest-food-retailer-drops-israeli-produce-european-boycotts-surge.55 Adam Horowitz, “BDS Victories: Online retailer drops Ahava; Kuwait boycotts companies with settlement ties,” Mondoweiss, October 29 2014, http://mondoweiss.net/2014/10/victories-companies-settlement.56 Laura Stampler, “Gilt's Susan Lyne: Selling On Facebook 'Was Like Trying To Sell Something At A Bar',” Business Insider, September 27, 2012,http://www.businessinsider.com/gilts-susan-lyne-on-social-media-2012-9.57 “Understanding United Methodist Divestment”, unitedmethodistdivestment.com, accessed November 24, 2014, http://www.unitedmethodistdivestment.com/IsraelPractApartheid.html.58 Haggai Matar, “Major Israeli construction company pulls out of settlement industry,” +972 Magazine, October 27, 2014, http://972mag.com/major-israeli-construction-company-pulls-out-of-settlement-industry/98089/.59 “We Pushed Urban Shield Out Of Oakland, But The Struggle Continues!”, Facing Teargas, accessed November 26, 2014, http://facingteargas.org/stop-urban-shield-oakland.60 “BDS Victory: Durham drops $1 million contract with Israeli occupation profiteer,” Jewish Voice For Peace, November 25, 2014, https://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/blog/bds-victory-durham-drops-1-million-contract-with-israeli-occupation-pr.61 “Death of Nelson Mandela recalls decades of ILWU support for anti-apartheid struggle,” International Longshore and Warehouse Union, accessed November 28, 2014, http://www.ilwu.org/death-of-nelson-mandela-recalls-decades-of-ilwu-support-for-anti-apartheid-struggle/.62 Numbers based on my estimations while witnessing the demonstration.63 I was present and able to witness these events firsthand.64 Ben Norton, “California Leads The Way In ‘Block The Boat’ Movement,” Mondoweiss, October 17, 2014, http://mondoweiss.net/2014/10/california-block-movement.65 Lena Dakessian, “Demonstrators return to Port of Oakland to protestlanding of Israeli ship,” SFGate, October 28, 2014,

http://blog.sfgate.com/inoakland/2014/10/28/demonstrators-return-to-port-of-oakland-to-protest-landing-of-israeli-ship/.66 Charlotte Solver, “Bay Area activists declare victory after Israelicarrier cancels all ships,” Electronic Intefada, October 31, 2014, http://electronicintifada.net/blogs/charlotte-silver/bay-area-activists-declare-victory-after-israeli-carrier-cancels-all-ships. 67 Mahmood Monshipouri Democratic Uprisings In The New Middle East: Youth, Technology, Human Rights, And US Foreign Policy, (Boulder, London: Paradigm Publishers, 2014) 8.68 “Israel to take over West Bank Land,” BBC News, September 1, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29008045.69Isabel Kershner and Jodi Rudoren, “Netanyahu Expedites Plan for More Than 1,000 New Apartments in East Jerusalem” New York Times, October 27, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/middleeast/benjamin-netanyahu-east-jerusalem.html?_r=0.70 “The Facts,” The Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions, accessed November 29, 2014, http://www.icahd.org/the-facts.71 “Israel: Stop Punitive Housing Demolitions,” Human Rights Watch, November 22, 2014, http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/21/israel-stop-punitive-home-demolitions.72 “Israeli ministers pass bill jailing stone throwers for 20 years,” Russia Today, last modified, November 4, 2014, http://rt.com/news/201695-israel-stone-throwing-law/.73 Jamee Hadad, “In the West Bank, Israeli and Palestinian kids who throw stones face unequal justice,” April 22, 2014, PRI’s The World, http://www.pri.org/stories/2014-04-22/west-bank-israeli-and-palestinian-kids-who-throw-stones-face-unequal-justice.74 Ben White, NGO: More than one Israeli attack on Gaza per day in September, Middle East Monitor, October 24, 2014, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/blogs/politics/14842-ngo-more-than-one-israeli-attack-on-gaza-per-day-in-september.75 “Israeli forces open fire at Gaza fishermen, injure 3”, Ma’an News Agency, November 10, 2014.76 “Israeli forces shoot dead Palestinian man in Gaza Strip,” The Guardian, November 23, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/23/israeli-forces-shoot-dead-palestinian-man-gaza-strip.77 Gregg Carlstrom, “Israel set to make Arabs second class citizens,” The Australian, November 24, 2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/israel-set-to-make-arabs-

second-class-citizens/story-fnb64oi6-1227133224679?nk=b4b52d9a24977049c97f5ed984ecc8f7.78 “Offer Israeli Arabs money to move to Palestinian state: Lieberman,” Reuters, November 28, 2014,” http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/28/us-mideast-israel-lieberman-idUSKCN0JC12Q20141128.79 Avaneesh Pandey, “Israel's Foreign Minister Urges Government To Encourage Departure Of Arabs To Future Palestinian State,” International Business Times, November 29, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/israels-foreign-minister-urges-government-encourage-departure-arabs-future-1730716.80 Adrian Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),121.81 Peter Beaumont, “Israel set for elections as Netanyahu fires two ministers,” The Guardian, December 2, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/02/israel-set-for-elections-netanyahu-fires-ministers.82 Preeg, Ernest H. Feeling Good Or Doing Good With Sanctions. (Washington DC: CSIS Press, 1999), 7-9.83 Philip Weiss, “House committee votes to give Israel another 1/2 billion in aid,” Mondoweiss, June 10, 2013, http://mondoweiss.net/2013/06/committee-another-billion.84 “Israel to pay students to defend it online,” USA Today, August 14, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/08/14/israel-students-social-media/2651715/.