1 / 25 Social Media and China’s Public Diplomacy: A Path to the Future 1 Chenzhuo Gong Fudan University Abstract: In recent years, China—perceiving itself suffering from misjudgment and deserving more respect—has been vigorously pursuing a better international image. The rapid growth of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms that promote Chinese culture overseas, the generous aid to Africa and the global expansion of its media properties are the most notable efforts. However, scholars point out that the reluctance to develop social media tools for its public diplomacy limits the Chinese government’s capacity to directly engage a foreign public, a formula which in recent years has shown positive effects for other countries. This paper reviews the Bureau of International Information Programs of the United States and explores the possibility for Chinese authorities to include social media into its PD arsenal. Keywords: Social Media, Public Diplomacy, Bureau of International Informational Programs, Confucius Institutes 1. Introduction Currently on the international stage, there are two parallel trends transforming the landscape of public diplomacy (PD) 2 : the flourishing of social media and the rise of China. A burgeoning phenomenon since the beginning of 21 st century, social media 3 is everywhere nowadays. Nearly one in four people in the world use social networks in 2013 (eMarketer 2013). 4 This suggests that if “the social media empire” were a country, it already boasts the world’s largest population. Beyond its extensive reach, social media is revolutionizing the way people think, empowering the marginalized and even helping to spark uprisings (Kenna 1 This paper is mainly policy-centered as it seeks to offer concrete policy prescriptions to China’s public diplomacy practitioners concerning the use of social media. Thus, to save the space for policy recommendations and to make the paper as condensed as possible, it does not strictly follow the academic format, deliberately skipping a systematic literature review. This can be a limitation of this paper, but it somehow helps ensure the consistency, clarity and concision of the paper as well. 2 As an essential element of effective diplomacy, public diplomacy, often used interchangeably with “strategic communication” or “outreach” (United States Government Accountability Office 2009, 1), means the efforts to communicate with global audience to help advance the nation’s policies, interests, and values, increase its favorability in the short run, while to increase the nation’s influence by sustaining long-term relationship with foreign publics in the long run. This definition, presented by the author, is a brief summary to a great variety of relevant interpretations(For example, Cowan and Cull 2008, 6; Matwiczak 2010, 27; Nye 2008, 101;Ross 2002, 77-82; State Department 2010, 60; Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 2014; United States Government Accountability Office 2009, 6; Wallin 2012, 3) 3 This paper defines social media as “highly interactive platforms via which individuals and communities share, co-create, discuss, and modify user-generated content” ( (Jan H. Kietzmann 2011, 241). Amidst the literally hundreds of different social media platforms, the major platforms in social media including blogs, the crowd-sourced user-generated encyclopedia sites like Wikipedia, and social media sites including Facebook, file-sharing sites like YouTube. When mentioning about social media, this paper usually refers to, in specific, Facebook or Twitter, the two most dominant tools used by public diplomacy officers. 4 The percentage seems to be moderate, but regarding the Internet penetration rate of a mere 35 percent worldwide, a quarter is not trivial. For more detailed statistics on the Internet Penetration Rate, see http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
25
Embed
Social Media and China’s Public Diplomacy · Social Media and China’s Public Diplomacy: ... Wikipedia, and social media ... Whether China poses a tangible threat to the western
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
1 / 25
Social Media and China’s Public Diplomacy:
A Path to the Future1
Chenzhuo Gong Fudan University
Abstract: In recent years, China—perceiving itself suffering from misjudgment and deserving more respect—has been vigorously pursuing a better international image. The rapid growth of Confucius Institutes and Classrooms that promote Chinese culture overseas, the generous aid to Africa and the global expansion of its media properties are the most notable efforts. However, scholars point out that the reluctance to develop social media tools for its public diplomacy limits the Chinese government’s capacity to directly engage a foreign public, a formula which in recent years has shown positive effects for other countries. This paper reviews the Bureau of International Information Programs of the United States and explores the possibility for Chinese authorities to include social media into its PD arsenal.
Keywords: Social Media, Public Diplomacy, Bureau of International Informational Programs, Confucius Institutes
1. Introduction
Currently on the international stage, there are two parallel trends transforming the
landscape of public diplomacy (PD)2: the flourishing of social media and the rise of China.
A burgeoning phenomenon since the beginning of 21st century, social media 3 is
everywhere nowadays. Nearly one in four people in the world use social networks in 2013
(eMarketer 2013).4 This suggests that if “the social media empire” were a country, it already
boasts the world’s largest population. Beyond its extensive reach, social media is revolutionizing
the way people think, empowering the marginalized and even helping to spark uprisings (Kenna
1 This paper is mainly policy-centered as it seeks to offer concrete policy prescriptions to China’s public diplomacy practitioners
concerning the use of social media. Thus, to save the space for policy recommendations and to make the paper as condensed as
possible, it does not strictly follow the academic format, deliberately skipping a systematic literature review. This can be a
limitation of this paper, but it somehow helps ensure the consistency, clarity and concision of the paper as well. 2As an essential element of effective diplomacy, public diplomacy, often used interchangeably with “strategic communication” or
“outreach” (United States Government Accountability Office 2009, 1), means the efforts to communicate with global audience to
help advance the nation’s policies, interests, and values, increase its favorability in the short run, while to increase the nation’s
influence by sustaining long-term relationship with foreign publics in the long run. This definition, presented by the author, is a
brief summary to a great variety of relevant interpretations(For example, Cowan and Cull 2008, 6; Matwiczak 2010, 27; Nye
2008, 101;Ross 2002, 77-82; State Department 2010, 60; Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs 2014; United
States Government Accountability Office 2009, 6; Wallin 2012, 3) 3 This paper defines social media as “highly interactive platforms via which individuals and communities share, co-create,
discuss, and modify user-generated content” ( (Jan H. Kietzmann 2011, 241). Amidst the literally hundreds of different social
media platforms, the major platforms in social media including blogs, the crowd-sourced user-generated encyclopedia sites like
Wikipedia, and social media sites including Facebook, file-sharing sites like YouTube. When mentioning about social media, this
paper usually refers to, in specific, Facebook or Twitter, the two most dominant tools used by public diplomacy officers. 4 The percentage seems to be moderate, but regarding the Internet penetration rate of a mere 35 percent worldwide, a quarter is
not trivial. For more detailed statistics on the Internet Penetration Rate, see http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
2011, 3). The pervasive influence of social media unavoidably affects the sphere of PD, as
practitioners and scholars alike manifest profound interest in the “game-changer” (McHale
2009). PD scholar Matt Armstrong commented that, “In this age of mass information and
precision-guided media, ignoring social media is surrendering the high ground in the enduring
battle to influence minds around the world” (Amstrong 2009).
At the other end of the spectrum, China is flexing its soft power through a wide range of
PD channels, which span from culture, to foreign aid and international broadcasting. The
traditional balance of power in the “war of ideas” has been challenged by the rise of “the Middle
Kingdom”. Whether China poses a tangible threat to the western hegemony remains a question,
its PD campaign has, at least, touched on a nerve in the U.S. The labels of charm-offensive,
assertive or aggressive often go hand-in-hand with every move of China’s PD program (For
example, Dale 2010; Powell III 2012; Shambaugh 2010; The Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars 2012). The high-profile narrative “going out” and the new Office of Public
Diplomacy established in 2010 are further evidences of China’s “assertiveness”.
The two threads---one exogenous to the PD arena, the other endogenous---have yet to
converge. The usual “second adopter” (Gregory 2011, 362)---the U.S. government---has already
tapped into the potential of social media diplomacy. However, the risk-averse Chinese authorities
are still lingering around the gate of social media, with virtually no official presence on either
Facebook or Twitter.5 This paper will explore the possibility for China to capitalize on the
popularity of social media.
2. Review of China’s Public Diplomacy
When it comes to evaluating PD, two main roads diverge (Matwiczak 2010, 16). One is
to measure the output of PD effort, for example how many foreign students have enrolled in
Confucius Institutes6; the other goes beyond the activity per se and seeks to assess its outcome,
often at an epistemological level. In the case of Confucius Institutes, a positive outcome would
be participants’ increased understanding and favorability towards China, or more fundamentally,
whether the presence of Confucius Institutes improves China’s favorability in surrounding
communities.
The output approach is easier to quantify and track, often adopted by practitioners to
justify funding. However, a high output does not necessarily bring forth positive PD outcomes;
the soaring number of students does not lead to an indisputable victory in the battlefield of PD.
The outcome approach, which “gets to the heart of assessing the effectiveness of public
diplomacy” (Matwiczak 2010, 13), is more reliable in this regard.
In terms of its output, China’s PD program appears to be a booming success. Confucius
Institutes and Classrooms, in a mere nine years, have swept across 117 countries, with a
staggering number of 435 Institutes and 644 Classrooms (Confucius Institute Online 2013).
Beijing pledged worldwide $189 billion for foreign aid and government-sponsored investment
activities in 2011 (Charles, Xiao and Eric 2013, 70), investing $75 billion on aid and projects in
Africa alone from 2000 to 2011 (Austin, et al. 2013). China’s media property CCTV boasts three
major global offices in Beijing, Washington, and Nairobi, and more than 70 additional
5 The only exception is the Facebook account of Chinese Embassy in Myanmar. 6 Confucius Institutes, led and funded by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (in Chinese, Hanban), send out
Chinese language teachers to hundreds of branches around the world (Wang 2008, 264-265). The aim of Confucius Institutes is
explained as promoting Chinese language and culture.
international bureaus. Its program claims a reach of millions in 137 countries (Nelson 2013). In
an era when Voice of America and BBC World Service budgets are battered by funding cutbacks,
CCTV’s output is staggering.
However, when it comes to the outcome of China’s PD, the result may be more
disturbing than reassuring. Unlike its western counterparts, China’s PD practitioners have paid
greater attention to improving their image. In an online exchange in 2013, Qin Gang, China’s
Director General of Information Department, explained public diplomacy as “an important
means to introduce China and improve national image”.7 And the Public Diplomacy Forums in
2011 and 2013 also revolved around the concept of image.8 Nevertheless, through a cross-year
analysis, this paper finds that China’s favorability in 16 sample countries was in flux from 2007
to 2013. The image of China is in an embarrassing situation, compared to the country's booming
economic power and the reputation it attempts to shape.
In 2008, favorability towards China plummeted to the lowest point in the sample period,
from a median favorability rate of 44.5 percent in 2007 to 38 percent. After 2008, there was an
incremental increase in favorability in most of the sample countries, with the median reaching its
peak of 55 percent in 2011. In the past two years, the favorability rate sees a clear pattern of
recession. Among the 16 sample countries, only Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey exhibit a positive
trend with an average 6 percent increase.9 In another survey conducted by the BBC, of the 25
countries surveyed in 2013, 12 hold positive views of China, 13 negative views. China’s
“performance” remains strong in Africa and BRIC countries with strongly positive views in
general. However, in the EU, the U.S., Canada, as well as neighboring countries like Japan and
Korea, China suffers from an “extremely negative view” (BBC 2013).
The flux of favorability partly points to a PD campaign that has yet to claim success. The
high outputs in cultural diplomacy, foreign aid and international broadcasting have not been
translated into any tangible outcome in terms of a more positive image, which China has
arguably put the most weight on. Even though China has been scrambling to improve its
tarnished image, the outcome remains, at best, unclear. 10
3. Facebook Outreach: a Case Study of IIP
3.1. IIP’s Achievement against the Historic Backdrop
IIP, the Bureau of International Information Programs, is one of three bureaus that fall
under the authority of the U.S. Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. It
consists of over three hundred tech-savvy staff including myriad contractors (OIG Report 2013,
29). Its mission is to keep a finger on the pulse of the latest trends in technology and become the
creative engine of PD. To better understand the role and limits of IIP necessitates placing it
against the historic backdrop. The functions of IIP sit at the confluence of several narratives:
most notably, the wax and wane of PD in the U.S., the surge of New Public Diplomacy and the
7 Available online at: http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/02-22/4588352.shtml 8 The topic for the 2013 Forum was set as “Advocacy and Dialogue: China’s stories and image in the Public Diplomacy era” And
the focus of the forum was heavily steered towards “how to use public diplomacy to improve China’s image”. Available online
at: http://gb.cri.cn/42071/2013/06/26/6611s4161486.htm. 9 See Table 1 in the Appendix. 10 There are certain limitations to the method of poll data in PD evaluation: a) opinion is inherently variable and may only reflect
how an individual is feeling at a given point in time. b) The margin of error cannot be avoided. c) The change of favorability is
not solely determined by public diplomacy efforts, but influenced by a number of other variables. Poll data of favorability cannot
precisely evaluate public diplomacy due to the existence of mixed variables.
Under the iron veil of the Cold War, PD had been the central pillar of U.S. foreign
policies. The U.S. Information Agency played a significant role to “win the hearts and minds” in
the era marked by containment and ideological confrontations. However, the demise of the
Soviet Union has shaken the very foundation where the USIA, anti-Soviet “propaganda
machine” (Neal and Neal 2013, 2, Richards 2001), gained its premier legitimacy. The fate of the
agency was already sealed (Cull 2013, 129). In 1999, as PD receded to the backstage, the major
elements of the USIA were folded into the State Department (Cull 2012). The turning point for
PD came on the tragedy of 9/11 (Kohut 2003). Deteriorating favorability in the Middle East had
created a natural haven for terrorists; U.S. national security was at stake. To make up for a
decade of complacency, Washington attempted to reinvigorate America’s underutilized soft
power. It urged “effective public diplomacy”---“a different and more comprehensive approach”
in “a war of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism.” (The White House 2002, 31),
renewing significant resources devoted to PD (Neal and Neal 2013, 1). However, the meta-
narrative of the “war on terror” dwarfed the minor outcome PD is able to deliver. The U.S. image
was precipitously declining abroad (Ham 2008, 141).11 The depth of hostility in the Muslim
World provided a wonderful stage for PD practitioners. IIP is one of the beneficiaries. Its budget
almost doubled from to 2008 to 2010, reaching more than $102 million in 2010. The momentum
of growth, though constrained by a stringent economy, has remained strong in recent years (U.S.
Department of State 2013, 293).
Another narrative shaping IIP is the sunrise of the New Public Diplomacy. Instead of
“peddling information to foreigners” (Melissen 2005, 9), states are looking towards engaging
with foreign citizens. A radical departure from the Cold War doctrine that features state-to-people
communication, the New Public Diplomacy emphasizes the people-to-people relationship.
Meanwhile, the government no longer has a monopoly in engaging with foreign audiences; a
broad variety of actors, such as non-governmental organizations, private companies and citizens
are springing up. Facing the threat, PD practitioners are looking to new thinking and methods.
IIP, the innovation hub in the State Department, wins greater attention.
Apart from the resurgence of PD in the national strategy and the emergence of New
Public Diplomacy, technology advancement also favors IIP. With the advent of Web 2.0, viral
communication, social media and consumer-driven content have overtaken their predecessors---
email and websites---to become the defining characteristics of the Internet. In 2008, the Obama
administration gave social media high priority after witnessing their utility in his presidential
campaign. IIP, with its technical expertise, came across a historic opportunity.
Driven by the positive environment, IIP began to hit the fast lane. 12 Now, IIP claims an
extensive social media presence with a reach of 1.4 billion. 209 out of 294 U.S Embassies and
Consulates have been on Facebook, 122 of them on Twitter (U.S. Department of State 2013).
And IIP, as the central coordinating body and the arsenal of PD materials, sends out its best items
in a daily social media feed, while each Embassy or Consulate also produces their own messages
that are tailored to the taste of the local audience.
In the case of the Embassy in Jakarta, it has skillfully incorporated FB into its PD efforts
by relating it to offline events. For example, the Embassy has attracted a large local audience by
providing tangible rewards donated by Microsoft and Starbucks. Specifically, in a contest that 11 In 2007, only 9 percent of Turks and 30 percent of Germans had a positive view of the United States, according to Pew
Research Global Attitudes Project. 12 It is noteworthy that IIP provides a great variety of functions other than Facebook outreach, including the maintenance of
embassy websites, the promotion of American Corners and U.S. Speaker/Expert Program.
Gong 5
offered trips to the U.S., the fan count doubled to more than 60,000 in a month (Ciolek 2010,
16).
3.2. The Problems Haunting IIP and its Facebook Outreach
With effective use of FB along with other social media, IIP has made significant
contributions to the State Department’s digital diplomacy outreach efforts. However, the utility
of this approach was questioned in an official inspection of IIP in 2013. There are a multitude of
problems haunting IIP’s FB outreach (OIG Report 2013), including a slow response time
constrained by security clearance, the antithesis between policy dissemination and audience
tastes, the stagnation in designing reliable metrics to evaluate FB outreach, an over-emphasis on
the raw numbers of fans with an engagement rate of just over 2 percent, as well as an opaque
group of audience.
At the same time, IIP, as a whole, is circumscribed by, among other things, the problems
of functional overlap with other agencies, the lack of management over contractors that
constitute 45 percent of total staffing, a lack in leadership and strategic vision, and limited
interagency cooperation characterized by “tribal cultures” (Gregory 2011, 14).
To provide a clearer picture to the problems faced by IIP, this paper provides a threefold
classification to the problems: institutional problems, strategic problems and inherent problems.13
The first two can be resolved with institutional surgeries or clarifications at the strategic level,
but the last type of problem is rooted in inherent tensions. Security clearance cannot be
surrendered for the sake of response time; policy dissemination lingers as determined by the
nature of PD; and “the long-term nature of PD work” (OIG Report 2013, 18) defies any accurate
evaluation. Another inherent problem that was not mentioned in the inspection report is
“sustainability”. The essence of New Public Diplomacy is “building quality and sustainable
relationships with foreign publics as an end in itself.” (Zaharna 2007, 217) However, in the fast-
paced world of social media, to sustain interest and relationships is exceptionally challenging.
The new media campaign unleashed during Obama’s visit to Brazil in 2011 produced only a
short-lived focus (Ali and David 2011, 6). And based on this paper’s study, the number of people
interacting with the FB page of the Embassy in Jakarta is almost the same as the number three
years ago, despite the fan base multiplying five times. The average engagement rate is even
lower. 14
Facing the controversy, it might be the time to re-evaluate social media as a tool of PD: Is
it a hype or hope for PD? To provide a clearer evaluation of social media, this paper, referring to
a two-way communication model, conducts a systematic analysis to the pros and cons of FB in
the realm of PD.15 The result appears to be mixed, as FB exhibits almost equal numbers of
advantages and disadvantages when employed in PD.
4. Why Chinese Embassies Should not Follow the Trend
The war of ideas is not new. Thousands of years ago, the Chinese philosopher Sun Tzu
pointed out that a complete and lasting triumph comes only through a sophisticated strategy, one
that acts persuasively on the mind of the opponent. Suppose Chinese authorities cast social
13 See Tale 2 in the appendix for more information. 14 See Figure 3, 4 and 5 in the appendix for more information. 15 See Figure 6 and Table 3 in the appendix for more information.
Gong 6
media aside, it risks ceding the high ground in the global battle of ideas. However, based on the
case study of IIP, the author proposes that it would be inadvisable for Chinese Embassies to
capitalize on the potential of FB. There are five inherent problems when it comes to applying FB
diplomacy to Embassies: the absence of suitable organizational culture, the liability of security
clearance, the incapacity to be personable, the potential backfire and the burden of an enormous
fan base.
4.1. Lack of Organizational Culture that Values Social Media
All bureaucracies---and the Chinese Embassy is no exception---tend to be risk averse
(Beetham 2013; Bardos 2001, 437). The conservative nature impedes Embassies from keeping
up with trends, which more often than not involve risks. In the case of social media, its open-
ended and real-time characters often make “staying inside the bureaucratic cocoon” the most
rational choice for Embassies; the stakes to go out are too high. Even in the U.S., the most active
government (Crouch 2012) in using social media as diplomacy tools (Lichtenstein 2010), the
resistance in organizational culture still lingers.16 Proposals existed as early as 2004 that the
senior position of IIP should be designated as an assistant secretary, “given the size of the bureau
and the responsibilities of the coordinator” (OIG Report 2013, 2). However, after almost a
decade, the much-anticipated promotion has yet to come. This can be interpreted as an
insufficiency of recognition in the Congress and the Department.
Akin to the situation in the U.S., China’s FB outreach program, if located in Embassies,
may be marginalized in the greater organizational structure. One direct consequence is that the
bright brains will shun the social media posts, leaving the quality of FB outreach discounted.
4.2. The Inherent Tensions between Security and Engagement
In FB Diplomacy, the nature of real-time communication demands a freer mandate for
the PD practitioners. Otherwise, constrained by security checks, the quality of engagement will
be discounted. However, if the message check is bypassed, an inaccurate message can go viral17
and cause catastrophic consequences.
Indeed, the antithesis between security and engagement is deeply rooted in the structural
tensions between the government and social media. A hierarchical structure of top-down
messaging represented by the government is inherently incompatible to the horizontal network of
social media. Hierarchies have their place. But social media now favors horizontal structures and
agile practitioners. To force a bureaucratic structure into FB, that is slow and ill-equipped to new
media, would generate more cost than benefit.
Success in FB Diplomacy presupposes a quick and accurate response, something Chinese
authorities cannot deliver for the moment.
4.3. A Politicized Organ in a Depoliticized Sphere
In the world of social media, being personal is the key to success. Many scholars
reinforce that connections are best made online when organizations converse in a less-official
tone, making them appear more personable and approachable (Dale 2009, 8;Wallin 2013, 5).
Indeed, in the top three hundred FB pages ranked by fan counts, U.S. President Barack Obama is
17 The author gained the inspiration from a personal conversation with Matthew Wallin, a senior fellow in the American Security
Project, also an expert in PD.
Gong 7
the lonely island of a politician in a sea of actors, musicians, athletes and brands
(Fanpagelist.com 2013).
If Chinese Embassies seek to tap the full potential of FB, a refurbishment of the political
jargon is a must. However, to adopt a less obviously governmental style is easier said than done.
In the case of China, consistency lies at the core of foreign policy. Every diplomatic actor, from
Foreign Ministry Spokesman to the People’s Daily, must strictly stick to a uniform tone.
Consistency can be a great advantage in traditional diplomacy. However, in FB diplomacy, it
means much less leeway for Chinese Embassies to become personable. From the perspective of
agency theory, Embassies, the PD “agents,” can hardly adopt a personable approach without an
overhaul of thinking and strategy from their “principals.” The detached and impersonal tone,
which permeates Chinese authorities, is expected to persist in the Embassies’ FB pages.
A more fundamental problem is the question of credibility. As Walter Lippmann wrote
nearly a century ago, most people don’t choose between true and false messages, they choose
between trustworthy and untrustworthy messengers (Lippmann 1922, 223). In “a contest of
competitive credibility” (Nye, The Pros and Cons of Citizen Diplomacy 2010), any official
mouthpiece is never fully trusted (Stead and Smewing 2002, 54), even less when it belongs to the
communist faction. 18
Worse still, Chinese Embassies, like its U.S. counterpart, will face the tensions between
policy dissemination and audience preferences. Few audiences go to FB in the morning to read
the latest Chinese foreign policies. In the essentially depoliticized social media community, a
politicized body, that occasionally circulates political propaganda, is doomed to be an
anachronism.
4.4. A Public Diplomacy Practice that Might Backfire
The advent of global real-time media has drastically increased the transparency of
international politics (Livingston 2002). In light of the not-so-positive image of China in many
regions, a FB campaign unleashed by China may backfire in the open marketplace of ideas. At
any rate, without the umbrella of censorship to protect itself, Chinese diplomats will be exposed
to the strong bastion of anti-Chinese sentiment.
More importantly, as China has not revealed any intention to unblock Facebook and
Twitter, any official presence on the two platforms will possibility spur a flurry of critiques from
both home and abroad. The cost, though indeterminate, is sure to be incurred.
4.5. “Engagement” With Tens of Thousands of Fans: Forget about It
Despite the vague definition of “engagement”, it presumes an interactive and approach,
which can be costly. A simple click of a “like” button cannot be defined as engagement in a
strict sense; it is too weak to be taken into account. Only a series of “likes,” “comments” and,
“sharing” are strong enough to breed substantive changes in people’s minds.
The controversy is that the governing logic of any social media site is “weak ties.” As
Gladwell illustrated, “Twitter is a way of following (or being followed by) people you may never
have met. FB is a tool for efficiently managing your acquaintances, for keeping up with the
people you would not otherwise be able to stay in touch with. That’s why you can have a
thousand ‘friends’ on FB, as you never could in real life.” (Gladwell 2010, 3) 19 However, what
18 Regarding the thick skepticism towards government permeating across Western neighborhoods, think about Ronald Reagan’s
remark---“government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem”. 19 The number of strong ties on Twitter is limited. See Figure 5 in the Appendix for more information.
Gong 8
PD evangelists anticipate from social media is sowing changes at a cognitive level (e.g. the shift
of attitude), or even at a behavioral level (e.g. social movement). This demands strong ties, not
the weak ties that prevail in social media. For many, pressing a “like” button on FB is no more
than an act of philanthropy, meaning “I have come to the page.”
In this way, the grand scale of the Embassies will be an obstacle, instead of an asset, for
substantial engagement. On one hand, utterly outnumbered, a stray staff or two working to
maintain FB pages in the Embassies cannot realize a total engagement with the foreign audience.
On the other hand, as staff being preoccupied by providing decent feedback to the audience, the
burden of customer service might lead to a deteriorating quality of the news feeds, thus
perpetuating a vicious circle. When failing to accommodate the demands of the audience, the
supposed engagement tools like FB may retrogress into old-fashioned press conferences. The
news feeds are tedious. The engagement rate is pathetically small. And after FB revised its edge
rank, the lack of engagement will lead to dwindling fans able to see the news feeds in the first
place. Worse still, facing a large pool of fans that is appallingly dynamic and hybrid, it is almost
impossible to provide tailored messages only to the relevant audience. Imagine you are intrigued
by the Chinese language, but the news feeds you receive every day are about Chinese food,
something you happen to frown on. The page is unlikely to create positive change in your mind
which “engagement” is supposed to bring. This is a fundamental problem facing IIP, which
brought the agency to halt its FB advertising during the 2013 inspection (OIG Report 2013, 22).
However, considering the burden of the sheer number of fan count, it is questionable how well-
targeted IIP can become with a stringent budget.
Indeed, for all of its rhetorical emphasis on engagement, or strengthening relationships,
the Obama administration paid little more than lip service to engagement claims. It still prefers
the number of engagement over the genuine quality of engagement, and emphasize short-term
advocacy20 over the long-term relation-building aspect of PD. The “fan campaign” is one piece
of evidence. It can be interpreted as a legacy of the Modus Oprandi in the Cold War, when
audience reach constituted the predominant criteria for success. The age of mass communication
championed number rather than quality. However, in social media, quality is king. 21
At any rate, engagement is not an end in itself. As diplomats swarming to platforms for
the sake of swarming to platforms, it is healthy to note that engagement is no more than a tool. If
engagement does not favor the ultimate goal, or at least has not reached its full potential, it may
be the time to re-evaluate the “engagement campaign”.
5. Why Confucius Institutes can be a Great Stage for FB Outreach
By comparison, incorporating Facebook into Confucius Institutes will provide the
following comparative advantages over applying it to Chinese Embassies. The inherent problems
haunting either IIP or possibly Chinese Embassies can be resolved to a great extent:
• The partnership structure of Confucius Institutes with foreign universities means that their 20 Professor Nicholas Cull classified PD into five general types: (1) listening, (2) advocacy, (3) cultural diplomacy, (4) exchange,
and (5) international broadcasting. Among them, advocacy mainly refers to an actor’s attempt to manage the international
environment by “undertaking an international communication activity to actively promote a particular policy, idea, or that actor’s
general interests in the minds of a foreign public” (Cull 2008, 31-32). This appears to be the core duty of social media diplomacy
for the moment, at least in the case of IIP. 21 The problem of the over-emphasis on numbers can also be interpreted from the angle of “perform-control model”. With the
advent of New Public Management reform, State Department has pursued accurate measurement to the performance of different
functional cones. This may steer social media practitioners to more numerical parameters, attempting to meet the expectations
from the Congress and the senior leadership in the State.
Gong 9
remarks cannot be interpreted as official standpoints. With a less stringent demand on
message accuracy, the tensions between security and engagement can be largely alleviated.
• The non-profit, unofficial status of Confucius Institutes, offers the space to pursue a more
personable approach. At the same time, Confucius Institutes can win more credibility on FB
vis-à-vis Embassies, by keeping an arm’s length from the government.
• Despite an undeniable political background, Confucius Institutes are cultural entities in
nature. Confucius Institutes will not become politically charged and risk alienating fans.
• 63 Confucius Institutes22 (almost half of them in the U.S.) already have FB pages with a
median fan count of 105. There has been little, if any, public backlash over the move. The
potential consequence of “backfire” is minuscule.
• An Embassy FB page needs to address millions of people. The FB pages of a Confucius
Institute, however, would target only thousands of people in the located community. The
relatively small size of its audience, compared to Embassies, provides the opportunities for
substantial engagement. The quality of engagement can be guaranteed.
6. A Path to the Future: Preliminary Recommendations
• Recommendation #1: Establish the central nervous system of the FB accounts of
Confucius Institutes. In reference to the structure of IIP,23 a Social Media Center, with an
initial staff of 1624, should be placed under the China Public Diplomacy Association, an
NGO outside governmental bureaucracies.25 The Center, in cooperation with Confucius
Institutes, will form a Board of Directors that includes people from Foreign Service,
Confucius Institutes, Private companies and academia. 26 Paramount is that the Board
should articulate a tailored strategy for Confucius Institutes' outreach on FB.
• Recommendation #2: The pilot program, or Phase One, will focus on the establishment of
the central coordinating body---the Social Media Center. The Social Media Center will
consist of five offices: Front Office, Office of Content Development, Office of Platform
Management, Office of Training and Office of Strategic Planning and Evaluation.
• Recommendation #3: In the Office of Content Development, a content strategist officer
will produce thematic packages under a well-planned annual publication plan. The
recommended themes are Chinese food, Chinese tourism, Chinese exchange opportunities
and Chinese e-journals.27 It should also explore ways to leverage civil society’s knowledge,
skills and creativity through the means of contracts. Possible partners include Lenovo28,
Guokr.com, 163.com and Hua Yi Media. Info graphics and pictures are highly preferred
compared to plain text.
22 For the full list of the Confucius Institutes and Classrooms that have Facebook accounts. See Table 4 in the appendix for more
information. 23 For detailed IIP organizational structure, see Figure 6 in the appendix for more information. 24 For the proposed initial staff composition, see Table 5 in the appendix for more information. 25 For the proposed organizational structure, see Figure 7 in the appendix for more information. 26 For the proposed composition of the Board, See Table 6 in the appendix for more information. 27 Chinese e-journals are mainly about influential academic theses and reports recently published in China. 28 Lenovo has been exceptionally successful on Facebook. It boasts more than a hundred thousand active fans. More importantly,
many of its posts were able to go viral online. For one example, see
Functional overlap Lack of metrics for evaluation Security clearance vs. the quality
of engagement
Lack of interagency supports Over-emphasis on fan numbers Policy dissemination vs. audience
Preference
Lack of management to contractor Lack of clarification of the targeted
audience
Not sustainable
No department wide PD strategy
Table 2. Problems facing IIP: a threefold classification
31 One positive application is that Embassy Bangkok used Facebook and Twitter to keep American citizens and the public at large
informed about the volatile security situation during the political crisis in Thailand in 2010.
Advantages Disadvantages
Content Multimedia, interactive content available Generally not used to disseminate
information about complex policy
issues (Ciolek 2010)
Real-time delivered to the
Audience31
Rumors and errors travel fast as well
Gong 16
Table 3.The advantages and disadvantages of Facebook
Name of the Institutes Country Like People
Talking
About
Ratio
Oceania UWA Confucius Institute Australia 169 1 0.01
Confucius Institute in Auckland New Zealand 130 1 0.01
Confucius Institute University of Melbourne Australia 66 0 0.00
Tourism Confucius Institute at Griffith University Australia 44 16 0.36
Sydney Confucius Classroom Australia 36 0 0.00
Africa Confucius Madagascar :: Institut du groupe
Hanban
Madagascar 525 8 0.02
Confucius Institute at the University of Botswana Botswana 228 73 0.32
Confucius Institute, Unilag Nigeria Nigeria 34 2 0.06
Confucius Institute, Unilag Nigeria Nigeria 34 2 0.06
Confucius Institute at Egerton University Kenya 29 0 0.00
Asia Confucius Institute at the Ateneo de Manila
University
Philippine 1346 20 0.01
Confucius Institute NTU Singapore Singapore 1101 11 0.01
Confucius Institute at Prince of Songkla
University
Thailand 330 32 0.10
TAG Confucius Institute Jorden 299 34 0.11
Confucius Institute at NSU Bangladesh 205 3 0.01
Confucius Institute at Kathmandu University Nepal 63 0 0.00
Europe Китайский язык каллиграфия гохуа ушу чай
Институт Конфуция
Russia 1674 35 0.02
Confucius Institute at YSLU after V.Brusov Armenia 406 11 0.03
32 Take the U.S. Embassy Belgrade for example, among its approximately 160,000 fans in 2013 October, only 88.4 percent of
them are from Belgrade, the supposed targeting country. While, as suggested by Matthew Wallin, after such breakdown, the
number of the fans remain inaccurate considering the variables of VPN (domestic users from Serbia might us a U.S. domain to
log in, then they will be classified as U.S users) , foreign fans living in Serbia (they will be defined as Serbia users. (Wallin 2013) 33 “OIG inspectors found that the use of social media is extensive, but labor-intensive. Many embassies required
additional staff or had to reprogram an existing position in order to use social media in an active way…”Review of the Use of
Social Media by the Department of State, Office of Inspection, Report Number ISP-I-11-10, February 2011
Dissemination Overcome the geographical barriers Will be delivered only to a portion of
fans, determined by the Page Rank of
the content
May be drown amidst the great number
of feeds
Audience Connect to educated youth in cities Cannot connect to people who are
unable or unwilling to use Facebook
Facebook Insight allows in-depth
audience analysis
The analysis can be questionable32
Follow-up Realize the potential of a total
engagement approach
May be labor-intensive facing piles of
messages33
Able to provide fast feedback Might churn out troubles if the