Social Change and Religion

7/25/2019 Social Change and Religion

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In different ways classical social thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th century all thoughtthat religion would either disappear or become progressively attenuated with the expansion ofmodern institutions, resulting in a "seculariation thesis" aptly captured in the title of !reudsfamous The Future of an Illusion#see $urkheim, 1912%19&'( !reud, 19')( *arx and +ngels,

1-%1'( .ylor, 1)1( /eber, 190-%19'12( and iddens, 199020)3 .he evidence ispervasive and clear, however, that religion has disappeared nowhere but changed everywhere3!or those expecting its attenuation to accompany moderniation, religion remains surprisinglyvibrant and socially salient3 .his is particularly true in 4merica, but in much of the rest of theworld as well, where religion continues to be a potent factor in the emerging global order and itsconflicts3 It is in parts of /estern +urope where individual religiosity has been radicallytransformed that the seculariation thesis seems to work the best3

In the 5nited 6tates pollsters and scholars have foundevidence that the vast ma7ority of 4mericans continue tobelieve in supernatural forces, identify themselves in religious

terms, and hunger for a spiritually enhanced life3 8egarding thelater, there is clear evidence that many 4mericans participateregularly in religious and spiritual small groups and form alarge market for religious%spiritual books, tapes, music, andparaphernalia3 8eligion is a significant factor in votingpatterns, ideology about public policy, and political careers3ut pervasive evidence also exists for changes that manyobservers see as religious decline declining membership,particularly among liberal%mainline :rotestant denominations,and declining participation in religious services and traditionalforms of piety like prayer and ible reading3 .olerance of

"other religions" grows along with declines in specific confessional and denominational loyalties#i3e3, commitment to "brand name religion" #arna, 199&( :rinceton 8eligious 8esearch ;enter,199&, 199)a, 199)b( uidens, 199-( 8oof and *c?inney, 19)( ellah andothers, 19'3( 8oof, 199@( /uthnow, 19, 199)( *arAuand, 199&; The Economist, 199&'3

8esponding to religious persistence as well as perceived declines, social scientists havecreated neoseculariation perspectives, ostensibly faithful to contemporary facts as well asclassical theory3 .hey understand moderniation not to involve the actual disappearance of

" In the United States

pollsters and scholars

have found evidence that

the vast majority of

Americans continue to

believe in supernatural

forces, identify themselves

in religious terms, and

hunger for a spiritually

enhanced life."


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religion, but perhaps as attenuation and certainly as changing religious forms in relation to otherinstitutions3 !rom the #assumed benchmark of unitary religion in medieval +urope, scholarshave argued variously that seculariation involved the differentiation of religion from otherinstitutional realms, the privatiation of religious belief and experience, desacraliation and thedeclining scope of religious authority, and the "liberaliation" of religious doctrine #6ee

$obbleare, 191( ;haves, 199-(


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local experience #Innis, 19'0( Fng, 19))3 6uch communities were highly aware of beingsurrounded by very different "others" in different villages and other places3

:eople understood that human life and nature were ruled by powerful natural and supernaturalexternal forces, but spheres of social life like religion were still relatively fused and unitary, as

were other institutional spheres like the family, work, medicine, or politics3 .he masses ofordinary villagers only dimly recognied religion or much else as distinct from a seamless webof personal and social life3 8eligioCmagical ceremonies, ritual, and practice were personallyconducted between, and strongly identified with, known and intimate others3 Indeed, there islittle evidence that abstract somethings called religion, religious faith, or different religionsexisted as words or ideas before the 1&00s3


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Frganiations became the emblematic social forms of moderniing systems, particularly thenation state, as faceCtoCface feudal relations gave way to nationalism, changing the boundaries of"us" and "others3" :olitical leadership became more distant, inaccessible, and delegated3*achiavellis book, .he :rince, functioned as the first public relations manual for suchinaccessible political leaders3 Fver several hundred years, organiations proliferated and became

more distinct, and, as !oucault observed, the boundaries #or "membranes" around prisons,hospitals, military barracks, factories, and schools thickened #19))3 :eople were increasinglyseparated from households into groups with homogenous purposes and identities3 :rintcommunication, later augmented by electronic media like radio and television, fostered farbroader solidarity than could the oral media of traditional societies3 :rinted texts increasinglyshaped intellectual worldviews and national myths, as printed constitutions and laws literallyhelped constitute nations, laws, and national myths #*eyrowit, 199) &@C&'3

>ike learning and work, worship and religious devotion became increasingly separate anddistinct3 8eligion in larger organiations was distinguished from the shared worship with thoseone could see, hear, and touch, as in more traditional orders3 :eople increasingly understood

religion as activities, organiations, and beliefs as distinct from other institutional spheres, andby the 1-th or 1'th century it was possible for many +uropeans to speak of my religion, religionin general, and other religions #6mith, 19&@( *eyrowit, 199) &-3 4s with other institutions inmodern systems, organiations or organied religion, as constituted by churches, denominations,and sects, provided the context in which to understand religious belief and practice3 *odernreligious organiations could unify people across broader spans of time and space utiliingprinted holy texts of religious literature and doctrine, or expert systems of special religiousknowledge created by theologians, clergy, and bishops3 8eligious belonging increasingly becamea matter of accepting formalied religious doctrines, creeds, and confessional statements #e3g3,the 4postles ;reed, the 4ugsburg ;onfession, or the altimore ;atechism3 .hese creedsdefined religious identity, related to national, ethnic, or social class characteristics, and provided

a basis for distinguishing ones religion from that of others3

Fur point is that much of the current controversy concerning religion is about changes in theonCgoing fates of the predominant social forms of religion, that emerged in modern societies aslate in human history as the 1'00s3

!ate or High -odernity

+arly modernity carried the seeds of its own transformation3 In our view such largeCscaletransformations are typically gradual and continuous with the past, rather than discontinuous,sudden, apocalyptic, or revolutionary3 !or that reason, we prefer iddenss #1991 terms "high"or "late" modernity to the more widely used "postmodernity," but we have no commitment tothese terms and would prefer to simply speak of the third largeCscale sociocultural transformationthat is now onCgoing, were it not so awkward to do so3

.o note the obvious, globaliation has been integrating the worlds economic and politicalsystems into vast, abstract relations that have dramatically altered the economies, politics, andthe cultures of the worlds relatively separate nations since the middle of the 20th century3+lectronic communication media continues to augment print, thereby facilitating globaliation


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by making all nations and regions informationally permeable #e3g3 .s, satellite communication,personal computers, and web pages #*eyrowit, 199)&'3 iddens contends that globaliationis inherent in the fundamental social processes of modernism3 .he emergence of globalCscaleeconomies and institutional connections, however rational to those enterprises themselves, vastlyincrease the separation of time and space and the disembedding of social relations, often

rendering social life incomprehensible to ordinary persons #19913

+ven though a variety of expert systems dominate the production of knowledge and policy inmodern societies, the dream of the +nlightenment, to replace irrational dogmas and superstitionsof traditional societies with rational certainty, has failed abysmally3 ecause expert knowledge,including that of theologians, becomes more specified but about less and less, comprehendingand living life becomes more and more difficult3 oth larger systems and personal life becomeinfused with uncertainty3 .raditional life was more ob7ectively haardous and risky than life inthe modern world but, ironically, expert knowledge and abstract systems have increased theawareness of uncertainties and risks3 In lateCmodernity reflexivity is fundamental to bothindividuals selves and institutions, including religion3 *atters are continually open to change

and doubt, and have probabilistic outcomes3 5lrich eck therefore characteried modernsocieties as "risk societies," in which individual action and organiational policy are driven notby a sense of certainty or fate but by calculating the odds3 /hat are some basic social changeprocesses of the transformation to late modernityJ #19&3

A(!/ T !AT -+(#IT/ )HA#$ *()SSS

4t the same time that growth and globaliation produce relations that are more abstract, suchrelations are experienced as problematic, leading to a revival of the importance of relativelysmallCscale relations and identifications3 .hus dual processes, both integrating and fractionating,shape the current sociocultural transformation3 .hese are analytic categories that express and

summarie the cumulative effects of other diverse factors and processes3 Integrating processeshave their sources in the rise of new information technologies and in sociotechnical forces thatfacilitate the spatial spread of ideas, money, products, and human problems of many kinds3 !orparticular organiations, integration is often accelerated by threats from a broader competitiveclimate and the necessity of organiations to protect their viability #or profitability by growth,mergers, or alliances3 .hese processes are associated with the emergence of broad but abstractcultural themes that may threaten particular other ones3 In the transition to lateCmodernism, theseforces effect organiations of all kinds religious, political, economic, and civic3 !ractionatingprocesses intensify in relation to integrating ones, because they often transcend the capability ofpersons to meaningfully identify with them and may threaten peoples particular historiccommitments3 +veryday life becomes more ambiguous or hollowed out, and growingcontingencies lead people to withdraw commitments and legitimacy from large systems3Integrating processes may also threaten the everyday life of persons as organiations seek tosurvive by the efficiency of removing the costs of labor3 .hus, there is often a congruence amongconsciousness, ambiguity, and practical necessity that amplifies attempts to preserve, revive, orreconstitute relatively micro, private, local, or subnational spheres of both personal and sociallife #!eathersone, and >asch, 199'2C@( eyer, 1990, @)@C)&( *eyerowit, 199)(&&C&3 Gext,we illustrate these processes with particular emphasis on religious change3 /e rely heavily on


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4merican evidence and case materials, but we think that the substance of our argument has widerimplications3

Integrating processes3

rowing largeCscale relations in many spheres of social life began by the 1'0s, perhapsearlier3 .hey accelerated and became more visible after /orld /ar II, understood asglobaliation by the 19&0s #8obertson, 19902&C23 Illustrations include the emergence of aworld market system, multinational corporations, a world network of national governments andtreaty organiations like G343.3F3, G343!3.343, the roup of ) industrial nations, the 5nitedGations with its multitude of agencies, and the /orld ank3 .he growth of international nonCgovernmental organiations #IGFs, is less obvious, because many are highly specialied, suchas the International .in ;ouncil, the .ug of /ar International !ederation, the :an 4merican4ssociation of Fphthalmology, and the International ;atholic ;hild ureau3 Fnly a few are wellknown, such as the International 8ed ;ross, the Flympic ;ommittee, 4mnesty International, andthe /orld /ildlife !und3 Ff the known population of IGFs, the vast ma7ority were founded

after /orld /ar II3 *ost of these are not religiously connected, but some are #oli and .homas,199) 1)&3

Illustrating similar processes that elaborate broad religious structures across previouslyexisting boundaries is not hard3 +cumenical ventures, like the Gational ;ouncil of ;hurches,represent a unifying effort, even it at times resorted to out of weakness3 6uch ventures, however,result in limited crossCboundary tiesCCgiven the extraordinary diversity of religious culture anddoctrine in the 5nited 6tates3 Frganic mergers, such as that which gave rise to the 5nited ;hurchof ;hrist, have occurred, but are rare and usually viable only among organiations havingcommon or compatible religious histories or cultures3 ;onsultations, cooperation, andcommunion on practical, humanitarian, and even political mattersCClike the ;hristian ;oalitionCC

are more common, to which we would add new religious or AuasiCreligious enterprises like:romise ?eepers and the *arriage +ncounter *ovement, which also transcend denominationalboundaries3 /uthnow has documented the increasing organiation and mobiliation of religiousresources across denominational lines, along with declining denominational conflicts andpre7udices3

*oving beyond the 5363, we note the extension of historicreligious formations beyond their national or regional bases,their becoming become truly international in important ways3;atholicism comes most easily to mind, and observers havenoted both the strengthening of :apal supremacy, and theinternationaliation of ;atholicism, so that it has not only "astructure centered on 8ome, but also a remarkable increase intransnational ;atholic networks and exchanges of all kinds thatcrissCcross nations and world regions, often bypassing 8ome"

#;assanova, 199&( see also $ella ;ava, 19923 In the shadow niches of ;atholicism, bothliberation theology base communities as well as :entecostalism have become truly international,the one associated with radical politics and the other more apolitical #.homas, 199&29&3 +venthough formally apolitical, :entecostalism, like other transnational ;hristian conservative

"ven though formally

apolitical, *entecostalism,

li0e other transnational

)hristian conservative

movements, is neitherescapist nor passive. "


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movements, is neither escapist nor passive3 :entecostals use their religion to actively organiemodern life and push for cultural transformations3 In >atin 4merica, for instance, while typicallypatriarchal, :entecostalism stands staunchly against machismo culture3 4 man is to be rational,moral, and responsible, and the familys spiritual leader( in practice he is to be sober, present, andnurturing #4mmerman, 199-3

.urning to the nonC;hristian world, it is difficult to understand Islam as anything other thantransnational3 It dominates much of the world between *orocco and *indinao, and it is thefastest growing religious affiliation in Gorth 4merica, perhaps in the world3 /e also note theenormous popularity of uddhism in the /est, particularly among 4merican intellectuals, amongwhom it resonates culturally with the renaissance of mystical religiosity and spirituality3 Ff theworld religions, utheranC;atholic conversations,;atholic 4nglican conversations, and ecumenical conversations between the Frthodox and/estern ;atholic ;hurch3 8oman ;atholics and :rotestants regularly send official observers toeach others important gatherings3 ut there are still deep divisions between, for instance,evangelical and liberal :rotestants, 6unni and 6hia *uslims, and *ahayana and ama and the .ibetan cause by both secular and religious leaders around the world, or theexpansion of humanitarian or environmental IGFs that are not explicitly religious #e3g3,4mnesty International, reenpeace, but that nonethless have dense network ties within religiousorganiations3 /e expect these processes to continue3 =ust as +uropean nations developed withthe help of printing of the vernaculars, new electronic communication technologies now facilitatethe rise of what *eyrowit calls neoCfeudal alliances on a global scale #199)&&3

ractionating processes

Integrating processes are accompanied by eAually pervasive processes, that revive orreconstitute local relations and make personal and communal identity more important andcoherent3 6uch local relations and identities are certainly not new3 ut as modernity emerged inthe 19th century, nationCstates came to possess the power and technologies of social control toincreasingly sub7ugate and assimilate them into national hegemonic structures3 +volvingglobaliation, particularly after the ;old /ar, revived and renewed ethnogenesis and theindigeniation of subnational groups3 :aradoxically, proliferating state structures exerted less andless control over loyalties, and subnational groups around the world began to reconstitutethemselves by becoming more visible, self conscious, and politically contentious3 .his is true inthe 5363 with the contemporary *ohawks, $elawares, 6ioux, Gavaho, >atinos, and *iami


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It is possible to understand the declining fates of :rotestant mainline denominations as theirrelative failure to provide such small groups and niches, rather than more conventionally in termsof doctrinal deficiencies3 4nd even within the vast multiplex world of 4merican 8oman;atholicism, people now shop around for suitable parishes, priests, spiritual directors, and churchauxiliary organiations or movements3 8esearch has documented growing mobiliation of people

between religious groups, declines in interdenominational pre7udice, and weakening internaldenominational ties #/uthnow, 193 /hat these processes mean, we think, are thatorganiational forms and doctrinal content are becoming ever more secondary in terms of theways that religion is experienced and practiced3 .his may mean the decline of denominationalorganiations, but not of the principle of denominationalism which emphasies nonCexclusivnessand voluntarism #;assanova, 199-'-3

Institutional dedifferentiation

If differentiation was a hallmark of early modernity, in later modernity the process in somesenses has reversed3 Institutions and institutional culture are becoming less distinct, particularly

at macro levels3 4t elite levels, the global system is being organied and extended bybureaucrats, technologists, political and business managers, marketers, strategic planners,scientists, IGF mobiliers, and notable "public citiens" #e3g3, =immy ;arter or *ikhailorbachev, who share common outlooks and strategic network connectionsCCalmost irrespectiveof nationality or professional training3

6tudies of occupational differentiation within the 5363 have reported similar declining socialsignificance of occupation per se #6ullivan, 19903 /hether one is a lawyer or not is still asignificant social fact, but it increasingly makes a difference whether one is a lawyer in a large:acific 8im investment firm in >os 4ngeles, or in a small town bank in Fklahoma3 Fr, to take amore pertinent example, whether one is a sociologist working at a national research institution in

/ashington and living on grants, or teaching at a community college in :ocatelloL 6imilarly,after several decades of understanding the differentiation of work and the family as asine quanonof emerging modernity, theorists and family sociologists have recently noted growingreintegration and blurring boundaries between work and family3


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Illustrations of more structurally dense and culturally sanctioned religionCpolity crossCsectorallinks abound3 In 19'0 there were 1& ma7or religious lobbies in /ashington, $3;3( by 19' therewere at least 0 #


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In traditional and early modern social orders, conflicts between whole units #betweenkingdoms, governments, churches, classes, and ethnic groups took on relatively greaterimportance and visibility3 y contrast, in the late modern world the familiar become strange andthreatening, while the strange become more familiar and often friendly3 Gothing more clearlydemonstrates the interacting character of the dual processes of intergation and fractionation3

*ublic religion and civil society

It is difficult to imagine macro and micro social formations without intervening middleCrangestructural and cultural connections, such as those illustrated above as crossCsectoral links3igorous and vital public religion is to be found not only among :rotestant +vangelicals in the5363 and in the 4merican 8oman ;atholic ;onference of ishops, but also among the national;atholic conferences in :oland, rail, and 6pain #;asanova, 199-3 Futside of the /esternworld, public religion is manifest certainly in India, where electoral politics was recentlydominated by a anka, where religious hostility is an axis of civil war( and=apan, where the 6okka akki ";lean overnment :arty" never polls a ma7ority but is always an

essential parliamentary coalition partner3 +ven more obvious is the revitalied public religionsweeping the Islamic world #regarding the latter, see *oaddel, 199&3

In the /est, however, if od is gaining political voice, it is a od who must speak innonsectarian and nonCdoctrinal languageCCas neoseculariation theorists properly note #Bamane,199)11C1193 8eligious 7udicatories enter public and political life with greater vigor, voice, andpublic sanction for doing so, but they succeed only by deCemphasiing the hallmark of religion asit was understood in the early modern period organiational exclusiveness and doctrinaldistinctiveness based on specifically religious beliefs3 .hese early modern emphases enabled thedifferentiation of bureaucratically organied religions #driven by expert knowledge to becomedistinct from other institutional spheres and competing religious 7udicatories3

ut if the voice of religious actors and 7udicatories is not distinctively religious when theyenter public life with such vigor, how do they speak todayJ In a telling example, a *oral*a7ority lobbyist reported to a researcher "/e cant afford to say, od settled it, thats it"#aity resoundingly re7ect religious teachings on sexualmorality, particularly as embodied in the 19&


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become state compulsory institutions and have become free religious institutions of civilsociety33334s national ;atholic churches transfer the defense of their particularist privileges to thehuman person, ";atholicism becomes mobilied again, this time to defend modern universalrights and the very right of a democratic civil society to exist" #;asanova, 19&&@&&3 .here arelarge parts of the world where this disestablishment process seems not to apply in ?abul or other

strongholds of 6hia Islam, in =ersulaem, or in Gew $ehli, to the extent that conservative religiousparties maintain political and cultural hegemony3 ut we think these cases are hard to maintainfaced with the emergence of the late modern world order3 .he last two cases are particularlyproblematic3

In the study of IGFs cited earlier, oli and .homas examined the emergence of a globalculture and particular values embodied in the multitude of existing IGFs3 /hat they foundmore analytically defines, we think, the contours of the voices of public religion, at least in the/est3 .hese themes include #1 universalism, #2 individualism, #@ rational voluntaristicauthority, #- human purposes of rationaliing progress, and #' world citienship #oli and.homas, 199)103

Fbservers of religious change often see it as part ofglobaliation processes or as the reconstitution of spirituality,sub7ectivity, and small groups3 6ome miss or misunderstand thereinvigorated forms of national public religion oftenconnecting macro and micro processes3 ut others haveexamined these in the 5363 and around the world with greatclarity #see /ald, 199)( ;asanova, 199-3 /hile vigorous reCshaped forms of national public religion exist that utilie

churches and religious authorities, they speak with a curiously ambiguous and ambivalent voice3.hey appeal to secular values and eschew much of the "od talk" that defined the social forms

and doctrines characteristic of confessional religion in the early modern period3 .o someobservers #e3g3, ;arter, 199@ this ambivalence is prima face evidence of the more generaldecline or evisceration of public religion in 4merica3 /e think they mistake transformation fordecline3

I# )#)!USI#

8eligion in 4merica, and perhaps much of the world, is not in a state of general decline orpublic evisceration3 8ather, those forms and structures identified most specifically with earlymodernity are all being reshaped, challenged, and in some senses threatened by the processes ofemerging late modernity3 .hese include bureaucracies in general, but more specifically nationCstates, denominational and confessional religion, national corporations and cities, and distinctscholarly disciplines3 GationCstates, for example, find their sovereignty is being challenged bothfrom below and above, by pervasive alienation from the political process, new courtship rituals,scientific advances that challenge authority, global scientific and cultural exchanges, andinternational banking and money flows, as well their growing inability to control information andsecrecy due to the media and new communication technologies3

"(eligion in America, and

perhaps much of the

1orld, is not in a state of

general decline or public

evisceration."


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4s iddens succinctly observes, "in circumstance of accelerating global integration, thenationCstate has become too small for the big problems and too big for the small problems oflife" #1990&'3 .he same, we argue, could be said of the other systems emblematic of earlymodernity, and specifically of its religious sociocultural forms3 /e have summariedschematically parallel elements of the current transition by social sphere and levels of analysis in

.able 13

TA2! 3'LARGE-SCALE SOCIOCULTURAL-CULTURAL TRASFOR!ATIOS, "# le$els ofanal#sis an% social s&heres

>evels of 4nalysis

8+I4>, 8+G+/4>4G$ 8+;FG6.I.5.IFG3

Increasingly significant*I;8F relations andsub7ective experience

4*I4>+G;+ 4G$.84G6!F8*4.IFG3

$eclining effectiveness andloyalty to G4.IFG4> levelorganiations and culture

+*+8+G;+ 4G$46.84;.IFG3 rowing

significant and importantglobal and crossCboundary*4;8F relations

+conomics3 Increasing selfemployment,entrepreneurialism, strategicnetworks

8elative weakening anddisadvantage of nationalcorporations, markets, laborand capital

rowing dominance ofmultinational and globalcorporations, businessnetworks, and markets

:olitics3 Increasinglyindependent voters, and

contention for power by subCnational groups

;ompromised effectivenessof the nationCstate andpolitical parties, growing

privatiation of publicfunctions3 $eclining trust inthe nationCstate

Increasingly importantglobal and regional

networks of nations andmultilateral organiations

;ommunity and culturerowing importance andvisibility of localcommunity and civicorganiations,

Gew ethnogenesis,proliferation of civil societyorganiations, and smallgroup participation

8elatively weakening powerof communities and urbanareas with national ties andmarkets,

$eclining legitimacy and

trust in most nationalClevelinstitutions, and increasingconservatism

rowing power andhegemony of world cities3+mergence of global cultureand social movements

rowing importance andvisibility of international

non governmentalorganiations #IGFs, andgrowing global and "crossCboundary" culture

8eligion3 rowingprivatiation of experience,

/eakening loyalty todenominations, traditional


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arna, eorge

199& The In%e) of Lea%in' S&iritual In%icators3 $allas, .M /ord :ublishing3

eck , 5lrich

19&Risi*o'esellshaft+ Auf %em e" in eine an%ere !o%erne3 !rankfurt 6uhrkamp3

ellah, 8obert, 8ichard *arsden, /illiam 6ullivan, 4nn 6widler, and 6teven .ipton

19'a"its of the eart+ In%i$i%ualism an% Commitment in American Life3 erkeley, ;45niversity of ;alifornia :ress3

eyer, :eter !3

1990 ":rivatiation and the :ublic Influence of 8elgion and global 6ociety3" :p @)@C @)& in!eatherstone #ed3,Glo"al Culture3 >ondon 6age3

oli, =ohn, and eorge *3 .homas

199) "/orld ;ultures in the /orld :olity 4 ;entury of International GonCgovernmentalFrganiation3"American Sociolo'ical Re$ie.&2 1)1C1903

;arter, 6tephen

199@ The Culture of /is"elief+ o. American La. an% 0olitics tri$iali1e /e$otion3 Gew Borkasic ooks3

;asanova, =ose


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199-0u"lic Reli'ions an% the !o%ern orl%3 ;hicago 5niversity of ;hicago :ress3

;haves, *ark

199- "6eculariation as declining religious authority3" Social Forces)2)-9C)-3

$4ntonio, /illiam, =ames $avidson, $ean


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!eathersone, *ike, and 6cott >asch

199' "lobaliation, *odernity, and the 6patialiation of 6ocial .heory3" :p3 1C2- in!eatherston, >asch and 8obertson #eds3, Glo"al !o%ernities3 .housand Faks, ;4 6age3

!oucault, *ichael

19))/isci&line an% 0unish+ The 2irth of the 0rison3 translated by 4lan 6heridan3 Gew Bork:antheon3

!reud, 6igmund

19') The Future of an Illusion(arden ;ity, GB 4nchor3

allup, eorge, =r3, and 8obert eilla

199& "6mall groups enhance religious experience,"e"ras*a !essen'er, a :ublication of theGebraska 5nited *ethodist ;onference3 @', 913

iddens, 4nthony

1990 The Consequences of !o%ernit#3 6tanford, ;4 6tanford 5niversity :ress3

1991!o%ernit# an% Self I%entit#+ Self an% Societ# in the Late !o%ern A'e3 6tanford, ;46tanford 5niversity :ress3


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ouisville, ?B /estminster%=ohn ?nox :ress3

Innis, owie, .heodore =3, and en7amin insberg,


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199-American Go$ernment+ Free%om an% 0o.er3 @rd edition3 Gew Bork /3 /3 Gorton3

*arAuand, 8obert

199& "/orship shift 4merican 6eek !eeling of 4we ," Christian Science !onitor3 *ay 2& 13

*arx, ?arl, and !redrick +ngels

1-%19'' The Communist !anifesto #6( eer, +d33 Gew Bork 4ppleton ;enturyC ;rofts3

*eyrowit, =oshua

199) "6hifting /orlds of 6trangers *edium .heory and ;hanges in .hem versus 5s 3"Sociolo'ical Inquir# &) '9C)13

1991 The Chan'in' Glo"al Lan%sca&e3 4tlanta, 4 Nuest3

*oaddel, *ansoor

199& ".he 6ocial ases and $iscursive ;ontext of the 8ise of Islamic !undamentalism .he;ases of Iran and 6yria3" Sociolo'ical Inquir# &&@@0C@''3

Gaisbett, =ohn

199- Glo"al 0ara%o)3 Gew Bork 4von ooks3

Flsen, *arvin +3

5665 Societal /#namics+ E)&lorin' !acrosociolo'#3 +nglewood ;liffs, G3=3 :rentice


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Fng, /alter =3

19))Interfaces of the orl%3 Ithaca, GB ;ornell 5niversity :ress3

:arsons, .alcott

19&@ ";hristainity and *odern Industrial 6ociety," :p3 2@@C2)0 in +dward .iryakian #ed3,Sociolo'ical theor#, 3alues, an% Sociocultural Chan'e3 lencoe, I> .he !ree :ress3

:rinceton 8eligion 8esearch ;enter

19 The Unchurche% American((((Ten 7ears Later3

199&Reli'ion in America+ 5668 Re&ort3

199)aEmer'in' Tren%s(21 #4pril3

199)bEmer'in' Tren%s(21 #*ay3

8eich, 8obert 3

1991 The or* of ations3 Gew Bork 4lfred 43 ?nopf3

8obertson, 8oland

1990 "*apping the lobal ;ondition lobaliation as the ;entral ;oncept" Theor#, Culturean% Societ#) 1'C@03

8oof, /ade ;lark


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199@A Generation of See*ers+ The S&iritual 4ourne#s of the 2a"# 2oom Generation3 Gewrunswick, G3=3 8utgers 5niversity :ress3

8oof, /ade ;lark, and /illiam *c?inney

19)American !ainline Reli'ion3 Gew runswick, G= 8utgers 5niversity :ress3

6melser, Geil =3

19&& ".he *oderniation of 6ocial 8elations3" :p3 110C121 in /einer #ed3,!o%erni1ation+ The

/#namics of Gro.th3 Gew Bork asis ooks

6mith, /ilfred ;antwell

19&@ The !eanin' an% en% of Reli'ion3 Gew Bork Gew 4merican >ibrary3

6tark, 8odney, and >aurence 83 Iannaccone

199& "8esponse to >echner3"4ournal for the Scientific Stu%# of Reli'ion @'2&'C 2)13

6ullivan, .eresa

1990 ".he $ecline of Fccupations 8edefining the >abor !orce3" in


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.ylor, +dward 3

1)10rimiti$e Culture(>ondon =ohn *urray3

/ald, ?enneth $3

199)Reli'ion an% 0olitics in the Unite% States#@rd edition3 /ashington, $3;3 ;ongressionalNuarterly :ress3

/eber, *ax

190'%19' The 0rotestant Ethic an% the S&irit of Ca&italism3 Gew Bork 6cribners3

/eeks, =ohn 83

199-0o&ulation+ An Intro%uction to Conce&ts an% Issues3 elmont, ;4 /adsworth3

/ilson, ryan

19&&Reli'ion in SecularSociet#( >ondon /atts3

/uthnow, 8obert

19 The Restructurin' of American Reli'ion3 :rinceton, G= :rinceton 5niversity :ress3

CCCCCCCCCC199- Sharin' the 4ourne#+ Su&&ort Grou&s an% America9s e. :uest for

Communit#3 Gew Bork !ree :ress3


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Bankelovich, $aniel

191e. Rules+ Searchin' for Self-Fulfillment in a orl% Turne% U&si%e /o.n3 Gew Bork8andom

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