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Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26, 2007 Jean-Daniel Aussel, Technology & Innovation, gemalto [email protected]
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Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

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Page 1: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Smart Cards & Digital Security

ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26, 2007

Jean-Daniel Aussel, Technology & Innovation, gemalto

[email protected]

Page 2: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Smart Cards

� Tamper resistant cryptographic devices

� Securely store keys and private attributes

� Perform cryptographic computations

� Perform non-cryptographic computations

� Portable (Nomadicity)

MMM-ACNS 2007 2

Page 3: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Why are smart card tamper resistant?

MMM-ACNS 2007 3

Page 4: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Physical Attacks

MMM-ACNS 2007 4

input output

�Side Channel Attacks

Monitor analog signals on all interfaces and analyze:

� Time� Power� Electromagnetic Radiation, ...

-+-

input

keykey

error

Fault Generation

Apply combinations of environmental conditions

� Vcc, Clock,

� Temperature, UV

� Light, Laser, …

… and bypass protections or infer secrets

Invasive Attacks

� Deposit probe pads on a bus

� … or through conductive grid

� Expose hardwired ROM links

� Disconnect sensors, RNG…

� Connect tracks

� Cut tracks

Page 5: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Countermeasures (hardware)

� Functional blocks are mixed into a glue logic design

� Makes it more difficult for an attacker to analyze the structure of the logic

and locate functional blocks such as the CPU or coprocessor

� Buses are scrambled and buried

� Inaccessible from outside the chip, thus impossible to recover memory

content

� Latest chips implement strong cyphering of bus

� A current carrying protective layer is placed on top of the chip

� The chip does not operate if the layer is removed

� Sensors are monitoring abnormal variations of voltage, temperature, clock frequency and light

� Power signals and electromagnetic radiations are reduced to a minimum

� Random interrupts are generated to change the clock speed

MMM-ACNS 2007 5

Page 6: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Countermeasures (software)

MMM-ACNS 2007 6

3232--bit Hardware and librariesbit Hardware and libraries

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Page 7: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Smart Cards is by far the most sold personal

computing device

MMM-ACNS 2007 7

2006 Worldwide Shipments in million units

Page 8: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Smart card shipments to total over 4 billion in

2007

MMM-ACNS 2007 8

Page 9: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Smart cards main usages

� Secure GSM or 3G networks

� Secure payment transactions

� Secure documents

� Secure personal computers

MMM-ACNS 2007 9

Page 10: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Logical Attacks

� Buffer overflow

� Trojan horses

� In terminal (e.g. PC, handset) to retrieve PIN

� Bug exploitation

MMM-ACNS 2007 10

Page 11: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Smart Cards Current Ecosystem

� Connected thru readers

� Point-of-Sale readers (payment cards)

� Baseband modem (handsets)

� Smart card reader (PC)

� Standardized

� Serial interface ISO7816

� Byte based Half-duplex protocol (APDU)

� Industry standards with closed set of messages

– Eurocard Mastercard Visa (EMV)

– Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)

� Single application cards

� EMV, SIM, passport, ID/Health card

MMM-ACNS 2007 11

Page 12: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Emerging Smart Card Applications

� Contactless Payment with Mobile phone

� Dual contactless (single wire protocol) and SIM card

� Mobile-TV� DRM

� OMA-BCAST

� PC Connectivity� WiFi, WiMax, 3G+

� Voice-over-IP authentication

� ID/Health online services

� Tax return

� Oncard/online medical record

� Consumer market identity management

� Financial institution (Home banking), mobile network operator identity,

MMM-ACNS 2007 12

Page 13: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

Emerging Smart Card Ecosystem Opens New

Possibilities for Logical/Hardware Attacks

� New communication channels

� Contactless

� USB

� Not buffered any more by smart card reader

� Multiple chip configuration

� Contactless chip + smart card

� Nand flash + smart card

� Uncontrolled terminals

� PC, Open handsets (Windows Mobile, linux)

� New incentives

� Mobile TV, Internet identity

� New on-card applications can be attack targets� Smart card web server

MMM-ACNS 2007 13

Page 14: Smart Cards & Digital Securityre-trust.dit.unitn.it/files/20070925Doc/aussel... · 2007. 10. 12. · Smart Cards & Digital Security ReTrust Technical Workshop, Trento, September 25-26,

R&D Workload increase to secure smart cards

MMM-ACNS 2007 14

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