1 Small players in the big game - Norwegians and the slave trade MSc Dissertation in Economic History London School of Economics and Political Science Candidate Number 75531 Words: 10 007(excluding bibliography and footnotes)
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Small players in the big game - Norwegians and the slave trade
MSc Dissertation in Economic History London School of Economics and Political Science
Candidate Number 75531 Words: 10 007(excluding bibliography and footnotes)
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Table of Contents 1. Introduction ……………………………………………...…………. page 3 - 4 2. The Dano-Norwegian Slave Trade 1659 – 1803 ………………...... page 5 - 6 3. The Money - Jørgen Thormøhlen Bergen, Norway 1673-1694 3.1 Jørgen Thormøhlen and the slave economy………………………… page 7-9 3.2 Similarities to the big players in the Atlantic trade ………………… page 9-10 3.3 The peculiar position of a small player in the Atlantic trade ………. page 10-11 4. The Administration - Severin Schjelderup Guinea, West Africa 1735 - 1736 4.1 Severin Schjelderup and the deal that would lead to a new fort ....... page 12-14 4.2 The bigger picture: African agency in the Atlantic trade ………...... page 14-16 4.3. Schjelderup and Denmark-‐Norway’s position as a small player page 16 5. The Noble Ideas - Engebret Hesselberg St. Croix, Danish West Indies 1759 5.1 The 1759 rebellion plans on St. Croix ………………………….… page 17-19 5.2 The paradox of Engebret Hesselberg ……………………………... page 19-20 5.3 Similarities to the big players: the importance of the economy …... page 20-21 6. Conclusion ……………………………………………………...….. page 22 Bibliography
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1. Introduction The remote peasant country of Norway got entangled in the Atlantic slave trade from the mid-17th century. As the kingdom of Denmark-Norway secured slave plantations in the West Indies and fortresses along the Gold Coast, numerous Norwegians seized their opportunity to enrich themselves from the trade. The country was a tributary state under the Danish crown, but possessed both capital and skills that were sought after in the slave trade. Many Norwegians served as sailors, captains, investors and administrators in the Dano-Norwegian slave trade. The author Kjartan Fløgstad labels Norwegians as “the colonised coloniser” 1, a schizophrenic position where Norwegians were both under Danish overrule, but also in the position to subjugate others to their rule. Generally speaking, the Dano-Norwegian slave trade has not received much scholarly attention in the literature on the Atlantic slave trade. Daniel Hopkins notes “it is not commonly known that Denmark ever had any part in the history of Africa” despite the fact that “the Danes sailed the same seas, traded in the same commodities, and entertained much the same imperial ambitions as the Spanish, the Portuguese, the British and the Dutch.” 2 Adding to the scarcity of literature is the fact that a large proportion of what has been published on the topic is only written in Danish or Norwegian. This paper will present three Norwegian historic figures, in order to add to the knowledge on the Atlantic slave trade. This approach of writing micro-history leads to a deeper understanding of the difficulties and advantages that small players possessed when entering the slave trade. Another motivation behind focusing on Norwegians is to highlight the colonial and exploitative part of Norwegian history. While Norway only became an independent state in 1814, its history as a nation has deep roots. Regrettably, this perspective seldom emerges in popular discourse or in public memory. This again can lead Norwegian politicians to conclude that the country does not have “a past as a colonial power” as part of “Norway’s merits”, useful in promoting Norway as an agent for conflict resolution. 3 The experiences of the three Norwegians Jørgen Thormøhlen, Severin Schjelderup and Engebret Hesselberg highlights the colonial and exploitative past of Norway and provides broader knowledge on the advantages and disadvantages of small players in the “big trade”. These individuals have been given three roles in this narrative, and they cover three different time periods and geographical areas. The Bergen-based investor and merchant Jørgen Thormøhlen highlights the story of the profits and politics in the slave economy in chapter 3. He experienced the instability of the emerging Dano-Norwegian slave economy in the late 17th century. He had first-hand experience with the unstable political climate with other European nations that threatened his profit margins. His story also shows the importance of
1 Fløgstad, 1999 p. 43 2 Hopkins 2012 p.1 3 One example is this speech by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre from 2010: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-‐new/Speeches-‐and-‐articles/speeches_foreign/2010/conflict_efforts.html?id=608187
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private players in the slave economy, reducing the impact of chartered companies, who traditionally has been seen as the engine behind the slave trade. Severin Schjelderup, governor on a Dano-Norwegian slave fort in Guinea, highlights the day-to-day administrative issues of the slave trade in chapter 4. His experiences emphasise the importance of European-African relations. Through careful and covert negotiations, Schjelderup managed to carefully manoeuvre his way around European competitors in order to facilitate a deal with an African ruler. This paved the way for a second Dano-Norwegian slave fort along the Gold Coast. This highlights how Europeans had to show a great deal of patience, flexibility and ability to adapt to local power structures in order to get access to the slave trade. As a small player, Denmark-Norway also found itself extremely dependent on cooperation with other European traders. Unique insight in Schjelderup’s time as a governor is given through his letters written to his employer, the West Indian-Guinean Company. These handwritten letters have been transcribed and translated to English.4 Humanist and civil servant in the West Indies, Engebret Hesselberg, tells the story of how progressive ideas collided with the economic motivation behind slavery in chapter 5. During his employment on the West Indian island St. Croix, Hesselberg experienced the transformation from a humanist and well-known judicial expert to a ruthless torturer. Hesselberg’s experience in the West Indies highlights the meeting of progressive ideas with medieval punitive practices. His ideas mirrors those that later were to be credited for the abolishment of slavery, but were not carried out in real life, partly out of the fear of losing profits. This mirrors the extreme importance of the economy in shaping slavery. The narrative is strengthened by looking at Hesselberg’s own account of the trial, translated to English by Waldemar Westergaard.5 This paper will start by presenting the general background of the Dano-Norwegian slave trade, and then focus on these three Norwegians, first by presenting them as historical persons and the context they were operating within, then looking at how their stories fit with a wider narrative. Comparisons will be drawn to the bigger players in the Atlantic slave trade and the three Norwegians experiences will be examined in the light of prevailing literature on the Atlantic slave trade. When appropriate, aspects showing the peculiarity of Denmark-Norway as a small player will be discussed.
4 Justesen, Ole (edt) (2005) “Danish sources for the history of Guinea, 1657-‐1754” 5 The original title is ”Species Facti over den paa Eilandet St. Croix i Aaret 1759 intenderede Neeger Rebellion” translated to “Account of the Negro Rebellion on St. Croix, Danish West Indies 1759” by Westergaard 1926
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2. The Dano-Norwegian Slave Trade 1659 – 1803 The kingdom of Denmark-Norway has a long history of involvement in the slave trade, centred on the Gold Coast in present-day Ghana6 and in the Caribbean. The involvement in the Atlantic slave trade dates back to 1659, when the African Company in Glückstadt established the fort Fredericksborg in Guinea. In 1661, a second fort, Christiansborg, was erected, on the fringes of Accra in Guinea. Frederiksborg was later lost to the British, and Christiansborg came to play a major role in the Dano-Norwegian slave trade. The key player in the first phase of the Dano-Norwegian slave trade was the West Indian-Guinean Company.7 A royal charter by King Christian V established the company in 1671, and it was given the task to colonize the Caribbean island St. Thomas.8 The company absorbed the African Company in Glückstadt in 1674 and thus gained control of the Guinean trade.9 Problems raising sufficient capital led to the company to lease out its right on trade in Guinea and in the West Indies to private merchants in the late 17th century.10 The West Indian-Guinean Company would restore its operations and expand its presence in Guinea and in the West Indies from the early 18th century onwards. It annexed St. John in 1718 and purchased St. Croix from the French in 1733. Together with St. Thomas, these islands were named the Danish West Indies11. On the coast of Guinea, the Company gained a second fort named Fredensborg in 1736. However, powerful Copenhagen merchants got increasingly dissatisfied with the monopolistic power of the Company, and these protests were coupled with royal ambitions to engage directly in the slave trade. This led to the closing of the Company in 1754.12 The Danish government gained direct control over the trade, which marked the end of the existence of monopolistic chartered companies.13 During a period of expansion in the 1780´s, four additional forts were erected on the Gold Coast.14 In 1792, the king declared the forthcoming abolition of the slave trade. This took effect in 1803, but only concerned the slave trade from the Dano-Norwegian forts in Guinea. Slavery would continue in the Danish West Indies up to 1848.15 Throughout this period, the kingdom of Denmark-Norway was a small player in the Atlantic slave trade. Approximately 85 000 slaves were transported across the Atlantic by Dano-Norwegian ships. In addition, around 13 000 slaves were sold to other European slave traders from the Danish-Norwegian fortresses in Africa, or transported secretly on the account of individual Dano-Norwegian fort officers.16 The 6 The historical name “Guinea” will be used consequently. 7 The company was established under the name West Indian Company, and renamed West Indian-‐Guinean Company in 1674, Feldbæk 1986 p. 364 8 Weiss in Müller, Rydén and Weiss 2010 p. 49 9 Westergaard 1917 p. 40 10 Bro-‐Jørgensen 1966 p. 152 11 The Danish West Indies are today known as the US Virgin Islands, after Denmark sold the islands to USA in 1917 12 Weiss in Müller, Rydén and Weiss 2010 p. 49 13 ibid p. 50 14 ibid 15 Gøbel in Svalesen (2000) p. 11 16 Hernæs 1998 p. 232
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total of around 100 000 slaves accounts for less than 1 % of the total number of slaves exported in the Atlantic slave trade.17 Apart from being small in numbers, the Dano-Norwegian slave trade was characterised by a “late bloom”. The trade only became significant around 1730, and peaked in the last quarter of the 18th century. From 1776 to 1800 the Dano-Norwegian slave exports from the Gold Coast added up to 35 900, outnumbering by far the Dutch exports.18 This was partly out of the advantages Denmark-Norway possessed as a neutral state during times of war, especially during the North American War of Independence.19 The boom was also a response to the king’s declaration in 1792, which led to increased slave imports to the Danish West Indies aiming at upholding of the slave population through “natural increase”.20 The slave trade was a vital part of the triangular trade, which was a solution to the demand for raw materials like sugar and cotton and the desire to avoid sailing one of the distances without cargo. Goods were brought to Guinea and used to barter for slaves, after which the slaves were transported to the plantations on the Danish West Indies. Here, the slaves would produce sugar to be sent back to Copenhagen. There is a tight connection between the Dano-Norwegian slave trade and sugar refining, exemplified with the establishment of several sugar refineries in Denmark owned by the West Indian-Guinean Company.21 Sugar was always the main exports from the Danish West Indies. Gold and ivory initially played the major role in the trade with the Guinean forts, but slaves would gradually gain this position in the 18th century. 22 The simplicity of the triangular trade-thesis does however need revising. The majority of ships leaving Denmark-Norway went directly to the Caribbean and back in this period. Of the 3000 trans-Atlantic voyages that were launched from Denmark-Norway during the 18th century, only about 260 of these sailed the whole route via the Gold Coast to the Danish West Indies.23 The Danish West Indies would in addition buy slaves from other nations, around 42 000 slaves were bought from Great Britain, the US, France and the Netherlands between 1680 and 1825.24
17 This is using Lovejoy’s (1981) estimate of 12 million slaves being exported from Africa to the Caribbean. 18 Weiss Online source p. 8 19 Weiss in Müller, Rydén and Weiss 2010 p. 53 20 Weiss Online source p. 8 21 Westergaard 1926 p. 136 22 Gøbel 1980 p. 553 23 Weiss Online source p. 7 24 own calculations from Table 2 ibid pp.7-‐8
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3. The Money – Jørgen Thormøhlen Bergen, Norway 1673-1694 Jørgen Thormøhlen was born around 1640 in a merchant family in Hamburg, and came to Bergen as a young man.25 The city on the Western coast of Norway became the centre of his expansive business, and he became “Borger” of Bergen in 1664, which allowed him to conduct trade.26 Starting out as a merchant, Thormøhlen soon got involved in shipping and industrial production. His economic power gave him political influence, such as an initially friendly relationship with King Christian V, who appointed him as “Kommersedirektør”, the equivalent to Minister of Norwegian Trade, in 1681.27 Thormøhlen’s business was wide-ranging and he got involved in the slave economy. While the profits surrounding this economy were enormous, it was also closely associated with risk. This risk would eventually lead to the decline of Thormøhlen’s power.
3.1 Jørgen Thormøhlen and the slave economy His engagement in the slave trade started out when his ship Cornelia left Bergen in the autumn of 1673, it was to leave for Guinea and carry slaves from there to the West Indies28. The facts about this journey are however disputed. One often repeated claim is that Cornelia’s journey was successful; it reached St. Thomas in 1674 with 103 slaves, being the first Dano-Norwegian ship to transport slaves from Guinea to St. Thomas29. Hernæs claims however that Cornelia never reached St. Thomas, and points at that she is not mentioned in any Danish records related to the West Indies. As Cornelia returned to Bergen by June 1674, Hernæs doubts she would have managed to complete the whole triangular route in such short time.30 He believes that “Cornelia” could have been carrying slaves along the slave coast to the island São Tomé in the Gulf of Guinea, thus participating in the slave trade, but not the triangular trade.31 What is known is that Cornelia got seized during her second voyage, in 1675, outside the Guinean Coast. A ship owned by the Dutch East India Company hijacked Cornelia claiming that the ship was Dutch and that the Norwegian owners served merely a pro-forma function. The Dutch also claimed that one of the passengers on the ship, a clerical officer named von der Stahl, had earlier been serving for the Dutch West India Company. He was thus was not allowed to serve for other nations. 32 Thormøhlen complained to the Danish king, hoping for assistance. The Company was also notified by this event in a letter from factor Cassius at fort Frederiksborg in Guinea, who claimed that the seizure of “Cornelia” was done on a “false pretext”.33 After no response from the King or Company, governor Crull at Frederiksborg wrote 25 Fossen 2003 p. 5 26 Fossen 1978 p.21 27 Sivertsen and Simonsen 1997 p. 51 28 Hernæs 1998 p. 186 29 Westergaard 1917 p. 40 , Fossen 2003 pp. 60-‐61, Fossen 1978 p. 45, Hansen 2005 p.45 30 Hernæs 1998 p. 187 31 ibid . 188 32 Fossen 1978 p. 46 33 Factor Cassius to the directors of the West Indian-‐Guinean Company, Frederiksborg 4th December 1675 VgK;77 in Justesen 2005 pp. 32-‐33
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a new letter, this time directly to the king, complaining over the lack of communication.34 But their grievances did not pay off, and Cornelia ended up as a Dutch captured interloper.35 Thormøhlen left the slave trade for a period, until the 1690`s, which marked the zenith of his economic and political power.36 Despite his previous problems in engaging directly in the slave trade, he was still eager to get involved in the lucrative slave economy. This materialized when he contracted to lease St. Thomas and its surrounding islands in 1690 from the West Indian-Guinean Company.37 The contract gave Thormøhlen the highest authority over St. Thomas, and he would take over all valuables of the Company, including slaves, plantations and forts, and he was expected to deliver back the Company valuables when the contract ended. He would enjoy the same privileges as the Company, and in return he would pay an annual rent of 3 086 Riksdaler.38 Rather than getting directly engaged in the slave trade, Thormøhlen positioned himself to reap the benefits from a plantation economy based on slave labour. Denmark-Norway had yet to become actively involved in the slave trade, and the Danish West Indies would in this period get most of their slaves from Dutch interlopers.39 By this time, the slave plantations on St. Thomas had slowly started to increase since the Dano-Norwegian colonisation in 1671; there were 385 European colonists and 751 slaves on the island by 1691.40 Thormøhlen was to send ships to St. Thomas with mainly foodstuffs to the plantations and personnel to the forts, and the ships would return with sugar, indigo and animal skins. The profits of this trade was immense; Thormøhlen’s first return shipment had a value of 26 000 Riksdaler in the West Indies, and he estimated the same goods would have a value of 72 000 Riksdaler in Denmark-Norway.41 Thormøhlen would however suffer from the complicated relationship between the Danish king and the Brandenburger. The powerful German state was starting to engage in the slave trade, and established in 1683 the Brandenburg African Company, trading on the Gold Coast. They wanted to use St. Thomas as a trading centre, where they could sell slaves to Spanish America42. These ambitions met the needs of a financially weak West Indian-Guinean Company, which resulted in an agreement in 1685. The contract stated that the subjects of the elector of Brandenburg would obtain the right to settle and trade on St. Thomas.43 Tensions would eventually arise between the Dano-Norwegian authorities on St. Thomas and the Brandenburger, as the first wanted the latter to establish plantations and pay land tax, and not just conduct trade. The conflict culminated in 1690 when the Danish governor ordered a break-in of a 34 Governor Crull to the King of Denmark, Frederiksborg 25th April 1676 TKIA;B in Justesen 2005 p. 34 35 found in the Trans-‐Atlantic Slave Trade Database http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces 36 Fossen 1978 p. 135 37 Westergaard 1917 p. 99 38 ibid p. 99 39 Green-‐Pedersen 1971 p. 169 40 Fossen 1978 p. 110 41 Fossen 1978 pp. 116-‐117 42 Bro-‐Jørgensen 1966 p. 147 43 Fossen 1978 p. 110
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storage belonging to the Brandenburger in order to annex sugar and cotton.44 Thormøhlen inherited this conflict, when he leased the right to trade. The Danish authorities expected him to solve the situation, and instructed him in 1692 to give the Brandenburg African Company 16 000 Riksdaler worth of cargo, as a form of compensation from the annexation. The Brandenburger also gained the right to trade freely on St. Thomas during the next three years, paying a lower price of its lease than previously agreed. 45 This was a severe blow to Thormøhlen, who complained to the Danish king in several letter documenting his economic loss. The costs came from the loss of monopoly power, of losing income from future fees from the Brandenburger and being forced to give up goods on St. Thomas rather than selling them with high profit margins in Europe.46 Thormøhlen failed to pay the yearly contracting fee and the Company chose to reclaim St. Thomas in March 1794.47
3.2 Similarities to the big players in the Atlantic trade Thormøhlen’s experiences highlight more general features of the Atlantic slave trade. First and foremost, they serve as a reminder of the difference between ideal and reality surrounding the chartered companies. A Danish minister articulated in 1779 the high hopes and ambitions for the chartered companies: “the State’s general interests are most closely linked with the welfare of the Company”.48 This mirrored the contemporary belief in chartered companies as the engine of national economic growth, within the context of the prevailing mercantilist theory. Mercantilism is a system of political economy that views international trade as a zero-sum game, where the strongest states are the ones with the strongest balance-of-trade. Governments used monopolies, quotas and duties in order to encourage exports and restrain imports, which would lead to an inflow of gold and silver.49 Chartered companies were vital in the state’s foreign ambitions. These were given the task of both colonising foreign territory and to facilitate the trade benefitting national interests. In order to build sound chartered companies, the state would provide privileges such as monopoly of trade, no duty on exports, tax freedom for the company employees and own jurisdiction.50 The West Indian-Guinean Company fits into this pattern: they were given the task of administrating possessions in the West Indies and Guinea, to expand the King’s foreign possessions and receive the usual privileges of trade.51 It is quite evident that the high ambitions of the West Indian-Guinean Company were not achievable by the 1680’s. The acceptance of the competitor Brandenburger presence on St. Thomas showed a financially weak Company, who failed to declare dividends to its shareholders during its first two decades of operation.52 The fiscal problems were further emphasised when the company leased the Danish West Indies to Thormøhlen. By this time, the rights to the Guinean trade had also been leased, to the Danish
44 Bro-‐Jørgensen 1966 p. 151 45 Westergaard 1917 p.102-‐103 46 Fossen 1978 p. 139 47 Bro-‐Jørgensen 1966 p. 154 48 quoted in Feldbæk 1981 p. 135 49 LaHaye 2008 50 Gøbel 1980 p. 539 51 Feldbæk 1981 p. 154 52 Hall 1992 p. 7
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merchant Nikolak Jansen Arff in 1789.53 The company thus failed to uphold its monopolies, the very fundament for its existence. This difficult situation was however not unique to the Dano-Norwegian chartered company. Steensgaard claims that while chartered companies in the Asia trade managed to protect their monopolies, this was more seldom the case in the Atlantic trade. The companies in Asia had the advantage of entering an “old world” of established trade and networks, which the Europeans could more easily adapt to. This was not the case in the Atlantic “new world” that required more resources to exploit. It was especially challenging to establish an Atlantic plantation economy. Plantations required men, land and capital, and was much more difficult than the simple resource extraction in other parts of the Atlantic world, based on cod, and timber.54 These geographical challenges put limitations on the chartered companies in the Atlantic world, and Steensgaard claim that these only could be considered monopoly companies in a restricted sense. Creative and flexible solutions were required to trade in the Atlantic, and most companies would sub-delegate tasks to persons or unincorporated partnerships.55 Other European chartered companies struggled in the same way to defend their privileges. The Dutch West India Company (WIC) lost its monopoly on the profitable sugar trade already in 1638, Emmer argue that this was due to the competitive feature of sugar in the European market56 The WIC went bankrupt in 1674, and when it was re-launched the next year, it had lost its extensive monopoly, and only held monopoly in the slave trade and the trade with Africa.57 Their English competitor, the Royal African Company, would gradually loose their monopolistic power following the 1688 Glorious Revolution. This revolution strengthened the interest of private merchants who favoured free entry to the slave trade.58 Green-Pedersen claims that historians have paid too much attention to mercantilist colonial theory, and failed to appreciate the importance of exceptions that prevailed in reality.59 Thormøhlen is one of these exceptions. He was a private entrepreneur enabling the slave economy; he had the capital that the Company lacked, commercial know-how from continental Europe and not at least: the willingness to take risk. He possessed both the personal royal relationship vital in the mercantilist age and the capitalist spirit of the times to come.
3.3 The peculiar position of a small player in the Atlantic trade Despite the similarities to the bigger players, Thormøhlen would also bitterly experience the weak position of belonging to a small player like Denmark-Norway. His main challenge, the Brandenburger presence on St. Thomas was a necessity for the Danish King and the Company. By late 17th century, Denmark had half the
53 Green-‐Pedersen 1971 p. 166 54 Steensgaard 1981 pp. 253-‐256 55 ibid p. 252 56 Emmer 1981 p. 79 57 Emmer 1981 p. 82 58 Davis 1999 59 Green-‐Pedersen 1971 p.177
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population density compared to its rivals, France, England and Holland60. It was a kingdom of colonial ambitions, but lacked the demographic base to colonise: Hall labels the Danish West Indies as constituting an “empire without dominion”.61 Attempts in transporting prisoners to work on St. Thomas failed due to the high mortality, and the Dano-Norwegians had to accept the dominance of foreign merchants and planters.62 Hall terms this “colonisation by invitation” where the foreigners could potentially become Trojan horses, who could challenge Copenhagen’s cultural values that should have been tools for domination and control over its colonies.63 Not only the Brandenburger were potentially Trojan horses; the Dutch had also a strong presence on St. Thomas, by 1688 they comprised 66 of the free adult males, while there were only 17 Danes in this category, out of a total of 14864. This led to Dutch becoming the lingua franca, while Danish was confined to official documents and the forts on the island.65 Therefore, the challenge Thormøhlen met in the Brandenburger was not just a result of a Company in desperate need of money, but also a fundamental trait of the nature of Dano-Norwegian colonisation. Another example of Denmark-Norway’s weakness as a small player is the lack of response from the King when the Dutch East India Company seized Cornelia in 1673. Despite complaints from Thormøhlen himself and administrators at the Guinean fort, the King seems unable or unwilling to intervene in the conflict with the Dutch. This emphasise the weak military position vis-à-vis the Dutch. The seizure of Cornelia further emphasise the image the Dutch had of the Dano-Norwegian slave trade at the time. They would accuse Thormøhlen of being merely a pro-forma owner, as they believed the ship to be Dutch owned. They also claimed that one of its passengers were a former employee of the WIC, and thus not allowed to serve for other nations. The Dutch saw the Dano-Norwegian engagement in the slave trade as having a “pseudo Dutch” character, and with good reason. Dutch merchants, knowledge and capital had been vital in the establishment of the first Danish chartered company. This undermined Dutch monopoly interests, who saw the Dutch “freelancers” as illegitimate 66. The freestanding Dutch could also prove dangerous for the WIC, as they often experienced being attacked by Dutch merchants disguised as foreigners.67
60 Hall 1992 p. 5 61 Hall 1992 62 Hall 1992 p. 6 63 ibid 64 ibid p. 9 65 ibid 66 Weiss online source p. 14 67 Emmer 1981 p. 86
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4. The Administration - Severin Schjelderup Guinea, West Africa 1735 - 1736 Severin Schjelderup68 was born in 1698 in Skogn close to Trondheim, in mid-western Norway. His was the son of a priest and educated as an officer, and received a medal of honour after fighting against the Swedes for Denmark-Norway in 1719. He later left the military and got appointed governor at the fort Christiansborg on the Gold Coast in August 1734.69 Schjelderup took up the post one year later and only served as a governor for 10 months, until he died in June 1736. The short duration of his work was however not unusual; many governors served for short time periods, until they died of diseases or got ousted by their colleagues over accusations of corruption or misconduct.70 Schjelderup’s employment proved profitable for the West-India-Guinean Company: during his engagement the Company stock of slaves increased from 44 to 59, and the stock of gold increased from the equivalent of 3600 Riksdaler to 10 300 Riksdaler. 71
4.1 Severin Schjelderup and the deal that would lead to a new fort Despite his short employment, Schjelderup managed to increase the Dano-Norwegian presence along the Gold Coast. Upon his arrival, the West Indian-Guinean Company had only one fort on the Gold Coast: fort Christiansborg outside Accra. Schjelderup showed his ambitions in expanding the Company’s presence eastwards early on, when he reopened the trading lodge at the island Ada, situated a few miles from the mouth of the river Volta. In his first letter to the Company, Schjelderup revealed that their chief-assistant Jørgensen would be posted in Ada, his task was to establish ties to the local chief, in order to obtain access the to trade in slaves and tusks.72 Schjelderup then proceeded to conduct negotiations with the Akyem chief Owusu73, who served as a middleman in the Dano-Norwegian slave trade. The aim of these negotiations was to erect of a fort in Great Ningo, an African coastal town 75 kilometres east from Christiansborg.74 Schjelderup stressed the need to build this fort in several letters to the West Indian-Guinean Company. This was a strategic decision, since Ningo was located close to the river Volta delta; the river was vital in transporting slaves from the interior to the coast. A fort in Ningo would also enable the Dano-Norwegians to establish trading connections with the Portuguese. At this time, Accra was controlled by the Dutch, and they would escort all Portuguese ships past Accra to prevent any form of trade. Schjelderup complained in one letter to the Company “It is hardly possible to trade with the Portuguese here at Accra, because they are so harassed by the Dutch, but at Great Ningo, which is situated twelve miles from here, there is better opportunity”. 75 Holland and Portugal had a long history of 68 Severin Schelderup is also mentioned in the primary sources as Søren Schielderup. 69 Dansk biografisk Lexikon online source 70 Hansen 2003 p.61 71 Norsk Biografisk Leksikon, online source 72 Gov. S. Schielderup et. al, Sekret Council minutes, Christianborg, 3rd October 1735, VgK.;881, in Justesen 2005 p. 501 73 Owusu is also mentioned in the primary sources as Orsue, Ussue and Ursu 74 Nørregaard 1966 p. 160 75 Gov. Schielderup to Directors of the West Indian-‐Guinean Company, Christianborg, 15th April 1736, VgK;123, in Justesen 2005 p. 521
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mutual hostility, driven by a clash of colonial interests in the Americas and southern Asia.76 The deal depended on the goodwill of Owusu. He is titled “caboceer” in the letters from Schjelderup, a word derived from Portuguese describing a chief or king.77 Owusu held an important position in the state Akyem Abuakwa, which in 1730 had consolidated its power on the Gold Coast as they defeated its main rival, the Akwamu. Owusu was the nephew of the king Baa Kwante, which made him an heir-apparent the Akyem Abuakwa stool. Not only inheritance favoured Owusu, he had also showed himself as a competent commander-in-chief in the war against the Akwamu.78 Owusu had established connections to Christiansborg before Schjelderup arrived at the coast. Schjelderup’s predecessor Governor Werøe wrote already in November 1734 “Orsue, who is a field colonel for the Akenists has once more promised a lodge at Great Ningo, indeed to come down with his army to protect us, until we have got up our defences there “.79 Note the term “once more”, which indicates that the offer of a Dano-Norwegian settlement in Ningo had been given at an earlier date already. Owusu continued his lobbying towards the new governor Schjelderup. In November 1735 Owusu sent a representative to Jørgensen in the lodge at Ada. “I received this man very kindly and treated him to brandy and then drank a toast to Ursue, and he in turn drank a toast to the governor, whom he praised highly and bowed and scraped for”, Jørgensen wrote to Schjelderup.80 This friendly relationship got reinforced two days later, when the representative invited Jørgensen to his house, where he informed him that that Owusu would like to have “Danish White” situated in Ningo. 81 Schjelderup responded to this opportunity by sending a servant to Owusu to conduct secret negotiations. He did not inform the Company of his discussions with Owusu in advance, out of fear of that the news would “come to the ear of our neighbours” 82, by this he meant most probably the Dutch. The negotiations paid off in a deal stating that the Company could build a fort at Ningo for the price of 640 Riksdaler. The Dano-Norwegians agreed to buy slaves from Owusu at a set price.83 Owusu seemed very eager to secure this deal: he promised to protect Danish interests against external threats: it was stated in the resolution that he would “assume responsibility for anything that might be lost from there, and to procure it for us again, and in all conceivable ways to protect us”. 84 Owusu even sent a lock of his hair and some gold to be buried in the foundation wall of the fort.85 The joint effort of Schjelderup and Owusu was materialised in the
76 Westergaard 1917 p.10 77 Justesen 2005 p. 1006 78 Fynn 1971 p. 71 79 Gov. Wærøe et. al to Directors of the West Indian-‐Guinean Company, Christianborg, 10. November, 1734, V.g.K.; 123, in Justesen 2005 p. 498 80 P.N. Jørgensen to Gov. Schielderup, Ada 4th December 1735, Copy Letter Book VgK; 887 in Justesen 2005 p. 506 81 ibid. 82 Schielderup et. al, Sekret Council minutes, Christianborg 21st March 1736, VgK; 881, in Justesen 2005 p. 507 83 Nørregaard 1966 p. 160 84 ibid. p. 508 85 Hansen 2003 p. 64
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building of fort Fredensborg in Ningo in 1736. It was built by 150 slaves from fort Christiansborg, had two bastions, 10 cannons and could be defended by 3-4 men. Severin Schjelderup did not live to see the fruits of his efforts; he died on the 14th of June 1736, before Fredensborg was finished. Owusu proved himself a man of his word, however. The new fortress intimidated the Dutch, and they approached the local caboceer in Ningo with gifts, who in return allowed them to establish a small trading lodge there. Owusu reacted by sending men to drive out the Dutch and gave a fine to the caboceer in Ningo for allowing the Dutch presence. 86 Schjelderup’s initiative in expanding the Dano-Norwegian presence on the Gold Coast proved to be timed perfectly. The West Indian and Guinean Company had by this time three islands in the West Indies in its possession: St. Thomas, St. Jan and St. Croix. St. Jan was taken in 1719, but the small island had little impact on the demand for slaves. By 1720 the plantation sector on the Danish West Indies was in fact declining, a situation that would dramatically change with the purchase of St. Croix in 1733. This island was the biggest island in the Danish West Indies and had excellent conditions for sugar plantations.87 This led to a boom in slave demand from the Danish West Indies, and Denmark-Norway had by this time two forts to accommodate this demand. The 1730’s marked the start of the “late bloom” in the Dano-Norwegian slave trade. Estimations done by Hernæs shows that while 6 800 slaves were transported on Dano-Norwegian ships from 1698 to 1733, this number had more than doubled in the subsequent period, to an estimated 15 500 slaves transported between 1734 and 1765.88
4.2 The bigger picture: African agency in the Atlantic trade The story of Owusu and Schjelderup shows the importance of African agency in shaping the slave trade, as Europeans needed the permission of African rulers in order to conduct trade and establish forts and lodges. This highlights the relationship between Africans and Europeans in the Atlantic Slave Trade, which has been a highly debated topic in the academic literature. Rodney sees the slave trade as the main explanatory factor of Africa’s subsequent underdevelopment, and presents it as a disruptive involvement in the internal African trade and as a result of European capitalism. Europeans would position themselves as middlemen and operate as parasites on existing trade, only providing Africans with the lowest quality products such as liquor, cheap gunpowder and beads. African rulers or kingdoms on the contrary did not benefit from the slave trade, according to Rodney. Those African states that did increase their economical or political power in this period did it despite of, not because of the slave trade.89 Thornton, on the other side, stresses the European’s weak position vis-à-vis the African rulers. His famous quote states that “Europe offered nothing to Africa that Africa did not already produce”, emphasising that Africa was virtually self-sufficient in textiles, foodstuffs and iron products. 90 In this narrative, the slave trade is a demanded trade by African rulers, as it was a way to obtain luxury and “exotic”
86 Justesen 2005 p. 538 87 Weiss Online source p.6 88 Hernæs 1998 p.232 89 Rodney 1988 pp. 93-‐147 90 Thornton 1992 p. 44-‐45
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European goods. In order to access this lucrative trade, Europeans would have to engage in lengthy negotiations, adapt to local customs and be sensitive to the changing tastes of its African trading partners.91 One example of the strong position of Africans is the failed attempts of the Portuguese and Dutch to obtain supremacy over the whole Gold Coast.92 The proactive role of Owusu gives support to Thornton’s approach to the Atlantic Slave Trade. It is Owusu that made the fort in Ningo an imaginable possibility to Werøe and Schjelderup. He approached them several times to invite them to settle in Ningo, and went to great length to defend the fort against Dutch aggression. At this time, three European powers had slave fortresses on the Gold Coast: the English, the Dutch and the Dano-Norwegians.93 Owusu’s motivation could be to use a small player, Denmark-Norway, as a method of “split-and-divide” tactics towards the other Europeans in the area. Weiss argues that African rulers would often invite two or more European powers to settle in their areas. This had two advantages: it would prevent European monopolies and maximise profits, as the Europeans would pay rents (so-called “custymes”) to the rulers.94 Owusu seems to use this profit-maximising tactic towards Denmark-Norway. He entered Accra personally well a year after Fredensborg was erected and demanded a monthly “costuym”95 of 16 Riksdaler in order to protect the fort in Ningo. Owusu claimed that this had been agreed with the now deceased Schjelderup, something which has however not been mentioned in Schjelderup’s letters to the Company. The new governor Boris agreed on Owusu’s demands. In a letter to the Company Boris claims that they would not loose economically on the agreement, as Owusu would also lower the selling price on slaves. Boris explained this peculiar situation out of Owusu wanting to “get the reputation that he has a fort and gets monthly dues from it”96 Despite this rationalizing, it seems like Boris felt forced to obey Owusu’s demand. He notes that Owusu had brought with him 800 -1000 men to Accra to settle an external dispute, and stated that he agreed to pay the costuym “considering the harmful consequences that could accrue from his hostility to us”.97 Owusu also stated that the Dutch had promised him 40 Bendos and a costuym of 16 Riksdaler a month if he would drive the Danes from Ningo. This must have sounded as a discreet threat to governor Boris. Owusu’s pressure on the Dano-Norwegians could be motivated by the desire to gain a reputation of “having a fort”, in the words of governor Boris. Such motivation would support the theory of Hernæs, who claims that Owusu used the Dano-Norwegians in order to consolidate his own position vis-à-vis his uncle Baa Kwante. The fort at Ningo could function as Owusu’s own “port of trade”, from where he could be directly engaged in the slave trade with the Europeans.98 But, Boris’ letters also
91 Thornton 1992 p. 55 92 Thornton 1992 p. 63-‐65 93 Weiss Online Source p. 15 94 Weiss Online Source p. 10 95 Word derived from Portuguese to describe ”costum” or ”dues”, Justesen 2005 p. 1006 96 Boris et. al, General Letter, Christiansborg 3rd May 1738, VgK; 123, in Justesen 2005 p. 536 97 Boris et. al, Sekret Council minutes, Christiansborg 26st January 1738, VgK; 881, in Justesen 2005 p. 534-‐535 98 Hernæs 2003 p. 51
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implied that the new settlement with Owusu was economically unfavourable for the Dano-Norwegians. Boris promised to seize paying the monthly salary to Owusu “once the Ningo obsession is out of the Dutch heads”. Regardless of his motivation; it seems evident that Owusu used the presence of the Dutch competitor as well as his own military strength to force through an agreement of his own liking. The Dano-Norwegians had little choice but to accept Owusu’s demands. The strength of African rulers is also exemplified with lengthy negotiations where the Dano-Norwegians would adopt to local customs. One of these West African traditions is to “eat Fetish”. This describes a religious ceremony used in the swearing of oaths.99 Schjelderup notes that Owusu has eaten fetish as a part of the deal of the fort in Ningo.100 Here, we see that the Dano-Norwegians used indigenous traditions in order to secure credible commitment from their trading partners. This shows that Europeans would have to obtain knowledge of local customs and adapt to these, further emphasising the strong position of Africans in the trade. A very clear-cut divide between Africans and Europeans may however be a bit artificial. It is important to remember that the Europeans were few in numbers and far from their home and few would survive and ever to return. As opposed to staying in their own communities, they would therefore often become integrated in local power structures. This was quite apparent in the case of the Dano-Norwegian forts, where the population would only consist of 40-80 individuals around the mid-18th century101. Their relationship to African employers on the fort and people of the neighbouring village seems to display a great deal of flexibility. One example is the reception of Schjelderup in Ningo, where many Africans tried to position themselves close to him once the plans of a new fort was revealed: Owusu even tried to marry his daughter to Schjelderup.102 This demonstrates the desire to integrate Schjelderup in the local power apparatus.
4.3. Schjelderup and Denmark-‐Norway’s position as a small player Denmark-Norway thus faced much the same situation as the bigger European players did, when relating to African rulers. Denmark-Norway’s peculiar position as a small player in the big trade is more highlighted in its encounter with other European players. Schjelderup’s many letters stressing the need to erect a fort in Ningo revealed the fragile position of Denmark-Norway on the Gold Cost. While most Dano-Norwegian ships would go directly to the West Indies and return with plantation goods, Dano-Norwegian forts and lodges in Guinea were usually only visited by one or two ships per year.103 A fort was therefore vital for Dano-Norwegian interests, as it would loosen the Dutch hegemony along the coast and enable trading connections to the Portuguese, who could offer both imminent foodstuffs and goods used in trading slaves, which was always based on barter trade.
99 Hernæs 1998 p. 106 100 Schielderup et. al, Sekret Council minutes, Christianborg 21st March 1736, VgK; 881, in Justesen 2005 p. 507 101 Weiss in Müller, Rydén and Weiss 2010 p. 66 102 Hansen 2003 p. 65 103 Weiss Online source p. 7
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5. The Noble Ideas - Engebret Hesselberg St. Croix, Danish West Indies 1759 Engebret Hesselberg was born in 1728 at Norderhov in Ringerike, an agricultural area in south-eastern Norway. He proved himself early more suitable as an academic than a farmer: as a 23-year-old he obtained the highest marks in his degree in both theology and law from the University of Copenhagen. In 1753 his book “Juridisk Kollegium” was published, which became a textbook at the University of Copenhagen.104 His academic career ended due to conflicts with his colleagues, and he left for St. Croix 27 years old. When Hesselberg arrived on Christiansted, the capital of St. Croix, in 1755, the Danish king Christian the 5th had recently taken direct control with the Danish West Indies. The Norwegian lawyer became among the first civil servants to serve under new power structures. His title was “byefoged”105 of Christiansted, a position that put him in charge of the local administration as well of the local police and trade.106. He would also gradually accumulate capital to buy a profitable slave plantation.107
5.1 The 1759 rebellion plans on St. Croix Some weeks before Christmas 1759, Hesselberg received upsetting information. Loose talk and hints from a slave implied that a slave rebellion was being planned. The course of events was thoroughly presented by Hesselberg himself in a report named “Account of the Negro Rebellion on St. Croix, Danish West Indies 1759”108, which is truly a peculiar document. The document mixes the ideals of enlightenment and respect for individuality with detailed accounts of torture. It shows how old practices of harsh treatment of slaves meet emerging ideas of humanism. The most unsettling is perhaps Hesselberg’s unwillingness to see how these two realties collide. This ambiguity reflects the importance of economics on the slave trade, and values and ideas playing a secondary role. The account starts with the following sentence:
“The desire for liberty, which is so inseparable from human nature, and the unreasonable conduct of a number of masters towards their slaves, has always led, and will necessarily always lead, to rebellion; and especially it is to be feared the resistance of the most intelligent among those Negroes who have been property owners in their native land”. 109
He further emphasised that the majority of slaves on St. Croix were born free before becoming captives, and notes that this entails that the slaves “have therefore just as good claim to their freedom as we have to ours”.110 In Hesselberg’s view it is merely a coincidence that led to people to end up as slaves, and that in a different course of events the slaves could have become the masters.
104 Hansen 2005 p.227 105 translated to bailiff and magistrate by Hansen 2005 p.222 106 Vibæk 1966 p. 16 107 Fløgstad 1999 p. 48 108 translated by Westergaard 1926 109 Hesselberg quoted in Westergaard 1926 p. 51 110 in Westergaard 1926 pp. 51-‐52
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Hesselberg then proceeded to hint to why his proud principles were not carried out in real life. First he emphasised the demographic situation, citing a 1758 census showing that St. Croix had 1 690 white inhabitants, and 11 807 blacks, a ratio of seven blacks to one white.111 Secondly, Hesselberg presented rebellions and conspiracies on other Caribbean islands. Attention was given the drawn out war between British slavers and runaway slaves on Jamaica. The Dano-Norwegians had also recent first-hand experience of rebellions, but Hesselberg mentioned only briefly the 1733 slave rebellion on St. John, without going into detail. This uprising was conducted by runaway slaves who gained control over a majority of the island for several months112. Westergaard claims this rebellion had left «a profound impression on the minds of the Danish planters», and that a number of planters from St. John had left to St. Croix following the insurrection, spreading the knowledge and fear of slave revolts. 113 After providing this historical backdrop, Hesselberg then described the course of events that led to the gruesome death sentence for 13 men. An African slave named Cudjo was supposed to have approached two whites and asked to obtain some bullets. Cudjo did not give any satisfactory reason for his request, and it was illegal for slaves to own any weapon. He should later that day have stated to a group of whites “You look out that some of your heads won’t lie at your feet pretty soon”.114 One day earlier Cudjo was supposed to have said regarding one of the plantation houses “Maybe that house will be mine in a short time”.115 Cudjo also asked a white man about how long it would be until Christmas, and commented, “I am asking about it, as I hope by that time to be a little Petit Maitre”116. These comments lead to Cudjo’s arrest, and Hesselberg’s house became the location of the following investigation. Cudjo confessed to have met a freed slave by the name of Davis that had suggested inciting a slave rebellion. Davis was arrested and did eventually confess and gave the names of others that were supposed to be part of the uprising. One day after his confession, Davis managed to slit his throat. The wound was not deemed as fatal, and he continued to give confessions about the rebellion plans. In the following night, Davis tore the bandages and swore that he would not confess anything more. He died the following morning.117 Despite the main witness committing suicide, Hesselberg pursued the case, where 84 of the suspected 90 slaves got arrested. He served as judge during the trial, together with two supporting judges. 13 of the slaves were sentenced to death and the rest of the slaves either got acquitted and sent back to their planters or sold out of St. Croix.118 Fløgstad questions whether the trial exposed any real rebellion plans. He points out that the slave Qvamina, whose confession the trial partly rested on, in return got his freedom and some money. Fløgstad labels this “Judas money” for a bought witness and ponders whether
111 Westergaard 1926 p. 52, see also Vibæk 1966 p. 102 112 Mulich 2003 p. 85 113 Westergaard 1926 p. 51 114 in Westergaard 1926 pp. 53-‐54 115 ibid p.54 116 ibid 117 ibid p. 55 118 ibid pp. 58-‐61
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the confessions from the other slaves were a product of torture or promises of impunity.119 «There was no limitation to the inventiveness of the judges» states Vibæk on punishment of the slaves120. Hesselberg personally saw to their execution and sent detailed notes back to the Danish authorities. The two suspected ringleaders were put in iron cages, where they survived for 42 and 91 hours. Cudjo was among the four who received the relative mild death sentence of being burned alive. Two other persons were broken on the wheel with an iron crowbar and laid alive on the wheel, they survived for 12 and 2 hours. Three others were pinched with hot tongs and hanged upside down, two of them with a dog placed between them. One was pinched with glowing tongs and hanged by the neck and one was set up in a gibbet. The body of Davis was dug up, and drawn across the town by a horse by one leg, hanged on a gallows, then taken down and burned on a fire.121
5.2 The paradox of Engebret Hesselberg Hesselberg is a paradox. His report from the trial shows two faces that cannot be reconciled. His first face is of a progressive humanist, who has soaked up ideas from the French enlightenment. He delivers surprising thoughts for an administrator of a plantation island with personal economic interest in the slave economy. Hesselberg does not fall into temptation of using racism or ideas of European cultural superiority as tools in legitimating the slave trade, quite contrary: he denounces these tools, as he states that it is not natural that non-whites should be subjugated to become slaves. Hesselberg sees is as just as natural that the outcome could have been reversed, that the slaves would be masters, and that he and the other whites would be slaves. The other face of Hesselberg is of the investigator who used payments to obtain confessions, leading to a trial where he is the main judge, handing out severe punishments. He talked about the natural freedom of slaves, and then proceeded to brutally penalize those who dared to carry out these ideas. How do we understand this duality between theory and practice? Hall offers an easy explanation by stating that Hesselberg was merely conducting public order, just doing his job.122 This is too simplistic, and ignores the fact that the legal framework he operated under, was solely made to ensure stability to maintain slavery, an institution that Hesselberg condemned on paper. His harsh verdicts seem motivated by the need of preventing future slave rebellions, as Hesselberg dwells on past rebellions in his report. This in turn would ensure the future of the slave economy. The harshness of the sentences had also a more practical side: as only a fraction of the suspected conspirators were killed, the king’s purse was spared. The king in Copenhagen was obliged to compensate the planters for each executed slave, by a price reflecting the market value of the slave. 123 With rather few, but brutal convictions, a deterrent effect was ensured. Such considerations imply how vital it is to look at the economic realities of the Danish West Indies at the time of Hesselberg’s verdicts. The islands had just begun
119 Fløgstad 1999 pp.53-‐55 120 Vibæk 1966 p. 159 121 Westergaard 1926 pp. 58-‐59 122 Hall 1992 p. 51 123 Fløgstad 1999 p. 50
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their “era of greatness”, the term Vibæk uses on the period from 1755 to 1800.124 The boom started out with two events: the seven years war that drove up sugar prices and the dismantling of the Company that removed some of the negative aspects of monopoly and attracted new planters.125 By 1755 around 2000 casks of sugar were exported from St. Croix, by 1764 had the export reached 23 600 casks.126 Increased sugar prices did not only benefit the planters but also the industrial production in Denmark-Norway. Sugar refining became the most important industrial branch in Copenhagen in the years following 1755.127 Denmark-Norway also benefitted from its neutrality during the war, as St. Thomas was opened as a free port for trade during the 1750’s. This led to increased trade on St. Thomas, and increased income from duties and taxation.128 Hesselberg was directly connected to this boom, being a plantation owner and administrator of the capital of a plantation island. He saw the profits generated and understood the threats posed by rebellions. Also, he was accustomed to the mental state on St Croix, which Hall describes as a sort of a «state-of-siege»-psychosis.129 This psychosis was ironically the result of the economic boom. As the plantations increased in size to accommodate growing demand, demographic divisions widened between slave and masters, which contributed to the sense of paranoia and fear on the island.130 This enabled a very strict punitive system, known as the Gardelin code, which authorised severe capital punishment of slaves.131 One interesting note is that Hesselberg’s harsh punishments seems to pay off, in the sense that there are no slave revolts for the next 88 years.132 St. Croix continued to bloom, and became one of the major Caribbean slave markets in the second half of the eighteenth century133 Another point as that Hesselberg’s verdict seems to not get any critical response from his surroundings. He lost his job half a year after the trial, but this was out of accusations of corruption. The complaints did not mention Hesselberg’s trial, and only emphasised his dubious economic activities.134 The subsequent rise of the abolitionist movement seems also not to capitalize of Hesselberg’s harsh treatments of the slaves. The Danish surgeon Isert would later travel to Guinea and St. Croix, his letters condemning slavery was published in 1788, without mentioning Hesselberg’s verdict.135
5.3 Similarities to the big players: the importance of the economy The paradox of Hesselberg fits into a wider narrative surrounding the Atlantic Slave Trade. In understanding slavery and its subsequent abolition, the literature tends to be divided between economic and ideological explanations. Drescher represents the first,
124 Vibæk 1966 p. 7 125 ibid p. 34 126 ibid p. 67 127 ibid p. 73 128 Weiss Online source p.7 129 Hall 1992 p. 36 130 ibid 131 ibid pp. 57-‐62. Note that by 1755 a new, more humane slave law was introduced, without being implemented by local authorities 132 Fløgstad 1999 p. 54 133 Mulich 2003 p. 84 134 Fløgstad 1999 p. 56 135 Isert 1788 in Winsnes 1992
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in his seminal book “Abolition – A History of Slavery and Antislavery” he examines an ideological shift in the late 18th century Great Britain. This period was marked by the upsurge of an antislavery movement with large popular appeal that used political channels to lobby for a prohibition of slavery. The British would then export its 1807 abolition of slavery to other countries – though “hard power” of seizing foreign slave ships and “soft power” of bilateral treaties and bi-national commissions.136 Drescher stresses the importance of religious and legalistic principles in rationalising slavery in the period up until the abolitionist movement.137 Williams connects the rise and fall of slavery to economic changes in his highly influential book “Capitalism and Slavery”. To Williams, it is not the humanitarian ideas, but rather the success of the slave economy that leads to the collapse of the Atlantic slave trade. The economic success of the plantations led to an emerging capitalist class that challenged the mercantilist privileges, Williams states “The very vested interests that had been build up by the slave system now turned and destroyed that system”.138 In William’s narrative, ideas merely serve a supporting role, and new and progressive principles would only be advocated once they served an economic function. The new elites could then use the new enlightened ideas of human rights, in order to justify a new economic order. Most scholars today agree that slavery and its abolition rested on both economic and ideological principles. But the example of Hesselberg serves as a reminder that the “right” ideas are seldom sufficient in creating change. Hesselberg uses the same words and logic as representatives of the subsequent abolitionist movement, seeing Africans as equal to Europeans, with a “desire for liberty, which is so inseparable from human nature”. Still, he chose to carry out the institution of slavery in practice. Facing the threat of losing the impressive economic gains that St. Croix had achieved the last couple of years, Hesselberg decided to leave his principles and hand out few and brutal verdicts, aimed at reducing the King’s expenses and to prevent future uprisings. The slaves were treated in a gruesome fashion, not because Hesselberg deemed them as sub-human, but because they produced economic gains.
136 Drescher 2009 pp. 232-‐233 137 ibid p. 84 138 Williams 1964 p. 136
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6. Conclusion This paper has placed three Norwegians in the midst of the Atlantic slave trade, contrasting the popular and constructed belief that Norway has no colonial past. Their stories show how Denmark-Norway fitted well within the mainstream experiences of the bigger players in the Atlantic slave trade. Thormøhlen is perceived as the private saviour of the troubled chartered Danish company in the Atlantic trade. The lease of the Danish West Indies to Thormøhlen highlights the flexibility these companies needed in order to survive in the Atlantic trade, challenging the straightforwardness of an orthodox mercantilist theory. Schjelderup’s positioning on the Guinean coast shows how Europeans needed to adapt to their African trading partners in order to access the slave trade. An aspiring African ruler, who sought to strengthen his position within his African state and towards other Europeans, probably used Schjelderup as a pawn in his game. This places Schjelderup within the narrative of Thornton, who stresses the importance of African agency in the Atlantic slave trade. Hesselberg wrestles with economic and moral considerations on a slave island in the West Indies. His experiences shows that the good and enlightened ideas were not always sufficient in speaking up against slavery in practice, as long as the institution of slavery proved very profitable, and the threat of slave revolts was substantial. Still, their experiences highlight the specific demographic, military and fiscal weaknesses of Denmark-Norway as a colonial power. As the state lacked the demographic base for a full-heartedly colonisation in the West Indies, it became dependent on foreigners who again could reduce the profits of the Dano-Norwegian slave economy. Denmark-Norway’s military weakness is emphasised through the lack of sanctioning power against Dutch chartered companies acting as privateers. During the 17th century, the fiscal weakness led to Dano-Norwegian colonisation attempts to be dominated by Dutch merchants, leaving it with low levels of credibility in the eyes of Dutch chartered companies. The fiscal weakness of the Company also led to a low degree of self-sufficiency on the Dano-Norwegian forts on the Guinean coast, making them more dependent on African rulers and other European states.
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Bibliography Books: Bro-Jørgensen, J.O. (1966) “Bind 1, Dansk Vestindien Indtil 1755 – Kolonisation og Kompagnistyre” in Brøndsted, Johannes (edt) “Vore Gamle Tropekolonier” Fremad: København Davies, Kenneth Gordon (1999). “The Royal African Company” Routledge: Drescher, Seymour (2009) “Abolition – A History of Slavery and Antislavery” Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Feldbæk, Ole (1986) “Danske Handelskompagnier 1616-1843 – Okrojer og interne Ledelsesregler” Selskapet for Udgivelse af Kilder til Dansk Historie; København Fløgstad, Kjartan (1999) “Eld og Vatn – Nordmenn I Sør-Amerika” Universitetsforlaget, Oslo Fossen, Anders Bjarne (2003) “Saa stor var min Lycke, saa dyb er min Sorg – Herren til Møhlenpris” Clioto Forlag: Fossen, Anders Bjarne (1978) “Jørgen Thormøhlen - forretningsmann, storreder, finansgeni” Einar Blaauw; Bergen Fynn, John Kofi (1971) “Asante and Its Neighbours 1700-1807” Northwestern University Press, London Hall, Neville (1992) “Slave Societies in the Danish West Indies: St. Thomas, St. John and St. Croix” the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London Hansen, Thorkild (2005) “Islands of Slaves” Sub-Saharan Publishers: Accra Hansen, Thorkild (2003) “Coast of Slaves” Sub-Saharan Publishers: Accra Hernæs, Per O. (1998) “Slaves, Danes and African Coast Society. The Danish Slave Trade from West Africa and Afro-Danish Relations on the Eighteenth-Century Gold Coast” Norwegian University of Science and Technology: Trondheim Hopkins, Daniel (2012) “Peter Thonning and Denmark's Guinea Commission - A Study in Nineteenth-Century African Colonial Geography” Leiden : Brill Justesen, Ole edt (2005) “Danish sources for the history of Guinea, 1657-1754” Volume 1: 1657-1735 and Volume 2: 1735-1754, Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab: Copenhagen Nørregaard, Georg (1966) “Bind 8, Guldkysten – De Danske Etablissementer i Guinea” in Brøndsted, Johannes (edt) “Vore Gamle Tropekolonier” Fremad: København
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Sivertsen, Aage Georg and Simonsen, Eivind (1997) “Bergen under lupen – en historisk reise” Sofista Forlag; Oslo Svalesen, Leif (2000) “The Slave Ship Fredensborg” Indiana University Press: Bloomington Rodney, Walter (1988) “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” Tanzanian Publishing House: Dar-Es-Salaam Thornton, John (1992) “Africa and the Africans in the making of the Atlantic world, 1400-1680” Cambridge University Press: Cambridge Vibæk, Jens (1966) “Bind 2, Dansk Vestindien 1755-1848 Vestindiens Storhetstid” in Brøndsted, Johannes (edt) “Vore Gamle Tropekolonier” Fremad: København Westergaard, Waldemar (1917) “The Danish West Indies under Company Rule 1671 – 1754” The Macmillan Company: New York Williams, Eric (1964) “Capitalism and Slavery” Andre Deutsch: London Winsnes, Selena (1992) “ Letters on West Africa and the Slave Trade – Paul Erdmann Isert’s Journey to Guinea and the Caribbean Islands in Columbia (1788)” Oxford University Press: Oxford Articles and book chapters: Emmer, P.C (1981) “The West India Company, 1621-1791: Dutch or Atlantic” in in Blussé and Gaastra (eds) Companies and Trade – Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Régime Leiden University Press The Hague p. 71-93 Feldbæk, Ole (1981) The Organisation and Structure of the Danish East India, West India and Guinea Companies in the 17th and 18th Centuries” in Blussé and Gaastra (eds) Companies and Trade – Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Régime Leiden University Press The Hague pp. 135-159 Hernæs (2003) “African Power Struggle and European Opportunity: Danish Expansion on the early 18th Century Gold Coast” in Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, New Series, No. 7 pp. 1-92 Published by: Historical Society of Guinea Green-Pedersen (1971) The Scope and the Structure of the Danish Negro Slave Trade in The Scandinavian Economic History Review Vol XIX No. 1 Gøbel, Erik (1980) “Danske oversøiske handelskompagnier i 17. og 18. århundrede. En forskningsoversigt i Fortid og Nutid XXVIII pp.535-569. LaHaye, Laura (2008) “Mercantilism” in Henderson, David (edt) The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics Liberty Fund: Indianapolis pp. 340-343 Lovejoy (1981) “The Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Synthesis” in Journal of African History pp. 494-500
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Mulich, Jeppe (2003) “Microregionalism and intercolonial relations: the case of the Danish West Indies, 1730–1830” in Journal of Global History vol. 8 issue 1 pp. 72-94 Steensgaard, Niels (1981) “The Companies as a Specific institution in the History of European Expansion” in Blussé and Gaastra (eds) Companies and Trade – Essays on Overseas Trading Companies during the Ancien Régime Leiden University Press The Hague p. 245-265 Weiss, Holger (2010) “Danskar och svenskar i den atlantiska slavhandeln 1650-1850” in Müller, Rydén and Weiss (edt) Global historia från periferin – Norden 1600-1850 Studentlitteratur; Lund pp. 39-75 Westergaard, Waldemar (1926) “Account of the Negro Rebellion on St. Croix, Danish West Indies, 1759” in The Journal of Negro History Vol. 11 No. 1 pp. 50-61 Association for the Study of African American Life and History, Inc. Online Sources: Dansk biografisk Lexikon, on Søren Schielderup digital edition, XV.Bind.Scalabrini - Skanke http://runeberg.org/dbl/15/0112.html (Reading date: 28th of August 2013) Norsk Biografisk Leksikon on Søren Schjelderup: http://nbl.snl.no/Søren_Schjelderup/utdypning (Reading date: 28th of August 2013) Støre, Jonas Gahr, former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, speech 11th of June 2010: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/speeches_foreign/2010/conflict_efforts.html?id=608187 (Reading date: 2nd of September 2013) TAST- Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, on Cornelia in 1676 http://www.slavevoyages.org/tast/database/search.faces (Reading date: 2nd September 2013) Weiss, Holger “Dutch and Baltic Ambitions in the Atlantic World, the Danish Slave Trade and the Danish-Dutch relations on the Gold Coast” (draft version) Åbo Akademi University, Online paper: https://www.kitlv.nl/pdf_documents/Weiss_Danish_Atlantic.pdf (Reading date: 1. September 2013)
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