SMA White Paper What Do Others Think and How Do We ...

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SMA White Paper

What Do Others Think and How Do We Know What They Are Thinking?

AStrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)PeriodicPublication

March2018ContributingAuthors:BrigGenAlexusG.Grynkewich(DDGO,J39),Dr.Hriar“Doc”Cabayan(JSJ39),Mr. Robert C. Jones (SOCOM), Col. Scott K. Thomson (Office of the Undersecretary of Defense(Policy)),Dr.SpencerB.MeredithIII(NDU),LTC(Dr.)GregoryS.Seese(JHU-APL),LTC(Dr.)RafaelE.Linera(USASOC),Mr.ErinnMcQuagge(NorthopGrumman),Ms.PatriciaDeGennaro(TRADOCG2),Mr.RandyMunch(TRADOCG2),Dr.DianeDiEuliis(NDU),Dr.JamesGiordano(Georgetown),Dr.IanMcCullough(JohnHopkins),Ms.LaurieMcCullough(Fielding),Dr. JasonSpitaletta (JHU-APL),Dr.NicholasD.Wright(Univ.Birmingham,UK),Dr.MargeretHall(UNO),Dr.GinaLigon(UNO),Ms.ClaraBraun(UNO),Dr.LauraSteckman(MITRE),Mr.ClarkMcCauley(BrynMawr),Ms.SophiaMoskalenko(BrynMawr),Mr.TomMcCauley(Univ.Rochester),Mr.DanFoy(Gallup),Mr.ChrisStewart(Gallup),Dr.LindaDurnell(Fielding),Dr.GarryHare(Fielding),Dr.GwynethSutherlin(GeographicServices),Mr.MarkPolyak(IpsosPublicAffairs),Dr.DavidC.Ellis(JointSpecialOperationsUniv.),Dr.KatieZiemer (Ipsos Public Affairs), Mr. Howard Simkin (USASOC G9), and Dr. William D. Casebeer(LockheedMartinATL)

Editor:Ms.MariahYager(NSI)

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Disclaimers

Thiswhitepaperrepresentstheviewsandopinionsofthecontributingauthors.ThiswhitepaperdoesnotrepresentofficialUSGpolicyorposition.

MentionofanycommercialproductinthispaperdoesnotimplyDoDendorsementorrecommendationfororagainsttheuseofanysuchproduct.Noinfringementontherightsofthe

holdersoftheregisteredtrademarksisintended.

TheappearanceofexternalhyperlinksdoesnotconstituteendorsementbytheUnitedStatesDepartmentofDefense(DoD)ofthelinkedwebsites,ortheinformation,productsorservicescontainedtherein.TheDoDdoesnotexerciseanyeditorial,security,orothercontroloverthe

informationyoumayfindattheselocations.

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Table of Contents

Preface 1ExecutiveSummary 3

PartI:OperationalPerspectives 9Lies,DamnedLies,andAssessmentsMr.RobertC.Jones 10

Empathy:The(Missing)FoundationofEffectiveOperationalArtCol.ScottK.Thomson 17

BuildingaHouseontheRock(ofGoodAnalysis)Dr.SpencerB.MeredithIII 22

Effects-BasedPsychologicalOperationsMeasuresofEffectiveness:MeasuringChangeandImpactDr.GregoryS.Seese,LTCRafaelE.Linera,&Mr.ErinnMcQuagge 25

CoordinatingOperationstoInfluenceBehaviorsintheOEMs.PatriciaDeGennaro&Mr.RandyMunch 38

PartII:HowReliableAreSelf-ReportingandPollingData? ABiopsychosocialPerspective 44NeurocognitiveMechanismsofSelf-DisclosureDr.DianeDiEuliis&Dr.JamesGiordano 45

KnowingtheTerrain:ExplicitandImplicitMeasuresofthePopulationDr.IanMcCullough&Ms.LaurieMcCullough 49

RemoteBehavioralAssessment:PoliticalPsychologyMethodsDr.JasonSpitaletta 57

TheNeuroscience,PsychologyandPracticeofTargetAudienceSelf-ReportDr.NicholasD.Wright 61

PartIII:Advantages,Limitations,andPitfallsofSocialMedia 69DigitalParticipationRolesoftheGlobalJihad:SocialMedia’sRoleinBringingTogetherVulnerableIndividualsandVEOContentDr.MargeretHall,Dr.GinaLigon,&Ms.ClaraBraun 70

TheNextFrontier:MovingBeyondSocialMediaintoSociotechnicalSpaceDr.LauraSteckman 79

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PartIV:Meta-Opinions:TheLinkBetweenPollingandSocialMedia 85EncouragingandAssessingtheValidityofAnswerstoQuestionsaboutRadicalization:TheUseofMeta-opinionsMr.ClarkMcCauley,Ms.SophiaMoskalenko,&Mr.TomMcCauley 86

TheContinuedRelevanceofSurveyResearchMr.DanFoy&Mr.ChrisStewart 91

PartV:DiscussionofAlternativeOptions 96StealingHistoryDr.LindaDurnell&Dr.GarryHare 97

Groupthink:TrainingNewTechnologiestoSeeThatHumansDon’tAllThinkAlike Dr.GwynethSutherlin 103

TheInternetofThings(IoT)andtheArtofMappingaPopulation’sThinking,Behavior,andInfluencersMr.MarkPolyak,Dr.DavidC.Ellis,&Dr.KatieZiemer 108

TheImpactoftheInternetofThings(IoT)andBlockchainsonFutureWarfareMr.HowardSimkin 118

NarrativeTechnologytoDetectandDefeatAdversaryIdeologicalInfluence

Dr.WilliamD.Casebeer 129

Acronyms 139

AuthorBiographies 142

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List of Figures

Figure1.ManagingtheCircleofTrust 15

Figure2.ComprehensiveGoal/ObjectiveFramework 26

Figure3.PSYOPGoals,SPOs&SeriesObjectivesadaptationtoEnds-Ways-Meansconstruct. 31

Figure4.Serieslevelmessageobjectiveexamples 32

Figure5.EstablishingtheCorrelation.BetweentheSeriesandMOE 35

Figure6.TheAudienceDecisionProcess 62

Figure7.ConvergentevidencesupportsarolefortheorbitoPrefrontalcortexinintrospectiveaccuracy 63

Figure8.Self-reportedopinionsabouttheU.S.andChinaconstraindecision-makersinkeyAsianstates. 65

Figure9.Digitalparticipationroles. 72

Figure10.AnexampleofdisseminatingVEOcontentontheplatformYouTube. 75

Figure11.GlobalInternetaccessaccordingtotheGallupWorldPoll 94

Figure12.GreatMosqueofal-Nuri(beforeandafter) 100

Figure13.Screenshotofsurveyasseenbytranslators 105

Figure14.GeospatialaggregationofeventcategoriesfromSomaliaSpeakssurvey 106

Figure15.ChildrenintrainingbyISISinSyria 111

Figure16.OpenAccessIoTconnecteddevices’inMiddleEast/NorthAfricaandSouthEastAsia 114

Figure17.ExponentialConvergence-FiveconvergingtechnologiesthatwilldrivetheexponentialdevelopmentofincreasinglycapableArtificialIntelligence. 119

Figure18.Relationshipoflethalitytodispersion. 120

Figure19GrowthoftheInternetofThingsbyNumberofDevices 121

Figure20SensorsinaTypicalSmartphone 121

Figure21.TheBlockchainProcess 122

Figure22.TheNarrativeInformationSystem 133

Figure23.Expandingthe“EEG(Electro-Encephalogram)Human-in-LoopTesting”Block—APrototypeNarrativeInfluenceandMessageAnalysisTestBed 134

Figure24.AnalyzingMessagesinSocialNetworkInfluenceContext 136

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List of Tables

Table1.ExamplesofDPRKdefectors’perceptionsontopicsrelatedtoCapacity,Autonomy,andLegitimacy 24

Table2.Policyimplications 67

Table3.ManuallycodedresultsofVEOcontentscrapedfromopenarchitecturesandEnglish-basedsocialmedia 73

Table4.MostPopularSNSintheArabWorld(Salem,2017) 82

Table5.PercentageofTunisia’sPopulationwithAccesstoRegionally-FavoredSNS 83

Table6.InternetaccessacrosstheCENTCOMAORaccordingtothe2017GallupWorldPoll 93

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Preface

BrigadierGeneralAlexusG.GrynkewichDeputyDirector,GlobalOperations(J39)

Determiningmethodstobetterunderstandcriticalpopulationgroupsisessentialtoallaspectsofmilitary planning. Operations are essentially approaches toward modifying the environment ofrelevantactorssuchthattheirperceptionsofthatenvironment(theinformationtheyactupon)leadthemtobehaveinwaysthatarefavorabletodesiredoutcomes.Assuch,militaryintelligenceandplanning analysts need to focus on developing an empathetic understanding of others. Thecontributors in this white paper provide recommendations for planning methodologies,technologicalapproaches,andrequiredexpertisetothatend.

Questionstheyaddressinclude:

• Howdowefindandinfluencetherightpeopletoachievestrategicgoals?

• Whichbehaviorsarecriticaltooverallsuccess?

• Howdowe understand perceptions about governance andworldviewswithin their ownculturalsettings?

• Whatare thebenefitsandanalyticpitfalls of self-reportingmethodologies?Howcanself-reporteddatabecompared—andcombined—withfindingsfromothersources?

• Whatmethodsareavailabletounderstandstrategicpopulations?

Addressing these questions requires direct and indirect approaches and highlights the need forcombiningmultipleapproachesanddatasources.Withtheproperframework,itispossibletonotonlymeasurechangesinbehaviorandtheassociatedknowledgeandbeliefs,butalsowhethertheinfluencemechanismusedishavinganyimpact.

Thecontributorsalsohighlightseveralrequirementstoachievetheseoutcomes:

• Technology suites todetect and exert influence are of paramount importance in aworldwherekineticandnon-kineticeffectsinteracttoproduceoutcomes.

• Theability todetectandanalyze stories inprogress, forecast their effects, formulate andenactalternatestoriesinahuman-in-the-loopfashion,andassessthebehavioralimpactoftheircounter-narrativestrategy.

• The ability tomeasure impact based on in-depth understanding of knowledge, attitudes,beliefs,intentions,andbehaviorsofapopulation.

• Adoptionofan“outside-in”mindset,whichmakestheaudience’sdecision-makingprocessthefocusoftheinfluencestrategy.

Inthiscontext,thedevelopmentofacomprehensiveeducationalandtrainingsystemthatallowstheJointForcetohaveabetterappreciationofthepeopletheyseektopersuadeisneeded.Suchasystem


will provide tangibleprocesses throughwhichwe canmore clearly evaluate the effectivenessofvarious approaches. These capabilities allow planners and operators to detect, analyze, andunderstandadversary informationoperations, andprovide “human-in-the-loop” tools to assist indeveloping counter-narratives to influence the behavior of the audience. Using technology tounderstandforeignenvironmentsrequiresafusionofmulti-vectorsources.Researcherscanimprovetheirapproachestounderstandingforeignpopulationsbycombiningsocialmediawithotherdatasources. Thus, while the inherent limitations of social media data—including its self-selectivenature—meantheyoffernopanacea,theydoenablemoredetailedexplorationofthesociotechnicalspace.Inthiscontext,surveysremaincritical.Advancesinanalyticstoolsandtechniqueshavedriveninnovationinsurveyresearch.

In sum, achieving real competitive advantage for the United States in understanding audiencesrequires triangulating across data sources, implementing technologically innovative solutionsgroundedincognitiveinsights,anditerativetestingandimprovementinthefield—whichtogetherprovidesaplatformtorealizestrategicobjectives.


Executive Summary

Dr.Hriar“Doc”CabayanJointStaffJ-39

[email protected]

Thiswhitepaperdealswithbroad topicofassessingoptions togainbetterunderstandingof thesubjectiveworldofpopulationsweneedtointerfaceandrelateto.Howcanwereliablyanticipatebehavior patterns? Our challenge is gaining the most accurate and useful information forcommandersandotheragenciesforplanningpurposes.Whoaretherightpeopletotrytoinfluencetoachievestrategicgoals(individualsand/orgroups).Whichbehaviorsarewetargeting?Whydopeopledisplay thoseparticularbehaviors?Finally,howdowecoordinateoperations todrive thedesiredbehaviors?Wecannotrelyentirelyonsocialmedia(wemustblenditwithotherintelligence),even though it can be an important contributor. This White Paper is intended to providerecommendationsforplanningmethodologies,technologicalapproaches,andrequiredexpertise.

Thearticlesaregroupedinfiveparts:

• PartI:OperationalPerspectives

• PartII:HowReliableAreSelf-ReportingandPollingData:ABiopsychosocialPerspective

• PartIII:Advantages,Limitations,andPitfallsofSocialMedia

• PartIV:Meta-Opinions:TheLinkBetweenPollingandSocialMedia

• PartV:DiscussionofAlternativeOptions

IntheopeningarticleinPartIentitled“Lies,DamnedLies,andAssessments,”Mr.BobJones(SOCOM)makesthecasethatwehavebuiltapowerfulstrategicassessmententerprisededicatedtothepursuitofprecision.Wehavenot,however,putequaleffortintoupdatingourunderstandingoftheproblemswe seek to measure. He makes the case that we should focus more on the accuracy of ourassessments, not howwemetric, but ensure thatwe aremeasuring the right thing. The rapidlychangingstrategicenvironmentdoesnotmeanweneedtoabandonourtried-and-truetheoriesandapproachestowarcompletely.Instead,weneedtoexpandtoincludenon-conventionaltheoriesanddatapointsinwhichwecanuse tomeasureoursuccessesor failures.Hegoeson toconcludebystatingthattheworldischangingfasterthangovernancecankeepup.ThenetresultfortheU.S.isthatthemajorpowerplaybookweinheritedfromthosewhofoundthemselvesinthisrolebeforeushasbecomeobsolete.Thisdoesnotmeanitisimpossibletobeagreatpowerortoleadarules-basedworldorder.Whatitmeansisthatpowerhasshifted,andthegamehaschanged.Weneedanewplaybook.

Inhisarticletitled“Empathy:The(Missing)FoundationofEffectiveOperationalArt,”COLScottK.Thomson(OUSDP)arguesthatthestrategicfailuresthathavefrustratedseniorleadersamongtheJointForcestemfromalackofhumanunderstandingasitappliestooperationalart.Strategy,heasserts,isessentiallyaplantopersuaderelevantactorstowardspecificbehaviorsthatsupportU.S.national interests. Therefore, military intelligence and planning must focus on developing anempathetic understanding of others, and that operations are essentially approaches towardmodifyingtheenvironmentofrelevantactorssuchthattheirperceptionsoftheirenvironment—theinformationtheyactupon—leadthemtobehaveinwaysthatwedesire.Suchanapproachwould


help to ensure that tactical execution remains linked to strategic goals and would thereforedramaticallyimprovetheJointForce’scontributionstostrategicoutcomes.COLThomsonsuggeststhatdoctrineisthedecisivepointinoperationalizingempathy.Whendoctrineproperlyaccountsforempathy,boththemilitaryeducationalsystemandtrainingapproacheswilldevelopthecultureoftheJointForcesuchthattheyhaveabetterappreciationforthepeopletheyseektopersuadeandwillprovidethemwithtangibleprocessesthroughwhichtheycanmoreclearlythink.

Inanarticleentitled“BuildingaHouseon theRock(ofGoodAnalysis),”Dr.SpencerMeredith III(NDU) makes the point that the perception that the U.S. is failing to understand operationalenvironments, specifically its human aspects, makes the elusive search for what goes on insidepeople’sheadsallthemorepressing,whilekeepingitequallyfrustrated.Hegoesontosaythatthatmethodologydoesinfactexisttogetwhatweneed,andwhileitcanbedifficult,itisalsoimminentlydoablewithgoodanalysis.Hefocusesonthetopicofgovernanceinallitsdimensions.Hemakesthecase that we need some methodological approach to getting at people’s perceptions aboutgovernancebecauseweknowcognitivemotivationsshapebehaviorstowardsgovernance.Hepointstoallthepitfallsinsuchinvestigationsandrecommendsahealthydoseofhumility.

In a following article entitled “Effects-BasedPsychologicalOperationsMeasuresofEffectiveness:MeasuringChangeandImpact,”LTC(Dr.)GregSeese(JHU-APL),LTC(Dr.)RafaelLinera(USASOC),and Mr. Erinn McQuagge (Northrop Grumman) focus on current trends and methodologies indeveloping a comprehensive assessment and evaluation plan for behavior-focused PsychologicalOperations(PSYOP)programs.TheystatethemissionofPSYOPistoinfluencebehavior.BehavioralchangeisattherootofthePSYOPmission.Althoughconcernedwiththementalprocesses,itistheobservablemodificationofbehaviorthatdeterminesmissionsuccess.Therefore, influenceeffortsmusthaveclearlydefinedandmeasurablebehavior-focusedgoalsandobjectives.Theygoontostatethatplanningandevaluating theeffectivenessofaPSYOPprogramcanbeadaunting task,but ifmeasurable goals and objectives are developed, measure of effectiveness (MOE) questions arerelatively straight forward to write. Properly craftedMOE’s aremuch easier to integrate into asupported unit’s intelligence collection plan and lend credence to the credibility of influenceprograms.Theyconcludebystatingthatthepragmaticframeworkpresenteddemonstratesthatitispossibletonotonlymeasurechangesinbehaviorandtheassociatedknowledgeandbeliefs,butalsowhethertheprogramishavinganyimpact.

IntheclosingarticleofPartIentitled“CoordinatingOperationstoInfluenceBehaviorsintheOE,”Ms.TriciaDeGennaroandMr.RandyMunchbothwithTRADOCG2OperationalEnvironmentCenter,argue that integrating information operations (IO) and physical operations at the strategic,operational,andtacticalplanninglevelsiscriticalforachievinglong-termmilitaryobjectives.IOisacomprehensiveefforttounderstandandmaneuverinthehumanandcognitivedomains.Theygoontostatethatplanningandexecutingoperationswithoutthinkingabout“humanemotions,responses,or actions”will not likely result inanykindof repeatable success.They concludeby stating thatplanners must match IO to populations based on actual understanding of the people and theirmotivationsinordertoachievedesiredeffects.

In the opening article of Part II, Dr. Diane DiEuliis (NDU) and Dr. James Giordano (GeorgetownUniversity Medical Center) present “Biological Embodiment, Social Embeddedness, and theImportanceofCommunication,”inwhichtheydescribehowthecapacitytocommunicateretro-andprospection,emotionalstate,andintenthaveenabledhumansconsiderableprowessinoptimizingpsychologicalaspectsofsocialinteractions.Giventhatconsciousnessandfirst-personphenomenalexperiencearetransparentonlytoself,communicationofcertainfeaturesofcognitivestates(e.g.implicitemotion;intent;etc.),thatis,“self-disclosure”canbevitaltohumansocialengagement.Self-


disclosureisdefinedastheactofsharingpersonalinformationwithothers.Inthecontextofforgingrelationships,peopleshare informationabout their thoughts, feelings,andaspirations,and ithasbeenestimated that self-disclosure constitutesapproximately30-40%of the information that isshared by a person on any given day. DiEuliis and Giordano posit that self-disclosure entailsneurocognitivemechanismsofdecision-makingandrewardandthatsocialmediacanbeaforce-multiplierforself-disclosure.Theyconcludebystatingthatamorecompleteunderstandingofneuro-cognitive mechanisms involved in self-disclosure may be important to developing new ways offosteringinterpersonalcommunicationusingsocialmediaandotherinteractiveplatforms.

In the following article, entitled “Knowing the Terrain: Explicit and Implicit Measures of thePopulation,”Dr.IanMcCulloh(JHU)andMs.LaurieMcCulloh(Fielding)statethatcommonquestionsaskedbymilitaryplannersinclude:whatarepeopleactuallyreportingwhentheyself-report?Canself-report data be trusted?How should self-reported data be comparedwith findings from theIntelligenceCommunity?Whatmethodsareavailableforunderstandingstrategicpopulations?Theyprovideareviewofexplicitandimplicitmethodstomeasurepeoples’thoughts.Explicitmethodsarewell-suitedformeasuringknowledge,attitudes,andbeliefs,especiallywhenquestionsareobjectiveand not introspective, overly personal, or culturally taboo. Implicit methods provide a strongalternativetoexplicitmethodsinthesecircumstances.Advancesinportableneuralimagingmakeimplicitmethodsaviablealternativeformilitaryplanners.Giventhefocusofeffortsthatdominatecurrentmilitaryoperationsandthoseoftheforeseeablefuture,understandingpopulation-centricknowledge,attitudes,beliefs,intentions,andbehaviors(KABIB)isofincreasingimportance.Theygoontostatethatthreatstovaliditycanbemitigatedwithmultiplesourcesofdata,multipleapproachestomeasurement,andwithinvestmentinqualifiedexpertstodesign,conduct,andanalyzeresearch.Implicitmeasuresprovideacompellingalternativetoexplicitmeasuresforunderstandingdifficulttomeasurevariablessuchasattitudeandbehavioralintention.

In an article entitled “Remote Behavioral Assessment: Political Psychology Methods,” Dr. JasonSpitaletta (JHU-APL) discusses political psychology methods in support of remote behavioralassessments.Theseapproaches,largelydevelopedinclinicalandlater,politicalpsychologyhavelongbeenusedbyU.S.intelligenceagencies.Hepresentsvariousapproachessuchas:trait/motivational,cognitive, personological, and psychodynamic approaches. He concludes by stating that theseapproaches typically emerge from political psychology andare generally applied toward foreignleaders.However,withtheeven-increasingavailabilityofpersonaldataontheInternetthesesameapproachesmaybeappliedtoaverageindividuals.

In the next article entitled “TheNeuroscience, Psychology and Practice of Target Audience Self-Report,”Dr.NickWright (Univ.ofBirmingham,UK)drawspolicy insights fromdiversebodiesofevidenceincludingneuroscience,psychology,andpracticetoaddresskeyquestionsraisedbythiswhite paper: What can humans self-report? And how reliable is it? First, from neuroscience hedescribes theneuralmachineryunderlyingmetacognition (“thinkingabout thinking”),which setslimits to self-report and suggests enhancements to self-reportmethods. For example,measuringconfidenceinself-reportsmayidentifyindividualsmorelikelytochangetheirminds,anditreflectsacriticalquantityinGreyZoneconflicts.Second,fromclassicpsychologyhehighlightsworkmappingthegapbetweenattitudesandbehaviors.Third, fromhistoricalcaseshedescribespublicopiniondriving inadvertentescalationbetweenstates.Fourth,hedescribespracticalways tomeasure theimpactofinfluenceintargetpopulations.Finally,hesummarizesimplicationsforpolicyandpractice,inparticularforGreyZoneconfrontationsandthescientificbasisoftheJointConceptforOperatingintheInformationEnvironment(JCOIE).Theseissuesarekeyforanyeffectiveinfluencestrategy.Hemakesthepointthatinfluenceeffortsmustbetailoredtotheaudiencetomaximizeintendedeffect.


Organizationsshouldadoptan“outside-in”mindset,whichmakestheaudience’sdecision-makingprocessthefocusoftheinfluencestrategy.

IntheopeningarticleofPartIII,entitled“DigitalParticipationRolesoftheGlobalJihad:SocialMedia’sRoleinBringingTogetherVulnerableIndividualsandVEOContent,”Dr.MargaretHall,Dr.GinaLigon,and Ms. Clara Braun from the University of Nebraska-Omaha state that Violent ExtremistOrganizations(VEOs)haveposedsecuritychallengesfordecades.However,inthemodernera,withthe adventofmore lethalweapons, globalmobility, and improved communicationmethods (e.g.,opensocialmedia),thespanandimpactofthesegroupsgrowsfromregionaltoworldwideviatheironlinebrand.Withtheadventofparticipatoryinternettechnologiesandthepromulgationofopenandfreeinternetarchitectures,lesstechnicalinfrastructureisrequiredforsmallerorresource-poororganizations to communicate and conduct operations. Yet despite its prominent place inpublicdiscourse,abasicunderstandingofhowdigitalmediacontentinfluencesindividualstoparticipateinpropagatingVEOcontentislacking.Theyproposeinvestigatingthepathwaytoextremistbeliefsandbehaviorsfromtheperspectiveofthedigitalparticipationlifecycle,consideringthetransitionfromviewing to actively participation in content dissemination. Whereas traditional analyses wouldsuggestCreatorsshouldbethefocusofdisruptionactivities,theiranalysissuggeststhatthereisanentirepathwayofparticipationwithVEOcontent.Ateachstageofparticipation,thereareentry(andexit)pointswhichcaneffectivelystoptheflowofcontentandinformationdissemination.EscalatingbehaviorsalongwiththeirqualifyingactivitieshelppractitionersandresearchersmoreaccuratelyclassifythedifferencesbetweenLurkersandthosewhomoreactivelycreatemalevolentcontent.

Inanarticleentitled“TheNextFrontier:MovingBeyondSocialMediaintoSociotechnicalSpace,”Dr.LauraSteckman(MITRE)makesthepointthatusingtechnologytounderstandforeignenvironmentsrequiresafusionofmulti-vectorpubliclyavailabledatasources.Researchers,whethergovernmentoracademic,canimprovetheirapproachestounderstandingforeignpopulationsbycombiningsocialmediawith other data sources. Combiningmultiple data sources is the nextmajormilestone inunderstandingpopulations,assuchresearchmovesbeyondsocialmediatoencompasslarger,morerobust sociotechnical spaces (i.e., spaces that are simultaneously social/sociological andtechnical/technological,suchascyberspacewhenitinvolveshumaninteractions).Thus,whilenotinglimitationsinherentwithinsocialmediadata,includingtheself-selectivenatureofthemedium,shenotesanopportunitytoexploresociotechnicalspaceingreaterdetail.

IntheopeningarticleofPartIV,“EncouragingandAssessingtheValidityofAnswerstoQuestionsaboutRadicalization:TheUseofMeta-opinions,”Dr.ClarkMcCauley(BrynMawrCollege),Dr.SophiaMoskalenko(BrynMawrCollege),andDr.TomMcCauley(UniversityofRochester)recognizethatinterview and poll respondents may lie in answering questions about radicalization: to avoiddetectionbysecurityservices,tominimizetheirresponsibilityfordamagingandillegalbehaviors,ortoprojectamoresociallyacceptablepersonatotheresearchers—oreventothemselves!Thebiaseddirectionofthesemisrepresentationsmakesthemagreaterthreattoasurveythanthemorerandomperturbations that result frommisunderstanding the question ormaking up an answer to avoidlooking ignorant. They advance ways to encourage truthful responses to questions aboutradicalization,aswellasways toassess the truthfulnessofanswersobtained.Theyhighlight theusefulnessofcomparingpersonalopinionwithmeta-opinion—opinionabouttheopinionsofothers.Theyconcludebyhighlightingthelinkbetweenmeta-opinionsandopinionspostedonsocialmedia:bothindicatethepowerofsocialnorms.

In an article entitled “The ContinuedRelevance of Survey Research,”Mr. Dan Foy andMr. ChrisStewart (Gallup) underscore just how important surveys remains for the modern democraticprocess.Theyhighlightmanysettingswheresurveyresearchremainsthebest,andattimes,only


method for reaching all segments of a population. They go on to highlight the role advances inanalyticstoolsandtechniqueshaveindrivinginnovationinsurveyresearch.Suchinnovationswillhelp ensure survey researchwill remain essential for themeasurementofpublic opinion for theforeseeablefuture.

In the opening article in Part V entitled “Stealing History,” Drs. Linda Durnell and Garry Hare(Fielding)makethepointthatterrorismthrivesinnationsorregionswithweakinstitutionsoftenaccompaniedbyhighlevelsofcorruptionandunemployment.Inthesesituations,thetoolstostealhistoryincludefearandterroraccompaniedbythesystemicdestructionofthepast.Culturalandreligious symbols and icons areblownto rubble inhopes thatdestroying thepastwill eradicatecultural memory, identity and heritage. One tool of the fundamentalist—the terrorist—is thesystematicdestructionofculturalandreligiousicons,asifdestroyingmosquesandlandmarkswilldestroyculturalhistoryandgroupidentity.Immersivemediaisonetoolinvisuallyrestoringsacredsiteswiththeobjectiveoftriggeringanemotionalreactiontowhatusedtobe,fosteringlong-termmemorybothforthosewhoexperiencedtheintactstructureandforthosewhoseonlyfirst-handexperienceislittlemorethanrubble.Throughimmersionsuchasvirtualreality(VR)orreal-timeaugmentedreality(AR),visualmemorycanbeenhancednotonlybyvisualizingbutexperiencingmedia.

Inanarticleentitled“Groupthink:TrainingNewTechnologiestoSeeThatHumansDon’tAllThinkAlike,” Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin (Geographic Services) discusses methodological and technologicalalternatives to conventional collection andanalysismethods. She stresses the need to develop ameanstosenseandanalyzeculturalvariationandrecommendsdevelopingacollectionandanalysismethodthatissensitivetothesevariations.Shearguesthatweneedtoassesstheveryfoundationofthetechnologiesandmethodswerelyon;i.e.stripthemdowntotheassumptionsfromwhichtheyarebuiltandexamineiftheyareservingtheirpurpose.Aretheysensitivetoculturalvariation,tocognitivevariation?Canthesetechnologiesandmethodsexposedifferencesinhowotherculturesthinkandhelpusnavigateacrossthemmoresuccessfully?Ifnot,howdoweevolveourtechnologytomeettheneedsdescribedinthispaper?Sheidentifiesamethodforcapturingtheshiftinnarrativethatoffersameanstoidentifyculturalvariationataconceptuallevelandaddthisnuancetotechnicalcapabilities.

Inanarticleentitled“TheInternetofThings(IoT)andtheArtofMappingaPopulation’sThinking,Behavior, and Influencers,” Mr. Mark Polyak (Ipsos), Mr. David Ellis (Joint Special OperationsUniversity),andDr.KatieZiemer(Ipsos)makeseveralobservations:

1. Effective utilization of Internet of Things requires an approach grounded in a theory ofidentityandaclearconceptofthetypeoflogicalreasoningneededtomeetanalyticalneeds.

2. The Logic of Appropriateness provides a conceptual linkage between interests, thinking,behaviorandidentity.

3. Algorithm-basedanalysis is insufficient tomake full use of the data available in the IoT;rather, itrequiresthelensofthethreetypesoflogicalreasoning,genericallydescribedascrowdsourcing,detectivework,anddesigningthefuture.

AdisruptivetechnologyliketheIoTcouldexacerbatethechallengesanalystsfaceintheinformationenvironment, but only if they rely on algorithmic trend analysis and a crowdsourcing lens ofreasoning.TherulesofengagementwiththeIoTnecessitateresearchandanalysisonthemotivationsbehindandimplicationsofreceiveddataforthesocialconstructionofreality.Otherwise,thecontent


of thedatawill lie inertamongthenoise,andsocio-cultural indicatorswillbe lost.WhenviewedthroughtheperspectiveoftheLogicofAppropriateness,thedatacanbemorerichlyinterpretedtoproactivelyassesstheinformationenvironmentforI&Wandgreaterstrategicawareness.

Inanarticleentitled“TheImpactoftheInternetofThings(IoT)andBlockchainsonFutureWarfare,”Mr.HowardSimkin(USASOC)describestheimpactoftheInternetofThings(IoT)andblockchaintechnologyonfuturewarfare.Hebeginswithafollowingproblemstatement:Facedbyincreasinglycapableadversariesinaneraofexponentialtechnologicalchange,whataretheprobableimpactsoftheInternetofThings(IoT)andblockchainsonfuturewarfare.HegoesontosuggestthattheIoTwillprovidearichsourceofdatafortheJointForceandDoDastheycooperatewithouralliesandpartners, compete with our adversaries, or engage in conflict with our enemies in the physical,virtual,andcognitivedomains.FriendlyIoTdatamustbesecuredwithacombinationofblockchaintechnology, changes in hardware, or by building applications with security as a primaryconsideration.Becauseofsheervolume,AImustbecapableofanalyzing,curating,andusingthatdatatoplan,develop,andexecutecoursesofaction.AImustalsobecapableofdiscerningadversaryattemptstodisruptorcorruptIoTdata.Itshouldalsobecapableofrespondingtosuchattempts.Failure to take these steps will inevitably degrade the Joint Force’s operational capabilities.Blockchain technology presents a means to increase trust in data, including that from sensors,devices,ordigitaltransactions.Assuch,itoffersrealopportunitiestohelpsecuretheIoT.Itisnotapanacea,butitdoesseemtoofferameanstosignificantlyreduceriskinanumberofJCAs.

In the closing article entitled “Narrative Technology to Detect and Defeat Adversary IdeologicalInfluence,” Dr. Bill Casebeer (LMI) states that developing technology suites to detect and exertinfluenceisofparamountimportanceinaworldwherekineticandnon-kineticeffectsinteracttoproducefinaloutcomes.HediscussesthedevelopmentofacomprehensivetechnologysuitetoallowtheU.S.anditsAlliesandpartnerstodetectanddisruptradicalizationprocessesinmultiplemedia.Thesecapabilitieswillallowtheplannersandoperatorstodetect,analyze,andunderstandadversaryinformation operations, and provide “human-in-the-loop” tools to assist in developing counter-narratives to influence thebehaviorof theaudience inwayswhichwillprevent themfrombeingexploitedbymalignantviolentnon-stateactors.Heremindsthereaderthatoperatorsneedtobeabletodetectandanalyzestoriesinprogress,forecasttheireffects,formulateandenactalternatestoriesinahuman-in-the-loopfashion,andassessthebehavioralimpactoftheircounter-narrativestrategy.The suite of enabling technologies he proposes builds off well-established technologies andincorporatesnovelphysiologicandneurobiologicalsensorssoastoprovideauniqueintheworld“human-in-the-narrative-loop”counter-radicalizationinformationoperationstestbed.


Part I: Operational Perspectives


Lies, Damned Lies, and Assessments

RobertC.JonesUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommand

[email protected]

TheyoungsoldierbeamedwithprideastheDrillInstructorinformedhimthathehadshotaperfectscore,puttingall40roundsintothebullseye.Unfortunately,thesergeantwentontoexplain,hehadbeenaimingatthewrongtarget.So,whilehisprecisionwasamongthebestintheclass,hisaccuracywastheveryworst.Inrecentyears,thejointforcefindsitself inasituationnotunlikethatofourtragic young soldier.We have built a powerful strategic assessment enterprise dedicated to thepursuitofprecision.However,wehavenot—thoughweknowweareoperatinginarapidlyevolvingstrategicenvironment—putequaleffortintoupdatingourunderstandingoftheproblemsweseektomeasure.Forexample,nearlyeverycoalitioncommanderoverthepastgenerationhaspredictedthatvictoryinAfghanistanisnearlyathand.CurrentlyinSyriaandIraq,commandersareclaimingvictorybasedonamilitarydefeatofDaesh,measuredintheareaofgroundliberated,equipmentdestroyed,andnumbersofcasualtiesinflicted.Victorystilleludesus inAfghanistan,and timewilltell ifourapproachinIraqandSyriayieldsthestabilityweseek.Thesehavenotbeenintentionaleffortstodeceive;wehavesimplybeenshootingatandreadingthewrongtarget.

Oncewegetthequestionsright,theanswersbecomeeasier.Or,saidanotherway,oncewegettoabetterunderstandingofpoliticalinstability,thebetteronewillbeatassessingandfosteringpoliticalstability. The good news is that there is a growing awareness for the importance of populationperceptions of the governance affecting their lives. The bad news is that we have yet to re-contextualizehowwethinkaboutpoliticalinstabilityintheemergingstrategicenvironment.Theendresulthasbeena fixationonattempting toassessthecapabilitiesof threats,theattractivenessofideologies,andtheeffectivenessofgovernments.Weobsessoverimprovingourprecision,butweignoreourproblemwithaccuracy.Weareattemptingtomeasureanddothewrongthingsbetter—but show little inclination to evolve in our understanding of the problems we are working sodiligentlytoresolve.Shiftingone’sfocusfromsymptoms(threats)toproblems(governance);andfromtheeffectivenessofhowgovernmentperforms,tothegoodnessofhowgovernanceisperceived,willimproveaccuracyandofferatruermeasureofpoliticalstability.

One realitywe need to come to gripswith is that political stability is not simply the absence ofinstability.Thevolatilityofasystemiscriticalaspectthatmustbetakenintoconsideration.Afterall,asystemmaybenaturallystable,requiringlittlecountervailingenergytosustainequilibrium;oritmay beartificially stable, demanding tremendous amounts of countervailing energy to sustain astablestate.Themoreartificialthestabilityis,themorevolatileitisaswell,andthemoresecurityforcesnecessarytosustainstability.Aprisonisoneexampleofartificialstability;anotherisIraqatthetimePresidentObamamadethedecisiontodrawdownUSmilitarypresence.Asimple,face-valuemetricofartificialstabilitywithinastateistonotethesize,visibility,andcharacterofsecurityforcesanddetermineiftheirprimarypurposeforactionistoprotectthegovernmentfromthepopulation.Themorevisible,themoremilitaristic,themorefocusedonprotectingthegovernment,themoreartificialthepoliticalstability.TheremovalofU.S.militaryforcesfromIraqenabledthatsystemtoquicklydevolvetoitsnaturalstate.Daeshdidnotcausetheenergyforinstabilitythere,buttheywerequicktoexploitittotheiradvantage.Ifwehadbeenthinkingabouttheproblemdifferently,wemaywellhaverecognizedhowprovocativetheU.S.solutionforgovernanceinIraqwas,andofferedtheSunniArabpopulationofIraqandSyriaamoreviablepathtonaturalstability.Perhapsnexttime.


Unfortunately,naturalvs.artificialisnotadistinctionwetypicallymakewhentalkingaboutpoliticalstability,ormilitarystabilityoperations.IfwelearnnothingelsefromtheArabSpringortheriseoftheIslamicState,anartificiallystablesocietywithhighvolatilitycanquicklydevolveintohighorderinstability. What seems a “Black Swan” in the context of effective government, is completelyforeseeable,treatable,andavoidableinthecontextofgoodness.Thisiswhythefocushereisnotonhow tomeasure,aswealreadyhaveawealthofapproachesdesignedtomeasureandassesswithadequateprecision.Thefocusisonwhattomeasure,asitisouraccuracythatisprovenwanting.

Shifting Power, an Evolving Environment, and a Changing Mission

Ascapturedinthe2015USSOCOMStrategicAppreciation1document,signedbythencommander,GeneralJosephVotel,themostsignificantdynamicaffectingpoliticalstabilityinthecurrentstrategicenvironment is one of rapidly shifting power, slowly adjusting laws andpolicies, distribution ofsovereignprivilege,andevolutionofgovernance.Thereisagrowinggapbetweenthenecessityandexpectationforgovernmentalevolution,andtheabilityofallaspectsofgovernancetoadjust.Itiswithinthatgapofgovernanceevolutionthatgrowsthegreaterlikelihoodforpopulationrevolution.Ifstabilityoperationsframesuccessaspreventingorstoppingrevolution,ratherthancreatingtimeandspaceforevolution,thenoneisattackingandassessingthesymptoms,ratherthantheproblem.Notonlyisoneengagingthewrongtarget,thepopulationattherootofthematteraremostlikelyhuddled behind it. The energy for revolution resides in how that population feels about thegovernanceaffectingtheirlives.Threat-focusedwarfareresponses,guidedbywartheory,invariablymakes that energy worse. It is long past time to stop confusing tactical successes againstrevolutionaryorganizationsforstrategicprogressinresolvingtheenergyforrevolution.

Thisisnotacondemnationofwarwherewarisdue.Ourwartheoryissound,andwhollyappropriatefor political conflicts between states. Render unto Clausewitz, the things that are Clausewitz’s.2Between states, the energy for instability isprimarily a functionofstateswhoareboth rising inpowerandseekingtoenhancetheirdistributionofsovereignprivilegetocorrespondinglevelsbyanymeansnecessary(China);ordecliningstateswhocurrentlypossessapoweradvantageovertheirneighbors andwho see opportunity to enhance their sovereign privilege before thatwindow ofopportunityslamsshut(Russia).Thisisnotreallysomethingoneneedstomeasure,asthedegreeof

1United States Special Operations Command. (2015). Strategic Appreciation: FindingBalance in a ShiftingWorld.Washington,D.C.ThefoundationaldocumentfortheUSSOCOMStrategicPlanningProcess.Thiseffortintentionally avoided focusing on particular trends or threats, and sought a holistic understanding of theenvironment.TheStrategicAppreciationlooksatthenatureofthestrategicoperatingenvironment,andhowtheevolvingcharacterisimpactingpoliticalconflictbothbetweenandwithindistinctsystemsofgovernance.Retrievedfromhttps://drive.google.com/drive/u/0/folders/0BzrcfrqF8zFVUXMydGUydWgzeVU

2Clausewitz,C.V.(1984).OnWar(M.HowardandP.Paret,Trans.).Princeton:PrincetonUniversity.OnWarisrecognizedastheleadingstrategicguideonthetheoryofwar.ArguedhereisthatwhileOnWarremainsasviabletodayaswhenitwasfirstpublished,whatisbecomingincreasinglyclearisthatwehaveinappropriatelyappliedClausewitztopoliticalconflictinternaltoasinglesystemofgovernance(revolutionaryconflict)simplybecauseitoftensharessimilarcharacteristics,andbecausestatepowerapplyingwartheoryhashistoricallybeenabletosuppressthesymptomsoftheseproblems.However,asrelativepowershiftstowardpopulationsfromgovernments,itisbecomingincreasinglyclearthatinternalrevolutionaryconflict-beitinlatent,non-violent,orviolent form- ismoreaccurately thoughtofasaformof illegaldemocracy.Conductingwarfareagainstrevolutioncanstillsuppresssymptomstemporarily,butisreactive,symptomaticandtypicallyresultsinmakingthetrueproblemsinthegovernmental-populationrelationshipworse.CurrenteffortstodefeatISILinIraq,andtheTalibaninAfghanistanaremodernexamplesinvolvingtheUnitedStates.


aggressive,illegal“grayzone”activityappliedtothegoalofincreasingsovereignprivilegeismetricenough.Andwhileindividualactivitiesmayseemambiguous,theoveralldynamicisanythingbut.

Theeffectsofrapidlyshiftingpowerarenaturalandcreateapotentialenergyforpoliticalconflict.Whileoneleadermaybemoreinclinedtoadoptanaggressiveapproachthananother,thepotentialisthere.Thispotentialenergythatcreatesrevisionistactors.Whetherthatenergyremainslatent,ormanifestsinsomemixoflegalorillegalcompetition,orrisestowarfare,isaleadershipchoice.ItiseasytoforgetthatonlyacenturyagoitwasapowerfulyoungUnitedStatesmakingthestatusquokeepersof theworldordernervousaswe flexedourownrevisionistmuscles.The industrialageservedtoshiftpowerbetweenactorsandfueledtremendouschangetotheworldorder.

Thecurrentera ismarkedbyanunprecedentedspeed,scopeandscaleofshiftingpower.This isstrainingthebureaucraciesofstatecraftdesignedforaColdWar,pre-globalizedworldthatnolongerexists.WhiledisconcertingtotheWest,theresultantcompetitionandconflictislessanassaultonthe rules-basedworld order, andmore a clearmetric that the order is overdue for a significantoverhaul.Themilitarymissioninallofthisistodeterandprepareforwar,andalsotocreatetimeandspaceforcivilauthoritiestotacklethehardworkofupgradingtheworldordertobetterreflecttheemergingbalanceofpower.Reformationoftheworldorderistheprimarytask.Tofocussolely,orevenexcessively,ondeterrencealoneislikelytoresultintheverywarswehopetoprevent.

Withinstatesiswheretherealworkofmeasuringneedstooccur.KeepyourClausewitzhandy,butmakesomeroomonyourshelfformoreeclecticworksfromthelikesofMadison,Maslow,andMao.Whilethephysicalcharacterofinternalconflictisoftenindistinguishablefromtheexternalvariety,itisthenatureoftherelationshipsbetweenthepartiesthatmakesitadifferentdynamicaltogether.These are not examples of irregular warfare, as doctrine tells us to believe. These are betterunderstood fundamentally as exercises in illegal democracy.3 The effects of shifting power fromgovernmentstopopulationsisexposingthefollyofthinkingofthesetypesofconflictsinthecontextof war theory and applying tactics derived from centuries of colonial policing and Cold Warcontainment.Suppressingsymptomstosustaingovernmentsisnolongergoodenoughandisinfacthighlyprovocative.Itisthisprovocationthatfuelswhatwehavecometothinkofastransnationalterrorism and the rise of this new breed of non-state wager of political warfare we brandsimplisticallyasviolentextremistorganizations.Thenatureofwarhasnotchanged,butthechangesinthestrategicenvironmenthaveexposedourhistoricerrorinlumpinginternalpoliticalconflictinwiththeexternalvariety.

Strategy as a Function of Nature, Tactics as a Function of Character

Understandinghowpeopleareunique iscriticalto the framingofsoundtactics.However, it is inunderstandinghowpeopleare the same that one finds the framework for good strategy.Asonestudies internal, population-based conflicts over time and across cultures, a common core of3 Jones, R. C. (2014). Strategy - A Mix of Broad Guidance and Deep Understanding [PowerPoint Slides].USSOCOMJ5Strategy,Plans,andPolicy.Fromapresentation to the JointSpecialOperationsForcesSeniorEnlistedAcademy.Postulatingthatthenatureofinternalrevolutionaryinsurgencyismorecloselyrelatedtothenatureofdemocracythantothenatureofwar.DemocracyandRevolutionbothbeingpoliticalinprimarypurpose,population-based,and internal toa single systemofgovernance.Thesolefundamentaldifferencebeingthatdemocracyis legal,andrevolutionisillegal.Thecreationandimplementationoftrusted,certain,legal and effective mechanisms across the entire population being the most essential task in resolvingrevolutionaryinsurgency.Whatisrevolutioninmoreautocraticsocieties,isasimpleexerciseindemocracyamongmoreempoweredpopulations.


grievances emerges. Governments are quick to fix blame for instability on factors beyond theircontrol,suchasfoodprices,drought,youthbulges,andmalignactorsemployingradicalideologies.Theseareallimportanttacticalfactorstounderstandastheywillshapethecharacteroftheconflict.Thenatureoftheconflict,however,isrootedinhumannature,andtherearefivebroadperceptionsof governance that are surprisingly common to internal political instability. These provide theframework for our assessment. All of thesemust be assessed through the unique lenses of thepopulationsinquestion.

1. PopularLegitimacy.Dopeopleperceivethegovernanceaffectingtheirlivesashavingarighttodoso?

2. CulturalAppropriateness.Dopeopleperceivethatthegovernanceaffectingtheirlivesisdoingsoinamannerdeemedappropriateinthecontextoftheirculture?

3. Justice.Notruleoflaw,buthowdopeoplefeelabouttheruleoflawasitisappliedtothem?

4. Dignity/Respect.Dopeopleperceive themselves to be treated by governance equally tosimilarlysituatedpopulations?

5. Empowerment.Dopeopleperceivethemselvestohavetrusted,certain,legalandeffectivewaystoaddressgrievanceandshapegovernanceinthecontextoftheirculturalexpectations,

Whatisperceivedasgoodorbadacrossalloftheseperceptionsvariestremendouslybyculture.Butthe importance of these perceptions of governance for purpose of political stability are criticaleverywhereandamongallcultures.Thekeytoanassessment—thatisbothaccurateandprecise—istoseekinformationabouttherightthings,whileresistingtheurgetoprejudgeinthecontextofourownvalues,orperceptionsofwhatisgoodorbad.

A Simple Framework for Strategic Assessment

There aremany layers to this challengeofmeasuringhowothers think, not least of those is ourtendencytothinkwithinthecontextoftheWestphaliansystemweknowandseektopreserve.ToassumethatothersvalueordesirethesamethingsinthesamewaysdeemedimportantintheU.S.isthehighestformofhubris.Expectationsofgovernancevarywidely,shapedbythehistory,culture,and geography of every location. Every effort must be made to capture the perceptions of thepopulation one hopes to understand through their own eyes, unclouded by our bias andpreconceptions.Nosocietyis“ungoverned;”fewwantorneedtobe“fixed;”andself-determinationofgovernanceistheultimateexpressionofdemocracyforanysociety,regardlessofwhatformofgovernmenttheymightpick,orwhomightemergetoleadthem.

Nopopulationisamonolith.Inrealitytherearedozensofpowerfulidentitiesthatpopulationsformaround.Individualstypicallybelongtoseveralofthesepowerfulidentities,andeachindividualhastheirownsystemofprioritiesastowhichidentitiestheyvaluemost.Whenconditionsforpoliticalinstabilitygrow,itisbecauseidentitiesperceivedasbeingatrisktogovernmentactionelevateaboveone’sidentityasbeingamemberofthebodythatgovernmentgoverns.Wetendtocallthisprocess“radicalization,”butmoreoftenthannot,itisthegovernmentthathasradicalizedtheindividualorpopulation,andnotsomemalignactorarmedwithapowerfulnarrative.Narrativeismuchmoreatoolofexploitation,thancausation.AsMaoreportedlynoted,“Isawaparade,andleaptinfront.”


So,thetaskathandistoidentifywherethepotentialenergyforthese“parades”ofpoliticalinstabilityare forming and to understandwhat perceptions of governance are creating that energy. Then,dependingonour interests andobjectives, put inplacemeasures to simplymonitor; or assist inreducingtheenergy;orco-opttheenergytoourownpurpose;ordisrupttheeffortsofotherswhowouldusethatenergytopurposescountertoourinterests.Ultimately,thereiseitheropportunityorthreatinthisenergy,italldependsonwhogetstherefirstandhowtheyapproachthesituation.

Understanding the identity-based populations relevant to the issue being assessed is incrediblyimportant,asisappreciatinghowthosepopulationsaredistributedandnetworkedaroundtheglobe.Ultimatelywhatweneedtoassessishowthesepopulationsfeel,andwhotheyblameforthepoorgovernanceaffectingtheirlives.Thisgovernancecanbeforeignordomestic,formalorinformal.Wealsowanttoappreciatewhoiscompetingforinfluencewiththesepopulations,andwherewestandinthatcompetition.Toooftenwethinkofinfluenceasaverb,inthecontextofhowwecangetotherstothinkinwayswewishthemtothink.Increasinglywemustthinkofinfluenceasanoun,inthecontextofhowwecanimprovehowothersthinkofus,ourpartners,andourallies.Currently,wefindourselvestoooftenthecreatorand/orprotectorofpoorgovernance.Bytransitioningtobeingafacilitatorofgoodgovernance,ourinfluencewillgrow.

So,onceaninterestorissueofpolicyorgovernanceisidentified,onecanbuildanassessmentthatwillidentifywherepotentialpopulation-basedchallengesarelikelytocomeandguideaprogramofengagementdesignedtoreducethelikelihoodofconflict.(Importanttonotehereisthat,baseduponthisassessment,thesmartestnextstepwilloftenbetomakesignificantmodificationstobothdesiredoutcomesandthemethodsoneseekstoachievethoseoutcomes,inordertoreducetheprovocativeaspectsoftheendeavor.)

StepOne:determinewhichidentity-basedpopulationsarecriticaltotheissueinquestion.Agoodstartfordeterminingcriticalidentitiesarethefollowingthreecriteria:

1. Anidentitysoimportantthatpossessorswouldbewillingtokillordieforit.

2. Possessorsofthisidentityperceivethepopulationformedaroundthisidentitytoeitherbeattremendousrisk,orbenefit,ofgovernmentalaction

3. Possessorofthisidentityperceivesnotrusted,certain,oreffectivelegalmeansavailabletothemastomitigatethisriskorsecurethisbenefit.

StepTwo:identifywhatsystemsofgovernance,relativetothisissue/interest,areimpactingeachrelevantidentity-basedpopulation.

StepThree:foreachidentity-basedpopulation,assessbymultiplemeanshowtheyfeelabouteachofthefiveperceptionsforeachofthesystemsofgovernanceimpactingthemonthisissue/interest.Avoidtheurgetobetooheavilytiedtodata,gonkulatedouttofivedecimalpoints.Thisisasubjectiveassessment of howpeople feel, andwho they blame.Many viablemethods exist to gather theseperceptions. A simple stoplight chart of red-amber-green assessment for each perception isadequate.Foranyparticularsystemofgovernance,populationsperceivegoodgovernanceandarewithintheproverbialcircleoftrust,andthereforenaturallystable/resilient;or,theyperceivepoorgovernance and are outside the circle of trust and either actively unstable or artificially stable.Stabilityoperationsareaboutunderstandingandmanagingthiscircleoftrust(seeFigure1).


That’sit.Oncethispictureispainted,itshouldshapethepoliciesforwhatitiswehopetosecureorachieve;itshouldshapethewhole-of-governmentcampaigndesignforhowwehopetoachieveourgoals;anditshoulddrivethedesignofday-to-dayoperations.

Figure1.ManagingtheCircleofTrust

Whensuccessisbelievedtobeacombinationofdefeatingthreatsandbuildingeffectiveness,itdrivesa logic and campaign approach that is often completely counterproductive to shaping theseperceptions inpositivedirections. Italsodeludesus intoadoptingpolices thatare impossiblebydesign,andthenbecomingtrappedinanendlesscycleofinfeasibleoperationsattemptingtomaketheimpossiblework.ThisiswhatputsusintotheThucydidestrap4of“Fear,Honor,Interest.”Weexaggerateourinterestsandourfearstorationalizewhywemustbeinsomeplaceandattemptingsomeaction;andthenwhenitisclearlyfailingundertheweightofitsimpossiblenature,weworrythattheimpacttoourhonorwillbesogreatthatwecan’tchangecourseorwithdraw.Thisinturnleadsus toexaggerateevenmore the fearsand interests thatbroughtushere tobeginwith.Theperspectivesandprocessofferedherehelpspolicyleaderstobreakthatcycle.

Whensuccessisbelievedtobeafacilitationofgoodness,onerealizesthatthebroadcategoriesofsecurity forcecapacityandmilitaryassistance;democracyandgovernmental institutionbuilding;anddevelopmentandinfrastructure;arenotendsuntothemselvesthataddupto“effectiveness.”Betterwethinkoftheseaslinesofoperationthroughwhichweconductcarefullycraftedactivitiesdesignedandimplementedinwaysmostlikelytomovenegativeperceptionsinpositivedirections.Forexample,9timesoutof10,actionstocaptureorkillanindividualbrandedasahighvaluetargetdolittletoadvanceourstrategicgoals.Underthisparadigm,knowingwhereahighvaluetargetis

4Theprecariousopportunitiesofdangerwhenarisingpowerthreatensarulingpower.Rulingpowersfearchallenges to their status, tend toexaggerate interests to justify reactingviolentlyon those fears,andonceembroiledinafutileefforttoimposetheirwill,oftenareunabletoextricatethemselvesforconcernsofhonor.


presentsanopportunitytocraftanoperationfocusedonimprovingspecificperceptionsofspecificpopulations.Attheendoftheoperation,the“enemy”maywelleludecapture.But,ifinthepursuitofthisindividual,weareabletoreinforcedesiredperceptionsamongcriticalpopulation—thattheirgovernmenthastherighttobeinchargeofthemandthatourrolethereisproper;thatgovernanceisactinginwaysthatmakesensetothem;thattheyreceivejusticeandaretreatedwithrespectanddignity;andthatiftheyhaveconcernswithanyofthis,thattheyareempoweredtoaddresstheirconcernsinwaysthataretrusted,certain,effectiveandlegal—thenwemovedtheballforward.Thatisstrategy.Thatisstrategic.Thatisthecontestweareintoday.

Conclusion

Theworldischangingfasterthangovernancecankeepup.ThenetresultfortheU.S.isthatthemajorpowerplaybookweinheritedfromthosewhofoundthemselvesinthisrolebeforeushasbecomeobsolete.Thisdoesnotmeanitisimpossibletobeagreatpowerortoleadarules-basedworldorder.Whatitmeansisthatpowerhasshifted,andthegamehaschanged.Weneedanewplaybook.


Empathy: The (Missing) Foundation of Effective Operational Art

ScottK.Thomson,Colonel,USARInformationOperationsDirectorate,OfficeoftheUndersecretaryofDefense(Policy)

[email protected]

IftheJointForceistoroutinelyachievedurableanddesirablestrategicoutcomesstemmingfrommilitaryoperations,anunderstandingofwhatrelevantothersthink—whatthisarticlereferstoas“empathy”—isindispensable.Anysolutionleadingtothoseoutcomesmustincorporateempathyintothe knowledge base and culture of the Joint Force and make empathy a procedural planningimperative.Recognitionofthevitalimportanceofempathyisnothingnewasanaspectofmilitaryartandscience.Jointleaderssteepedinmilitarytheorycaneasilyrecountquotesfromtheoristssuchas SunTzu,Machiavelli, orClausewitzdealingon the topic of “knowing the enemy.”Yet, serviceculturesandjointplanningprocedureslackanythingotherthansuperficialtreatmentofempathy.Coherenttreatmentofempathyisnearlyimpossibletofindinthedoctrinethatguidesthethinkingofcommandersandstaffsintheconductofmilitaryoperations.

Consequently,thejointforcehasonlysurface-levelunderstandingofempathy.Evenwhenleadersdoappreciate the topic, they and their staffs may lack the tools to incorporate it into the existingplanning system described in joint doctrine. This planning system has multiple interlockingprocesses,includingadaptiveplanningandexecution(APEX),operationaldesign,jointintelligencepreparationoftheenvironment(JIPOE),thejointplanningprocess(JPP),andtargeting.Collectively,jointdoctrineimpliestheseprocesseswhenitrefersto“operationalart.”

JointPublication1,DoctrinefortheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates,definesoperationalartas“thecognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience,creativity,andjudgment—todevelopstrategies,campaigns,andoperationstoorganizeandemploymilitaryforcesbyintegratingends,ways,andmeans”(DepartmentofDefense,2017,p.I-8).Thus,operationalartisthewaycommandersandtheirstaffsdeveloptheirapproachestotheproblemstheymustsolveusingtheresourcestheypossessorcanaccess.

To understand the necessary inclusion of empathy into operational art, onemust explore threegeneralquestions.First,whatisempathyandwhyisitsoimportanttomilitaryoperations?Next,whydoestheJointForcefailtoseetheimportanceofempathy?Finally,whereisdoctrinedeficient,andhowcandoctrinewritersimbueempathyintooperationalart?

Understanding Empathy

Dictionarydefinitionsaside,empathyistheabilitytostandintheshoesofanother;tounderstandtheworldasotherpeopleorgroupsofpeopleseeit.Thevitaltaskhereistogetinsidetheheadofthosepeoplewhomattertooutcomesatalllevelsofstrategyandwar(toincludecompetitionshortof armed conflict). The Joint Force must ensure that their tactical operations remain linked tostrategicoutcomes.Commandersmustavoidwastingtime,blood,andtreasureonoperations,thatwhile tactically successful, make no strategic contribution. These commanders must plan theiroperationstomovetheserelevantactorstowardtheendsofstrategy.Thisunderstandingisprimarilypossiblewhenoneseestheworldthroughtheeyesofanother,eitheronanindividualleveloronasociallevel.


In other words, the Joint Force must think of the world in terms of human behavior. It mustunderstandstrategyasaplantopersuadeotherstobehaveinwaysthataccordwithU.S.nationalinterests.Inthiscontext,onemustfocusoninformationastheinterpretivelensthroughwhichothersseetheworld.WhenaJointForcecommanderunderstandshowheorshewantsrelevantactorstosee,thinkabout,andreacttotheirenvironment,theycansynchronizetacticalactionsbasedonthestorytheywanttheiroperationstotell;ormoreaccurately,thestorytheywantrelevantactorstoperceive.Understanding this, “information,” is revealedas theelementofnationalpowerandthecomponentofmilitarypowerthatiscapableofsynchronizingtacticalactionssothattheygeneratedesiredstrategiceffects.

Toclarify,thereasonthatinformationissuchanimportantconsiderationisthatpeoplebehavebasedupontheinformationtheyobserveintheirenvironment.InsystemtheoristJamshidGharajedaghi’sdescriptionofsocioculturalsystems,hereferstothischaracteristicofcomplexadaptivesystemsasbeing “information-bonded,” and it is perhaps one of the most important aspects that militaryeducationfailstohighlightwhentrainingitsoperationalplanners(2011,p.59-60).

This approach brings the ambiguity of “information” into focus. The Joint Force must think of“information” as the totality of sensory inputs that relevant actors use to guide their behaviors,whetherintheformofobservedmilitaryactions,culture,history,resources,loyalties,interests,orfear. Empathy causes the Joint Force to focuson informationnotas itmatters to them,but as itmatterstotherelevantactorstheyhopetopersuade.Thisempathy-basedapproachmovestheJointForceawayfromtransactional,activity-basedplanningtowardtheoutcome-basedplanningitclaimstovaluebutstrugglestoexecutesuccessfully.

Intellectual Barriers to Empathy

WhyisitthatthisargumentissometimesanathematothecultureofJointForceleaders?Theansweristhat,justlikeanyotherpersuasiveargument,itisfilteredthroughaseriesofparadigmsthatdonoteasilyallowitsacceptance.Ifoneexposesthosefilters,theygeneratelessresistance,andtheneedtochangeoperationalartbecomesmorereadilyapparent.

First,leadersaretaughttothinkofstrategyprimarilythroughanends-way-meansconstruct.Whilethatconstructisperfectlyvalid, italsotendstosteerthe“ends”awayfromthefactthatstrategicsuccessorfailureisalmostexclusivelydefinedbywhatpeoplearedoing—inotherwords,behavior.Rather,“ends”focusesonvagueconditions,notthespecificbehaviorsthatproducetheends.Asnotedbefore, strategy is an approach to cause relevant actors to behave in accordance with nationalinterests.

Second,whenthemilitaryspeaksofpower,itthinksintermsoflethality.EquatingtheamountofdestructivenesstheJointForcecanbringtobearwithpowerisunderstandable.Itworksifonethinksof physicsbutnot of politics.This conceptionofpower always counts inbattle, but oftennot instrategy.Inthepoliticalsense,poweristheabilitytoachieveone’sstrategy,whichagain,isdefinedthroughthebehaviorsofrelevantactors.

Third,mostleaderscanquoteJointPublication1,whereitstates“TheultimatepurposeoftheUSArmedForcesistofightandwintheNation’swars”(2017,p.I-13).Asimilarnumberignorewhattheyshouldconsidertobeamoreimportantsentence.Namely,that“TheUSemploysthemilitaryinstrumentofnationalpowerathomeandabroadinsupportofitsnationalsecuritygoals”(2017,I-13).Fightingwarsis,forallintentsandpurposes,theexclusivepurviewoftheJointForce,butitisnotitssolepurpose.Thehigherpurposeofthejointforceis,inconjunctionwithotherinstruments


ofpower,toachievestrategicoutcomesinaccordancewithnationalinterestsandpoliticaldirection.Sincestrategicoutcomesareevaluatedby thebehaviorofrelevantactors, the JointForcehasnoallowancetoignorethebehavioraleffectsofitsoperations.

OncetheJointForcemakesthesethoughtsexplicit,theinherentlinkbetweeninformation,power,andstrategybecomesapparentandpertinent.TheJointForcewillalsoacceptthatifinternationalrelations is a misnomer for “efforts to persuade,” then its mandate is larger than warfighting(importantasthatis).Takentogether,thislogicclearlyshowsthatempathymustbefoundationaltoeffectiveoperationalart.

Operationalizing Empathy

Theaverageoutputofasystemtellssomethingaboutwhatthatactualdesignofthatsystemis.Theactual outputof that systemmayormaynotdiffer from the system’sdesigners intended. If oneroutinelyachievesdesiredoutputs,thentheyareusingawell-designedsystem.However,ifoneislessthansatisfiedwiththeaverageoutputsofagivensystem,thentheirsystemisdeficient.

For the Joint Force, one can describe the systemic output as the strategic outcomes operationsgenerate.Capabilitiesareofcourseimportanttotheseoutcomesandreceivedueattentionbyseniorleaders. Strategic outcomes as systemic outputs, though, are determined less by capabilities andmore by the outputs of planning—theway planners and commanders understood the problemsrelatedtotheirmissionandchosetoapplytheiravailableresourcestosolvethoseproblem.Andhereis theproblemwith jointdoctrine.Whenone reads thedoctrinalmanuals—themanualsused toeducateandtraintheforce—theyfocustoointentlyonbattleandeasilydiscardstrategicpurpose.CurrentdoctrineseemstounintentionallyallowtheJointForcetofocusontacticsdevoidofstrategy.

Tobefair, jointdoctrinefrequentlyreferstoinformation,culture, legitimacy,andotherfactorsofempathy—itjustfailstodosoinausefulway.Further,whilejointdoctrinemustevolve,itmustalsoretainclearandthoroughtreatmentofbattle—todootherwisewouldbeunthinkable.Ultimately,joint doctrinemust provide the force with some philosophical underpinning ofwhy empathy isimportant,howtodevelopit,andfinally,howtoleverageit.

No single joint doctrinal publication is the key to producing this understanding. The doctrinalchanges the Joint Force requires to operationalize empathy span a number of manuals, but theprimaryareaoffocusshouldbeintelligenceanalysisandoperationalplanning.5

DevelopingoperationalapproachesbeginswithoperationaldesignasdescribedinChapter4ofJointPublication 5-0, Joint Planning (2017, p. IV-1 – IV-42). Operational design is meant to helpcommandersunderstandtheproblemstheyfaceandtodevelopappropriateoperationalapproachestosolvingthoseproblems.Whenthemilitaryadopteddesignmethodology,itdidsotodiscardlinearthinkingthathadprovedinappropriateforsolvingproblemsrelatedtocounterinsurgency,andtoencouragesystemicunderstandingofcomplexproblems.

Unfortunately,theversionofdesignadoptedmayhavediscardedtoomanyrulesandignoredthevalueofafewconsistentlyusefulquestions.Warispolitical,asiscompetitionshortofarmedconflict.

5ThisarticledoesnotrecommendspecificAPEXchanges,astheformatsspecifiedinAPEXshouldbequicklyadaptedtoreflectchangesindoctrine.Neitherdoesthisarticleaddresstargeting,whichisnotwell-suitedtothetimeandintelligencerequirementsofinfluenceoperations.


Allformsofinternationalrelationsinvolvespeople,soempathyforrelevantactorsmustalwaysbeaplanningconsideration.Thequestionsoperationaldesignshouldanswerspecifically,butdoesnot,are:

• Whichactorsdefinestrategicoutcomes?

• Whatbehaviorsbytheserelevantactorsareinhibitingdesiredstrategicoutcomes?

• Whatbehaviorsbytheseactorswouldleadtostrategicsuccess?

Second,theJIPOEprocessasdescribedinJointPublication2-01.3,JointIntelligencePreparationoftheEnvironment, leansin therightdirection.Step3of JIPOE isto “EvaluatetheAdversaryandOtherRelevantActors,”andstep4isto“DetermineAdversaryandOtherRelevantActorCoursesofAction”(2014,p.IV-1–V-11).Theoverallstructureoftheprocessissound,buttreatmentofsocioculturalfactorsisvagueandprovideslittleusetotheintelligencecommunityintermsofunderstandingthebehaviorsof relevant actors.What JIPOEmustdo for the commander is toprovideaprocess fordevelopinganunderstandingoftheconsequentialbehaviorsofrelevantactors.Thisis,again,aheavyanalyticallift,aseachintersectionofrelevantactorsandadesiredbehaviorisaseparateanalysis.JIPOEoutputsare inputs for the JPP,and therefore,heavily influence theoperationalapproachescommanderschoose.

Finally,theJointForcemustredesignJPP(asdescribedinJP5-0(2017,V-1–V-62))toincorporatethese JIPOE outputs that describe the drivers of the behavior of relevant actors andmaintain aconstant linkage with the logics of change stemming from empathetic understanding. Course ofactiondevelopment(step3ofJPP)mustdirectlyfocusonenvironmentalmanipulationbytheJointForce(andotherpartners)thatcommandersbelievewilldrivethedesiredbehavioralchangesbyrelevantactors.Finally,courseofactionanalysisandwargaming(step4oftheJPP)mustenablestaffsto analyzewhether theirplannedactions stand tochange thebehaviorsof relevant actors in thedesiredway.Thesesortsofchangesshouldalsoservetosimplytheprocessofcampaignevaluation.

Muchofwhatisdescribedaboveistiedtothespecifictoolsandvisualrepresentationsthatstaffsuse,butthatdoctrineinfrequentlyprovides.Thesetoolsareusuallydigitalproductspassedonfromstaffofficer to staff officer in the form of spreadsheets and slide presentations. For example,synchronizationmatrixformatsarenotspecifiedindoctrine,butarefairlyuniformacrosstheforce,andrarelyaddressthetopicofempathyinanywayotherthananinclusionofinformationoperations,publicaffairs,andothercapabilities.ThesematricesdescribeJointForceactions,butusuallyfailtocapturetheobservationsandreactionsofrelevantactors—inotherwords,theyrarelyconsidertheeffects of operations on people. Therefore, the existing methodology routinely risks losing thelinkages between tactics and strategic outcomes. Doctrinal changes designed to operationalizeempathywouldhavethebestchanceofsuccessiftheyprovidedspecificexamplesoftoolsthatstaffscouldadoptandmodifyasneeded.

Inthefinalevaluation,theneededadjustmentstooperationalarttoaccountforempathyaresmallin number, but significant in impact. Even if the higher purpose of the Joint Force is to achievestrategicoutcomesascontainedinpoliticaldirection,theJointForcemustremainpreparedtofight.Changestooperationalartmustsurvivethisscreeningcriteria,then—thatjointdoctrinestillenablethe joint force to actmoredecisively thanpotential enemies. Perhaps this leads to separate andcomplimentaryplanningprocess.Thisremainstobeseen.However,theJointForcedoesnothavethe luxury to remainwillfully dismissive of strategy. The Joint Forcemust ensure that planning


processes remain rooted in the aim to achieve the strategic dictates, and this requires anunderstandingofthewaysinwhichothersseetheirworld.

References

DepartmentofDefense.(2014).JointPublication2-01.3,JointIntelligencePreparationoftheEnvironment.Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice.

DepartmentofDefense.(2017).JointPublication5-0,JointPlanning.Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice.

DepartmentofDefense.(2017).JointPublication1,DoctrinefortheArmedForcesoftheUnitedStates.Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice.

Gharajedaghi,J.(2011).SystemsThinking:ManagingChaosandComplexity—APlatformforDesigningBusinessArchitecture.Burlington,MA:Elsevier,Inc.


Building a House on the Rock (of Good Analysis)…

Dr.SpencerB.MeredithIIINationalDefenseUniversity

[email protected]

Thegoalisclear–weneedtoknowwhatvulnerablepopulationsthinkandfeelabouteverythingfromtheirgovernmentsandexternalactors,tothelinksbetweenthem,andanythreatstheypose,sowecanknowwhattodoaboutthem.Statingtheobvioushereisnoearth-shakingrevelation.Nordoesitseemsurprisingtojuxtaposetheobviousnessoftheneedwiththegravityofnotmeetingit.TheperceptionthattheUSisfailingtounderstandoperationalenvironments,specificallyitshumanaspects,makestheelusivesearchforwhatgoesoninsidepeople’sheadsallthemorepressing,whilekeepingitequallyfrustrated.

The commonmessage is that in-house and interagencyprocesses eithermiss themark—despitesomereallyconcertedefforts—orevenworse,offerlittlemorethansmokeandmirrorsmaskinganotherwiseinflexiblebureaucraticculturebentonblindness.Whatifneitheristruethough?Whatifinstead,theproblemslieatthesame“howwedoit”levelasintraditionalacademicresearchdesignedto answer real world questions with answers found in the real world? The good news is thatmethodology does in fact exist to getwhat we need, and while it can be really hard, it is alsoimminentlydoablewithgoodanalysis.The followingbrief introductionof the topicofferssuchaview. It layssomeof the foundations for the followingWhitePaper assessments,while fosteringdialogue between scholars and practitioners grounded in sound research, and its application tocomplexsecurityenvironments.

Thefirstplacetolookisgovernancebecauseitisthecommonreferencepointwithinandbetweensocieties.Itservesasboththesubjectmatteraboutwhichwepeople’sviews,andthethingwewantto influence.Variations exist in theways andmeansof governance acrossdifferent state-societyrelationships,buttheendsofgovernanceremainthereferencepointforonesimplereason—power.Somehaveit,otherswantit,andthevastmajorityareoblivioustoitunlessitdirectlytouchestheirlives.Comparativepoliticsexaminesthosephenomenaandthevariationsthatexistacrossculturesandcountries.Yet,italsofindsenoughsimilaritiestooffercorecategoriesforcomparison.

The foundations forgovernanceare1) thecapacity todostuff,2)autonomy indecisions,and3)legitimacysupportingboth.Thatlastfactoroftenstandsastheposterchildfortheconundrumofthehumandomain:whohasit,whowantsit,doesitimpactthegeneralpopulaceandifsohow?Yetthisonevariableneednotbesuchamystery.Thesamebasicprocessesforanalyzingpowerdynamicsapplytolegitimacy,autonomy,andcapacitybecausetheyallaremeasuresofpoweritself.Whetherdiscussingthetraditionalconceptsofhardpower(capabilitiesmeasuredastangibleresources)orsoftpower(the“squishier”influence),powerdrivesthesystem.Asaresult,governanceisthekeyconnection for structure (the systems that constrain and create opportunities) and agency(individualsandgroupswhooperatewithin,eitherinsupportoforoppositionto,thosestructures).

Whatthatmeansforoureffortshereisthatweneedsomemethodologicalapproachtogettingatpeople’s perceptions about governance because we know cognitive motivations shape behaviorstowardsgovernance.Wealsoknowthatthereverseholdstrue,thatbehaviorshapesbeliefs.Italsoreveals theoften “unthinking”natureofwhat goes in theworld, in that cognition is often “lazy”.Peoplerelyasmuchonhabitasheuristics;bothshortcut the thinking-actingequationandmakebehavioracriticalelementinitsownrightintheInfluenceenterprise.


Thechallengecomesinthatwhilewecanobservebehaviortoanextent(basedonaccessandtiming),weareleftwithindirectmeasuresofthinkingandfeelingatbest.Caveatscertainlyarisefromdecadesofsocialscienceandhumanitiesresearch,asmuchasfromcenturiesofphilosophicaltreatisesandhistoricalaccounts,allbentontacklingthehumannature-humansocietyconnection.Morerecently,andbuildingon those earlier foundations, thepromisingworkdoneon cognitivemappingofferstantalizingglimpsesofthe“graymatter.”Yetthesetoohavemethodologicalhurdlesbuiltintothem,justlikereadingClausewitzorSunTzuforapplicationtotheGrayZonetoday.Botharefraughtwithabstractionfromreality.Justasdistancefromthe“incarnational”natureofpastwritingscreatesgapsbetweenoursettinginlifeandtheancientsweplumbforwisdom,gettingthepeoplewewanttostudyintothelabcreatesinsurmountableproblemsintheaggregate.Themassesasawholewillnotsitdowntochat,eventhoughweneedsuchbroaddatafortrulyeffectiveindicatorsandwarnings.Evengoingsmallerscalefor“samples”ofthepopulationorkeyleaderspresentschallengesbecausewecannotfindallthosewhowouldwantandneedtotalkwithus.Ifwecould,thereisalsonoperfectfirewallagainstpeople’sinstrumentalspeech–tellingussomethingotherthanwhatweactuallyneedtohear.Worsestill,theartificialityofexperimentationpresentschallengeswhenwetrytogeneralizeotherwiseaccurateresultsoutwardstothefuzzyworldatlarge.

Rather than throw up our hands though, the contributors to this White Paper understand theproblemandthepressingneedtosolveit.Atthesametime,thereshouldbeahealthydoseofhumilitywhenitcomestoproducingthosesolutions.HereinliestherealrubforeffortssuchasthisWhitePaperinparticular,butevenmoresofortheentireInfluenceenterprise.Theinteragencyfocusonhumanaspectsisasnecessaryasitischallenging,butwealsofaceaproblemofourownmaking.Ouradversariesrelyonmuchsimplerapproaches,whichinturnrelyonmuchsimplerparadigms.Forthem,thegoalofpowerisclear,themeanstogetitevenclearerbecauseRussia,China,Iran,NorthKorea,andVEOssharecommonaltiestogovernance.Allsharethedrivetoincreasepowerthroughcapacity andautonomy, and critically, byusing legitimacy asmerely a tool forboth.TheUS andWesternparadigmisnoticeablytrickierbecauselegitimacyisagoalinitsownright,inadditiontobeingameanstogreatergovernanceeffectiveness.

Thisrealitytellsustwobasictruths,onemethodologicalandtheotherphilosophical,andbothresideattheheartofthisproject.First,theidentificationofcommonalitiesbetweenusandouradversariesshows key points of traction, for both analysis of strategic strengths and vulnerabilities, andapplication down range at the tactical and operational level. Second, the differences between usbecomeevenmoreimportantbecausethenatureofaDemocraticGreatPowerliketheUSisasmuchabout rights as responsibilities. These translate to everything from civil liberties to responsivegovernance.Thedifferentparadigmpresentedbyouradversariesshouldbeclearlyhighlightedwhenmessaging into new narrative landscapes, or inoculating populations from hostile informationoperations on the horizon or already there. The following are starting points for assisting thoseefforts,recognizingthateachisaspectrumratherthananabsolutevariable.

Measuresofgovernancerequirebothcomparabilityanduniqueness:

• Capacity,autonomy,andlegitimacycanbeusedatbothstateandsocietylevelstogivealayof the land in termsofwhatgovernanceactuallydoes(capacity), the levelof interferencefromexternalactorsandinternalfactions(autonomy),andthespectrumofhowpopulationstacitlyacceptit,allthewaytoovertlysupportoropposethosefactors(legitimacy).

• Theyalso give a lens throughwhich to categorizevaluesandthenormsof behavior theyengenderasreferencepoints.


These categories identify the kinds of perceptions/views people can have about the factors ofgovernance.

FortheDPRK,thismightlooklikeaskingdefectors’perceptionsonthefollowing:

GovernanceStability NumberofChallenges

StrengthofChallenge

DirectionofChallenge(fororagainststatusquo)

Capacity Infrastructure:prisoncamps,information

dominance,“starvingpopulation”

dependenceonstate

Few.Ifany,localized/individual

Weak Against

Civ-Milrelations Few,“purges”reinforcesystem

Weak DefactoForregime

Financials Numerous Manystate“shadow”alternatives=Weak

DefactoForregime

Autonomy Domesticvs.

Internationallegalauthority

NumerousfromexternalthreatcenteredonUS

High Against

Center-peripherypowerdistribution

Few Weak For – localized corruptionworksforregime

Legitimacy

Tacit–non-action Many-communalizedpersonalfailuresWeak Against

Overt–action Fewifany,defectionsasrareexamplesWeak Against

Table1.ExamplesofDPRKdefectors’perceptionsontopicsrelatedtoCapacity,Autonomy,andLegitimacy

Theresultisabaselineforknowingwheretostartaskingtherelevantquestions.Withoutit,effortsto “prove” intentions and perceptions run the risk of becoming yet another example ofmethodologicalfantasyland.


Effects-Based Psychological Operations Measures of Effectiveness: Measuring Change and Impact

GregoryS.Seese,Psy.D(LTC,USAR)

TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysics

[email protected]

LTCRafaelE.Linera,Ph.D.USASOC

[email protected]

ErinnMcQuaggeNorthopGrumman

[email protected]

Thispaperfocusesoncurrenttrendsandmethodologiesindevelopingacomprehensiveassessmentandevaluationplanforbehavior-focusedPsychologicalOperations(PSYOP)programs.Itoutlinesapragmaticapproachthattakesintoconsiderationtheneedfornotonlyreactivebutproactivereal-timeinfluenceeffortsthattargetproblembehaviorsandproblemconditionsastheyunfold,viewingthemasfluidanddynamicratherthanstaticandunchanging.Thisupdatedmethodologyexpandsupon the traditional approach by focusing on precise end-states and the detailed psychologicaleffectsrequiredtoachievethem.Thisalsofacilitatesthedevelopmentofadaptiveinterventionsthatcan be altered in response to rapidly changing situations to maximize the effectiveness of theinfluence effort, andaddress the increasing need to be flexible at the strategic, operational, andtacticallevel.

ThemissionofPSYOPistoinfluencethebehaviorofforeigntargetaudiences(TAs)tosupportU.S.nationalobjectives.PSYOPaccomplish thisbyconveyingselected informationand/oradvisingonactions that influence the emotions,motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior offoreignaudiences.BehavioralchangeisattherootofthePSYOPmission.AlthoughconcernedwiththementalprocessesoftheTA,itistheobservablemodificationofTAbehaviorthatdeterminesthemissionsuccessofPSYOP.Therefore, influenceeffortsmusthaveclearlydefinedandmeasurablebehavior-focusedgoalsandobjectives.

Figure2.ComprehensiveGoal/ObjectiveFramework


ThePSYOPassessmentandevaluationframeworkpresentedhereconsistsofmeasurableprogramgoals,supportingobjectives,andserieslevelmessageobjectivesthatwhenproperlynestedprovidedetailedmeasuresofeffectiveness(MOE)toevaluatebehaviorchangeanditsimpact.Furthermore,thismodeldemonstrateshowtoplaneffects-basedPSYOPprogramsthattargetthespecificchangesinknowledge,attitudes(andtheunderlyingbeliefsandemotions),andintermediatebehaviorsatthePSYOPserieslevelthatarerequiredtobringaboutthedesiredbehaviorchange.

Psychological Operation Objectives

AtthetopoftheframeworkarethePsychologicalOperationsObjectives(POs).Doctrinally,aPOisageneralstatementofmeasurableresponsethatreflectsthedesiredbehavioralchangeofforeignTAs(SpecialText,2014).However,thisisalegacydefinitionasPOsarenolongermeasurableresponsesbutratherbroadlinesofeffortusedasapprovalauthoritiesthatgrantpermissionandallocatefundsandresourcestoconductPSYOP.Thishasresultedinaneedforanewmetrictomeasuretheimpact6thataPSYOPprogramishavingagainsttheproblemsetsidentifiedduringplanning.Tomitigatethis,PSYOPProgramGoalscanbedevelopedasanewmetricbetweenthePOsandtheSPOs.

ProgramGoalsweredevelopedforselectprogramsandfieldtestedinIraq.

Program Goals

APSYOPprogramgoal isastatementofmeasurableresponseor impactthatreflects thedesiredbehaviorchange,anddescribesfutureexpectedoutcomesorstates.Programgoalsarewrittenasmeasurablechangesinbehaviororasbehavioral‘endstates’thatreflecttheimpacttheprogramisintendedtohave.Theyfocusontheendsratherthanthewaysand/ormeans,andaredevelopedbaseduponadetailedanalysisofspecificquantifiedproblemsatthelocal/tactical,regional,andstrategiclevels.7Thustheprogramgoalsaresolutionstotheidentifiedproblems(ormicroproblems).

PSYOP Program Goals provide commanders with a rapid-response mechanism (tool) nestedunderneathexistingauthorities(i.e.,policy,statutory,budgetary,andexecute(GraphicTrainingAid[GTA],2017)),andpermissions that lends itself tocrisis-responseandcontingencyoperations inneartorealtime.InsertingProgramGoalsbetweenPOsandSupportingPSYOPObjectives(SPOs)bridgesthegapleftbybroadandvaguePSYOPObjectivesactingasapprovalauthoritylimitsratherthanasausefulmetric.

TheformatofProgramGoalscanvarybaseduponthespecificneedsidentifiedduringplanning.Goalscanbe‘directional’andreflectanincreaseordecreaseofatargetedbehavior,ortheycanbevery‘situationspecific’andbeaconcisestatementofwhattheTAistodoornottodoandareusefulwhensupportingshort-termoperations.ProgramGoalsmayalsoincludeatargeteddecisionmakerandthe specific influence technique being utilized as well. Including the technique can be useful inarticulatingtosupportedleaderswhatPSYOPisproposingtodoaswell.Itmayalsobedesirableinsomesituationstoincludeend-statestoProgramGoalssuchastimequantifiers(e.g.“…byJuly2018”)

6 ImpactisthemeasurableeffectthePSYOPprogramishavinginregardstotheproblembehavior/situationidentifiedduringmissionanalysis. 7 “Endsaredefinedasthestrategicoutcomesorendstatesdesired.Waysaredefinedasthemethods,tactics,andprocedures,practices,andstrategiestoachievetheends.Meansaredefinedastheresourcesrequiredtoachievetheends,suchastroops,weaponssystems,money,politicalwill,andtime.”(JP-3-13/NWP3-13):http://mglaich.blogspot.com/2010/07/ends-ways-means.html


or as a change in percentage (e.g. “…by 25%/50%/75%”) thatwill indicatewhen final programsuccess has been achieved. The final consideration in the writing of detailed Program Goals isensuringthatadequatebaselineinformationisavailable,andthatquantifiableinformationcanbeobtainedonatleastasemi-regularbasissotrendscanbetrackedandchangesinbehaviorcanbemeasured over time. Furthermore, detailed monitoring also allows adaptations to be made tomessagingasneededtomaximizetheoveralleffortorreacttochangingconditions.

DirectionalProgramGoalexamples8:

• Increasethe#ofillegalweapons,drugs,insurgents,andkidnapvictimsfoundduringclearing/searchoperations.

• Increasethe#ofcommunitieswhoriseup/rebelandforceoutinsurgents.• Decreasethe#ofcivilianinjuriesanddeathsresultingfromcombatoperations.• Increasethe#enlisteesintotheNationalArmyfrom500amonthto700amonthbyDecember

2015.• Decreasethe#ofIED’semplacedalongUStravelledroutes.• Decreasethe#ofpeopleinattendanceatradical/extremistschools/mosques.• Increasethe#ofinsurgentswhoparticipateinthereconciliationprogram.• Increasethe#ofsmallbusinessestofostereconomicstability.• Decreasethe#ofFacebookgroupsthattolerateviolentextremistcommentsby25%

Notes:A. Formatfordirectionalprogramgoalsareasfollows…Increase/decrease#of,amountof,ratioof,etc.Time

quantifiersmayalsobeaddedbutshouldbedonesowithcaution.(e.g.from500amonthto700amonthbyDecember.)

B. WhiletheProgramgoalsarebehavioralobjectives,theycanalsobeattitudinalobjectivesbymeasuringthespecificattitudetowardsthebehaviorswithpolls,surveys,andfocusgroups.Justbeawareof100+yearsofsocial/behavioralsciencepeerreviewedresearchthatclearlydocumentsaweakrelationshipbetweengeneralattitudesandbehavior.

Situation Specific Program Goal Examples: • Causethewithdrawofextremistoradversaryforcesfromthecity.• Causemoderatorstoclosetheaccountsofextremistsofonlineforumsx,y,andz.• CausetheCounciloftheRevolutiontovote“yes”onWomenRight’sreforms.• CauseapopularuprisinginCityXagainstanoccupyingpower.• Causetriballeaderstorejectthepresenceofextremistsandforeigninvadersontheirland.• CauseparliamentmemberstoreversetheirdecisionontopicA.• Causethepresidentofamultinationalcorporationtochooseanalternativerouteforapipeline.• Causecivilianstofleethecitybeforeitsliberationtoreduceinnocentinjuriesanddeaths.• Causeadictatortoorderthereleaseofpoliticalprisoners.• Causetheshutdownofextremistaccountsbyapplyingpressureonforummoderators• CauseauniversityPresidenttoshutdownextremistgroupsoncampus.• Causecivilianstoevacuatethecitybeforetheliberationbegins.• Causetriballeaderstoembracethefederalgovernments’reconciliationprogram.

Notes:

8 Thesegoalssupportacommander’stargetingeffortsandarenotsolelydonebyPSYOPmessaging,butratherincoordinationwithothercommandactivities.


A. Situationspecificprogramsgoalsweretestedstatingthewordcauseasitsactionverb;however,thisisnotmeanttoinsinuatethatthePSYOPeffortisthesolereasonfortheoutcome.Causecanbereplacedwiththewordsinfluenceorpersuadeifusingcausebecomesanissue.

B. Formoredetailedobjectives,contacttheauthorsdirectly.

Supporting PSYOP Objectives

Inadditiontomeasuringprogramimpact, thespecificbehavioralresponseseach targetaudience(TA)istoengageinarewrittenasSupportingPSYOPObjectives(SPOs).Unlikeprogramsgoalsthatfocusontheends,SPOsfocusontheways.Developingwell-writtenSPOsisthecriticalstepintheplanningprocessthatwillenablecommanderstoevaluateprogress,manageresources,andmakeadjustmentstotheplanasneeded.Well-writtenSPOstargetspecific,measurable,andobservablebehavior.9 Specific refers to criteria such as the setting, frequency and intensity of the behavior;measurablemeans it can be counted;observablemeans it can be seen or heard.Without clearlydefinedSPOs,itwillbedifficulttodevelopthemetricsorbaselinedataneededformeasuringchange,andintheworstcase,theentirePSYOPplanmaybeineffectiveorunmanageable(Seese&Smith,2008). IndevelopingmeasurableSPOs,plannersmustunderstandthatbehaviormeansaspecific,observableaction.Termssuchasparticipation,support,orviolencearefartoobroad,andtheymustbebrokendownintotheirunderlyingbehaviors.SPOsarewrittenusinga“subject–verb–object”structure.ThesubjectisalwaysTA.TAsarenotspecifiedintheSPObecauseoftenmultipleTAsmustbetargetedtoaccomplishthedesiredbehavioralchange.

SupportingPSYOPObjectivesexamples:

• TAsurrenderstocoalitionforces.• TAjoinstheguerillaresistancemovement.• TAreportshumantraffickingrecruitmentattempts.• TAevacuatestheareausingrecommendedtravelroutes.• TAattendsseculareducationalinstitutions.• TAstaysindesignatedsafeareasuntiltoldbyauthoritiesitsafetoleave.• TAvotesinlocalandfederalelections.• TAappliesforamicroloan.

Note:JustliketheProgramgoals,whileSPO’sarebehavioralobjectives,theycanalsobeattitudinalobjectivesbymeasuringthespecificattitudetowardsthebehaviorswithpolls,surveys,andfocusgroupstogatherfurtherinsightintothem.

While thePSYOPprogramgoalsweredevelopedtosolveorprevent the identifiedoranticipatedproblemsbehaviorsandconditions(Ends),SPOsarethespecificbehavioralresponsesdesiredfromeachTAtoaccomplishagivenprogramgoal(Ways).Thefollowingexamplesillustratethelinkagebetweenthetwo.

ProgramGoalA:Increasethe#oflegitimatebusinessestofostereconomicstability.• SPO1:TAregistersbusinesseswiththeappropriategovernmentagency.• SPO2:TAappliesforsmallbusinessmicroloan.• SPO3:TAuseslocalcurrencyforpurchasesandtransactions.

9 Alistof198non-violentspecificbehaviorsidentifiedbyGeneSharpisavailableonlineattheAlbertEinsteinInstitutionwebsite,anorganizationwhosepurposeistoadvancetheworldwidestudyandstrategicuseofnonviolent action in conflict. Sharp,G. (1973). 198methods of nonviolent action.The politics of nonviolentaction.Retrievedat:http://www.aeinstein.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/198-Methods.pdf


• SPO4:TAreportsillegaleconomicactivitytoauthorities.• SPO5:TAarrestsblackmarketoperatorsandsmugglers.• SPO6:TAstagespublicprotestsagainstblackmarkets.• SPO7:TAattendslocaljobsfair.• SPO8:TAsetupsjobfairsinvariousneighborhoods.

ProgramGoalB:Increasethe#ofvoterturn-outforfederalelections.

• SPO1:TAregisterstovoteatUNvotingsites.• SPO2:TAnominatespoliticalcandidatesforlocalelections.• SPO3:TAjoinsapoliticalparty.

ProgramGoalC:Decreasethe#ofcivilianinjuriesanddeathsresultingfromcombatoperations.

• SPO1:TAstaysintheirhomesduringcombatoperations.• SPO2:TAcomplieswithcoalitiontroopsduringcordonsearches.• SPO3:TAtravelsonlyalongdesignedroutes.• SPO4:TAobeyslocalcurfewstatutes.

ProgramGoalD:CauseSupremeCouncilleaderstoorderthereleaseofpoliticalprisoners.

• SPO1:TAprotestsagainstthearrestsofoppositionpartymembers.• SPO2:TApublicallycondemnsthesupremecouncilforarrestingpoliticalrivals.• SPO3:TAmakesfinancialcontributiontotheoppositionparty.• SPO4:TApublishes/postsreportsofgovernmentabusesandcorruption.

Program Goals and Supporting PSYOP Objectives (SPOs)

ProgramGoalsaredevelopedafteradetailedanalysisofthecurrentoranticipatedsituationfocusingontheproblembehaviors,problemsconditions,andassociatedmasternarrativesthatimpedethesupportedunitcommander(orAmbassador)achievinghiskeytasksandobjectives.Theidentifiedproblemsareobstaclesthatneedtobemitigatedorovercomeandarereflectedbytheexecutionofinformationandinfluenceoperationswhendealingwithreal-timeproblemsets.TheProgramGoalsfacilitate exploration of the problem set—already done during PO Program development—yetupdating it to current evolving situations. Program Goals—after revising and identifying moredefinedproblemsetsspecifictoasituation—canthenleadtootherSPOsthatcanlendthemselvestorapidprototypingofSeriesandProductDevelopment,aswellasproper identificationand(then)collectionofimpactindicatorsandMOEs.SPOs, in thiscase,shouldnotbelimitedinnumbers.Inotherwords,similartomilitarydeception(MILDEC)GoalsandObjectives,durationsofsucheffortsarebetween short andmid-term; thus, not lending themselves formultipleuseor recurrentusenecessarily.Inotherwords,suchproblemsetsasidentifiedinthePG,followedbythecreationoftailored SPOs, Series and Product Development don’t have to be restricted to current norms of‘lifespans’(e.g.,havingsameSPOforyears).Thisprovidesgroundcommandersandambassadorstheopportunitytobeagileinanticipatingsituationsbutalsorespondinanexpeditedwaythatallowsproperplanningtotakeplace,aswellastheidentificationofassessmentstomeasuresuccessandadjustinrealtime.


Series Level Objectives

Inadditiontomeasurablegoalsandobjectives,comprehensivestrategiesneedtobeidentifiedforeachPSYOPseries.AseriesconsistsofalltheproductsandactionsconcurrentlydevelopedinsupportofaSPO.Tofacilitatethis,additionalobjectivestailoredforeachseriescanbedeveloped.Thisthenlendsitselftoevenmoredetailedandrefinedmeasuresofeffectiveness.WhiletheProgramGoalsaretheends,andtheSPOsaretheways,serieslevelobjectivescompletetheequationandarethemeans(Figure3).APSYOPseriescanhaveanycombinationofbehavioral,knowledge,belief,andemotionalobjectives(seeFigure4forexamples).AbehavioralobjectiveiswhattheTAistodoornotdo,aknowledgeobjectiveiswhattheTAneedstoknow,abeliefobjectiveiswhattheTAneedstobelieve(Kotler&Lee,2011),andanemotionalobjectiveiswhattheTAneedstofeel(Seese&Haven,2015).Behavioral,knowledge,belief,andemotionalobjectivesprovidedirectionfordevelopingstrategiesduringseriesdevelopment.Abehavioralobjectiveiswrittensimilartotheprogramobjectivesasitis a specific,measurable, andobservablebehavior. It describes the actionor intermediate action(behaviorscanbeshapedovertimethroughaseriesofintermediatebehaviors)aTAistotaketofinallyachievethedesiredbehaviorchange.ItisdirectlymeasuredbyobservingachangeinaTA’sbehaviorovertimeinresponsetoexposuretotheseries.KnowledgeobjectivesaretheinformationandfactstheTAistoknowinregardstothedesiredbehavior(statistics,facts,andotherinformationtheTAwouldfindmotivatingorimportant),andbeliefobjectivesaretheassociatedattitudes,values,and beliefs (what the TA needs to believe). Emotional objectives are the feelings a TA needs toexperience(toprovoke/elicitareaction)inrelationtoaspecificthemeormessage.Peopletendtobe deeply affected by the emotional state they are left with after seeing, reading, or hearingsomething.Thesearethefeelingsapersonhasattheendorclimaxofanarrativethatmotivates,energizes,oreveninspiresthemtodosomething.Toultimatelyinfluenceattitudesandbehavioranarrative must gain the attention of a TA. In order togarner and hold attention, the narrativemust engagethem. Engagement becomes the essential gateway toinfluence(Haven,2014),andgoodnarrativeseffectivelyengageandholdattention.Engagementhasamandatoryemotionalcomponent.SeeseandHaven’s(2015)paper,“TheNeuroscienceofInfluentialStrategicNarrativesandStorylines”laysoutastructuralmodelthatrepresentstheelements and techniques used to establish and tomanipulatereader/viewerengagement.

Unlike behavior that can be directly measured, knowledge, beliefs, and emotions are indirectlymeasuredthroughtheuseofpolls,surveys,andinterviews/focusgroups,andareanexcellentsourceof qualitative data. In addition, recent advances in neuroscience technology such as functionalmagneticresonanceimaging(fMRI),electroencephalography(EEG),galvanicskinresponse(GSR),andeye trackingand facialexpressionanalysispermitsreal-timemeasurementofarespondent’scognitiveload,motivation,arousal,attention,andemotionalresponse.Asneuroimagingtechnologiesandmethods continue to improve and becomemoremobile over time, PSYOP professionals canpretesttheirnarratives,themes,andmessagingutilizingneuroandbiofeedbackinreal-time.Thisservesasawaytocollectandanalyzerespondent’scognitiveload,motivation,arousal,attentionandemotionalresponse toPSYOPproducts.Thisalso lowers/mitigaterisks,attainsbetterpersuasivelinesofargumentation,resultinginbetterpredictionsofdesiredeffects/outcomes.Similarfactorsusedinsurveys,pollingorinterviews(e.g.,cultureanddemographics)alsohavetobeconsideredtoproperly attain a representative sample when using such methodology (Martin, Otwell, Seese,Stangle,&Linera;2016).

Influence & Engagement Strategy Program Goals = Ends SPOs = Ways Series Objectives = Means Strategy: Ends + Ways + Means

Figure3.PSYOPGoals,SPOs&SeriesObjectivesadaptationtoEnds-Ways-Meansconstruct.


Serieslevelmessageobjectivesexamples:

Figure4.Serieslevelmessageobjectiveexamples

APSYOPseriesmayconsistofanycombinationofthefourtypesofobjectives.Someproductsmayjust be informational in nature and only require knowledge objectives, while others may raiseawarenessofanissueandrequirebothknowledgeandbeliefs.Products thataremeant todirectbehavior(compliancegaining)andthosemeanttoinfluenceachangeinattitudeandbehaviorwouldlikely require all four. Furthermore, series level objectives can be used to guide the precisiondevelopmentofnarratives,specificthemesandmessages,andcanhelpfacilitatethedesignofsurveyinstrumentstobeusedforpreandpost-testingofindividualproducts.

SeriesobjectiveswerefirstfieldtestedattheJointInformationSupportTaskForceinQatarin2014(JLLIS,2014)asawaytoimprovemessagelevelMOEandprovideobjectivesforpreandpost-testingofproductsandthemethodologywaspresentedduringaconferenceattheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)CenterofExcellenceinAnkara,Turkey(Seese,2014).Thismethodologywasfurtherrefinedandusedduringthe2016InternationalCommunication&NegotiationSimulationsProject(ICONs)narrativesimulationthatvalidatedtheireffectivenessbydemonstratingthatseriesobjectiveseffectivelyfacilitatedthedelegationofmessagingapprovalauthorityforreal-timesocialmediamessagingwithinpre-approvedthemesbyprovidingpreciseleftandrightlimitsfornarrativedevelopment(Linera,Seese,Canna,&Rhem,2016).


Academic rigor and theory in the PSYOP process

EssentialtotheeffectivenessofaPSYOPprogramisthedevelopmentofinterventionsbasedonsoundattitudeandbehaviorchangemodelssuchasTheoryofPlannedBehavior(Fishbein,&Ajzen,2010),TripartiteModel ofAttitudes (Rosenberg&Hovland, 1966), andSocial JudgmentTheory (Sherif,Sherif,&Hovland,1980)tonamejustafew.It’sduringphase3(SeriesDevelopment)ofthePSYOPprocess where attitude and behavior changemodels are utilized to guide the development andstagingoftheSPOsandserieslevelobjectivesthatbecometheoverallstrategy.AnexcellentresourceforthisisDr.IcekAjzen’s(2006)paper“BehavioralinterventionsbasedontheTheoryofPlannedBehavior:Briefdescriptionofthetheoryofplannedbehavior.”

Measures of Effectiveness

MeasuresofEffectiveness(MOE)areeasytocraftwhengoalsandobjectivesarewellwritten.MOEarewritten as questions and initiallydevelopedduring planning, refined during target audienceanalysis,andfurtherrefinedduringseriesdevelopment.TheanswerstotheMOEquestionscollectedonaperiodicbasis,formtrendsthatcanbeanalyzedinrelationtothedisseminationofmessages.TheanalysisofthesetrendsgivesinsightintotheimpactaparticularPSYOPseriesandprogramishaving.Thefollowingillustratesaprogramgoal,asupportingPSYOPobjective,andseriesobjectiveswith their associatedMOE questions. Themetricswere refined to include both quantitative andqualitativeinformationbyincludingmorespecificdimensionsofbehavior,suchassetting,frequency,andintensity.Thesettingcouldincludethecity,town,orarea.Thefrequencywoulddescribehowoftenabehavioroccurs.Theintensitymeasurestheconsequencesorseverityofthebehavior.

PSYOPProgramGoal:Decreasethe#ofinjuriesanddeathsresultingfromminesandunexplodedordnance(UXOs).MOE:HowmanypeoplewereinjuredandkilledlastmonthfromminesandUXOs,whereat,andwhatweretheagesandgender?SupportingPSYOPObjective:TAreportsthelocationoflandminesandUXOstolocalauthorities.MOE:HowmanypeoplereportedthelocationoflandminesandUXOsintheBrčkoMunicipalitylastmonth,whereat,andthroughwhatmeans(phone,inperson,text)?KnowledgeObjective:Text(SMS)landmine/UXOlocationsto1-800-blowdup.KnowledgeMOE:WhatpercentageofTeenageBosniaSerbspolledknowthe#toreportmines/UXOs?BeliefObjective:Reportinglandmines/UXOswillkeepmeandmyfriendssafe.BeliefMOE:WhatpercentageofTeenageBosnianSerbspolledbelievethatreportingmineswillkeepthemsafe?EmotionalObjectives:(tiedintospecificthemeoflossoffriends)Sadnessoverlossoffriends/fearfulorangryoverthreatofbeinginjuredorkilledEmotionalMOE:WhatpercentageofTeenageBosnianSerbsreportbeingsad,fearful,and/orangry.BehaviorObjective:TeenageBosnianSerbstextthelocationoflandmines/UXOstolocalauthorities.BehaviorMOE:HowmanyteenageBosnianSerbstextedthelocationoflandmines/UXOsintheBrčkoMunicipalitylastmonth,andhowmanyreportsturnedouttobecredible?


Establishing a Relation Between the PSYOP Series and MOE

UtilizinganacademicallysoundmethodologytoestablisharelationshipbetweenthedisseminationofaPSYOPseriesandchangesinbehaviorisparamountandlendsbothcredenceandcredibilitytoPSYOPefforts.LinkingtheseriesandMOEimpactindicatorsisthemosteffectivemeansbecauseitindividually evaluates the effectiveness of each SPO. Additionally, this facilitates a comparisonbetweentheseriesforthereturnoninvestment.EstablishingaconnectionbetweentheseriesandProgramGoalorPOisfeasible,butmorecomplexduetocompetingSPOsandothervariablesthatinfluencetheoutcome.

Usingatruncatedacademicresearchmethodology(Treadwell,2013)achievesdefendableresultswithoutaseriousinvestmentinadditionaltraining.Determiningeffectivenesscanbeminimizedintosixsteps:

1. Definetheresearchquestionandhypothesis

2. Collectbaselinedata.WhatisoccurringbeforeanyPSYOP?

3. Collectdatatosupportthehypothesis(H1)

4. Collectdatathatrefutesthehypothesis(H0)

5. Analyzethedata

6. Determinewhichconclusionisbestsupported

Steponedefinestheresearch(aclearquestionabouttherelationshipbetweenthePSYOPseriesandtheMOE).Itensuresclarityabouttheprocessandservesasaguidepost.Fromtheexampleabove,theresearchquestionwouldlooklike

“DidseriesXcausetheTAtoregisterbusinesseswiththeappropriategovernmentagency(ProgramGoalA,SPO1fromabove)?

Formulate a hypothesis (statement that the research intends to test, abbreviated “H1”) from theresearch question. A hypothesis for PSYOP tends towards the following format: “series” caused“targetaudience”to“SPO.”Fortheresearchquestionabove:

H1=“SeriesXcausedtheTAtoregisterbusinesseswiththeappropriategovernmentagency.”

Afterestablishingtheresearchquestionandhypothesis,collecthistoricdataontheMOE(discussedaboveindetail)usedtomeasuretheSPO.It’sidealtohaveatleastayear’sworthofdatatohaveabaselinetoaccountforseasonalchangesanddeterminethenormbeforeinterveningwithPSYOP;however, it understood that this is not always possible. In the example, how many businessesnormallyregisterwiththeappropriategovernmentagencybeforetheseriesbegan?

Next,collectdatathatsupportsthehypothesis(H1).Primarily,itwillbequantitative,inthiscasetheamountofbusinessesregistering;howeverqualitativeexampleslikecasestudiesandinterviewsareequallysignificantastheyaddcontexttonumericaldata.


Correlation, a relationshipbetween twovariables, is requiredbefore establishing causation (onecausestheothertooccur).Withoutit,thereisnocausallinkagepossiblebetweenthePSYOPseriesandtheMOE.PlottheMOEontheY-axisandthecumulativeamountofPSYOPontheX-axis(seeFigure5).DuetorepetitionofthemessagebeingakeyfactorintheTA’sbehavioralchange,plottingcumulativeinvestmentisgoodmethodtopresentthedata.TokeeptheX-axismetricuniform,whileaseriesusedifferentmedia(e.g.radio,TV,newsprint,etc.)usefundingcosts.Othermeasurescanbeused,butdollarsspentproducesaccurateresultswithoutextensiveinvestmentinresearchtime.

Note changes in the effects after aperiod of time. Before the series begins, there is no externalinfluenceontheTAandtheirMOEisstable.Aftertheseriesbegins,thereshouldbeanincreasingamountofMOE(correlationline)andthenalevelingoff(saturationpoint).AslopinglineindicatesacorrelationbetweenthePSYOPseriesandtheMOE.Atthispoint,theobservationcouldberandomcoincidence.Qualitativedatacanaddcontexttothenumbers,especiallylargesurveys,interviews,andcasestudies.Withqualitativedata,theresearchercanestablishknowledgeandbeliefswithintheTA,noteanychanges,anddeterminewhythosechangesoccurred.IfthechangesoccurredbecauseofthePSYOPseries,itbecomesevidencetosupportthehypothesis.

OncethereisacorrelationbetweentheseriesandtheMOE,establishcausation-provingthattheseriesandeffectsaremorethantworandomeventsinthesamespace.Thestandardtechniqueistotesttheoppositeofyourhypothesis,orthe“nullhypothesis”(H0forshort).Whereaspreviously,datawascollectedtosupportthehypothesis,nowitiscollectedtorefuteit.

Figure5.EstablishingtheCorrelation.BetweentheSeriesandMOE


H0=“SeriesXdidnotcausetheTAtoregisterbusinesseswiththeappropriategovernmentagency.”

TestingthenullreducesconfirmationbiasbyallowingdatathatdoesnotsupportthehypothesisanddeterminesifthereareothervariablesthatcontributetotheMOE.Ifduringtheprocessoftestingthenullhypothesis issupportedbyevidence, then theoriginalhypothesismaybedisproven(i.e. theseries was ineffective and/or other variables influenced the outcome). However, if there is noevidence to support thenull hypothesisandother variables are ruledout (e.g. seasonal changes,majorpolitical/economicpolicies,etc.),theoriginalhypothesisstandsasthebestoutcome.

Withthedatacollectedontheoriginalhypothesisandthenull,beginanalyzingandinterpretingthedata.Aneasyscenarioiswheneitherthehypothesisornullhasoverwhelmingevidencetosupportit; one stands out over the other. Difficulty arises when there is competing evidence for both,requiringarigorousanalysistoreachaconclusion.QualitativedataisessentialhereasitcanaddcontexttonumbersandexplainwhytheTAtookcertainactions.Addressthenullfirsttoanalyzewhereothervariables influencedtheMOEandbyhowmuch.Remember that thenullstatesthatSeriesXdidnotcausetheMOE;meaningthatothervariablescouldhavecauseditorthattherewasno observable effects. Once their effects are accounted for, the remaining effects may provideevidencetosupportthattheoriginalhypothesiswasatleastpartiallyinfluentialontheMOE.Intheexample,assumethatmajorpoliticalchangesimprovedtheeconomy,creatingmorebusinessesfortheTAtoregisteroverall.Buttheseriesincreasedtheknowledgeabouttheregistrationprocessandabeliefthatbusinessownersshouldregisterwithgovernmentagencies.

Conclusionsarealmostneverabsolute;theyareoftenthemostlikelyorbest-supportedstatement.Acknowledgingtheshortcomingsupfrontintheconclusionlendsadegreeofcredenceasopposedto burying it, which draws into question other parts of the research. In the case of businessregistration, political policy changes andSeriesX influenced theMOE in tandem.The conclusionshouldlooksimilartotheexamplebelow:

Conclusion = “Whilemajor political changes improved the economy, thus creatingmorebusiness opportunities, Series X had significant influence on the TA registering theirbusinesseswiththeappropriategovernmentagency.”

Hereisadefendableconclusionthatcanwithstandoutsidescrutiny.Itisnotabsolute,whichonlyrequires a small amountof evidence to the contrary tobe refuted.Rather it acknowledgesothervariables, thus competing evidencewill not disprove the entire conclusion and opens it to laterrefinementasnewevidencebecomeavailable.

Summary

Inconclusion,planningandevaluatingtheeffectivenessofaPSYOPprogramcanbeadauntingtask,butifmeasurablegoalsandobjectivesaredeveloped,MOEquestionsarerelativelystraightforwardtowrite.ProperlycraftedMOE’saremucheasier to integrate intoasupportedunit’s intelligencecollectionplan,andlendcredencetothecredibilityofinfluenceprograms.

Measuring the effectiveness of influence efforts requires detailed problem analysis to quantifyspecific behavioral problemsets and to identify the enablers (i.e. conditions,who isdoingwhat,where,how,etc.).Thegoalistogainabetterunderstandingoftheproblemsoprecisesolutions(bothpreventions and interventions) can be developed for implementation. Program goals that aremeasurableend-stateshelpassess the impact theprogramis intendedtohave,whilesupporting


PSYOP objectives focus on themeasurableways to attain them. Series level objectives take intoaccount the psychological effects required to provide the comprehensive strategies necessary toachievethegoalsandobjectivesbyfocusingontheknowledge,beliefs,emotions,andintermediatebehaviorsrequiredforeachoftheidentifiedtargetaudiences.

The pragmatic framework presented here demonstrates that it is possible to not onlymeasurechanges in behavior and the associated knowledge and beliefs, but alsowhether the program ishavinganyimpactontheproblemitself.Furthermore,themethodologyprovidedherenotonlyaddsacademicrigortotheexistingdoctrine,ittakesittothenextlevelandchangeshowPSYOPSoldiersthinkaboutplanningandthecapabilitytheycanleverageandbringtothe21stcenturyfight.

Works Cited

Ajzen,I.(2006).Behavioralinterventionsbasedonthetheoryofplannedbehavior:Briefdescriptionofthetheoryofplannedbehavior.

Fishbein,M.,&Ajzen,I.(2010).Predictingandchangingbehavior:Thereasonedactionapproach.NewYork:PsychologyPress(Taylor&Francis).

GraphicTrainingAid(GTA)33-01-004.(2017).MilitaryInformationSupportOperations(MISO)AuthoritativeReferences,Washington,DC:Headquarters,Dept.oftheArmy.(p.1-4)

Haven,K.(2014).StorySmart:UsingtheScienceofStorytoPersuade,Influence,Inspire,andTeach.SantaBarbara,CA:LibrariesUnlimited.

Kotler&Lee.(2011).Socialmarketing:Influencingbehaviorsforgood.(4thed).ThousandOaks:Sage.

Linera,R.,Seese,G.,Canna,S.,&Rhem,S.(Eds)(2016).Counter-Da'eshInfluenceOperationsCognitiveSpaceNarrativeSimulationInsights.Washington,DC:StrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense.

Martin,M.,Otwell,R.,Seese,G.,Stangle,S.,&Linera,R.(2016).WinningtheBattleInNarrativeSpaceUsingAppliedNeuroscience—EnhancingAndModernizingThePSYOPProcess.InGiordano,J.,Rhem,S.,Popp,G.(Eds)(2016)WhitePaperonAssessingandAnticipatingThreatstoUSSecurityInterestsABio-Psycho-SocialScienceApproachforUnderstandingtheEmergenceofandMitigatingViolenceandTerrorism-AStrategicMulti-Layer(SMA)PeriodicPublication.Washington,DC:StrategicMultilayerAssessmentOffice,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense.

Montano,D.&Kasprzk,(2008).TheTheoryofReasonedAction,TheoryofPlannedBehaviorandtheIntegratedBehavioralModel.InGlanz,K.M.,Rimer,B.K.&Viswanath,K.(Eds.).Healthbehaviorandhealtheducation:Theory,researchandpractice,pp.67-96,4thEdition,SanFrancisco,California:Jossey-Bass.

Rosenberg,M.J.,&Hovland,C.I.(1966).Attitudeorganizationandchange:Ananalysisofconsistencyamongattitudecomponents.

Seese,G.(2014).ComprehensivePSYOPAssessmentandEvaluationinCounterterrorismEfforts.In,StrategicCommunicationinCounterTerrorism:TargetAudienceAnalysis,Measuresof


EffectandCounterNarrative.NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)CenterofExcellence,Ankara,Turkey

SeeseG.,&HavenK.(2015).TheNeuroscienceofInfluentialStrategicNarrativesandStorylines.IOSphereJournal,Fall2015.JointInformationOperationsWarfareCenter(JIOWC),SanAntonio,TX.

Seese,G.,&Smith,P.(2008).MeasuringPsychologicalOperations(PSYOP)effectiveness.SpecialWarfareMagazine,21(6),31-34.

Sherif,M.,Sherif,C.,&Hovland,C.(1980).Socialjudgment:Assimilationandcontrasteffectsincommunicationandattitudechange.Westport:Greenwood.

SpecialText(ST)33-01.(2014).MilitaryInformationSupportOperations(MISO)Process,Washington,DC:Headquarters,Dept.oftheArmy.(p.1-23)

Treadwell,D.(2013).Introducingcommunicationresearch:Pathsofinquiry.SagePublications.


Coordinating Operations to Influence Behaviors in the OE

PatriciaDeGennaroTRADOCG2OperationalEnvironmentCenter

[email protected]

RandyMunchTRADOCG2OperationalEnvironmentCenter

[email protected]

We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, andconductedatincreasingspeedandreach—fromclosecombat,throughoutoverseastheaters,and reaching to our homeland. Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize theirtargetingofourbattlenetworksandoperationalconcepts,whilealsousingotherareasofcompetition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare,ambiguousordeniedproxyoperations,andsubversion).Thesetrends,ifunaddressed,willchallengeourabilitytodeteraggression.

--TheNationalDefenseStrategyoftheUnitedStates,2018

Integrating informationoperations(IO)andphysicaloperationsat thestrategic,operational,andtacticalplanninglevelsiscriticalforachievinglong-termmilitaryobjectives.IOisacomprehensiveeffort to understand andmaneuver in the human and cognitive domains. In 2014, the StrategicLandpowerTaskforcememberscametotheconclusionthat“timeandagaintheU.S.hasundertakentoengageinconflictwithoutfullyconsideringthephysical,cultural,andsocialenvironmentsthatcomprise what some have called the ‘human domain.’”10 As stated in the quote above, the U.S.NationalDefenseStrategydemands thatweaddressnotonly lethal threats,butalsocompetitionshortofopenwarfare,becauseouradversariesareusingsuchcapabilitiestochallengeourabilitytodeteraggression.Further,itisthehumanwillthatdeterminesthefinaloutcomeofwar.

Developingandmaintainingunderstandingofhumanemotions, responses,oractionscanleadtosuccessorfailureinthemidstofrisingcompetitionbetweenStateinfluences.Itishardtoimagineplanning and executing a successful campaign to influence or alter behavior whenwe have notinvestedsufficienttimeandenergytodevelopatrueunderstandingofpeopleandtheirmotivationsinordertomatchinformationoperationswithdesiredeffectsinagivenoperationalenvironment(OE).

TheJointStaff’s latestdoctrineandconceptsfocusonapplyingacombinedcognitiveandphysicalapproachtosucceedinfuturecampaigns.ByfollowinglogicallinesofeffortamongjointdoctrineJP2-01.3 Joint IntelligencePreparationof theOperationalEnvironment, the Joint Concept forHumanAspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO) and the Joint Concept for Operating in the InformationEnvironment (JCOIE), the staff realize that these references focus on identifying key individuals,populations, and events in order to inform the commander’s decision making, understand andinfluencebehaviors,andshapetheenvironmentinoperationsacrossthespectrumofconflict.

Leveraging the informationalaspectsofmilitaryactivities isbeingcapturedmorepurposefullyinmuch of the emerging doctrine. Themilitary tends to plan and conductmilitary operations andcampaignsthewaywehavefordecades,butasourunderstandingofthecharacterofwardeepens,our plans must change due to rapid technological and information changes in the operationalenvironment.

10StrategicLandpowerTaskForceWhitePaper,WinningtheClashofWills,2014


Recent joint doctrine and concepts move the joint force closer to building information into“operationalarttodesignoperationsthatdeliberatelyleveragetheinformationalaspectsofmilitaryactivities to achieve enduring strategic outcomes.”11 The soon-to-be-released JCOIE describesinformationalpoweras“…theabilitytoleverageinformationtoshapeperceptionsandattitudesthatdrivedesiredbehaviorandthecourseofevents.”12Thecentral ideaofthisconcept isto leverageinformationtoinfluencetheperceptionsandbehaviorofrelevantactorsintheater.

Byinfluencingtheserelevantactors,theJointforcecanfocusitseffortsoncreatingdesiredend-stateconditions throughout the entire operational environment (OE). Developing understanding ofrelevantactorsandtheirbeliefsystemrelatedtotheirnarratives,perceptionsoftheirenvironment,anddeepknowledgeofidentity,cultureandhistory,ofteninvolvesaneffortthattakesuninterruptedandunrelentinginvestment.

Thegapthatremains,astheJointForcerecognizestheneedtomorefullyunderstandandengagewiththeserelevantactorsduringtheplanningandexecutionphases, isthepaucityof training toreplicate and deliver the right measure of non-lethal elements, perceptions and attitudes thusshapingdesiredbehaviorsofrelevantactors.

TheJCOIEisdirectlylinkedtotheJC-HAMO,aconceptthatlooksatpopulationsandpeoplesmoresystematically.JC-HAMOlistsfourmainobjectives(1)identifytherangeofrelevantactorsandtheirassociatedsocial, cultural,political,economic,andorganizationalnetworks; (2)evaluaterelevantactorbehaviorincontext;(3)anticipaterelevantactordecisionmaking:and(4)influence13thewillanddecisionsofrelevantactors.14Thesefourimperativesarefocusedonrelevant“human”actors—friendly,neutral,andthreateningones.

Importance of Relevant Actors

TheclearestlinkbetweentheJCOIE,theJC-HAMO,andJP2-01.3istheiremphasisontheconceptofrelevantactors,whichareessentiallythehighvaluetargetswithinthehumandomain.15Sowhyarerelevantactorssoimportant?JP2-01.3describesrelevantactorsasthoseactorsin“friendly,neutral,and threatnetworks that coulddelay, degrade, or prevent the joint force fromaccomplishing itsmission,”and those“actorsthatcouldhelp the joint forcemission.”16 Identifying therelevancyofactors goes much farther than solely targeting them with force. Devoting time and energy tounderstandkey leaders,groups,and individualswillhelp influenceonce thesehuman factorsareunderstoodand interpreted.Developing thisunderstanding and replicating this level of depth intraining,educationandleaderdevelopmentisimportantbecausethefutureJointForcewillneedtoidentify,evaluate,and influencerelevantactorstosucceed in futurecampaigns.TheexactphrasefromJC-HAMOisthatthereis“…acriticalandenduringchallengeinwarfare—theneedtounderstand

11JointConceptforOperatingintheInformationEnvironment(JCOIE),tobereleased.12JointConceptforOperatingintheInformationEnvironment(JCOIE),tobereleased13Influencedefinedastheactorpowertoproduceadesiredoutcomeonatargetaudienceorentity.14JointConceptforHumanAspectsofMilitaryOperations(JC-HAMO)15JointPublication3-60,dated31Jan13,pagesviiandviiistates,“Theemphasisoftargetingisonidentifyingresources(targets)theenemycanleastaffordtoloseorthatprovidehimwiththegreatestadvantage(high-valuetarget[HVT]),thenfurtheridentifyingthesubsetofthosetargetswhichmustbeacquiredandengagedtoachievefriendlysuccess(high-payofftarget[HPT]).”16JP2-01.3,pageI-22.


relevantactors’motivationsandtheunderpinningsoftheirwill.Theconceptrecognizesthatwarisfundamentallyandprimarilyahumanendeavor.”17

ThisneedtoidentifyandengagerelevantactorsaspartoftheJIPOEprocessrepresentsanexpansionof previous thinking. Historically, adversarial actors demanded themajority of attention duringplanning andoperations.Nowplannersmust train andpractice todevote increased attention to“relevantactors”thatexistinfriendlyandneutralnetworks,nolongermerelyfocusingonthreatoradversarialactors.

AlthoughtheJCOIEandJC-HAMOarealignedinfocusingontheconceptofrelevantactors,JP2-01.3advocatesamorecomprehensiveviewthanthejointconcepts.Forexample,itexplainstheneedtounderstandnotonlytheconceptofrelevantactors,butalsotheconceptofkeynodes.Keynodesaredirectlyrelatedto[networkandsystem]functionality.

Keynodesareessentiallythehighpay-offtargetsofthehumandomain.18Theyexistineverymajorsystemandsubsystemandarecriticaltothefunctioningoftheirassociatedsystems.Forexample,ahydroelectricplantcouldbethekeynodeinametropolitanarea’spowergrid(asubsystemoftheinfrastructuresystem).Somemaybecomedecisivepointsformilitaryoperationssince,whenactedupon, they could allow the JFC to gain amarked advantage over the adversary or otherwise tocontributemateriallytoachievingsuccess.Weakeningoreliminatingakeynodeshouldcause itsrelatedgroupofnodesandlinkstofunctionlesseffectivelyornotatall,whilestrengtheningthekeynodecouldenhancetheperformanceofthesubsystemandlargersystem.Keynodesoftenarelinkedto,orresidentin,multiplesystems.19

Keynodeswithinhostnationfriendly,neutral,andthreatnetworksincludethosehumannetworknodesthatarecriticaltothefunctioningoftheirassociatedsystems.Thesekeynodesarehumans,anddevelopmentofaplantogather,store,retrieve,andincorporatethesehumanfactorsintocourseof action development and decision-making will provide opportunity for the joint,intergovernmental, and multinational (JIM) communities to more effectively influence thefunctioningofhostnationsystems.Thisdynamic,describedintheJIPOEprocess,mustbeappliedwhenimplementingtheJCOIEandJC-HAMO.ItisanimportantreasonthattheJC-HAMOimperatives“complementanddependontheJIPOEprocess.”20

A Good IO Campaign Influences Actors and Behaviors

"Whenthepublicbelieves themissionwill succeed, then thepublic iswilling tocontinuesupportingthemission,evenascostsmount.Whenthepublicthinksvictoryisnotlikely,evensmallcostswillbehighlycorrosive"

-ChristopherF.Gelpi,PeterD.FeaverandJasonReifler21

17JC-HAMO18JointPublication3-60,dated31Jan13,pagesviiandviiistates,“Theemphasisoftargetingisonidentifyingresources(targets)theenemycanleastaffordtoloseorthatprovidehimwiththegreatestadvantage(high-valuetarget[HVT]),thenfurtheridentifyingthesubsetofthosetargetswhichmustbeacquiredandengagedtoachievefriendlysuccess(high-payofftarget[HPT]).”19Ibid,pageIII-46.20JC-HAMO21ChristopherF.Gelpi,PeterD.FeaverandJasonReifler,"SuccessMatters:CasualtySensitivityandtheWarinIraq,"InternationalSecurity,30:3.


War is the battle ofwills.22 This statement has beenmade bymanymilitary leaders and itwillcertainlybemadeagain.Theidea,asCarlvonClausewitzremindsus,isto“…compelourenemytodoourwill(or)whatwedesire.”SunTzu,authorofTheArtofWar,says“…tosubduetheenemywithoutfightingistheacmeofskill.”Intoday’sOE,wherethecharacterofwarischangingandalldomainsmatter, humanwill, lies in the human and cognitive domain. It is therewhere thewincomes—withoutfighting.Instead,anIOcampaignmustbestrategic,usedcreativelyandholisticallyto influence,modify, or change another’s behavior. This ismuch easier said thandone. Think ofinfluencingarelativeletaloneanunknownadversaryfaraway.Howthen,dowedeterminehowthesenodesthink,behave,orreact?

Behaviorsaresocial,meaningthatthesebehaviorsarelearned,mostnotably,frominteractionwithotherpeopleinvarioussituations.Behaviorsarealsoresponsesofanindividualorgrouptoanaction,environment,person,orstimulus.23Forexample,whenyougreetsomeone,yourbehaviormaybedifferentwithachildthanwithanadult.Youmaynegotiatewithconfident,proudbehaviorormeekbehaviordependingonhowyoulearnedtointeract.Youmaybeinfluencedbynegotiatingwithmenorwithwomendependingonyourbeliefsystem.Sohowdoyougetmoreconfident?Youlearnabouttheartofnegotiationandyoupracticedifferentapproaches,maneuversifyouwill,togettoyes.

Itisalwaysdifficulttounderstandhowpeoplethinkorwhytheyreactorbehaveinacertainmannerorinparticularsituations.Further,ifabehaviororbeliefisingrained,howdoyoufindanotherwaytoinfluenceitbecausechangestothoseembeddedbeliefsystemsaredifficulttoinfluence.Militaryplanning involves, historically, deciding howwewant to fight an adversary. Awell plannedandexecuted IO campaign includes plans for non-lethal maneuvers when dealing with a potentialadversary. By definition, any act—be it diplomatic, informational, military, or economic—is aninterventionintothatcountry’saffairsanddisturbsitssocietalsystems.Militarycommandersshouldconsiderthereasonswhyactorsbehavetowardanyinterventionwhetheritbethroughleafletsorbombs.

Aninterventionofanykindwillsolicitabehavioralreaction,especiallywhenthatinterventionisinitiated from an outside source. Military interventions often evoke fear, misperception, andsuspicion.Therefore, it isessential tounderstandhowhumans intheOEmaybehave inordertoachievedesiredeffects through influenceactivities.Humansreact throughemotionandareoftendifficulttopredict,however,ifyouunderstandunderlyingbeliefornarratives,manyreactionscanbepredicted.Forexample,mostexpertsontheMiddleEastsawtheArabspringasinevitableduetotheincreasingyouthpopulation,minimaleconomicopportunitiesandvariousothersocialfactorsthatexistedinthesesocieties,buttotheirdismay,U.S.federalleadershipwasseeminglycaughtbysurprise. Had they understood the complexity of the OE in these nations, uprisings anddemonstrationsmayhavebeenincorporatedaslikelyactivitiesinstandingplansandorders.Thisplanningwouldhavesupportedamoreeffectiveandcoordinatedresponse.”futurethreats.

Ininfluenceoperations, it ishumanbehaviorthatweseektoaffect.Theinformationenvironmentimpactsalldomains. In thespectrumofdiplomatic, informational,militaryandeconomic(DIME)planning,the“M”istheoftentheprimaryfocusofmilitarycommanderswhilethe“I”orinformationvariables are often viewed as secondary or tertiary in importance. This perspective inhibits theabilityofstaffelementstounderstandrelevantactorsandpopulationsinthehumandomain.Onan

22Will isdefinedhereasdetermination,willpower, strengthof character, resolution, resolve, resoluteness,single-mindedness, purposefulness, drive, commitment, dedication, doggedness, tenacity, tenaciousness,stayingpower.23http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/behavior.html


international security scale, dangerous conditionsoccurwhen the response from thepeople andpopulations is unexpected. For instance, the burning of a Koran in Florida sparked outrage inAfghanistanputtingmanyAmericans,civilians,militaryandalliedpartners,incountryatrisk.IfU.S.IOplanningcouldbecomeasproficientasitscombatplanning,Americanswouldknowhowtoreactor potentially avoid situations like this all together. If we study the “I” in DIME and practicedincorporating theseelements intoourplansandactivities, theability tospot IE indicatorswouldinformouractions.Thisresponsewouldallowteamstobetterinfluencefriendly,neutral,andthreatrelevant actors and key nodes within human networks through both kinetic and non-kineticoperations. Better IO planning will assist commanders in decision-making to produce desiredoutcomesinsteadofunwantedeffects.

Manyassumethatanother’sbehavioralresponseswillalignwiththeirown,butthisassumptionisoftenfalse.Behaviorsandreactionstoinfluenceactivitiesdependonthegeopoliticalrelationshipsamong countries, a person’s culture, religion, upbringing, family circumstances – rich/poor;abusive/coddled-andtheirnarratives.Narrativesimpacthowpeopleinterprettheirenvironment,identity,cultureandhistory.Tounderstandandnotassumehowsomeonemayrespond,awealthofinformationaboutculture,histories, socialnetworks,andbeliefsmustbestudiedanddigestedaswell as the nuances of how societies evolved. Much of this information is available, and onceidentified,informationcanbecollectedtofillgapsandimproveunderstanding.Onechallenge,then,is to findanduse thatinformationtounderstandthereasonsbehindabelieforbehaviorso thatengagement, influence, collaboration, and assessment all feed into planning and engagementactivities.

Moreimportantly,whenworkingoninfluenceandinformationoperations,yourlearnedvaluesorbehaviorsmustbeclearlyunderstoodsothatbiasdoesnotcloudtheabilityformissionsuccess.Itwill relyonyou leavingyourown thinkingat thedoor andputting yourself in the shoesof thatrelevantactor.Byembracingtheirthoughtsandbeliefs,itismucheasierunderstandhowtoinfluencebehaviorsintheOE.

Coordinating Operations

“Foralmostaminutethetwoofuswerelockedinabattleofwillsthathadnopossiblewinner,onlyadifferentorderoflosing.”--MiraGrant,Author

TheNationalDefenseStrategypoints tonations thatuseallelementsofUS foreignpolicy tovetoauthorityovernationsincompetitionotherthanwar.24TheU.S.mustnotstandidlyby.ThesenewdoctrinalreferencesandconceptsmustbeembracedbytheJointForce.IOplanningisgenerallystaff-driven,notcommand-driven.Instead,IOgenerallydonepiecemealthroughIO,MISO,andCAteams.ItisoverseenbytheJ/G-9inaparallelplanningprocessthatmayormaynotbeintegratedbytheinformationoperationscell.

Planning for information operations should be command-driven and included in the centraldevelopmentofoperationalart,operationaldesign,andthejointplanningprocessbecauseinfutureoperationalenvironments,non-combatoperationswillgenerallyhaveanequalorgreaterimpactonachieving enduring strategic objectives than will combat operations. The Joint Force must beresponsibleforconductingfullspectrumnon-combatoperationswiththesamelevelofcompetenceas combat operations; however, this cannot be accomplished when non-combat operations are

24Summaryofthe2018NationalDefenseStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerican:SharpeningtheAmericanMilitary’sCompetitiveEdge,p.1.


excludedfromthefullattentionofthecommanderduringdevelopmentofoperationalartanddesign.By studying current and emerging doctrine as well as joint force concepts, US Army TRADOC’sNetworkingEngagementTeam(NET) isworkingwithvariousgovernment,academicandcivilianpartnerstodevelopamissionfocusedcourseinordertoteachthewarfighterhowtocomplementthephysicalwiththeinformationsideofplanning.

Thisisnotaboutheartsandminds,itisaboutclearlyunderstandinghowthenon-combatinteractionsandrelationshipsaffectthestrategicoutcomeofthecommander’sintent,incorporateitinplanningandgiveimplementationtoolstothoseontheground.TheDecadeofWarStudyhighlightedthispointbystatingthatinbothIraqandAfghanistanforcesfailed,“torecognize,acknowledge,andaccuratelydefine theoperationalenvironment led toamismatchbetween forces,capabilities,missions,andgoals.”TheU.S.continuestooperateinboththeaterswithmanyofthesamehumanchallenges.Thelessonhasnotbeenlearned.JC-HAMOstressesthatbasedonthecentralityofhumanwillinachievinglastingobjectives,U.S.forcesmustlearntoinfluencethewillanddecisionsofallrelevantactors.

Therefore,itisclearthatthoroughlyintegratinginformationoperationsandphysicaloperationsatthestrategic,operationalandtacticalplanning levels iscritical forachievinglong-termgoalsandobjectivesforsuccess.


Part II: How Reliable Are Self-Reporting and Polling Data? A Biopsychosocial Perspective


Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Self-Disclosure

[email protected]

[email protected]

Biological Embodiment, Social Embeddedness, and the Importance of Communication

Humans are biologically embodied (i.e. exist in a physiologic form) and socially embedded (i.e.functionwithinecologiesviapsychological interactionswithothers).As “socialanimals,"humansengagetools(ofinformation/knowledge,language,andvariousinstruments)tofostercooperation(andsomelevelofcompetition)inordertobothaugmentfavorableaspectsoftheirbiology,andtocompensate for thosebiologicalcharacteristicsthathaverenderedvulnerabilitiestosurvivalandflourishing (Benedikter & Giordano, 2011; Giordano & Benedikter, 2012). The capacity tocommunicateretro-andprospection,emotionalstate,andintenthaveenabledhumansconsiderableprowess in optimizingpsychological aspects of social interactions. Given that consciousness andfirst-personphenomenalexperiencearetransparentonlytoself,communicationofcertainfeaturesofcognitivestates(e.g.implicitemotion;intent;etc.),thatis,“self-disclosure”canbevitaltohumansocialengagement.

Self-disclosureisdefinedastheactofsharingpersonalinformationwithothers.Inthecontextofforgingrelationships,peopleshareinformationabouttheirthoughts,feelings,andaspirations,andithasbeenestimatedthatself-disclosureconstitutesapproximately30-40%oftheinformationthatissharedby apersonon anygivenday (Landis&Burtt, 1924;Dunbar,Marriott&Duncan, 1997).Informational sharing isalsobaseduponand requires the ability forperceivingparticular socialenvironments and understanding the nature and extent of self-disclosure that is appropriate forgivensocialcontextsandsituations(e.g.withkin;intimatefriends;strangers;smallorlargegroups).

Self-Disclosure Entails Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Decision-Making and Reward

Having information about oneself, deciding to reveal, what to reveal, to whom, and to forecastpotential reactions todisclosure,entailscomplexdecision-makingprocesses.These involvebrainnetworks that function inself-referentialcognition thatevaluaterelativerisk, threat,andreward(Northoffetal.,2006).Theseentailsubstratesofexecutiveactionandworkingmemory,inclusiveofthalamicandsensorycortical regions(operative insensory integration); theanteriorandmedialcingulate cortex (that function in expectation, and perception of aversiveness); the cuneus andprecuneus (which are involved in valuation responses); prefrontal cortical networks (which areengaged in rational cognition), and septo-hippocampal tracts of the limbic system (operative inmemory andemotional arousal (for overview see:DiEuliis&Giordano, 2017).Aswell, decision-making engages reinforcement and reward mechanisms subserved in part by dopaminergicnetworksoftheventro-tegmental/mesolimbicregions.Ofparticularinterestisthatrecentfunctionalneuroimagingstudieshaveshownthatactsofself-disclosureinvolveactivityofthesesub-corticalrewardpathways, includingthenucleusaccumbensandventraltegmentalarea(Savine&Braver,2010; Tamir & Mitchell, 2012). These same brain nodes and networks are involved in rewardresponses to other stimuli (e.g. food, money, sex), suggesting that acts of self-disclosure engagemechanisms of subcortical and cortical reinforcement, and can be strongly influential to humanbehavior.


Moreover,itisimportanttonotethatwhileself-disclosureinvolvescommunicatinginformationtoothers(i.e.analtruisticaction),processesofreinforcementandrewardtendtoreferentialtofirst-personconsequencesoftheaction—inthiscase,theexpressionandtransferofinformation(i.e.anegoistic component (Avram et al., 2014)). Here, some form of situational and/or relationalreciprocity becomes relevant: in communicating self-referential information, the communicatorcharacteristicallyisplacedinapositionofrelativevulnerability(i.e.cognitiveexposure),andtendstousuallyexpressonlythatinformationthatwillrenderrelativepositivegain.Iftherelationshipisoneof trust, suchperceivedgainsmaybe inmaintaining confidentiality, and/or in reciprocityofaction (such as shared communication or deeds). Thus, a person may consider how sharinginformationaboutthemselveswillmakethemfeelandwhetherthereisanythingtheycangainorlosefromsharing.Apersonmayalsoassesshowthepersontheyarecommunicatingwithmayreactto their self-revelations. In face-to-face interactions, there is an observational context related toemotionsandphysiologicalreactions,includingobservationsoffacialexpression,toneofvoice(i.e.prosody),posture,timing,andintensityofthedialog.

Social Media Can Be a Force-Multiplier for Self-Disclosure

However,theadventofremoteformsofcommunicationhasbeeninfluentialtopatternsofhumaninteraction. Currently, socialmediahaveprovided facileand capableplatforms throughwhich toadvancecommunicativeengagement,inclusiveofself-disclosure.Ingeneral,socialmediaadvancesthescaleofself-disclosureexponentially;whereasface-to-faceself-disclosuremayrepresent~30-40%of interpersonal communication, it has been estimated that socialmediamay increase thisamount to ~80% (Thompson, 2008). Furthermore, social media (like other forms of remotecommunication;e.g.telephoneconversation)mayobviatethecontent/contextintimacyofface-to-facedisclosure.Thisaddedfeatureofrelativeanonymity(anddiminishedriskofretribution)makessocialmediaplatformsevenmoreviableforovertinterpersonalexpression(Xiaoetal.,2016).

This“forcemultiplying”capabilityofsocialmediaisdirectlyrelatedtothecapacitytoengagethereward system of the brain that has been linked to self-disclosure: when using social media,individual users prepare, then share information in the form of texts and images (frequently“selfies”). A recent neuroimaging study of adolescent social media users revealed high levels ofactivityinrewardnetworksofthebrainwhensubjectswereself-disclosingpersonalinformationonthesocialmediaplatform,Instagram.Thisstudyalsosuggestedareinforcing/rewardroleforpeerapprovalinfosteringself-disclosure(Moisalaetal.,2016).Neuro-cognitiveresponsestosocialmediainteractionsaresimilartothoseevokedbyface-to-facecommunicationsofpositiveself-disclosure:ofinterestinthisregardarestudiesthathaveshownincreasedreleaseoftheneuropeptideoxytocin,associatedwithtrustandpositivebonding/interactions,duringpositivesocialmediainteractions,aswellasdecreasesinthestressrelatedhormone,cortisol(Alexander,2015).

However,itisalsoimportanttonotethatcertainpatternsofsocialmediausemayinterferewith,orreduce the capacity formulti-taskactivity,withbothdiminished cognitive control and increasedsusceptibilitytodistractionbyirrelevantenvironmentalstimuli(Rothbart&Posner,2015;Savine&Braver, 2010), with greatest effect observed in children and early adolescents (Ophir, Nass, &Wagner,2009;Moisalaetal.,2016;Fahsen-Paetau,Kohls,&Giordano,2018).Thus,itappearsthatboththepattern(s)andextentofsocialmediausemaybeimportanttodifferentiallyactivateneuro-cognitivemechanismsoperative in reinforcement/rewardand control that function in and focusand/ordistraction.If,andwhencoupledtodecisionalprocessing,engagingsucheffectsmayinducedistinctsusceptibilitiestoself-disclosure.


Finally,studiesofthebrainduringsocialmediainteractionscanrevealimportantunderstandingofhowindividualsnavigatesocialrelationships;individualswhodonothaveatightly-knitnetworkoffriendstendtoexperienceahigherdegreeofnetworkreorganization inthebrain inresponse tosocial exclusion. These findings may suggest differences among individuals in how much theyconsidertheviewsofothers,andhowtheyapproachsocialrelationships(Schmälzleetal.,2017).

Opportunities for the Future

Furthering an understanding of neuro-cognitivemechanisms involved in self-disclosure may beimportanttodevelopingnewwaysoffosteringinterpersonalcommunicationusingsocialmediaandother interactiveplatforms(see, forexample,Scholzetal.,2017).Tools, tacticsandstrategies forinfluencingthefacility,extent,andtypeofself-disclosingcommunicationcouldbeemployedtogetherwithparticularnarrativesinhealthpromotionalprograms,aswellasinformationsupportoperationsof humanitarian, or military value. Additional studies aimed at identifying key features of bothevocativestimuliandindividualandgroupresponseswillbeinstrumentaltosuchprogress.

References

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Avram,M.,Hennig-Fast,K.,Bao,Y.,Pöppel,E.,Reiser,M.,Blautzik,J.,Giordano,J.,&Gutyrchik,E.(2014).Neuralcorrelatesofmoraljudgmentsinfirst-andthird-personperspectives:implicationsforneuroethicsandbeyond.BMCNeurosci15:39.

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Giordano,J.,&Benedikter,R.(2012).Anearly–andnecessary–flightoftheOwlofMinerva:Neuroscience,neurotechnology,humansocio-culturalboundaries,andtheimportanceofneuroethics.JEvolTechnol22(1):14-25.

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Ma,X.,Hancock,J.,&Naaman,M.(2016)Anonymity,intimacyandself-disclosureinsocialmedia.In:Proceedingsofthe2016CHIConferenceonHumanFactorsinComputingSystems(CHINY:ACM,3857-3869.DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858414


Moisala,M.,Salmela,V.Hietajärvi,L.,Salo,E.,Carlson,S.,Salonen,O.,&Alho,K.(2016).Mediamultitaskingisassociatedwithdistractibilityandincreasedprefrontalactivityinadolescentsandyoungadults.NeuroImage,134,113-121.

Monsell,S.(2003).Taskswitching.TrendsCognSci,7(3),134-140.

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Knowing the Terrain: Explicit and Implicit Measures of the Population

IanMcCulloh,[email protected]

LaurieMcCulloh,M.S.Ed.FieldingUniversity

[email protected]

Introduction

Modernwarfare is experiencing a profound and significant change, characterized by the power,speed,volume,digitization,andlowcostofinformation.Thisinformationaffectspeoplerangingfromfriendly,neutral,toadversarypopulations,comprisingbothstateandnon-stateactors.Theresultingstrategicenvironmentoffersaspacewherepoliticalwarfareisofincreasingimportance.AccordingtoGeneralVoteletal.(2016),“politicalwarfareisplayedoutinthatspacebetweendiplomacyandopenwarfare,wheretraditionalstatecraftisinadequateorineffectiveandlarge-scaleconventionalmilitary options are not suitable or deemed inappropriate for a variety of reasons.” Militaryoperationsinthispeace-conflictcontinuumareoftenreferredtoas“GrayZone”operations.Voteletal. (2016) further state that these operations are “population-centric engagement that seeks toinfluence,topersuade,eventoco-opt.”Giventhefocusoftheseeffortsthatdominatecurrentmilitaryoperations and those of the foreseeable future, understanding population-centric knowledge,attitudes,beliefs,intentions,andbehaviors(KABIB)isofincreasingimportance.

Politicalwarfareandgrayzoneoperationsshouldrelyonpersuasion.Persuasionistheintentional,successfulchangeofmentalstate,wherepeoplehavefreewill.Coercionanduseofforceeliminatestheperceptionoffreewill,whichnegatestheeffectofpersuasion,whichensureseffectivelong-termchange.GrayZoneoperationsmusttargetthepopulation’sKABIBvariables.Thesevariablesmustbemeasuredusinganappropriate,valid,reliable,andscientificmethod.

Themodernmilitarycommanderhasmore toolsandcapabilities tounderstandandmonitor theoperationalenvironmentthaneverbefore.Intelligenceandstrategicunderstandinghastransitionedfromatimeofinformationscarcity,whereeffortwasneededtoacquiredata,toatimeofinformationsuperabundance,whereeffortisneededtodiscardlessrelevantdata.Commandersmustthereforeuse the right data to answer their information requirements. For population-centric operations,which are increasingly common, commanders must measure KABIB attributes of variouspopulations.

TherearetwogeneralapproachesformeasuringpopulationKABIBattributes,explicitandimplicit.Explicitmethodsdirectlyasktherespondentfortheirjudgmentofanattitudeobject.Thesemethodsmeasure conscious, intentional, easy-to-report features, and usually consist of direct questions,surveys,orpolls.Implicitmethodsmeasureunconscious,involuntary,andoftenunknownfeaturesandusually consist of physiological orbehavioralobservationandmeasurement.ThispaperwilldiscusssomeofthestrengthsandlimitationsofexplicitmeasuresofKABIBandwhentheiruseisappropriate. Strengths and limitations of implicitmeasures are also discussed,with a particularemphasisonrecentadvancesinneuroscience.

Explicit Population Measures

Explicit measurements of population are commonly used in support of diplomatic and militaryoperations.MethodsmayrangefromgeneralpopulationsurveyscommissionedbytheDepartmentofStateortacticallydevelopedsurveystosupportmeasuresofeffectivenessinamilitaryinformation


supportoperations(MISO)campaignorseries.Civilaffairsforceswillpollindigenouspopulationstobetteraddresscivil-militaryoperationsandconcerns.HumanterrainteamswereusedthroughoutAfghanistanandIraq,providingamorescientificandanthropologicalapproach.Stillotherunitshavecommissioneddefensecontractorstoconductatmospherics,respondentdrivensamplingofeliteandhardtoreachpopulations,andevenopensourceresearchontheinternet.Acommonquestionraisedistheveracity,ortrustworthinessofexplicitpopulationmeasures.Thekeyshortcomingisthattheexplicitmeasureonlyprovidesanestimateoftherespondent’sattitude.Itfailstoprovideinsightintothebeliefsthatmayliebehindtheattitude(O’Keefe,2016).

Whilemanymayquestionthevalidityofdatathatisself-reportedbyhumansubjects,thereisastrongtrackrecordofsuccess.Perhapsthestrongestsupportofexplicit,self-reporteddataisthatitreportswhatnooneelseknows(Baldwin,2000).Forexample,ifacommanderisinterestedintheattitude(affectorliking)amongvillagerstowardthepresenceofmilitaryforcesintheirtown,thesedataarenotrecordedinsomeonlinearchive.Thedataresideswithintheheartsandmindsofthevillagers,soyoumustgotothevillagerstoacquirethedata.

Thereisperhapsagreaterdangerinrelyingonobservedbehaviortoimplicitlymeasureattitude.Therearemany factors thatcontribute tobehaviorchangeandattitude isonlyone.Wemay, forexample, observe a reduction in tobacco smokingby young adults either through a reduction incigarettesalesorphysicalobservationatlocaldiningestablishments.Attributingattitudinalcause,however,ismoredifficult.Istheobservedreductionduetonewlawsprohibitingsmokinginside?Isitduetomoreeffectivewarninglabelsontobaccoproducts,ortheeffectivenessofpublicserviceannouncements? Perhaps it is due to the increased use and popular acceptance of vaping ormarijuanause.Themosteffectivemeasureofattitudetowardstobaccointhiscaseislikelyanopinionpoll.Understandingthesourceofbehaviorchangeisimportantforsustainingandexploitinggainsinournotionalsmokingcessationexample.

Self-reporteddatacanbehighlyaccurate.Objectiveevidenceoftheaccuracyofexplicitmeasuresisfound inseveralapplicationareas.Okuraetal. (2004) foundgreater than90%accuracy forself-reporteddatawhenpeoplewerereportingmedicalhistory.Intheirstudy,theycomparedpatientreportsofmajormedicaleventswiththemedicalrecordsheldbytheirhealthcareprovider.DelBocaandDarkes(2003)foundreliableself-reportforalcoholconsumption.Thereexistsalargebodyofresearchthatsupportsthevalidityofself-reportdataformeasuringdelinquencyandcrimestatistics(Hindelangetal.,1981;Sampson,1985;Wyner,1981;Hardt&Petersen-Hardt,1977;Huizinga&Elliott,1983).

There aremany critics of explicitmeasurement of attitude (Allport, 1927; Dunning et al., 2005;Hindelangetal.,1979;Tourangeau&Smith,1996;Wilson&Schooler,1991;Nisbett&Wilson,1977).Data collected from human subjects and archival data measure different domains, leading todiscrepancybetweenthetwosources.Itisnotclearthatarchivaldataisuniformlysuperior.Errorsmayexistinhowdatawasentered,biasincollection,amongotherthreatstovalidity.Someerrorsinself-reportdatahavebeenattributedtocognitivelimitationsorthemeasurementofsensitiveissues(Hindelangetal.,1979).Tourangeau&Smith(1996)arguethatself-reportdataisnotaccurateformeasuringthenumberofsexualpartnersorencountersinwhichsubjecthaveengaged.Theysuggestthatthepersonalandsensitivenatureofsexualrelationsmayaffecthowtruthfulrespondentsareinreportingtheirdata.

Explicit,self-reportedmeasurementismoreeffectivewhenquestionsaskconcreteobjectivefacts,suchasthenumberofhospitalizationsorincarcerations,subjectageandmaritalstatus,orwhichpolitical candidate they voted for in the last election. Questions requiring a subject to exercise


introspectionarelesseffective(Wilson,2002).Accuracycanalsobeaffectedbyhighautomaticity(Mils&Hogan,1978;Paulhus&Levitt,1986).Otherfactorsincludeanchoringeffects,primacyandrecencyeffects,andtimepressure.Culturallytabooquestionswillalsonegativelyaffectthereliabilityofdata.

Subjectsmayhavevariedmotiveswhenparticipatinginstudiesorsurveys.Theirresponsesmaybeaffectedduetotheirself-perception(Robins&John,1997).Theymaystriveforconsistentreporting,thereby obfuscating small or recent changes in attitude. Explicit instruments that measureperformance(Johnson,2004)oftenhavebias.Manytimes,subjectmotivesinnon-responseandthesubsequentinterpretationofmeaningisbiased(Tourangeau,2004).Self-reportinginthecontextofface-to-face interviews generate additional problems such as the effects of self-consciousness,rapport,transference,andmodeling.Focusgroupsfurtheraddpressuresofsocialconformity(Asch,1956;McCulloh,2013).Inmostcases,therespondentswillactuallybeunawareoftheirownbiasandpressuretoconform.

Thedesignofexplicitmeasurementinstrumentsrequirestechnicalexpertiseinbothmeasurementtheory and cognitive psychology. Often times multiple items are used to assess an attitudinalconstruct and mathematical measures of internal consistency are used to verify accuracy andincreasereliability.Poorlyconstructedcompositemeasures,however,mayobfuscatetherealintentofquestions.Indirecttechniquesusequestionsthatdonotdirectlyaddresstheattitudeofinterest,butrathermeasurethewayinwhichasubjectresponds.Forexample,theNarcissisticPersonalityInventory(NPI)(Raskin&Hall,1981)usesquestionsaboutperformanceandotheritemstoassesshowsubjects rate themselves relative toothers.This approach indirectlymeasures their level ofnarcissism.Openendedquestionscanoftenrevealgreaterinsightintoattitudesandbehaviors,buttheymustbehand-coded,whichcanleadtootherformsofbias.

Responses also vary across different cultures and respondents may not interpret self-reportquestionsasintended(Hamamuraetal.,2006).Chenetal(1995)demonstratedamoderatebiasandambivalenceinsurveyresponse.Whenconductingcross-culturalsurveyresearch,itisimportanttoensureaccurate linguisticandculturaltranslation.Forexample,an instrumentwritteninEnglishmustbetranslatedintothetargetlanguageandthenback-translatedbyanindependentinterpretertoascertainwhethertheback-translatedandoriginalinstrumentareconsistent.Additionalcognitivetestingmustbeconductedinthetargetlanguagetoensurethatconstructsholdsimilarmeaningforthetargetpopulation.Compositescalesmustbeverifiedforinternalconsistency.

ExplicitmeasuresofferapowerfultoolforunderstandingKABIBfeatureswithinapopulationandtheyarecriticallyimportantforstrategicunderstanding.Asmilitaryoperationsbecomeincreasinglypopulation-centric,theireffectivenesswillhighlydependuponthesuccessfuluseofthesemethods.Measurement is a technical science, however, andshouldnotbe left toamateurs todevelop andconduct. There are inherent strengths and limitations to any method and those overseeingpopulation-centric measurement must be aware of these strengths and limitations in order toproperly employ measurement instruments and make effective resource and risk managementdecisions.

Implicit Population Measures

Implicitmeasuresofpopulationestimatefeaturesthatmaybeunconscious,sensitive,orinsituationswhereexplicitmeasuresareproblematic,suchasrequiringdeepintrospectionorwherearesponderisunawareoftheirinternalworkingsorisembarrassedbytheirbeliefs.“Implicitmeasuresarelikelytobemostattractive incircumstances inwhichone fearsrespondentsmay, forwhateverreason,


distort their true attitudes. (O’Keefe, 2016, p.9).When implicitmeasures arebeing recorded, therespondentshouldnotknowwhatisbeingassessed.Themeasurementtoolsuseindirectmethods.Mostofthesemethodsrelyonbehavioralindicators,biometrics(sweat,heartbeat),orneuroscienceapproaches (brain activity). The most common approaches are perhaps eye tracking andpupilometry. Eye trackers can locatewhat specific features of content or stimulus that increaseattention.Whenthesestimuliarecarefullydesigned,theyprovideinsightintounconsciouselementsof attention. Pupilometry works with many eye trackers and provides insight into emotionalresponses tostimulus. Increasinglyneural imagingsystemscanmeasurebrainactivity invariousregions associated with different types of cognitive response. These methods provide majoradvancesinbothourunderstandingofhumanattitudeandcognitionaswellastheabilitytomeasurehumanresponseatthecognitivelevel.Thesemethodsformthecoremeasurementtoolsofneuralmarketingcompaniesthatcontinuallyemerge.

Thereexistawiderangeofneuralmeasurementsystems.Acompletereviewofthesesystemsiswellbeyondthescopeofthispaper.Itisworthmentioningthreepotentialsystems,however,toexploretradeoffsincapability.Electroencephalography(EEG)measureselectricalsignalsinthebrain.TheEEGhasexcellenttemporalresolution,inthatitdetectsbrainactivitywithinmillisecondsofstimulusexposure,butitdoesnotoffermuchinformationregardingwhichbrainregionsareactiveorwhatcognitive processes may be involved. It is therefore difficult to assess whether a subject isexperiencinganemotionalorrationalresponse,forexample.Thislimitationisoftenmitigatedbycombiningitwithotherbiometrictoolssuchaseyetrackers,heartratemonitorsandothertools.TogetherEEG,eye-tracking,andbiometricsprovideapowerfulsystemforimplicitmeasurementofpeople.

A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) system measures brain activity based theelectromagnetic properties of blood flow in the brain. When brain regions become active, theyrelease chemicals known as neurotransmitters. These chemicals must be replaced for futurepotentialactivation.Thiscanbeobservedbymeasuringtheincreasedbloodflowtobrainregionsthatwererecentlyactive.Thistypeofsignalisreferredtoasblood-oxygenleveldependent(BOLD)signals.WhileBOLDsignalsoffer improvedspatial resolutionoverEEG, theyofferpoor temporalresolution.ThismeansthatfMRIsystemscanlocatespecificbrainregionsinvolvedincertaintypesof human cognition, but the observed signalmay be delayed several seconds from the stimuluspresentation. fMRI is a powerful tool that allows neuroscientists to understand how the brainprocessesinformationandinteractswithothercognitivefunctionstoaffectattitudeandbehavior.

AnunfortunatelimitationofthefMRIisitslargesizeandexpense.fMRIsystemslackportabilityandoften affect ecological validity. Ecological validity refers topotentialmeasurementbiasoccurringbecausetheenvironmentforexperimentationdifferssodrasticallyfromnormalconditionsunderwhich peoplemight experience stimuli. Functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) offers animprovementoverthesize,cost,andecologicalvalidityissues.fNIRSmeasuresBOLDsignalsbasedonopticalpropertiesinsteadofelectromagneticproperties.AnfNIRSsystemisoften5%ofthecostoffMRIandnewlyminiaturizedsystemscanfitinacoatpocket.ThespatialresolutionoffNIRSisnotas good as fMRI and many inner brain regions, often associated with emotional response areinaccessible. fNIRS can, however,measure several key accessible regionswith greater ecologicalvalidity.

TherearedisadvantagesforusingneuralimagingsystemsforassessingimplicitmeasuresofKABIBfeatures.Thisprocessisreferredtoas“reverseinference”(Poldrack,2006).Intraditionalinferenceofbrainactivity,itmaybeassumedthatagivenstimulusonlyinvokesasingleneuralprocess.Thus,observationofbrainactivityinaparticularbrainregionisassumedtosignalapsychologicalprocess


in response to that stimulus. The problem is that a stimulus might initiate multiple cognitiveprocessesthatinteractinunusual,complexways.Therefore,activationobservedinabrainregionassociatedwithoneparticularcognitiveprocesscannotprovethatthecognitiveprocessisactive.Thatsamebrainregionbeingobservedmaybeusedinadifferentprocessentirely.

Aclassicexampleof reverse inferencewasreported in theNewYorkTimesduringthe2008U.S.electionseason.Iacobonietal.(2007)measuredtheneuralresponseofsubjectsviewingpoliticalcampaignspeeches.Theyidentifybrainactivityinregionsassociatedwiththelimbicsystem,whichislinkedtoemotionandaffect.Theyarguedthatthebrainactivityallowedthemtoinferaffectivefeelingsthatsubjectsheldofcandidatesinthecampaignmessages.Aronetal.(2007)criticizedthefindings in theNewYork Times arguing that the Iacoboni findingswere not peer reviewed anddisagreed with the assertion that the brain activity could predict political party affinity on thegroundsofreverseinference.Iacobonidid,infactpublishhisfindings(Kaplanetal,2007),however,this public debate highlights potential criticisms of neural imaging application to implicitmeasurementofKABIBfeatures.

There have beenmany scientific studies since the Iacoboni-Aron debate that support the use ofneural imaging methods to implicitly measure neural processes associated with influence andpersuasion(Berns&Moore,2010;Falk,Berkman,&Lieberman,2012;Falk,Berkman,Whalen,&Lieberman,2011).Akeyfactorthatsupportsthesefindingsistheinclusionofadditionalbehavioralor physiological data to increase measurement validity, scientific validity, and external validity.Neuralimaginghasbeendemonstratedasaneffectiveimplicitmeasurepredictingmusicpurchase(Berns&Moore,2010)andsmokingcessation(Falketal.,2011,2012).TheuseoflargeandcostlyfMRIsystems,however,continuetolimittheirwiderapplicationformeasuringpopulations.

Recentadvancesinneuralimagingtechnologiesareopeningnewopportunitiesforpractical,appliedneural imaging insupportof implicitpopulationmeasurement. fNIRSprovidesa lowcost,highlyportable,andeasytousetechnologyformeasuringkeybrainregionsassociatedwithinfluenceandpersuasion (McCulloh, 2016;2017).MatthewLieberman has been able to replicate several fMRIstudiesinhislabatUCLAunderaresearchgrantprovidedbytheU.S.AirForcesOfficeofScientificResearch (AFOSR) Trust and Influence program managed by Benjamin Knott. Recent work iscurrently being conducted in Amman, Jordan to evaluate the cross-cultural suitability of thetechnology.Asthisworkcontinues,thepossibilityofmilitaryunitsusingthisorsimilartechnologytomeasurepopulation-centricvariablesbecomesareality.

Conclusion

AsmilitaryconflictsareincreasinglyfoughtintheGrayZone,population-centricwarfarewillbecomeevenmoreimportantthanitisalready.TheDepartmentofDefensemustdevelopandmaintainthecapabilitytounderstandkeyKABIBattributesofstrategicpopulations.ThesesamemethodsmustbeappliedtomeasuringtheeffectivenessofUSoperations.TheU.S.hasacriticalgapinthenecessaryskills,technology,andcapacitytomeasurepopulation-centricvariables.Militarycommandersoftenlack the experience with explicit and implicit measurement tools to understandmission criticalissuesorholdconfidenceinthefindingspresentedbytheirstaff.

This paper reviews the strengths and limitations of various approaches to explicit and implicitmeasurementofapopulation’sKABIBvariables.Directsurveysarevalidandprovideanimportanttoolforunderstandingthepopulations.Theyofferamoredirectmeasuretounderstandindigenouspopulations than institutionalized alternatives within the intelligence community. There aresituations, however, when explicit measures may face threats to validity. These situations may


includesensitivetopicssuchasreligionorsupporttoextremism.Theymayinvolvemoredifficultcognitiveconstructssuchasnarcissism,anomie,andlocusofcontrol.

Threats to validity can be mitigated with multiple sources of data, multiple approaches tomeasurement,andwith investment inqualifiedexperts todesign,conduct,andanalyzeresearch.Implicitmeasuresprovideacompellingalternativetoexplicitmeasuresforunderstandingdifficulttomeasurevariablessuchasattitudeandbehavioralintention.Advancesinneurosciencetechnologymakeimplicitmethodsincreasinglyaccessibletomilitarypractitioners.Traditionalintelligencealsomaintainsaroleinprovidingcriticaldatatosupportunderstanding.

Commandersandtheirstaffmustutilizeamixtureofdatasources,measurementtechniques,andanalyticmethodologiestomeetmodernchallenges.Theymustinvestintrainingandeducationforthemselvesandtheirstaffsinordertoproperlyconsiderthevastamountofdatathatisavailable.Certainly,theyshouldneversummarilyrejectmeasures,becausetheyfeelthemethodisuniversallyflawedorbecausetheydonotunderstandhowtoproperlyuseandinterpretthedata.IftheUSistomaintain dominance in the future, they must ensure planners are familiar with the properemploymentofexplicitandimplicitmeasuresinpopulation-centricwarfare.

Acknowledgement

ThisworkwassupportedbytheOfficeofNavalResearch,GrantNo.N00014-17-1-2981/127025.

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Remote Behavioral Assessment: Political Psychology Methods

JasonSpitaletta,Ph.D.(Maj,USMCR)TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory

[email protected]

Introduction

Amongthemanyapproachesintounderstandinghowaparticularaudience,inthiscase,anaudienceofone,thinksareremotebehavioralassessments.Theseapproaches, largelydevelopedinclinicaland later, political,psychologyhave longbeenusedbyUS intelligence agencies.The first remotepsychologicalprofileofaforeignleaderwasledbytheOfficeofStrategicServices’WalterC.LangerincollaborationwithHenryA.Murray(HarvardPsychologicalClinic),ErnstKris (NewSchool forSocialResearch),andBertramD.Lawin(NewYorkPsychoanalyticInstitute).TheirtargetwasAdolphHitler,andtheirreport,APsychologicalProfileofAdolphHitler:HisLifeandLegend,wasavitalpieceofintelligencethatsupportedAlliedpsychologicalwarfareeffortsandmilitarydeceptionoperations.Murray also authored a separate piece that took the remote analysis a step further suggestingadditionalapplicationsoftheeffort(Murray,1943).

SinceWorldWarII,numerousacademicandoperationalmethodsofassessingleadershavebeendevisedandimplemented.OSD-SMAhasincorporatedanumberoftheseapproachesintovariousWhitePapersinrecentyearsincludingstudiesofBasharal-Assad(Spitaletta,2014a)andtheIslamicState(Spitaletta,2014b)whileotherssuggesttheincorporationofsuchmethodsintocontemporaryapproachestoMilitaryInformationSupportOperations(MISO)(Spitaletta,2013;Spitaletta,2016).Thefollowingpaperprovidesabriefoverviewofsomeofthosemethods.

Trait/Motivational Approaches

EarlypsycholinguisticapproachestopersonalityanalysisdatebacktoWalterWientraub’sworkwithclinicalpopulationsinthe1960s.Wientraubemployedcontentanalyticmethodstoidentifysyntacticstructureinpatientresponsestoambiguousstimuli(givenduringprojectiveassessmentssuchastheThematicApperceptionTestorTAT)andclinical interviewsandhasappliedtheseapproachestolinguistic analyses for decades (1986). David Winter’s (2003) motivational analysis of politicalbehaviorappliedsimilarcontentanalysistocodeforneedforachievement,power,andaffiliationtodetermine a leader’s interpersonal behavioral preferences (Immelman, 2005). In MargaretHermann’straitanalysisof leadershipstyle,eachtrait isassessedthroughcontentanalysisoftheleader’spublicstatementsaswellasothersecondarysourcesofinformation.Althoughbothpreparedspeechesandstatementsfrominterviewsareconsidered,thelatterisgivenpreferencebecauseofitsspontaneity.Thedataarecollectedfrominterviewsandanalyzedorcontentcoded,andthenaprofileisdeveloped.Theprofileisthencomparedwiththebaselinescoresdevelopedforthedatabaseofleaderscores.Oneisconsideredtohavehighscoreonatraitifheorsheisonestandarddeviationabovetheaveragescoreforallleaders.

Hermann’sworkexploitsthestablepatternsorpersonalitytraitsvicethepsychopathologymodel(Hermann,1980).Hermann’smethodassessesleadershipstyleasafunctionof1)beliefthatonecaninfluenceorcontrolwhathappens(self-efficacy);2)need forpowerand influence;3)conceptualcomplexity,ortheabilitytodifferentiateamongthingsandpeopleinone’senvironment(relatedbutnotidenticaltointelligence);4)self-confidenceorself-esteem;4)theintensitywithwhichapersonholdsanin-groupbias;5)generaldistrustofothers;and6)taskversusrelationshipfocus.


Sincenosingleaspectdominatesbehavior,Hermann(1980)analyzeshowcombinationsof theseaspects lead to certainobservablepatternsof behavior.The combinationof beliefsandneed forpowerandinfluenceoftendetermineswhethertheleaderwillchallengeorrespectconstraints.Thecombinationofconceptualcomplexityandself-confidencedetermineshowopenaleaderwillbetonew information andnew ideas.The extent of their in-groupbias andgeneral distrust of othersprovidesevidenceconcerningaleader’smotivation,particularlywhethertheleadermaycoordinateorformcoalitionswithothergroups.Theleader’soutlookabouttheworldanditsproblemslargelydeterminestheconfrontationalattitudeoftheorganizationandmayhelppredictwhethergroupswill espouse violence. A leadership trait analysiswas included in Cabayan andWright’s (2014)assessmentofBasharal-Assad.

Cognitive Approaches

Operationalcodeanalysishastransformedfromamanualprocesstonear-automated(withhumanintheloop)processes.Regardlessofthemeans,cognitiveapproachesassumeperceptionandbeliefsaremoreeasilyinferredthanpersonalitygiventheavailabilityofdatasources(oftentranscriptsofspeeches,letters,orthepersonalcommunicationsofaparticularleader).Theintegrativecomplexityapproachtopoliticalpersonalityassessmentisanextensionofoperationalcodeanalysisinthatitismorerootedincognitivepsychologyandsocialcognitionthaninpersonalitypsychology(Immelman,2005).Contentanalyticalmeasuresofintegrativecomplexitycanbeappliedtoverbal(orwritten)materials to assess the extent to which the individual can differentiate and integrate multipleperspectives on a particular issue. Low integrative complexity correlateswith cognitive rigidity,wheretheindividualiseitherunableorunwillingtoconsidervaryingframesofreference(Simonton,2006).

A variety of content analytic approaches, to include various methods to measure cognitivecomplexity,wereemployedinCabayanandWright’s(2014)assessmentofBasharal-Assad.Whilethe approaches did not necessarily identify identical findings, the areas of convergence provedsufficiently illuminating to provide unique insight into Assad’s thinking and/or specificrecommendationsabouthowtodealwithhim.AsimilarapproachwasincludedinintoSpitaletta’s(2014b) comparative assessment of Zawahiri and Baghdadi, which helped quantify some of thedifferencesinthetwojihadistleader’sapproachestopublicstatements.

Personological Approaches

AnotherapproachtoremoteleadershipanalysisisTheodoreMillon’spersonologicalmodel.Aclinicalcriticismoftheaforementionedapproachesisthattheydonotadequatelyincorporatedisciplinesofpersonalitytheoryandpsychodiagnostics(Immelman,2005).Millon’stheoryofpersonalitywastheintellectual driver behind theDSM-IV AxisII personality disorder diagnostic criteria (whichwasremainedlargelyintactintheDSM-V)aswellastheMillonClinicalMultiaxialInventory(MCMI),awidelyusedpersonalityassessment.Millondivides thepersonality into functionaland structuralattributes.Functionalattributesaretheprocessingandmodulatingfeaturesofthepersonalitysuchasbehavior,cognitionsandperceptions,and intrapsychicregulatorymechanisms.Thereare fourfunctionalattributes:expressiveacts(observablebehavior),interpersonalconduct(howindividualsinteractwithothers),cognitivestyle(perceptions,attention,informationprocessing,organizationofthoughts),andregulatorymechanism(unconsciousprocessestoresolveneeds,protecttheego,andmediate conflicts) (Immelman, 2005). Structural attributes are the enduring components of thepersonality that help define one’s worldview. There are four structural attributes: self-image(perceptionofoneself/identity),objectrepresentations(interactionwithmemoryanditsinfluenceoninformationprocessing),morphologicorganization(structuralstrengthandinternalcohesionof


the mental system), and mood temperament (how one interacts with and processes emotion)(Immelman,2005).

Psychodynamic Approaches

FromLanger’s team’s initialwork through today, remotepsychodynamicassessmentshavebeenemployedtodetermine“whatmakesaleadertick”(Langeretal,1943).Psychoanalysisisbasedonthepropositionthatmuchofmentallifeisunconscious,thataperson’spsychologicaldevelopmentisimportant for understanding their current state, and that psychological distress derives fromunresolvedintrapsychicconflict.Psychoanalyticstudiesofnarcissismandparanoiahaveshedlighton the personalities of some leaders (Victoroff, 2005). Those studies have contributed to bothacademicandoperationalapplicationsofpsychodynamictheories.

Post’s (2010) integrated political personality is rooted in the objects relations school ofpsychodynamictheory.Hisapproachentails:1)apsychobiographicaldiscussiontoputthesubject’slife in the appropriate political context; 2) an analysis of the individual’s personality using anynumberofremoteassessmentmethods(manyofwhicharediscussedinthispaper;3)thesubject’sworldview, an attempt to describe the contemporary operating environment from the subject’sperspective;4)leadershipstyleorhowthesubjectgoesabouthisorherduties;and5)outlook,andintelligence-basedapproachtoassessinghowthesubjectislikelytobehaveinspecific,operationally-relevant,circumstances(Post,2010).ComponentsofanintegratedpersonalityprofileonZawahiriincludedinBosetal.(2013)studyoftheclandestinecomponentsofinsurgencies,wasincorporatedintoSpitaletta’s(2014b)comparativeassessmentofZawahiriandBaghdadi.Post’s(2010)integratedpoliticalpersonalityprofilingmethod,whilemorelaborious,allowsfortheincorporationofmultipleremoteassessmentmethods.

Conclusion

This brief paper presents a—by no means exhaustive—set of approaches to remote behavioralassessmentsof individuals.Theseapproaches typicallyemerge frompoliticalpsychologyandaregenerallyappliedtowardforeignleaders.However,withtheeven-increasingavailabilityofpersonaldataontheInternet,thesesameapproachesmaybeappliedtoaverageindividuals(Spitaletta,2013).Whilethereissomeevidencethattheseapproacheshaveoperationalutilityatthemacro(Post,2010)andmicro(Spitaletta,2013)levels,furtherexplorationofthesubjectiveutilitywouldbeworthwhile.PoliticalpsychologyresearchersareregularlyimprovingupontheseandotherremotebehavioralassessmentmethodsandpublishingtheirworkandleadershipanalystswithintheUSintelligencecommunity are likely doing the same. Both scholars and practitioners could benefit from acomprehensiveresearcheffortidentifyingtheeffectivenessofremoteassessmentmethods.

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Winter,D.G.(2003).Personalityandpoliticalbehavior.InD.O.Sears,L.Huddy,&R.Jervis(Eds.),Oxfordhandbookofpoliticalpsychology(pp.110-145).NewYork,NY,US:OxfordUniversityPress.


The Neuroscience, Psychology and Practice of Target Audience Self-Report

Dr.NicholasD.WrightUniversityofBirmingham,[email protected]

ThemilitarychallengeoftheJointConceptforOperatingintheInformationEnvironment(JCOIE)25ishowto“integratephysicalandinformationalpowertochangeormaintaintheperceptionsandattitudes that drive desired behaviors of relevant actors.” That is, how to influence your targetaudience.Idefineinfluenceasameanstoaffectanaudience’sbehaviour,perceptions,orattitudes.26Influencecanbeachievedbydeterrence,persuasion,‘nudge,’ortheuseofhardorsoftpower.Akeyfeatureofinfluenceisthataudiencescanchoose,whichdistinguishesinfluencefromthedirecteffectsofbruteforcethatremovestheabilitytochoose.27Measuresoftargetaudiencederivedfromtheir“self-report”arecentraltothischallengeintwoways.

Firstly,influenceeffortsmustbetailoredtotheaudiencetomaximiseintendedeffect.Organisationsshouldadoptanoutside-inmindset,whichmakestheaudience’sdecision-makingprocessthefocusoftheinfluencestrategy.ToinfluenceanAfghanfarmernottogrowpoppy,orifweseektodeteranadversarystate, the influencermustconsiderthatcourseofactionand itsalternatives fromtheirperspective.Thisincludesrealistic,conscious,andunconsciousaswellasirrationalmotivations,suchas fear, fairness, and identity. Self-reportmeasures help us understand that calculus (Figure 6).Secondly,onemustassesstheimpactofinfluence.Manymethodsareneededtomeasuretheimpactofinfluence–andself-reportiscentraltomanyofthem.

Inthefollowingsections,Iconsiderwhathumanscanself-report—andhowreliablethosereportsare—fromtheperspectiveof:(I)neuroscience;(II)classicpsychology;(III)historicalcases;and(IV)thepracticeofmeasuringimpact.Ifinally(V)summarizepolicyimplications.ThroughoutInoteself-reportmeasures’significanceinGreyZoneconfrontations—morethannormalcompetitionbetween

25U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Draftv.080Sept12017,p.vi26Formoredetaileddiscussionofinfluence,powerandthinking“outside-in”see(Wright,2017).27Relatedtothisdistinction,e.g.(Schelling,1966)p.xiv

Figure6.TheAudienceDecisionProcess(Wright,2017)


statesbutlessthantraditionallythoughtofaswar(Wright,2017)—thatcentreonperceptionandinfluence.

(I) Metacognition: the neural machinery of self-report

First,Idescribefivecentralpointsfromthelatestneuroscienceevidence.

(1)Humanbrainscontainpowerfulmachineryforself-report(Figure7).Metacognitionisthehumancapacity for “thinkingabout thinking” (Fleming etal., 2012a; Frith, 2012).Metacognitionplaysacentral role in decision-making by facilitating the monitoring and control of behavior, and thecommunicationofsubjectivebeliefstoothers(e.g.,“Howcertainareyou?”).Thisiscriticalinenvironmentswithabsentorsporadicfeedback, characteristic of many real-world scenarios.Metacognition can also be applied to the thought of others, inwhich case it is calledmentalizing.Metacognitionenablesus toreflectonandjustifyourbehaviourtoothers(seealsoGiordanoandDieuliisthisvolume).

(2)However,brainstructureandfunctionalsolimitsmetacognition.Thereisalimiteddegreetowhich“higher”partsofthebraincanlookintoandbossaround“lower”partsofthebrainthatcanbecriticalforpowerfulmotivations(Berridge,2004).Indeed,classicevidence shows that evenwhen humans freely choose tomovetheirhandthat therelatedbrainactivityprecedes theconsciousfeelingofdecidingtomoveit(Haggard,2017).

(3)So,metacognitionmatters,butwhatarethecomponentsofmetacognition?Idiscusstwoimportantaspects.

Thefirstisintrospectiveaccuracy:howeasilyonecandistinguishbetweenbeingrightorwrongonatask.Convergentevidencefromstudiesofbrainstructure(usingMRI),brainfunction(usingfMRI)and brain damaged patients have identified anterior prefrontal cortex as key formetacognitivecomputation (Figure7) (Fleming etal., 2010,2012b,2014). Specifically, individualswith greaterintrospectiveaccuracyhadgreatergreymattervolumeinthisbrainregion(Flemingetal.,2010).

Thesecondisone’slevelofconfidenceinadecision.WhenIwasadoctorlookingatchestX-rays,forexample,Icoulddecidewhetherornottherewasevidenceofalungmalignancy,andthenIcoulddecidehowconfidentIwasinthatdecision(i.e.“thinkingaboutmythinking”).Recentworkidentifiedabrainnetworkincludingstriatumandfrontalcortexinvolvedincomputingconfidence(Flemingetal.,2012b;DeMartinoetal.,2013).

Assessing how confident an individual is about their self-reported judgements may be a forcemultipliertoincreasethepredictivepowerofself-reportdatainpopulations:

(i) Measuringconfidencemayimprovepolls’predictiveaccuracy.Strikingly,theoutlyingpoll28correctlypredictingTrump’selectionasPresidentinthe2016askedrespondentstogiveprobabilities,whichcapturedtheambiguityoftheirchoice.

28http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-polls-20161109-story.html

Figure7.ConvergentevidencesupportsarolefortheorbitoPrefrontalcortexinintrospectiveaccuracy.


(ii) AmbiguityandlowconfidenceinperceptionsiskeytoGreyZoneactivities(e.g.“littlegreenmen”).Indeed,theRussian“firehoseoffalsehood”approachseekstoreduceconfidenceinfactsbydelugingthemwithalternatives.Whenperceptualconfidenceisakeytargetofadversaryinfluencecampaigns,weshouldmeasureit.

(iii) Confidenceprovidesametricforhowlikelyaudiencemembersaretochangetheirmind.Forexample,theObama2012electioncampaignbigdataanalysiscomputedmeasuresakintoconfidence29–andaskingaboutconfidencewillbeusefulinpopulationswithoutsuchbigdata,andmaybecheapereveninpopulationswithit.

(4) Metacognition varies considerably between different individuals in populations. This can becapturedinbehaviorandbrainstructure(Flemingetal.,2010;Wrightetal.,2012).

(5)Whetherkeyaspectsofmetacognitionvarybetweenculturesispoorlyunderstood–andrequiresfurtherresearch.Priorresearchinpsychologyhasidentifiedpromisingavenuesforinvestigation.Forinstance,anumberofstudieshavefoundthatChinesesubjectsaremoreoverconfidentthanboththeirAmericanandJapanesecounterpartswhenreportingconfidenceingeneralknowledge(Yateset al., 1989, 1997, 1998). However, such early measures of confidence conflated performance,confidenceandmetacognitiveaccuracy(Fleming&Lau,2014).Thiscross-culturaldimensioniskey.Indeed,theJCOIEstressesthesignificanceofanaudience’sworldviewthat“isamentalmodelofreality--a frameworkof ideasandattitudes.Thebeliefs,values,narratives,andbehaviorsofaculturearederived from, and inform, theworldviewof a relevant actor.”30Butmorebasicandapplied cross-culturalresearchiscritical.

(II) Behavior-attitude gap: one factor shaping audience behavior

Asecondandlargelyseparatebodyofevidencefrompsychologyhasalsoexaminedtherelationshipofattitudes(e.g.obtainedviaself-report)andbehaviors.Suchworkshowsthatanumberofdifferentfactors can shape audience behavior and decision making. Understanding these factors aidsdevelopment of targeted influence approaches. Key examples include identity, age, education,attitudes,education,personality,andculture.Thus,forexample,self-reportedattitudeswillonlybeoneinputdrivingbehavior.

1.Attitudesinfluencebehavior,butthereisanimportantattitude-behaviorgap:Attitudesareexplicitorimplicitevaluativejudgementsaboutanabstractorconcreteobject.Importantly,thereisoftenabiggapbetweenattitudesandactualbehaviour(Ajzen,1991).However,carefullyusingattitudinaldatacanhelpaudienceanalysisandinfluence.Inparticular,attitudesbetterpredictbehaviourwhenthey are strong,more confidentlyheld, less internally inconsistent, lessambivalentandeasier torecall(Glasman&Albarracín,2006;Maio&Haddock,2009).Unformedorambiguousattitudesaremoresusceptibletoinfluence.Suchfindingsonconfidenceprovideconvergentevidencewiththosefromneuroscienceabove.Again,thissuggeststhatusingthesequantitiesmaybeaforcemultiplierintheacquisitionofpopulationdata,andagaintheyarekeyquantitiesintheGreyZone.

29 Tufekci, Z. ‘Beware the Smart Campaign’ New York Times (online), November 16 2012. Available athttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/opinion/beware-the-big-data-campaign.html?_r=1 [Accessed 31stMarch2016);Beckett,L.EverythingWeKnow(SoFar)AboutObama’sBigDataTacticsinPropublica(online),November 29 2012. Available at http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-obamas-big-data-operation[Accessed31March2016]

30U.S.DepartmentofDefense,Draftv.080Sept12017,p.16


(b)Attitudescanfollowbehaviours:Behaviourchangecanitselfchangeattitudes(Maio&Haddock,2009).Asanexample,changingenergyconsumptionbehaviourleadstocontinuedenergyefficientbehaviour, even after the initial incentives have been removed (Pallak et al., 1980). Thus, theunidirectionalaccountintheJCOIEmaybeaugmentedtoincludethisadditionaltool.

(III) Historical cases and the significance of whole population attitudes

Considerable evidence suggests that public opinion, although not formally polled, helped driveinadvertentescalationbefore the two largestconflictsbetweenEuropeanpowers from1815and1939.Inbothcasesescalationbetweenthestateswasinlargepartinadvertent,aswouldlikelybethecasebetweenmajorpowerstoday.

Firstwas theCrimeanwar(1854-6) inwhichsome800,000soldiersdied. Itwas foughtbetweenBritain,France,andTurkeyononesideversusRussia.Noneofthemajorpowerswantedwar,butprolongedescalation from1852-4 led toconflict.AcriticaldriverwasBritishpublicopinionthatdrove key British decision-makers—many of whom including the Prime Minister and ForeignSecretarywishedtoavoidwar—toanumberofescalatorystepstowardswar.31

SecondistheriseofAnglo-Germanantagonism in the decade and ahalfbefore1914.Publicopinioninboth Britain and Germanycrystallizedintoaprofounddislikethatagaindrovepoliticalrealitieswithinwhichkeydecision-makersonbothsideshadtooperate.32

In neither case did we havemoderntechniquesformonitoringpublic opinion – but for examplewe can now examine modernpublic opinion in multiple EastAsiansocieties.The toppanelsofFigure 8 shows profound recentJapanese disfavor towards Chinaand little change in morefavourable ratings of the U.S. Thebottom panels show Indonesianopinion more finely balancedbetweentheU.S.andChina.Subtleaspects of public opinion may bedifficulttocapturewithself-report

31Forgeneralhistoriesseee.g.(Rich, 1990; Baumgart, 1999; Figes, 2011).ForafocusonBritishpublicopinionsee(Martin, 1963).

32Thecontributionofpublicopinion isnoted throughout thisperiod in theseminalworkonrisingAnglo-GermanAntagonism(Kennedy, 1980).Forarecenttreatmentofpublicorpressopinionseepp.226-39in(Clark, 2013).

Figure8.Self-reportedopinionsabouttheU.S.andChinaconstraindecision-makersinkeyAsianstates.Fullquestionwording:“Pleasetellmeifyouhaveaveryfavorable,somewhatfavorable,somewhatunfavorableorveryunfavorableopinionoftheUnitedStates/China.”Theplotscombine"veryfavorable"and"somewhatfavorable",aswellas"veryunfavorable"and"somewhatunfavorable.“DatafromPewResearchCenter.http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/group/7/[Accessed:06February2018]


pollssuchasthese,buttheydocapturebrutepoliticalfacts.Indeed,whilstmanycriticizepollingformissingclosecalls,suchasBrexit,actuallypollingoftencorrectlypredictsthebigpicture.33GreyZoneconflictsinherentlyoccuratmultiplelevelsincludingbroadnationalscaleslikethesedowntolocaltargetaudiences,inwhomonemaywishtoplanorevaluateaninfluencecampaignasthenextsectiondescribes.

(IV) Measuring the Impact of Influence using self-report

Many methods are needed to measure the impact of influence.34 Self-report is central to manymethods–andreliability (e.g.acrosscontexts) isa toughchallenge forallmethodsregardlessofwhethertheyinvolveself-report.Thechoiceofmethoddependsonanumberoffactorsincludingthespecificinfluencestrategy,thetargetaudienceandfactorsavailabletomeasure.

QualitativeandQuantitativemethods:Self-reportiscentraltobothtypesofmethods.Qualitativemethods involve social research that does not rely on comparing quantities, for instancewherequantitative surveys of populations do not permit detailed analysis of tastes or emotions, or ofunknownunknowns.Methodsincludefocusgroups,ethnographies,interviewsorcasestudies.Thesemethodsareoftenusefulfor“how”or“why”questions(Kingetal.,1994).Quantitativemethodsarethe rangeofmathematical and statistical techniquesused to analysedata.That is, they comparenumbers.

Convergentmethods:Strongerconclusionscanoftenbemadebyusingmultiple,complementarymethods. For example, a good case involves the real-world study of an intervention to promotereconciliationinRwanda(Paluck,2009).Thatstudyusedthequalitativemethodoffocusgroups,thequantitativemethodofsurveystomeasureperceptions–andmeasuredbehaviour.

Measuringbehaviouralchange:Measuresoftenrequirecleveracquisition,forexampleobservingparticipantsafteraninterventionwhenparticipantsbelievetheirbehaviourisofftherecordasintheRwandanexampleabove.

Measuringattitudesandperceptions:Attitudesandperceptionscanbeidentifiedusingmethodssuchasquestionnaires.Caveatsarisefromtheinconsistentrelationofattitudestobehaviour,andwell-knownbiasesinvarioussamplingmethods.35

Measuring interventions against adaptive adversaries: Many important targets of influencecannotbeevaluatedinthemoreclassicalwaysdescribedabove–andakeyexampleisinterventionsagainstadversarieswholearnandadapt.Considerthetypesofpoliticalreformsthatwerecentraltoinfluence efforts and failures in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kleinfeld, 2015). Success in such politicalreformsoftenrestsonamassingpoliticalsupport,overcomingrepeatedcyclesofreformandcounter-reformwithadaptiveadversariesandinvolveshighlyinterdependentpoliticalvariablesthatarehardtoseparate.

Multipleevaluations–beyondmeasuringoneimpactinoneintervention:Inthelong-termitiscritical that, where possible, key lessons and findings from an evaluation are available to other

33 Many Brexit “poll-of-poll” trackers correctly called the broad result that the vote was very close, e.g.https://ig.ft.com/sites/brexit-polling/.34Thissectiondrawson(Wright,2017).35(Pauletal.,2015)Chapter9


practitionersandcontributetotheaccumulationofknowledgefromacrossmultipleprojects.Thisarisesforfourreasonsthataffectreliabilityofself-reportornon-self-reportmeasures.First,findingsmay not replicate even in ideal conditions, andmany sciences now face this “replication crisis”(Begley&Ellis,2012).Second,testtheinterventionacrosscontexts,askeycontextualvariablesmayrenderaninterventionineffective.Third,commonsensechangestotheinterventionmayradicallyalter itseffectiveness, sonewversionsof interventionsshouldbeevaluatedagainwhenpossible.Fourth,multipleinfluencestrategiesareoftendeployedsimultaneously.Singleevaluationsstruggleto tease apartmultiplepotential causal factors,which canbedoneby reviewing acrossmultipleevaluations,forexamplebysystematicreviewormeta-analysisandusingself-reporttoask“why”questions.

(V) So what? Implications for policy and practice

(1)Metacognition:theneuralmachineryofthinkingaboutthinking(a) Self-reportismeaningfulandtherewillalwaysagapbetweenself-reportandbehavior.(b) Utilisespecificaspectsofmetacognition.E.g.confidence(howconfidentanindividualis

intheirjudgment?)maybeaforcemultiplierintheacquisitionofotherself-reportpopulationdata,andisitselfakeyquantityintheGreyZone.

(c) Weneedmoreresearchonvariation/commonalitiesbetweencultures.(2)Classicpsychology

(a) Attitudesandbehaviorsmatter–extremeviewsthatonlyoneortheothermattersareincorrect.Thisisconvergentevidencebetweenpsychologicalandneuralevidence.

(b) Behavioralchangecanchangeattitudes–andthustheunidirectionalaccountintheJCOIE(attitudesdrivebehavior)maybeaugmentedtoincludethisadditionaltool.

(3)GreyZoneconfrontationsoccuratmultiplelevels(e.g.nationalpopulationsorlocaltargetgroups),andsotoomustanalysisofattitudes.Forinstance,measurenationalpublicopinionofkeyalliesandthirdpartiesthatconstrainsnationaldecision-makers.(4)Measureimpactsofinfluencecampaignsusingself-report

(a) Measuringbehaviorisbestwherepossible(e.g.ratesofpoppyfarming,onlinechoices)butoftenself-reportisveryuseful(e.g.electionpolling,favorabilityratings)andmaybetheonlyfeasiblemetric.

(b) Self-reportmayprovideinformationtoexplainbehavior–understandingmechanismsorreasonsforbehaviorcanbeimportanttodesigninterventions.

(c) Convergentevidencefrommultipleself-reportmethodsand/orbehaviorisoftenmorepowerfulthanonemethodalone.

(5)ScientificfoundationsoftheJCOIE(draftv.0.80,Sept2017)(a) TheJCOIEcontainsamodelofattitudesandperceptionsdrivingbehaviors:

(i) Operationalizethisbycombiningwithacognitivelyrealisticaccountoftheaudiencedecisioncalculus,e.g.asinFigure6here(Wright,2017).Thisisalsoconsistentwith,forexample,theDeterrenceOperationsJointOperatingConcept(DoD,2006)andrelatedapproaches.

(ii) Useevidence-basedtoolsforbehaviorandattitudechangefromdisciplinessuchaspublichealth,criminologyandsecuritystudieswhereappropriate(Wright,2017).

(b) TheJCOIEstressestheimportanceofworldviewsandsocio-culturalprisms–butapplyingthisrequiresnewrobustcross-culturalresearchonkeyaspectsofself-report,e.g.onconfidence.

Table2.Policyimplications


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Part III: Advantages, Limitations, and Pitfalls of Social Media


Digital Participation Roles of the Global Jihad: Social Media’s Role in Bringing Together Vulnerable Individuals and VEO Content

MargeretHall,[email protected]

GinaLigon,Ph.D.UniversityofNebraskaOmaha

[email protected]

ClaraBraunUniversityofNebraskaOmaha

[email protected]

ViolentExtremistOrganizations(VEOs)haveposedsecuritychallengesfordecades.However,inthemodernera,withtheadventofmorelethalweapons,globalmobility,andimprovedcommunicationmethods (e.g., open social media), the span and impact of these groups grows from regional toworldwideviatheironlinebrand(Ligon,Harms,&Derrick,2015).Thus,thesecybertechnologieshaveincreasedVEOlethalityandmessagingreach(Derrick,Sporer,Church,&Ligon,2017)andarebecominganever-increasingpartoftheportfoliosofVEOs(Denning,2010).Historically,accesstoresources allows wealthier nation-states and other large organizations to build and maintaininfrastructures in comparison to their smaller, less prosperous counterparts.With the advent ofparticipatory internettechnologiesandthepromulgationofopenand free internetarchitectures,however, less technical infrastructure is required for smaller or resource-poor organizations tocommunicateandconductoperations.Whiledigitalizationinitiallyactedasasupplydriverofthisphenomenon,theadventof‘digitalnatives’(generallyspeaking,thosebornafter1980)reversedtheequation and the move to ubiquitous online presence and content has become a demand-lednecessityforgroupscommunicatingonline(Niemeyer,Hall,&Weinhardt,2016).Thisnewparadigmof highly connected, low-cost communication technologies has simultaneously offered suchorganizationsaccesstoresourcesthatfurtherbenevolentormaliciousgoals(Derricketal.,2017).Terroristgroupsusethesetechnologiesinavarietyofways,suchasgroupdecision-making,cyberfacilitatedfinancing,recruitment,enabled(remote-control)attacks,andpropagandadissemination(Derrick,Ligon,Harms,&Mahoney,2017).

VEOcontentsharingisneatlyformattedfordigitalnativesinawaythatmakesvulnerableyouthfeellikestarsof theirownactionmovies(Pape&Gunning,2016).Yetdespite itsprominentplace inpublic discourse, a basic understanding of how digital media content influences individuals toparticipateinpropagatingVEOcontentislacking.Emergingqualitativeapproachesidentifywhichdigitalmediacontentinfluencesindividualstoadoptextremistbeliefsandbehaviors(Derricketal.,2017;Pelletier,Lundmark,Gardner,Ligon,&Kilinc,2016).Thischapterproposesinvestigatingthepathwaytoextremistbeliefsandbehaviorsfromtheperspectiveofthedigitalparticipationlifecycle(Li&Bernoff, 2011), considering the transition fromviewing to activelyparticipation in contentdissemination.Toillustratethevarietyofrolesuserscanplayindigitalcommunities,wehighlighthowavarietyofindividualsassociatedwithSalafist-inspiredJihadhavemanifestedrolesspanningLurkerstoCreators.

Participation in Digital Communities

Broadly speaking, participation on the Internet and social media has a looped dependency.Individualsrelyonconnectedtechnologiestoreceivecontent,whereconnectedtechnologiesrelyonindividuals tocreate thecontent that ispropagated(Bishop,2007;Malinen,2015).Conceptually,contentiscreated,thenconsumed.OneissueinthecurrentdiscoursescenarioinsocialmediaaswellasVEOresearchisthatsocialmediacontentissimultaneouslytreatedasbothaninputandanoutputvariableformeasuringuserbehavior.AmorematuretheoreticallensinvestigatesVEOsocialmediafromtheperspectiveofhowusersengageorparticipatewiththecontent.Thisallowspractitionersandresearcherstoclassifyuserbehaviorgiventheirengagementwithsocialmediacontent.While


the figure below may connote movement between the levels based on increasing commitment,individual differences (e.g., backgrounds in graphic design, degree of leadership) could driveindividualstomovemorequicklythroughthelevels.Thekeyconsiderationisthattherearefarmorelurkersthantherearecreatorsinonlinedigitalcommunities(Li&Bernoff,2011):

Inthefollowingdiscussion,weconnecttheliteratureondigitalparticipationroleswiththesocialmedia activities of violent extremists. In this discussion, we highlight notable individuals whomanifest attributes described by Li and Bernoff (2011).36 This schema has alternatively beendescribedasaladderorapyramid.Thereareprogressivelylessactiveindividualsthehigherthelevelofparticipationisrequired;itshouldbenotedthatanindividualcanbedifferentiallyengagedindifferentcommunitiesandmayfindthemselvesinoneofmanyrolessimultaneouslyindifferentcommunities.Bylinkingcontent,behaviors,andusers,itispossibletoestimateescalatingbehaviorsbymappingtypesofactivitiesbyindividuals.Networkscienceisausefulapproachformappingtheescalationofindividualbehaviors.

Connecting the Digital Participation Lifecycle and VEO Social Media Content

Socialmediaandcontentsharingtechnologiesareidealforgroupswithunknownfollowings,asitenablesproducersofcontenttohaveaone-to-manyreachwithpotentialfollowers(Li&Bernoff,2011). VEOs (ISIL inparticular) have capitalizedon this by disseminating varying content typeswhich are potentially relevant to an unknown, international, vulnerable audience. Derrick andcolleagues classified 37 different content types produced and disseminated by ISIL in theiradvertisingandrecruitmentcampaigns(Table3).Thevarietyandfrequencyof thecontenttypes

36InactivesarenotrepresentedinthisdiscussionasitisnotpossibletoestimatethenumberofpeopleintotalwhoareonlinebuthaveneverhadaccesstoVEOcontentonthe(social)web.

Figure9.Digitalparticipationroles.


speaks to the sophistication of VEO content producers in disseminating enticing content for anunknownaudience.

Quran Media Shame

Legitimacy Justify Apocbattle

Caliphate Leader Cyber

Education Territory Hijrah

Violentitems Militaryops Hisbah

Mujahideen Shahid(Martyr) Repent

Apostate Helpinglocals Diyya

Antiwest Destroyproperty Ribat

Jihad Bayat Training

Sharia Destroybyenemy Villageldr

DestroybyISIS Motivate Lonewolf

Atrocities Manuals

Mohammed Baghdad

Table3.ManuallycodedresultsofVEOcontentscrapedfromopenarchitecturesandEnglish-basedsocialmedia(D.Derricketal.,2017).Wordsdisplayedoncreatedsocialmediacontentarelistedinorderoffrequency.

User-specifictailoringhasbecomemoreimportantwiththeriseofsocialmediaoutreach,as‘brands’thatdonotexcite theiraudiencesrisklosingnetwork traction.Followerswhotakean interestinsocialmediacontentmorethoroughlyconsumethepresentedinformation(Schacht,Hall,&Chorley,2015).Contentengagementiscriticalforgrowingsupportandrecruitmentthroughtheinternet.

Lurkers

Thediversityofcontenttypesalsoindicatesthevarietyofwaysthatgroupscanmovepassivecontentconsumers (lurkers or spectators) into joiners. Lurkers are generally the largest of any onlinecommunity. They are classified as content consumers who are otherwise inactive in radicalbehaviors.Whileanargumenthasbeenmadethatparticipationisdichotomous(thusanyviewingofcontentshouldbeconsideredactiveparticipation(Malinen,2015)),thisisanoversimplificationoftheproblem.Bothintheoryandpractically,thereisdifferencebetweenanimpactofseeingmaterialsandusingorpropagatingmaterials.Lurkingandallformsofgeneralexposurearetantamounttothematerial’sreachandimpressionscount,andnotclicksotherreturnoninvestmentmetrics(Schachtetal.,2015).

Duetotheirlackofengagementwiththecontent(e.g.,sharing,downloading,commenting),itisnotpossibletoestimatetheextenttowhichlurkersareconsumingcontentforinterest,valuesalignment,


researchorothermotivations.DuetothenatureofVEOcontent,itisalsopossiblethatlurkersarenotstakeholdersbutmayactuallybeintelligenceagenciesorcompetinggroups.ThisfactdrivestheneedforVEOcontentontheopensocialwebtobeattractiveenoughtofurtherenticeusers’joiningbutnotsospecifictoongoingoperationssuchthattheymaybedisrupted.Forthisreason,muchoftheonlineplanningandcoachingthathappensisdonewithencryptedservicesandnotontheopensocialweb (Ligon et al., 2017). In our technical report in 2017 to the Studies of Terrorism andResponsestoTerrorism(START,UniversityofMaryland),weidentifiedthatthemajorityofVEOsrequiredsometypeof log-in toviewcontent,which indicates thatmostmembersof JihaddigitalcommunitiesquicklymovetotheJoinerstage(Ligon,Logan,Hall,Derrick,Fuller,&Church,2017).

Joiners

Joinersmayeithertransitionfromlurkingorjointhedigitalcommunitydirectly.Thisisgenerallyunderstood to be driven by usermotivation andnetwork structure.Motivation can be linked tointerests or values. Specifically, the focus on religious content and community reflects valuesactivation(seeTable3),whereasinterestsmaybeanycombinationofthecontentavailableorevendrivenbydesiretodigitallybelongtoaspecificgroupaffiliation(Lindner,Hall,Niemeyer,&Caton,2015).Groupaffiliationisinthiscaseanumbrellafunctionwhichaddressesbothinterestsoftheuserandthenetworkstructuretheybelongin.

Network structures are highly pertinent to Joiners’ transformation into active users. While thelikelihoodanindividualwillshareincreasesmonotonicallywithexposure,explicitfeedbackabouthowmany friendshavepreviouslyshared the same content increases the likelihoodofanactiveresponse.Friendsand‘influencers’(veryactivenodesinthesocialgraph)activateotherusersandhavethehighestimpactonnetworktiesandtheirbehavior.Thepositioningofcontentonauser’sinterfacestronglyaffectssocialcontagion(Schachtetal.,2015).EstimatingthepropensityofonenodeinagraphtotransitionintoanactivenodeisfeasibleusingGranovetter’stheoryofthestrengthof weak ties (Granovetter, 1973). His theory has been used to track peer-based diffusion byidentifyingconstrictionsandcontractionsacrossnodesandedges(Granovetter,1973).Thesedatareasonablycanbe,buthavenotbeen,extrapolatedforonlineradicalization.Networkmodelstracethespread individual influence.Assuch,networkstructuresareusefultoconsider fordiscerningactivation(ascomparedtolurking)alongtheparticipationspectrum.

OneexemplarofaJoinerisSaddamMohamedRaishani(akaAdamRaishani),whowasarrestedafterattemptingtofleetheUnitedStates(Bucher,2017).Mostofevidencerelatedtothiscaseinvolvesaudio recordings of Raishani discussing his allegiance to ISIS, his desire to travel overseas, andinformation about how he had helpedanother flee abroadas a foreign fighter. According to thecriminalcomplaintrelatedtoRaishani’scase,37hehaddownloadedandusedawebbrowser thatallowstheusertoconcealonlineactivities.DuringoneoftherecordedconversationswithFBIagents,Raishanistatedthatheusedthebrowsertoviewjihadivideos.InaMarchmeetingwithundercoveragents,Raishaniwasprovidedwithalaptopwherehecoveredthecameraandmicrophone,woregloves, and deleted all jihadi content after viewing it. Beyond utilizing the web browser anddownloadingvideos,Raishani’sonlinefootprintwasminimal,indicatinghefittheprofileofaJoinerinhisdigitalcommunity.

37 United States of America v Saddam Mohamed Raishani. 18 U.S.C. § § 2339B & 2.


Collectors

AsopposedtoseeingdigitalmediacontentorjoiningadigitalJihadcommunity,collecting,storing,owning and/or disseminating extremist materials is a direct violation of criminal statutes. Thisrepresents(knowinglyornot)anescalationinradicalbehavior.Collectorstransitionfromjoiners:

they are already activated by VEOcontent and now are activelyworking to further organize anddisseminate it. Collectors are notcreators.Theydonotgeneratenewororiginalmaterials. Collectorsarethose who clone and fork digitalrepositories. They also collatecollections of interest for thebroadercommunitytoaccess.Thisisa particularly critical group formaintaining the pipeline of non-indexed websites (i.e., justpaste.it)(Ligon et al., 2017), as well as formaintaining clear and openpathwaystosaidcontent.Figure10containsasamplescreenshotofhowCollectors accomplish this pathwaymaintenance. Collectors are secondonly to creators in terms ofmaintaining the visibility of VEOcontentonthesocialweb.

The value of individual collectors(nodes) in the social network is

contingentupontheirbetweennessandclosenesswithotherhighvalueindividuals(nodes)inthesocialgraph.Betweennessisthelikelihoodofapersontoserveasthemostdirectroutebetweentwoothers.Closenessofnodesisameasurementofthespeedbywhichinformationisdisseminatedinanetwork. Collectorswithhighbetweennessand/or closenessscores are especiallywell-poised tobroadlydisseminatecontent.ThispropensityincreaseswhentheyareconnectedtoCreatorswithahigheigenvectorscore.Eigenvectorscoresmeasurehowwellconnectedan individual istootherwell-connectedindividualsinanetwork.Thosewithhigheigenvectorscoreswillbewellconnectedwithsuspectsofterrorisminvestigations(Brooks,2011).

Collectorsare critical for the formingof ‘smallworld’networks.These arenetworks thatappearalmostrandombutexhibitsignificantlyhighclusteringcoefficients(i.e.,nodesthattendtoclusterlocally)andarelativelyshortaveragepathlength(i.e.,nodesthatcanbereachedinafewsteps).Sucha network will have many sub-clusters but be joined by many bridges between clusters whichshorten the average distances between individuals and other sub-networks. For these reasons,Collectorsarestrategicallyrelevant targets forshuttingdownthepipelineofVEOcontenton thesocialweb.

Khalid Ali-M Aldawsar exemplifies a Collector role (Bernstein, 2011). During the time of hisradicalization,SaudiimmigrantAldawsarwas20yearsoldandfailingoutofhischemicalengineeringprogramatTexasTech.Whenhewasarrested,hewasabusinessstudentatSouthPlainsCollegein

Figure10.AnexampleofdisseminatingVEOcontentontheplatformYouTube.Imagetakenfrom:“UploadKnights”:HowTerroristsSlipBeheadingVideosPastYouTube’sCensors.https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/xyepmw/how-terrorists-slip-beheading-videos-pas


Lubbock,TX.HisFacebookpostsprogressedfrombeingpositiveabouthislife,theUnitedStates,andlikinggirlstocriticallydiscussingU.S.andIsraelforeignpolicy.Onepersonalblogpostexplainedhowheexcelledacademicallyinhighschool,earnedascholarshipthatallowedhimtobesenttoAmericawhere he intended to learn English, learn to build explosives, and target U.S. citizens. Collectingbehaviors ranged from accumulating guides and materials for making bombs and to acquiringinformationabout selecting targets.Using three email addresses, he senthimself summariesandstoredtheminacommonlocationbeforewritingabouttheminhispersonaljournal.

Critics

‘Critics’asastageintheparticipationlifecycleisaslightmisnomer.WhileCriticsmaycriticize,theyareknownforcontentevaluationorreviewing.Criticsarealsothe‘experts’inmaturesocialsystemsthat set the standardsof engagement andbehaviors (Lampe, Johnston,&Arbor, 2005).They aretantamounttomoderatorsofsubredditsorverifiedpurchasersone-Commercesites.Criticstakeontherolesofdiscoursemanagementinforumsandposts.Discoursemanagementornormsettingisafactorinestablishinglikeness(orhomophily)withinthegroupandfornewentrants(lurkersandjoiners).Astrongestablishedidentitycanleadtotheformationofhomogeneousgroups(clusters)where facilitating direct relationships is easier. It must be remembered that Critics respond tocontent, rather than create content themselves. Critics shape and refine the messages andconsequentlyinfluenceitsmeaning.

TheyarethecommentersonYouTubeandtheactiveretweetersofVEO‘influencers’ontwitter.AtthisstageofactivationCriticsvalidatetheorganizationsbyinteractingwithVEOasitwereanysocialmediacontent.Criticscomment,discuss,andevaluateVEOcontentinthesameveinasthetwitteratiorredditorscomment,discuss,andevaluateontheirrespectiveplatforms.Contentengagementatthislevelservestomakethesocialnetworkdenser.Densityisameasureoftheconnectionsbetweennodesinasocialnetworkandservesasanindicatorofpopularityorinfluence.Densityisacriticalmetricasinformationindensenetworkscanflowmorequickly.Inthecaseofnon-indexedwebsitesorcontentthatisinviolationoftheTermsandConditionsofaplatform,aswiftflowofinformationcanmorequicklysupportCollectorsintheirdisseminationofVEOcontent.

AnexampleofaCriticisNicholasMichaelTeausant,whoactivelyengagedacrossseveralsocialmediaplatforms.38Teausanthad accountson severalsocialmediaplatforms, includingAsk.fm,Google+,Facebook, Tumblr, and Instagram. During the time of his arrest, hewas 20 years old andwas acommunitycollegestudentinStockton,CA.ANationalGuarddropout,TeausantcommunicatedwithanundercoverFBI agent, statingheplanned tobomb theLosAngelessubway system.Hissocialmediaaccountswereplaguedwithanti-Westernmessages,callingforviolentaction.HewasarrestedforattemptingtofleetoCanadainthehopesofmakingitabroadasaforeignfighter.BelowaresomeofhisInstagramcomments:

May31,2013:userAssadTeausantbigolsmurfposted:@don-quadlol"don'tgetmewrongIdespiseamericaandwantitsdownfallbutyeahhaha.LolIbeenpartofthearmyfortwoyearsnowandIwouldlovetojoinAllah'sarmybutIdon'tevenknowhowtostart."

38 UnitedStatesofAmericav.NicholasMichaelTeausant.Caseno.2:14-MJ-0064DAD;7June2016.CaliforniaManSentencedto12YearsIPrisonforattemptingtojoinISIL.DepartmentofJustice:OfficeofPublicAffairs.


August5,2013:userAssadTeausantbigolsmurfposted:AnyoneknowwhereIcangetthe"loneMujahidpocketbook"#alqaeda#jihadist#jihad#islamicpridetimuslim#mashallah#islam#allah#AllahuAkbar#thelonemujahid

Creators

Thereare far fewercontentcreatorsthanconsumers (Li&Bernoff,2011).Socialmedia’sone-to-manycontentprovisionisbuiltuponthismodel.Creatorsaretheleastcommonindividualsinthedigitalparticipationlifecyclebutarelynchpinstothrivingcontent-basednetworks.Contentcreationentry points can include blogging, online fundraising, ideological campaigns, active recruitment,videoorothermediacreation,oractiveparticipationinorganizationaldecision-making.Thereisnota linearprogression through the digital participation ladder or a known entrypoint for contentcreators,otherthanidentityvalidationbytheorganization.Oncevalidated,Creatorsdirectlyengageincontentcreation.Themorematuresocialnetworkordigitalcommunitiesare,themoretheyallowforthisimmediateprogression.Inotherwords,theirskillsmayallowthemtostartatthetopofthedigitalcommunitypyramid.

JosePimentelexemplifiesaCreatorrole(Goldstein&Rashbaum,2011).Pimentelmaintainedhisownwebsite(www.trueislam1.com)withbomb-makinginstructionsfromInspireMagazine,andhealsopostedhisownrecipes.Hispersonalwebsitecommunicatedanti-Westernpropaganda,ultimatelycalling for violent action against the United States. “Pimentel talked about killing U.S. militarypersonnelreturninghomefromIraqandAfghanistan,particularlyMarinesandArmypersonnel,”Mr.Kellysaid.“HetalkedaboutbombingpostofficesinandaroundWashingtonHeightsandpolicecarsinNewYorkCity,aswellasapolicestationinBayonne,N.J.Oncehisbombingcampaignbegan,Mr.Pimentel said thepublicwouldknow that thereweremujahideen in the city to fight jihadhere”(Goldstein&Rashbaum,2011).

Summary

Standardanalyticalmodelsarebuiltontheassumptionthatengagementwithsocialmediacontentisbinary–content iscreated,andcontent isreceived(Malinen,2015).Empiricalandtheoreticalmodelsincreasinglyshowthatparticipationindigitalcommunitiesisactuallyaspectrum(Bishop,2007;Li&Bernoff,2011).Thismorenuancedviewallowspractitionersandresearcherstobetterdiagnosewhereindividualsareintheirengagementwithincommunitiesbymeasuringtheirtypesofengagement,ratherthantheoutputofcontentcreated.Italsocorrectsthecurrentanalyticalissueinsocialmedia analysis,which is the use of socialmedia content as an input and output factor ofanalysis.Analyzingthepersonintermsofwhichstageofparticipationtheyarecurrentlyinismorepertinent in terms of stopping the progression of extremist beliefs and behaviors. WhereastraditionalanalyseswouldsuggestCreatorsshouldbethefocusofdisruptionactivities,thisanalysissuggests that there is an entire pathway of participation with VEO content. At each stage ofparticipation thereareentry(andexit)pointswhichcaneffectivelystop the flowofcontentandinformation dissemination. Escalating behaviors along with their qualifying activities helppractitionersandresearchersmoreaccuratelyclassifythedifferencesbetweenLurkersandthosewhomoreactivelycreatemalevolentcontent.

Acknowledgement

This project has been funded in whole or in part with Federal funds from the Department ofHomelandSecurityunderBOANo.HSHQDC-17-A-B0004,TaskOrderNo.HSHQDC-17-J-00504.Thecontentof thispublicationdoesnotnecessarilyreflect theviewsorpoliciesof theDepartmentof


HomelandSecurity,nordoesmentionoftradenames,commercialproducts,ororganizationsimplyendorsementbytheU.S.Government.

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The Next Frontier: Moving Beyond Social Media into Sociotechnical Space

LauraSteckman,PhDTheMITRECorporation [email protected]

The Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) community participated in a panel discussion onDecember13, 2017, entitled “ExploitationofTechnology:TechnologicalAdvances andTerrorismAdaptationPotential.”Duringthequestionandanswersession,thepanelistsandparticipantsagreedthatusingtechnologytounderstandforeignenvironmentsrequiresafusionofmulti-vectorpubliclyavailabledata sources.Theoverall conclusionacknowledgedtheover-privilegingof socialmediadata,suchasrelianceonTwitter,asthesolesourcetoconveydataaboutthecognitiveaspectsofanenvironment. Italsopointed tohowresearchers,whethergovernmentoracademic,can improvetheirapproachestounderstandingforeignpopulationsbycombiningsocialmediawithotherdatasources.Combiningmultipledatasourcesisthenextmajormilestoneinunderstandingpopulations,assuchresearchmovesbeyondsocialmediatoencompasslarger,morerobustsociotechnicalspaces(i.e., spaces that are simultaneously social/sociological and technical/technological, such ascyberspacewhenitinvolveshumaninteractions).

Whendecisionmakersrelyonresearchbasedsolelyonsocialmedia,itpresentsinherentoperationaland intelligence challenges.While socialmedia can contain valuable insights to understanding apopulation’sbehaviorsanddecisionmakinginspecificcontexts,usingitasthesole,orevenprimary,data source limits understanding. Few populations reach 100 percent internet and socialmediausage;thepercentageofsocialmediapenetrationvarieswidelybycountry.Socialmediausersarepeoplewhoself-selectedtointeractthroughspecificdigitalmediaplatforms.Whereandhowtheyinteract are influenced by personal, social, and cultural preferences. Because of individualpreferences, social media produces non-random samples—which can be biased due to selectiveparticipationevenwhenexaminingalargevolumeofmessages.Consequently, suchdatasamplesmaynotbegeneralizabletoaregionalornationalpopulation.Thesesamplessometimesfunctionasanamplifierforexaminingbeliefsandbehaviorsthatmightbemicroscopicinawidercontext,ormayonlyrepresentaminorthemewhenviewedwithawiderlens.

Socialmediaanalysesoftenrequireevenmorecautionsandcaveatswhenusedtoaddressnationalsecurityissues.Manyofthecurrentapproachestopopulationanalysesrequireimprovedtheoreticalandmethodologicalapproaches.Theywouldbenefit further frombeing fusedor integratedwithotherdatasources.

Socialmedia is one piece of larger sociotechnical constructs inwhich populations of individualsinteract,notonlywitheachotherbutalsowithandthroughtechnology.Theculturalcontextthatemerges through and exists within sociotechnical space remains largely unmapped. Yet, theseculturalspaces are critical tounderstanding andoperating effectively in thedigitalworld.Thesespaces merit additional attention to enhance operations and intelligence in the informationenvironment(IE).Improvingmethodologicalandtechnicalapproachestoanalyzingsociotechnicalspace closely align with several joint concepts, such as the Joint Concept forHumanAspects ofMilitaryOperations(JCHAMO)andtheJointConceptforOperatingintheInformationEnvironment(JCOIE,currentlyunderdevelopment),andarecentlyproposedSMA-communityinitiativeconstruct


ontheCognitiveAspectsofMilitaryOperations(CAMO).39Itistimetomovebeyondoverrelianceonsocialmediaandopen the aperture to explore sociotechnical space, anintegralportionoftheIE.

Limitations of Social Media and the Importance of Sociotechnical Space

Social media is a part of sociotechnical space. For thisreason,itcannotbediscountedasasourceofinformation.Infact,withinthesociotechnicalspace,socialmediacontributesinformationdirectfromparticipantswhoshedlightontheiropinions,beliefs,andsometimes,behaviors.However,socialmediausageandpreference is not universal; it alone does not provide analysts with holistic information aboutpopulations.

Formuchoftheworld,significantbarriersexisttointernet,andthereforesocialmedia,access.Toparticipate incyberspace-basedactivities,onemustmeet the followingbasiccriteria:a)have themeanstopurchaseoracquireaninternet-enableddevice;b)havethemeanstopurchaseoracquireinternet access; c) have the knowledge to use the internet (e.g., searching, downloading apps,traditionalandmedialiteracy,etc.);andd)haveaccesstoplatformsthatcorrespondtosocialandculturalcommunicationsneeds(e.g., ifoneonlyspeaksanon-Romancharacter languagesuchasArabicorBurmese,thatpersonmustfindandchooseaplatformthatfunctionsintheirlanguage).Anindividualwhomeetsthesecriteriahasonlineaccess.

Whousestheinternetandsocialmediaaroundtheworldcandifferwidely.PopulationsintheWestgenerallyhaveanadvantagebecauseplatformsareoftendesignedintheWest,primarilyforEnglishspeakers.Insomepartsoftheworld,onlyelitesorspecificsocialclassesmeettheaccesscriteria.Inotherparts,somepeoplewillsacrificeandsavetoobtainspecificdevicesandaccess,astheyenablecommunicationsandraisesocialstatus.Todayover50percentonlinemediausersworldwidewhomeettheaccesscriteriaandchoosetocommunicatedigitallyarebetweentheagesof18-24years.Theresultisthatsocialmediausageexposesagenerationaldivideinmostsocietiesontechnologyusage.Thus,socialmediausageoccursunevenlyacrosstheglobe;itisoftenself-selectedbasedonthe ability toovercome the financialand technical barriers to access, socialpressures, andothersignificantdemographic,social,orculturaldivisions.

Evenwhen barriers to access are reduced, sociocultural influences affect how people use socialmedia.The interactionof these two forces, sociocultural influences and theuseof digitalmedia,definessociotechnicalspace.Countrybycountry,regionbyregion,andgroupbygroup,socialmediaandnetworkingpreferencesdiffer.Notwoenvironmentsfunctioninexactlythesameway.Peoplechoosehowtheycommunicatebasedonhowtheywishtointeractandwithwhom(e.g.,Facebookconnects “friends,” while Twitter attracts “followers”—and each of these categories can havedifferentculturalimplications)(Steckman&Andrews,2017).Additionally,individualsmakechoicesbased on interpersonal skills and relationships, agreement with privacy (and other) policies,languagescriptcompatibilities,andthepurposeofcommunication.Theyalsomakedecisionsonthebasisofsocioculturalnorms:censorship, restrictedspeech,anonymity, socialstatus, religion,andgender,dependingonnationalityandlocation.Ultimately, thesesocioculturalfactorsaffect ifandhow people choose to use social media. Therefore, to incorporate social media into analyses39SeeAstorino-Courtoisetal.,2017

“WhatsApp is to South Africa as Snapchat is to Ireland as WeChat

is to China”

-Adweek


effectively, the nuances of how people in an areaof interest use socialmedia are paramount tounderstanding.

As a comparative example, consider the use of social media in the ArabWorld. The differencesbetween regional averages and country-specific usage statistics demonstrate the impact ofsociotechnicalspaceandhowadditionalresearchinthisspacecanfurthernationalsecurityinterests.

Social Media in the Middle East and North Africa

IntheArabWorldOnline2017,asurveyofdigitaltechnologiesacross22countriesconcludedthat42percentofthepopulation(173millionof414millionpeople)usestheinternet.Thesamereportlists47percentsocialmediapenetration,meaningthat20millionpeople(raisingthenumberfrom173to193millionpeople)claimtoaccesssocialmediathroughsomealternativetotheinternet.40FifteenArabWorldcountrieshave90percentorgreaternationalinternetpenetration.Ofthetotalsocialmediausers, 65percent (approximately125million)arebetween the agesof 18-24years(Salem,2017).

MostArabsocialmediausersprefersocialnetworkingsites(SNS).Table4 liststhe top five.41Theseare thesitesthatshouldreceivegreatestanalyticalattentionwhenstudying theregion.Examiningspecificcountries,whilemostpreferredWhatsApp,inLibyaandIraqViber ratedhighest,whileFacebookMessenger rankedhighest inAlgeriaandTunisia(Schwartz,2016).

Whydothesenumbersmatter?Theygeneralizetotheentireregionandcannotbeassumedtorepresentanyspecificcountry.Basedonthesesites,ananalyticeffortonTunisiawouldconsiderdatafromsiteslistedinTable5.ThatanalysiscouldmissdatafromYouTube(18 percent) and Instagram (0.3-23 percent, depending on the

40Thereportdoesnotexplainthediscrepancybetweeninternetandsocialmediapenetration.Inmostreports,internetpenetrationisahighernumberthansocialmediapenetration,becauseusersrequiretheinternettoaccesssocialmedia.Thepossiblealternativehereiseitherthatsomeofthepeoplesurveyeddidnotcounttheirsmart phone access as internet access or that they haveways to access socialmediawithout an internetconnection.

41Whensocialmediasitesareincluded,thetopthreeregionalsitesbecomeWhatsApp(67%),Facebook(63%),and YouTube (50%), while the bottom three are Instagram (33%), Snapchat (23%), and Twitter (20%)(NorthwesternUniversityinQatar&DohaFilmInstitute,2017).

SNS %ofusers

WhatsApp 89

FacebookMessenger

74

Snapchat 22

Telegram 15

YahooMessenger

14

WindowsLive

11

Table4.MostPopularSNSintheArabWorld(Salem,2017)


sourceconsulted)(Statscounter,2017;NorthwesternUniversityin Qatar&Doha Film Institute, 2017).42 However, the generalstatisticsdonotprovidethemostrobustlookintotheTunisianmedia environment; with an estimated 55 percent internetpenetration(accordingtotheInternetWorldStats).HalfoftheTunisian population communicates and consumes mediathroughchannelsotherthantheinternet.Withoutsupplementaldata sources, analysesof aportionof half of the population isgenerally inaccurate. Many current social media analysesexamineonlyTwitterdata,which as ofDecember 2017wouldcover only 3-8 percent of the 55 percent of the Tunisianpopulationonline(approximately190,000to505,770outof6.3million). There is also the inherent assumption that all of theaccountsincludedhereareactive.

LookingcloserattheTunisiansocialmediaenvironment,thereareageandgenderdifferencestoconsider.TheagebreakdownforTunisianusersis35percentaged18-24,33percentaged25-34,13percentaged35-44,withtheremaining20percentspreadoverthe13-17and45-65-year-oldcategories.Thegenderbreakdownis58percentmaleand42percentfemale(L’EconomisteMaghrébin, 2016). However, these are averages for the entireenvironment,witheachplatformhavingdifferentdemographics.

TheresultisthatTunisiansocialmediadatacancontributeinformationonlyonhalfthepopulationfromtheoutset.Fromthere,thedatabecomesmorelimitedanddividesintosmallerandsmallerdemographic pieces thatmay not form representative samples.Without representative samples,conclusionsdrawnaboutbeliefs,attitudes,andbehaviorsmaynotprovidedecisionmakerswiththeinformation they need. They could, however, lead to unexpected secondary and tertiaryconsequencesiftheyarefactoredintoanassessmentoftheoperationalenvironmentorusedasthefoundationforbaseliningtheIE.Analyzingthemorerepresentativedataproducesresultsthataremore effective, more conducive to operational requirements, and more precise for analyticalpurposessothatthevalueofthedataincreasessignificantlyfornationalsecurityinterests.

TheTunisiancaseis,ofcourse,veryspecific.Themethodologyusedtoanalyzeitssocialmediaandthe specific sites analyzed are unique, and as described here, do not address socioculturalconsiderations.Analysesonothercountries,suchasEgyptorSaudiArabia,wouldneedtailoringtoconfirmsocialmediadatarequirementsforeachcountryandaddressthelimitationsofthatdatainunderstanding the population, or the segments of interest. To overcome these limitations anddevelop cutting-edgeways to analyzebeliefs andbehaviors, especiallywhen they appearonline,moreattentionmustbepaidtothewidercontextinwhichtheyoccurinsociotechnicalspace.

Evolving the Understanding of Sociotechnical Space

Socialmediaisaresourcethat,asexplainedabove,canleadtoinsightsaboutspecificpopulationswithsomesignificantcaveats.Whencombinedwithotherdatasources, to include those thatare

42Thepercentagerangeshowsthedifferencebetweendatacollectedbysurveyanddatacollectedbytechnicalmeans.Theactualpercentagelikelyliessomewhereinthemiddle.

SNS %ofusers

WhatsApp 7

FacebookMessenger

57-74

Snapchat 5

Telegram Nodata

YahooMessenger

Nodata

WindowsLive

Nodata

Table5.PercentageofTunisia’sPopulationwithAccesstoRegionally-FavoredSNS(Statscounter,2017:NorthwesternUniversityinQatar&DohaFilmInstitute,2017)


publicly available or commercially acquired, the combination can provide more substantialinformationaboutapopulationinsociotechnicalspacesandthephysicalworld.Techniques,theories,andmethodologiestocombinedataandderivemoreaccurate,meaningfulinsightsaboutpopulationsare currently cutting-edge research areas,whichmustbecome standardoperatingprocedure foranalysts.

Therearealreadyexamplesofinnovativeresearchcombiningpubliclyavailableinformation(PAI),whichincludessocialmedia,toderivepreviouslyunknowninformationonbehavior.Inaninnovativeattempttoexaminesociotechnicalspace,Ozsoy,Polat,andAlhajj(2016)combined22socialmediadata sources to understand users’ preferences and behaviors, and developed amethod to sendtailored recommendations to specific groups.Through further experimentation, theydeterminedthatcombiningdatasourcesprovidedsignificantlybetterresultsthanusingasingleplatformalone.Pateletal.(2017)combinedsatelliteimagesofsettlements,urbanareas,topographicfeatures,andnighttimelightswithdatasetscoveringtransportationnetworks,healthfacilities,populationcounts,mobilephone calls,and socialmedia to improve Indonesian census results. In thearenaof virusdetectionandprediction,Santillanaetal.(2015)achievednear-real-timepredictionsbycombiningsocial media data with five other health-related datasets, surpassing most other research thatidentifiesvirus-relatedtrendsthroughsocialmediaalone(andoften,postfacto),withthefurtherpotentialtobecorrelatedwithadditionaldemographicandtopologicaldata.

Thus,whilenotinglimitationsinherentwithinsocialmediadata,includingtheself-selectivenatureofthemedium,wealsonoteanopportunitytoexploresociotechnicalspaceingreaterdetail.Atthesametime, thebenefitsofcombiningsocialmediadatawithother typescanenhanceknowledgeabout populations’ beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors in ways that can enhance operations andintelligenceandbeusedtoadvancenationalsecurityinterests.

References

Astorino-Courtois,A.,DiGuardo,J.A.,Cabayan,H.,Ceroli,M.,Goolsby,R.,Jones,R.,&Thomson,S.(2017).ACognitiveCapabilitiesAgenda:AMulti-StepApproachforClosingDoD’sCognitiveCapabilityGap.ArlingtonVA.

InternetWorldStats.(2016).Tunisia:InternetUsageandMarketingReport.Retrievedfromhttp://www.internetworldstats.com/af/tn.htm

L’EconomisteMaghrébin.(2016,January15).Afrique–Facebook :laTunisieclassée1èreavec48%d’utilisateurs.Retrievedfromhttp://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/2016/01/15/facebook-afrique-tunisie-utilisateurs/

NorthwesternUniversityinQatar,&DohaFilmInstitute.(2017).SocialMedia.Retrievedfromhttp://www.mideastmedia.org/survey/2017/chapter/social-media/

Ozsoy,M.G.,Polat,F.,&Alhajj,R.(2016).Makingrecommendationsbyintegratinginformationfrommultiplesocialnetworks.AppliedIntelligence,45,1047–1065.https://doi.org/10.1007/s10489-016-0803-1

Patel,N.N.,Stevens,F.R.,Huang,Z.,Gaughan,A.E.,Elyazar,I.,&Tatem,A.J.(2017).ImprovingLargeAreaPopulationMappingUsingGeotweetDensities.TransactionsinGIS,21(2),317–331.https://doi.org/10.1111/tgis.12214


Salem,F.(2017).TheArabWorldOnline2017:DigitalTransformationsandSocietalTrendsintheAgeofthe4thIndustrialRevolution.Dubai.

Santillana,M.,Nguyen,A.T.,Dredze,M.,Paul,M.J.,Nsoesie,E.O.,&Brownstein,J.S.(2015).CombiningSearch,SocialMedia,andTraditionalDataSourcestoImproveInfluenzaSurveillance.PLoSComputationalBiology,11(10),1–15.https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004513

Schwartz,J.(2016,May24).TheMostPopularMessagingAppinEveryCountry.Retrievedfromhttps://www.similarweb.com/blog/worldwide-messaging-apps

Statscounter.(2017,December).SocialMediaStatsinTunisia-December2017.Retrievedfromhttp://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/tunisia

Steckman,L.M.,&Andrews,M.J.(2017).OnlinearoundtheWorld:AGeographicEncyclopediaoftheInternet,SocialMedia,andMobileApps.SantaBarbara:ABC-CLIO.


Part IV: Meta-Opinions: The Link Between Polling and Social Media


Encouraging and Assessing the Validity of Answers to Questions about Radicalization: The Use of Meta-opinions

ClarkMcCauleyBrynMawrCollege

[email protected]

[email protected]

TomMcCauleyUniversityofRochester

[email protected]

Whenitcomestoquestionsaboutradicalization,interviewandpollrespondentsmaylietoavoiddetectionbysecurityservices,tominimizetheirresponsibilityfordamagingandillegalbehaviors,ortoprojectamoresociallyacceptablepersonatotheresearchers—oreventothemselves!Thebiaseddirectionofthesemisrepresentationsmakesthemagreaterthreattoasurveythanthemorerandomperturbations that result frommisunderstanding the question ormaking up an answer to avoidlooking ignorant.Herewereviewsevenways toencourageandassess thevalidityofanswers tosensitive questions, especially questions about political radicalization. One way is to comparepersonal opinion with meta-opinion—opinion about the opinions of others. We conclude byhighlightingthelinkbetweenmeta-opinionsandopinionspostedonsocialmedia:bothmeasurethepowerofsocialnorms.

How to encourage and assess truthfulness in interviews and polls

1)Assureanonymityofrespondents.Responsestointerviewquestionsortopollquestionsarecodedinawaythatmakesitimpossiblefortheresearchersthemselves,nottomentiongovernmentofficials, to connect participants’ answers with their personal information. All participants areassuredofanonymitybeforetheyagreetobepartofthestudy.

Ofcourse,itispossiblethatparticipantsdonotbelieveassurancesofanonymity.Butthen,theycanalwayssaynotothestudy;thefactthattheyagreetoparticipatesuggeststhattheyfeelsafetoanswerquestions.Thefactofparticipationisthussomeevidenceofparticipants’willingnesstocontributetruthfulinformation.

2)Useinternetpolling.Inaninternetpoll,respondentsagreetoanswerpollingquestionsposedandansweredontheircomputerscreens,ratherthanquestionsposedbyaface-to-faceortelephoneinterviewer.Recentresearchhasshownthatresponsestosensitivequestionsareoftenmoretruthfulin internetpolls than in face-to-faceor telephonepolls—perhapsbecausescreenanswersdonotopen the respondent to evaluation by an interviewer. Internet polls were more accurate thantelephonepolls,forinstance,inpredictingthatU.K.voterswouldvoteforBrexit(Clarke,Goodwin&Whiteley,2016).

3)Usequestions thatare clearandculturallyappropriate for the respondentsof interest.Whenintroducingnewquestions,pilottestingmayberequired.Betterthanpilottestingistousequestionsthathavebeenusedbeforewiththepopulationofinterest.

Our2013-2017internetpollsofU.S.Muslimshaveusedseveralquestionsthatearlierappearedinthe 2007 and 2011 Pew telephone polls of U.S. Muslims. These well-tested questions not onlyguaranteed clarity and comprehension for the population of interest, they provided extrainformationvalueinpermittingcomparisonofnewresultswithearlierresults.


Aquestionaboutwhethersuicidebombing is justified indefenseof Islam, forinstance,producedresultsinourinternetpollsimilartoresultsintheearlierPewpolls.InthePewpollsof2007and2011,respondentssayingthatsuicidebombingisoftenorsometimesjustifiedwere8percent(bothpolls). InWaves4, 5, 6, and7 of our internet polling (Jan, June andOctober 2016; April 2017),respondentssayingthatsuicidebombingisoftenorsometimesjustifiedwere10,8,9,and13percent(Fajmonova,Moskalenko&McCauley,2017;Moskalenko&McCauley,2017).ThisconvergenceofresultsoveryearsandmethodsincreasesourconfidencethatinternetpollingcanreplaceslowerandmoreexpensivetelephonepollingofU.S.Muslims.

4)Usetrackingpolls:repeatedpollswithrepeatedquestions.Trackingpollscanproducevalidindicationsofchangeinopinionevenifsomerespondentsareconfusedorlying.Marketresearchforcommercialproductsdependsontrackingpollsandsomeexpertsbelievethatitisamistakeevertodraw conclusions from a single poll. Themeaning of responses to “Howmuch do you like Tidedetergent?”canbedebated,butasix-monthincreaseoffifteenpercentsayingtheylikeTide‘verymuch’isaresulttobetakenseriously.

Asresponseratesforfacetofaceandtelephonepollshavedeclined,commercialpollingcompanieshave competed to develop representative internet survey panels, including panels representingminority groups such asAfrican-Americans,Hispanics, andMuslims. Inour internetpolls ofU.S.Muslims, results onmany questions repeated over years show confidence-inspiring stability. Asalreadynoted,Waves4,5,6,and7showedrespondentsagreeingthatsuicidebombingindefenseofIslamisoftenorsometimesjustifiedwere10,8,9,and13percent.

Stable results for many items lead us to take seriously changes measured for a few items. Forinstance,Waves4,5,and6ofourinternetpollofU.S.Muslimsasked,Doyoufeelthewaronterrorismisawaragainst Islam?Respondentsanswering yeswere47percent,30percent,and32percent,indicatingasignificantdeclineinagreementwiththisradicalopinionbetweenWaves4and5.Noticethatthe32percentyes inWave6isessentiallythesameasthe30percentyes inWave5,addingconfidencethattherewasadeclineinagreementwiththisradicalopinionbetweenWaves4and5.

5)Focusonnormativelyundesirable(radical)responses.Forquestionsaboutradicalopinions,respondentsshouldbeminimizingtheirviolentideasandintentions,notmaximizingthem.Thus,tothedegreethatparticipantsdoreportradicalthoughtsorintentions,wecanbemoreconfidentthattheyaretellingthetruth.Forinstance,ifarespondentagreesthatsuicidebombingis“oftenjustifiedindefenseofIslam,”wecanbeconfidentthisparticipantisreportinghisorhertruefeelings.

Inotherwords,normativelyundesirableresponsestoquestionsaboutradicalizationcanbemorerevealingthanmoredesirableresponses.Mostresearchersarereadytoassumethatthosegivingradicalresponsesareontheaveragemoreradicalthanthosewhodonot—eveniftherearesomelyingradicalshidingamongthenon-radicals.Iftheassumptionholds,thenresponsestoasensitivequestioncanstillbeusedtoidentifyfactorsassociatedwithmoreradicalopinions.

6) Compare results across differentmethods and different investigators. In general, socialscientistsvalidateresearchresultsbytriangulation.Thus,datafrompollsaboutradicalizationneedtobesupportedbydatafrominterviewsandcasestudies;datafromoneresearchteamneedtobesupportedby findings fromadifferent team.Whenpollsor interviewsproduceresultssimilartoresultsfromcasestudiesordatabaseresearch—methodsthatdonotrelyonself-report—wegainconfidencethatparticipants’responseswerelargelytruthful.


AnexampleofthiskindofconvergenceemergedfromourWave7internetpollofU.S.Muslims.Moredepressedrespondentsweremore likely to justifysuicidebombing.Thisresultconvergeswithapossibleprofile of suicidebombers thatwasderived fromcasehistorymaterials. Casematerialsindicated thatmany suicidebomberswere sociallydisconnected,withahistoryofmental healthproblems,especiallydepression(McCauley&Moskalenko,2014).Itseemspossiblethatdepressionisariskfactorforbothradicalopinionandradicalaction.

7)Compareresultsforquestionsaboutradicalizationintwoformats:personalopinion(“DoyoupersonallybelievethatsuicidebombingindefenseofIslamisjustified?”)andmeta-opinion,oropinionabouttheopinionsofothers(“Thinkingnownotaboutyourself,butaboutotherU.S.Muslims,howmanywouldyousayagreethatsuicidebombingindefenseofIslamisjustified”).Meta-opinionquestionsallowparticipantstoexpresstheirtruefeelingswithoutriskingbeingconsideredradical.

Inplaceswheremanyfeartheoperationsofsecurityforces(inPalestineforinstance)wehavefound(unpublishedresearch)substantialdifferencesbetweenpersonalandmeta-opinionquestionsaboutradicalopinions:meta-opinionresponsestendtobemoreradicalthanpersonalresponses.Wherethisisthecase,werelymoreonmeta-opinionresponsesthanonpersonalresponses.

IntheU.S.thedifferencebetweenpersonalandmeta-opinionresponsesissmall,usuallyonlyafewpercentage points, suggesting that respondents are answering honestly to personally wordedquestions.InourWave5(May-June2016)internetpollofU.S.Muslims,forinstance,agreementthatsuicide bombing in defense of Islam is often or sometimes justified was 8 percent for personalopinionand11percentformeta-opinion.

Meta-opinions and social media posts measure social norms

Meta-opinionsarenotjustawaytoassessthetruthfulnessofpersonalopinions.Meta-opinionsareperceptionsofsocialnorms.Ahundredyearsofsocialpsychologyhaveshownthepowerofsocialnormsmanifestedintheirabilitytomakepeoplesayanddothingsincongruouswiththeirbeliefs,moralstandardsandevenpersonalsafety

RogerBrown’sclassic1965textdefinedagroupnorm(p.49)astheexpectedbehaviorforaspecifiedcombinationofactorandsituation.Inaspecifiedsituation,mostspecifiedactorswillbehaveinthesameway(regularityofbehavior),mostpeoplewillexpectthisbehaviorinthissituation(regularityofexpectation),andmostwillseenotactingthiswayassomehowwrong(regularityofprescription).Forexample,ajobhuntercanattendaninterviewjustaswellinjeansandaT-shirtasinasuitandtie–butfewintervieweeswouldriskthemorecomfortableattire.Mostapplicantsdressup,mostpeopleexpectajobapplicanttodressup,andanapplicantshowingupinjeansandT-shirtisnotjusteccentricbutwrong.

PerhapsthestrongestdemonstrationsofthepowerofnormsareSolomonAsch’s1950sconformityexperiments(Brown,1965,pp.670–673).Eightparticipantswereshownastimulusline,thenaskedtopickwhichofthreelineswasthesamelengthasthestimulus.Onlyoneoftheparticipantswasanexperimental subject; the otherswere all Asch’s confederates,who, on preselected trials,wouldchoosethesameobviouslywronganswer.Three-quartersofthesubjectswentalongwiththecrowdatleastonce. In therealworld,wherecorrectanswersarerarelysoobvious, thepressureof thecrowdcanbeenormous–butthispowerdependsonthestrengthofconsensus.Evenasingleallyfortherealsubjectcutyieldingtoaboutafifthofwhatoccurredwhentherealsubjectfacedaunanimousmajority.


Inotherwords,thepowerofasocialnormdependsuponmaintainingthethreekindsofregularity.Ifperformance,expectation,orprescriptionloseconsensus,thenormwillloseitspowertodefineboththerightanswerandthesafeanswer.Ameta-opinionmeasuresthestrengthoftheregularityofexpectation,andthelargerthemajorityperceived,thestrongerthenorm.Pollquestionsaboutameta-opinionthusdirectlyassessaperceivednorm.

Atfirstglance,thereisacuriouscircularityaboutmeta-opinions.Meta-opinionquestionscantellusabout both the truthfulness of personal opinion and the perceived group norm that affects thatopinion.Theresolutionistorecognizethat,formanyrespondents,thereismorethanonerelevantmeta-opinion.Personalopinionversusmeta-opinionfortheingroupcantellusabouttruthfulnesswhenthemeta-opinion ismoreradicalthan thepersonalopinion.Personalopinionversusmeta-opinion of an outgroup tells us about the pressure against reporting a radical opinion. In short,understanding radicalization of norms will require asking respondents about multiple meta-opinions.ForU.S.Muslimsitwillbenecessarytoaskaboutmeta-opinionforU.S.Muslimsandaboutmeta-opinionforU.S.citizensingeneral.

Similarissuesariseforposts(includinglikesandretweets)onasocialmediasite.Theactualandperceiveddistributionofopiniononasocialmediasitecanmeasureasocialnorm.Thereisnotspaceheretopursuethisdirection.

GovernmentsintheageoftheInternetareconcernedaboutsocialnormsthatchallengethepolicies,thejustice,andeventhelegitimacyofthestate.Indeed,developmentofsuchnormsinsmallgroupsand subcultures is preciselywhat ismeantby radicalization, andmanygovernments todayhaveprograms to combat radicalization by controlling the opinions appearing on social media sites(McCauley,2015).ThewarofideashasbecomeawartocontrolthesocialnormsrepresentedontheInternet.

Conclusions

Threewaystoencouragetruthfulresponsestoquestionsaboutradicalizationare:

• Assureanonymity

• Useinternetpolling

• Usequestionsthathavebeenusedbeforeforthepopulationofinterest

Fourwaysofassessingthetruthfulnessofresponsestoquestionsaboutradicalizationare:

• Usetrackingpolls

• Focusonradicalresponses

• Compareresultsacrossmethodsandinvestigators

• Comparepersonalopinionsandmeta-opinions

Meta-opinionsandsocialmediapostscanmeasurethepowerofsocialnorms.


References

Brown,R.(1965).Socialpsychology.NewYork:FreePress.

Clarke,H.D.,Goodwin,M.&Whiteley,P.(2016)Leavewasalwaysinthelead:whythepollsgotthereferendumresultwrong.http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/07/12/leave

Fajmonova,V.,Moskalenko,S.&McCauley,C.(2017).TrackingradicalopinionsinpollsofU.S.Muslims.PerspectivesinTerrorism,11(2),April.http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/594/html

McCauley,C.,&Moskalenko,S.(2014).Towardaprofileoflonewolfterrorists:Whatmovesanindividualfromradicalopiniontoradicalaction?TerrorismandPoliticalViolence,26(1),69-85.http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/t2UcqPg8gZPwUwbuwaET/full

McCauley,T.(2015).ThewarofideasontheInternet:Anasymmetricconflictinwhichthestrongbecomeweak.DynamicsofAsymmetricConflict,8(1),79-90.

Moskalenko,S.&McCauley,C.(2017).U.S.Muslimswithradicalopinionsfeelmorealienatedanddepressed.ReporttotheOfficeofUniversityPrograms,ScienceandTechnologyDirectorate,U.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.CollegePark,MD:START.https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_USMuslimswithRadicalOpinionsFeelMoreAlienatedDepressed_August2017.pdf


The Continued Relevance of Survey Research

DanFoyGallup

[email protected]

ChrisStewartGallup

[email protected]

When Surveys Makes Sense

Whilerecentprominentexamplessuchasthe2016U.S.PresidentialElection,theBrexitReferendumintheU.K.,ortheFrenchPresidentialelectionwhereresearcherswerecorrectintheirforecastforEmmanuelMacronvictory,butsignificantlyunderrepresentingsupportforMacronarefrequentlycitedasexamplesofsurveyresearchfailures,they infactunderscorejusthowimportantsurveysremainsforthemoderndemocraticprocess.Surveysareexpectedtobeaccurate,ifnotindividually,then certainly in aggregate, aspolitical forecasters such as FiveThirtyEight claim. Unfortunately,manycommentatorsinthepoliticalsphereremainignorantofjusthowfarsuchclaimscanbepushed–whenpartialpercentagepointdifferencescanswingavoteeitherway,nosurveywilleverbeabletoreliablypickwinners.Moreover,therearealsomanypoorlydesignedorexecutedsurveyattempts,frombiasedorincompetenttraditionalmethodsto“innovative”approachessuchasopt-inonlinepanels, click-polls, socialmedia surveysofprofessional respondentsdrawn fromsources such asAmazonMechanicalTurk.

Howeverinterestingthisdebatemaybe,itisalmostentirelyWestern-oriented,ignoringthemanysettingswheresurveyresearchremainsthebest,andattimesonly,methodforreachingallsegmentsofapopulation.TaketheexampleofYemen.Asof2017,justoverhalfofYemenishaveaccesstoacellphoneandamere19%haveaccesstotheinternetinanylocationwhilehardlyanyhouseholdshaveinternetaccess(5%).43Eventhatslimsegmentofthepopulationisprimarilyclusteredinthemajor western cities, internet penetration in the eastern desert—where AQAP dominates—isvirtually nonexistent. Such technological constrains are exacerbated by Yemen’s political anddemographicbarriers.While the countrysharesacommon language,Yemen’ssociety is riftwithdivision across ethnic (e.g.,Houthi), tribal (there arehundredsof cross-cutting tribal affiliations,organizedincomplex,oftencontradictoryalliances),andpoliticallines(e.g.SouthernSeparatists).

Inthissetting,cheapsolutionslikesocialmediascrapingortraditionalmediamonitoringmakelittlesenseforcapturingapopulation-widemeasureofopinion.Thereissimpletoolargeanuncoveredsegmenttomakeonlinecommunityopinionrepresentativeofthebroaderpublic.Otherapproachesto evaluating public sentiment suffer from their own limitations. For instance, remote sensingapproachescanbeusedtotrackbroadpatternoflifedatabutarelimitedinansweringthecentralquestion of “whatdo others think.”Meanwhile other approaches such asHuman Terrain Teams(HTT) and Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Teams (SCRATs) have had some utility inunderstanding attitudes and behaviors but are still often constrained by the use of unfamiliarwesterninterlocutorswhobothprovokereluctanceonthepartofresearchsubjectsandthemselvesoftenlackadeepunderstandingofthepopulationstheyseektoevaluate.

43AsmeasuredthroughtheGallupWorldPollhttp://www.gallup.com/178667/gallup-world-poll-work.aspx


However, as Gallup has repeatedly demonstrated, representativenationwidesurveysarepossibleinYemen,despitetheongoingcivilwar,whichhasdrivenYementothetopofthewordrankingsinthepercentage of its population currently classified as “suffering”accordingtoGallup’sLifeEvaluationIndex–40%ofYemeniswereclassifiedas“suffering”in2017,3rdbehindSouthSudan(46%)andAfghanistan (73%). Gallup has fielded over a dozen nationallyrepresentativesurveysinYemeninthelastdecadealone,includingtenwavesof theGallupWorldPollandmultiple large-sample(i.e.N>10,000)customstudies.

While Yemen presents a uniquelydifficult location forweb-basedresearch alternatives, population representation inonline settingsremainsfarfromidealinmanycriticalcountries.ConsiderjusttheCENTCOM AOR (see Table 6), even in Egypt—the center of thesupposedlytwitter-drivenArabspring—just34%ofthepopulationhasaccesstotheinternet,whilePakistanandAfghanistan,twoofthemost critical countries in the world for U.S. national securityinterests,85%ofthepopulationlacksaccesstotheinternet.

The situation is similar across thePACOMandAFRICOMAORsaswell (see Figure 11). Quite simply, even in2018, survey research

remainstheonlytrulyrepresentativemeansformeasuringpublicopinioninmanycountriesacrosstheworld.

Whileafullprimeronbestpracticesinpublicopinionmethodsisbeyondthescopeofthisessay,sufficetosaythattherearerightand

wrongwaysofdoinganything,andsurveyresearchmethodsarenoexception.Expertoversightisrequiredtoensurequestionnairesaretranslatedaccurately,samplesaredesignedcorrectly,surveyoperationsareproperly trainedand implemented,andrigorousprocesses forqualitycontrolareinstituted.Galluphaslongbeenattheforefrontofeffortstoincreasethescientificrigorofsurveyresearch, leading thepush to setsocial science standards across the survey research communitythroughtheestablishmentoftheAmericanAssociationofPublicOpinionResearch(AAPOR)in1947.However, the rapidly changing sociotechnical landscape of the internet era presents constantchallengestothecollectionanduseofsurveydata.

Access to the Internet Kuwait 94% United Arab Emirates 94% Bahrain 92% Lebanon 86% Saudi Arabia 85% Jordan 78% Kazakhstan 71% Turkey 69% Iran 67% Iraq 63% Kyrgyzstan 59% Algeria 56% Palestinian Territories 55% Turkmenistan 36% Egypt 34% Uzbekistan 31% Tajikistan 25% Yemen 19% Afghanistan 15% Pakistan 14%

Table6.InternetaccessacrosstheCENTCOMAORaccordingtothe2017GallupWorldPoll


Figure11.GlobalInternetaccessaccordingtotheGallupWorldPoll(latestresults2016/2017)

Making Sense of Surveys

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to survey research is the same fundamental problemindustryfounderslikeDr.GeorgeGallupsetouttosolve–howtomeasureandinterpretvariation.Onthemeasurementside,thisproblemcanbemoreproperlythoughtaboutastheproblemsofdatacollection:sampling,questionnairedesign,fieldwork,dataprocessing,weighting,etc.Eachofthesesurveydesignandadministrationstepsarecalibratedtoensureasurveyaccuratelyrepresentsthenaturalunderlyingpopulationvariationitintendstomeasure.Ontheinterpretationside,thesolutiontotheproblemofvariationinvolvesbothartandscience.Peoplearenotnumbersinaspreadsheet.Qualitativecontextualunderstandingoftheissuesandcomplexdynamicsatplaywithinanygivensocietyisaprerequisitetoanalyzingitssurveydata.Atthesametime,knowingthepercentageofapopulationwhoholdsagivenbeliefcanonlytaketheanalystsofar.Whileatafunctionallevel,surveyresearchisaboutthecollectionofdata, itis justoneamongmanypotentialsourcesofpotentiallyusefuldataforansweringthequestionsthatinspiredthecollectionofdatainthefirstplace.Surveyresearchersshouldberadicallyopentothenewpossibilitiesofsecondaryornon-traditionaldatasourcesenabledby therapidadvances in fields likedatascience,machine learning,andartificialintelligence.

Itsuniqueabilitytocaptureandinterpretpopulationvariationmakessurveyresearchideallysuitedto informactivitieswhere subgroupnuance is critical. Themost obvious examplebeing the longhistoryofcollaborationacrossthesurveyresearchandadvertisingindustries.ThesameholdsforsurveyresearchandDOD’svariousforaysintothecommunicationspace,fromMISO/PSYOPtoPublicAffairs/Strategic Communications to Recruiting. In fact, DOD’s involvement in survey researchpredatesDOD itself –with theOfficeofWar InformationhiringGallup to conduct researchwithpopulationsbehindenemylinesinGermanyduringWWII.

ThecommonthemeacrosseachoftheseapplicationsofsurveyresearchwithinDODistheneedtounderstandwhataparticulargroupthinks, ideallywithahigh-degreeofnuanceas in thecaseof


subgroup stabilitymodeling or target audience-specific narrative development. In each of thesecases,surveyresearchprovidesotherwiseunattainable“groundtruth”–forinstance,byaccuratelymeasuringstabilityrisksanddriversinatavillagelevelorbyestablishingbaselinestomeasureamessagingcampaignseffectivenessatcounteringthespreadofaparticularnarrativeorbeliefwithinkeypopulationsegments.

Stretching Survey Research

Whilesurveyresearchwillremaintheonlyviableoptionforawiderangeofapplicationsacrossalargeswathoftheworldforquitesometime,innovationswithinthefieldarealsoexpandingitsvaluetoabroadarrayofresearchquestions.Gallupandothersarepioneeringnewapplications,designconcepts,fieldmethods,andanalyticsthathighlightthecontinuedrelevanceofsurveyresearchfordiversedomains.

For instance, through DARPA’s Next Generation Social Science (NGS2) program,44 Gallup isexperimentingwithnewapproachestotherecruitmentofnon-WEIRD45researchsubjectsthatdrawheavilyontechniquesperfectedthroughGallup’svariedsurveyresearchexperiences.Untilrecently,littleconsiderationwasgiventothecompositionofresearchsubjectpools,evenindomainswherediversity(inwhateverform)islikelytobecriticaltotheresearchresults.However,surprisinglyfewresearchers have made meaningful attempts to overcome this barrier with increasing relianceinsteadoncheap,easilyaccessibleresearchsubjectssuchasthoseavailablethroughparticipant-for-hire services like Amazon Mechanical Turk. Using representative sampling principles to recruitparticipants and best practice participant management techniques to maintain subject poolsthroughout experiments could help trigger a revolutionary shift in our understanding of coreprinciplesofhumanbehaviorandpsychologybyenablingresearcherstotestacceptedtheoriesonpreviouslyunstudiedsegmentsofthepopulation.

Inadditiontonovelapplicationsofcoresurveyresearchmethodologies,Gallupisactivelyexploringnoveldesignconceptsthatre-envisiontheconceptofrespondentsprovidingsingle,moment-in-timesnapshotsoftheirself-reporteddatabyincorporatingnewtechnologiesandmethods.Forinstance,designingdatacollectionplansthatcombinesourceslikewearablesensorsinsyncwithmethodslikeGallup Senior Research Advisor Arthur Stone’s ecological momentary assessment approach46 tobetterunderstandhowfactorsliketimeofdayandsettingaffectissueslikewell-being,health,andproductivityonanongoingbasis.Mobiletechnologiesandthecommunicationmodelstheyenablealsopresenttheopportunitytorethinkthe traditionaldatacollectionprocess.App-based,surveydesignershave farmorecontroloverhowandwhenasurvey isadministered thanks toenablingtechnologieslikeGPS,SMS,andnotifications.App-drivenbusinessmodelsholdthesamepotentialtodisruptthesurveyresearchlandscapeastheyhavedoneforcountlessotherindustries.On-demandinterviewing services are already well-established in many global markets, though theirmethodologicalrobustnessremainstobeprovenrelativetotraditionalfieldmethods.

Finally,theroleofadvancesinanalyticstoolsandtechniquesincultivatinginnovationamongsurveyresearchers bears restating. Whether through permitting saleable applications of longstanding

44https://www.darpa.mil/program/next-generation-social-science45https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2055073346https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49641157_A_Comparison_of_Affect_Ratings_Obtained_with_Ecological_Momentary_Assessment_and_the_Day_Reconstruction_Method


techniqueslikesmallareaestimation,47whichusesauxiliarydatafromsourceslikecensusbureaustoconstructreliablesyntheticestimatesforsurveydataatfarsmallergeographicunitsthanwouldtraditionally be possible. Meanwhile, the ubiquity of new technologies like satellite imagery arerevolutionizingsurveydesignbyopeningthedoortotechniqueslikegeospatialsampledesignsthatapply imageprocessingalgorithms to select interviewer startingpoints anddeliverprecisewalkrouteinstructions,reducingtwocommonsourcesofbias/errorinsurveyfieldwork.Whilethesearejustafewexamplesofthenewcapabilitiesthatareradicallyalteringthesurveyresearchlandscape,theseinnovationsinsurveyanalyticsandtechnologies,combinedwithsurveyresearch’sessentialnatureforreachingmuchoftheworld’spopulation,ensurethefield’scontinuedrelevanceinthefaceofcompetingapproachestomeasuringpublicopinion.

47https://www.popcenter.umd.edu/mprc-associates/plahiri/partha-lahiri-bibliography/articlereference.2013-10-02.8154073636


Part V: Discussion of Alternative Options


Stealing History

Dr.LindaDurnellFieldingGraduateUniversity

[email protected]

Dr.GarryHareFieldingGraduateUniversity

[email protected] you can destroy truth you can destroy trust; and if you can destroy trust you can destroyinstitutions.Whiletacticsdiffer,theobjectiveofthetyrant—acrosspoliticalsystems—aremarkedlythesame.Indevelopednationswithstronginstitutions,afrontalassaultontrustedinstitutionsoftenprovokes a political reaction and can be counter-productive. A farmore effective strategy is toappoint the least competent people to the top of targeted institutions in the hope that theincompetencetricklesdown.Inquasi-democraciesanddictatorships, it iscommontoimprisonorexecute political rivals often including previous office holders. Terrorism thrives in nations orregionswithweakinstitutionsoftenaccompaniedbyhighlevelsofcorruptionandunemployment.Here,thetoolstostealhistoryincludefearandterroraccompaniedbythesystemicdestructionofthepast.Culturalandreligioussymbolsandiconsareblowntorubbleinhopesthatdestroyingthepastwilleradicateculturalmemory,identity,andheritage.

Cultural History & Identity

Eradicatingculturalidentityandheritageleavespeoplewithoutahistoricalrelevance,whichinturnaffectstheirrulesandtraditionsthatwereonceintegraltotheirculturalhistory.Forexample,whenpeoplethinkofthemselvesasagroupwithcommoninterestsandwithnormsandrulesthatobligethem at all times, they can gain confidence and indeed a certain kind of power. If people link ahistorical narrative to their cultural understanding, these stories of national identity, struggle,suffering,andresiliencebecomethemeanstoconstructaparticularsocialidentity.Identityisthusconstructedalwaysinreferencetosomeother.Itiswhentheperceptionofidentitythreatisatitsextreme in the contextofconflict,whenthe legitimacyof identities isatstake(Guala,Mittone,&Ploner,2013).Theculturalpsychologyofidentity,whichisanchoredinnarrativeprovidesvaluableinsights intowhat is both shared and contested amongmembers of a given cultural community(Snyder,2017).

Iconology & Psychology of Memory

Sincetheinceptionofprint,precisethinkingwasthoughttorelyontextrenderingimagestoapoorandmisunderstoodreputation.Inspiteofthis,greatthinkersofpast,includingDarwinandGalileo,resortedtodrawnimageswhenunabletoexpresstheirthinkinginwords.Whattheyhadnowayofknowingisthismixedmethodtriggersaverydifferentconstructionofmemory.Wordlessimageasopposedtoimagewithnarrativecanbeevenmorepowerfulintheformationoflong-term,culturalmemory. Warburg’s research as translated by Bredekamp and Diers (1932), concluded that thesignificanceofimageintheprocessofcivilizationliessomewherebetweenmagicandlogos.Michaudcallsthis“amutelanguage,freedfromtheconstraintsofdiscourse”(Grau&Veigl,2011,p341).Inthisway,imagescanrepresentaveryacuteandreasonabletooltoconvincethepeoplewhotrustimagesmorethanwords.

Short vs. Long-Term Memory

Memorycanbebothbroadlyandsimplisticallyunderstoodasatimewhenanexperienceinfluencescurrentorfuturebehavior.Short-termmemoryischaracterizedbylowcapacityandhighvolatility.


Informationneedstoberepeated,combined,orrehearsed,otherwisefocusquicklyshiftstoothershort-term interests.Thisvolatilitymakes itdifficulttosustainemotionovertimedecreasing theshort-termroleintheconstructionofbothidentityandpersonalbelief.

Long-termmemoryrevolvesaroundtheformulationofperception-makingpatterns.It iseasiertorecall futurememories of personal experiences,which are a key factor indefining oneself as anindividualorpartofagroupidentity.Activatingalong-termmemoryinvolvesthesamepatternsinthebrainthatoccurredwhenthememorywasfirstformed.Interestingly,BrickmanandStern(2010)foundthatstresscanimpactdifferenttypesoflongandshort-termmemory.Anemotionalexperiencecaninfluencepeopletomakedecisionsbasedon;1)easy-to-recallmemories,2)currentperceptions,or 3) emotions that were elicited during an event. This may affect the way people perceive,experience,andeventuallyrememberemotionalexperiencesorrespondtoemotionallychallengingsituations.Whenitcomestopersonalbeliefandchange,long-termmemoryiswheretheactionis.Butcanitbetriggeredifthememorywasrecalledbyothersratherthanexperiencedfirst-hand?

Visual Memory & the Image

Visualinformationcanbeoverwhelmingbutiskeyinourabilitytounderstandandchangepeople’sperceptions and behavior. In George Orwell’s 1984, the language of visual media is highlyconstrained,tostarvethepublicoftheconceptsneededtothinkaboutthepresent,rememberthepast,andconsider the future.Moderncommunicationandpropagandarelyonrepeating imageryover time so that the viewer remembers the memory and not the event. This is even morepronounced in how group memory or culture develops. Over time, both individual and groupmemory are subject tomemory loss and both are subject tomemory addition. This can lead torememberingeventsthatdidn’tactuallyhappenoratleastdidn’thappenasremembered,buttheintroductionofvisualmemoryrecreatingevents,particularlygeospatialevents,astheywereratherthanhowtheyare,canrecreateandreinforcegroupmemoryandculture.Theimagebecomestheleverforbothunderstandingandsocialinfluence.Theimplicationsareprofound,asDavidsonetal.(1994)suggestemotionhasthecapacitytosetasidealifetimeofculturalhistoryandlearning,whichcanrevealacommondenominatorofhumanresponse.Visualimagetriggersthisemotion.

Mechanisms of Visual Working Memory

Wheneveraperson’seyesareopen,theyareformingmemoriesandtheirbrainiscomputingathree-dimensional representation of what is in their field of vision. The brain may not retain all theinformation it encodes inaday, but of thosememories retained, howdoes visualmemoryaffectremembering?Visualmemoryandvisualimageryrelyonhighlysimilar,butnotidenticalcognitiveprocesses(Slotnick,Thompson,&Kosslyn,2012).Visualworkingmemoryandvisualattentionareintimatelyrelated,suchthatworkingmemoryencodingandmaintenancereflectsactivelysustainedattentiontoalimitednumberofvisualobjectsandeventsimportantforongoingcognitionandaction.It is not knownwhether exposure to irrelevant environmental stimuli impairspeople’sability toaccuratelyretrievelong-termmemories.However,Wais,Rubens,BoccanfusoandGazzaley(2010)hypothesize that visual processing of irrelevant visual information would interfere withmentalvisualizationengagedduringrecallofthedetailsofapriorexperience.WaisandGazzaley(2014)suggestamemorynetworkthatsupportsvisualimageryandsuccessfulrecollection,isdisruptedbyexternaldistraction.


Countering Media Through Visual Memory

Visualmediacanbeusedasaweaponagainsttruthandassuch,itisimportanttounderstandhowthevisualmediaweaponworks.Whenapopulationrespondstoavideo,photographorgraphicwitha tweet, impact can be expected. For example, “one moment of shock enables an eternity ofsubmission”(Snyder,2017,p.110).Visualmemoryisnecessarytocounterothermedia.Researchrevealssocialmanipulationcanaltermemoryandextendtheknownfunctionsoftheamygdalatoencompasssociallymediatedmemorydistortions.Humanmemoryisstrikinglysusceptibletomediainputandothersocialinfluences,andrecentstudiesofvisualperceptionarebringingusclosertoanunderstandingofwhatwerememberandmoreimportantly,whatweforgetwhenwerecallascene.

Stealing Symbols

Mosul’sGreatMosqueofal-NuriisamongthescoresofWorldHeritagesitesdestroyedbyISIS(Figure12).Thisdestructionofreligiousandculturalsymbolsisonetacticaimedatthedestructionofhistoryandwith it the destruction ofmemory. Imagine a father, standing before the rubble of all-Nuri,attemptingtoexplaintohischildrenwhatusedtobethere.Wordsfailtoelicittheemotionalmemorysharedbythosewhoexperiencedtheevent.Groupmemorybecomesthevictim.

Figure12.GreatMosqueofal-Nuri(beforeandafter)

Yetmemory,evenemotionalmemory,canberecreated.Mobilephones,increasinglysmartphoneshavebecomeubiquitous,makingitpossibletovisuallydisplaywhatusedtobethere.Now,imaginethat same father, before the same rubble, is able to show his children what used to be there.AugmentedReality(AR)makesitpossibletolookthroughthecamerafunctionsofthephoneandseewhatusedtobe.Thistriggersemotionalmemoryandwordlessimagescanenhancegroupmemory.

The Art of Immersion

Through immersionsuchasvirtualreality (VR)oraugmentedreality(AR)visualmemorycanbeenhancedbynotonlyvisualizingmedia,butexperiencingmedia—images,maps,videos,illustrations.


Understanding media visualization has the ability to increase our ability to anticipate behaviorthroughallowingthetargetaudiencetoforgettheyaretheaudienceandinsteadfall intoanewlymanufactured reality. This is relevant because immersive environments can provide cues in thevirtual environment that can remind subjects of somepast eventor aid in thememory retrievalprocess, which involves reconstructing and sometimes altering the information being recalled.However,someinformationmaynotbeeasilyrecalledbutcanberecalledwithpromptingorcueing.

Inthisway,VRcanaddanemotionallayerofpersuasionthatdidnotexistbeforeand“theemotionalconnectionattheendofaVRexperienceisoftenwhatisremembered”(Jerald,2016,p.79)andwhatcounts.

Augmentedrealitycanenhancetheperceptionofrealworldbyenrichingwhatpeoplesee,feel,andhear in the real environment. AR products can provide skilled activities, which allows acquiredmemoryskillstobestoredinlong-termmemoryandkeptdirectlyaccessiblebymeansofretrievalcuesinshort-termmemory.Theideaissimple:whateveriscreatedcouldreadilymovefromonemedium to another, changing perceptions and emotions along theway. Aspart of the executivefunction of the brain, cognitive flexibility describes the ability to adjust thinking, attention andmemoryrecallinresponsetowhat’shappeningaroundthem.Thiscognitiveabilityallowspeopletoapplyoldinformationormemoriestonewproblemsorchangepeople’sbeliefsandattitudeswithnewinformationoranewexperience,suchasimmersiveandvisualenvironments.

Restoring History

Canrealitycanbereconstructed—digitallyrestored—throughimmersivetechnology?Theinventionofvirtualandaugmentedrealityhascreatedshifts inpeople’sperceptionof theworld,and theirdecision-makingprocess.Thecommonideaappearstobetheabilitytousethesetoolstocreateaprocessbyvisualizinghistoricalmediaandcomposingthemintoasequencethatcreatesanarrativethrough graphics, data visualization, visual explanations such a mind mapping, virtual reality,thematicmapping,statisticalinteractivity,orgraphicalmethodologies.Inessence,thesetoolscanaidinthecreationofinterpretationofbehaviorandbehavioralpatterns.

What Could Be Done

The salientquestionbecomes,whatdoweknowabout thepsychologyof visualmemory and itsapplicationsindefiningculturalhistoryandidentity?AlthoughthedesiretoparticipateinengagingVRexperiencesiscompelling,forimmersiveinterfacestobeeffectivetheyneedtoberootedintherealworld.

Thefollowingstrategiesaredesignedtocreateadeeperunderstandingofcognitionandimmersivemedia,thehands-oncreationofreal-timeARapplicationsandthetoolsandmeasuresusedtoassessthecognitiveimpactofthecreatedmedia.

1. TrainPSYOPincognitionandimmersivemedia

2. TrainPSYOPinthecreationofreal-timeARapplications

3. TrainPSYOPontheuseofcognitiveneurosciencetoolsdesignedtoassesstheemotionalimpactoftheapplicationscreatedin2,above.


Key Points

1. Eradicatingculturalidentityandheritageleavespeoplewithoutahistoricalrelevance,whichinturnaffectstheirrulesandtraditionsthatwereonceintegraltotheirculturalhistory.

2. Wordlessimageasopposedtoimagewithnarrativecanbeevenmorepowerfulintheformationoflong-term,culturalmemory.

3. Short-termmemoryroleintheconstructionofbothidentityandpersonalbelief.Short-termmemoryischaracterizedbylowcapacityandhighvolatility.Long-termmemoryrevolvesaroundtheformulationofperceptionmakingpatterns.

4. Emotionhasthecapacitytosetasidealifetimeofculturalhistoryandlearning,whichcanrevealacommondenominatorofhumanresponse.Visualimagetriggersthisemotion.

5. Visualmemoryandvisualimageryrelyonhighlysimilar,butnotidenticalcognitiveprocesses.6. Throughimmersionsuchasvirtualreality(VR)orreal-timeaugmentedreality(AR)visual

memorycanbeenhancedbynotonlyvisualizingmedia,butexperiencingmedia.7. Restoringhistoryusingimmersivetoolscanaidintheinterpretationofbehaviorandbehavioral

patterns.

References

Bredekamp,H.,&Diers,M.(1932).DieErneuerungderheidnischenAntike.BeiträgeZurGeschichteDerEuropäischenLiteratur.

Brickman,A.M.,&Stern,Y.(2010).Agingandmemoryinhumans.InEncyclopediaofNeuroscience(pp.175–180).http://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008045046-9.00745-2

Davidson,R.J.,Ekman,P.,Frijda,N.H.,Goldsmith,H.H.,Kagan,J.,&Lazarus,R.(1994).Howareemotionsdistinguishedfrommoods,temperament,andotherrelatedaffectiveconstructs?InNatureofemotion:Fundamentalquestions(pp.49–96).http://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-4765(04)00066-9

Grau,O.,&Veigl,T.(2011).Imageryinthe21stCentury.InM.I.ofTechnology(Ed.),LondonFirst:MITPress.

Guala,F.,Mittone,L.,&Ploner,M.(2013).Groupmembership,teampreferences,andexpectations.JournalofEconomicBehaviorandOrganization,86,183–190.http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.12.003

Jerald,J.(2016).TheVRBook:Human-CenteredDesignforVirtualReality.AssociationforComputingMachineryandMorgan&ClaypoolPublishers.

Slotnick,S.D.,Thompson,W.L.,&Kosslyn,S.M.(2012).Visualmemoryandvisualmentalimageryrecruitcommoncontrolandsensoryregionsofthebrain.CognitiveNeuroscience,3(1),14–20.http://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2011.578210

Snyder,T.(2017).OnTyranny(First).NewYork:CrownPublishing.

Wais,P.E.,&Gazzaley,A.(2014).Distractibilityduringretrievaloflong-termmemory:domain-generalinterference,neuralnetworksandincreasedsusceptibilityinnormalaging.FrontiersinPsychology,5.http://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00280


Wais,P.E.,Rubens,M.T.,Boccanfuso,J.,&Gazzaley,A.(2010).NeuralMechanismsUnderlyingtheImpactofVisualDistractiononRetrievalofLong-TermMemory.JournalofNeuroscience,30(25),8541–8550.http://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1478-10.2010


Groupthink: Training New Technologies to See That Humans Don’t All Think Alike

Dr.GwynethSutherlinGeographicServices,Inc.

[email protected]

Thispaperdiscussesamethodologicalandtechnologicalalternativetoconventionalcollectionandanalysismethods.Totakethepreliminarysteptowardaddressingtheissuesraisedinthispaper—thatwelackinsightintohowotherculturesthinkandthisisattheheartofmanyofourcontemporarynational security challenges—bydeveloping a collection andanalysismethod that is sensitive towhatweseektounderstand.Whenwewantedtomeasurelight,wedevelopedthephotometer.Whenthestateoftheartadvanceandwewantedtomonitorpatternsofmovement,weuseddeltasbetweenpixelsinimagerytodevelopmachinelearningalgorithms.Fortheproblemofunderstandinghowother cultures think, we need to develop a means to sense and analyze cultural variation.Conventionalcollectionandanalyticslackthiscapabilityandarehinderingourpursuit.Thispaperproposeswemuststartattheveryfoundationofthetechnologiesandmethodswerelyon,stripthemdowntotheassumptionsfromwhichtheyarebuilt,andexamineiftheyareservingtheirpurpose.Aretheysensitivetoculturalvariation,tocognitivevariation?Canthesetechnologiesandmethodsexposevariations inhowothercultures think? Ifnot,howdoweevolve themtomeet theneedsdescribedinthispaper?

Learninghowotherculture’sthinkoftencomesfromlookingatdatasourcesincludingsocialmedia,onlinepollingandsurveytools,self-reporting,oracombinationoftheseandtheassociatedanalytics.Howreliableareanyoftheavailableoptionsfromatechnicalperspective(thishasbeenaddressedin previous sections)? Andwhat are the alternatives that the PSYOP community can leverage tosupportdecision-makers?Basedonworking inconflictmediationandriskanalysis in the field inplaces likeNorthAfricaduringtheArabSpringwhensocialmediausecameto the forefrontandservingasaKreyol toEnglish translatorduring the2010earthquake inHaitiwhenmanyonlinesurveyandself-reportingtechnologieswereborn,myresearchevolvedfromwatchingtheevolutionofcommunicationtechnologiesusedintheconflictandcrisisspace.Ispecificallylookathowthesetechnologies,includingsocialmedia,selfandcrowdsourcedreportingtools,andonlineandmobilesurveys contribute to analysis for decision-making—as a class, referred to as information andcommunicationtechnologies(ICTs).

Myresearchexaminedthefollowingproblem:ifICTsweredesignedbyasinglecultureandexhibitasingleculture’swayofseeingtheworld,howdoesthatimpactothercultureswhentheyusetheseICTs? (Sutherlin, 2016) To put it another way, we (Anglophone/Americans) are simultaneouslyadmittingwedonotunderstandotherpopulationgroupswellandaretryingtodosobygatheringcommunicationsinformation,andatthesametime,weareassertingthatallhumanscommunicateinauniversalmannerbecauseourICTstreateveryculturalgroupthesame.Thismeanstheverytools we use to understand difference assume there is no difference; they are blind to it. TheconsequenceforpopulationgroupsthatcontributecontentviaICTsisthattheymustconformtheircommunication patterns and content to the prescribed logics of the ICT which follows theAnglophone/Americanculturalnormsofitsdesigners.Theymustadheretotheuseofcategories,conceptsoflocationsandtime,agents(whoisresponsible),connectionsbetweenevents,etc.Toputitanotherway,usingtheICTputstheuserinan‘Anglo-Americanwayofthinking’eveniftheyareusingtheirownnativelanguage.TheyareobligedtorecallthenarrativeinAnglo-AmericancognitivetermsbecausetheICTisconstructedaroundanAnglo-Americancognitivenorm.Thisdissolvesthe


keyingredientwewereafter,namely,anunderstandingwhatothersarethinking.TheICTmoreorlesshomogenizesotherculturalcognitiveschemastofitthoseprescribedbytheICT.Thesesameassumptionsunderpin themethodsof analysis that link and correlate resultsderived from ICTs.These cognitive norms are often described as universally human although there is considerableevidencethatthereishighvariabilityacrossculturesincognitiveprocesses(Majid,2018;Pavlenko,2014; Boroditsky, 2011). The result of other cultures expressing narratives via ICTs is distortedcontent(i.e.distortednarratives)atafoundationalconceptuallevel.Thisisthelevelof‘thinking’thatwewant to address in thewhitepaper. The ubiquitous ICTswe have come to rely on to collectinformation,toassess ‘whatpeoplearethinking’,areinherentlyflawedbecausetheycaptureandframe the content in theway an Anglophone American thinks at a conceptual level. These ICTshomogenizecontenttoconformtothiscognitivenormthatwebelievetobeuniversal,andtheyerasethecrucialaspectsweseektolearnthroughourinvestigations.

Iwas firstmadeawareof thisproblemby listening togroupsand individualsonthegroundandcomparing their responses (in their native languages) to results from large survey samples orcrowdsourcedaggregationsandothertechnologicallyaidedanalyses(2013a).WhatIheardonthe

groundandwhat Iwould read in a reportwas never in agreement. Not even close.WhileIwasonlyspeakingwitharelativelysmall number of individuals compared towhat is possible with crowdsourcing orsocial media polling, for example, I wasconvinced this was not an issue oftranslationorofpeopletellingmewhattheythought Iwanted tohear. Itwasdeeper. Itwasatthelevelof‘thought’thatthemodeoftheirICTcommunicationwasscriptingtheircommunication.

Thisisoneexampleexcerptedfroma2013essay (Sutherlin, 2013b). In December2011,Al JazeeralaunchedSomalia Speaks,an SMS crowdsourcing collaboration withUshahidi. Their stated aim was giving avoicetothepeopleofSomaliaandsharingapicture of how violence was impactingeveryday lives.Acall for translators in thediaspora, particularly Somali studentgroups,wasissuedonline,andphonesweredistributed on the ground throughoutSomaliasomultipleuserscouldparticipate.The volunteers translated the SMSs andcategorized the content as either political,social,oreconomic.Theresultswerecolor-codedandaggregatedonamap.

WhileAlJazeeraisanewsorganization,notaresearchinstituteoragovernmentactor,itplays an important role in informingelectorates who can put political pressure

Figure13.Screenshotofsurveyasseenbytranslators(Sutherlin,2013b).


ongovernmentsinvolvedintheconflict.Furthermore,thissametypeoftechnologyisusedonthegroundtogatherinformationincrisissituationsbyUSGandinternationalpartners.Thisexampleillustratestwokeydesignflawsthatpreventusfromgainingabetterunderstandingofwhatothersarethinking.TheICTdesignandanalysismethodsmakeassumptionsthatallhumansunderstandeventsinauniversalmanner(i.e.,denyingculturalcognitivevariation)andcommunicatetheminthesamestraightforwardway.TheICTswerelyonarethereforeblindtotheexactattributewewanttosee.

TheSMSpollaskedanopenquestion:HowhastheSomaliaconflictaffectedyourlife?

Inoneresponseexample:TheBosasoMarketfirehasaffectedme.IthappenedonSaturday.

Theresponsewascategorizedas‘social.’Butwhydidn’tthefactthatviolencehappenedinamarket,an economic center, denote ‘economic’ categorization? There was no guidance for maintainingconsistencyamongthetranslators,noranyindicationofhowtheinformationwouldbeusedlater.Itwasthesecategorieschosenbythetranslators,representedasbrightcolorfulcirclesonthemap,which were speaking to the world, not the Somalis—whose voices had been lost through acrowdsourcingapplicationthatwasdesignedwithalanguagebarrier.Theprimarysourcescouldnotsuggestanothercategorythatbettersuitedtheintentionsoftheirresponses,nordidtheyunderstandtherolecategorieswouldplayinrepresentingandvisualizingtheirresponsestotheEnglishlanguageaudience.Already,theconceptsframingthenarrativewerepartofthedesign.

An8December2011commentontheUshahidiblogdescribedincompellingtermshowlanguageandcontroloverinformationflowimpactthepowerbalanceduringaconflict:

A—-,Myfriendreceivedthemessagefromyouonhisphone.Thequestionsays“tellushowisconflictaffectingyourlife”and“includeyournameoflocation”.Youdidnottellhimthathisnamewillbetoldtotheworld.PeopleinSomaliaunderstandthatsmsisbetweenjusttwopeople.Manypeopledonotevenunderstandtheinternet.Thewarlordshavemoneyandmanycontacts.Theyunderstandtheinternet.Theywilllookatthisandtheywilllookatwhoiscomplaining.Canyouprotectthem?Ithink

Figure14.GeospatialaggregationofeventcategoriesfromSomaliaSpeakssurvey(Sutherlin,2013b)


thisprojectisnotforthepeopleofSomalia.ItisforthemedialikeAlJazeeraandUshahidi.Youarenotfromhere.Youarenothelping.Itisbetterthatyoustayout.

UshahididirectorPatrickMeier,respondedtothecomment:

Patrick:DearA—-,IcompletelyshareyourconcernandalreadymentionedthisexactissuetoAlJazeeraafewhoursago.I’msurethey’llfixtheissueassoonastheygetmymessage.Notethatthequestionthatwassentoutdoes*not*requestpeopletosharetheirnames,onlythenameoftheirgenerallocation.AlJazeeraiscarefultomapthegenerallocationand*not*theexactlocation.Finally,AlJazeerahasfulleditorialcontroloverthisproject,notUshahidi.(Meier,2011)

Diditoccurtothedesignersthattheirconceptoflocationandthelocalconceptoflocationornameoranythingelsewasatodds?Thiswasnotanissueofmisreadinginstructions.Thisisacognitivevariation of how we see/perceive and recall the world around us. While the differences aresometimessubtle,itisthatnuancethatleadstotheconflictweseektounravel.Weneedtechnologiesthatcandetectthis.

Intheexampleabove,thedangeristhatthesecategories—economic,political,andsocial—becometheframeworkforaiddonationsandpolicyendeavors;theapplicationframesthediscussionratherthan the Somalis’ understanding.We lose an opportunity to really learn what another group isthinking.Thesimplisticcategoriesbecometheentrypointfordecision-makersandcitizensaliketounderstandandbecomeinvolvedwithtranslatedmaterial.Decisionsandpoliciesdevelopedfromthe translated informationare lessconnected to ‘realvoices’ thanwewouldlike tobelieve.Evenbeforethematerialistranslated,whenparticipantsarerespondingtotheopenquestionviaSMS,myexperimentexaminedthis,lessscriptedinteractionandfoundtheengagementwithICTsstillcamewithafoundationalnarrativeshift.Forsomeparticipantgroups,thismaybeintentional.TheyseeICTsasinherentlyconnectedtotheWestandanycommunicationviaICTisdirectedatthisaudience.Forothers,itwaslessintentional,butthecognitiveshifttomanipulatetheirnarrativeintothenormsdictatedbytheICTswasapparent.

Developingamethodologytoevaluatewhatsomeoneisthinkingiscrucial.Havingdemonstratedthatthisproblemexiststhroughempiricalresearchseveralyearsago,themethoddevelopedtoillustratetheproblemwasalsodesignedasthekeytosolvingitandevolvingthetechnologytoincorporateculturalcognitivevariation(Sutherlin,2016).TheexperimentalsamplebroughttheissueofculturalcognitivevariationintoreliefbyselectingaculturethatwashighlydistanttotheAnglo-AmericandesignersoftheICT.Itshowednearlythree-quartersoftheparticipantswhosharedanarrativeviaICT changed their recall of a conflict eventnarrative from theway they reported it as a spokennarrative.Thismeanstheychangedwhathappened,whowasthere,howmanypeoplewereinvolved,howcertaintheywereaboutwhattheyweredescribing,whenandwheretheeventtookplace,andtherolesofthoseculpablevs.victimized.Thesechangesoccurredirrespectiveofthepresenceofaresearcher, and in both open and closed survey type formats. These are foundational things tochange,particularlyifaggregatedanddevelopedintothebasisofareportfordecisionmakers.Thedescriptionofeventsonthegroundwillquicklybecomeskewed.

Themethod for capturing the shift innarrativeoffers ameans to identify cultural variation at aconceptuallevel.Once thesecorecognitiveactivitiescanbeculturally localized, then theycanbeincorporatedintosoftwareandtheapplicationsweknowtodaythatchangefromEnglishtoSwahilitoArabic,willbeabletoinsteadshifttoanotherculturalconceptualization.Thisisthepathforward.


AddingthislevelofsensitivitytoanalyticsortomodellingwouldenablearichgrowthinMLforsocialsciencedrivenapplicationssuchaspatternsoflife.

References

AlJazeeraEnglish.SomaliaSpeaks.(2011).RetrievedJanuary2012fromhttp://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/somaliaconflict/somaliaspeaks.html

Boroditsky,L.(2011).HowLanguagesConstructTime.InDehaeneandBrannon(Eds.),Space,timeandnumberinthebrain:Searchingforthefoundationsofmathematicalthought.Elsevier.

Majid,A.etal.(2018).Hunter-GathererOlfactionIsSpecial.CurrentBiology,28(3),409-413.e2.

MeierP.(2011).AmplifyingSomaliVoicesUsingSMSandaLiveMap:#SomaliaSpeaks–TheUshahidiBlog.http://blog.ushahidi.com/index.php/2011/12/08/somalia-speaks/

Pavlenko,A.(2014).TheBilingualMind:andwhatittellsusaboutlanguageandthought.CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge,UK.

Sutherlin,G.(2013a).AVoiceintheCrowd:BroaderImplicationsforCrowdsourcingTranslationduringCrisis.JournalofInformationScience,9(3),June2013:pp.397-409.

Sutherlin,G.(2013b).CrowdsourcingTranslationduringCrisisSituations:are‘realvoices’beingexcludedfromdecisionsandpolicesitsupports?D.Sutcliffe(Ed.),PolicyandInternetJournalBlog.OxfordInternetInstitute.(Online7May)

Sutherlin,G.(2016).Groupthink:QuantifyingtheImpactofCultureforCommunicationAnalysis.SMASpeakerSeries.DoDJointStaffJ39.


The Internet of Things (IoT) and the Art of Mapping a Population’s Thinking, Behavior, and Influencers

MarkPolyakIpsosPublicAffairs

[email protected]

Dr.DavidC.EllisJointSpecialOperations

[email protected]

Dr.KatieZiemerIpsosPublicAffairs

[email protected]

KeyPoints

• ThepromiseoftheIoTisinprovidingcontinuousinsightintohumanbehaviorsandthefidelitywithwhichitcanreturnI&Wondailydecision-makingprocesseswithinoramongpopulationsandallowmilitarydecisionmakers to increase their operational situationalawarenesswhilemitigatingagainststrategicsurprise.

• EffectiveutilizationofInternetofThingsrequiresanapproachgroundedinatheoryofidentityandaclearconceptofthetypeoflogicalreasoningneededtomeetanalyticalneeds.

• The Logic of Appropriateness provides a conceptual linkage between interests, thinking,behaviorandidentity.

• Algorithm-basedanalysisisinsufficienttomakefulluseofthedataavailableintheIoT;rather,itrequiresthelensofthethreetypesoflogicalreasoning,genericallydescribedascrowdsourcing,detectivework,anddesigningthefuture.

Advancingthemilitary’sinsightintoapopulation’sthinkingandbehaviorrequiresgoingfurtherthanprobingsocialmediafortacticalinsights.Itrequiresapproachingpopulationsfromtheperspectiveofthesocialconstructionofidentityandthroughthelensesofthethreetypesofreasoninginsocialscientific research. As the Internet of Things (IoT) is explored as another potentially disruptivetechnology, developing and designing appropriate research “rules of engagement” is of vitalimportance for future operations. This chapter describes the importance of (a) the Logic ofAppropriateness as a behavioral indicator of identity and (b) utilizing three different lenses ofreasoning—genericallydubbedherecrowdsourcing,detectivework,anddesigningthefuture—tomake use of the IoT.While these concepts are not new, they are often overlooked in the art ofdesigningtechnicalresearchbecausetheappealoftacticalIoTapplicationsappearsocompelling.ThechapterfirstexplainswhytheLogicofAppropriatenessiscrucialasabehavioralindicatorofidentity;thenbrieflydescribesthedifferencesbetweenthethreetypesofreasoning;andconcludeswithwhyIoThasgrownandoffersexamplesofhowitcanbeleveragedtorevealdistinctaspectsoftheLogicsofAppropriateness.

The Impact of the Logic of Appropriateness on Thinking and Behavior

What a person thinks about, holds as interests, considers rational, and acts upon is in the firstinstanceamatteroftheidentityapersonadoptsinagivencontext(Berger,etal.,1966;Wendt,1999;Katzenstein, 1996;Weldes, et al., 1999).Oneof themost valuable concepts linking interestsandbehaviorstoidentityiscalledtheLogicofAppropriateness.Typicalmodelsofrationalbehaviormakethematerialinterestsoftheindividualtheprimarymotivator.Incontrast,JamesMarchwritesthatLogicofAppropriatenessbehavior

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come[s]frommatchingachanging(andoftenambiguous)setofcontingentrulesandidentitiestoachanging(andoftenambiguous)setofsituations(Turner,1985)…Actionsreflectimagesofproperbehavior,andhumandecisionmakersroutinelyignoretheirownfullyconsciouspreferences.Theyactnotonthebasisofsubjectiveconsequencesandpreferencesbutonthebasisofrules,routines,procedures,practices,identities,androles(Anderson,1983;Biddle,1986;March&Simon,1993).(1999p.22)

LogicofAppropriatenessanalysisasks,“whatarenormativelyandethicallyappropriatebehaviorsgivenwhoIaminthissituation?”Byclearlylinkinginterestsandbehaviorstorolesandtherulesofrightandwrongassociatedwiththem,theLogicofRationalitybecomessubordinatedtotheLogicofAppropriateness. Interests and behaviors in thisview depend on contextualized identity, whichinevitablydrawsuponalimitedrangeofacceptablebehaviors. For example, astute observers of ISISmightnoticethattheSalafiJihadigroupmandateswearingpantlegsabovetheankles.ThisbehavioraltraitisrationalbecauseSalafiJihadisinterprettheProphet Mohammed as having done so, whichmeansitisappropriateforgoodMuslimstofollowsuit.Unsurprisingly, ISISalso forcespeopleunderitsswaytoadoptthesamebehaviorandsocializeschildrentothisnorm.Analystshaveamucheasierjobofderivingreasonablehypothesesandresearchassumptions when the range of acceptablebehaviors is knowable based on existingsociologicalandanthropologicalliterature.

Nevertheless,whatapopulationthinksaboutandthebehaviorsitfindsrationalaremutable,context-dependent,andbasedoncompetingnarrativesoverwhichidentitiestodrawupontoperceiveandinterpretagivenissue.Importantly,theseidentitiesoftenmovewellbeyondthetypicalethnicity,religion,race,andtribalidentitiesthroughwhichmilitaryunitsoftenperceivemostsituations.Othermeaningfulidentitiescouldbe,forinstance,oppressedcitizen,water-starvedfarmer,technocraticprofessional,civillibertarian,or,perhaps,amemberoftheummaasopposedtoacitizenofastate.Thus,totrulydigesttheissueofhowtoforecastrationalbehavior,theanalystmustfirsthaveasenseoftherangeofbehaviorsflowingfromthedifferentidentitiesinaperson’sidentitypalette.

Onewaytolinkpossiblebehaviorswithidentitiesisbyunderstandingtheprioritiesassociatedwitheachidentity.Forexample,anoppressedcitizenmayprioritizefreespeech,whereasawater-starvedfarmermayprioritizeaccess toequipment thatresultsingreatercropyields.Peopleconsistentlymakedecisionsandactaccordingtotheprioritiesassociatedwithspecificidentities.Whilecontextinfluenceswhichidentitiesbecomesalient,theprioritiesassociatedwithspecificidentitiestendtobestableintheshort-term(Plott,1996;Bettman,Luce,&Payne,1998).Ifprioritiesdochange,theychange gradually over time and in predictable ways according to external events (Jennings &Wlezien, 2011).For instance, after9-11, national securitybecamea toppriorityof theAmericanidentity and this resulted in more patriotic behaviors, such as civic engagement, and greateroppositiontoforeigners.

Appreciating the reasoning and priorities behind posted data andmessages enables analysts tobetterinterprethowtousetheinformationandthetechnologiesmostappropriatefortheresearchdesign.TheLogicofAppropriatenesschangestheemphasisfromwhatisposted(aperspectivebased

Figure15.ChildrenintrainingbyISISinSyria(November18,2015).https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/620051/Islamic-State-jihadi-camp-children-school(accessedJanuary31,2018).

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oncontentatagivenpointintime),tooneexploringtheroleidentitiesthatmakethepostingthecontent a rational behavior in the first place (aperspective rooted inpriorities,motivation, andreasoning).Botharevalidtypesofinquiry,butthelatterisfarmoreinterestingtotheintelligenceanalyst.

IoT Indicators, Behavior Priorities and Identities Matrix

Thelinkbetweenidentity,priorities,andbehaviorsallowsforthecreationofamatrixthatcanbeusedtoanalyzethebehavioralpatternsinIoTdata.Thematrixidentifiespatternsofbehavior(e.g.,cryptocurrencyusage, trafficpatternsaroundgovernmentcenters) fromIoTdataandlinks thesebehaviorswith therangeofpossiblebehaviorsstemming frompeople’spriorities (e.g.,economicstability,trust-worthygovernment,safety).Theseprioritiesareinturnlinkedwithspecificidentities(e.g.,oppressedcitizen,technocraticprofessional).

Identifyingpeople’sprioritiesallowsforabetterunderstandingofhowtheindividualsaswellasthepublicwill react todifferent campaigns,movements, and interventions. Campaigns that target orframetheirmessagingaroundpeople’s topprioritieswillproduce thegreatestreaction fromthepublic.Sincedifferentidentitieshavedifferentpriorities,messagingandinterventionscantargetthetop priorities of specific identities or groups of people. For example,water-starved farmerswillrespondthemosttocampaignsthatenhancetheircropyields,sincethisislikelyatoppriorityforthem.

The Art of Reasoning behind Mapping the Internet of Things.

The IoT analytics provide emerging exponential opportunity to develop Indications &Warning(I&W)fromanidentityandLogicofAppropriatenessperspective.Theartofmappingapopulation’sthinking,behavior,andinfluencersshouldstartwithatheoryofthesocialconstructionofreality,afirmgraspoftheidentitiesandsocialstructuresvyingfordominancewithinthepopulation,andasenseof the life interestsofapopulation’svarioussubgroups.Differentquestionsarise fromthisbase,andIoTdatacanbeinterpretedthroughthreedifferentlensestorevealdifferentinsights.Toavoidjargon,thelensescanbedescribedascrowdsourcing,detectivework,anddesigningthefuture.

Crowdsourcing (Inductive Reasoning)

Crowdsourcingseekstoletthedataidentifyrelevantcorrelationswithoutanypreconceptionofwhatrelationshipsmight be important. Algorithmic analysis, uponwhichmost social media analyticstodayarebased,canyieldsomeinsightintoimmediateconcernsandissuesthroughtrendanalysis.Theassumptionisthatthetechnologycantellanalystswhattheyneedtobeconcernedaboutsincetheyareoftenonlysuperficiallyfamiliarwithapopulation.Unfortunately,crowdsourceddataoftencomes too late tobeactionable.By the timesufficientdata isavailableto illustrateanoteworthytrend,themajorityofthesocio-politicalforcesarewellentrenchedandtheoutputmostlyhastacticalvalueonly.Operatinginthiskindofinformationenvironmentalwayscedestheinitiativetootherforces,especiallyintheinformationenvironment.

Detective Work (Deductive Reasoning)

Detectiveworkbeginswithahypothesisaboutcorrelationsandcausalrelationshipsandthenlooksattheevidenceinthehistoricalrecordtodetermineiftheassumptionshold.Thisisanapproachtodiscoverybasedonintuitionandhassignificantmeritwhendeepsocio-culturalappreciationofa

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population already exists. Otherwise, detective work is highly subjected to the mirror imagingproblemsrecognizedintheintelligencecommunity’sliterature(Heuer,1999pp.9-16&70-71).

Whiledetectiveworkisastepintherightdirection,it,too,isretrospectiveinnaturesinceitfavorsinsightgatheredfrompastinteractionsbasedsolelyontherelationshipsandvariablestheresearcherbelievesmightmatter.Thus,itcannotadequatelypredictthefuturebecauseanalystsdonotknowabout all the relationships and interactions in theopen systems they study. Yet, analysts have achanceofatleastaskingbetterquestionsofthedata,andthehistoricalrecordmightillustratehowthe interplay of social structures shape identities, thinking, and Logics of Appropriateness andthereforeprovidecluesonhowtothinkabouttherangeofpossiblefutures.

Designing the Future (Abductive Reasoning (Can Wicked Problems Be Tackled Through Abductive Inferencing, 2000))

Designing the future is most closely associated with the social construction of identity becausesubgroupsofapopulationareforeverpromotingideas,thoughts,andnormsinordertochangetheirsocialstructures.Culturalmeaningsandtheboundariesofidentityareconsequentlyformedbyideaslocked in a competition for dominance. Identity in this view is ecological, highly variable, andpermanentlyunderthreatofbeingsupplantedbynewcodesandlogicsofunderstanding(SocietyasaComplexAdaptiveSystem,2008;DilemmasinaGeneralTheoryofPlanning,1973).Identityisnotstatic,andideasarealwaysapotentialthreat,sodominantculturalnormsandidentitiesmustalwaysreproduce themselvesand inculcate their logic throughoutsociety lest theybeovercomebynewideasandidentityconstructs(Weldes,etal.,1999p.16;TheEvolutionofInternationalNorms,1996p.372).Thefutureiscreatedbyactivists,influencers,networks,andcommunicationstreams,andforsuchpeoplethefutureiscurrentoperations.ThinkagainaboutISISsocializingpreviouslynon-jihadiSyrianchildrentonewnormsofappropriatedressingandallthereligiousinterpretationsandsocio-politicalbehaviorsassociatedwithit!

The reality is that today’s inductive, algorithmic trend analysis is based on some interaction ofactivistsandnetworksworkingdiligentlyfiveyearsago,forexample,oncreatingnewrelationships,identities, and Logics of Appropriateness, hence ISIS as an organizational and socio-politicalphenomenon.ThesocialinfrastructureforlonewolfterroristsdidnotoccurwiththeriseofISIS;ittookmanydecadestoputtheglobaljihadieducationsysteminplace,theinternettoamplifyit,andISIStogivephysicalexpressiontoanalreadyvividnarrativeofthecaliphateinculcatedbyothers.

ThepoweroftheInternetandsocialmedialiesintheirabilitytogeneratehomophilyandpropinquityamongdisparatepopulationsandprovidethemwiththecommonvocabularyandframesofrealitytocreateaneworadaptedidentity(Kadushin,2012pp.18-20).Socializationinavirtualnetworkhasthesamepotentialtoinculcatenorms,values,andethicsand,asaresult,rolebehaviorsasdirectinterpersonalcommunication.Inthisview,forinstance,“lonewolf”terroristsalmostneveractalone;rather,theyarepartofavirtualsocialsystemornationrepletewithasenseofcommunity,roleswithinthatcommunity,normsofbehaviorassociatedwithroles,andsophisticatednarrativesthatreinforcetheroleidentitiesresultinginterroristorenablingbehavior(Just,2015pp.34-55).

Synthesizing the Art of Reasoning

Byexploringpopulationsthroughthethreelenses,theIoTcouldprovideexcellentdatatodeterminewhichpossible future is “trending”given thewealthofempirical, crowdsourceddata,whilegooddetective work based on an analyst’s hunch might illuminate a potential, localized threat that

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crowdsourcing algorithmsmight not elevate as an important trend. Synthesizing these types ofreasoningiswhatmakesthethinkingandbehaviorofpopulationscomealive.

For example, persistent IoT “crowdsourcing” in a new post-ISIS controlled conflict zone mightillustrateachange inpatternsofmovement, showingthat traffic isslowly increasingintheareasaroundtraditionalnormativemosques.Simultaneously,de-identifiedradiofrequencyscanningandtrafficpatternanalysismaydemonstrate increasedattendance of publicauthority buildings duringworking hours. TheseindicatorsseenthroughtheLogic of Appropriatenesssuggest gradualimprovement in trust ofgovernmental andtraditional institutions.Detective work on thepopulation and their IoTfootprint might revealactorsandsocialstructureshaving interest inpropagatingthemovementtoward Jihadism, thoseopposed, and thenarratives both groupsmightexpress.Hypothesescouldthenbeformedabouttheir discourse, behavior,andalliances in thestruggle for thesocialconstructionofrealityandgenerate, for instance, localagriculturalsupport interventionstobolster the influenceofnon-Jihadinetworksandtheoverallresilienceofthepopulationagainstthethreat.DesigningthefuturereasoningcouldthendeveloppossiblefuturescenariosagainstwhichI&Wontheactors,alliances,andnarrativescouldbeassessedfortrendanalysis.

ThepromiseoftheIoTisinprovidingcontinuousinsightintohumanbehaviorsandthefidelitywithwhichitcanreturnI&Wondailydecision-makingprocesseswithinoramongpopulationsandallowmilitarydecisionmakerstoincreasetheiroperationalsituationalawarenesswhilemitigatingagainststrategicsurprise.

The Growth of the Internet of Things

According toarecentCISCO/DHLreport, roughly1.5trillion“items”globallycanbenefit fromaninternetprotocol (IP)address,with justunder15billion connected asof 2014(Macaulay, et al.,2015).RecententerpriseIoTdeploymentshavegrownbyover300percentsince2012.Whilemuchof thedatawill concentrate in information-rich,developedcountries,asignificantportionwillbeemplaced in information-poor, hard-to-reach areas in thedevelopingworld (seeFigure16).Therecent explosionof the IoT to complex, hard-to-reach, often conflict environments is drivenbyanumberoffactors.

Figure16.OpenAccessIoTconnecteddevices’inMiddleEast/NorthAfricaandSouthEastAsia,Source:ThingfulIoTSearchEngine,(accessedonJanuary30,2018).

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The IGO and NGO Drive for Transparency and Improving Accountability

Recently,manylargeIntergovernmentalOrganizations(IGOs),includingtheWorldBank,EuropeanUnion,andtoalesserextenttheUN,re-evaluatedhowandwhentoengageinfragiledomesticandconflict environments.Thepreviousmodusoperandisanctionedengagementmainly in thepost-crisissettingwitharecognizednationalgovernmentinstabilizedareas.However,duetoincreasedstatefragilityintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA)andHornofAfrica(HOA)regions,aswellasunprecedentedlevelsofmigrationintodonorcountries,thisapproachhasbeencriticizedforbeingtooslowinitsimplementationandoperationallyunsuitablegiventhelongevityofmanyconflicts.

Faced with the challenges of operating in the conflict setting and requiring higher levels ofaccountability, these organizations have actively contributed to the development of the IoT. Forinstance,somehaveembracedthepromiseofblockchainandradio-frequencyidentification(RFID),specificallytoimprovepharmaceuticalandsupplychainmanagementinconflictsettings(Stanley,2017;Kucheryavenko,etal.,2017).Additionally, smartsensorsarestarting tobe integrated intosensitivewatermanagement systems,mostnotably in Somalia andMalawi, in order to facilitateassistanceandtoanticipatewater-relatedstressandconflict.Additionally, these technologiesareseenascriticalforimprovingtrustintheglobaldistributionofaid,formitigatingcorruption,andultimatelyforimprovingfaithintheinstitutionsthemselves.

Precision Farming Initiatives for Optimizing Farm Management

Precision farming combines sensors, robots, location intelligence analytics, andunmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs)toprovideunprecedentedinsightonindividualplants,improvetimemanagement,reduce water and chemical use, and produce healthier crops as well as higher yields. Althoughprecision farming isencounteringadoption issues indevelopednationsdue topotentialup-frontequipmentcosts,farmersindevelopingnationsareadoptingcheaper,lowerenergysolutionsthatrelyonwireless, solar-poweredsensors.Bothlargecompaniesandlocalstart-upsaredevelopingsensor plug-and-play solutions for systemic, real-time measurements of soil data, includingtemperature,nutrients,vegetativehealth,andyieldaswellasforprovidingaudioandSMS-basedguidancetofarmersbasedonreal-timeweatherandfinancialmarketforecasts(Ling,etal.,2017;Ekekwe,2017; economist.com,2016). Simultaneously, thewillingadoptionof internet-connectedsensorsystemsbyfarmersacrosstheglobecanenhancetheanalyst’sappreciationofsocio-economicdriversofhumanbehavior,especiallyinremoteareasinMENA,HOA,andEastAfrica.

The Local Adoption of Mobile Financial Transactions for New Product Markets

Useofsecuremobilecommunicationsinareasthatrelyonremittancesisnotnew.InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment(IFAD)estimatesthat30-40percentofremittancesgotoruralareas,globallyamountingto$2.5trillion.ItisestimatedthattwomillionSomalislivingoverseassendanestimated$1.3billionbackhomeeveryyearwithmanyofthesetransactionsincreasinglydoneoverencryptedmobile applications, including via cryptocurrency (International Fund for AgriculturalDevelopment, 2016). Increasingly, however local market transactions, including those involvingexport of agricultural products and livestock are done using mobile financing. For example,Somaliland’smobilemoney platform, Zaad, counted approximately10% of the local region’s 3.8millionpeople as subscribers as of 2014 (Iazzolino, 2014). Similarly, inMogadishu and Galkayo,AriFarm,alocalmobilelivestock-sellingplatformthatwascreatedinAugust2016withthepromiseofgivinglocalnomadictribesmentheabilitytofindnewcustomersintheGulf,isconducting10%ofitstransactionsviabitcoin(Dahir,2017).

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Critical Asset Management in Complex Environments

Logistics management, while a major factor for IoT implementation in developed countries, isincreasinglyviewedindevelopingcountriesasasourceofimprovedoperationalefficiency,criticalresourcetracking,ananti-graftinstrument,andapromisingcomponentofearlywarningsystemstopreventnaturaldisastersandenablebetterunderstandingofdriversofconflict.Additionally,theIoThas been seen as a way to anticipate equipment failure and understand employee utilization.Currently,anumberofsolutionshavebeendevelopedtoassistinrealtimetelematicsandsensorshardwaretrackingandsensing,includingAgheera,andinitiativesthatattempttodemocratizeaccessto traffic sensor data such as World Bank’s Open Traffic initiative (The World Bank, 2016).Increasingly,solutionsthatcombineIoTlogisticstrackingwithblockchaintechnologyarebecomingavailableaswell,suchasarecentcollaborationbetweenAOSSASandIBMWatsontoprovidetrucktrackingsolutionsspecificallydesignedforincreasingtransparencyandsecurityinaconflictzone(Lewis,2017).

The Rise of Urban Planning and Resilience Projects

Finally,therecentalliancebetweenleadersofemergingmegacitiesandIGOs,tomakeinfrastructureand organizations more resilient in the face of localized disasters is driving adaption of IoTtechnologyandmaking“existinginfrastructure‘smarter.’”ArecentWorldBank/GFDRRreportnotedthat“60percentoftheareasexpectedtobeurbanby2030areyettobebuilt”andstronglyurgeddonorsandmunicipalitiestoinvestinresilientinfrastructure.Aspartofitswork,theWorldBankalongwithnineotherlargeactorshassignificantlyexpandedits“ResilientCities”programtoincludeemergingmegacities inLatinAmerica,MENA,EastAsia,andSouthEastAsia.Forexample,urbanresilienceprojects,includingthelocalized“IoTization”ofexistinginfrastructure,arecurrentlytakingplaceinBeirut,Dhaka,AddisAbaba,CanTho,theGreaterAccraRegion,andLahore,withadditionalresiliencediagnosticstakingplaceinanother28cities(TheWorldBank,2016).

How the Internet of Things Allows Us to Infer a Population’s Thinking and Behavior

ClearlythesheervolumeofIoTdatastreamscurrentlyinexistenceandlikelytobeemplacedoverthecomingdecadeswilloverwhelmanalystslackingaclearresearchdesignandcorrespondinglensof reasoning throughwhich to seekoutand interpret thedata.The art ofmapping the interests,thinking,andbehaviorsofpopulationsstartswiththequestionsanalystsask.

Much of the power of the IoT is on the surface about crowdsourcing since all the technologiesmentionedrevealbehavioranddecisionsmadeinrealtime.Lookedatmoredeeply,however,theyrevealmoreinterestingquestionsastowhythedecisionsweremadeandthisgoestoidentity.Doesanincreaseintheuseofcryptocurrencyinacountryinsteadofitsbankingsectorindicatelackoflegitimacyoftheinstitutionsandthereforeaweaknationalidentity?Iffarmsensorsindicateaseveredroughtandlowyield,whatistheLogicofAppropriatenessofa“waterstressedfarmer”identityina particular country, and howmight international assistance reinforce social order through thesystems of formal and informal governance? If traffic patterns avoid governmental centers, buttraverseotherareasmoreconsistently,does thispattern indicatealternative, informalcentersofgravityand corresponding identity constructsaboutwhich theanalystshouldknowmore?WhatpatternsoflifecanbediscernedfromthefullrangeofIoTinacountry,andwhatarethesubgroupscontributingtothevarioussubsystemsasrevealedbytheirsocialmediaposts?

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Conclusion

AdisruptivetechnologyliketheIoTcouldexacerbatethechallengesanalystsfaceintheinformationenvironment, but only if they rely on algorithmic trend analysis and a crowdsourcing lens ofreasoning.TherulesofengagementwiththeIoTnecessitateresearchandanalysisonthemotivationsbehindandimplicationsofreceiveddataforthesocialconstructionofreality.Otherwise,thecontentof thedatawill lie inertamongthenoiseandsocio-cultural indicatorswillbe lost.WhenviewedthroughtheperspectiveoftheLogicofAppropriateness,thedatacanbemorerichlyinterpretedtoproactivelyassesstheinformationenvironmentforI&Wandgreaterstrategicawareness.

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The Impact of the Internet of Things (IoT) and Blockchains on Future Warfare

Mr.HowardSimkinG-9Concepts,ExperimentationandAnalysisDirectorate,USASOC

[email protected]

“TheFutureisalreadyhere.It’sjustnotveryevenlydistributed.”–WilliamGibson,sciencefictionauthorwhocoinedthewordcyberspacein1984.48

Purpose

This paper briefly describes the impact of the Internet of Things (IoT) and blockchain technology on future warfare. It begins with a problem statement, followed by a short discussion of the future operating environment (FOE). It next provides a brief working description of the IoT and blockchains. Subsequent paragraphs discuss potential impacts of the IoT and blockchain on future warfare. The final paragraph suggests a way ahead.

Problem Statement

Faced by increasingly capable adversaries in an era of exponential technological change, what are the probable impacts of the Internet of Things (IoT) and blockchains on future warfare?

The Future Operating Environment (FOE)

A survey of the two most commonly available, authoritative sources on the FOE points to an ever-increasing rate of technological change, the growth of mega-cities, and the diffusion of cutting-edge technology into the hands of both state and non-state actors.49 Over the next ten to twenty years, the world will experience dramatic changes in technology, many of which will affect how Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) operates.

Dr. James Canton, a noted technologist and futurist, observed that the five emerging technologies noted in Figure 1750 are driving an exponential growth in Artificial Intelligence (AI). This growth rate will approximate that of Moore’s Law, doubling in

48https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/William_Gibson,accessed18April2017.49 The FOE depicted in this paper is a synthesis of theNational Intelligence CouncilGlobal Trends (2035)ParadoxofProgress,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,WashingtonDC,January2017andtheChairman,JointChiefofStaff,JointOperatingEnvironment2035,TheJointForceinaContestedandDisorderedWorld,JointStaffJ7,Washington,DC,14July2016.50TakenfromaPowerPointpresentationentitled“AIFutures”givenbyDr.JamesCantonattheUSASOCFuturesForum,8August2017.

Figure17.ExponentialConvergence-FiveconvergingtechnologiesthatwilldrivetheexponentialdevelopmentofincreasinglycapableArtificialIntelligence.

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power while dropping in price every two years. Increasingly capable AI will in turn accelerate the development of each of the five converging technologies. As data proliferates, verifying its accuracy will become increasingly important for AI to be able to process it. On the other hand, AI coupled with increasingly capable computers will have the ability to attack unprotected data. Our adversaries will undoubtedly seek to harness those trends to accomplish their ends.

Kevin Kelly, another futurist of note predicts that soon, AI will be both cheap and ubiquitous. He uses electricity as an illustration to describe the future of AI in society. In addition to being cheap and ubiquitous, it will also be diffuse, running many of the processes of society without even being noticed – until it doesn’t work. He forecasts, “You’ll simply plug into the grid and get AI as if it were electricity. It will enliven inert objects, much as electricity did more than a century past.”51

AIwilloperationalizetheIoT,whichwillincludetheroboticsandautonomoussystems(RAS)thatwill be a significantpart of futuremilitary operations andwarfare.The value of the IoT to thewarfighterwillcomefromthedata itgenerates.However, therewill simplybe toomuchdatacomingfromtheIoTforhumanstosortthrough.OnlyAIwillbeabletosortthroughtheoceansofdataandproduceactionableinsights.

Increasingly capable reconnaissance and surveillance technologies will bring about an increase in the lethality of weaponry. These will depend, to a degree on their ability to ‘see’ targets through their associated sensors. What can be seen can be targeted. That which can be targeted can be destroyed. As lethality increases, so does the need for dispersion (Figure 18). Future units of action will tend to operate in an increasingly dispersed fashion, even more so than today. Their operations will tend to pulse, where widely dispersed operators and units mass quickly, act, and then disperse before the adversary can counter them effectively.

The Internet of Things (IoT)

ThispaperwillemploythefollowingdefinitionfortheIoT:“TheInternetofThings(IoT)istherapidlyexpandingnetworkof physical objects such asdevices, vehicles, buildingsandotherobjects that

51Kelley,Kevin.TheInevitable,Understandingthe12TechnologicalForcesThatWillShapeOurFuture.NewYork:PenguinBooks(KindleEdition),2017,33.

Figure18.Relationshipoflethalitytodispersion.

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containembeddedelectronics,software,sensorsandnetworkconnectivity.Thisenablesthingstocollectandexchangedata.”52TheIoTisexperiencingexplosivegrowthasshowninFigure19.53

ThegrowthoftheIoThasdependedontheconvergenceofthreekeytechnologies.Byitself,theIoTgeneratesmassive amounts of data. AI provides themeans to analyze that data. Two other keyenablingtechnologiesarethereducedcostofsensorsandtheavailabilityofcloudcomputing.54

Embeddedsensorshavebeenaroundsincethe1970’sformanyindustrialdevices.Mostwerecostlyanddidnotconnecttoanexternalnetwork.Lowercostsensorshasledtothembecomingubiquitous.Forexample,thetypicalsmartphonehasadozensensors(seeFigure20).55Withthecurrentnumberof smart phones at around two billion, that translates to 24 billion sensors generating data. Assensors become smaller and less costly, theywill continue to proliferate. Finally, cloudcomputingallowsthevastamountsofdatatobecollected,analyzed,andmined.

LiketheInternet,theIoTisaphysicallayerornetworkwhoseprimaryfunctionistotransportinformationfromonepointtoanotherquickly,reliably, and securely. While speed andreliability present few problems, security isanothermatter.TheforemostreasonisthattheIoTwasnotcreatedwithsecurityasaprimaryconsideration.Instead,securitywasanadditionto the software components of the IoT.Governmentandtheprivatesectorarecurrentlywrestling with ways to secure the IoT, withsomemeasure of success.56 As the Internet ofThings (IoT) grows and matures, we mustconsider the impactofhowthese technologiesmay affect the population and civilian groups.Additionally, the emerging fields of human-machine interfaces, human augmentation, andbrain-computer interfaceswill require thatweconsider the emerging trend towards theInternetofPeople(IoP)asacompanionof theIoT.

52Scoble,Robert,andShelIsrael.TheFourthTransformation:HowAugmentedReality&ArtificialIntelligenceWillChangeEverything.USA:PatrickBrewsterPress(KindleEdition),2017,Location2870.53Evans,Dave.TheInternetofThings:HowtheNextEvolutionoftheInternetIsChangingEverything.USA:CISCOInternetBusinessSolutionsGroup,April2011,3.54https://www.designnews.com/automation-motion-control/evaluating-business-impact-industrial-iot/95347012958024Accessed08January2018.55https://www.quora.com/how-many-different-sensors-are-available-inside-a-smartphoneAccessed08January2018.56https://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/to-secure-the-internet-of-things-we-must-build-it-out-of-patchable-hardwareAccessed09January2018

Figure19GrowthoftheInternetofThingsbyNumberofDevices

Figure20SensorsinaTypicalSmartphone

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Blockchain

Blockchain isan information technologybaseduponaseriesof universallyaccessible, encrypteddigitalledgersdistributedatnumerouspointsacrosstheInternet.Itisasubsetofdistributedledgertechnology.57Inblockchain,thedigitallegersarecalledachainbecausechangescanonlybemadebyaddingnewtransactioninformationattheend.Blockchaintechnologyoriginatedasa“distributedledger platform for cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin.” It provides a way to “securely andtransparently store information in near real time thereby providing transaction confidence in atrustless environment.”Blockchain anddigital ledger technologieshavebecome “tools to record,enable,andsecurehugevarietiesoftransactions, incorporatingrules,smartcontracts,anddigitalsignaturesamongmanynewandemergingtechnologies.”58

Blockchains formbaseduponaseriesof transactions(Figure21).Oncea transactionoccurs, it istransmittedtoallofthenodesinthesystem.Thetransactionsaresignedwithapublickeyvisibletoall, while the owner or originator holds the private key. The two keys have a mathematicalrelationshipthatmakesthemusefulinsigningdigitalmessages.Thenextstepisforeachnodetocollectthenewtransactionsintoablock.Eachnodethenrecordsdataforeachnewtransaction,it

57Formoreondistributedledgertechnologies,see“DistributedLedgers,”Investopedia,http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/distributed-ledgers.aspaccessed10January2018andhttps://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/2016095pap.pdfaccessed10January2018.58AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC).EnablingBlockchainInnovationInTheU.S.FederalGovernment,ABlockchainPrimer.Primer,Fairfax,VA:AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC),2017,1.

Figure21.TheBlockchainProcess

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doessowithprivatekeysthatcorrespondtothepublickeymostrecentlyassociatedwiththeassetorinformationbeingtracked.

Thenodesthengeneratewhatisreferredtoasa‘proof-of-work’fortheblock.Thisinvolvescheckingthecurrenttransactionagainstpreviousblocks.Eachnewaddition,orblock,containsanewsetoftransactionsthatreferenceprevioustransactionsinthechain.Throughthecryptographicprocessofhashing,eachblockinthechainisusedtogeneratesubsequentblocks.

Onceanodeestablishesaproofofwork,ittransmitstheblockandtheproof-of-worktoallothernodes.Thenodesthenapprovethetransactionandvalidateit.Thenthenodewhichgeneratedtheproof-of-work ispaid inbitcoinby theownerof the chain.Theblock is thenaddedto the chain,providingapermanent,non-repudiable,andtransparentrecordofthetransaction.Thenodesshowtheiracceptanceofthetransactionbybeginningtobuildthenextblockinthechainbaseduponthehashoftheacceptedblock.Thissecuresthechainfromtampering.

A variant of the open ledgers described above, permissioned ledgers are an approach used bygovernmentandthecommercialsectorforanumberofreasons.Mostimportantly,theyrestrictwhocanviewdataonthesystem.Theyofferotheradvantagesaswell.Unlikeopenblockchain,theidentityofthoseaddingdataisknown.Also,theownerof theblockchainassignstherightstocreatenewblocks,sothereisnoneedforproof-of-workorasubsequentpayment.59

Future Impacts

TherearemanywaystoframethefutureimpactsoftheIoTandblockchainonwarfare.ThispaperwillexaminethoseimpactswithintheJointCapabilityAreas(JCAs)framework.ItisbeyondthescopeofthispapertoexamineeachJCAindetail.NeithertheIoTnorBlockchainconstitutesasingle,plug-and-play solution. Employment will require replacing existing systems or tightly integrating thetwo.60Also,notallJCAswillbeaffectedbyblockchain.

IoT

ForceSupport:PerhapsthemostusefulforcesupportapplicationoftheIoTisinthemaintenanceofhealth. Networked, wearable sensors can provide indications whether the wearer is healthy,wounded,injured,orill.Ratherthansimplyreportingastaticstatethesesensorscouldprovidedatatosupportpreventativemedicine.Theycouldrevolutionizehealthservicedeliveryby identifyingservicemembersintheinitialstagesofthetransitionfromhealthytoill.Itwouldalsomakediagnosisofinjuredorwoundedservicemembersmorerapidandaccurate.

BattlespaceAwareness:TheIoTwillprovidethefutureforcewithdatatoplananddirectoperations.Thisdata can come from Joint ForceTrackingorRAS, exploitationof adversarydevices, or fromciviliansources.Dependingontheclassofdevicesbeingtargeted,collectionmaypresentachallenge.However, the data obtainedwill support predictive analysis that provides the commander withnuancedinsightsoftheareaofoperations.

59https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/blockchains-how-they-work-and-why-theyll-change-the-worldAccessed10January2018.60AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC).EnablingBlockchainInnovationInTheU.S.FederalGovernment,ABlockchainPrimer.Primer,Fairfax,VA:AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC),2017,9.

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Force Application: Data provided by the IoT will facilitate friendly pulse type operations. Theheightened battlespace awareness it provideswill allow friendly forces tomaneuver physically,virtually,andcognitivelythoughareasnotunderadversarycontrol.Avoidingadversarystrengths,theJointForcewillpositionforcesandideasthatfacetheenemywithmultipledilemmas.IoTdatawillsupportJointForcephysical,virtual,andcognitivetargetingaswellincreasingtheprecisionofkineticandnon-kineticmeans.

Logistics:Fromsimpleradiofrequencyidentification(RFID)tagstosophisticatedon-boardsensors,theIoTwillprovidedatathatgreatlyincreasesthespeedandefficiencyoflogisticsfunctions.Notonlywill it allow the trackingof supply levels, itwill enableprecision trackingof supply chains.Predictive analysis basedon IoTdatawill allowproactive logisticsmanagement.Maintenanceofmajor end itemswill be easieraswellwith IoTdataproviding thebasis for faultpredictionandproactivemaintenance.

CommandandControl:TheIoTwilleasetheburdenofcommandandcontrolinsofarasitprovidesheightened battlespace awareness. Processed by AI, this data will enhance the Joint Forcecommanderandhisstaff’sabilitytoindividuallyandcollectivelycomprehendthebattlespaceinitsphysical,virtual,andcognitivedimensions.Providingbothknowledgeandsituationalawareness,itwillalsoaidinthespeedandqualityofplanninganddecisionmaking.TheIoTwillalsoallowtheJointForcecommanderandhisstafftomonitorandassesstheresultsoftheirdecisions.

CommunicationsandComputers:NetmanagementwillbethegreatestvalueaddedoftheIoTfortheJoint Force in this JCA. Data from the IoTwill allowAI to proactively configure and reconfigurenetworks,services,andunderlyingphysicalservices.CybersecuritywillbeaidedbydatafromtheIoTaswellasitprotects,defends,andrestoresinformationsystems.However,theIoTwillalsoposesignificantcybersecuritychallengesfortheJointForce.AIandchangesinhardwareconfigurationswillbepartoftheconstantefforttorenderfriendlyportionsoftheIoTbothresilientandreliableinthefaceofadversaryattacks.TheIoTcouldalsoprovideabackupmeansofposition,navigation,andtiming–particularlyifthesourceofdataisfromadversarydevicesandsystems.

Protection:DatafromtheIoTanalyzedbyAIwillprovidetheJointForcewithadvancedwarningofattacks,whetherphysical,virtualorcognitive.ThiswillallowtheJointForcetopreventormitigateeffects of attacks on personnel and physical assets. Protection may consist of repositioning orreconfiguring.Repositioningissimplymovingthepersonorphysicalassetwithinphysicalorvirtualspace.Reconfiguringwillconsistofalteringthephysicalorvirtualsignatureofthepersonorphysicalassettoconfuseanddeceivetheadversary.

BuildingPartnerships:TheprimaryutilityofIoTdatainbuildingpartnershipsfortheJointForcewillcomefromtheabilitytodeterminemisinformationandtofinetuneourmessaging.AnalyzedbyAI,adversary IoTdatawilldevelop intopatterns thatcan indicateadversarymisinformationefforts.Similarly, AI analyzed IoT data from friendly, neutral, or hostile sources can gauge the effect offriendlymessaging.Anexamplemightbeiffriendlymessagingwantedtopersuadethepopulationtoremaininplace,theIoTdatagleanedfromsmartphonesorotherpersonaldevicescouldestablishifthepopulationwasheedingthemessage.

CorporateManagementandSupport:Theareasofaudit, inspection,and investigationwillbenefitgreatlyfromIoTdata.ProcessedbyAI, itwillprovideclearaudittrailsforDoDassetswhetherinlocationormaintenancestatus.Inspectionswillbeeasierbecauseassetholderscaninspectassetsvirtually.Likewise,theaudittrailsprovidedbyIoTdatawillgreatlyeasethetaskofinvestigatorsastheyexamineissuesraisedbyauditsormishaps.

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Blockchain

Force Support: The areasof human capitalmanagement andhealth readinessare themost likelycandidatesforimplementationofblockchaintechnologyfortheJointForce.Digitalpersonnelandmedical records could be secured from tampering by making them part of a blockchain.61Additionally, blockchain could rendermedical devices less vulnerable to hacking by using smartcontracts.62 Using smart contracts would require authentication by the entire blockchain ledgerbeforeadevicecouldactivateorperformatask.63

BattlespaceAwareness:Forbattlespaceawareness,blockchainoffers the JointForce theability toassurethatdatahasnotbeentamperedbykeepingittransparentandtraceable.AsAIbecomesmoreprevalent in intelligence analysis, it is vital to assure that thedata it processes is not corrupted.Otherwisebaddatawill lead tobaddecisions.Also, smart contracts could secure the automatedtaskingofsensorplatforms.DigitalcurrencycouldprovidetheJointForcewithasecuremeanstofundhumanbasedcollection.

ForceApplication:Asinbattlespaceawareness,thevalueofblockchaintotheJointForceliesinitsabilitytokeepdatatransparentandtraceable.AIwillperformforceapplicationfunctionsinbothmaneuverandengagement.BlockchainwillraisethelevelofconfidencethatthedecisionssupportedbyAIwillbetherightones.

Logistics: For the Joint Force, the area offering the most opportunities to employ blockchain islogistics.TheFederalGovernmentisalreadytestingblockchainincontractmanagement,toincludevendor tracking, financial commitments and transactions, schedule tracking, and performancetracking.64Inthenearfuturetheywillbeusedtomonitorassetsandownershipregistries,supplychaintransfers, inamannerthatischeap,auditable,andopen.65Additionally, logisticianscanuseblockchaintotrackdatafromstationaryormobileassetsormajorenditems.66

CommandandControl:Bysafeguardingthedatausedinthedecision-makingprocess,blockchaincanreduce risk. Using blockchain in the promulgation of orders can help assure their security andtraceability.ItcanalsoassisttheJointForceinmonitoringtheeffectsofdecisions,particularlyintheirabilitytoanalyze,track,andmeasuretheresultsofactionstaken.67

CommunicationsandComputers:Blockchaintechnologyhasobviousapplicationincybersecurity.Itcanprotectagainstmodificationofdatabyanadversary.Itcanalsosecureinformationexchangeby61In2017theMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(MIT)recentlybeganissuingdiplomassecuredwithblockchain.See:https://futurism.com/mit-has-started-issuing-diplomas-using-blockchain-technology/accessed11January2018.Also,see:AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC).EnablingBlockchainInnovationInTheU.S.FederalGovernment,ABlockchainPrimer.Primer,Fairfax,VA:AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC),2017,14.62Asmartcontractisanautomatedtaskthatisperformedonlywhenablockchainledgerverifiesittobeauthentic.63See:https://www.designnews.com/iot/how-blockchain-key-secure-iot/87877979557738accessed11January2018.64AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC).EnablingBlockchainInnovationInTheU.S.FederalGovernment,ABlockchainPrimer.Primer,Fairfax,VA:AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC),2017,11-12.65Ibid,13–14.66Ibid,14.67https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/blockchains-how-they-work-and-why-theyll-change-the-worldAccessed10January2018.

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authenticatingindividuals,groups,orentitiesandtheirlevelofaccesstoservicesandinformation.Itcan also facilitate data governance and information sharing within a permissioned ledgerframework.68

Protection: The JCA definition of Protection limits discussion to the physical realm.69 Therefore,blockchainhaslittletoaddtoprotection.Theonepossibleareawhereblockchainmightbeusefulisinsecuringdataanadversarymightneedforpurposesoftargetingfriendlypersonnelorphysicalassets.

BuildingPartnerships:Blockchaincanbehelpfulinestablishingrelationshipsrequiringahighdegreeoftrustbetweenstrangers.70Accesstoapermissionedledgerwouldpermitpartnerstoseedatathatisbothverifiableandtransparent,therebybuildingtrust.Partnershipagreementscouldbesecuredwithblockchaintobuildconfidenceamongourpartnersthatthoseagreementsaresubstantial.

CorporateManagementandSupport:Audits,inspections,andinvestigationswouldallbesimplifiedwiththeapplicationofblockchaintechnology.Blockchainwouldprovidecleardatatrailstofollow.Thiswouldextendtopersonnelsecurityandclearanceinvestigations.JointForceprogram,budget,and finance functions would benefit from the verifiability and transparency afforded by thetechnologyaswell.

The Way Ahead

TheIoTwillprovidearichsourceofdatafortheJointForceandDoDastheycooperatewithouralliesandpartners,competewithouradversaries,orengageinconflictwithourenemiesinthephysical,virtual,andcognitivedomains.FriendlyIoTdatamustbesecuredwithacombinationofblockchaintechnology, changes in hardware, or by building applications with security as a primaryconsideration.Becauseofsheervolume,AImustbecapableofanalyzing,curating,andusingthatdata toplan,develop,andexecute coursesof actionby the JointForce andDoD.AImustalsobecapableofdiscerningadversaryattemptstodisruptorcorruptIoTdata.Itshouldalsobecapableofresponding to suchattempts. Failure to take these stepswill inevitablydegrade the Joint Force’soperationalcapabilities.

Blockchain technology presents a means to increase trust in data, including that from sensors,devices,ordigitaltransactions.Assuch,itoffersrealopportunitiestohelpsecuretheIoT.Itisnotapanacea, but itdoes seem tooffer ameans to significantly reduce risk in anumberof JCAs.TheDepartmentofDefenseshouldaggressivelydevelopanddeployblockchainbasedsolutionswhereverappropriate.

68AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC).EnablingBlockchainInnovationInTheU.S.FederalGovernment,ABlockchainPrimer.Primer,Fairfax,VA:AmericanCouncilforTechnology-IndustryAdvisory(ACT-IAC),2017,15.69“Theabilitytoprevent/mitigateadverseeffectsofattacksonpersonnel(combatant/non-combatant)andphysicalassets.

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Narrative Technology to Detect and Defeat Adversary Ideological Influence

WilliamD.Casebeer,PhD(USAF,Ret)LockheedMartinAdvancedTechnologyLaboratories

[email protected];[email protected]

Developingtechnologysuitestodetectandexertinfluenceisofparamountimportanceinaworldwherekinetic andnon-kinetic effects interact toproduce final outcomes in thenational securitydomain.Here,IdiscussdevelopmentofacomprehensivetechnologysuitetoallowtheUSanditsAlliestodetectanddisruptradicalizationprocessesinmultiplemedia;thesuiteisdistinguishedbyitsuseofhuman-in-the-loopcognitivetestingtoallowrapidretailoringofinformationactivity,andwillgivemilitarypersonnelentirelynewcapabilitiestounderstandandinfluencetheinformationenvironment.

Violent non-statemovements such as ISIL, al Qaeda, and others leverage cultural expertise andexquisite locally-groundedhistorical knowledge to formnarrativesand tell storieswhich exploitinnocentbystandersandcultivatepermissiveoperatingenvironmentsinwhichtothrive;thesamegoesforstateactors,suchasRussia.Adversaryinformationoperationscanbeeffectiveatconvincingtheirsometimesinnocenttargetstolooktheotherway—orevenactivelysupport—terroristtacticsandstrategiesbyprovidingpeople,money,moralandmaterielsupport,orcanbeusedtoachievestrategicobjectivessuchasunderminingculturalconditionsenablingdemocraciestothrive.

Detectingtheseideologically-driveninformationoperationsisanimportantcapability;theUnitedStatesanditsalliescannotrespondtowhatwedonotsense.Moreimportant,beingabletoformulateaholisticstrategy forundercutting theefficacyof theseoperations isacriticalpartofacounter-terrorismandcounter-radicalizationstrategy.Thiswillinvolvedevelopingtoolsandtechnologiestoformulate and forecast the effect of counter-narratives, supporting information, and largerenvironmentalfactorsonthefutureabilitiesofouradversaries.Thiscouldinvolveleverageexistingtechnologies,andtoolswhichcouldbebuiltrelativelyquickly,toequiptheUSwithacomprehensive“counter-radicalizationtoolkit”tocontestadversaryinformationinfluence.ThissuitewouldallowtheUStodetect,analyze,andunderstandadversaryinformationoperations,andprovide“human-in-the-loop”toolstoassistindevelopingcounter-narrativestoinfluencethebehavioroftheaudienceinwayswhichwillpreventthemfrombeingexploitedbymalignantviolentnon-stateactors.Measuresofperformanceandeffectivenesswillprovidefeedbacktoallowrapidcalibrationofacomprehensivecounter-radicalizationinformationcampaign.

The proposed system accomplishes this by automating the analysis of multiple forms of media(broadcast, social,etc.),detectingemerging themeswhichenableviolence to takeroot.Narrativetemplatesconnecttheautomatedanalysisofcontentwith factsabout localcircumstance tobuildmodelswhichforecastfuturepopulationandgroup-levelbehaviorinlightoftheinformationbeingreceivedandthesurroundingenvironment.Thesedriveacampaignplanningtool,whichallowstheUS and allies to shape the political and economic environment to minimize the chances ofradicalization,andtobuildeffectivecounter-narrativesandalternateschemawhichtrustedvoicesinthelocalcommunitycanusetochangetheinformationenvironment.Uniquely,thetoolsuiteisconnected to behavioral, psychological and physiological monitoring systemswhich allow rapidtailoringandpilot-testingofnarrativesinlightoftheexpectedaudience,toboostthechancetheywillbeheardandconsidered.Thisenables theUSand itsallies tospeak truth to thepower thatviolentnon-statemovementssometimesholdoverinnocentpopulations.

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Technologiesareavailablewhicharerelativelymaturewhichcancontributetothisprocess,suchasthe IntegratedCrisisEarlyWarningSystem(ICEWS)71andtheHumanSystemsCognitively-AidedDesign and related cognitive engineering processes, which can be leveraged to build thiscomprehensive counter-radicalization suite. Some technologies used in the construction of thesystemareexploratory,butwithmodestinvestmentcouldbeturnedintooperationallyusefultoolswhich themilitary—ranging from strategicplanners to combatant commanders, to specialists ininformationsupportoperations—canusetocomprehensivelydefeatgroupssuchasISIL.Thiscouldtakeplacequickly,allowingthetechnologiestoberefinedtogivetheUSnewcapabilitytooperateintheinformationandnarrativedomainby2020.

Operational Opportunity

TheFinalReportofthe9/11CommissionspentafairamountoftimeidentifyinganddiscussingtheideologyofalQaedaandmadestrongrecommendationstoengageinthe“struggleofideas.”Sincethat report, successive national strategy documents on counter-terrorism (CT) have arguablyweakened the linkages between CT efforts and ideology and have focused primarily on kineticactions.Further,the9/11Commission’sreportwasveryexplicitaboutthenatureandthedefinitionoftheideologybehindsomeviolentnon-stateactors.Giventhattheprocessofradicalizationhasaninformation component, being able to understand and act within your adversary’s informationobserve-orient-decide-act (“OODA”) loop is a requirement for a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. Put differently, a grand counter-terrorism strategy would benefit from acomprehensive consideration of the stories terrorists tell; understanding the narratives whichinfluencethegenesis,growth,maturationandtransformationofterroristorganizationswillenableustobetterfashionastrategyforunderminingtheefficacyofthosenarrativessoastodeter,disruptand defeat terrorist groups. More, recent developments in near-peer information operationawareness highlight how state actors leverage narrative formation and disruption to influenceinternaleventselsewhere,asinthecaseofRussianinterferenceintheNATOmembernationandUSpoliticaldomains.

Such a “counter-narrative strategy” will have multiple components with layered asynchronouseffects;whileeffectivecounter-storieswillbedifficulttocoordinateandwillinvolvemultipleagentsof action, their formulation is a necessary part of any comprehensive counter-terrorism effort.Indeed,afailureonourparttocometogripswiththenarrativedimensionsofthewaronterrorismisaweaknessalreadyexploitedbygroupssuchasalQaedaandISIL;wecanfullyexpectanyadaptiveadversary to act quickly to fill story gaps and exploitweaknesses in our narrative so as to ensurecontinued survival.More than giving us another tool with which to confront terrorism, though,narrative considerations also allow us to better dealmore generallywith the emerging securitythreatofviolentnon-stateactorsandarmedgroups.

Whythinkthatstorytellinghasanythingtodowithterrorismandcounter-terrorism?Considerthepsychologicalaspectsof terrorism:therearemultiplereasonswhypeoplechoose to formor joinorganizationswhichuseindiscriminantviolenceasatactictoachievetheirpoliticalobjectives,allofthemdealingatsomepointwithhumanpsychology.Peoplefeelalienatedfromtheirsurroundings;theyaredeniedpoliticalopportunitybythestate;thestatefailstoprovidebasicnecessities;theyidentifywith thosewho advocate the use of violence; they are angered by excessive state forceagainstpoliticalopponents;theiressentialneedsarenotbeingmet;theyfeeldeprivedrelativetopeergroupselsewhere;andsoon.Thesehaveallbeenofferedas“rootcauses”ofcontentiouspolitics

71Forinformationonthissystem,seetheICEWSwebsiteatwww.icews.com.

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ingeneral,and terrorism inparticular.Ourpurposehere isnot todefendanyparticularpositionabout root causes (indeed, some of those previously listed have been discredited as theories ofterrorism), but insteadmerely topoint out that all these causes have a proximate psychologicalmechanism—theyexertinfluencebyaffectingthehumanmind/brain.Ifstoriesarepartandparcelof human cognition,wewouldalso thenexpect consequently that storiesmightaffecthow thesecausesplayout togerminate,growandsustainterrorismandradicalization(Casebeer&Russell,2005).

Operatorsneedtobeabletodetectandanalyzestoriesinprogress,forecasttheireffects,formulateandenactalternatestoriesinahuman-in-the-loopfashion,andassessthebehavioralimpactoftheircounter-narrativestrategy.Ouradversariesdothispresentlyowingtotheirclosenesstotheculturesinwhichtheyoperate;cultivatingourowncapabilitytodosowillallowustosystematicallydisrupttheiroperationsandleveragethesofterelementsofnationalpowertopreventtheexploitationofvulnerablepopulations.

Enabling Technologies

Thetechnologiesrequired tobuild thissuite include theability tosense,analyzeandunderstandnarrativeinformationoperationsinmultiplemedia,theabilitytorefinemodelsforecastinggroupand population behavior in light of detected narratives quickly andwith sensitivity to audiencevariabilityusingcognitiveandphysiologicmeasures,andtheabilitytoassessthebehavioralimpactofinformationoperations.

Developments in existing technology suites—discussed below—and recent developments in thecognitivescienceofnarrativeandstorytelling,serveasthebackboneforthisproposedsystem.Itbuilds offwell-established technologies (such as ICEWS) but incorporates novel physiologic andneurobiologicalsensorssoastoprovideauniqueintheworldhuman-in-the-narrative-loopcounter-radicalizationinformationoperationstestbed.

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Proposed System

Theproposedsystemintegratesatwo-prongedapproachtoanalyzinginformationoperationsandtheir impact.The firstchartdetailssomeof theexistingandnear-future technologiesrequired todetectnarrativeinformationactivity(usingICEWSTrending,RecognitionandAssessmentofCurrentEventsor“iTRACE,”atoolallowingyoutodetecteventpatternsinmultiplemediatypes),predicttheimpactthemessagingmighthaveonsentimentandbehavior(theSocialNetworkOpinionDynamicsandAnalysisor“SNODA”tool,andtheICEWSForecastingor“iCASTtool),andevaluate theactualimpactonsentimentandbehavior(usingtheICEWSsentimentanalysisor“iSENT”tool)(Malinchik,2010).Othersystemscouldbeusedaswell.Thiscapabilitycanthenbeconnectedtocourseofactiondevelopmentandanalysis via the ICEWSenvironment in conjunctionwith electroencephalogram(EEG)signals—patternsofbrain-generatedelectricalactivitysensedon the topof thehead—andothercognitivevariablestoquicklyassaytheimpactofarevisednarrative.Thisallowsustoimprovemodelsofaudiencebehaviorinlightofthechangetothemessageortotheenvironmentinwhichitisdelivered.Figure22capturestheinformation-relateddimensionsoftheproposedsystem.Figure23capturesthehuman-in-the-loopmessageprototypingdimensions.

Figure22.TheNarrativeInformationSystem

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Figure23.Expandingthe“EEG(Electro-Encephalogram)Human-in-LoopTesting”Block—APrototypeNarrativeInfluenceandMessageAnalysisTestBed

System Capabilities

Thesystemoperatesbycombiningthebestcomputersciencealgorithmsforparsingstructuredandsemi-structuredtextfromopensourcestoextracteventsandsentimentwithmodelswhichforecastbehavioral impact,andleveragesworkdonebymy labandothers in thisarea.Thesemodelsareconstantly improved by having representatives of the population one hopes to reach look atprototype messages in a closed-loop monitoring situation where their psychological andphysiologicalreactionsserveasproxiesforattention,engagement,arousal,empathyforcharacters,narrativetransportationandimmersion,andultimatelyexpectedbehavioralinfluence.Capabilitiesarediscussedinmoredetailinthefollowingsection.

Thetechnologysuitewouldhavethefollowinggeneralcapabilitiesto:

1. monitorandanalyzemultiplemediatypesinrealtime,

2. combinethatanalysiswithothertypesofeventdata,

3. automateextractionandanalysisofnarrativestoallowsentimentforecasting,

4. connectnarrativeanalysistosocialnetworkanalysisofpopulationsandgroup,

5. pilottestproposedinformationoperationsandcounter-narrativeswithahuman-in-the-loop,usingthelatestcognitivescienceandphysiology,

6. allow effective detection, analysis, forecasting, planning and execution of informationoperations.

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Significance of Capabilities to Operational Opportunity

Thesecapabilitiesenablemilitarystrategicplanners,combatantcommanders,militaryinformationsupportoperationspersonnel,andotherstounderstandthenarrativedimensionsoftheinformationenvironmenttheywilloperateinandprovideplanningguidancenecessarytoallowrapidadjustmentof messaging activity, improved mid-to-long-term adjustment of the environment of action viaeconomicandpoliticaldevelopment,andanabilitytounderstandthesecondandthird-ordereffectsofoperationsandadversaryradicalizingnarrativesonthemilitaryoperationsenvironment(eveninthoserarecaseswhennoparticularinformationactioncanbetaken).

Inthemilitaryinformationsupportoperationsenvironment,thistoolsuitecanprovidecapabilitythatcutsacrossallaspectsofthetraditionaloperationalcycle:planning;targetaudienceanalysis;series development; product development and design; approval; production, distribution, anddissemination;andmeasuresofeffectiveness.Traditionaltoolsrelatedtocounter-messagingcanbebrought tobearbut inanenvironment,whichallowsrapidretailoringof themtomaximize theireffectiveness.

Enabling Technology

Enabling technologies leveraged here include EEG devices and collection platforms used bycompaniessuchasIntificandothers(suchasmylab),andfromscientificdevelopmentsstemmingfromworkaccomplishedbytheCityCollegeofNewYork(theParralab)(Dmochowski,etal.,2014),the University of Southern California (Damasio lab)(Araujo, Kaplan, & Damasio, 2013), theMassachusettsInstituteofTechnology(Saxelab)(Cikara,Bruneau,VanBavel,&Saxe,2014;Bruneau,Dufour,&Saxe,2013),andothers.Thisworkhasconfirmedandextendedrelationshipsbetweenstorystructureandcontentanddetectableneuralsignalslinkedtobehaviorchange.Forexample,principalcomponentsfromtheEEGsignalcorrelatecloselytoviewerattentiontoamediastimulusandalsopredictwhether theviewerwill senda tweetabout it (Dmochowski,etal,2014).Theseexistingmodelsareprimarilyattheproofofconceptlevel.However,asadvancesintechnologyandthesciencesareusedtoimprovethemodels,enablingtheresponsestomessagingandactionstointeractwithinapopulationwilllikelyproduceamorereliableresultthanmodelsthatproducetheseresponsesindependently.SeeFigure24forasummaryofinputsandoutputsforthemodel.

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Inaddition,thetargetaudiencewillrespondnotonlytomessaging,butalsototheactionsthataretakenbyourmilitaryintheareaswherethemessagingistakingplace.Itwillbeimportanttomakesurethatthemessagesandactionstogethertellacoherentstory.Understandingofhowthetargetaudiencesrespondstothemessagesandactionstogethercanbeanalyzedina"behavior-predictiveagent-basedmodel”thatincludesagent-basedmodelsofindividualsandgroupsthatarebasedonknowledgeoftheirdecision-makingstrategiesdesignedandvalidatedfrominputsfromthenews,socialmedia, social scientists, psychologists, andneuroscientists.The agent-basedmodels canbecombinedintheLockheedMartinAdvancedTechnologyLaboratories(LMATL)modelinteraction“backplane,”allowingtheagentstointeractwithmodelsthatrepresenttheirenvironment,suchaswhether they have electricity, food, access to water, etc., and themessagingmodels. The SocialNetworkOpinionDynamics&Analysis(SNODA)willanalyzeopinionpropagationandstabilizationinresponsetoexternalinfluencecampaignsoractionsofthemilitary.SNODArepresentsthenetworkofinfluencerelationshipsinasocietyandtheopinionsofindividualmembers.Connectionsinthenetwork encode the propensity for individual opinion shifts based on influences affecting eachindividual (Malinchik & Rosenbluth, 2011). These existingmodels are primarily at the proof ofconceptlevel.However,asadvancesintechnologyandthesciencesareusedtoimprovethemodels,enablingtheresponsestomessagingandactionstointeractwithinapopulationwilllikelyproduceamorereliableresultthanmodelsthatproducetheseresponsesindependently.

TheeventswhichfeedintonarrativetemplatesanddriveSNODAandiCASTpredictiveanalysescomefrom iTRACE—it extracts event type, participants and intensity, locations, and times fromunstructuredopennewssources.Itprovidesagraphicdisplayofevents,trends,andpatternswithdrill-downtounderlyingnewsstories.EventcodingofnewsstoriesusingRaytheonBBN’sSERIFproduct as the primary event coder is one of the core technologies at the heart of the iTRACEcapability.ThestoriescomefromEnglish,Spanish,andPortugueselanguagesources.Todate,over30millionnewsstoriesprocessedand20millioneventshavebeenextractedgoingback20years.This includesFactiva-aggregatednews stories fromover6000 sources, plusOpenSourceCenterfeeds.Thecoderextractseventsoftheformofa“tuple”of(1)sourceactor,(2)event,and(3)target

Figure24.AnalyzingMessagesinSocialNetworkInfluenceContext

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actor,usingestablishedtaxonomiesandatahigh~80%accuracy.OncetheeventsarecodedtheLMATLgeocoder,Lautenspot,isusedtoidentifythelocationoftheevents.Mosteventscanbecorrectlylocatedtothecountrylevel,whilesomecanbelocatedattheprovinceoreventhecitylevel.Eacheventisalsoassignedahostilitylevelbetween-10and10basedontheGoldsteinscalewherea10representsacooperativeeventorcessationofhostilitiesanda -10representsaveryhostile (i.e.violent)event.TheseeventsandtheGoldsteinscoresareusedassourcedataby theSNODAandiCASTforecastingtool.

Maturity

Avarietyoftechnologiesarebroughttogetherintothiscomprehensivesuite.Dependingonwhichpieceoftechnologyisunderconsideration,somecapabilityexiststhatisalreadyoperationallyfielded(for example, in the primary ICEWS system)(O’Brien, 2012). Other capabilities—such asrelationships between certain aspects of human physiology and likely narrative influence onbehavior—areemergingfindingsfromthebasicscienceswhichareripetobeincorporatedintothetechnologysuite.Piecesthatarerelativelyimmature,suchasagent-basedmodelslinkingnarrativestructureandcontenttoexpectedpropagation,canbematuredrelativelyquickly.

Theprincipalbarrierstomakingthesystemusablearedoctrinalandonlysecondarilytechnological.Forinstance, it isentirelypossibletodetectandanalyzeastoryspreadinginaparticularformofsocialmedia,tomodelitslikelyeffectonbehavior,andthentoproposeandpropagateanalternatenarrative that has been stress-tested in the human-in-the-loop test bed. However, whether theresultsofthisprocesscanbeusedquicklyarecontingentonensuringthatoperationalcommandershavetherequisiteauthoritiestoquicklyactintheinformationspaceabroad.Insomecases,approvalchainsforthereleaseofinformationcanslowthisprocessandrenderthetechnologynotaseffectiveaswouldotherwisebethecase.

Thereisanindustrialbasehere(primarilyinassessingtheimpactofentertainment,andininformingbusinessoperations),andsomeoftheworkinthecognitivesciencelaboratoriesmentionedearlierhas used more familiar polling methodologies from this industry to test posited relationshipsbetweenEEGmonitoringandbehavior.LMATLandsomeofitspersonnelhavebeeninvolvedinbothgovernmentandcommercialsettingsinthedevelopmentandtestingofthesetechnologies.

Manyofthepractitionersinthisdomainhavemilitaryandinformationoperationsexperience;forexample,theauthorofthiswhitepaperisaformermilitaryofficerwithfamiliaritywiththemilitaryplanningprocessandwhohasworkedwiththemilitaryinformationsupportoperationscommunityin the information technology domain on previous projects, and LM ATL has experience intransitioningprototypesintooperationaluse(ashasalreadyoccurredwithICEWS).

Recommendations for Development

Thissystemcouldemergefromprototypecomponentdevelopmentandintegrationtobecomefullyoperational with appropriate investments in (1) the narrative templates which will link sensedevents toestimationsofthe impactofaparticularnarrativeonapopulation, (2)theagent-basedmodelswhichcouldundergirdforecastingofnarrativeinfluence,and(3)continuedinvestigationofandintegrationintothefullsystemofneurobiologicalandphysiologicalbehavioralimpactmeasures.Thetechnologieswillneedtobetestedinacontrolledenvironmentbeginningwithademonstration,and then validated in an operational environment. This process will take several years, but thecombinedtechnologyreadinesslevelofthetechnologies—andthegapsthatwillneedtobefilledto

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developanoperationalprototype—meansthattherightinvestmentcouldassistintransitioningthetechnologyfromprototypetofieldedsystemwithdemonstratedcapabilityquickly.

Methods for Employing the Technology

The system could be fielded operationally for use in themilitary decision-making process, withforward-deployed components as well as reach-back to domestic piloting sites. It can supporttraining exercises aimed at themilitary decision-making process, assisting staff development attrainingfacilitiessuchasthoseoperatedbytheJ-7atSuffolk,VA,wheresocialmediaanalysisandoperations arealready tested, butnot inapersistent fashion. It canbeused at the strategicandoperational levels by combatant commander staffs seeking quick intelligence preparation of theenvironmentandrapidturnsontheexpectedinformationeffectsofmilitaryoperations,andbyunitssuchasStrategicCommand’sheadquarters(chargedwithdevelopinganddeployingdeterrenceandinfluenceframeworks).Mosteasily,itcouldquicklybeintegratedintoalltheexistingprocessesusedbygroupssuchastheUSArmy’sMilitaryInformationSupportOperationsCommandatFortBragg,ortheUSMarineCorp’sInformationOperationsCenteratQuantico,whoarealreadybuildinganddeployinginformationcampaignsinsupportofUSandcoalitionoperations.Thetechnologycouldalsobeusefullydeployedtomultinationalcoalitionenvironments,suchastheNATOCyberDefenseCentreofExcellenceinTallinn,Estonia.

Thesuitecouldalsobedeployedinotherresearchenvironments,suchassocialmedialaboratoriesoperatedby themilitaryat theNavalPostgraduateSchool,orevenbynational labs investigatinginfluenceandsocialmedia,suchasSandiaNationalLaboratories.Itwouldthusserveasatechnicaldriver in supporting the larger whole-of-government exploration of deterrence, influence, andinformationforceprojection.

Likealmostalltechnologies,thereareconversationstobehadaboutethical,legal,andsocialissues.Existinglegalandstatutoryauthoritiessufficeforthesystemtobedeployedintheenvironmentsjustmentioned.Tobeusedmosteffectivelyandinanagilefashion,informationoperationdecisionswillneed to be pushed to the lowest levels possible, however. In general, there is a well-developedframeworksupporting thesynchronizationof traditionalmilitaryoperationsand the informationdimension(asinourcorejointdoctrine).MultipleanalystshavealreadydiscussedtheneedfortheUSmilitarytocontinueinvestmentintechnologieswhichallowittopreventviolentnon-stateactorexploitationof thevulnerable(e.g.Casebeer,2014).Thesystemdoesnotneedtobesecret tobeeffective—the scientific findings that it relies on apply even when individuals understand thatinformationinfluencestheirbehavior.ThedevelopmentofthesuitemayevenactasadeterrenttogroupssuchasISILortheRussianInternetResearchAgencywhoatpresentarguablythinktheyhaveinformationdominanceandcanoperatewithimpunityinthenarrativesphere.

EquippingtheUSmilitaryanditsallieswiththetechnologyrequiredtoengageanddefeatISILandotherviolentnon-stateactorsischallenging.ThetypesoftechnologiesdiscussedintheTechnologySuitetoDetectandDefeatRadicalizationwouldprovideuswithanimportanttoolthatcanbeusedtodeter, disruptanddefeat our adversaries in thenarrative and information spaceswhere theycurrentlyoperatetoradicalizeindividualsandcultivatepermissiveoperatingenvironments.Itcanbe an important enabler for a comprehensive and effective counter-terrorism and counter-radicalizationstrategyandanimportantculturalstabilizerfordemocraciesconcernedtodisruptanddeterattemptsbyothernationstatestoskewdemocraticdeliberationandinternalpoliticalevents.Twenty-firstcenturysecuritychallengesdemandsophisticatedandsubtleapproachesofthekindenabledbythis technology. Itseffectiveuse inphasezero,oneandtwoofconflictcansave lives,

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preventtheneedforcostlykineticoperations,andworkinsynergywiththeuseofforcewhenitsapplicationbecomesanecessity(seemultiplechaptersofThomas,Kiser,&Casebeer,2005).

Works Cited

Araujo,H.F.,Kaplan,J.,andDamasio,A.(2013).CorticalMidlineStructuresandAutobiographical-SelfProcesses:anActivation-LikelihoodEstimationMeta-Analysis.FrontiersinHumanNeuroscience,04September2013.

Bruneau,E.,Dufour,N.,andSaxeR(2013).HowWeKnowItHurts:ItemAnalysisofWrittenNarrativesRevealsDistinctNeuralResponsestoOthers'PhysicalPainandEmotionalSuffering.PLoSOne,2013.

Dmochowski,J.P.,Bezdek,M.A.,Abelson,B.P.,Johnson,J.S.,Schumacher,E.H.,andParra,L.C.(2014).AudiencePreferencesarePredictedbyTemporalReliabilityofNeuralProcessing.NatureCommunications,5,29July2014.

Casebeer,W.D.(2014).ANeuroscienceandNationalSecurityNormativeFrameworkfortheTwenty-FirstCentury.InJ.Giordano(Ed.)NeurotechnologyinNationalSecurityandDefense:PracticalConsiderations,NeuroethicalConcerns.TaylorandFrancis.

Casebeer,W.D.andRussell,J.A.(2005,March).StorytellingandTerrorism:TowardsaComprehensive'Counter-NarrativeStrategy’.StrategicInsights,VolumeIV,Issue3.

Cikara,M.,Bruneau,E.,VanBavel,J.J.,andSaxe,R.(2014).TheirPainGivesUsPleasure:HowintergroupDynamicsShapeEmpathicFailuresandCounter-EmpathicResponses.JournalofExperimentalSocialPsychology,55,110-125.

Malinchik,S.(2010).FrameworkforModelingOpinionDynamicsInfluencedbyTargetedMessages”atTheSecondIEEEInternationalConferenceonSocialComputing,Minneapolis,Minnesota,August2010.Retrievedfromhttp://www.atl.external.lmco.com/papers/1912.pdf

Malinchik,S.andRosenbluth,D.(2011).ParadoxicalDynamicsofPopulationOpinioninResponsetoInfluenceofModerateLeaders,”IEEESymposiumSeriesonComputationalIntelligence(SSCI2011),ArtificialLife,pp.148-15,April2011.

O’Brien,S.P.(2012).AMulti-MethodApproachforNearRealTimeConflictandCrisisEarlyWarning,”inHandbookofComputationalApproachestoCounterterrorism,ed.byV.S.Subrahmanian.Springer,11December2012.

Thomas,T.S.,Kiser,S.D.,andCasebeer,W.D.(2005).WarlordsRising:ConfrontingViolentNon-StateActors.Landam,MD:LexingtonBooks.

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Acronyms

AmericanAssociationofPublicOpinionResearch(AAPOR)

adaptiveplanningandexecution(APEX)

ArtificialIntelligence(AI)

AugmentedReality(AR)

CognitiveAspectsofMilitaryOperations(CAMO)

counter-terrorism(CT)

diplomatic,informational,militaryandeconomic(DIME)

electroencephalography(EEG)

functionalmagneticresonanceimaging(fMRI)

futureoperatingenvironment(FOE)

galvanicskinresponse(GSR)

high-valuetarget(HVT)

high-payofftarget(HPT)

HornofAfrica(HOA)

HumanTerrainTeams(HTT)

Indications&Warning(I&W)

informationandcommunicationtechnologies(ICTs)

informationenvironment(IE)

informationoperations(IO)

IntegratedCrisisEarlyWarningSystem(ICEWS)

internetprotocol(IP)

InternationalCommunication&NegotiationSimulationsProject(ICONs)

InternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment(IFAD)

IntergovernmentalOrganizations(IGOs)

InternetofPeople(IoP)

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InternetofThings(IoT)

JointCapabilityAreas(JCAs)

JointConceptforHumanAspectsofMilitaryOperations(JCHAMO)

JointConceptforOperatingintheInformationEnvironment(JCOIE)

JointFunctionalConcepts(JFC)

jointintelligencepreparationoftheenvironment(JIPOE)

joint,intergovernmental,andmultinational(JIM)

jointplanningprocess(JPP)

knowledge,attitudes,beliefs,intentions,andbehaviors(KABIB)

measuresofeffectiveness(MOE)

MiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA)

militarydeception(MILDEC)

militaryinformationsupportoperations(MISO)

NarcissisticPersonalityInventory(NPI)

NextGenerationSocialScience(NGS2)

NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO)

OfficeofSecurityCooperation-Iraq(OSC-I)

observe-orient-decide-act(OODA)loop

operationalenvironment(OE)

PsychologicalOperations(PSYOP)

PsychologicalOperationsObjectives(POs)

publiclyavailableinformation(PAI)

radio-frequencyidentification(RFID)

roboticsandautonomoussystems(RAS)

SocialNetworkOpinionDynamics&Analysis(SNODA)

Socio-CulturalResearchandAdvisoryTeams(SCRATs)

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StrategicMultilayerAssessment(SMA)

SupportingPSYOPObjectives(SPOs)

TargetAudiences(TAs)

ThematicApperceptionTest(TAT)

unexplodedordnance(UXOs)

unmannedaerialvehicles(UAVs)

U.S.AirForcesOfficeofScientificResearch(AFOSR)

USSpecialOperationsCommand-Centraltheater(USSOCCENT)

ViolentExtremistOrganizations(VEOs)

virtualreality(VR)

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Author Biographies

BrigadierGeneralAlexusG.Grynkewich

Brigadier General Alexus G. Grynkewich is the Deputy Director,GlobalOperations(J39).HeservesastheJointStafffocalpointforcyberandelectronicwarfareoperations, informationoperations,special technical operations, and sensitive DOD support togovernmentagencies.

Gen.Grynkewichreceivedhiscommissionin1993aftergraduatingfrom theUSAir ForceAcademy.Hehas servedas an instructorpilot, weapons officer, and operational test pilot in the F-16FightingFalconandF-22Raptor.Gen.Grynkewichhascommandedatthesquadronandwinglevels,andhisstaffassignmentsincludeduty at Air Combat Command, US European Command, and theHeadquartersAirForce.Gen.Grynkewichisacommandpilotwithmorethan2,300hoursintheF-16andF-22.

Education1993BachelorofScienceinMilitaryHistory,U.S.AirForceAcademy,Colorado1994MasterofArtsinHistory,UniversityofGeorgia1997SquadronOfficerSchool,MaxwellAFB,Alabama2003AirCommandandStaffCollege,bycorrespondence2006MasterofArtsinHomelandSecurity,NavalPostgraduateSchool2006AirWarCollege,bycorrespondence2010MasterofScienceinJointCampaignPlanning&Strategy,JointAdvancedWarfightingSchool2012LeadershipEnhancementProgram,CenterforCreativeLeadership,Greensboro,NC2013ExecutiveSpaceOperationsCourse,NellisAFB,Nevada2014CapitolHillWorkshop,AlanL.FreedAssociates,Washington,D.C.2014EnterpriseLeadershipProgram,Kenan-FlaglerBusinessSchool,UniversityofNorthCarolinaAssignments1.June1993–August1994,Student,AirForceInstituteofTechnologyCivilianInstitutionsProgram,UniversityofGeorgia,Athens,Ga.2.September1994–September1995,Student,UndergraduatePilotTraining,VanceAFB,Okla.3.October1995–August1996,Student,F-16CReplacementTrainingUnit,63dFighterSquadron,LukeAFB,Ariz.4. September1996–July1999,F-16Pilot,ChiefofTraining,18thFighterSquadron,EielsonAFB,Alaska5. August1999–December2001,F-16 InstructorPilot,FlightExaminer,andFlightCommander,421stFighterSquadron,HillAFB,Utah6.January2002–January2003,F-16CInstructorPilotandChiefofWeapons,80thFighterSquadron,KunsanAB,RepublicofKorea7.February2003–August2005,F-16CandF-22AOperationTestandEvaluationInstructorPilot,422d Test and Evaluation Squadron; Chief, F-22A Standardization and Evaluation, 53d Test andEvaluationGroup;DirectorofOperations,59thTestandEvaluationSquadron,NellisAFB,Nev.8.September2005–December2006,Student,NavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,Calif.9.January2007–December2007,Chief,InteroperabilityBranch,5thGenerationFighterDivision;ExecutiveOfficer,DirectorateofRequirements(A8),HeadquartersAirCombatCommand,LangleyAFB,Va.

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10.January2008–June2009,Commander,49thOperationsSupportSquadron,HollomanAFB,N.M.11.July2009–June2010,Student,JointAdvancedWarfightingSchool,Norfolk,Va.12.July2010–May2012,JointOperationalPlanner,Chief,CrisisResponseBranch,andChief,PlansDivision(J35),HeadquartersUSEuropeanCommand,Stuttgart,Germany13.June2012–May2013,ViceCommander,57thWing,NellisAFB,Nev.14.May2013–June2015,Commander,53dWing,EglinAFB,Fla.15.June2015–June2016,Chief,StrategicPlanningIntegrationDivision,DeputyChiefofStaffforPlansandRequirements(A5/8),HeadquartersAirForce,Pentagon,Washington,D.C.16. June2016–June2017,DeputyDirectorforOperations,OperationsTeamThree,J3,TheJointStaff,Pentagon,Washington,D.C.17. June2017–present,DeputyDirector,GlobalOperations (J39), J3,The Joint Staff, Pentagon,Washington,D.C.SummaryofJointAssignments1.July2010–May2012,JointOperationalPlanner,Chief,CrisisResponseBranch,andChief,PlansDivision(J35),HeadquartersUSEuropeanCommand,Stuttgart,Germany,asalieutenantcolonelandcolonel.2.June2016–June2017,DeputyDirectorforOperations,OperationsTeamThree,J3,TheJointStaff,Pentagon,Washington,D.C.,asabrigadiergeneral.3. June 2017 – present, Deputy Director, Global Operations (J39), J3, The Joint Staff, Pentagon,Washington,D.C.,asabrigadiergeneral.FlightInformationRating:CommandPilotFlighthours:Morethan2,300Primaryaircraftflown:F-16C,F-22AOtheraircraftflown:B-1B,B-2,B-52,C-17A,E-9A,F-15D,F-15E,HH-60G,MC-12,MQ-1,MQ-9,QF-4,T-38A,U-2Major Awards and DecorationsDefenseSuperiorServiceMedalLegionofMeritwithoneoakleafclusterMeritorious ServiceMedalwith five oak leafclustersAirMedalAerialAchievementMedalwith fouroak leafclustersJoint Service CommendationMedalwith oakleafclusterAirForceCommendationMedalJointServiceAchievementMedalAirForceOutstandingUnitAwardwithValordeviceandoakleafclusterCombatReadinessMedalwithoakleafcluster

National Defense ServiceMedal with bronzestarArmedForcesExpeditionaryServiceMedalGlobalWaronTerrorismServiceMedalKoreanDefenseServiceMedalNuclearDeterrenceOperationsServiceMedalEffective Dates of PromotionSecondLieutenant June2,1993FirstLieutenant June2,1995Captain June2,1997Major August1,2003LieutenantColonel September1,2007Colonel September1,2011BrigadierGeneral May24,2017

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ClaraBraun

ClaraBraunisagraduatestudentattheUniversityofNebraskaatOmaha(UNO),andispursuingherM.A.intheSchoolofCriminologyandCriminalJustice.SheworksasagraduateassistantintheCenterfor Collaboration Science at UNO, which is devoted to facilitating innovative cooperation acrossmultiple majors. Her primary research interests include leadership development within violentideologicalgroups, radicalizationandmobilizationpathways,homegrownviolentextremism,andthepoliticizationofIslam.

Dr.WilliamCasebeer

WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, PhD (USAF LtCol, Ret.), SENIOR MANAGER,HUMANSYSTEMSANDAUTONOMY,LOcKHEEDMARTINATL:Bill istheSenior Research Area Manager in Human Systems and Autonomy forLockheedMartinAdvancedTechnologyLaboratories.Hehasadecadeofexperience inprogrammanagement and leading teamsof scientistsandengineersinmultiplesettings.

BeforeATL,BillwasaDARPAPMin theDefenseSciencesOfficeandtheBiologicalTechnologiesOffice,wherehe started theNarrativeNetworksandLow-CostEEGprograms,andledtheAcceleratedLearning,EducationDominance,StrategicSocialInteractionModules,YoungFacultyAwardandotherprograms.HislastcommandpositionwasasDeputyDirectoroftheTechnologyAdvancementand Warfighter Training Department for the 500-person Joint Warfare Analysis Center (a DoDmodeling and simulation unit), and he hasmultiple tourswith deployed time as an intelligenceofficer.HehasajointPhDinCognitiveScienceandPhilosophyfromUC-SanDiego,MAinNationalSecurityAffairsfromtheNavalPostgraduateSchool,MAinPhilosophyfromtheUniversityofArizonaand a BS in Political Science from the USAFAcademy. Publications include anMIT Press neuralnetworkandethicsbook(here),aneuroethicsarticleinNatureReviewsNeuroscience(here),andabookonviolentnon-stateactors(here).

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PatriciaDeGennaro

Patricia(Tricia)DeGennaroisaSeniorGeopoliticalRiskAnalystforThreatTec.,LLC.Shecurrentlysupports theUSArmyTRADOCG2/G27asananalystonACEFuturesand theNetworkEngagementTeam.DeGennarohas lectured atWestPoint and New York University on International Security Policy andCivilianandMilitaryAffairs.ShewasselectedasaSubjectMatterExpert(SME) on theMiddle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan for various projectsundertheTRADOCG2,thecommanderoftheMulti-NationalForcesinIraq,commanderoftheSpecialOperationsCommandCentral,andtheUSDepartmentofDefenseStrategicMultilayerAssessmentprogram.In2013,shewasacceptedintotheUSDepartmentofStateFranklinFellowsprogramwheresheservedinUSAID’sBureauforDemocracy,Conflict,andHumanitarianAssistance-OfficeofCivilianandMilitaryCooperation(DCHA/CMC)asaSeniorPolicy Advisor to support the Office and an Agency-wide Civilian-Military Cooperation SteeringCommitteeinanextensiverevisiontotheAgency’sCivilian-MilitaryCooperationPolicy.DeGennarocapitalizesonovertwentyyearsofexperienceasanacademic,authorandconsultantininternationalsecurity. Much of her work focuses on stabilization in theMiddle East and surrounding region,counteringviolentextremism,andtransitioningnationsfromwar.

Duringhertenure,shehasalsoconsultedwiththeAsiaFoundation,DirectorofNationalIntelligenceOffice, Department ofHomeland Security, The Conference Board,World Bank, Senate Labor andHumanResourcesCommitteechairedbySenatorEdwardM.Kennedy,andseveralorganizationsthatsupporttheMiddleEastPeaceProcess.ShealsospentfouryearsinAlbaniaasaSmallandMediumEnterprisevolunteerwiththePeaceCorpsand,later,asacontractorwithUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment.Regionally,DeGennarocontinuestofocusontheBalkans,theMiddleEastandSouthAsiawhereshetravelsoften.

DeGennarohaspublishedseveralarticlesonUSforeignpolicyandnationalsecuritytopics.Herfocusistoencourageanintegratedinternationalpolicythatlooksbeyondwarandtheuseofforce.SheisoftenanexpertcommentatorforCNN,MSNBC,AlJazeera,FoxNews,BBCandvariousnationallyandinternationallysyndicatedradioprograms.

DeGennaroholdsanMBAinInternationalTradeandFinancefromGeorgeWashingtonUniversityandanMPAinInternationalSecurityandConflictResolutionfromHarvardUniversity.ShespeaksfluentAlbanianandhasabasicknowledgeofItalian,ArabicandDari.

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Dr.DianeDiEuliis

Dr. Diane DiEuliis is a Senior Research fellow at NationalDefenseUniversity. Her research areas focus on emergingbiological technologies, biodefense, and preparedness forbiothreats.Dr.DiEuliisalsostudiesissuesrelatedtodualuseresearch, disaster recovery research, and behavioral,cognitive,andsocialscienceasitrelatestoimportantaspectsofdeterrenceandpreparedness.

PriortojoiningNDU,Dr.DiEuliiswastheDeputyDirectorforPolicy,(andservedasActingDeputyAssistantSecretaryforPolicyandPlanning)intheOfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryforPreparednessandResponse(ASPR),U.S.DepartmentofHealth and Human Services.While there, she coordinatedpolicy in support of domestic and international healthemergencypreparednessandresponseactivities, includingimplementationofthePandemicAll-HazardsPreparednessAct, the National Health Security Strategy, and the PublicHealthEmergencyMedicalCountermeasuresEnterprise(PHEMCE).

Fromto2007to2011,Dr.DiEuliiswastheAssistantDirectorforLifeSciencesandBehavioralandSocialSciencesintheOfficeofScienceandTechnologyPolicy(OSTP)intheExecutiveOfficeofthePresident.DuringhertenureattheWhiteHouse,shewasresponsiblefordevelopingpolicyinareassuch as biosecurity, synthetic biology, social andbehavioral science, scientific collections, ethics,STEMeducation,andbiotechnology.Dr.DiEuliisalsoworkedtohelpcoordinateagencyresponsetopublichealthissuessuchastheH1N1flu.

PriortoworkingatOSTP,Dr.DiEuliiswasaprogramdirectorattheNationalInstitutesofHealth(NIH), where she managed a diverse portfolio of neuroscience research in neurodegenerativediseases. She completed a fellowship at the University of Pennsylvania in the Center forNeurodegenerative Disease Research, and completed her postdoctoral research in the NIHIntramuralresearchprogram,whereshefocusedoncaellularandmolecularneuroscience.

Dr.DiEuliishasaPh.D.inbiologyfromtheUniversityofDelaware,inNewark,Delaware.

AreasofExpertise:Biodefense;Biosecurity;Deterrence(Neuroscience&Neurobiology);EmergencyManagement;Ethics&Leadership(LifeSciences/HumanSubjects);WMDPreparedness/Response

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Dr.LindaDurnell

Dr.DurnellteachesatFieldingGraduateUniversitythePsychologyofTechnology, Consumer Neuroscience and the Foundations of MediaPsychology. Her current research is on The Emotional Reactions ofViewingaCrisisinVirtualReality(VR).Durnellrecentlypresentedherresearch at Stanford’s 3rd Annual Innovations in Psychiatry andBehavioralHealth:VirtualRealityandBehaviorChange,sponsoredbyStanfordUniversitySchoolofMedicine.DurnellhasparticipatedintheU.S.ArmySpecialOperationsCommand(USASOC)andDepartmentofHomelandSecurity (DHS) simulation,whichwas coordinatedby theStrategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office in the Joint Staff, toassess options in the cognitive space to disrupt and counter ISILoperational capabilities and train the Psychological Operations (PO)operatorsandremainsactiveintheJointConceptforOperatingintheInformation Environment (JCOIE).With her backgroundworking atIBM, Xerox and Apple Computer, Durnell is a frequent presenter attechnology conferences such as AugmentedWorld Expo (AWE) andDigitalHollywood,andispresentingattheAmericanPsychologicalAssociation(APA)conventionin2018. Durnell brings research and resources to industry-defining technology used to influencebehavior,performance,andperception.

Dr.DavidC.Ellis

Dr.DavidC.EllisisaResidentSeniorFellowattheJointSpecialOperations University. He holds a doctorate in InternationalRelationsandComparativePoliticsfromtheUniversityofFlorida(’05), a Master’s degree in International Development with aspecialization in International Marketing from The GeorgeWashington University (’97), and Bachelor’s degrees inInternational Studies and Spanish from Jacksonville University(’95).

Dr. Ellis’s research on democratization and development inidentity conflict spans over two decades. His interests inpeacekeeping, conflict resolution, development, and atrocity inethnic conflict focusedhisdoctoral researchon identity, socialmovements, organization and social learning theory, andeconomic growth theory. Dr. Ellis served as an All SourceIntelligenceanalystinUSSOCOM’sJ2JICSOCfrom2009-2013andestablisheditsSocio-CulturalAwareness(SCA)Section.HisresearchinterestsatJSOUfocusontheopportunitiesforUSSOCOMtobecomealearningorganizationthroughDesignThinkingapplicationsandmorerobustSocio-CulturalAnalysisforintelligence,planning,andoperations.

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DanFoy

Mr.DanFoy is a SeniorConsultant atGallup, specializing inprogrammanagement, research andanalysisforU.S.governmentclients.SincejoiningGallupin2008,Foyhasdevelopedandledmultipleadvancedanalyticprojects thatstretchedtheboundariesof traditionalmethodologiesbypilotingnewdatacollectiontechniquesandcombiningnovelinputstoaddresshardresearchquestions.Hehas contributed to dozens of successful complex quantitative and qualitative studiesworldwide,providingsignificantsupporttoallphasesoftheresearchcycle–fromstudydesignthroughdatacollection, analysis and reporting. Projects in Foy’s portfolio range from massive multiyearmultitrack studies in active war zones consisting of tens of thousands of monthly face-to-faceinterviewsandhundredsoffocusgroups,tothedevelopmentofpredictiveandclassificatorymodelscombiningopen-source,proprietaryandclassifiedinputs,toin-depthinvestigationsofforeignonlinemediaenvironmentsusingdigitalethnographicmethods.Throughtheseefforts,Foyhasdevelopedabroadmasteryofglobalandcountry-specificissuesinvolvedinconductinginternationalresearch,with particular experience in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, theMaldives,Nigeria,Pakistan,SaudiArabia,andYemen.

Dr.JamesGiordano

James Giordano PhD is Professor in theDepartments of Neurology andBiochemistry, and Chief of the Neuroethics Studies Program of thePellegrinoCenterforClinicalBioethicsatGeorgetownUniversityMedicalCenter,Washington,DC,USA;andisExecutiveDirectoroftheCenterforPolicy for Emerging Technologies (C-PET), a Washington DC-basedinternational think tank. Dr. Giordano is also Distinguished VisitingProfessorofBrain Science,HealthPromotionsandEthics at theCoburgUniversityofAppliedSciences,Coburg,Germany.

Dr. Giordano has served as an appointed member of United StatesDepartmentofHealthandHumanServicesSecretary’sAdvisoryCouncilonHuman Research Protections (SACHRP); appointed member of theNeuroethics,LegalandSocialIssues(NELSI)AdvisoryPaneloftheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjects’Agency(DARPA);asSeniorScienceAdvisoryFellowof theStrategicMultilayerAssessmentBranchoftheJointStaffofthePentagon;andasResearchFellowandTaskLeaderfortheSub-ProgramonDualUseBrainScienceoftheEuropeanUnionHumanBrainProject.

Theauthorofover275publicationsinneuroscienceandneuroethics,7books,and15internationalgovernmentalwhitepapersonneurotechnology,ethicsandbiosecurity,heisEditor-in-Chiefoftheinternational journal Philosophy, Ethics and Humanities in Medicine; and Associate Editor of theCambridgeQuarterlyofHealthCareEthics.

Hisongoingresearchaddressestheneurobiologicalbasesofmoralcognitionanddecision-making;and neuroethical issues arising in and from the development, use andmisuse of neuroscientifictechniquesandtechnologiesinmedicine,publiclife,andmilitaryapplications.Inrecognitionofhiswork,hewaselectedtomembershipintheEuropeanAcademyofScienceandArts,theDanaAllianceforBrainInitiatives,andtheRoyalSocietyofMedicine(UK).

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Dr.MargeretHall

Dr.MargeretHall isanAssistantProfessorof IT InnovationandholdsaPositionofExcellence inViolent Extremist Discoursewith the School of Interdisciplinary Informatics at the University ofNebraska Omaha. Before this, she was a Senior Researcher and head of the Strategic Initiative‘Participation and Crowd Services’ at the Karlsruhe Service Research Institute (KSRI). Dr. Hall’sresearchinvestigatestheintegrationofdigitalsystemsandpeople,andthedigitallifestyle.HerPhDconcentratedonthemeasurementofhealthandqualityoflifeforthecreationofsentiment-basedindicators for community management, specifically in the case of online communities. Prior tostartingherPhD,sheworkedattheUnitedNationsOfficeinGenevaandattheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesinAuditandLegalAffairs,andatBayerBusinessServicesinTrainingandProcessManagement. She completedherBachelors andMastersdegrees inPolicy studies in theUnitedStates,Lebanon,andSwitzerland.Youcanfindherat:http://www.unomaha.edu/college-of-information-science-and-technology/about/faculty-staff/magie-hall.phpandhttps://www.linkedin.com/in/magie-hall-7b0b454.

Dr.GarryHare

Dr.HareisdoctoralfacultyatFieldingGraduateUniversity'sMediaPsychology PhD Program and Director of the Social Impact ofImmersiveTechnologyandRealTimeMediadoctoralconcentration.He focuses on the junction where cognitive science, informationdesign and immersive technologies impact the visualization ofcomplex data. He advises selected companies, foundations andpublic agencies on strategy and the creative use and impact ofimmersive media, mobile augmented reality and the disruptiveimpactofrealtimemediaonsocialproblems.Hiscurrentfocusisonmediastrategy,innovationanddesignandtherapidprototypingofimmersivesolutionstocomplexproblems,inpart,throughtheUSArmySpecialOperationsCommand(USASOC)andDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)withcoordinationbytheStrategicMulti-LayerAssessment(SMA)officeintheJointStaff,assessingoptionsinthecognitivespacetodisruptandcounterISILoperationalcapabilitiesandtrainthePsychologicalOperations (PO) operators. He continues to be active in the Joint Concept for Operating in theInformationEnvironment(JCOIE).

Over twodecades,Garryhas foundedand/orheld seniormanagementpositionswith companiescreating rich media content and enabling technologies. These solutions usher in new forms ofentertainment,mobilecommunicationsandsocialimpact.HewasPresidentandCEOofAmiga,Inc.,Executive Vice President of Into Networks with worldwide responsibility for BroadbandMedia,PresidentandCOOofOZ.com,thecreatorsofHelsinki2000(thefirstvirtualworld)andtheIntelvirtualmuseumprojectGarrywasfounderandCEOoftheawardwinningdigitalpublisher,FathomPicturesInc.,specializinginsportsandeducationsimulations.HewasfoundingManagingDirectorandCEOofPhilipsMediaEuropeonbehalfofPhilipsN.V.AsheadofthisEuropeandigitalpublishingcompanyhebuiltmanagementandcreativeteamstosupportthecreationanddistributionofdigitalproducts throughout Europe. He has createddigital products and/or advised companies such asLucasFilm,theGriffinGroup,PhilipsN.V.,Ericsson,ABCSports,thePGA,andAppleComputer,amongmanyothers,onnewmediacontentcreationandstrategy.GarryhasheldfacultypositionsatINCAE

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(aninternationalcampusofTheHarvardBusinessSchoolandTheHarvardInstituteofInternationalDevelopment),TheUniversityofWashingtonGraduateSchoolofPublicPolicyandTheUniversityofSouthernCaliforniaGraduateSchoolofPublicAdministration.HebeganhiscareerattheWaltDisneyCompany and holds a Ph.D. in the Applied Behavioral Sciences from the University of SouthernCalifornia.

Garry is affiliated with The American Psychological Association, The Broadcast EducatorsAssociation, CTIA, The National Association of Broadcasters, The Earth Institute, The SurfriderFoundation,TheWorldAffairsCouncil, TheCommonwealthClub,TheEnvironmental Forumandothers.Asaproducer,hisworkhasbeenacknowledgedwiththeCindyAward,5InVisionAwards,theNEVI,CDIAandParisSuperShowawardsaswellasBestConsumerProductatJapan’sFlowerandGreen.

HeisafrequentspeakeronMediaStrategy,InnovationandDesignfocusedontheCognitiveImpactofRealTimeDataandInformation.

Selectedkeynotesandpanels:TheImmersiveTechSummit,DigitalHollywood,theConferenceonImmersiveEducation,MediaSummitNewYork,theAugmentedRealityEvent,IMTech,TheNationalAssociationofBroadcasters,theBroadcastEducatorsAssociation,MILIA,TheForbesNewEconomyConference, The Conference on Disruptive Innovation, The American Film Institute, The SedonaConferenceonTechnologyandEducation,theEdinburghConference,PersonalTechnologyOutlook,theWorldAffairsCouncil,theLondonConferenceonInteractiveMedia,CES,MipComm,CTIA,TheAdvancedCenterforComputerStudies,andTheScreenActorsGuild.MultimediaProducerMagazineselectedhimasoneoftheWorld’sTop100Producers.

E-mail:[email protected]:415.342.3777

Mr.RobertC.JonesBobby Jones isaretiredU.S.ArmySpecialForcesColonel;a formerDeputy District Attorney; and the senior strategist at U.S. SpecialOperationsCommand.CurrentlyservingasamemberoftheSOCOMJ5 Donovan Group, Mr. Jones is responsible for leading innovativethinking on the strategic environment and how it impacts factorscritical to national security, such as the character of conflict,deterrence and societal stability. He also serves as the strategicAdvisortotheDirectorofPlans,PolicyandStrategy.

Mr.Jones’sprinciplefocusisonallaspectsofpoliticalconflict,andhowsuch conflicts are affected by our rapidly evolving strategicenvironment.HeenjoyshisroleasafeaturedlecturerintheJointSpecialOperationsUniversity’sEnlistedAcademy,focusingonthestrategicenvironment,thenatureofinsurgencyandterrorism,andtheevolvingcharacterofconflictscurrentlychallengingtheforce.

HehasbeenafeaturedspeakeratanOxfordUniversityChangingCharacterofWarfareconferenceonFragileStates;aHarvardextensioncourseonIrregularwarfare;andalsoco-createdandtaughtapop-upcourseattheStanfordDesignSchoolinpartnershipwiththeStanfordPeaceInnovationLabontheroleoftrustinstablesocieties.Mr.JonesisaFellowwiththeCenterforAdvancedDefenseStudies;andastrategicanalysisconsultantwithDS-48.

“IfwaristhefinalargumentofKings,thenrevolutionisthefinalvoteofthepeople.”RCJ

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Dr.GinaLigon

Dr. Gina Ligon is an Associate Professor of Management andCollaborationScienceattheUniversityofNebraskaatOmaha.ShereceivedherPhDinIndustrialandOrganizationalPsychologywitha Minor in Measurement and Statistics from the University ofOklahoma. Since arriving at UNO, she has been awarded over$3,000,000inNationalSecurity-relatedgrantsandcontracts.SheisamemberoftheNationalAcademyofSciences,Engineering,andMedicine,andservesonthepanelforbehavioralsciencesfortheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence.LigonisthePrincipalInvestigator on a grant from Department of Homeland Security(DHS)examiningtheleadershipandperformanceoftransnationalViolentExtremistOrganizations(VEOs),andsheistheoriginatoroftheLeadershipoftheExtremeandDangerousforInnovativeResults(LEADIR)database.

Herresearchinterestsincludeprofilingleadersfromafar,violentideologicalgroups,expertiseandleadershipdevelopment, and collaborationmanagement. Prior to joining UNO, shewas a facultymemberatVillanovaUniversityintheDepartmentofPsychology.ShealsoworkedinSt.Louisasamanagement consultantwith the firmPsychologicalAssociates. Shehaspublishedover50peer-reviewedpublicationsintheareasofleadership,innovation,andviolentgroups,andsheistheeditortotheacademicjournalDynamicsofAsymmetricConflict.

Dr.RafaelLinera

Rafael E. Linera Rivera (or ‘Rafa’) wascommissionedin1997asaSecondLieutenantinthe Infantry Branch. Rafa has served severalassignments both domestically and abroad,including South Korea, Iraq, Mexico, Ecuador,andAfghanistan.Hehas servedasCyberspaceElectromagnetic Activities & InfluenceOperations Chief in multiple Army and Joint-CombinedCommands.HeholdsaPh.D.andM.A.inPsychologyfromtheFieldingGraduateUniversityMediaPsychologyProgram,aM.A.inFinancefromWebsterUniversity,andaB.B.A.inAccountingfromtheUniversityofPuertoRico.

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ClarkMcCauley

ClarkMcCauley is Research Professor of Psychology at BrynMawrCollege.Hisresearchinterestsincludestereotypes,groupdynamics,and thepsychological foundationsofethnicconflictandgenocide.Heisco-authorofWhyNotKillThemAll?TheLogicand Prevention of Mass Political Murder (2006), co-author ofFriction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us (2011,second edition 2017), and founding editor emeritus of thejournal Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: Pathways towardTerrorism and Genocide. He is a lead investigator with theNationalConsortiumforStudyofTerrorismandResponsestoTerrorism(START)forresearchsupportedbytheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity.

TomMcCauley

TomMcCauleyisaPhDstudentinthePoliticalScienceDepartmentattheUniversityofRochester.HehasaBS inPhysics fromPennsylvaniaStateUniversity,andworked forLustickConsulting, apolitical science modeling and analysis firm. His interests are centered on mass politics withparticularfocusontheformationandmanipulationofpublicopinion,anareathatoffersconsiderableopportunity to combine quantitative analysis and social psychology theorieswith contemporarypoliticalconcerns.

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Dr.IanMcCulloh

Ian McCulloh holds joint appointments as a Parson’sFellowintheBloombergSchoolofPublichealth,aSeniorLecturer in the Whiting School of Engineering and asenior scientist at the Applied Physics Lab, at JohnsHopkins University. His current research is focused onstrategic influence inonlinenetworks.Hismost recentpapers have been focused on the neuroscience ofpersuasion and measuring influence in online socialmedia firestorms. He is the author of “Social NetworkAnalysis with Applications” (Wiley: 2013), “NetworksOverTime”(Oxford:forthcoming)andhaspublished48peer-reviewed papers, primarily in the area of socialnetworkanalysis.Hiscurrentappliedworkisfocusedoneducatingsoldiersandmarinesinadvancedmethodsforopen source research and data science leadership. Healso works with various medical practitioners in theBaltimore area to improve the effectiveness of publichealthcampaigns.

HeretiredasaLieutenantColonelfromtheUSArmyafter20yearsofserviceinspecialoperationsandimprovisedexplosivedeviceforensics.HefoundedtheWestPointNetworkScienceCenterandcreatedtheArmy’sAdvancedNetworkAnalysisandTargeting(ANAT)program.Inhismostrecentmilitary assignments as a strategist, he led interdisciplinary teams of Ph.D. scientists at SpecialOperations Command Central (SOCCENT) and Central Command (CENTCOM) to conduct socialscienceresearchin15countriesacrosstheMiddleEastandCentralAsiatoincludeddeniedareas,whichheusedtoinformdata-drivenstrategyforcounteringextremismandirregularwarfare,aswellasempiricallyassesstheeffectivenessofmilitaryoperations.

HeholdsaPh.D.andM.SfromCarnegieMellonUniversity’sSchoolofComputerScience,anM.S.inIndustrialEngineering,andM.S.inAppliedStatisticsfromtheFloridaStateUniversity,andaB.S.inIndustrialEngineeringfromtheUniversityofWashington.Heismarriedwithfourchildrenandagranddaughter.

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Ms.LaurieMcCulloh

Laurie McCulloh is the Chief Executive Officer of ArrowAnalytics, LLC, a small Florida-based consulting firmspecializing in education, data science, and neuralmarketing.Her projects focus on cognitive psychology, influence, andpersuasion. Prior to Arrow, Laurie served as a high schoolEnglishandSpecialEducationteacher,specializinginoutreachto disadvantaged children. She has taught in multiple statesacrosstheU.S.withexperiencerangingfrompublichighschoolstoalternative,state-run,lock-upfacilities.SheholdsaBachelor’sofScienceinSpecialEducationfromMansfieldUniversity.Sheholds a Master’s of Science in Education from the StateUniversityofNewYork(SUNY)Potsdam.Herthesisfocusedonbrain development from birth to age 3. She is currently agraduate student at Fielding University pursuing a graduatecertificate in Media Psychology with Neuroscience Emphasis.SheismarriedtoaU.S.Armyveteranwithfourchildrenandagranddaughter.

Mr.ErinnMcQuagge

ErinnMcQuaggeisaformerPsychologicalOperationsandinfantryofficerandcurrentlyworksforNorthropGrumman.HespentseveralyearstotalbetweenKosovo,Iraq,andAfghanistanondeployment.Duringthistime,Erinn conducted multiple influence campaigns. He holds a master’sdegreeingovernment.

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Dr.SpencerB.MeredithIII

Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III serves as an AssociateProfessorofNationalSecurityStrategyattheNationalDefense University, College of International SecurityAffairs.Withtwodecadesofresearchandworkonpost-communist countries, the Middle East, as well asbroader expertise on governance and conflictresolutionacrossmultipleregions,hisresearchbridgesscholarly andpractitioner communities ashe advisesDepartment of Defense, interagency, intelligencecommunity,NATO,andjointspecialoperationsefforts.

With a doctorate from the University of Virginia inGovernmentandForeignAffairs,aswellasaFulbrightScholarship,hehasaconsistentrecordoforiginalresearchandpublishing.Hisfirstbook,NuclearEnergySafetyandInternationalCooperation:Closing the World’s Most Dangerous Reactors(2014) resulted from previous work with theDepartmentofStateandextensiveinterviewswithkeydecisionmakersintheDepartmentsofState,Energy,andDefense,aswellaspost-communistelitesinEasternEuropeangovernmentsandnuclearindustries.Hisarticleshaveappearedinpeer-reviewedjournalsrangingfromCommunistStudiesandTransitionPolitics,PeaceandConflictStudies,CentralEuropeanPoliticalScienceReview,andSpecialOperations Journal; as well as in professional publications includingStrategy Bridge,Small WarsJournal,Inter-AgencyJournal,SpecialWarfare,andForeignPolicyJournal.

SophiaMoskalenko

SophiaMoskalenkoisanadjunctprofessorofpsychologyattheUniversityof Pennsylvania. With Clark McCauley, she has co-authored researcharticlesandbooksonradicalization,terrorismandmartyrdom.

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RandallMunch

Randall (Randy) Munch supports the TRADOC G-2 as an independentcontractor,assistingtheNetworkEngagementTeamindevelopingtrainingcourses that operationalize recent doctrine and joint concepts related tonetworkengagement,suchastheJointConcept(JC)forHumanAspectsofMilitary Operations and the JC for Operating in the InformationEnvironment.During29yearsofserviceintheArmyasanInfantryofficerandaForeignAreaOfficer,hedeployedwiththe10thMountainDivisiontoSomaliaandHaitiandwith theDefenseThreatReductionAgency to Iraq.Followinghismilitaryretirementin2005,heworkedwiththeJointIEDDefeatOrganizationandwithTRADOCorganizationstohelpoperationalizeandinstitutionalizetheconceptsofattackthenetworkand network engagement, and he is now using that experience to help advance the concept ofcognitivemaneuver.

MarkPolyak

MarkPolyakisaSeniorVicePresidentatIpsosPublicAffairs,NorthAmerica,oneofthelargestpublicopinionandsurveycompaniesintheworld.HeisaninternationallyrecognizedSMEintheuseofbigdata analytics for rapid crisis assessment anddecision supportwithover15yearsof experiencesupportingDoDandMulti-NationalNGOsincomplexemergencies.Hisworkfocusesonprovidingself-serviceanalyticsolutionsbyutilizingdatastreamssuchassatelliteimagery,socialmediaandinternetofthingsforcrisiscommunications,reputationriskandstrategiccommunicationsupport.Markhasledprojectsin27countriesoftheworld,includingmostrecentlyleadingrapiddamageandneeds assessments for World Bank, European Union and United Nations in Syria, Yemen, Iraq,Northern Nigeria, Somalia and Libya. This work resulted in development of effective crisiscommunications,disbursementofmulti-billiondollarloansanddevelopmentofstrategicframeworkforengaginglocalactorsinconflictandpost-conflictenvironments.

Dr.GregorySeese

GregorySeese,Psy.DisaseniorscientistattheJohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratoryintheCyberMissionOperationsGroup,andaLieutenantColonelintheArmyReserve.Hehasover20yearsofmilitaryexperience as a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) officer and has heldpositionsinboththeactiveandreservecomponents.GregservedasthePSYOP Division Chief in the United States Army Special OperationsCommand (USASOC), and prior to that was assigned to the TribalEngagementCoordinationCellintheOfficeofSecurityCooperationattheUSEmbassyinBaghdad,Iraq.PreviouspositionsincludetheDirectorofPlansat the Joint InformationSupportTaskForce inQatar,avarietyofassignmentsinthe6thPsychologicalOperationsBattalion,the1stSpecialWarfareTrainingGroup,andcombat tours in Iraq,Afghanistan,andBosnia.Greg'sresearch interests includeattitudeandbehavior change, deception, and prediction modeling.He has published a variety of articles onstrategiccommunications,MeasuresofEffectiveness(MOE)forbehaviorchangeprograms,counter-propagandamethodsandtechniques,andnon-lethalweaponsystems.

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Mr.HowardSimkin

HowardR. Simkin isa SeniorConceptDeveloper in theDCS,G-9Concepts, Experimentation andAnalysisDirectorate,U.S.ArmySpecialOperationsCommand.Hehasover40yearsof combinedmilitary, lawenforcement,defensecontractor,andgovernmentexperience.HeisaretiredSpecialForcesofficerwithawidevarietyofspecialoperationsexperience.WithintheG9,heanalyzesanddefinesthefutureoperatingenvironmentandrequiredcapabilitiesArmySpecialOperationsForces(ARSOF)insupportoffutureconceptsdevelopment.Hissubjectmatterexpertiseincludesanalyzingandevaluatinghistorical,currentandemergingtechnologyaswellasCombined,Joint,Multi-Service,ArmyandARSOForganizationalinitiatives,trends,andconceptstodeterminetheimplicationsforARSOFunits.Mr.SimkinholdsaMastersofAdministrativeSciencefromtheJohnsHopkinsUniversityandisacertifiedProjectManagementProfessional.

Dr.JasonSpitaletta

JasonSpitalettaisaMajorintheUSMarineCorpsReserveandapsychologistwithprimaryresearchexperience in applied, experimental, political psychology and cognitive neuroscience as well asoperational experience in Psychological Operations (PSYOP)/Military Information SupportOperations(MISO)andintelligenceassignmentsintheUSMarineCorpsaswellasJointandSpecialOperationscommunities.HehasdeployedtotheWesternPacific,Iraq,andUganda.

Incivilianlife,heisaresearcheratTheJohnsHopkinsUniversity-AppliedPhysicsLaboratoryaswellasanadjunct facultymemberatNational IntelligenceUniversity.Heholdsabachelors’degree inbiochemistry fromFranklin&MarshallCollege,amaster’sdegree inhuman factors fromEmbry-RiddleAeronauticalUniversityandamaster’sdegreeandPh.D.inappliedexperimentalpsychologyfrom The Catholic University of America. He also holds a graduate certificate from StanfordUniversity’sSummerInstituteforPoliticalPsychology.

Dr.LauraSteckman

Laura Steckman, PhD, is a social scientist at the MITRE Corporation. Her work operationalizestheories andmethodologies from the social and behavioral sciences to address approaches andsolutionstomission-specificproblemssetsworldwide.ShehassupportedInformationOperations(IO)andMilitary InformationSupportOperations (MISO) forU.S. CentralCommand,U. S. PacificCommandandvariousinteragencyefforts,andistheformerCommandSocialScientistfortheMarineCorps Information Operations Center (MCIOC). Her current research examines the relationshipbetweensocietiesandemergingtechnologies,specificallyinhowthetwoshapeeachotherandtheimpactthattechnologyandelectroniccommunicationshaveonculture,language,andbehavior.

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ChrisStewart

ChristopherStewartisapartneratTheGallupOrganization.Mr.Stewartprovidesstrategiccounselintheareaofmarketingcommunications,advancedanalysisandmodeling,andpopulation-basedassessments.Additionally,heplaysaseniorleadershiproleasastrategicadvisorforGallup's165countrypublicopiniontrackingprogram-TheGallupWorldPoll.

Mr.Stewartpreviouslyservedfor10yearsasRegionalManagingPartneroftheAsiaPacificDivisionwherehehadresponsibilityformanagingGallup'sseventeenofficesintheAsiaPacificregion.HeremainsaDirectorofGallupinSingapore,Thailand,Australia,Malaysia,HongKong,andIndia,andastheGeneralDirectorofGallupInstituteLLC,aRussiansubsidiaryofGallup,Inc.

Mr.Stewarthasconsultedonmanagement,marketing,andstrategiccommunicationsstrategywithmanyoftheworld'sleadingcompaniesandNorthAmerican,AsianandMiddleEasternGovernments.With25yearsof experience in theAsiaPacific region, he iswidelyacknowledgedasa leader inunderstandingpopulationattitudesandbehaviorinEastAsia,SoutheastAsia,andSouthAsia.

Dr.GwynethSutherlin

Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin is theDirector of HumanGeography andAnalytics Research at Geographic Services, Inc. She providesanalytic expertise in socio-cultural dynamics, geospatialtechnology, cognitive linguistics, and emerging conflicts. SheappliesHumanGeography researchdata collection andanalysis,operationalsecurity,cybersecurity(softwaredevelopment),andgeospatialintelligence(GEOINT).Herworkdrawsfromextensivefield experience in conflict mediation and security risk analysisincludingprojectsforelectionmonitoringinAfghanistanandPeru,training UKMOD on emerging conflicts, providing evaluation ofSouthSudanandSudanconflict,andworkingwithpolicymakers,academics, and parliamentarians on conflict mediation topics inPakistan as a board member of the journal Peace, Conflict &Development.

Herpublicationsinpeer-reviewedinformationandtechnologyjournalsseektobridgesocialscienceand emerging technology. Topics have included human-computer interaction, an analysis ofcrowdsourcingdatafordecision-makinginHaiti,Somalia,andtheArabSpringandanintegrationofculturalvariablesinopen-sourcecommunicationmodelssupportingpolicydecisionsintheME.Thisworkisinformedbyfieldexperience,suchasspendingmuchof2011inNorthAfricatraininglocalpro-democracygroupshowtoleveragenarrativesinmultiplelanguages.HerresearchisfeaturedintextbooksandUNreportsandherconferencepresentationsrangefromtheAfricaWritesliteratureconferencetoGEOINTtechnologyforums.

Currently,herresearchinhumangeographysupportsvariousgovernment,militaryandNGOteamswithanalysis,includingcontributionstheStrategicMultilayerAssessmentgroup.Dr.SutherlinhasadegreeinpoliticalsciencefromIndianaUniversityandaPhDinpeaceandconflictstudiesfromtheUniversityofBradford.Sheoperatesinsevenforeignlanguages.

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ColonelScottK.Thomson

ColonelScottK.ThomsonisanArmyReservePsychologicalOperations officer who recently completed a NationalSecurityFellowshipatHarvardUniversity’sJohnF.KennedySchoolofGovernment,wherehefocusedhisresearchontheapplicationofbehavioralsciencetocounter-insurgencyandstabilityoperations.

Priortohisfellowship,COLThomsoncommandedofthe17thPsychologicalOperationsBattalioninAustin,TX,from2013-2015, where he provided Military Information SupportOperationssupportprimarilytoArmySouthandtheUnitedStatesSouthernCommand.From2011-2013,COLThomsonattendedtheU.S.ArmyCommandandGeneralStaff Collegeand the School ofAdvancedMilitaryStudieswherehestudiedoperationalplanningandleadership.From2009-2011,heactivatedandcommandedthe316thPsychologicalOperationsCompanyatGrissomAirReserveBase,IN.Activitiesincluded manning, equipping, and training the newly-established unit to conduct MilitaryInformationSupportOperations.Priortocompanycommand,COLThomsonservedastheoperationsofficer of the 16th Psychological Operations Battalion in Fort Sheridan, IL from 2007-2009. COLThomsonpreviouslyservedintheregularArmyasanArmorOfficerinmultiplearmorandcavalryassignments,includingdutyinGermanyandIraq,andwasenlistedasaCavalryScoutfortenyearspriortocommissioning.

HeholdsaMastersofArtsinCommunicationsManagementfromWebsterUniversity,andaMastersofMilitaryArtsandSciencesinOperationalArtfromtheCommandandGeneralStaffCollege.Hisacademic interests includeapplicationof behavioralsciences such as complexity theory, systemsthinking,socialpsychology,andbehavioraleconomicstonationalsecurityissues.HecurrentlyservesatthePentagon,workingintheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefensefocusingonpolicyissuesrelatedtotheuseofinformationandcommunicationinnationalsecurity.HeisfathertothreechildrenwhoresideinTexas.

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Dr.NicholasD.Wright

Dr.NicholasWrightisaSeniorResearchFellowattheUniversityofBirmingham (UK). He applies insights from neuroscience andpsychology to decision-making in international confrontations inwayspracticallyapplicabletopolicy.HehasconductedworkfortheUK Government and Pentagon Joint Staff. He was previously anAssociateintheNuclearPolicyProgram,CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,WashingtonDC.Prior to joiningBirminghamandCarnegie,heexamineddecision-makingusingfunctionalbrainimagingatUniversityCollegeLondon(UCL)andintheDepartmentof Government at the London School of Economics. He workedclinicallyasaneurologistinOxfordandattheNationalHospitalforNeurology in London. He has published academically (e.g.Proceedingsof theRoyalSociety), ingeneralpublicationssuchasthe Atlantic or National Interest, and with the Joint Staff at thePentagon (see www.nicholasdwright.com/publications). He hasbriefedmultipletimesatthePentagon,andalsoattheUKMoD,FrenchMoD,GermanForeignOfficeandelsewhere.HehasappearedontheBBCandCNN.

WrightreceivedamedicaldegreefromUCL,aBScinHealthPolicyfromImperialCollegeLondon,hasMembership of the Royal College of Physicians (UK), has anMSc in Neuroscience and a PhD inNeurosciencebothfromUCL.

Dr.KatieZiemer

Dr. Katie Ziemer is an Associate Research Scientist at Ipsos Public Affairs, where she appliesbehavioralscienceprinciplestohelpagenciesmakeevidence-basedpolicydecisions.ShehasaPhDin clinical psychology and her research interests include attitude formation, behavior change,decision-making, and health promotion. She is trained in experimental, survey, and qualitativeresearchandhasapplieddataanalyticstoadministrativerecords,surveys,andsocialmediadata.Shehas conducted research onmany topics, including vaccination, prescription drugs, chronic pain,suicideprevention,patientsatisfaction,healthcareimprovement,andinformationsharing.

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STRATEGICMULTILAYERANALYSISTEAM

Dr.HriarCabayanDr. Hriar “Doc” Cabayan is currently in the Joint Staff/J-39, DDGOwhere he manages the Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA)Program.SMAprovidesplanningsupporttoCommandswithcomplexoperational imperatives requiring multi-agency, multi-disciplinarysolutions. Solutions and participants are sought from across USG,academia, think tanks, and industry. SMA is accepted andsynchronized by Joint Staff/J-39 and executed by ASD (R&E)/RFD.Prior to his current position he was with ASD (R&E)/RFD/RRTO(2007-2013). From 1997 to 2007, he was Special Technology andScience Advisor in the JS Directorate of Operations (J-3) where heprovided technical and scientific assistance to the CombatantCommands in the areas of deliberate and crisis action planning. In2007, Dr. Cabayan received a Joint Distinguished Civilian ServiceAwardbytheChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff.

His current focus is on counter-terrorism, counter-WMD (Stateandnon-State), Global & regional socio-cultural assessments, and Individual, state and national-leveldeterrencestudies.

Dr.Cabayanreceivedhisdoctoratedegree fromtheUniversityof IllinoisinUrbana, Illinois.Aftergraduating,hetaughtmathematicalphysicsforfouryearsatNewYorkUniversity’sCourentInstituteofMathematicalSciencesandMcGillUniversity.In1977,hejoinedtheDepartmentofEnergy’sLLNLwhere he worked on nuclear weapons effects, Strategic Defense Initiative related efforts, anddirectedenergyprograms.

Ms.MariahYagerMs. Mariah Yager serves as Deputy for the Strategic MultilayerAssessment(SMA)ProgramundertheJointStaff/J-39,DDGO.SheisaSeniorResearchAnalystwithNSI.From2010to2017,Ms.Yagerhelpedtodevelopascientificallyvalid,replicable,andoperationallytrainable discourse analysis methodology. This methodology hasbeenusedtoexamineinsurgentwritings,theexpressionoftrustandworldview, and cognitive complexity, both in the vernacular andEnglishtranslations.

Ms. Yager received her Master’s in Professional Communicationfrom Purdue University of Fort Wayne and Bachelor degrees inAnthropologyand InterpersonalandGroupCommunication, fromIndianaUniversityandPurdueUniversity,FortWayne(IPFW)respectively.Ms.Yagerhas taughtfundamental communication theory and public speaking at IPFW and previously worked in theprivatesectorinclientmanagementandassessmentsforanexecutivecoachingandconsultingfirm.

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