Slovakia and the European Union - Universiteit van Amsterdam · Slovakia and the European Union A single-country study of Slovakia’s position in the EU Country Report Series III

1

CoRe Studies III 2010 CoRe Studies III

Slovakia and the European Union

A single-country study

of Slovakia’s position in the EU

EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES

Slovakia and the European Union

A single-country study

of Slovakia’s position in the EU

Country Report Series III (CORE-series)

European Policy Studies

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Oktober 2010

© 2010, Jorine Boink, Eva Anna Braas, Jilles van Dam, Keijen van Eijk, Jorien Esser, Regina Goijen, Lonneke

van der Holst, Sarah Kik, Doenja Peeters, Mai-Ly Pham, Femke Pruis, Horia Siamari, Laura Snyders, Sinan

Tokbay, Steef Verweij, Valentino Vondenhoff and Nadja Wever.

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ISBN 978-90-807611-6-2

Factsheet

Slovakia within Europe

The flag of the Slovak Republic

White, blue and red are the Pan-Slavic colors. The

Slovak coat of arms consists of a red shield

bearing a white Cross of Lorraine, surmounting

three blue hills.

Map of Slovakia

Official name: Slovak Republic (Slovenská Republika)

Short form: Slovakia (Slovensko)

Capital: Bratislava

Population: 5,470,306

Administrative division: 8 regions: Banskobystrický, Bratislavský, Košický, Nitriansky,

Prešovský, Trenčiansky, Trnavský, Ţilinský

Main cities: Bratislava (428,672 inhabitants), Košice (236,093), Prešov (92,786),

Nitra (87,285), Ţilina (85,400), Banská Bystrica (83,056)

Urban population: 56%

Density: 110.1 inhabitants / km2

Geography

Area: 49,035 km2

Borders: Landlocked, bordered by Austria (91 km), the Czech Republic (197

km), Poland (420 km), Ukraine (90 km) and Hungary (676 km).

Terrain: Carpathian Mountains in the northern part, lowlands in the south

Forest area: 40.1% of land area

Arable land: 29.23%

Natural resources: Brown coal, lignite, iron ore, copper, manganese ore, salt

Government

Independence: 1 January 1993 (from Czechoslovakia)

Government type: Parliamentary democracy. President is elected by popular vote for a

five-year term. The National Council of the Slovak Republic has 150

seats. Last elections were held on 12 June 2010

Chief of State: President Ivan Gašparovič, since 15 June 2004

Head of government: Prime Minister Iveta Radičová, since 9 July 2010

Constitution: Ratified 1 September 1992, effective 1 January 1993

Juridical branch: Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, Special Court

Member NATO: 29 March 2004

Member EU: 1 May 2004

Member Eurozone: 1 January 2009

Demographics

Ethnic groups: Slovak 85.8%, Hungarian 9.7%, Roma 1.7%, Czech 0.8%,

Ruthenian 0.4%, Ukrainian 0.2%, other 1.4%

Religion: Roman Catholic 68.9%, Evangelical Church of Augsburg Affiliation

(Lutheran) 6.9%, Greek Catholic 4.1%, Reformed Christian Church

2%, Orthodox Church 0.9%, Jehovah Witnesses 0.4%, none 13%,

other 3.7%

Language: Slovak (official) 83.9%, Hungarian 10.7%, Roma 1.8%,

Ukrainian 1%, other 2.6%

Average age: 37.3 years

Life expectancy: 75.62 years (men: 71.7 years / women: 79.74 years)

Population growth rate: 0.129%

Fertility rate: 1.36 children born per woman

Public Finance

Gross Domestic Product: € 61.760 billion

GDP growth: -4.7%

GDP per capita: € 11,700

National Budget Deficit: -6.8% of GDP

National Debt: 35.7% of GDP

Inflation: 0.9%

Investments: 24.5% of GDP

Education expenditure: 3.79% of GDP

Economy

GDP share per sector: Agriculture: 2.6%, Industry 25.5%, Construction 8.8%, Trade/

Transport/ Communication: 24.3%, Business/ Finance: 21.9%, other

services: 16.9%

Agriculture: Grains, potatoes, sugar beets, hops, fruit, pigs, cattle, poultry, forest

products

Industry: Metal and metal products (steel), transport vehicles, food and

beverages, electricity, gas, coke, oil, nuclear fuel, chemicals and

manmade fibres, machinery, paper and printing, earthenware and

ceramics, textiles, electrical and optical apparatus, rubber products

Services: ICT, telecommunications, financial, tourism

Labour force: 2.365 million; by occupation: agriculture (3.5%), industry (27%),

services (69.5%)

Labour productivity rate: 82.8 (EU 27 index: 100)

Unemployment: 12%

Structural unemployment: 6.5%

Population below poverty line: 18%, after social transfers 11%

International Trade

Import: € 44.564 billion

Import partners Germany 16.8%, Czech Republic 12.3%, Russia 9%, South Korea

6.8%

Import goods: Machinery and transport equipment 31%, mineral products 13%,

vehicles 12%, base metals 9%, chemicals 8%, plastics 6%

Export: € 44.426 billion

Export partners: Germany 20.1%, Czech Republic 12.9%, France 7.8%, Poland 7.2%

Export goods: Machinery and electrical equipment 35.9%, vehicles 21%, base metals

11.3%, chemicals and minerals 8.1%, plastics 4.9%

Table of Contents

List of Figures ..................................................................................................................................... xiv

List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................ xv

Preface ................................................................................................................................................ xvii

Acknowledgement .............................................................................................................................. xix

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................ xx

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 21

Aim and Principles of this Country Profile ....................................................................................... 21

Approach of this Country Profile ...................................................................................................... 22

Organisation of this Country Profile ................................................................................................. 23

1. History .............................................................................................................................................. 25

1.1 Fifteen Tumultuous Centuries: from the First Slovaks to an Independent State ......................... 25

1.1.1 Premodern History (5th Century –10th Century) .................................................................. 25

1.1.2 The Hungarian Kingdom (10th Century – 16

th Century) ....................................................... 26

1.1.3 The Habsburg Empire (16th Century – 18

th Century) ............................................................ 27

1.1.4 National Awakening (19th Century – 20

th Century) .............................................................. 29

1.1.5 The First Czechoslovak Republic ......................................................................................... 32 1.1.6 The Second Czechoslovak Republic ..................................................................................... 33 1.1.7 The First Slovak Republic .................................................................................................... 33

1.1.7.1 The Slovak National Council ......................................................................................... 34 1.1.7.2 National Uprising ........................................................................................................... 35

1.1.8 Postwar Czechoslovakia: The Third Czechoslovak Republic .............................................. 36 1.1.8.1 May 1946 Elections ........................................................................................................ 36

1.1.9 Communist Czechoslovakia ................................................................................................. 37 1.1.9.1 Khrushchev‟s „Secret Speech‟ ........................................................................................ 38 1.1.9.2 Dubček ........................................................................................................................... 39 1.1.9.3 Normalisation ................................................................................................................. 40

1.2 The Velvet Revolution ................................................................................................................ 40

1.2.1 The Velvet Divorce ............................................................................................................... 41 1.2.2 Consequences of the Velvet Divorce .................................................................................... 43

1.3 Recent Transition(s) .................................................................................................................... 44

1.3.1 Historical and Political Transition ........................................................................................ 45 1.3.2 Judicial and Social Transition ............................................................................................... 46 1.3.3 Economic transition .............................................................................................................. 46

2. Culture .............................................................................................................................................. 49

2.1 National Culture and Identity ...................................................................................................... 49

2.1.1 The People ............................................................................................................................ 49

2.1.2 The Language ....................................................................................................................... 50 2.1.3 The Importance of History .................................................................................................... 50 2.1.4 The Legacy of the Communist Regime ................................................................................ 51 2.1.5 Art ......................................................................................................................................... 52 2.1.7 The Search for Identity ......................................................................................................... 52

2.2 Religion ....................................................................................................................................... 53

2.2.1 Religiosity in the Czechoslovak Republic ............................................................................ 54 2.2.2 The Slovak Catholic Church during Communism ................................................................ 55 2.2.3 Religiosity in Contemporary Slovakia .................................................................................. 56

3. Judiciary ........................................................................................................................................... 57

3.1 The Slovak Constitution .............................................................................................................. 57

3.1.1 General Provisions, Fundamental Rights and Social Rights................................................. 58 3.1.2 The Governmental Organs .................................................................................................... 59 3.1.3 The Judicial Body in Slovakia .............................................................................................. 60

3.2 Enforcement ................................................................................................................................ 61

3.2.1 Protection of the Rule of Law in the Slovak Republic ......................................................... 61 3.2.1.1 Assessment of the Compliance with the Rule of Law .................................................... 61 3.2.1.2 The Protection of the Rule of Law ................................................................................. 62 3.2.1.3 Incomplete Legal Transformation .................................................................................. 64 3.2.1.4 Excessive Executive Involvement .................................................................................. 65 3.2.1.5 Weak Commitment to the Rule of Law .......................................................................... 66 3.2.1.6 Caseload and the Length of Procedures ......................................................................... 67 3.2.1.7 Professional Competence of the Judiciary ..................................................................... 68 3.2.1.8 Evaluation ....................................................................................................................... 70

3.2.2 Human Rights in the Slovak Republic .................................................................................. 70 3.2.2.1 Anti-Discrimination Law ............................................................................................... 71 3.2.2.2 The Current Human Rights Situation in the Slovak Republic........................................ 73 3.2.2.3 Human Rights Institutions .............................................................................................. 74

3.2.3 Slovak Police Force .............................................................................................................. 74 3.2.4 The Fight Against Organised Crime ..................................................................................... 75

3.2.4.1 The Schengen Agreement .............................................................................................. 75 3.2.4.2 European Police Office (Europol) .................................................................................. 76

3.3 The Slovak Criminal Code .......................................................................................................... 77

3.4 Decentralisation ........................................................................................................................... 78

3.5 Corruption in the Slovak Republic .............................................................................................. 81

3.5.1 The Notion of Corruption ..................................................................................................... 81 3.5.2 Anti-Corruption Measures .................................................................................................... 83 3.5.3 Evaluation ............................................................................................................................. 85

4. Politics .............................................................................................................................................. 87

4.1 Political Transition and EU Accession ........................................................................................ 87

4.1.1 Initial Reforms ...................................................................................................................... 87 4.1.2 The Mečiar Governments (1992-1998) ................................................................................ 90 4.1.3 The Dzurinda Governments (1998-2006) ............................................................................. 91 4.1.4 Democratic Development after EU Accession ..................................................................... 94

4.2 Overview of Political Parties ....................................................................................................... 95

4.2.1 Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD) ........................................................................... 95 4.2.2 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ–DS) ......................... 96 4.2.3 Slovak National Party (SNS) ................................................................................................ 96 4.2.4 Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP) .................................................................... 97 4.2.5 People‟s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ĽS – HZDS) ................................ 98 4.2.6 Christian Democratic Party (KDH) ...................................................................................... 98 4.2.7 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) ............................................................................................... 99 4.2.8 The Parliamentary Elections of June 2010 ........................................................................... 99

4.3 Political Participation ................................................................................................................ 100

4.3.1 Political Participation under Communism .......................................................................... 100 4.3.2. Political Participation after 1989 ....................................................................................... 101

4.3.2.1Voter Turnout ................................................................................................................ 101 4.3.2.2 Uninstitutionalised Political Participation .................................................................... 102 4.3.2.3 Voter Volatility ............................................................................................................ 103 4.3.2.4 Party Membership ........................................................................................................ 103

4.4 Foreign Policy ........................................................................................................................... 104

4.4.1 Development of Slovak Foreign Policy .............................................................................. 104 4.4.1.1 The Mečiar Years ......................................................................................................... 104 4.4.1.2 The Dzurinda Years...................................................................................................... 105 4.4.1.3 The Fico Years ............................................................................................................. 105

4.4.2 Juridical Base of Foreign Policy: International Law in Slovakia ....................................... 106 4.4.3 The Current Overall Foreign Affairs Strategy .................................................................... 107

4.4.3.1 Priority: Slovakia in a Safe and Democratic World ..................................................... 108 4.4.3.1.1 NATO .................................................................................................................... 108 4.4.3.1.2 Iraq ......................................................................................................................... 110 4.4.3.1.3 United Nations ....................................................................................................... 111 4.4.3.1.4 OSCE ..................................................................................................................... 111

4.4.3.2 Priority: A Successful and Prosperous Slovakia .......................................................... 111 4.4.3.2.1 The Visegrad Group ............................................................................................... 112 4.4.3.2.2 The Czech Republic ............................................................................................... 116 4.4.3.2.3 Hungary ................................................................................................................. 117 4.4.3.2.4 Austria .................................................................................................................... 122 4.4.3.2.5 Ukraine ................................................................................................................... 123 4.4.3.2.6 Western Balkans .................................................................................................... 123 4.4.3.2.7 Russian Federation ................................................................................................. 124 4.4.3.2.8 United States of America ....................................................................................... 125 4.4.3.2.9 Evaluation of Slovak Bilateral Relations ............................................................... 126

4.4.3.3 Priority: The Interests of Slovakia in an Efficient EU.................................................. 126 4.4.3.3.1 Priorities for the Slovak Republic in the EU .......................................................... 127 4.4.3.3.2 The Danube Strategy .............................................................................................. 129

4.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 129

5. Civil Society.................................................................................................................................... 133

5.1 Media and Press Freedom in the Slovak Republic .................................................................... 133

5.1.1 Media in Times of Communism ......................................................................................... 133 5.1.2 Media in Post-Communist Times ....................................................................................... 134 5.1.3 Media Freedom and Possible Threats ................................................................................. 135

5.1.3.1 Media under Mečiar ..................................................................................................... 136 5.1.3.2 Media under Dzurinda .................................................................................................. 136

5.1.3.3 Media under Fico ......................................................................................................... 137 5.1.4 The Acquis Communautaire regarding Media .................................................................... 139

5.2 NGO Movement in Slovakia ..................................................................................................... 141

5.2.1 NGOs in Communist Times ............................................................................................... 141 5.2.2 NGOs between 1989 and 1993 ........................................................................................... 142 5.2.3 NGOs since 1993 ................................................................................................................ 143

5.3 Environmental Policy ................................................................................................................ 146

5.3.1 Environmental Policy in Communist Times ....................................................................... 146 5.3.2 Environmental Policy between 1989 and 1993 .................................................................. 147 5.3.3 Environmental Policy under Mečiar and Dzurinda ............................................................ 147 5.3.4 Environmental Policy under Fico ....................................................................................... 148

5.4 Environmental Issues ................................................................................................................ 149

5.4.1 Energy ................................................................................................................................. 150 5.4.1.1 Nuclear Power Plants ................................................................................................... 150 5.4.1.2 Coal Power Plants ........................................................................................................ 150 5.4.1.3 Opposition of Environmental NGOs ............................................................................ 150 5.4.1.4 Renewable Resources ................................................................................................... 151

5.4.2 Climate Change................................................................................................................... 152 5.4.3 Tatra National Park ............................................................................................................. 153 5.4.4 Air, Water and Soil Pollution ............................................................................................. 154

5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 155

6. Economics....................................................................................................................................... 157

6.1 Transition................................................................................................................................... 157

6.1.1 The Process of Privatisation ............................................................................................... 158 6.1.2 The Transition Period in the 1990s ..................................................................................... 159 6.1.3 The Economic Reforms during the Dzurinda Government ................................................ 161 6.1.4 The Economic Reforms during Dzurinda‟s Second Term .................................................. 163

6.2 The Economic Accession Criteria ............................................................................................. 164

6.2.1 The Assessment of the Economic Accession Criteria ........................................................ 164

6.3 Economic Legal Framework ..................................................................................................... 166

6.3.1 National Bank of Slovakia .................................................................................................. 166 6.3.2 National Property Fund ....................................................................................................... 167 6.3.3 The Supreme Audit Office .................................................................................................. 167 6.3.4 Slovak Competition Authority ............................................................................................ 169 6.3.5 The Internal Market ............................................................................................................ 172

6.3.5.1 Free Movement of Goods ............................................................................................. 173 6.3.5.2 Free Movement of Persons ........................................................................................... 174 6.3.5.3 Free Movement of Services .......................................................................................... 175 6.3.5.4 Free Movement of Capital ............................................................................................ 176

6.3.6 Consumer Protection and Product Safety ........................................................................... 177 6.3.7 Company Law ..................................................................................................................... 178

6.4 Fiscal Policy .............................................................................................................................. 178

6.4.1 Public Finance Management ............................................................................................... 178 6.4.2 Fiscal Transparency ............................................................................................................ 179 6.4.3 Fiscal Simplicity: Flat Tax .................................................................................................. 180 6.4.4 Public Finance Management during the Economic Crisis .................................................. 181

6.4.4.1 Anti-Crisis Measures .................................................................................................... 181 6.4.4.2 Excessive Deficit Procedure ......................................................................................... 182

6.4.5 Fiscal Overview .................................................................................................................. 183

6.5 Monetary Policy ........................................................................................................................ 184

6.5.1 Maastricht Convergence Criteria ........................................................................................ 184 6.5.2 Monetary Overview ............................................................................................................ 185

6.6 Economic Sectors ...................................................................................................................... 186

6.6.1 Agriculture .......................................................................................................................... 186 6.6.1.1 Diminishing Importance of the Agricultural Sector ..................................................... 188 6.6.1.2 Agricultural and Rural Policies .................................................................................... 189 6.6.1.4 Evaluation ..................................................................................................................... 191

6.6.2 Industry ............................................................................................................................... 191 6.6.2.1 The Steel Industry ........................................................................................................ 191 6.6.2.2 The Automotive Industry ............................................................................................. 193

6.6.2.2.1 Challenges for the Automotive Industry in Slovakia ............................................. 196 6.6.2.3 Electronics Industry ...................................................................................................... 197

6.6.3 Service Sector ..................................................................................................................... 198 6.6.3.1 Tourism ........................................................................................................................ 198 6.6.3.2 Information and Communication Technologies ........................................................... 201

6.6.3.2.1 The Slovak IT-market ............................................................................................ 202 6.6.3.2.2 The Use of New Technologies ............................................................................... 203 6.6.3.2.3 Policy Programmes and E-Government ................................................................. 203

6.6.3.3 Small and Medium Enterprises .................................................................................... 204 6.6.3.3.1 Historical Background ........................................................................................... 205 6.6.3.3.2 Legal Framework ................................................................................................... 205 6.6.3.3.3 Challenges for SMEs ............................................................................................. 206 6.6.3.3.4 Evaluation .............................................................................................................. 207

6.7 Business Environment ............................................................................................................... 207

6.7.1 Legal Framework ................................................................................................................ 207 6.7.1.1 Bankruptcy Laws .......................................................................................................... 208

6.7.2 Corporate Tax ..................................................................................................................... 208 6.7.3 Administrative Burden ........................................................................................................ 208 6.7.4 Improving the Business Climate ......................................................................................... 209 6.7.6 Challenges in the Business Climate Sphere ........................................................................ 209

6.8 International Trade .................................................................................................................... 210

6.8.1 Import/Export ..................................................................................................................... 210 6.8.2 Foreign Direct Investment .................................................................................................. 212

6.9 Energy ....................................................................................................................................... 215

6.9.1 Overview of the Energy Sector ........................................................................................... 215 6.9.2 Energy Reform Policies ...................................................................................................... 218 6.9.3 Evaluation ........................................................................................................................... 220

6.10 Transport and Infrastructure .................................................................................................... 220

6.10.1 Transport Policy ................................................................................................................ 221 6.10.2 Evaluation ......................................................................................................................... 223

6.11 Regional Disparities and Regional Development .................................................................... 223

6.11.1 Slovak Regions ................................................................................................................. 223 6.11.2 Regional Disparities .......................................................................................................... 225 6.11.3 Regional Development Policies in Recent History ........................................................... 228

6.11.4 Current Regional Development Policies ........................................................................... 230 6.11.5 Evaluation ......................................................................................................................... 233

6.12 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 233

7. Social policies ................................................................................................................................. 235

7.1 Education and Training ............................................................................................................. 235

7.1.1 Overview of Slovak Education Policy (1989-2010) ........................................................... 235 7.1.2 Government Expenditure on Education .............................................................................. 240 7.1.3 General Structure of the Education System ........................................................................ 241 7.1.4 Educational Attainment ...................................................................................................... 244 7.1.5 Regional System of Education ............................................................................................ 245

7.1.5.1 The 2008 Education Act ............................................................................................... 245 7.1.5.2 The Normative Financing Formula .............................................................................. 247 7.1.5.3 Secondary Schools and Vocational Establishments ..................................................... 247

7.1.6 Higher Education ................................................................................................................ 247 7.1.6.1 The 1990 Higher Education Act ................................................................................... 248 7.1.6.2 The 2002 Higher Education Act ................................................................................... 248 7.1.6.3 Quantity versus Quality ................................................................................................ 249 7.1.6.4 Evaluation of Quality and Accreditation ...................................................................... 250 7.1.6.5 The European Dimension ............................................................................................. 251

7.1.7 Evaluation ........................................................................................................................... 252

7.2 Research and Innovation ........................................................................................................... 252

7.2.1 The Lisbon Strategy ............................................................................................................ 252 7.2.2 The Slovak National Lisbon Strategy ................................................................................. 253 7.2.3 Historical Background ........................................................................................................ 254 7.2.4. Funding .............................................................................................................................. 254 7.2.5 The Role of Education ........................................................................................................ 255 7.2.6. The Slovak Workforce ....................................................................................................... 256 7.2.7. Tax Incentives .................................................................................................................... 257 7.2.8. Evaluation .......................................................................................................................... 258

7.3 Employment and Labour Mobility ............................................................................................ 258

7.3.1 Liberalisation of the Labour Market ................................................................................... 258 7.3.6. Foreign Employees ............................................................................................................ 263 7.3.7 Migration and Asylum in the Slovak Republic ................................................................... 264

7.3.7.1 Historical Overview of Government Policy towards Migration and Asylum .............. 265 7.3.7.2 Asylum and Migration since the EU Accession ........................................................... 266 7.3.7.3 Illegal Immigrants ........................................................................................................ 270 7.3.7.4 Slovaks Abroad ............................................................................................................ 271

7.4 Social Welfare and Health Policy .............................................................................................. 271

7.4.1 Slovak Social Security System ........................................................................................... 272 7.4.1.1 Evaluation ..................................................................................................................... 275

7.4.2 The Slovak Pension System ................................................................................................ 276 7.4.3 Slovak Program to Reduce Poverty .................................................................................... 279 7.4.4 Slovak Family Policy .......................................................................................................... 280 7.4.5. Health Care in the Slovak Republic ................................................................................... 281

7.4.5.1. Demographic Trends and Health Status ...................................................................... 281 7.4.5.2 Health Care in Communist Times ................................................................................ 282 7.4.5.3. Health Care after the Fall of Communism .................................................................. 283

7.4.5.4. Reforms in the 1990s – The Introduction of Social Health Insurance ........................ 283 7.4.5.5. Reforms in the 1990s – Privatisation and Decentralisation ......................................... 285 7.4.5.6 Health Care Reform Programmes of 2002 and 2004 under Dzurinda ....................... 285 7.4.5.7 Health Care Policy under Fico: 2006-2010 .................................................................. 288 7.4.5.8 Challenges .................................................................................................................... 289

7.5 Gender and Sexual Minorities ................................................................................................... 290

7.5.1 Legislation on Equal Treatment between Women and Men ............................................... 290 7.5.2 Sexual Minorities ................................................................................................................ 292

7.5.2.1 Transition Period .......................................................................................................... 292 7.5.2.2 The Situation after EU Accession ................................................................................ 293

7.5.3 Gender Equality .................................................................................................................. 295 7.5.3.1 Transition Period .......................................................................................................... 295 7.5.3.2 The Situation after EU Accession ................................................................................ 296

7.5.4 Challenges ........................................................................................................................... 299

7.6. Ethnic Minorities in the Slovak Republic ................................................................................ 299

7.6.1 Historical Overview of Governmental Policies towards Ethnic Minorities........................ 301 7.6.2 The Roma Minority in Slovak Society ............................................................................... 303

7.6.2.1 Historical Background .................................................................................................. 303 7.6.2.2 Description of the Roma Problem ................................................................................ 306 7.6.2.3 Roma and Education .................................................................................................... 308 7.6.2.4 The Situation and Policies since 2006 .......................................................................... 309

7.6.3 The Hungarian Minority in the Slovak Republic ................................................................ 309

7.7 Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities ........................................................................... 311

7.7.1. The Roma Minority ........................................................................................................... 311 7.7.2. The Hungarian Minority .................................................................................................... 313

7.8 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 315

8. General Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 319

8.1 Analysis of Different Fields of Research .................................................................................. 319

8.2 Interconnections ........................................................................................................................ 321

8.3 Good Governance ...................................................................................................................... 323

Appendix I: Overview Government Coalitions .............................................................................. 325

Appendix II: List of Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 327

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 333

xiv

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: Great Moravia 26

Figure 6.1: Employment in Agriculture in Slovak Districts (2000) 188

Figure 6.2: Total Net Energy Consumption by Source (1973 – 2030) 215

Figure 6.3: Energy Infrastructure Slovakia 216

Figure 6.4: Slovak Self-Governing Regions 224

Figure 6.5: Unemployment in Slovak Districts 225

Figure 6.6: Foreign Direct Investment in Slovak Districts 226

Figure 6.7: Social-Economical Types of Slovak Districts 227

Figure 7.1: Overview of the Slovak Education System 242

Figure 7.2: Number of Persons that Enter and Stay Illegally in the Slovak Republic 270

Figure 7.3: Organisation of the Social Protection System in the Slovak Republic 274

Figure 7.4: Prediction of the Pension Deficit Relative to GDP under the Pre-Reform 276

System

Figure 7.5 Slovak Health Care System in 2004 287

xv

List of Tables

Box 1: The OECD's Principles of Good Governance 22

Table 2.1: Religious Affiliation in Six Post-Communist Countries (percentages) 53

Table 3.1 Corruption Perception Index in V4 Countries, 1998-2001 81

Table 3.2: Overview of the Slovak Republic Anti-Corruption Legal Framework 83

Table 4.1: Distribution of Seats in the Slovak National Council as of 17 June 2006 99

Table 4.2: Distribution of Seats in the Slovak National Council as of 12 June 2010 100

Table 4.3: Voter Turnouts in Czechoslovakia and the Slovak Republic between 101

1990 and 2010

Table 4.4: Assumed Key Responsibility for Aggravated Slovak-Hungarian Relations 119

Table 6.1: Public Finances 184

Table 6.2: Public Finances Compared with Other Countries (2009) 184

Table 6.3: Inflation and Interest Rates 186

Table 6.4: Inflation and Interest Rates Compared with Other Countries (2009) 186

Table 6.5: Steel Production in Million Tonnes 193

Table 6.6: Objects of Interest for Visiting Slovakia 201

Table 6.7: Operational Programs Structural Funds 231

Table 7.1: Public Expenditure on Education as % of GDP 240

Table 7.2: Total Public Expenditure on Education by Educational Level as % of GDP 240

Table 7.3: Annual Expenditure in Public Sector Institutions by Pupil/Student and 241

Educational Level in Purchase Parity Standard (PPS) ( in thousand euro)

Table 7.4: Overview of the Slovak Education System 243

Table 7.5: Educational Attainment of the Population Aged 25-64 by ISCED Level 244

in 2007

Table 7.6: Total Number of Students in Tertiary Education 250

Table 7.7: Statistical Overview Asylum Seekers in the Period 1993-2010 268

Table 7.8: Expenditure on Social Protection per Sector as % of Total Expenditure 273

in 2007

Table 7.9: Social Protection Expenditure 273

Table 7.10: At Risk Poverty Rate by Age Group in the EU 27 in 2007 (percentage) 280

Table 7.11: Gender Pay Gap in Slovakia and in EU27 298

Table 7.12: Number of Hungarians and Roma in Slovakia 302

xvii

Preface

I am proud to present the third of a series of country reports, in short the CORE series, of the master

European Policy Studies. This report is about Slovakia. Technically spoken, Slovakia has not changed

that much in the mere 17 years of its existence. That is to neglect that the Slovak people have passed

through some important historical changes. The Slovak territories have been Habsburg, then

Czechoslovak territories before. Furthermore it was occupied by several foreign forces, the most

recent being the Soviet forces, which left after the lift of the Iron Curtin. In 1989 Czechoslovakia has

changed dictatorial rule to democratic rule. Since 1989, it has also been engaged in a transition from a

state led economy to a market economy. In 1993, the velvet divorce marked the start of the Slovak

Republic. In 2004 Slovakia joined the European Union as a member state. In 2009 the Euro was

introduced to replace the Slovak Crown as the national currency. It is safe to say that Slovakia has

made some enormous changes in a period of not much more than 20 years.

Under my supervision and as a part of their master European Policy Studies, 17 students of the

Universiteit of Amsterdam have organised a field research trip to Slovakia to investigate the

aforementioned transitions and to address the question of the Slovakian integration in the European

Union. They had a political, legal and economical focus underpinned by a cultural and historical

background. Their research has been interdisciplinary and this report shows just that. They combined

desk research with interviews in Bratislava, Komarno, Nitra and Samorin. In only 14 weeks they have

obtained insight in the internal affairs of Slovakia, its relationship with the European Union and some

important problems still waiting to be solved.

Some serious endeavours lie ahead for the Slovakian people. Corruption, the modernisation of the

infrastructure, the quality and content of education, the improvement of the judicial procedures and the

development of a competitive agriculture are some of the major tasks Slovakia has to address. A

mentality change is another. Slovakian society at large could benefit from a more proactive attitude.

The wealth of this report not only stems from the information that the students gathered and analysed,

it is also the result of the chosen interdisciplinary approach. This enabled the students to draw

conclusions surpassing a single disciplinary approach. They thus proved that some inferences about

our complex social reality can only be made after interdisciplinary research. Therefore once again, the

third CORE-study clearly demonstrates the necessity of and need for interdisciplinary studies like

European studies, particularly European Policy Studies.

I took pleasure in coaching and accompanying these students. They were very much involved in

making a success of this course. For them, the course itself was an adventure, as no preset course

material was available. They had to find their own information and make a comprehensive selection.

During their collaboration they showed a genuine team spirit, which was even strengthened by the

volcanic eruption on Iceland that kept us longer in Bratislava than anticipated. This report proves for

this good cooperation.

xviii

Finally, I want to thank Dr. Carlos Reijnen, colleague and expert on Slovakia, for his contribution to

the field trip. His historical explanations were of great help to the students to understand some

complex issues of Slovakian society. Of course I want to thank the 17 participating students for their

enthusiasm and their infinite dedication, which by far exceeded the demands of a compulsory

assignment.

Dr. A.C. van Wageningen

Amsterdam, October 2010

xix

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank all our interviewees for providing us with vital information in various fields

and helping us constructing a complete image of the Slovak Republic. Without your cooperation and

contribution it would not have been possible to complete our detailed report.

Furthermore, we would also like to express our gratitude to Drs. M. van der Laaken, Dr. C.W.C.

Reijnen and Dr. A.C. van Wageningen for their encouragement and inspiring words.

The authors

Jorine Boink, Eva Anna Braas, Jilles van Dam, Keijen van Eijk, Jorien Esser, Regina Goijen, Lonneke

van der Holst, Sarah Kik, Doenja Peeters, Mai-Ly Pham, Femke Pruis, Horia Siamari, Laura Snyders,

Sinan Tokbay, Steef Verweij, Valentino Vondenhoff and Nadja Wever.

xx

Abstract

In this country profile the implementation of a completely new institutional framework in the Slovak

Republic as a member of the EU is examined. Accordingly, through a combination of desk-research

and onsite qualitative interviews with representatives of relevant public bodies and authorities, private

companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), this study attempts to provide a better

understanding of the extent to which the EU affects daily practices in Slovak economics, politics, law

and social affairs. After centuries predominantly characterised by foreign domination, and decades of

belonging to the communist-led Czechoslovak Republic, the Slovak Republic became independent in

1993 and is therefore a noteworthy young nation state. Despite its relatively recent independence,

Slovakia has gone through a turbulent wide-ranging transition process in the past two decades: not

only did the country break with communism and did it enter the European Union, but it was also one

of the few „Big Bang‟ countries yet to introduce the euro as its currency in 2009. However, although

the country has adopted a legal framework largely corresponding with EU standards and although it

has a relatively promising economic outlook, some challenges remain.

21

Introduction

Over the last two centuries, the political and cultural history of the Slovak Republic has borne a strong

resemblance to a rollercoaster ride and it can best be characterised as turbulent. The country has been

repeatedly dominated by foreign rulers before becoming an independent state in 1993. For instance, in

the 19th and early 20th century, the territory presently known as the Slovak Republic was first part of

the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Subsequently, after the First World War, it was part of Czechoslovakia,

with a brief exception in the period of the Second World War when it was a puppet state under the

Nazi-regime. During the second half of the 20th century, the country was under strong influence of

Moscow until the fall of the Communist regime.

Another significant event for the Slovak Republic was its accession to the European Union

(EU). In 2004, the Slovak Republic joined the EU together with eight other Central and Eastern

European countries. In addition, the country adopted the euro in 2009. With the exception of Slovenia,

the Slovak Republic has been the only country of the newly accessed Central and Eastern European

member states to have adopted the euro.

In sum, after a turbulent state formation in the 20th century and after only a decade of

independence, the Slovak Republic was able to fulfil the accession criteria to successfully enter the

European Union.

Aim and Principles of this Country Profile

In the process of EU accession, the country needed to comply with the requirements of the

Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire. Due to the substantial importance of this matter,

the implemented changes thereafter have highly influenced the current institutional framework and

legal design. Since EU accession was of major importance for the Slovak Republic‟s legal design, the

country profile focuses on the accession in order to examine the functioning of the Slovak Republic

within the EU.

Consequently, the focus of the country profile will be on the economic, political, judicial and

social aspects of the Slovak Republic. However, the profile will not be a purely ex-post analysis about

„what went wrong‟ and „what went well‟ after EU accession, i.e. after the implementation of the

acquis communautaire. On the contrary, it attempts to provide a better understanding of the extent to

which the EU affects daily practices in economics, politics, law and social affairs. Although the first

task for the Slovak Republic after its independence was to change from a Communist country into a

democracy and from a planned economy into a market-led economy, it was quickly faced with a

second, perhaps even more daunting task: that of EU accession. After having successfully obtained EU

membership, the Slovak Republic also had the task to determine its place in the EU as a member state.

Therefore, the aim of this country profile is to examine the implementation of a completely

new institutional framework in the Slovak Republic as a member of the EU. The principles of good

governance are the key terms for the analysis and examination of the implementation of this

institutional framework within this country profile. The Organisation of Economic Co-operation and

Development (OECD) defines six principles for good governance: accountability, transparency,

efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness, forward vision and rule of law (box 1).

22

Box 1: The OECD's Principles of Good Governance

Accountability: government is able and willing to show the extent to which its actions and decisions

are consistent with clearly-defined and agreed-upon objectives.

Transparency: government actions, decisions and decision-making processes are open to an

appropriate level of scrutiny by other parts of government, civil society and, in some instances, outside

institutions and governments.

Efficiency and effectiveness: government strives to produce quality public outputs, including services

delivered to citizens, at the best cost, and ensures that outputs meet the original intentions of

policymakers.

Responsiveness: government has the capacity and flexibility to respond rapidly to societal changes,

takes into account the expectations of civil society in identifying the general public interest, and is

willing to critically re-examine the role of government.

Forward vision: government is able to anticipate future problems and issues based on current data and

trends and develop policies that take into account future costs and anticipated changes (e.g.

demographic, economic, environmental, etc.).

Rule of law: government enforces equally transparent laws, regulations and codes.

Source: OECD1

Although the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred almost two decades ago, the Slovak Republic still

has to deal with the relics of its communist past. During the pre-accession period to the EU, all aspects

of society had to undergo major, time- and energy consuming changes, yet, the skeleton and flesh and

blood of the relatively young country could evidently not change overnight. To fully understand

Slovakia‟s position within the EU, it will therefore be necessary to look at the changes it has

experienced in the aforementioned different perspectives: judicial affairs, politics, civil society,

economics and social issues. These fields are highly intertwined and therefore have to be considered

all together in the end. Thus, the main goal of this country profile is to understand Slovakia‟s position

within the EU, whereby the focus is on the current situation in 2010 in the different fields of society.

Approach of this Country Profile

The historical development of the Slovak Republic is considered a crucial factor for determining the

functioning of the country and its position within the EU. Therefore, history plays an important role in

this profile and it is a recurrent theme in the description of the functioning of Slovak society. Through

this historical perspective, practices in society can be understood through the context in which they are

embedded.

1 OECD (2010), retrieved 6 June 2010 from: http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,3343,en_2649_33735_

1814560_1_1_1_1,00.html.

23

The methodology used in the country profile is a single-country study. In short, the single

country forms the basic unit of analysis, which will be broken down into smaller units across time and

space.2 Such a single-country study merely describes or interprets political phenomena of which the

purpose is to provide the purely contextual descriptive information. The profile will be based on a

combination of desk-research, and onsite qualitative interviews with representatives of relevant public

bodies and authorities, private companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Organisation of this Country Profile

The profile is structured around the aforementioned different fields of Slovak society. The first two

chapters provide an historical overview and discuss general, Slovak, cultural issues. The historical

overview is the starting point of the country profile because current features of society are rooted in

the past.

In the third chapter, the broad judicial framework is discussed, since this judicial framework

will be the guide line in the following chapters on the different fields of society. These are politics

(chapter 4), civil society (chapter 5), economics (chapter 6), and social policy (chapter 7). Although at

first sight it seems that every field is clearly separated from the other, notions from every perspective

are considered in all the different fields to obtain a cohesive profile.

In the last part of this country profile, a comprehensive conclusion can be found. This full

scale analysis is based on the links between the different fields of society. The conclusion, resulting

from these links, will allow for a better understanding of Slovakia‟s position within the European

Union.

2 T. Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics; An Introduction (3

rd Edition). Londen/New York:

Routledge 2008, p.86.

25

1. History

Although the Slovak Republic was established only very recently in 1993, its history can be traced far

back. In order to understand the current Slovak society and its position in relation to the EU, it is

necessary to look at its origin and its developments. As Slovakia‟s history can be considered quite

turbulent and mostly coloured, the aim of this chapter is to provide an objective overview.

1.1 Fifteen Tumultuous Centuries: from the First Slovaks to an Independent State

This first paragraph will provide an extensive overview of the most significant features of Slovak

history touching upon fifteen centuries of history. It will start at the arrival of the Slavs in the 5th

century and continue with Slovakia under Hungarian and Habsburg rule (10th-19

th century). Thereafter,

the period from the establishment of Czechoslovakia in 1918 until Slovakia‟s independence in 1993 is

discussed, with an emphasis on important events such as the period of independence of the Slovak

state during WWII, the Communist regime and the Velvet Revolution in 1989.

1.1.1 Premodern History (5th

Century –10th Century)

The earliest history of Slovakia begins in the 5th century since this is the first period in history in

which Slovaks are mentioned. Although historians differ in opinion in whether it were Slovaks or

Slavs, the 5th century is considered as the first sign of the existence of some kind of Slovak nation.

Supposedly coming from the East, the Slavs arrived on the current territory of Slovakia around the 5th

or 6th century.

3 The first Slavs settled near the river Morava, slightly north of the Danube, in the

principality of Mojmr,4 better known as Great Moravia.

5

Unlike contemporary states, Great Moravia did not have definite borders and over the years its

area changed frequently.6 Some historians believe that Great Moravia was the first Slovak state; other

historians disagree and feel that it was the first Slavic state.7 Because of this indistinctness, this period

will not be dealt with in depth. Notwithstanding these differences in interpretation, Great Moravia

constantly had to deal with pressures from three sides: the Eastern Frankish Empire, Rome and the

Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Whereas the Bavarians from the Eastern Frankish Empire were

mainly interested in extending their rule and whereas Rome was mainly focused on strengthening its

position in Christianity, Constantinople wanted to be equalised with Rome and, moreover, it wanted to

be seen as the guardian of orthodoxy. This eventually resulted in a major ideological confrontation

between Christianity and paganism.8 The saints Cyril and Methodius were asked by the Byzantine

Emperor to Christianise the Slavs and therefore, they translated the bible into Slavonic. They were

3 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: IB Tauris & Co Ltd 1990, pp. 1-14.

4 „Formation of Slav States‟, by Slovakia.org, retrieved 27 March 2010 from

http://www.slovakia.org/history3.htm. 5 „Middle Ages‟, by Slovak Republic.org, retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://www.slovak-republic.org/history/.

6 G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, p. 12.

7 Interview E5.

8 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: IB Tauris & Co Ltd 1990, pp. 1-14.

26

also sent to Great Moravia where they founded a university and developed the Slav language.9 In

search of a homeland, the nomadic Magyars arrived at the end of the 10th century, which appeared a

crucial point in Slovak history. The centre of what was supposed to become a nation was incorporated

within the West and the lower region, the territory of today‟s Slovakia, became part of the newly

Christianised Hungarian Kingdom until Czechoslovakia came into existence in 1918.10

Figure1.1: Great Moravia

Source: Slovak-Republic.org11

1.1.2 The Hungarian Kingdom (10th

Century – 16th

Century)

The Hungarian Kingdom consisted of various nations and nationalities.12

The Hungarians maintained a

political system in which the principalities remained autonomous as a result of which the Slovaks were

able to maintain and develop their own language.13

All nations took part in the development of the

state and had an influence on what became the Hungarian culture. In this process the shared Latin

language was of crucial importance. However, this became problematic when in 1844 Magyar was

made the official language of the state and Hungary became a very powerful political power in Central

Europe.14

During this period of Hungarian rule, all non-Hungarians suffered from forced

Magyarisation.15

9 „Formation of Slav States‟, by Slovakia.org, the Guide to the Slovak Republic, retrieved 27 March 2010 from

http://www.slovakia.org/history3.htm. 10

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: IB Tauris & Co Ltd 1990, pp. 1-14. 11

Slovak-Republic.org, „Middle Ages‟, retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://www.slovak-republic.org/history/. 12

G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, p. 46. 13

S.J.Kirschbaum,A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival, New York:St.Martin‟s Press 1995,pp.40-60. 14

Interview E5. 15

Slovaks, retrieved 18 June 2010 from: http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Slovaks.

27

During the first period in the Hungarian Kingdom, Slovakia grew into one of the most

developed regions of Hungary. Around the end of the 13th century, Tartars, a group of Mongolian

nations who wanted to extend their power, attacked Hungary. Towns and villages all over Hungary, as

well as in Slovakia, were plundered. The initial aim was to conquer the area. However, when a throne

in Asia became vacant, the leader of the Tartars hastened back, leaving Hungary destructed.16

In the

process of rebuilding the country noblemen were given the freedom to rule their own regions, which

resulted in a weakening of royal power. To restrict the growing power of the nobility, certain rights

and privileges were granted. Since there was a growing demand to take part in the state administration,

a middle class began to develop.17

Together with these local developments, foreign trade also

increased. Bratislava became an important trade centre for the west, as Košice was for Poland and the

Balkans.18

Because of the social unrest in Europe, many religious reforms appeared throughout Europe as

a result of the Hussitism movement, which more or less was a combination of religious idealism,

national struggles and political and social movements. In Slovakia, the spread and defence of

Christianity was put into practice by many abbeys and monasteries, of which the influence in state

affairs rapidly increased.19

The Renaissance also left its mark on the territory of Slovakia, with its influence on

architecture, art and education. An important intellectual development was the founding of a university

in Bratislava in 1465, which consisted of the faculties of arts, law, medicine and theology. Because of

a lack of financial support from the state, the university finally had to close in 1490. However, after

two centuries more institutions began to appear, just as primary and secondary schools and art

institutions. The architecture also significantly changed. Especially in the larger towns many

fortresses, castles and walls were built. Slovakia underwent enormous economic, social and cultural

developments, which showed the beginning of its orientation towards the West.20

1.1.3 The Habsburg Empire (16th

Century – 18th

Century)

As a result of the Ottoman victory in 1526, Hungary was divided into three parts. A large part of

Hungary, Budapest included, was placed under Ottoman rule. In addition, Transylvania became an

autonomous region under Ottoman rule, whereas Slovakia became part of what was called Royal

Hungary, the heart of the Hungarian state. At the same time the reign of the Habsburg Dynasty over

the territory of Slovakia began.21

Bratislava, at that time called Poszony or Pressburg, in turn

temporarily became the new Hungarian capital and accommodated many important Hungarian offices

and churches. Moreover, the Hungarian Parliament met in Bratislava and it was the place where the

kings were crowned. The main advantage of Bratislava was that it was situated near Vienna.22

The

reign of the Habsburg Dynasty also introduced humanism in the region. As a result of this new

16 G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, pp. 29-30.

17 Ibid., p. 48.

18 S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, p. 52.

19 Ibid., pp. 47-50.

20 Ibid., pp. 40-60.

21 „History: Habsburg Empire (16th-18th Century)‟, by Slovakia Site, retrieved 7 June 2010 from

http://www.slovakiasite.com/history-habsburg-empire.php. 22

S.J. Kirschbaum,A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival, New York:St. Martin‟s Press 1995,pp.61-67.

28

philosophical orientation, the Ottoman war and religious struggles, the cultural development of the

Slovak nation was stimulated.23

Although the territory of Slovakia had not suffered as much from the Ottoman conquerors as

the greater part of Hungary, it now had to defend itself against the Ottoman troops that occupied the

Hungarian-Ottoman borders in southern Slovakia.24

The Habsburgs already had to defend Europe

against the Ottoman invasion. Furthermore, international trade routes that once were important ceased

to exist while other routes started to flourish. While in Western Europe capitalism emerged, the

development in eastern and central Europe stagnated and multinational centralised powers emerged.25

The flows of refugees to the cities in the Slovak territory often led to social unrest. Many

Hungarians fled to Slovak cities as well as many Germans that came to settle in the territory of

Slovakia, resulting in a movement of increasing Slovak national consciousness. It was, therefore,

decided that a defence system had to be developed to protect the population from the Ottomans. As the

Hungarians were responsible for repairing and strengthening the fortresses of Royal Hungary and as a

result of war developments, defence mechanisms were innovated. The war had two significant

consequences for the Slovak population. Firstly, people from the southern regions created committees

to help the Hungarians in the defence against the Ottomans. Secondly, the people who fought against

the Ottomans were upgraded to the class of lower nobility, which eventually led to a stronger support

for the Slovak language and solidarity. However, the Ottomans invaded Slovak territory again around

1663 and some regions became a province of the Ottoman Empire until the Ottomans were defeated

one year later. Throughout the 17th century this process repeated itself several times. As a consequence

of the Ottoman occupation, urbanisation in Slovakia underwent rapid change and an increase in

awareness of the Slovak culture took place. The process of rebuilding the region is often heard in

legends, ballads and songs.26

Because the Habsburgs were busy defending their kingdom against the Ottomans, their

struggle of promoting Catholicism in favour of Protestantism was pushed into the background.27

Protestantism, or Lutheranism, was rapidly spreading its influence in Europe and in Slovakia.

Protestantism mainly had its followers among the nobility.28

Only when the Habsburg rulers had

regained their strength they were able to counter the Reformation. This struggle for religion not only

led to religious conscience, but also to an increase in education. This is illustrated by the establishment

of schools, following Catholic orders, in order to disseminate their message to the children.

Simultaneously, Protestant schools were founded. Later on, universities also came into existence and

students started studying at foreign universities in Prague, Vienna, Wittenberg and various cities in

Italy. One of the most powerful instruments of the Counter-Reformation was the establishment of the

Trnava University. A considerable amount of Slovaks studied here and also a large number of

professors were Slovak.29

To spread new ideas, the press was frequently used30

. Although the

23 „History: Habsburg Empire (16th-18th Century)‟, by Slovakia Site, retrieved 7 June 2010 from

http://www.slovakiasite.com/history-habsburg-empire.php. 24

G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, pp. 54-55. 25

S.J. Kirschbaum,A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival,New York:St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.61-67. 26

Ibid. 27

Ibid. 28

G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, p. 56. 29

Ibid., p. 63. 30

Ibid., p. 56.

29

influence of Protestantism had decreased significantly up to the beginning of the 18th

century, both the

Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation left their marks on Slovak society.31

Besides the struggle for religion, humanism also had an influence in this development.32

The

increase in education led to the first written works on Slovak history and culture as well as to changes

in art, architecture and literature. From this moment on, the influence of both churches became

important for Slovak social and political life, for the stimulation of national cohesion.33

The struggle

between both religious groups and the defeat of the Ottomans eventually led to the weakening of the

nobility‟s power, as well as to intensified Habsburg absolutism.34

Furthermore, this also triggered an

increase in Magyar national consciousness and rebellion against non-Magyars.35

1.1.4 National Awakening (19th

Century – 20th

Century)

Notwithstanding the political and economic disadvantages the Slovaks suffered within Hungary, the

Slovak national cohesion had increased as a result of all the challenges they had overcome. Many

Slovak peasants migrated to the south for more fertile lands and better working conditions.36

Moreover, after the victory over the Ottomans, an enormous growth in population took place, resulting

in the Slovaks being the biggest minority in Hungary. Indeed, about 30% of the entire population were

Slovaks.37

This resulted in a growing opposition against Hungarian nationalist policies.38

Furthermore, Slovak historical events became an important source for the Slovak national

revival.39

Written works with proof of Slovak roots were written in Latin, but a cultural Slovak

language was also gaining ground. However, as the Slovak language did not have a written version, it

was influenced by the Czech language, which did have a written version. Just as in the rest of Europe

nationalism started to grow within Slovakia as a result of the French Revolution and Enlightenment.

The Roman Catholic priest Anton Bernolák was of great importance for the increase of Slovak

nationalism and was responsible for the codification of the Slovak language and the encouragement of

its use.40

The Slovak language was mainly used by the Catholic part of society, while Protestants

preferred to use the Czech language.41

After having studied the history and culture of various Slavic

nations in 1846, the leader of the younger generation of Protestants42

, Ľudovit Štúr, wrote a

publication that promoted the use of the Central Slovak language in writing and at the same time

rejected the Czech language. Because of Czech opposition it was not until 1851 that a compromise

was reached about the official Slovak grammar. An increase in literary works written in Slovak, the

influence of Romanticism and revolutionary events in Slovakia resulted in works expressing the

31 S.J. Kirschbaum,A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival, New York: St.Martin‟s Press 1995,pp.67-73.

32 „History: Habsburg Empire (16th-18th Century)‟, by Slovakia Site, retrieved 7 June 2010 from

http://www.slovakiasite.com/history-habsburg-empire.php. 33

S.J. Kirschbaum,A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival, New York: St.Martin‟s Press 1995,pp.67-73. 34

Ibid., pp. 73-78. 35

G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, p. 97. 36

Ibid., p. 88. 37

Ibid., p.99. 38

S.J. Kirschbaum,A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival, New York:St.Martin‟s Press 1995,pp.78-94. 39

G. Oddo, Slovakia and its people, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, p.98. 40

S.J Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival, New York:St.Martin‟s Press 1995,pp.78-94. 41

Interview A3. 42

Interview D7.

30

existing feelings and emotions of the Slovaks.43

Consequently, the Hungarian rulers, wishing to retain

their absolute power, were struggling against these nationalistic movements. The Slovaks claimed to

have historic rights for a nation. However, a lack of organisational and administrational skills led to

insufficient preparation and a delay in political developments. Another fact that contributed to this was

the relative heterogeneity and decentralisation of the Slovak society. Above all, the Hungarian nobility

of Slovakia still responded to its official leader. The Hungarian nationalism stimulated a confrontation

between the two regions.44

When Metternich lost power of Austria in 1848, the Hungarian leaders immediately took

liberal measures to keep their autonomy intact and to underpin their intentions to create a Hungarian

state. Magyar became the only official language of the Hungarian state. The stage was set for a

revolution, which would last until 1849.45

Besides being threatened by Magyarisation, the Slovaks were also internally divided on

religious and cultural aspects.46

Yet, a Slovak national programme was set up. Consequently, the

Hungarian government threatened to arrest Slovak leaders, such as Štúr, which in turn forced these

leaders to approach other countries in the region. During a meeting on 16 September 1848 in Austria,

the establishment of the Slovak National Council and a volunteer force became reality. An attempt to

fight Hungarian oppression and to declare Slovakia‟s independence resulted in several military

confrontations between the Slovak volunteer force and the Hungarian army and it eventually led to the

defeat of the Slovak forces and the condemnation of the Slovak leaders.47

Albeit unsuccessful, the uprising of 1848-1849 remained an important part of Slovak history.48

The leaders kept striving for an autonomous Slovakia, with an own government and parliament and

with Slovak as the official language. However, Slovakia was eventually split up in two administrative

regions: one comprising the Bratislava region and the other with Košice as its centre. Moreover, both

regions were put under Hungarian military control.49

In a final attempt to find a solution the Slovak leaders established Matica Slovenská, the

institute for Slovak culture.50

The northern Slovak city of Martin had become the political and cultural

centre for national activities, as it was the place where on 6 June 1861 the Slovak leaders created the

Memorandum of the Slovak Nation. This document contained the basic constitution and principles for

an autonomous Slovakia within Hungary. As the territorial proposal was again rejected and an anti-

memorandum campaign was launched, the National Committee decided to create a cultural institution,

which was officially founded on 4 August 186351

. A first initiative was to increase Slovak as the

working language in Catholic secondary schools, but the institution also served as a museum, library

and publisher.52

43 S.J. Kirschbaum,A History of Slovakia:The Struggle for Survival,New York:St.Martin‟s Press 1995,pp.98-105.

44 Ibid., pp. 107-112.

45 G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, p.107.

46 Ibid., p. 107.

47 Ibid., p. 116.

48 Ibid., p. 118.

49 S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

116-131. 50

Ibid., pp. 116-131. 51

G. Oddo, Slovakia and its People, New York: Hrobak Publications Inc. 1960, p. 130. 52

S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

131-136.

31

The Habsburg Empire transformed into the Austro-Hungarian State in 1867, which resulted in

a period of national oppression and discrimination.53

Because of a renewed Magyarisation of the

educational system, which meant that all members of society should be able to speak, understand, feel

and think Magyar, Matica Slovenská was closed down in 1875 and taken over by the Hungarian

government.54

The Slovak language was forbidden in schools55

and even children were taken away

from their parents to be raised by Hungarians, so they would not learn the Slovak history and

language. Some Slovaks, therefore, became “Hungarians of Slovak descent”56

.

Around the end of the 18th century many Slovaks migrated to Romania and Serbia. In addition,

in the 19th century a large group also left for the USA because of the poor political and economic

situation in Hungary.57

This group later became an important factor in the growing cultural awareness

of the Slovaks.58

Simultaneously however, several groups and organisations in Martin also continued

their activities. By doing so, they also served as an example for other towns in Slovakia. Again,

support from the Czechs was sought, even though they had grown rather aloof as a result of the Slovak

rejections in the past.59

As the Great War broke out in 1914, a solution was sought abroad.60

Eventually, the Cleveland

Agreements (1915) and the Pittsburgh Pact (1918) were signed by Slovak, Czech and American

organisations, in which the Czech promised Slovakia autonomy and which laid down the foundations for

a federal state of two independent nations.61

The Agreement of Pittsburgh (1918) was, on the one hand, the result of a meeting between

Slovak-Americans and Czech-Americans who pledged for a Czechoslovak entity. On the other hand, it

reflected the wish of the Allies‟ victory at the end of World War I to create new states in the territory that

used to be the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Pittsburgh Agreement approved the proclamation of a state

consisting of Czechs and Slovaks. A key person in these negotiations was Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. He

was Czechoslovakia‟s first President and he was the only one of both Slovak and Czech origin among the

representatives. The Agreement was signed in Washington D.C. on 14 November 1918. This was the day

after the Provisional Constitution of Czechoslovakia was adopted in Prague, which defined the role of the

emerging country‟s President.62

Accordingly, on 28 October 1918, the First Czechoslovak Republic was

declared in Prague.63

53 „Slovak National Aspirations (18th-19th Century)‟, by Slovakia Site, retrieved 7 June 2010 from

http://www.slovakiasite.com/history-aspiration.php. 54

S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp. 136-151. 55

Interview E5. 56

„Hungarian Ethnic Cleansing‟, by Slovakia.org, retrieved 27 March 2010 from

http://www.slovakia.org/history-magyarization.htm. 57

Interview E5. 58

Interview A3. 59

S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

136-151. 60

Ibid., pp. 136-151. 61

Interview E5. 62

„Slovak Study Program‟, by University of Pittsburgh, retrieved 5 May 2010 , from:

http://www.pitt.edu/~votruba/qsonhist/pittsburghagreement.html. 63

„The Slovaks in the WW1‟, by Private Grammar School Ţilina, retrieved 10 June 2010 from

http://www.ssag.sk/SSAG%20study/DEJ/THE%20SLOVAKS%20IN%20THE%20WW1.pdf.

32

1.1.5 The First Czechoslovak Republic

The Treaty of Versailles (1919), the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye (1919) and the Treaty of Trianon

(1920) established the frontiers of the First Czechoslovak Republic. The Peace Treaty of Trianon had

as a result that Hungary lost more than 60% of its territory and more than 30% of its population.

Moreover, more than three million Hungarians ended up in the territory of a different state and, from a

cultural point of view, Hungary lost many places where some of the most important events of

Hungarian history had taken place, such as Košice and Bratislava, which used to be the capital of

Hungary64

.

The Allied Powers that had defeated the Central Powers, which ended World War I, hoped

that the creation of new states would prevent future German expansion to the East and potential future

Russian expansion to the West as well.65

The First Czechoslovak Republic was a multinational state and consisted of a large Czech

majority, and Slovak and Sudeten German minorities. According to a 1930 census, the Czechs

numbered 7,400,000 and the Slovaks just under 3,000,000. Just over 3,000,000 lived in the border

region of Sudetenland and about 50,000 Hungarians lived in the southern and eastern parts of

Slovakia. Slovakia was considered a region in the First Czechoslovak Republic; the Sudeten Germans

were seen as a minority. 66

Despite the fact that Slovak society revived in this period, with the restoration of Slovak secondary

and university education and the establishment of a Slovak political elite67

, many people were not

satisfied with the Slovak situation in the middle of the 1930s. This was because of two reasons. Firstly,

in the Pittsburgh Agreement the Czechs had promised autonomy to the Slovaks. According to the

Slovaks, the Czechs never kept this promise.68

Although positions of Slovak historians differ on

whether or not the Czechs fulfilled the promises made during the signing of the Pittsburgh

Agreement69

, the feeling that the Slovak people did not obtain the promised autonomy is dominant.

Thus, Slovaks became increasingly dissatisfied with their position in the Czechoslovak state.70

Secondly, the early 1930s was the time of the Great Depression. In the first years of the Czechoslovak

Republic, many Czech civil servants had already come to the Slovak part of the country to work for

the state, especially in the education sector. With the world economy in an enormous crisis, the rivalry

over jobs between Czechs and Slovaks increased.71

At this time, there was one nationalist party in Slovakia, which was founded during the period

of the Austro-Hungarian domination. This party was called the Slovak People‟s Party, also known as

the Hlinka Party.72

The slogan “For God and the People” expressed the two main aims and the

ideological pattern of its political platform. Its followers, mainly Roman Catholics, who were the

64 M. Moravčíková, „Slovak-Hungarian Relations, Catholicism and Christian Democracy‟, in: Politics and

Religion, Issue 2, 2007, pp. 5-28. 65

Ibid., pp. 5-28. 66

E. Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, London: Cambridge University Press 1973, p. 17. 67

Interview E5. 68

Interview B5, E5. 69

Interview D7. 70

L. Cashman, „Remembering 1948 and 1968: Reflections on Two Pivotal Years in Czech and Slovak History‟,

in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1645-1658. 71

Ibid.. 72

Named after its first chairman Andrej Hlinka.

33

largest religious group in Slovakia and in politics, preached for stronger Slovak nationalism.73

Other

parties in both the Czech and Slovak regions were characterised by nationalistic tendencies. However,

these were based primarily on anti-Austrian and anti-Hungarian feelings and not on a wish for

autonomy. The Catholic Church became the most important pillar of Slovak nationalism in that period.

“Its important religious function was to save Slovakia from traditional Czech Protestantism”74

.

1.1.6 The Second Czechoslovak Republic

The Munich Conference in September 1938 led to major changes in the Czechoslovak Republic. The

Conference included France, the UK, Germany and Italy and the topic of discussion was the future of

the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was not invited for the Conference.

Ultimately, an agreement was signed which permitted Germany to annex Sudetenland. France and the

United Kingdom hoped to maintain peace within Europe by „giving‟ Sudetenland to Hitler. Moreover,

the rest of Czechoslovakia was transformed into the new Czechoslovakia, in which Slovakia was

recognised as a separate, self-governing nation.75

The signing of the Agreement of Munich was the

beginning of the Second Czechoslovak Republic.

The Second Czechoslovak Republic only lasted until March 1939. The period from 1939

onwards was marked by anti-Hungarian sentiments, because “Budapest had exploited the internal

situation to deprive Slovakia of the most fertile southern parts of the country. (…) Hungary had been

on friendly terms with Mussolini and hoped that he would help to achieve gains at the expense of

Slovakia”76

. In the end, Hitler did not accept the Hungarian wish for territorial expansion. However,

“Mussolini supported Hungary because his aim was to eliminate Slovakia from the map of Europe, to

achieve a common Hungarian-Polish frontier and thus, to create a bloc which would help to

counterbalance the influence of Hitler in this region”77

. Precisely this tactical-political consideration

led Hitler to give support to an autonomous Slovak state.78

1.1.7 The First Slovak Republic

After it had become clear that Hitler would support an autonomous Slovak state, a one-party system

was established based on the fascist model. It consisted of all non-socialist parties, including the

Hlinka party with leader Josef Tiso, who had succeeded Andrej Hlinka as party leader. In 1938, Tiso

became Prime Minister. Slovak independence became reality after Czechoslovak President Edvard

Beneš capitulated in March 1939. The First Slovak Republic was a fact.79

In exile, Beneš and his government refused to recognise the independent Slovak state and

Beneš and his supporters were already organising the struggle for the liberation of Czechoslovakia in

cooperation with the Anglo-French alliance. Their aim was to restore the Czechoslovak state as it had

been before the war. Beneš was a supporter of a centralist Czechoslovak state, just as almost all Czech

73 E. Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, London: Cambridge University Press 1973, p. 23.

74 Ibid., p. 29.

75 J. Krejčí, „Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History‟, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

76 E. Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, London: Cambridge University Press 1973, p. 34.

77 Ibid., p. 35.

78 Ibid., p. 35.

79 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

34

politicians in exile were. Slovak politicians in exile were not as united as their Czech colleagues, but

the majority saw Beneš as their constitutional leader.80

1.1.7.1 The Slovak National Council

The Slovaks understood that their autonomous state was nothing more than a puppet of Hitler‟s Nazi-

Germany.81

Nevertheless, this did not automatically imply that the Slovak people wanted to return to

the Czechoslovak state as it had been before the Conference of Munich. Already in 1941, the

governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union recognised the Czechoslovak

government in exile. By doing so, they indirectly favoured a centralist solution to the Czech and

Slovak problem. Thus, when it became clear that Hitler would lose the war, Slovaks realised that they

had to show anti-German sentiments in order to be able to participate in negotiations after the war. 82

Nonetheless, Slovak troops fought against the Red Army in the Soviet Union as a member of

the Axis Powers. However, after the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad it became clear that

Nazi-Germany would lose the war eventually. During the Casablanca Conference in January 1943

Roosevelt and Churchill even agreed that the war would only end with the unconditional surrender of

Germany.83

In December 1943, the so-called Christmas Agreement84

was signed, which resulted in

cooperation between the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS), the Slovak Democratic Party and the

Czechoslovak resistance in Slovakia.85

The Democrats represented different parties that were all

characterised by anti-fascist sentiments. All sides expressed the wish for an armed uprising against the

fascist Slovak state and in line with this, they created the Slovak National Council (SNC). The task of

the SNC was to lead the resistance in Slovakia but above all, “to take over all political, legislative,

military, and administrative powers in Slovakia and exercise those according to the will of the people

until freely elected representatives of the people are able to assume all power.”86

For the government in exile, the signing of the Christmas Agreement was a positive

development. Until then, Beneš had not had considerable influence on the anti-fascist parties in

Slovakia and the overthrow of the Tiso government would bring him closer to his goal: the restoration

of Czechoslovakia as it was before the outbreak of the war. Moreover, Beneš made it clear that he

would not make any concession to the position of the Slovak nation in the Czechoslovak state. Beneš,

as one of the founders of the Czechoslovak state, had always been reluctant to recognise any form of

Slovak identity. According to him, the Slovaks are Czechs and the Czechs are Slovaks and the Slovak

language is only one of the Czech dialects. He did not accept the existence of a distinct Slovak

national identity.87

Therefore, Slovaks fighting against the fascist Slovak state at the same time meant

fighting against the prospect of living in an autonomous Slovak state in the near future.

80 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

81 E. Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, London: Cambridge University Press 1973, p. 60.

82 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, p. 193.

83 Ibid., p. 209.

84 Ibid., p. 206.

85 J. Krejčí, „Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History‟, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156-202.

86 S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

211-225. 87

J. Buncak and M. Piscova, „Modern National Identity of Slovaks and Their Attitude Towards Europe‟, in:

Social Science in Eastern Europe, Newsletter Special Edition, 2001, pp. 126- 136.

35

1.1.7.2 National Uprising

The original plan of an armed uprising against the fascist state was to coordinate partisan military

action with the Soviet army.88

With the change in the course of the war after the Battle of Stalingrad in

February 1943, Czechoslovak partisan units had begun to operate in Slovakia.89

The plan was that

strategic attacks on the Slovak army and Nazi forces would open the frontiers in the Carpathian

Mountains to the Red Army.90

However, the armed uprising had started before the Soviets were

involved. The reason for this was as follows: in 1943 support for the Communists and democrats had

increased rapidly. Therefore, partisan military activity intensified in parts of the country. The fascist

Tiso government was not able to respond to the growing violence, mainly due to a lack of motivated

soldiers in the Slovak Army; they were unwilling to fight against their countrymen, the partisans. “The

bulk of the Partisan was in fact recruited from Army deserters.”91

Thus, Tiso had to choose between

capitulation and a request for German help against his own people. After the killing of German

soldiers in the end of August he chose the latter option, thereby inflaming the uprising in August

1944.92

From the end of August 1944 until the end of October of the same year, the resistance

movement fought together with Soviet and Czechoslovak military units against the Germans in central

Slovakia. After heavy reinforcements of German troops from Hungary, the uprising was defeated.93

The Czechoslovak military leaders were executed94

, but the Germans only disarmed the Soviet and

Czechoslovak troops and not the partisan units. The partisan units pulled back into the mountains and

were able to supply the Allies with intelligence. Furthermore, they continued to harass German troops.

After the uprising, the SNC was recognised by the Czechoslovak government in exile. Ultimately,

Soviet troops liberated Czechoslovakia in the beginning of April 1945. 95

The struggle for power and the future of the Slovak nation started immediately after liberation.

Already during the war, one of the leaders of the CPS and the SNC, Gustáv Husák, had criticised the

government in exile. He stated that the government gave orders and commandments and that “Beneš

wanted to dictate the solution towards the Slovak question.”96

The wish of the CPS was a federal

solution of the Slovak question, whereas the Democratic Party only wished for autonomy. In March

1945, a conference on the „Slovak question‟ was held in Moscow among Communist representatives

of the SNC and the Czechoslovak government in exile, which had moved from London to Moscow

after the treaty of friendship between Beneš and Stalin. During the conference the parties agreed on a

measure for autonomy for Slovakia and a higher number of Slovak representatives in the

Czechoslovak government. 97

88 S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

211-225. 89

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 90

E. Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, London: Cambridge University Press 1973, p. 64. 91

Ibid., p. 62. 92

Ibid., p. 69. 93

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp. 211-

225; J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 94

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 95

Ibid., pp. 156- 202. 96

S.J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, p. 213. 97

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

36

1.1.8 Post-war Czechoslovakia: The Third Czechoslovak Republic

After the Second World War, the Allied Powers agreed on the restoration of Central Europe as it had

been after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. As a result, Czechoslovakia lost Ruthenia, which was

annexed to Ukraine. Slovakia, in its turn, recovered the territory that had been given to Hungary in the

Vienna Awards of 1938, which was the consequence of German-Italian arbitration after Hungarian

territorial claims.98

Moreover, the Czechoslovak government set in motion a population transfer

between Hungary and Slovakia. Around 74,000 Hungarians left Slovakia to go to Hungary and almost

the same number followed the other way around.99

During their meeting with the Beneš government in exile in Moscow, the SNC, and mainly the

Communists in the Council, agreed on a wide-ranging autonomy for Slovakia within the Czechoslovak

state, although they wished for more than that. In the first months after the war, Slovak competences

were even further reduced. There were three reasons why the Slovak Communists allowed this.

Firstly, after the restoration of Czechoslovakia by the Allies, Slovakia as a separate political entity

disappeared. Secondly, the Slovak Communists decided to prefer ideology above nationalism. In other

words, the post-war political situation asked for party discipline within the Communist Party.100

Consequently, the CPS worked together with the Communist Party Czechoslovakia (CPCS) more

intensively and most of the leaders of the CPCS wished for a central government in Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the 1944 national uprising had caused a division within the CPS. A part of its members had

not participated in the uprising, because they wished for a centralist solution to the „Slovak question‟

as well.101

1.1.8.1 May 1946 Elections

The „degree of autonomy‟ as agreed upon in Moscow gave the Slovaks administrative and political

autonomy, as well as representation in the Czechoslovak government. The Czechs did not have such

separate organs and fell entirely under the jurisdiction of the Czechoslovak government. As a

consequence, the Czechs were not satisfied with this situation and they limited Slovak competences

through a series of agreements. The third and last of these so-called Prague Agreements102

was signed

after the elections of May 1946, which held disastrous results for the Slovak Communists and which

ended in a victory for the Czechoslovak Communists. As a result of its electoral failure, the CPS fully

aligned itself with the CPCS. Because the Communists had won the overall election, the Czech

Klement Gottwald became Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia. Some historians believe that the leaders

of the Communist parties in Prague and Moscow were convinced that the Slovak people would

voluntarily accept the establishment of a Communist state. Nevertheless, the election results of 1946

proved the opposite and the Communist leaders started to set things in motion, resulting in a

Communist „coup d‟état‟ in February 1948.103

98 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

99 Interview A3.

100 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, p. 231.

101 Ibid..

102 Ibid., pp. 225-251.

103 Interview B5, E5.

37

1.1.9 Communist Czechoslovakia

In order to understand the turn towards communism, the development of the Communist movement in

Czechoslovakia is described below. The Czechoslovak Communist Party, founded in 1921, recruited

its members from the right wing of the Social Democratic Party. In the beginning, the Czechoslovak

Communists supported the idea of the Czechoslovak state and thus centralisation. This attitude did not

change until the Munich Agreement of 1938. In the last two years of the First Czechoslovak Republic,

the Communist Party became one of the most important defenders of the Czechoslovak state.104

However, the Communists changed their opinion on this issue. Until the moment that Nazi

Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Moscow had ordered the Slovak communists to support

the idea of a Soviet Slovak state. Nonetheless, after the invasion the instructions of the new leader of

the Czech and Slovak Communists, Gottwald, were: “to become good patriots again, and recognise

Beneš as a democratic leader”105

. At that time, they returned to their initial position of supporting

centralised Czechoslovakia.

The fascist government of the independent Slovak state had chosen the side of Hitler in the

invasion of the Soviet Union. When it became clear that the Nazis would not conquer the Soviet Union

after the Battle of Stalingrad, the number of non-Communist opponents of the fascist Slovak state

grew rapidly. Furthermore, the respectability and political importance of the Slovak Communists rose

after Stalingrad. “The non-Communist democratic activists began to see no reason why they should

not cooperate with the Communists when Britain and the United States were marching together with

Soviet Russia”106

. Meanwhile, Beneš signed a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war

cooperation with the USSR in Moscow in December 1943. The Munich Agreement of 1938 and the

disloyalty of the West had shown that Czechoslovakia needed more allies in international relations to

ensure its own post-war security.107

The end of World War II placed Czechoslovakia within the Soviet sphere of influence.

Although the Allies could have liberated Czechoslovakia a few days earlier, the Soviet Union became

the liberator.108

When the United States announced the Marshall Plan in June 1947, Moscow forbade

the Czechoslovak government to participate in it. According to the Soviet Union, membership of the

Marshall Plan was considered a hostile act towards the USSR.

Just after its re-establishment, it appeared that the Third Czechoslovak Republic was a

compromise between the East and the West and that it could function as a bridge between those power

blocks. “However, Stalin had no interest in making bridges. His aim was further expansion of his

empire”109

. At that time, the Czechoslovak people were not hostile towards the Soviet Union at all.

The Red Army was considered as the liberator of Czechs and Slovaks from Nazi Germany. Moreover,

the Czechoslovaks did not have many reasons to trust the West. Firstly, it was the West that had

104 E. Steiner, The Slovak Dilemma, London: Cambridge University Press 1973, p. 41.

105 Ibid..,p. 46.

106 Ibid., p. 53.

107 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

108 L. Cashman, „Remembering 1948 and 1968: Reflections on Two Pivotal Years in Czech and Slovak History‟,

in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1645-1658. 109

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

38

„betrayed‟ Czechoslovakia at the Conference of Munich. Secondly, the Great Depression of the 1930s

had shown the weakness of the capitalist system.110

On a meeting in autumn of 1947, all Communist parties of Central Europe decided in Warsaw

to make a thoroughgoing effort to take power.111

In Czechoslovakia the Communist Party took over

power in February 1948. After days of strikes and demonstrations in favour of the party, Beneš

accepted the resignation of the democratic ministers and approved of the new cabinet with Gottwald as

its Prime Minister.112

“The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June 1948 brought the

implementation of a series of radical measures in the Soviet bloc. The Yugoslav leader, Josip Tito, had

resisted the attempts of the Kremlin to subordinate his country to Soviet interests. Stalin, fearing that

other satellites would follow Tito‟s example, assured himself of their obedience o a series of purges,

show trials and executions of high-ranking Communists that lasted until his death in 1953.”113

In

Czechoslovakia, the majority of the high-ranking officials that were arrested had been part of the CPS

during the Slovak national uprising in 1944 and were in favour of a federal Czechoslovak state. From

that moment on, the Communist party established its absolute rule in Czechoslovakia. As a result, non-

Communist parties were disbanded and large industries and financial institutions were nationalised.114

The collectivisation of the agricultural sector took about ten more years. Thus, a system of state

ownership was created.115

1.1.9.1 Khrushchev‟s „Secret Speech‟

Khrushchev succeeded Stalin as party leader. In the beginning, his leadership was not as harsh as it

had been in the Stalinist period. In his „secret speech‟116

at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Khrushchev condemned Stalin‟s general behaviour as vile,

monstrous, and terrorist.117

As a consequence, public demonstrations were held in Poland and

Hungary. In May of the same year, there were student demonstrations in Prague and Bratislava and at

the second Czechoslovak Writer‟s Congress many participants publicly voiced their opposition against

the regime.118

Under the leadership of Antonín Novotný, who succeeded Gottwald as the leader of the

CPCS, Czechoslovakia became a socialist republic in 1960.119

After another attack on Stalin‟s policies

by Khrushchev in 1961 and due to growing domestic pressure, Novotný was forced to carry through

110 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156-202.

111 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 112

L. Cashman, „Remembering 1948 and 1968: Reflections on Two Pivotal Years in Czech and Slovak History‟,

in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1645-1658. 113

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 114

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 115

Interview E5. 116

L. Cashman, „Remembering 1948 and 1968: Reflections on Two Pivotal Years in Czech and Slovak History‟,

in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1645-1658. 116

Interview E5. 117

O. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 68. 118

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 119

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

39

reforms. There are two reasons why domestic pressure on the Communist leadership grew in those

years. Firstly, problems with the centrally planned economic system became fully apparent in

Czechoslovakia,120

especially in Slovakia since the industrial gap between Slovakia and the Czech

lands had widened since the establishment of the Communist rule.121

Therefore, the Slovaks demanded

a constitutional guarantee of the equality of the Slovak nation with the Czechs. Secondly, the end of

Stalinist terror and the student demonstrations had created an awakening of conscience122

, in which the

Slovaks demanded the rehabilitation of the leaders of the Slovak national uprising.123

1.1.9.2 Dubček

In 1963, the leaders of the uprising were officially rehabilitated and from that moment on they were

permitted to write in Slovak newspapers and periodicals. Only one year later, in 1964, the regime officially

celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the uprising. In 1965, the first secretary of the Slovak Communist

Party, Alexander Dubček, made the Slovak demand for constitutional equality public.124

Because of

economic failure in the whole Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSR) on the one hand and the growing

wish for reform from the Slovaks on the other, Novotný was replaced by Dubček – a Slovak – as the leader

of the CPCS in January 1968.125

Eventually, an amendment was adopted that gave the Czechoslovak

Republic a federal structure. This balanced the relation between the Czech part and Slovak part to some

extent. However, this amendment changed the procedures to change or promulgate legislation in such a

way that the Czech part could always block the legislation process and vice versa. Providing legislation

became so difficult that it hardly happened anymore.126

Under Dubček, Slovakia entered a period of liberalisation. The aim was the creation of “socialism

with a human face”127

, a kinder form of democratic socialism. In order to achieve this, the freedom of

speech and the freedom of the press were increased and economic reforms were introduced to improve the

quality and availability of consumer goods. With the Hungarian Revolution in mind, Dubček tried to avoid

a confrontation with the Soviet Union. However, after seven months of expanding civil liberties, the

armies of five Warsaw Pact states invaded Czechoslovakia on 20 August 1968. The Czechoslovak

leadership had to sign the so-called Moscow Protocol, which reversed the reforms that were introduced

during the Prague Spring. “Czechoslovak society was well on its way to being „Normalised‟, or put

another way, to being turned back into what the Soviet leadership regarded as a „normal‟ socialist

120 L. Cashman, „Remembering 1948 and 1968: Reflections on Two Pivotal Years in Czech and Slovak History‟,

in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1645-1658. 121

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 122

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 123

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 124

Ibid.. 125

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 126

K. Mathemova, „Czechoslovakia: Constitutional Disappointments‟, in: D. Howard (e.a.), Constitution Making

in Eastern Europe, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Press 1993, pp. 58-79. 127

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251.

40

society”128

. In addition, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic was transformed into a federation of Czech

Socialist and Slovak Socialist Republics129

. Moreover, another Slovak, Gustáv Husák, replaced Dubček.130

1.1.9.3 Normalisation

“In the context of Czechoslovak history, Normalisation covered the period between the Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia (…) and the completion of the political purges in 1970. Secondly, the term Normalisation

is used to describe the specific local variant of the regime of „social socialism‟ in the condition of post-

invasion Czechoslovakia during the entire period of the 1970s and 1980s”131

.

Whereas Dubček is remembered as the statesman who introduced “socialism with a human

face”132

, his successor of the CPSC, Husák, is remembered as the one who ruled according to the harsh

policies of Normalisation.133

The legacy of Husák is twofold and has positive as well as negative

connotations. On the one hand, the period of Normalisation brought Slovakia enormous economic

improvements. The Slovak wish for an asymmetrical model had become reality through the creation of a

federal model in Czechoslovakia and the federal government supported Slovakia with massive

investments.134

On the other hand, all the liberties that had been achieved during the Prague Spring were

muted135

and the new leadership decided to follow a conservative and hard-line course.136

One can notice an interesting difference in the way Slovaks and Czechs opposed to the Communist

regime. Whereas the Czechs were actively involved in resistance against Normalisation, Slovak

manifestations of dissent were only limited to the younger generation.137

The Catholic Church was the only

institution in Slovak society, in which resistance towards the regime occurred. The party put a lot of effort

in breaking the traditional attachment of the Slovaks to Catholicism, which ultimately had the opposite

effect. As a result, a revival of religious consciousness138

took place and those who opposed the Husák

regime could turn to the practice of their faith as a way of showing their opposition.139

1.2 The Velvet Revolution

The signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 and the alternation in Soviet Union leadership led to a new

period for all Soviet satellite states. Regarding Czechoslovakia, this period is known today as the Velvet

Revolution. Czechoslovakia was one of the countries that signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The main

128 L. Cashman, „Remembering 1948 and 1968: Reflections on Two Pivotal Years in Czech and Slovak History‟,

in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1645-1658. 129

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 130

Ibid.. 131

J. Marušiak, „The Normalisation Regime and its Impact on Slovak Domestic Policy after 1970‟, Europe-Asia

Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1806. 132

Ibid.. 133

Interview E5. 134

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 135

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 136

J. Marušiak, „The Normalisation Regime and its Impact on Slovak Domestic Policy after 1970‟, Europe-Asia

Studies, Vol. 60, No. 10, December 2008, pp. 1811. 137

Ibid., p. 1813. 138

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202. 139

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251.

41

reason why the countries of the Soviet bloc agreed to signing the Final Act was that the West recognised

the existence of the Soviet republics. One of the demands of the then European Community was the

inclusion of a chapter about human rights. By signing the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet countries

recognised certain rights for their citizens. As a consequence, several dissident groups were established

proclaiming human rights. In Czechoslovakia, Charta 77 became the most well known dissident

movement. However, civil dissident groups failed to take root among the Slovaks who expressed their

resistance through religion.140

In 1985, Gorbachev became the new leader of the Soviet Union. In the following years he tried to

restructure the Soviet economy and he ended the Soviet ban on freedom of expression. The terms

perestroika (economic reforms) and glasnost (openness) were introduced, in which some influence of the

Helsinki Final Act can be discovered. The Husák regime reacted very negatively to these new policies.

However, Moscow replaced him with Miloš Jakeš as the new party leader of the CPCS; Husák remained

President of Czechoslovakia.141

In 1989, Gorbachev publicly stated that Eastern Europe no longer belonged to the Soviet sphere of

influence. With the threat of an invasion of the Red Army gone, the former Soviet republics started to

abandon their Communist regimes. Czechoslovakia‟s regime fell on 10 December 1989. A week earlier,

mainly Czech dissidents had organised themselves in a movement called the Civic Forum, with Václav

Havel as their leader. What followed was the Velvet Revolution, a series of short strikes and street

demonstrations, which brought an end to communism in Czechoslovakia and which made Havel the

second non-Communist President in the post-war era on 29 December 1989.142

1.2.1 The Velvet Divorce

On the first of January 1993, the democratic Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist. Even though the

divorce was called „velvet‟, to some the divorce of the Czechs and the Slovaks came very sudden,

maybe even as „a shock‟.143

The peaceful divorce of the Czechoslovak state was finally accomplished

by Constitution Act 541 that took care of the arrangement of the division of properties, whereas

Constitution Act 542 settled the final dissolution of the Czechoslovak state. The most appropriate way

of dividing the assets of the Czechoslovak Republic seemed to be a division in the ratio 2 to 1, which

was the same ratio as the amount of members of the Czech nation and members of the Slovak nation

in the former Czechoslovak Republic respectively. For example, aspects like the equipment of the

army, the different forms of infrastructure, the national currency the „koruna‟ (crown), but also the

amount of civil servants, judges and institutions had to be spread over two countries instead of one. 144

In the end, over 25 international treaties were signed between the Czech Republic and

Slovakia in order to deal with all the aspects of the break-up. One of these treaties was an agreement

on monetary cooperation, which created a currency union between the Czech and the Slovak lands.

This currency union made sure that the old currency, the koruna, still remained the common currency

for both the Czechs and the Slovaks during the transition period, whereas technically the koruna was

140 J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156- 202.

141 S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 142

Ibid. 143

Interview A10, B23. 144

Interview A10.

42

split in a Czech koruna for the Czech Republic and a Slovak koruna for Slovakia.145

Finally, the

common Czechoslovak currency was split into two different currencies.146

Another reform that had to

be introduced was the dissolution of the former national bank of Czechoslovakia, the Státni Banka

Ceskoslovenska. Formally, this dissolution was completed on the 31 December 1991, with the creation

of two new banks: the Czech National Bank and the National Bank of Slovakia. For the time of the

transition period these two new banks were placed under the supervision of a Joint Monetary

Committee.147

A more delicate feature of the divorce between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is the matter

of citizenship. After the break-up it appeared that the two new countries started to develop a different

way of thinking about dual citizenship. The matter of dual citizenship became relevant after the

sudden divorce of the Czechs and Slovaks, because many Slovaks worked and lived in the Czech part

of the former Czechoslovak Republic, mostly in Prague. Likewise, there were also Czechs who lived

in the Slovak part of the former Czechoslovak Republic, for example those who worked in the heavy

weapon industry in Slovakia. However, the problem was that the Czechs had a different approach to

dual citizenship than the Slovaks. Indeed, whereas a Czech citizen living in Slovakia was fully

allowed to hold dual citizenship and to participate fully in Slovak society, a Slovak person in the

Czech Republic could not count on the same treatment because dual citizenship was not recognised in

the Czech Republic. In fact, it was possible for a Slovak to gain Czech citizenship. However, in order

to do so, he or she needed to be prepared to give up his or her Slovak citizenship, which most of the

Slovaks in the Czech Republic did not consider being a real option. Furthermore, the status of the

citizenship of a Slovak in the Czech Republic was only an administrative status and not a legal one.

Therefore, most of the Slovaks did not apply for Czech citizenship and chose to remain Slovak

citizens. However, this implied that those persons were not able to apply for a work or residence

permit in the Czech Republic.148

Moreover, the complete state apparatus of civil servants and diplomats had to be divided. For

example, what used to be the Slovak consulate of the Czechoslovak embassy in the United States,

became the Slovak embassy and vice versa. Furthermore, two new flags had to be designed so that it

was clear that the Czech Republic and Slovakia were two different states. Those two new flags were

also hoisted in front of the building of the United Nations (UN) where henceforth the Czech Republic

and Slovakia took different seats. Finally, two „new‟ national anthems were created. The new national

anthem of Slovakia, called „Nad Tatrou sa blýska‟149

, was in fact not really a new song, because from

1920 to 1993, it had been part of the national anthem of the Czechoslovak Republic. The

Czechoslovak anthem consisted of the national folk song of the Czechs, called „Kde domov můj‟150

,

followed by the first part of the Slovak „Nad Tatrou sa blýska‟. After the Velvet Divorce in 1993, the

Czechs cut out their part of the national anthem and made it their new national anthem. The Slovaks

145 S. Denyer and M. Solc, „Czechoslovakia: What‟s in the Divorce Settlement?‟, International Financial Law

Review Vol. 12, No. 2, February 1993, p. 29. 146

Nowadays, the Czechs still have their Czech Koruna, whereas the Slovaks have become a member of the

eurozone in 2009 which made the euro the currency of contemporary Slovakia. 147

S. Denyer and M. Solc, „Czechoslovakia: What‟s in the Divorce Settlement?‟, in: International Financial

Law Review Vol. 12, No. 2, February 1993, p. 29. 148

Ibid. 149

Meaning „lightning over the Tatras‟. 150

Meaning „where is my home‟.

43

did the same and took the first two strophes of „Nad Tatrou sa blýska‟ and made them the national

anthem of Slovakia.151

1.2.2 Consequences of the Velvet Divorce

The Velvet Divorce was a lot less convenient for Slovakia than it was for the Czechs, as after the

Velvet Divorce, the Czech Republic is referred to as the role model of a consolidated post-Communist

democracy.152

The political situation in the Slovak Republic was a lot more problematic.153

In

comparison to the stable and consolidated democracy of the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic was

described as “border democratic”154

, “partly-free”155

, “national populist”156

, “illiberal democracy”157

or

as “special case with doubts over its status”158

.159

Moreover, the Slovaks have always felt like they

were the “younger brother”160

of the Czechs, which, to a large extent, has influenced Slovakia‟s

behaviour in international relations later on.

Some scholars are of the opinion that the Velvet Divorce highlighted the already existing

differences between the Czechs and Slovaks and that there was an imbalance within the Czechoslovak

Republic from the very first beginning.161

For instance, back in the time of the Austro-Hungarian

double monarchy the Czech lands were the most economically evolved region in the empire, whereas

the Slovak lands could be described as the most backward region in the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Moreover, the two nations had very different opinions on the content of economic policies. Whereas

the Czechs believed that trying to create a market economy would be the supreme good for the

country, the Slovaks knew that by doing so, their complete industry, existing of heavy industry and

weapon industry, would fall apart.162

Others argue that the historically existing differences could be attributed to the division

between Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Although geographically there is no doubt that Slovakia

belongs to the central part of Europe, in terms of characteristics of political cultures it could be placed

among the Eastern European countries which originally consisted of more authoritarian or anti-liberal

countries than the Western European countries. In this theory, the Czech Republic would historically

151 „Slovak National Anthem‟, by Slovensko.com, retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.slovensko.com/about/national-anthem and http://www.government.gov.sk/10138/national-

anthem.php. 152

P. Kopecký and C. Mudde, „Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: The Czech and Slovak

Republics‟, in: Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2000, p. 64. 153

Ibid., p.63. 154

R.D. Gastil, Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, New York: Freedom House, 1994. 155

A. Karatnycky, „Freedom on the March‟, in: Freedom Review, Vol. 28, No.1, 1997, pp. 5-29. 156

M. Carpenter, „Slovakia and the Triumph of Nationalist Populism‟, in: Communist and Post-Communist

Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1997, pp. 205-220. 157

F. Zakaria, „The Rise of Illiberal Democracies‟, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997, pp. 25-43. 158

P.G. Lewis, „Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Easter Europe‟, in: Journal of

Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1997, pp. 4-26. 159

P. Kopecký and C. Mudde, „Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: The Czech and Slovak

Republics‟, in: Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2000, p. 64. 160

L. Palata, „Elections: Almost Like Old Times‟, in: Transitions Online (Transitions Online), Issue: 6 June

2006, p. 2. 161

C. Skalnik Leff, The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997, pp.

44-52; E. Büyükakinci, „Syndromes and Alternatives for Slovak Foreign Policy: The Process of Restructuring

After the Velvet Divorce‟, in: East European Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 2002, p.85. 162

E. Büyükakinci, „Syndromes and Alternatives for Slovak Foreign Policy: The Process of Restructuring After

the Velvet Divorce‟, in: East European Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 2002, p. 85.

44

belong to the central part of Europe, which could be the explanation for the fact that the Czech

Republic started, earlier than the Slovak Republic, the implementation of economic reform

measures.163

In terms of the economy, the Czech Republic came out of the divorce relatively better

than Slovakia did. This probably had to do with the differences in economies and industries in both

countries, but also with a difference in politics and elite culture that had existed for ages. For example,

in politics the Czechs seemed to care a lot about economical issues, whereas Slovak politicians seemed

to be interested in a more complex set of political issues.164

This obviously had to do with the fact that

Slovakia has to deal with other borders than the Czech Republic does. For instance, the Slovaks have

always had a specific relationship with their Hungarian neighbour and the Hungarian minorities living

in the south of Slovakia. The Czechs have never had a similar ethnic relationship with any other

country, except perhaps with the „Sudeten Deutscher‟ living in the border region of Germany and the

Czech Republic.

1.3 Recent Transition(s)

Since the collapse of communism, the Slovak Republic has undergone several transitions. Most of

these have been largely affected by the process of EU accession. It was on 4 October 1993, that the

Slovak Republic signed the European Association Agreement with the EU. This agreement embodied

the commitment of the Slovak Republic to apply for membership of the EU. In December 1999,

during the European Council Summit in Helsinki, the Slovak Republic was invited for negotiations on

joining the EU. These negotiations officially ended at the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002.

After the ratification of this treaty by the Slovak people by referendum, the Slovak Republic joined the

EU on 1 May 2004.165

The Slovak Republic applied for EU membership for three reasons. Firstly, they felt that the

country historically belonged to Europe. Secondly, the country wanted to adopt the same democratic

and social standards as the rest of the EU and this could be accomplished by EU accession. The third

reason was motivated by economic considerations; the country wanted to be part of the internal market

and raise its economic standards.166

In order to join the EU, the Slovak Republic had to meet the Copenhagen accession criteria. In

addition to these criteria, the accession country needs to be able to assume the obligations of

membership. These obligations are set out in the acquis communautaire. The accession country needs

to create the judicial and administrative capacity to implement the acquis.

The Copenhagen Criteria comprise of the following parts:

- The applicant state must have a functioning market economy with the capacity to cope with

competitive pressures and market forces within the Community;

- The applicant state must have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule

of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;

163 Ibid., p. 83.

164 G. Evans and S. Whitefield, „The Structuring of Political Cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of

the Czech Republic and Slovakia‟, in: Political Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 1, 1998, pp. 115-139. 165

„Slovakia in the European Union‟, retrieved 21 March 2010 from http://www.slovak-republic.org/eu/. 166

Interview C9.

45

- The applicant state must be able to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence

to the aims of political, and economic and monetary union.167

1.3.1 Historical and Political Transition

In 1989, Gorbachev publicly stated that Eastern Europe no longer belonged to the Soviet sphere of

influence. With the threat of an invasion of the Red Army no longer present, the former Soviet

republics started to abandon their Communist regimes. The Communist regime in Czechoslovakia

dissolved on 10 December 1989.168

In the aftermath of the demise of communism two crucial dissident

umbrella organisations in Czechoslovakia, Civic Forum in the Czech lands and Public against

Violence in Slovakia169

, had troubles in achieving an agreement about the way power had to be shared

between the Czechs and Slovaks.170

During the economic transition period, the Slovak part had been

negatively affected, having had to cope with high unemployment rates.171

Due to this uneven

economic development between both regions, Slovak politics became vulnerable for nationalist-

populist political rhetoric. The embodiment of this political culture was Vladimír Mečiar and his

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), who initially pledged for a confederation of Slovak

and Czech states. Ultimately, this wish led to the division of Czechoslovakia through a process that is

today known as the „Velvet Divorce‟.172

After the success of HZDS in the 1994 national elections, the

spread of democratic values was severely hindered by Prime Minister Mečiar‟s policies of

authoritarian nation building and his undemocratic actions aimed at political opponents, which

resulted in severe polarisation of the political spectrum.173

The replacement of the Mečiar government

by the government of Mikuláš Dzurinda (1998-2006) proved to be beneficial for Slovakia‟s

democratisation process.174

Moreover, the Dzurinda governments were willing to fulfil the political,

judicial and economical requirements that are necessary to become an EU member state.175

Slovakia

joined the European Union in 2004 and became part of the euro zone five years later, in 2009.

Between 2006 and 2010, Slovakia was governed by a coalition of populist and nationalist parties led

by Prime Minister Robert Fico. The government could be characterised as conservative, with a focus

on high levels of social security and increased governmental influence.176

167 European Commission, „Enlargement‟, retrieved 9 June 2010 from:

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm. 168

S. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival, New York: St. Martin‟s Press 1995, pp.

225-251. 169

Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party Competition and Parliamentary

Institutionalization, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2001, p. 23. 170

Ibid., p. 29-35. 171

J. Adam, „Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.

45, No. 4, 1993, p. 630-635. 172

P. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party Competition and Parliamentary

Institutionalization, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishinh Limited 2001, pp. 29-35. 173

M. Pittaway, „From Communist to Past-Communist Politics‟, in: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds.),

Development in Central and East European Politics, Durharn: Duke University Press 2007, p. 34. 174

G. Pridham, „The European Union‟s Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: The

Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared‟, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2002, p. 209. 175

G. Meseţnikov, „Slovakia: Consolidation of Democracy with State Sovereignty‟, in: Review of International

Affairs, Vol. 50, Issue 52, 2003, p. 1080. 176

G. Meseţnikov, O. Gyárfášová, M. Bútora and M. Kollár, „Slovakia‟, in: G. Meseţnikov, O. Gyárfášová and

D. Smilov (eds.), Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava: Institute

for Public Affairs 2008, p. 22.

46

1.3.2 Judicial and Social Transition

The Slovak Republic implemented 85 amendments in order to make the Slovak Republic ready for EU

accession. One of the most important amendments is Article 7 which shifted the balance of power

between the EU and the Slovak Republic.177

In addition, the anti-discrimination law, which was

implemented in 2004, made an important contribution to the integration of the Slovak Republic into

the EU. Key components of the EU, such as the protection of minorities and human rights, are now

better guaranteed.178

On the one hand, European regulation was complied with; on the other hand,

some controversial laws were introduced too. An example of such a law is the State Language Act,

which stipulates that the Slovak language is the official state language.179

The introduction of this act

can be explained by the national sentiments that still prevail in Slovak society. This has been caused

by the historical domination by foreign powers.

Another consequence of the legacy of communism is the functioning of the legal system. The

rapid development in the legal system, e.g. changing the Communist judicial system into a judiciary

after Western constitutional systems, has led to inadequate adaptation of judges within the judiciary.180

In the past decade, decentralisation and liberalisation took place in many sectors in the Slovak

Republic. Amongst others, the media has to some extent been liberalised181

and the educational system

has gone through a process of decentralisation.182

In addition, the amount of NGOs has increased

which has contributed to the protection of collective rights such as gender and minority rights.183

Current problems that the Slovak government faces are problems regarding minority groups.184

1.3.3 Economic transition

The Slovak Republic embarked on an economic transition process in order to transform the

Communist economic system into a market economy. Important reforms during this economic

transition process were the process of privatisation of state owned property and companies,

restructuring of government finances and balance of payments, liberalisation of markets and prices and

the restructuring of the banking sector. Furthermore, the tax system, labour market and health care

system were reformed.185

177 A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, New York: Cambridge

University Press 2005, pp.67-69. 178

M. Bell, I. Chopin, F. Palmer, „Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States

compared‟, by the European Commission, 2007, p. 10. 179

M. Ootes, „Slowakije wantrouwt eigen minderheden‟, in: Ablak, no. 5, 2009; Z. Skrobak,‟Language Policy of

Slovak Republic‟, by Anuual of Language and Politics and Politics of Identity, retrieved 07 May 2010 from

http://alppi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Skrobak.pdf. 180

Interview B6, D3. 181

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 386. 182

D. Malova and E. Lastic, „Higher Education in Slovakia: A Complicated Restoration of Liberal Rules‟, East

European Constitutional Review, Summer 2000, pp. 100-101. 183

K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 05 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf, p. 12. 184

M. Ootes, „Demografie Slowakije‟, in: Ablak, no. 5 2009; Z. Skrobak,‟Language Policy of Slovak Republic‟,

by Anuual of Language and Politics and Politics of Identity, retrieved 07 May 2010 from http://alppi.eu/wp-

content/uploads/2009/11/Skrobak.pdf. 185

J. Adam, „Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.

45, Issue 4, 1993, p. 629.

47

The country has successfully adopted the EU economic framework. Moreover, the economic

reforms have led to an economic system that could be described as liberal.186

These reforms have

attracted the attention of foreign investors that have invested in several sectors of the economy;

particularly in the car and electronics industry. In the late 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s, the

Slovak Republic faced a period of economic prosperity.187

However, some sectors of the economy

were not transformed to the same extent as others. The labour market still poses a problem, since the

rate of structural employment remains high. In the areas of regional development, innovation and

education, further reforms are necessary as well in order to create a balanced and diversified economy

that can bolster continuous economic growth.188

186 SEC/2003/1209, pp. 5-8.

187 Interview D21.

188 Interview C9.

49

2. Culture

Culture can be seen as the connection of all parts of Slovak society. Some academics state that culture

was defined by industrialisation189

, while others state that culture was already existent before

industrialisation or modernisation took place.190

In the case of Slovakia both theories can be

confirmed. On the one hand, a Slovak culture was already clearly present before the Slovak Republic

came into existence. On the other hand, the many transitions Slovakia has gone through and the effects

of communism have also defined Slovak culture. In short, culture is of crucial importance to

understand the developments the Slovak society has been going through until today. The next sections

will deal with the most important aspects of Slovak culture, such as the people, language and art,

consequently, will define Slovakia‟s national identity.

2.1 National Culture and Identity

2.1.1 The People

Although the borders have frequently changed through the years, Slovakia‟s current territory has

always been the region where the ancestors of the Slovak people have lived. A shared historical

territory and an association with a specific „homeland‟ are therefore clearly present. However, as a

result of these shifting borders many non-Slovaks live within the territory of Slovakia as well, such as

Hungarian and Roma minorities. To these minorities Slovakia is also their „homeland‟, as they had

lived there before the Slovak Republic came into existence in 1993.191

Through all the years, the Slovaks have lived in this region where they have been able to

create and preserve their own language, customs and traditions. However, despite the small size of the

country, there are many differences between east and west, between city and village and even between

villages. In the eastern part of the country, Slovaks are more traditional and conservative than in West

Slovakia.192

The Slovak identity is characterised by close family relations. Family occasions, such as

weddings, births and funerals are full of rituals and ceremonies which are characterised by folk

dancing and folk music.193

Moreover, Slovaks are known as kind and hospitable people. They consider

themselves to be more emotional in comparison to Czechs who are considered to be more rational.

Slovaks are supposed to be “people of courage [...] more passionate than Czechs, more sentimental

and closer to nature [...] they are not short-term pragmatics but long-term objective seekers [...] loyal

to their national values: religion, family, respect for human life, sense of honour and courage”194

.

189 E.Gelnner, Nationalism, New York: NYU Press 1997, p. 25.

190 A.Smith, National Identity, London: University of Nevada Press 1991, p. vii.

191 A.Vauchez, R. Barrie Dobson and M. Lapidg, Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages, Chicago: Routledge 2000, p.

1363. 192

Interview B15. 193

E. Krekovicová, „Stereotype and Folklore in the Language of Populist Politicians in Slovakia After 1989 and

1993‟, Slovak Policy Affairs, Issue 1, 2005, p. 62. 194

D. Tencer, „Slovaks as an Unknown Nation: Who Are They Anyway?‟, retrieved 4 May 2010 from

http://www.athamantis.com/slovaks.pdf .

50

2.1.2 The Language

When Slovakia became independent in 1993, Slovak was declared to be the official language.195

In

2009, the language law that already existed in Slovakia underwent major changes. The language law

gives priority to the Slovak language over all other languages that are spoken in Slovakia. Although

the law has led to many protests, especially from the Hungarian minority, in practice this only means

that government officials must be able to speak Slovak.196

Section 7.6 on minorities will elaborate on

this topic.

Besides Slovak, Hungarian is widely spoken and in some municipalities also the Roma or

Ukrainian languages are spoken. This is more or less consistent with the size of the ethnic groups that

live in Slovakia.197

Besides Slovak, a lot of people in Slovakia speak other languages as well. While

the older generation is still able to speak German as a second language, a large part of the younger

generation nowadays speaks English besides Slovak. Approximately 32% of the population speaks

English as a second language198

, as is the case with German.199

Furthermore, the government is trying

to promote the Czech language to prevent a deterioration of the relationship with the Czechs. The two

languages are quite similar, except for differences in vocabulary, which facilitates mutual

communication.200

2.1.3 The Importance of History

Historical memories have been very important in the unification process of the Slovak people and in

the creation of a national identity. Very often historical memories or myths have been used by

politicians to characterise the Slovak identity. For instance, Josef Tiso, a Catholic priest and president

of the first Slovak Republic, used the revolt of the people of Moravia against the Franks in 871 AD to

emphasise the importance of faith in Slovak society. The revolt was led by Slavomir (Svätopluk), a

Slovak priest who is still seen as the national hero.201

The history of the Slovaks shows that the Slovak

nation is not just a recent construction.

However, historians disagree on the parts of history, e.g. the period under Hungarian rule; that

would typically belong to the official history of the Slovak state. Although historical awareness is

problematic in Slovakia because of the complexity of the country‟s history202

, some historical events

are more important for Slovak society than others. Several events in history deserve special attention.

First of all, in 1918, after 1000 years of Hungarian rule, the Czechoslovak state came into existence.

195 M. Smatlák, „Country Profile Slovakia‟ (2007), by Council of Europe, retrieved 5 March 2010 from

http://www.culturalpolicies.net/down/slovakia_122007.pdf, p. 6. 196

„The Language Act and Minority Rights in Slovakia‟, by Ministry of Culture, retrieved 6 June 2010 from

http://www.culture.gov.sk/aktuality/the-language-act-and-minority-rights-in-slovakia. 197

„Languages‟, by CIA Factbook, retrieved 23 March 2010 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

world-factbook/geos/lo.html. 198

„ Skills of EU Citizens > Other than Mother Tongue > English (Most Recent) by Country‟, by

Nationmaster.com, retrieved 6 June 2010 from

http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/lan_ski_of_eu_cit_oth_tha_mot_ton_eng-other-than-mother-tongue-english. 199

„Language Statistics > Skills of EU Citizens > Other than Mother Tongue > English (most recent) by

country‟, by Nationmaster.com, retrieved 6 June 2010 from

http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/lan_ski_of_eu_cit_oth_tha_mot_ton_eng-other-than-mother-tongue-english. 200

Interview B15. 201

A. Findor, „(De) Constructing Slovak National Mythology‟, in: Sociologia – Slovak Sociological Review, Vol.

34, No. 3, 2003, p. 200. 202

Interview A3.

51

Secondly, in 1948, Slovakia was taken over by the communists and Prague became the centre of the

Communist state. Thirdly, in 1968, the Slovak Alexander Dubček became the leader of

Czechoslovakia and introduced “socialism with a human face”203

as a new style of governing. A fourth

important event was the fall of communism in 1989. The period prior to 1989 is also important as

communism left a clear mark on Slovakia‟s current society. Furthermore, in 1993 the Slovaks gained

sovereignty and separated from the Czech Republic. Finally, recent events, such as the accession to

NATO and the EU in 2004; accession to the Schengen zone in 2007 and the introduction of the euro in

2009, are also considered important events for the Slovak state.204

During the 19th century, pan-movements, such as pan-Slavism came into existence as a result

of nationalism. These movements aimed at the unification of not just one culture, but of whole groups

of cultures that were related to each other, such as the Slavic cultures. Slovakia can be considered as

the hub of pan-Slavism, as it had many important propagators. For instance, Jan Kollár (1793-1852)

was a Slovak poet whose poems on Slavism were an inspiration for many readers throughout Eastern

and Central Europe. Pavol Šafárik (1795-1861), a Slovak scholar, gave these poets a common

historical and archaeological foundation, which eventually resulted in a Slavic historical awareness

among all Slavic nations.205

At present, Slovak culture is still quite nationalistic, but it differs from pan-Slavism as the

Slovak society tries to determine their cultural identity, like all young nation states do.206

What has to

be taken into account is the current type of nationalism, which is rather used as a certain political

strategy than an actual ideology.207

Moreover, the adoration of ice hockey by many Slovaks reveals

nationalistic sentiments as well. Slovakia‟s national ice hockey team is considered something to be

very proud of as the team became world champion in 2002.208

2.1.4 The Legacy of the Communist Regime

The fall of communism has clearly led to a generation gap. On the one hand there is the older

generation, who have consciously lived under the Communist regime and still have this particular

mindset. During communist times the government took care of the people, as long as citizens

supported the communist ideology. This resulted in a strong reliance on the government. On the other

hand, there is the younger generation who understand that change is needed, but think that this can

only be achieved after two or three generations. According to them, the influence of communism on

the government and other governmental organisations is still too strong and it will be difficult to

change this quickly.209

Although there has been a slight increase in youth participation at the EP elections in 2009 in

comparison to 2004, people are not actively involved in Slovak politics. However, in general they do

have an opinion on political issues. Research has shown that the increase in participation is mainly

203„History‟, retrieved 10 June 2010 from http://www.slovakia.org/history/.

204 Interview E5.

205 J. Leerssen, National Thought in Europe, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2008, pp. 154-155.

206 M. Smatlák, „Country Profile Slovakia‟ (2007), by Council of Europe, retrieved 5 March 2010 from

http://www.culturalpolicies.net/down/slovakia_122007.pdf. 207

Interview A3. 208

„Ice Hockey in Bratislava‟, by Bratislavaguide, retrieved 7 June 2010 from

http://www.bratislavaguide.com/ice-hockey. 209

Interview D7.

52

influenced by an increase in students‟ knowledge about the EU and politics. Therefore, a specific

project aimed at informing students was initiated. Despite the increase in participation, Slovakia

achieved the lowest voter‟s turnout in the EP elections in 2004 and 2009.210

A development among the current political parties that seems to be gaining ground is that

certain political parties implement restrictions on membership: people who used to be a member of a

Communist party cannot become a member of those parties.211

This could reduce the communist

influence on the government, increase the information supply and increase political engagement of the

younger generation in Slovakia. However, it has to be taken into account that these restrictions could

also have been implemented just to gain popularity in the elections of 2010.212

2.1.5 Art

After the collapse of communism the younger generation felt that the country needed to manifest itself

in terms of art. A first change that took place was the beginning of the use of computer-graphic design

by artists from the younger generation. A second change was that there no longer were restrictions on

where to exhibit or how to sell the works. Suddenly artists had plenty of possibilities, which led to an

increase in different types of art.213

However, there were only a few artists and not many financial means available for exhibitions

and travelling. After the Velvet Divorce, Western interest in Slovak artists rose and more and more

Slovak artists are now in competition with their counterparts all over the world.214

One famous artist of Slovak origin is Andy Warhol. Although Warhol was born in the United

States, he is considered a famous „Slovak‟. Nonetheless, the opening of the Andy Warhol Museum of

Pop Art in Medzilaborce, a town in Northeastern Slovakia, rather was a commercial event for Warhol

fans than something to be proud of for the conservatives among the Slovak people. The more

conservative Slovaks in east Slovakia did not want to be associated with “this decadent American

homosexual”.215

2.1.7 The Search for Identity

Looking at the cultural identity from a theoretical perspective, e.g. the theory of Anthony D. Smith216

,

it can be stated that a Slovak cultural identity certainly exists. However, abroad Slovakia is still quite

unknown and the country is often mixed up with Slovenia.217

This could be explained by the fact that

Slovakia still is a very young nation state. A consequence of this internationally unknown identity is

that people abroad do also not precisely know how to deal with the country, which directly influences

210 „Increase in Youth Participation at EP Elections: Impact of a European Citizenship Project on Slovak

Students‟, by Vyskummladeze.sk, retrieved 7 June 2010 from

http://www.vyskummladeze.sk/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=107=en. 211

Interview D16. 212

Interview D16. 213

H. Swains, „Modern Art Masters Making an Impression in Slovakia‟, retrieved 28 April 2010 from

http://travel.spectator.sme.sk/articles/1510/modern_art_masters_making_an_impression_in_slovakia. 214

H. Swains, „Modern Art Masters Making an Impression in Slovakia‟, retrieved 28 April 2010 from

http://travel.spectator.sme.sk/articles/1510/modern_art_masters_making_an_impression_in_slovakia. 215

R.Rigney, „Andy Warhol in Slovakia‟, retrieved 6 June 2010 from http://www.slovakia.org/culture-

warhol.htm. 216

A.D. Smith, National Identity, New York: Penguin Books 1991, p. 14. 217

Interview A14.

53

Slovakia‟s national and foreign politics as well. The lack of identity seems to have led to political

power games to enforce a certain Slovak identity, e.g. by being negative about others instead of being

positive about oneself, or by the approval of the Patriot Act.

The Slovak people seem to be aware of the fact that their country is still quite unknown

abroad. Looking at the developments that the country has undergone, it is clear that Slovakia is trying

to put itself on the map. For instance, in 2013 the Slovak city, Kosice, will be one of the Cultural

Capitals of Europe.218

The slogan that is currently used in the tourism industry to promote the Slovak

Republic abroad is “Little, Big Country”. In short, this means that the country is small, but full of

possibilities. “It has everything except for the sea”219

. On the one hand, this sounds quite positive, but

on the other hand Slovaks are quite sceptical about their country and its „silent voice‟ within the EU.

To promote the country abroad, the Directorate General of Tourism will soon join the Slovak Ministry

of Culture instead of being a part of the Ministry of Economy.220

Whether these actions will indeed

positively influence Slovakia‟s image abroad will remain to be seen in the future. What must not be

forgotten is that Slovakia is still a very young country which has undergone many different transitions.

It naturally needs time to determine its position.

2.2 Religion

In this section, the matter of religiosity in contemporary Slovakia as well as in Czechoslovakia and

under communism will be discussed. Table 2.1 shows the attitude of five former Communist countries

towards religions. Two of the countries examined in this section are the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

When comparing these two countries, it is striking to notice the differences in religious perceptions of

two nations that formed the state Czechoslovakia until 1993.221

Table 2.1: Religious Affiliation in Six Post-Communist Countries (percentages)

Affiliation Ukraine Bulgaria Czech Rep Slovakia Hungary Russia

Orthodox 64 55 0 1 1 48

Catholic 4 0 37 72 54 0

Muslim 0 10 0 0 0 2

Protestant/Other Christian 5 17 4 10 22 6

Other, including Jewish 1 1 2 1 1 2

No religion/Refused to say 26 17 58 17 22 44

N 1200 1519 1003 1056 988 2141

Source: Review of Religious Research222

218 „Košice INTERFACE 2013‟, retrieved 25 May 2010 from http://www.kosice2013.sk/en.

219 Interview A14.

220 Interview B15.

221 A. Grødeland, B. Miller, S. Oates and S. White, „Religion and Political Action in Post-Communist Europe‟,

Political Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 4, 2000, pp. 681-705. 222

Ibid., p. 688.

54

2.2.1 Religiosity in the Czechoslovak Republic

As can be seen in the table above, more than half of the Czech population considers itself atheist while

religion seems to play an important role within Slovak society, especially Catholicism. More than 70%

of the population consider themselves as Catholic. In addition, in comparison with its neighbouring

countries, the Czech Republic is the only state that is characterised by a decrease of Christian

religiosity during the last two decades of communism and the transition period.223

The reason why the degree of secularisation is higher within Czech society than in Slovakia

goes back to the Habsburg Empire. Prior to the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the

Czechs fell under Austrian rule and the Hungarian part of the monarchy ruled the Slovak region. The

Slovaks associated the Reformed Protestant churches with the Hungarian ruler, while the Czechs

associated Roman Catholicism with their suppressor.224

The Czech Protestants and admirers of Jan

Hus, who had criticised the Roman Catholic Church more than hundred years before Luther and

Calvin, were imposed to Catholicism again after the Czech region became part of the Habsburg

Empire in 1620225

. The Battle of the White Mountain between the Czech Protestants and the army of

Ferdinand of Habsburg ended in a victory for Ferdinand, who was a Catholic. Consequently, the

Czechs not only lost their political freedom but also their religious freedom. Therefore, an anti-

Catholic attitude was equal to opposing the Habsburg rule. 226

Because of the secular attitude of broad parts of Czech society, some Slovaks feared that a

unified Czechoslovak state would undermine the Catholic Church. This transition to

czechoslovakisation227

led to resistance among predominantly Catholics, which resulted in the

foundation of the nationalistic Slovak People‟s Party by priest Andrej Hlinka. Before the foundation of

the Czechoslovak state, he wrote a letter to his friend, father Kolísek, in which he advocated

Czechoslovak unity:

“The Czechs have been the enemy of Rome since the time of Hus and the White Mountain.

They attribute all misfortune to Rome and to Catholicism. Moreover, they are by nature more

hot-headed and inclined for freedom. With regard to language I have no fears, for we are

almost identical, and we shall gradually merge altogether. Whether we speak Slovak or Czech

will not weaken us or be to our detriment. The only thing which can destroy us is atheism.”228

The Slovaks had reasons for their fear, because Thomas Masaryk, the first President of

Czechoslovakia, opposed the Roman Catholic Church and felt that it stood in the way of

Czechoslovakia‟s future. As a consequence, in most Czech regions the anti-Catholic sentiment swelled

223 P. Froese, „Secular Czechs and Devout Slovaks: Explaining Religious Differences‟, Review of Religious

Research, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2005, pp. 269-283. 224

Ibid. 225

A. Grødeland, B. Miller, S. Oates and S. White, „Religion and Political Action in Postcommunnist Europe‟,

Political Studies, Vol. 48, Issue 4, 2000, pp. 681-705. 226

A. Kompánek, „The Catholic Church in Slovakia: I‟, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 12, No.

36, 1934, pp. 611- 621. 227

M. Moravčíková, „Slovak- Hungarian Relations, Catholicism and Christian Democracy‟, Politics and

Religion, No. 2, 2007, pp. 5-28. 228

A. Kompánek, „The Catholic Church in Slovakia: I‟, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 12, No.

36, 1934, pp. 611- 621.

55

to enormous proportions. Moreover, Masaryk advocated for the creation of the Evangelical Church of

Czech Brethren (ECCB) and provided its development with state funding in 1920. It was a

combination of Lutheran and Reformed Churches with a Czech nationalist identity.229

Thus, in the first years of the Czechoslovak Republic, one could already notice major

differences between the Czech and Slovak regions. The situation even deteriorated after the

collaboration of the Catholic Slovak People‟s Party, led by Josef Tiso, with Nazism.

2.2.2 The Slovak Catholic Church during Communism

During communism a policy of repression was used against primarily the Catholic Church in Slovakia.

The Communists realised that they could not destroy the Church. Consequently, they tried to influence

it as much as they could after the Communist coup in 1948. On the one hand, the Communist Party

tried to drive a wedge between the episcopate and the clergy. On the other hand, they believed that by

continuing to pay the salaries, the state could retain a powerful weapon in influencing the behaviour of

the clergy. Moreover, the Communists established an association of loyal priests towards the

Communist state, the Peace Committee of Catholic Clergy.230

Between 1949 and 1951, it became clear that most priests would not join the Peace Committee

of Catholic clergy and a true religious repression took place.231

“Church administration and the

pastoral activity of clergy were put under state control, and priests who had not taken the oath of

allegiance to the government were dismissed. In the event that they opposed government policy, they

were imprisoned.”232

From that moment on, church property and church schools were nationalised and

Christian periodicals and publishing houses were dissolved. Moreover, the churches and religious

societies became completely controlled by the state. Of all these measures, the Roman and Greek

Catholic Churches were affected the most.233

Hence, the Catholic Church was controlled by the state. It could only act with approval of the

state and a representative from the state controlled the masses.234

Furthermore, the state tried to

weaken the Catholic Church by approving bishops and engaging priests through payments and certain

privileges.235

Although the Catholic Church had more influence in opposing communism in Slovakia

than in the Czech lands,236

it was weaker than in its Catholic neighbouring country Poland.237

Nevertheless, the Catholic Church was perceived as an institute that wanted to help the Slovak people

in opposing Marxism-Leninism and this is one of the most important reasons that an estimated 70% of

the Slovak population considers itself Catholic today.238

229 P. Froese, „Secular Czechs and Devout Slovaks: Explaining Religious Differences‟, Review of Religious

Research, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2005, pp. 269-283. 230

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 156-202. 231

Ibid., pp. 183-186. 232

Ibid. 233

M. Cipár and M. Moravčíková, „Religiosity in the Slovak Republic: Demographic Study‟, Bratislava: Institute

for State-Church Relations 1997 234

Interview D7. 235

Interview B5. 236

Interview E5. 237

J. Krejčí, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London: Tauris 1990, pp. 183-186. 238

Interview B5.

56

2.2.3 Religiosity in Contemporary Slovakia

In May 2007, the Slovak government amended the religious registration law. Due to this amendment

religious groups, that wanted to officially register their group, had to provide signatures of 20,000

citizens or permanent residents of Slovakia, who were adherents of the faith. The law was a reaction,

initiated by the Slovak National Party (SNS), to the registration of Muslims at the end of 2006.

Registered groups received state subsidies and are permitted to conduct legal marriage ceremonies.

Today, only six churches comply with this provision: Roman-Catholics, Greek-Catholics, the

Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession, Reformed Christians, and the Orthodox Church.239

From this development one can derive an interesting similarity with the period of communism.

As mentioned before, the Communist Party tried to influence the Catholic Church after the

Communist coup in 1948 by financing Church sectors that were willing to cooperate with the state.

The Fico government still seems to continue the same policy, through subsiding churches.240

In Slovakia, Roman Catholicism is widespread throughout the country and it has the highest

ratio of believers. Lutheran Church Believers are the second largest religious group represented in

Slovakia. Mainly Protestants live in the central and in the southern parts of the country. Just like the

Greek-Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church is only presented in eastern Slovakia; the percentage of

inhabitants in west Slovakia that are disciples of the Greek-Catholic Church or the Orthodox Church

does not even reach 1%.241

239 L. Grešková, „The Registration of Religious Associations in Slovakia‟, Bratislava: Institute for State-Church

Relations, Bratislava: 2007. 240

Interview D7. 241

M. Cipár and M. Moravčíková, „Religiosity in the Slovak Republic: Demographic Study‟, Bratislava: Institute

for State-Church Relations 1997

57

3. Judiciary

In this chapter several aspects of the Slovak judiciary are highlighted. First of all, the Slovak

Constitution will be discussed. Secondly, law enforcement will be elaborated upon. Thirdly, the

Slovak civil code, the notion of decentralisation and, finally, the notion of corruption will be

explained.

3.1 The Slovak Constitution

“We, the Slovak Nation,

bearing in mind the political and cultural heritage of our ancestors and the centuries of experience

from the struggles for national existence and our own statehood,

mindful or the spiritual heritage of Cyril and Methodius and the historical legacy of Great Moravia,

recognizing the natural right of nations to self-determination,

together with members of national minorities and ethnic groups living on the territory of the Slovak

Republic,

in the interest of lasting peaceful cooperation with other democratic states,

seeking the application of the democratic form of government, guarantees of a free life,

that is, we, the citizens of the Slovak Republic,

adopt

through our representatives

this Constitution:”242

The above-cited preamble of the Slovak Constitution goes to show that the Slovak Republic is a state

that regards its cultural heritage of key importance. In the previous chapter, we have seen that the

Slovak people have experienced major changes throughout the decades. Accordingly, when the Slovak

Republic became independent in 1993, emphasising its exclusive identity was an all-important matter,

as is also illustrated by this preamble. Remarkably, the Slovak nation is taken as a starting point,

whereas it can be stated that in Western constitutions, usually the citizens of the country are taken as a

starting point.

Law can be defined as rules equal for every citizen within the state. Although it becomes clear

from the preamble that the law rules equally for every inhabitant, there is a difference between specific

groups of inhabitants included in the Constitution as it exclusively distinguishes between, on the one

hand, the Slovak people and, on the other hand, members of national minorities and ethnic groups

living on the territory of the Slovak Republic. More neutral are the words “through our

representatives”, which indicate that the Slovak Republic is a representative democracy.243

The Constitution of the Slovak Republic was adopted in 1992, just before the country‟s

official independence. At that moment, the Slovak Republic could already take the possibility of

joining the EU into account. Indeed, most of the provisions are to a certain extent oriented towards the

242 „Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, retrieved 17 February 2010 from www.nrsr.sk, p. 1.

243 Ibid.

58

West; several amendments have been adopted to ensure that Slovak law is in accordance with

European standards, so as to enable access to the EU.244

In this chapter, provisions of the Slovak

Constitution will be discussed as well as other important legislation of the Slovak Republic and

developments in Slovak legislation aimed at meeting European standards in this area.

3.1.1 General Provisions, Fundamental Rights and Social Rights

The structure of the preamble is maintained throughout the Constitution. The first chapter of the

Constitution contains general provisions, state symbols and the capital of the Slovak Republic. In part

one of chapter one, the general provisions are set out. In general, the tenor of these articles is that the

Slovak Republic is autonomous and may decide about its territory, borders, natural resources, citizens,

and language. The Slovak language is explicitly laid down in the Constitution as being the official

language of Slovakia. Article 7 states that the Slovak Republic may transfer some powers to the EU.

Moreover, the possibility of transferring powers to the EU was adopted in the Slovak Constitution in

2001, together with 85 other amendments, in order to make the Slovak Republic ready for accession to

the EU.245

Article 7a states that the Slovak Republic supports the national awareness and cultural identity

of Slovaks living abroad. This article indicates that the Slovak nation is very important to the Slovaks.

This is further underlined by part two and three of chapter one, in which the state symbols and the

capital of the Slovak Republic are laid down.246

Subsequently, the second chapter of the Slovak Constitution contains basic rights and

freedoms. Most of these fundamental rights and freedoms are similar to those laid down in Western

constitutions. However, there are a few remarkable articles. Firstly, the focus in the part on

fundamental rights is very much on the individual rights of Slovak citizens. This should be seen in the

light of the Communist Constitution that was in force until 1989 in which collectivism was

emphasised.247

Examples of articles that focus on individual freedom are: Article 16, in which the

inviolability of a person and his or her privacy is guaranteed; Article 20, in which the right to own

property is laid down; Article 21, in which the inviolability of a person‟s home is laid down.248

A second somewhat dubious provision can be found in part four on the rights of national

minorities and ethnic groups. More specific, Article 34 (2) states that minorities have the legal right to

develop their own culture. They furthermore have the right to education in their own language, the

right to use their language in official communication and the right to participate in decisions on affairs

concerning national minorities and ethnic groups. Notably, this article seems to be in contradiction to

the Slovak Language Law, adopted in 2009, which forbids any language other than the Slovak

language in the public sphere.249

Next, Article 34 (3) states that the rights of national minorities and

ethnic groups may not lead to jeopardising the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak

244 Ibid.

245 A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, New York: Cambridge

University Press 2005, pp.67-69. 246

„Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, retrieved 17 February 2010 at www.nrsr.sk, pp. 1-3. 247

A. Bröstl, „IX. The Slovak Republic‟, in: L. Prakke and C. Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional Law of 10 new

Member States, Deventer: Kluwer Law International 2007, p. 37. 248

„Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, retrieved 17 February 2010 from www.nrsr.sk, pp. 4-8. 249

„The Slovak Language Law is discriminatory and restrictive‟, (10-07-2009), by György Schöpflin, 7 March

2010 from http://euobserver.com/9/28440.

59

Republic and to discrimination against its other inhabitants. This seems to be the legitimating

provision which made that the Slovak Language Law was not found unconstitutional by the

Constitutional Court of Slovakia. However, this law does not seem to be entirely proportionate in

achieving its aim, as there are less radical ways of maintaining the Slovak culture without limiting the

rights of ethnic minorities living in Slovakia.

Thirdly, in part five, six, seven and eight, social rights are laid down. Social rights in the

Slovak Constitution are quite similar to social rights laid down in Western constitutions. However, as

will be elaborated on in section 7.5 and 7.6 on gender and minorities, the Slovak government does not

seem to be used to applying positive rights. Consequently, the fact that social rights are included in

this chapter does not necessarily mean that they are applied in Slovak society.

3.1.2 The Governmental Organs

In chapters four, five and six, the organs of the state, their functioning and the procedures of

installation are laid down. Slovakia has a parliamentary system of proportionate representation and a

President elected by popular vote.250

The Slovak parliament is called the National Council. The National Council consists of 150

members, who are directly elected by the Slovak people for a period of four years. The main tasks of

the National Council are developing legislation and monitoring the government. In addition, every

member of the National Council has seat in one or two committees. These committees are specialised

in certain policy subjects, such as economy, education, human rights etc. In order to develop proper

legislation, the National Council hands over draft legislation to the committees for scrutiny. Moreover,

legislative initiative falls under the competence of these committees. The National Council has a

President who signs constitutional acts, sets the agenda, presides over meetings, calls for elections for

the National Council and the President, etc.251

Moreover, the head of state is the President, who is directly elected by the Slovak people

every five years. In former days, the President used to be elected by the National Council, but after its

failure to elect a President in 1998, the National Council adopted a Constitutional Act providing for

the direct election of the President. The President appoints almost every public official for important

public functions. Furthermore, he has the right to comment on draft legislation provided by the

National Council. If the National Council does not agree with the President‟s comments and if the

President for that reason refuses to sign the law, the law will be promulgated without the signature of

the President. The President does not bear political accountability towards the National Council.252

The government consists of a Prime Minister and several ministers, the number of which is

not laid down in law. The President appoints the Prime Minister. He also appoints the other ministers

on the Prime Minister‟s advice. It is tradition that the party with the largest number of votes can

suggest the Prime Minister. Contrary to the President, the ministers are politically accountable to the

250 R. Sakwa, and A. Stevens, Contemporary Europe (2

nd edition), New York: Palgrave Macmillian 2006, p. 90.

251 A. Bröstl, „IX. The Slovak Republic‟, in: L. Prakke and C. Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional Law of 10 new

Member States, Deventer: Kluwer Law International 2007, p. 13. 252

Ibid., p. 18.

60

National Council. In addition, the ministers have the authority to provide decrees in order to

implement European legislation, or legislation derived from other binding international treaties. 253

Finally, in chapter five part two, the regulations concerning referenda are laid down.

Referenda in Slovakia are used for confirming a constitutional act on joining an international alliance

or an act on withdrawing from this alliance or to decide on other important issues of public interest. A

referendum in Slovakia is only valid if more than 50% of the eligible voters have voted and if more

than the majority of the voters have voted in favour of the referendum. Due to this high percentage for

a minimum of votes, there have hardly been valid referenda since 1990.254

An important exception is

the referendum on the accession to the EU in 2003.255

3.1.3 The Judicial Body in Slovakia

The judicial body of the Slovak Republic consists of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and

other decentralised or specialised courts. The decentralised courts comprise eight regional courts and

45 district courts.256

The Constitutional Court decides on whether governmental acts are in line with the Slovak

Constitution. This court consists of 13 judges who are elected for a period of 12 years. The National

Council nominates 26 candidates, after which the President ultimately appoints 13 of them. The case

law of the Constitutional Court is in fact the only case law that constitutes an official legal source. All

other decisions of judges in Slovakia do not have to be adhered to by other judges. The Constitutional

Court has the competence to suspend legal regulations if their consequences would jeopardise

fundamental rights or if their economic impacts would be irreparable. This competence de facto

enables the Constitutional Court to make politically sensitive decisions. There is no possibility to

appeal against a decision of the Constitutional Court. 257

The Supreme Court is the central court, the court of third instance. As a rule, a case is decided

upon by the Supreme Court, after respectively a district court and a regional court have passed their

judgments. The Supreme Court decides upon matters that fall under the scope of civil and criminal

law.258

In addition, the Supreme Court also judges military cases. Before 2005, military cases were

judged separately by the military courts, of which there were three on the regional level and one on the

central national level. Maintaining these courts became too expensive, since there were hardly any

military cases to process. Currently, military cases are dealt with by the general courts.259

Furthermore, there is a Specialised Court for Corruption, which is concerned with scandals

involving corruption, especially in political cases. This court has existed since 17 July 2009 and it

replaces the Court for Corruption that was considered unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court on

253 A. Bröstl, „IX. The Slovak Republic‟, in: L. Prakke and C. Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional Law of 10 new

Member States, Deventer: Kluwer Law International 2007, p. 23. 254

Interview E1. 255

P. Taggart and A. Sczcerbiak, „The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes and Turnout: Two Models‟,

West European Politics, Vol. 27, Issue 4, 2004, pp. 559-564. 256

G. Meseţnikov e.a., „Slovakia‟ in: D. Bushati, Nations in Transit 2009: Democratization from Central

Europe to Eurasia, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. 2009, p. 494. 257

A. Bröstl, „IX. The Slovak Republic‟, in: L. Prakke and C. Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional Law of 10 new

Member States, Deventer: Kluwer Law International 2007, p. 28. 258

Ibid., p. 32. 259

Interview B22.

61

16 July 2009. The Court for Corruption was considered unconstitutional because the judges were

checked by the National Security Office, which the Constitutional Court judged to be a breach of the

principle of separation of powers.260

Finally, the so-called Judicial Council was installed in 2001 to guard the independence of the

judicial organs. The Council has the competence to submit nominations of Slovak judges to both

national and international courts and to give advice on the budget of courts.261

Except for the judges of

the Constitutional Court, every judge is appointed or removed by the President, after a proposal from

the Judicial Council.262

To conclude, the Slovak Constitution consists of national Slovak symbols, fundamental rights and the

state system and its functioning. Despite some remarkable provisions, the Slovak Constitution more or

less fits the European standards and fundamental rights are protected. Moreover, the Slovak

Republic‟s functioning as a democratic state is laid down in the Constitution, as well as the

impartiality of the judiciary and its functions. As regards economic and criminal law provisions, the

Slovak Republic has made significant progress towards European and international standards. More

specific, to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria, states have to do more than simply adopt certain regulations

about these criteria and include them in the Constitution or in other legislative acts. The legacy of

communism seems to have left its traces in the Slovak Republic, hindering the implementation of

Western norms and values. What looks correct on paper could be less effective in practice; crucial

ingredients to let European norms and values work in practice seem to be lacking. In the course of this

report, the effect that these lacking ingredients have on the Slovak people and the position of the

Slovak Republic within the European Union will become clear.

3.2 Enforcement

3.2.1 Protection of the Rule of Law in the Slovak Republic

This section deals with the impact of EU integration on the Slovak legal order. The protection of the

rule of law was one of the aspects of the Copenhagen criteria that Slovakia had to fulfil upon

accession. For this reason, special attention will be given to transparency, accountability and the

functioning of the judiciary and anti-corruption measures.

3.2.1.1 Assessment of the Compliance with the Rule of Law

Since the rule of law can be interpreted in many different ways, this report will assess the Slovak

compliance with the rule of law according to the Copenhagen criteria of the European Commission,

which include:

1. The independence of the judiciary;

2. Training of judges;

3. Filling the judicial vacancies;

260 Interview B22.

261 A. Bröstl, „IX. The Slovak Republic‟, in: L. Prakke and C. Kortmann (eds.), Constitutional Law of 10 new

Member States‟, Deventer: Kluwer Law International 2007, p. 33. 262

„Legal Professions – Slovakia‟ (2008), by European Judicial Network in Civil and Commercial Matters,

retrieved 20 March 2010 from http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/legal_prof/legal_prof_svk_en.htm.

62

4. Improvement of the public‟s access to justice;

5. Improvement in the handling of cases;

6. Effective enforcement of court decisions.263

Moreover, from the analysis of the Copenhagen-related documents, “it follows that the judiciary

should be independent, well paid, well staffed and well trained, efficient, respected and acceptable to

people. The judiciary‟s self governance without interference of the other branches of power in the

training of judges in a Special Institute is important, as well as the work of its self-governing bodies,

as appointment and the work of the courts. The budget should also be in the hands of the judicial

branch”264

. The next section assesses the judicial system of Slovakia in line with these grounds.

3.2.1.2 The Protection of the Rule of Law

On 1 September 1992, a new Constitution was adopted in the Slovak Republic, guaranteeing the

principle of the rule of law with regard to the judiciary, by defining justice as the third power of the

state. The Constitution stipulates that this power should be exercised independently, impartially and

separately from other state organs and that the judicial power at the same time is regarded as the

principal safeguard of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, by making the judges

subject only to law, judicial independence was also ensured by the constitution.265

Before the adoption

of this constitution, the legislators of Slovakia regarded the existing safeguards to ensure the

independence of the judiciary as sufficient under Communist rule.266

Although the adoption of the 1992 Slovak Constitution ensured the judicial independence on

paper, the European Commission highlighted concerns about the behaviour of the government towards

key institutions, such as the Presidency and the Constitutional Court, in its avis of 1997.267

A

monitoring report of the Open Society Institute (OSI) 268

was published in 2001, in which it was stated

that the Slovak Republic was in the middle of a process of legal reform. According to this report

Slovakia had definitively broken with the Communist legacy and many basic constitutional and legal

guarantees of judicial independence were in place.269

Moreover, in 2001, 85 constitutional amendments were made in order to meet European

standards. Among these amendments was the creation of the ombudsperson, a clarification of the

separation of powers, the creation of a constitutional basis for the transfer of powers, the right for

263 K. Dimitry, „Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the Copenhagen Political

Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law‟, in: European Integration Papers, Vol. 8, no. 10, 2004, p. 20. 264

Ibid. 265

„The role of the Judicial Service Commissions: Proceedings: Multilateral Meeting, Council of Europe Legal

Co-operation with Central and Eastern European Countries‟, by Council of Europe, 1995, p. 117. 266

Ibid., p. 118. 267

S. White (e.a.), Developments in Central and Eastern European Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan

2007, p. 57. 268

The Open Society Institute is a foundation that works to build tolerant democracies and seeks to shape public

policies that assure greater fairness in political, legal and economic systems. It published monitoring reports on

the EU candidate countries within the European Union Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP). 269

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence in Slovakia‟, by Open Society Institute, 2001,

p. 398.

63

foreign residents to vote for local governments and several amendments to change the judicial

system.270

Despite the reforms that have been made, a number of challenges remain. From interviews

conducted as part of this research, it became clear that the judicial branch did not start with a clean

slate in 1993, since not all judges serving under the Communist rule have been replaced by new ones.

This highlights one side of the challenges of the Slovak judicial system as will be elaborated on later

on in this chapter.271

Furthermore, the Fico government (2006-2010) also had an impact on the extent to which the

transformation of the judicial system was conducted. The period of the pro-European Dzurinda

governments (1998-2006) can be marked as a period of progress and reform, whereas the 2006-2010

Fico period, can be described as a period of no reforms, which even meant a deterioration of the

quality of the judicial system.272

In addition, figures of the World Bank, based on the criteria of independence and

accountability, competence of personnel, efficiency and access, show that the Slovak score on the

judicial system in 2009 is worse than it was ten years ago.273

Since the beginning of the transition

period, the Slovak judicial system only improved until 2007. Since 2007, the score of the Slovak

Republic on the judicial system has every following year been worse than the year before.274

These

concerning scores are mainly caused by several new laws, such as the Press Act of 2008, which

infringes on human rights and by the assertion that the Constitutional Court is affected by political

influences.275

Another factor, that has an impact on the transition of the judicial system, is the monitoring

that is done by the EU. For instance, the period before EU accession in 2004 enhanced the creation of

an institutional framework because the judicial system was under close scrutiny of the EU. After the

Slovak Republic had joined the EU, the monitoring stopped and the needed efforts to transform the

judicial system stopped as well.276

The Communist heritage also plays a role in the current challenges. Over the years, there has

been a discontinuity of the law system. During the 20th century, Slovakia had six different law

systems. The most influential was that of the Communist regime. This law system was introduced in

the 1960s. From then on, the Communist parties had hegemony in the legal systems of the Soviet

Union. The most influential provision of the Constitution at that time was article 4. In this article it

was laid down that all judges, professors and other civil servants had to be a member of the

Communist party. The rights for citizens that were laid down in the constitution were just a formality.

They were not implemented. From 1968 onwards, after the Prague Revolution, people started to be

270 A. Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, New York: Cambridge

University Press 2005, pp. 67-69. 271

Interview B6, C7, D3, D20. 272

K. Miroslav, G.Meseţnikov and M. Bútora (e.a.), A Global Report on the State of Society. Slovakia 2006,

Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2006, pp. 126-127; Interview D20. 273

R. Messick, „Key Functions of Legal Systems with Suggested Performance Measures‟, retrieved 6 May 2010

from: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/legaltoolkit.pdf, pp. 3-5. 274

G. Meseţnikov (e.a.), „Slovakia‟ in: D. Bushati, Nations in Transit 2009:Democratization from Central

Europe to Eurasia, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. 2009, p. 479. 275

Ibid., p. 482. 276

Interview B6, C7.

64

critical of the Communist regime, but the reforms have only started in 1989, after the abolition of

communism.277

The challenges that remain for Slovakia‟s judicial system are the incomplete legal

transformation; the excessive executive involvement; the commitment to the rule of law; caseload and

the length of procedures and the professional competence of the judiciary. These five challenges will

be elaborated in the following sections.

3.2.1.3 Incomplete Legal Transformation

Judicial independence was non-existent during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, nor did the transition of

1989 and the Velvet Divorce contribute to the development of this independence. It was only after the

end of the Mečiar government in 1998 that a Western-style judicial culture began to flourish. Most

legal reforms took place under the centre-right government of Prime Minister Dzurinda (1998-

2006).278

In 2001 Slovakia was still in a transitional phase in which structural changes had to be carried

through. Although the country rejected its communist legacy, it still had to fully replace all the formal

elements of that system with democratic alternatives. Efforts to develop comprehensive reforms in the

organisation of the judiciary had been hindered by the political branches‟ insufficient appreciation of

the importance of the judiciary and by institutional traditions favouring strong executive involvement

in managing the courts.279

The 2000 Regular Report of the Commission noted that, although certain

measures had been implemented to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, continued efforts

were needed to achieve this aim.280

In response to the criticism of the lack of judicial independence by

the EU, the pro-European Dzurinda government established a judicial council that became operational

in August 2002.281

The Judicial Council consists of 18 members and is chaired by the President of the

Supreme Court. Eight members are elected by the judges and the other nine members are appointed by

the President, the National Council and the government, whereby each party elects three members.

The Council aims at strengthening the judicial self-governance, it has the right to propose judicial

candidates, the right to determine the transfer of judges and it is involved in disciplinary issues of

judges.282

The Judicial Council has already used its powers in submitting nominations for judges who

are to represent the Slovak Republic in international judicial bodies. In 2005, the Judicial Council had

to nominate three candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, but since it did not nominate

any women, it failed to comply with the affirmative action rule set out by the Parliamentary Assembly

of the Council of Europe.283

Although certain powers have been transferred to the new Judicial Council, the Ministry of

Justice still retains large responsibilities for the operation of the judicial sector. Important matters such

277 Interview E18.

278 G. Falkner, Compliance in the Enlarged European Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters? Hampshire:

Ashgate Publishing Limited 2008, p. 96. 279

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence in Slovakia‟, by Open Society Institute, 2001,

p. 398. 280

European Commission, „Regular Report on Slovakia‟s Progress towards Accession, November 2001, p. 14. 281

G. Falkner, Compliance in the Enlarged European Union: Living Rights or Dead Letters? Hampshire:

Ashgate Publishing Limited 2008, p. 96. 282

Ibid.. 283

Ibid..

65

as budgeting and negotiations with other government institutions and Parliament on behalf of the

judiciary continue to be conducted by the Ministry of Justice.284

Before the Judicial Council was

established, the Association of Slovak Judges proposed a far broader range of powers for the Judicial

Council in 2001 and requested that the judiciary should draft, submit and defend its own budget.

However, the established Judicial Council of 2002 only obtained the power to express its opinion on

the draft budget for the judiciary. The budget for the judiciary is still included within the budget for

the Ministry of Justice, with the exception of the Supreme Court, which has its own chapter. 285

The system for preparing the annual budget lacks transparency, the budget is primarily based

on the expenditures of the previous year and there appears to be no relation between allocation of

funds and caseload.286

According to the OSI, the budget decisions depend more on the personal skills

and relationships of the court president in dealing with the ministry than on any objectively

determined need.287

When the Council had come into effect in 2002, it did not have either premises or

staff. The issue of funding is thus still a matter of concern, since the success of the Council depends on

the resources and quality of staff it receives.288

3.2.1.4 Excessive Executive Involvement

Excessive executive interference in the Slovak Republic harms the judiciary‟s independence and

creates tensions between the executive and legislative branch. The OSI noted that the supervision by

the executive was far greater desirable for maintenance of an independent judiciary and that the

expanded powers of the National Judicial Council did not go far enough in removing executive

involvement in the organisation and administration of the judiciary.289

Next to representing the judiciary in relations with the political branches and the preparation

on the budget of judiciary, the Ministry of Justice still exercises authority over the drafting of relevant

laws; the control of allocated funds; the determination of the numbers of judges and support staff in

courts; the selection and disciplining of judges; appointing and dismissing court presidents and

developing and overseeing the implementation of standards and guidelines for court operations.290

Over the last decade, several cases of political interference in the judicial branch have

highlighted the tensions between the executive and legislative powers. The most important example of

excessive executive interference is the case of Stefan Harabin.291

Mr. Harabin had been appointed as chief justice during Mečiar‟s regime in 1998. He is still a

member of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS) that was established by Mečiar.292

In

2006, Mr. Harabin served in the government, this time under the Fico government as the Minister of

Justice. Serving as the Minister of Justice, Mr. Harabin made attempts to hinder the functioning of

284 „Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Independence in Slovakia‟, Open Society Institute, 2001, p.

408. 285

Ibid. 286

Ibid., p. 200. 287

Ibid. 288

Ibid. 289

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process,Judicial Independence in Slovakia‟,Open Society Institute,2001,p.402. 290

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity‟, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 198. 291

Interview B6, C7, D3, D20. 292

T. Nicholson, „Chief Justice not Likely to Go Quietly. Supreme Court Boss Stefan Harabin Calls New Justice

Minister a Liar, Holds out Against Judicial Changes‟, in: The Slovak Spectator, retrieved April 2010 from

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/11008/1/.

66

several judges. In October 2006, he proposed a 70% cut in wages for half a year for Milan Karabín,

the then-President of the Supreme Court. The reason for this proposal was that Mr. Karabín had

refused to let a ministry inspector enter his court and that he had a “low level of activity as a judge”.293

Mr. Harabin also recalled five heads of regional and district courts that were considered to be fighters

against corruption and who had called on Harabin to leave his post as the head of the Supreme Court.

According to Harabin, these officials had not fulfilled their duties as regional district heads, but

specific clarifications never followed.294

Following these events, 90 judges signed a petition called

„Five Sentences‟ to express their concern about the independence of the judiciary. On 26 January

2009, an open letter was sent to the Prime Minister by Via Iuris295

in which he was asked to take

responsibility for the current situation regarding the Slovak judiciary.296

In June 2009, Mr. Harabin was appointed President of the Supreme Court and President of the

Judicial Council for the second time. This time there was a last-minute demonstration in front of the

Ministry of Justice, held by several NGOs that believed Mr. Harabin‟s appointment to be a direct

threat to justice, independence, impartiality, honesty and the judiciary. The protest was followed by a

rally on the 19th of June, initiated by the political ethics watchdog Fair-Play Alliance that had

recorded proof of a telephone conversation between Mr. Harabin and the leader of the Albanian mafia

Badi Sadiki. As Sadiki had been accused of heroin trade and convicted for various crimes such as

illegal possession of firearms, several NGOs and law firms questioned the reliability of the new

President of the Supreme Court.297

Mr. Harabin‟s shows that the executive power has drawn more

controlling powers towards its branch, by letting the Minister of Justice become the head of the

judicial branch.298

Daniel Lipšic, former Minister of Justice under the Dzurinda government, has also

expressed his concern about the credibility of Slovakia‟s judiciary.299

3.2.1.5 Weak Commitment to the Rule of Law

A weak commitment to a genuine legal culture, which marks Slovak social and political life, also

hampers the complete transformation of the judicial system. For instance, some judges and public

officials have embraced European democracy. Others, however, prefer immunity from any criticism as

was identical to the Communist model.300

Furthermore, there is an insufficient degree of support for the principle of judicial

independence by the executive power and therefore it is not considered a priority. Some politicians

and government officials, argue that a lack of independence is not the most critical problem for the

293„Justice Minister Wants to Punish Head of Supreme Court‟, in: The Slovak Spectator, retrieved April 2010

from http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/24909 294

„Harabin Sacks Critical Justices‟, in: The Slovak Spectator, retrieved April 2010 from

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/24803. 295

Via Iuris is a non-governmental association of advocates and is also known as the Institute for Public Affairs. 296

„Analysis of the Current Situation in Slovak Judiciary‟, by Za Otvorenú Justíciu, retrieved May 2010 from

http://www.sudcovia.sk/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog&id=9&Itemid=61 297

Interview B6, C7, D3. 298

Interview C7. 299

„Justice Minister Štefan Harabin Elected President of Slovakia‟s Supreme Court‟, in: The Slovak Spectator,

retrieved April 2010 from http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/35736/2/justice_minister_stefan_harabin_elected

_president_of_slovakias_supreme_court.html. 300

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process,Judicial Independence in Slovakia‟,by Open Society Institute, 2001,

p. 403.

67

judicial branch.301

The most critical problem is that some judges assert an overreaching independence

and thereby reject the system of checks and balance. Consequently, this attitude has resulted in

tensions between the Ministry of Justice and the judges‟ organisations.302

Besides, the public opinion on judges was quite negative in 2001 and there was a high level of

criticism towards all judges and courts except towards the Constitutional Court. The judiciary is

believed to be unable to deliver services efficiently and most people still perceive the judiciary to be

no more than an extension of the state administration as it was under Communist rule.303

According to

the Eurobarometer survey of autumn 2009, the Slovak citizens have less trust in their national

institutions than in the EU. Of all Slovak branches the lowest trust was in the justice and legal

institutions, namely 26%, whereas the EU 27 average was 40%.304

From this can be drawn that the

public‟s perception towards the judiciary still remains negative.

3.2.1.6 Caseload and the Length of Procedures

Due to a lack of adequate support staff to handle caseloads and to maximise productivity, a report of

the American Bar Association of 2002 pointed out that Slovak judges had to deal with administrative

burdens for a great part of their work time. Retaining qualified staff was difficult, because staff

salaries were not competitive compared to salaries in the private sector.305

The shortage of support

staff forced judges to devote an estimated 50% of their work time on administrative work instead of

spending their time on delivering justice. Most judges are not even trained for administrative work or

management of the courts.306

As a consequence of this inefficiency, the judicial system faces an overwhelming and slow-

moving backlog of cases. From 1999 to 2002, the heavy caseload comprised approximately 900,000

unsettled cases. The average length for judicial proceedings took almost 18 months for civil cases and

4 months for criminal proceedings in 2002.307

Based on the conducted interviews, the caseload is still

high. For foreign businesses the biggest problem concerning the rule of law, is that law enforcement is

inefficient in the Slovak Republic.308

In 2010, contract enforcement took 60 days longer than in

previous years, which has led to more uncertainty for entrepreneurs.309

Due to unnecessary delays, the level of public trust in the system remains low and plaintiffs

turn to the Constitutional Court to fight unnecessary delays.310

In 2004, 968 complaints were filed. Of

all applications lodged against the Slovak Republic with the European Court of Human Rights,

301 Interview B22, C13.

302 „Monitoring the EU Accession Process, Judicial Independence in Slovakia‟, Open Society Institute, 2001, p.

403; Interview B22, C13. 303

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process, Judicial Independence in Slovakia‟, Open Society Institute, 2001,

p. 403. 304

„Standard Eurobarometer 72. National Report Slovak Republic‟ (2009), by European Commission, retrieved

7 April 2010 from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_en.htm, p. 4. 305

„Judicial Reform Index for Slovakia‟, American Bar Association and Central and East European Law

Initiative, 2002, p. 25. 306

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity‟, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 200. 307

COM (2002) 308

Interview D3. 309

Interview D20. 310

„NIT 2006 Slovakia‟, Freedomhouse, 2006, p. 18 and Interview D20.

68

approximately two thirds concern judicial delays and claim the violation of Article 6, the right to a fair

trial.311

To reduce court delays, two initiatives were introduced in 2002. The first was a change in

caseload norms from a purely numerical system to a point system designed to account for the

complexity of individual cases. While previously judges were required to close up to 25 cases per

month, the point system required them to achieve at least 1,000 points a month.312

Some argue that this

new system may provide a distorted picture of judges‟ performance since the points assigned to

specific procedural acts do not necessarily relate to their difficulty or the time required. It may also

create a negative impact on the quality of court decisions since it creates incentives for judges to

simply fulfil their quota.313

The other initiative to address the caseload problem was the establishment of an Office of the

Public Defender of Human Rights (Ombudsman). Mr. Kandráč, the first Public Defender of Human

Rights, was appointed in March 2002 and the office became operational in July 2002. The office

started with approximately 1,000 complaints, of which many concerned the work of the judiciary and

court delays.314

Since its installation, it has experienced an increase in the number of complaints of 50

to 100 cases each year. The majority of the cases are concerned with the breach of law with regard to

the delay in proceedings. Although the Ombudsman has no competences in this field, one of his

successes has been the good cooperation with the administration of the courts to speed up the

processes.315

3.2.1.7 Professional Competence of the Judiciary

The executive involvement is not the only challenge within the judicial system; the problem also lays

in the functioning of the judges. The judicial system never started with a clean slate in 1993, while

most judges served under Communist rule and were appointed for life.316

Therefore, the judicial

system is difficult to transform because some of the judges try to secure their position or pass positions

over within their network of friends and family. Consequently, nepotism plays a role in the selection

of new judges.317

Moreover, the professional competence of the judges is also strongly related to their selection

and the standards for their training. Prior to 2001, district and regional judges in the Slovak Republic

were elected by parliament to serve a four-year probationary term. Judges who received a

recommendation after this term from the Ministry of Justice and the government were appointed for

life. This procedure had been criticised for lacking objective criteria and transparency and for being

subject to political influence.318

After 2001, several amendments to the Slovak Constitution and the

adoption of the Act on Judges clarified the methodology for selecting and appointing judges.

311 G, Falkner, Compliance in the enlarged European Union: living rights or dead letters? Hampshire: Ashgate

Publishing Limited 2008, pp. 96-97. 312

„Monitoring the EU accession process: judicial capacity‟, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 191. 313

Ibid. 314

Ibid., p. 191. 315

Interview A2. 316

Interview B6, D3. 317

Interview D3. 318

„Judicial Reform Index for Slovakia‟, American Bar Association and Central and East European Law

Initiative, 2002, p. 7.

69

Nowadays, judges are appointed for life which, on the one hand improves the judiciary‟s

independence, but on the other hand also hinders changes in the judicial system.319

The creation of the

Judicial Council helped to depoliticise the selection procedure for judges, given that the Council now

presents the proposals for judicial candidates to the President of the Slovak Republic instead of the

Parliament.320

With regard to the professional background of the judges, a Slovak citizen of thirty years or

older, who has obtained a Masters degree in law at a Slovak university or a similar degree abroad, can

be appointed to a district or regional court. Although judges must have had legal training at the

university, they are not required to practice before tribunals prior to taking the bench.321

In 2001, a

Code of Ethics for judges was adopted relating to issues such as judicial independence, dignity of

office, conflicts of interest, fairness and impartiality, professionalism and outside activities. A survey

of 2002 indicated that many judges were unaware of the adoption of neither the Code of Ethics nor its

content. In addition, these principles are rather statements of general principles that do not provide

detailed guidance to judges and lack enforcement mechanisms.322

Furthermore, the training of judges is also a matter of concern. Due to insufficient support

from the government, the training for serving judges was uneven and inadequate in 2002. There was

no centralised training centre for judges or judicial staff and training was provided by the Ministry of

Justice during ad hoc seminars on a voluntary basis.323

Since this training was unsatisfactory, the

Association of Slovak Judges organised additional seminars and a PHARE324

project started in 2001

which aimed at making judges familiar with relevant EU topics on the short term.325

Since 1995 the

Association of Slovak Judges had been promoting the idea of an independent judicial educational

institution. With the support of judges and other international institutions a draft on a Judicial

Academy was submitted which eventually led to the establishment of the Judicial Academy of

Slovakia in 2004.326

Although it is a budgetary organisation under the Ministry of Justice, and

therefore not independent, a centralised training academy exists nowadays which cooperates with

several international partners such as the European Judicial Training Network and European Academy

of Law.327

Nonetheless, the quality of the training of judges is questioned due to a lack of transparency

and external control.328

319 „Judicial Reform Index for Slovakia‟, American Bar Association and Central and East European Law

Initiative, 2002, p. 7. 320

„Article 141a of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, retrieved APRIL 2010 from

http://www.vop.gov.sk/en/legal_basis/constitution.html 321

„Judicial Reform Index for Slovakia‟, American Bar Association and Central and East European Law

Initiative, 2002, p. 6. 322

Ibid, p. 22 and Interview B6, C7. 323

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity‟, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 197. 324

PHARE = Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies 325

„Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Judicial Capacity‟, Open Society Institute, 2002, p. 197. 326

„The Judicial Academy of the Slovak Republic‟ (2008), retrieved 30 March 2010 from http://www.ja-

sr.sk/node/1360 327

„Slovakia: Judicial Academy of Slovakia‟ (2010), by the European Judicial Training Network, retrieved 30

March 2010 from http://www.ejtn.eu/About/EJTN-Affiliates/Members/Slovakia/ 328

Interview C7, D20.

70

3.2.1.8 Evaluation

To conclude, in 1992, the Slovak Republic acknowledged the judicial branch as the third power of the

state. Under the Dzurinda government, many reforms were carried out to transform the judicial system

and to guarantee the independence of the judges. The main challenges of reforming the judicial system

were the excessive executive involvement, the professional competence of the judges, the selection

and training of the judiciary and the length of procedures. The biggest change in the judicial system

was the enhancement of the independence of the judges and the separation of powers. Challenges still

remain given the fact that some judges, who have not been replaced after the collapse of the

Communist regime, are not ready to adapt to a new judicial system. Another challenge is the growing

executive involvement under the Fico government, resulting in the deterioration of the judicial system

since 2006. An example is the election of the former Minister of Justice, Mr. Harabin, as the President

of the Supreme Court in 2009. The change of government in 2006 and the suspension of EU

monitoring after the Slovak Republic had joined the EU, has led to a decline in the quality of the

judicial system.

3.2.2 Human Rights in the Slovak Republic

According to the Slovak government, all European criteria have been implemented concerning human

rights. The laws on human rights and minorities in the Slovak Republic are similar to those in other

EU countries because of international conventions which have been signed. As member of the EU, the

European Council and the UN, the Republic has a legislative and socio-political foundation for human

rights protection and implementation329

. According to the UNDP, the Slovak Republic has

implemented all the instruments of human rights of the UN, the Council of Europe and the OSCE330

.

The protection of human rights is further protected by the Anti-Discrimination Law that has been

implemented in 2004331

. Important international legislation for this, is article 14 of the Convention for

the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which „prohibits discrimination on a

whole array of demonstrative grounds, inter alia, sex, race, colour, language, national or social origin

or association with a national minority‟332

. A problem, however, is, that the Slovak Republic does not

always share the same rhetoric as the EU does, especially considering the ´social´ aspects of the EU.

´Social inclusion´ (of minorities among others) is an EU concept which focuses on the protection of

the social aspect of European citizens. However, some Slovak citizens seem to dislike the term

„social‟. A probable reason for this could be that it reminds them of the Socialist zeitgeist before the

1990s333

. That could explain why the Anti-Discrimination Law was rejected twice by the Slovak

National Council before it was finally adopted.

The Slovak Republic experiences most problems with the protection of the human rights of

minorities. Because of the fact that section 7.6 is dedicated to minorities, this section will focus on the

anti discrimination legislation, the current human rights problems in the Slovak Republic and it will

329 P. Guran and A. Polakova, Human Rights, in: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov and M. Kollár (eds.), Slovakia 2006.

A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007 330

Interview B12. 331

Ibid . 332

„Ethnicity as a Statistical Indicator for the Monitoring of Living Conditions and Discrimination‟, by Friedich

Ebert Stiftung and UNDP, 2009, p. 35. 333

Interview B19.

71

provide information from human rights reports. In addition, the institutions that protect human rights

will be discussed. Finally, it will be demonstrated that statistical data also form a problem in the field

of human rights.

3.2.2.1 Anti-Discrimination Law

The Constitution of the Slovak Republic guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms to all

irrespectively, inter alia, of race; colour; language; belief and religion; national or social origin; and

belonging to a national or ethnic group. No single person can be harmed, advantaged or disadvantaged

for those reasons.334

In 2000, the European Council adopted two important directives concerning anti-

discrimination. Directive 2000/43/EC known as the Racial Equality Directive, and Directive

2000/78/EC also called the Employment Equality Directive. These directives aim to eliminate

discrimination on the ground of racial and ethnic origin; religion and belief; age; sexual orientation;

and disability. By the time the Slovak Republic entered the EU, these directives were already part of

the acquis communautaire. From this follows that it was part of the Copenhagen Criteria and that the

Slovak Republic had to implement these directives before accession.335

The implementation was

completed in Act No. 365/2004, which was adopted on the 20th of May 2004. This act, better known as

the Anti-Discrimination Act, was meant to amend and supplement other laws on anti-discrimination,

in order to reach European standards.336

In first instance, the European Commission had its reservations about the anti-discrimination

provisions as adopted in this act. Therefore, the Slovak Deputy Minister for Knowledge Society,

European Affairs, Human Rights and Minorities started an extensive process to amend this act. The

first amendment passed in June 2007 and was meant as a rapid response to the reservations of the

Commission. The second amendment passed the National Council in February 2008. These

amendments made the structure of the act clearer and applicable to social services as well. The second

amendment also made Slovak law in compliance with Directive 2004/113/EC on equal treatment

between men and women.337

Remarkably enough, with the adoption of this amendment, a provision which allows

affirmative action was introduced, which has always been a critical point in Slovak political debates.

In 2005 a previous provision on affirmative action was considered unconstitutional by the

Constitutional Court. It is thus not surprising that the new provision still seems reluctant towards

positive discrimination. The new provision only contains positive measures related to age and

disability and these measures can only be taken by public agencies.338

The third important change in

the Anti-Discrimination Act was the revision of the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights.

334 „Ethnicity as a Statistical Indicator for the Monitoring of Living Conditions and Discrimination‟, by Friedich

Ebert Stiftung and UNDP, 2009, p. 36. 335

M. Bell, I. Chopin, F. Palmer, „Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States

compared‟, by the European Commission, 2007, p. 10. 336

Ibid. 337

European Anti-Discrimination Law 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004. 338

„Slovakia‟, European Anti-Discrimination Law Review No. 6/7 – 2008, pp. 1,2.

72

In April 2008, the act was amended.339

With the amendment of 2008, this organ got to do

research and recommend on issues related to discrimination such as racism, xenophobia and anti-

Semitism. Besides, from then on it provides legal assistance for people who feel discriminated in one

of the above mentioned areas although the law has been rarely applied in practice.340

Unfortunately,

the centre has no concrete information about the amount of complaints of discrimination. It is

confirmed by several interviewees that the amount of cases which reach the court of NGOs is unclear

because there is no systematic system that counts these cases.341

Although Slovak provisions on anti-

discrimination seem to fulfil European standards completely, in practice there seems to be a lack of

experience with the concept of discrimination. Before the accession to the European Union, the notion

of discrimination did not exist in the Slovak law system. Under the communist regime, Slovak people

were judged on the basis of their legal position. Everyone was equal according to the law. Therefore,

judges are not used to this concept and to judging it.342

The definition that the Slovak government uses in the anti-discrimination law is based on the

definitions of EU directives. The difference between direct and indirect discrimination is that direct

discrimination is based on „comparing one person with another person when one person is treated less

favourably that the other person and where this less favourable treatment is motivated by a prohibited

reason like race or ethnicity‟343

. Indirect discrimination is „an apparently neutral instruction, provision,

decision or practice that would put a person at a disadvantaged position compared with other persons,

unless such instruction, provision, decision or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and

the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary‟. Direct discrimination is based on

comparison of individuals whereas indirect discrimination is based on comparing groups.344

The anti-discrimination law led to the Education Act which introduced “provisions regulating

the ways of integrating students with special educational needs to elementary and secondary schools”.

This law was adopted to decrease the gap between mentally weaker children, Roma and Slovakians

who attend school.345

A problem with this law is that new and judges tend to take a conservative

approach in discrimination cases. They have problems to adhere to human rights issues and

international standards.346

Educating these judges to better understand the concept of discrimination is

essential in this context. Besides the judges, the Slovak people seem to have problems with applying

this legislation as well. There is not enough knowledge among citizens of what this anti-discrimination

act entails.347

339 „Slovakia‟, European Anti-Discrimination Law Review No. 6/7 – 2008, pp. 1,2.

340 „Written Comments Concerning the Sixth, Seventh and Eight Periodic Reports of the Slovak Republic under

the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination‟, Centre for Civil and Human Rights,

January 2010. 341

Interview B19, D12; F.E. Stiftung, „Ethnicity as a Statistical Indicator for the Monitoring of Living

Conditions and Discrimination‟, UNDP, 2009, pp. 36-37. 342

Interview E18. 343

F.E. Stiftung, „Ethnicity as a Statistical Indicator for the Monitoring of Living Conditions and

Discrimination‟, UNDP, 2009, p. 38. 344

Ibid. 345

E. Gallova Kriglerova & J. Kadlecikova, Roma, in: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov and M. Kollár (eds.), Slovakia

2006. A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007 346

On the way to equality, 2008, Obcan a democracia 2008 347

„ECRI Report on Slovakia‟, by Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 26 May 2009

73

3.2.2.2 The Current Human Rights Situation in the Slovak Republic

The Slovak Republic is doing well in many areas of human rights. With regard to reports in citizens‟

rights and freedoms it offers and guarantees the freedoms that are embraced in the EU. The

International Helsinki Federation concluded that the main problems with human rights consist of

discrimination against Roma. This is visible in various areas such as housing, education, employment

and segregation.348

These problems are acknowledged by the Council of Europe and the EU.349

This

could be underlined by an example of a case of the European Court of Human Rights. This case was

about forcing Roma children to attend special schools for disabled children instead of regular

schools.350

Other general problems with human rights that still exist, concern inadequate protection of the

rights of the mentally handicapped; members of sexual minorities; migrants; asylum seekers; refugees

and gender equality.351

For example, the Slovak Republic has not yet ratified the International

Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Family.352

Furthermore, „the Slovak Republic has signed Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human

Rights which provides a general prohibition to discriminate, but it has not been ratified yet‟. Besides,

provisions of the Criminal Code regarding racially-motivated crimes are rarely implemented353

.

What could be seen as a resemblance in comparison with the other chapters on migration and

minorities, is the absence of statistical data on discrimination and violations of human rights. There are

no coherent statistics of these violations because the cases are scattered throughout different

organisations. The Slovak Equality Body, which is independent, should be the institution that holds

the comprehensive data.354

This lack of information forms a collective problem in all EU states, but in

particular in the Slovak Republic it is such a problem because it appears in many fields.355

In addition, there are reports of discrimination of religious groups. In the Slovak Republic, this

is becoming more violent, more extreme and better organised and above all, it is „entering the political

scene‟356

. „Organised Neo-Nazi groups, estimated to have 500 active members and several thousands

of additional sympathisers, promoted anti-Semitism and harassed and attacked minorities, including

Roma‟357

. Other groups that have been harassed are Hungarians; Jews; Africans; Asians and people

from Latin-America. Between 2006 and 2008, 492 racially-motivated crimes were registered.358

The

348 P. Guran , A. Polakova, Human Rights, in: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov and M. Kollár (eds.), Slovakia 2006. A

Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007 349

E. Gallova-Kriglerova – J. Kadlecikova, Roma,: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov and M. Kollár (eds.), Slovakia

2006. A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007 350

Interview C14. 351

P. Guran & A. Polakova, Human Rights, in: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov and M. Kollár (eds.), Slovakia 2006.

A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007 352

„ECRI Report on Slovakia‟, by Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 26 May 2009,

Written Comments Concerning the Sixth, Seventh and Eight Periodic Reports of the Slovak Republic under the

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination‟, by Centre for Civil and Human Rights,

January 2010 353

Ibid 354

Interview C14. 355

E. Gallova-Kriglerova & Jana Kadlecikova, Roma, in: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov and M. Kollár (eds.),

Slovakia 2006. A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007 356

Interview D17. 357

„Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2008‟, by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour,

25 February 2009 358

„ECRI Report on Slovakia‟, by Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 26 May 2009

74

Council of Europe is also warning the Slovak Republic for anti-Semitism and hate against Roma and

Hungarians. According to them, the situation has become worse because of the SNS participation in

the government. The report „European Commission against Racism and Intolerance‟ (2009) claims

that Slovak politicians have not condemned this situation. The most critical problem according to the

report is that the politicians are using the anti-minority sentiment in order to gain votes and that this is

widely accepted.359

Especially since the SNS is part of the government, the racist political discourse

has increased even more. This has an influence on the public opinion against minorities. However, in

2008, a department on Extremism and Youth Criminality was created within the Ministry of Interior360

Finally, there are also cases of police misbehaviour against minority groups and in particular

against the Roma. Complaints of Roma are not taken seriously and there are cases of mistreatment of

Roma in prisons361

. Another problem which should be improved is the situation of refugees in refugee

centres. They do not have the possibilities to integrate and the waiting processes for asylum are very

long. Besides, in most cases the centres have only people in charge that speak Slovak or Hungarian

and both languages are not the most prevailing languages for refugees. So far, facilities should be

improved.362

3.2.2.3 Human Rights Institutions

There are three main institutions in the Slovak Republic which fight discrimination and racism. These

are the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights, the Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Slovak

Republic for Roma and the Ombudsman. The Slovak National Centre for Human Rights monitors and

implements the anti- discrimination law. Since the installation of this centre in 2004, they have already

received 3500 complaints. This number would even be higher if all complaints were gathered. Most

complaints are from Roma about the workplace and facilities. The centre does not have the power to

represent the cases in court.363

The Office of the Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic for Roma

provides advice and guidance on the implementation of government programmes concerning Roma

especially in the fields of education, health, housing and social issues. They also try to standardise the

Roma language. For the period 2007-2013 a budget of 200 million euros is available to improve the

Roma situation.364

The Ombudsman receives complaints about discrimination and cooperates with the

judiciary, the police and prosecutors. In the last four years, the ombudsman received 14,000

complaints and 150 of them were discriminatory related.365

3.2.3 Slovak Police Force

The National Police of the Slovak Republic is the country‟s main law enforcement body and it is

subordinated to the Ministry of Interior. Act No 171/1993 Coll. of Laws on the Police lays down the

359 „Meer Antisemitisme en Racisme in Slowakije‟ (2009), by Mondiaal Nieuws, 07 March 2010

www.mo.be/index.php?id=63&tx_uwnews_pi2[art_id]=25243&cHash=7b18d4ea94. 360

„ECRI Report on Slovakia‟, by Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 26 May 2009 361

„Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2008‟, by Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour,

25 February 2009 362

ECRI Report on Slovakia‟, by Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, 26 May 2009. 363

Ibid. 364

Ibid. 365

Ibid.

75

tasks, powers and responsibilities of the police force members.366

The police is headed and managed

by the Police President who is appointed by the Ministry of Interior. The central headquarter is called

the Presidium of the Police and is situated in Bratislava. The special units of the organisation report to

other authorities. For instance, the Local Police reports to local governments, the Railway Police

reports to the Ministry of Traffic, the Military Police reports to the Ministry of Defence, the Customs

Authority reports to the Ministry of Finance and the Corps of Prison and Court Guards367

report to the

Ministry of Justice.368

The police force of the Slovak Republic has changed from a highly centralised and militarised

police force under Communist rule, into a more decentralised police force, defending public order and

fighting crime. This was also the case in most other neighbouring countries that dealt with the same

Soviet heritage.369

One of the changes was the amendment on Act No 171/1993 in 2002, which resulted in the

establishment of a Code of Ethics for police officers, in which human rights, freedoms and duties are

respected.370

Moreover, a reorganisation was carried out in 2003, which resulted in a new structure

since1 January 2004. In 2003, there were 125 regional and district units, consisting of 8 regional

headquarters, 54 district police headquarters, 8 regional offices of investigation and 55 district offices

of investigation. After the reorganisation, the number of units at regional and district level was

reduced from 125 to 49. Since 2004, there have been 8 regional police headquarters and 41 district

police headquarters.371

3.2.4 The Fight Against Organised Crime

3.2.4.1 The Schengen Agreement

Upon EU accession in 2004, the Slovak Republic signed the Schengen Agreement in order to benefit

from Europe‟s free border area. The key rules that had to be adopted within the Schengen framework

included:

- the removal of checks on persons at the internal borders;

- a common set of rules applying to people crossing the external borders of the EU Member

States;

- harmonisation of the conditions of entry and of the rules on visas for short stays;

- enhanced police cooperation (including rights of cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit);

- stronger judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and transfer of enforcement of

criminal judgments;

366 „European Police College (CEPOL)‟ (2010), retrieved 3 May 2010 from

http://www.cepol.europa.eu/index.php?id=slovakia. 367

The Court Guards is an armed corps performing tasks in the areas of maintenance of order and security in the

buildings of courts and prosecuting authorities. 368

„OSCE Policing On Line Information Service (POLIS)/„Country profiles‟/„Slovak Republic‟, by OSCE,

retrieved 3 May 2010 from http://polis.osce.org/countries/details?item_id=29. 369

K. András, Police in transition: essays on the police forces in transition countries, Budapest: Central European

University Press 2001, p. 41. 370

„European Police College (CEPOL)‟ (2010), retrieved 3 May 2010 from

http://www.cepol.europa.eu/index.php?id=slovakia. 371

Ibid.

76

- establishment and development of the Schengen Information System (SIS). 372

However, accession to Europe‟s free border area was delayed for three years by the European Council.

The most sensitive issue for the Slovak Republic was its eastern border with Ukraine, which was to

become one of the most important external borders of the EU, if Slovakia was to be included in the

Schengen area. Insufficient police capacity at this border also played a role. In 2006, 650 policemen

worked on the Slovak-Ukrainian border, while the estimated number of policemen needed was 900.373

On 21 December 2007 the European Council concluded that the criteria of the Schengen

acquis had been met and the Slovak Republic finally joined the Schengen area together with the Czech

Republic, Poland, Hungary, Malta, Slovenia and the Baltic States.374

The first step of the completion

of the Schengen area was the dismantling of land and sea border controls in 2007, followed by the

lifting of the air border controls on 30 March 2008.375

3.2.4.2 European Police Office (Europol)

Due to the abolishment of the internal border controls, police cooperation with other EU member

states has become very important for the Slovak Republic for combating cross-border organised

crime.376

The Slovak Republic became a member of Europol in 2004 and the country now cooperates

and exchanges information with other members in order to fight serious forms of organised crime. The

Slovak Europol department has 12 employees, including two liaison officers in The Hague, one head

of department and nine employees in Bratislava.377

In order to meet the Europol framework, Slovakia had to make some changes in the field of

police cooperation and the fight against organised crime. Between 2000 and 2004, specialised police

units had to be created in accordance with their counterparts in other member states, such as a

counterterrorism unit and a counter-corruption unit. This has been a plausible development, since the

created special units have more in-depth expertise.378

Furthermore, some legislation had to be

amended, such as the Police Act (Act No 171/1993) which has already been mentioned before. The

Code of Criminal Procedure was also amended in 2002, simplifying the pre-trial procedure by

removing the overlapping functions of the police officers and the criminal investigators.379

In 2002, the

Criminal Code was also amended, introducing terrorism as a criminal offence.380

Following the

372 „The Schengen Area and Cooperation‟ (2009), Summaries of EU legislation, retrieved 3 May 2010 from

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigrati

on/l33020_en.htm. 373

Summary of conference proceedings: Assessing the enlargement and consequences of the Schengen Area,

organised by the information office of the European Parliament in the Slovak Republic and representation of the

European Commission in the Slovak Republic, Kosice, November 2006 p., 3. 374

Summaries of EU legislation, retrieved 3 May 2010 from

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigrati

on/l33020_en.htm. 375

„Enlargement of the Schengen area to be completed: border controls to be lifted at airports on 30 March.‟, by

RAPID, retrieved 3 May 2010 from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/472&

format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 376

Interview B14. 377

Interview B14. 378

Interview B14. 379

COM (2002) 700 final. 380

Interview B14.

77

implementation of the Schengen acquis, Slovakia has common police stations together with Austria,

Poland, and Hungary and in the near future with the Czech Republic.381

Since border controls were lifted, the police cooperation of the Slovak Republic with Hungary,

Poland and the Czech Republic has intensified. Another result of Europol membership is that Slovakia

also cooperates with other countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The Slovak

Europol units exchange information with the UK regarding a large group of Roma residing in the Kent

district. Some of them commit fraud with social benefits, by registering children that do not exist. The

information exchange with the Netherlands is related to women trafficking.382

Major achievements

within the Europol cooperation included the arrest of five members of a criminal group involved in the

fraudulent international transport of goods, and successful operations against criminal gangs active in

illegal immigration from Moldova and Ukraine to Slovakia.383

3.3 The Slovak Criminal Code

The Slovak criminal law system consists of the Slovak Criminal Code, adopted in 1961, together with

the Criminal Procedure Code. The Criminal Procedure Code was amended in order to make it possible

to cooperate with the International Court of Justice.384

The Slovak Criminal Code is the most complex

form of legislation. In order to bring Slovak legislation in compliance with European Law, a new

criminal code was adopted in 2005, which came into force 1 January 2006.

The most important changes were new provisions on bribery, moreover, terrorism and

extremist actions were introduced as new crimes. To make the Slovak Criminal Code comply with the

acquis communautaire amendments were adopted regarding provisions on international cooperation,

confiscation orders and monetary sanctions. Yet, the Criminal Code still has to be changed to be in

accordance with international law. The draft amendments are discussed in parliament at the time of

writing this report. Adoption of these amendments is mainly a political question, so it has become very

difficult to finalise the changes in the Slovak Criminal Code. The Slovak Republic has already been

occupied with changing the critical points of the Code for ten years, especially those relating to

corruption.385

In 2004, the National Council appointed a commission for re-codification of the Criminal

Code and the Procedural Criminal Code. This commission was occupied with the task of bringing the

Slovak Criminal law system in accordance with international treaties that are binding for the Slovak

Republic.386

After 1989, the Slovak Criminal Justice System had already undergone some progressive

changes. In April 2002, the Slovak government launched a project to execute several experimental

381 Interview B14.

382 Ibid.

383 „Annual Report 2007‟ (2008), by Europol, retrieved 3 May 2010 from

http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Annual_Reports/Annual%20Report%202007.pdf 384

B. Boháčik, „International Agreements in the Legal Orders of the Candidate Countries‟, in: A. Ott and K.

Inglis, Handbook on European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, The Hague: T.M.C.

Asser Press 2002, pp. 324 – 327. 385

Interview B22. 386

„Steps taken to implement and enforce the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public

Officials in International Business Transactions: Slovak Republic‟ (2 October 2008), by OECD, retrieved 23

March 2010 from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/21/42103045.pdf, p. 1.

78

pilots in mediation and probation. The aim was to change the umbrella philosophy of the Slovak penal

policy. The project was carried out in cooperation with several NGOs. On the basis of this pilot project

an Act on Probation and Mediation Officers was developed, which became effective on 1 January

2004. From then on, 77 mediation and probation officers have been hired at every court in order to

gently transform the way courts operate.387

3.4 Decentralisation

In chapter four of the Slovak Constitution the provisions concerning Territorial Self-Administration

can be found. These provisions concern the decentralisation and the powers of lower governmental

entities. In the Slovak Republic there are two types of lower governmental entities, which are the

municipalities and the superior territorial units.

According to Article 64 of the Constitution, municipalities and superior territorial units are

independent territorial and administrative units. The provisions on how both entities function are laid

down in the articles that follow Article 64. Within the restrictions of law, both municipalities and

superior territorial units manage their budget from their own revenues. The bodies of a municipality

are the mayor and a representative body, both for a period of four years elected by the long-term

residents. Both are elected by secret ballot, on the basis of general, equal and direct right to vote. The

mayor represents the executive power of the municipality. Municipalities are allowed to associate with

other municipalities when they consider that more efficient.388

The bodies of a superior territorial unit are quite similar to those of a municipality. Superior

territorial units consist of a council of the territorial self-administration unit and a chairman of the

territorial self-administration unit. The chairman is the executive body of the superior territorial unit.

Both chairman and council are elected for a period of four years, by the permanent residents of the

unit, on the basis of general, equal and direct vote.389

There are eight superior territorial units (kraj)

and approximately 2800390

municipalities.391

The reform of decentralisation is a process that started in 1990. Under the Communist regime,

the regional level was controlled by committees, generated by the government. Local authorities

hardly had any executive power.392

After the abolishment of communism, the two federal entities of

Czechoslovakia tried to reform this system. In 1990, the Slovak Parliament passed law 369/1990 on

the functioning of the local authorities.393

The system of centrally generated committees had to be

387 J. Kunová, „Probation and mediation in the Slovak Republic‟ in: Newsletter of the European Forum for

Victim-Offender Mediation and Restorative Justice, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 1-2. 388

„Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, retrieved 17 February 2010 from www.nrs.sk, pp. 18–20. 389

Ibid. 390

D. Klimonovský, „Inter-communal Co-operation and Its Features: The Case of Slovakia‟, 3rd

Central

European Conference in Regional Science, CERS, 2009, p. 1108. 391

P. Lauritzen a.o., Youth Policy in the Slovak Republic: conclusions of the Council of Europe international

review, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2007, p.27. 392

J. Nemec a.o., „Local Government in Slovakia‟ in: Local Governments in Cental and Eastern Europe,

retrieved 20 March 2010 from http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2000/25/Chapter_7.PDF, p. 302. 393

B. Jarábik, „Equal Opportunities Policies and Decentralization in Slovakia‟, by Center for Legal Analyses-

Kalligram Foundation, retrieved 20 March 2010 from www.cla.sk, p. 4.

79

replaced by a system of local self-administration and self-government.394

In the Slovak Constitution,

which was developed after this law, this idea was incorporated. However, if something has been laid

down in the Constitution, it does not necessarily means that it is actually put into practice. After the

Slovak Republic came into existence in 1993, the reforms needed to be continued in order to put the

provisions provided by the Constitution into place.395

So far, the ideal as represented in the Constitution has not been completed. In law No.

222/1996 the reform of decentralisation was further developed. In this law it was stated that local

authorities were given the power to regulate almost everything necessary for their residents, except for

environmental issues and labour safety.396

The revenues municipalities get for 22.7% come from state

taxes. Specific grants counts for 17.5% from the state and the rest comes from revenues within the

competence of the municipality. These revenues include real estate taxes, property taxes, local taxes,

taxes for domestic animals, a part of the income taxes from which the other part goes to the state, and

loans.397

The local authorities thus have a relatively big mandate. The mandate a municipality gets, is

not determined on the basis of size. Every municipality, with the exception of Bratislava and Košice,

gets equal competences. 67% of the municipalities have less than 900 inhabitants. Based on the size of

their population, only Bratislava with 430,000 inhabitants398

and Košice with 236,000 inhabitants399

have the character of a city. Both are divided into town districts. Bratislava consists out of 17 town

districts and Košice consists of 20 town districts.400

The widely spread competences over the large

number of local authorities make Slovak policy fragmented.401

This has a major influence on, for

example, the difference in education or health care throughout the country.

The possibility for municipalities to associate makes the problem of fragmented policy even

bigger. There are four forms of inter-communal cooperation: national associations of universal

character; Joint Municipal Offices; voluntarily institutionalised regional associations and specific-

purpose associations. The most important form is the Joint Municipal Offices, of which joining takes

place on a voluntary basis. Joint Municipal Offices works on the basis of the principles of mutual

usefulness, equality and autonomy in the decision-making processes. They are used as a form of

cooperation since 2002. Currently, there are approximately 230 Joint Municipal Offices, but their

activities and to what extent they cooperate, varies. Cooperation mostly takes place on the topics of

public health care, water resource management, fire protection, land transport, construction

proceedings, nature and environmental protection, regional development and domiciliary services.402

394 J. Nemec a.o., „Local Government in Slovakia‟ in: Local Governments in Cental and Eastern Europe,

retrieved 20 March 2010 from http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2000/25/Chapter_7.PDF p. 304. 395

Ibid., p. 305. 396

Ibid., pp. 303-304. 397

Interview E1; J. Nemec a.o., „Local Government in Slovakia‟ in: Local Governments in Cental and Eastern

Europe, retrieved 20 March 2010 from http://lgi.osi.hu/publications/2000/25/Chapter_7.PDF, p. 305. 398

„The largest cities in Slovakia‟, retrieved 6 May 2010 from http://www.slovensko.com/about/slovakia-cities. 399

Ibid. 400

D. Klimonovský, „Inter-communal Co-operation and Its Features: The Case of Slovakia‟, 3rd

Central

European Conference in Regional Science, CERS, 2009, p. 1106. 401

B. Jarábik, „Equal Opportunities Policies and Decentralization in Slovakia‟, by Center for Legal Analyses-

Kalligram Foundation, retrieved 20 March 2010 from www.cla.sk, p. 5. 402

D. Klimonovský, „Inter-communal Co-operation and Its Features: The Case of Slovakia‟, 3rd

Central

European Conference in Regional Science, CERS, 2009, pp.1108, 1109.

80

However, in practice due to the many small municipalities which do not have enough

capacity, both in human and financial resources, most of the local revenues are allocated by

conditional grants or shared taxes from the national government.403

Besides the problems concerning a

fragmented Slovak policy and the problems with financial and human resources, the decentralisation

policy brings problems about what topic the central government should take responsibility for. Before

the decentralisation process started, the strategy was that the central government should keep

supporting activities of local governments linked to national interests such as infrastructure,

environmental protection and public-housing assistance. 404

Under the Mečiar government, hardly

anything happened in reforming the decentralisation structure. The first Dzurinda government, which

can be described an anti-Mečiar government, was in essence occupied with changing the policy

Mečiar had introduced. However, this government established the superior territorial units. So far,

these units are not functioning as efficiently as other governance layers. The Slovaks never knew such

a governance layer before and therefore are not used to govern at the regional level. Delegating

competences is difficult for every government, no matter the political colour, but during the

progressive second Dzurinda government, such competences were delegated more easily than during

the Mečiar government.

The competences of the region are EU-funds, secondary education, regional hospitals,

regional infrastructure and environment. Primary education, local police and all local issues fall within

the competences of the local governments. After the reforms under the Dzurinda government, the local

governments gained additional competences.405

On the basis of the Communal Reform proposal, this

government aimed to improve the decentralisation system by introducing laws on particular

competences which were carried out in five phases. In these five phases, local governments are given

competences on strictly defined subjects. After the installation of the Mečiar government in 2006, the

reforms were not mentioned in the program proclamation any longer. All the discussions on the

Communal Reform stopped. A Territorial Self-Government Commission was called into existence to

reconsider the dilemma of the discontinuity of policy, but this topic was definitely not an emphasised

issue for this government.406

To make the fragmented Slovak policy more coherent, the Government Council for Public

Administration was introduced. This council consists of 25 members among which are academic

experts and deputies from different representative bodies. The council explores existing measures and

potential effects of proposed legislation.407

However, the fragmented policy that the decentralisation

process brought is not the biggest problem. The main problem is that the more competences the local

governments have, the more difficult it becomes for the local governments to obtain financial

resources to bring all these competences effectively in practice.408

In principle, municipalities have

403 Interview E13; Bryson, P. J. “State administration” vs. self-government in the Slovak and Czech Republics.

In: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 41, 2008, p. 340. 404

D. Klimonovský, „Inter-communal Co-operation and Its Features: The Case of Slovakia‟, 3rd

Central

European Conference in Regional Science, CERS, 2009, p.1102. 405

Interview E1. 406

D. Klimonovský, „Inter-communal Co-operation and Its Features: The Case of Slovakia‟, 3rd

Central

European Conference in Regional Science, CERS, 2009, p. 1105. 407

G. Meseţnikov e.a, „Slovakia‟ in: D. Bushati, Nations in Transit 2009:Democratization from central Europe

to Eurasia, Rowman & Littlefield Pub Inc. 2009, p. 491. 408

Interview E1.

81

possibilities to get funds from the EU to resolve problems with, for example, minorities. In practice,

however, there is a lot of corruption in the allocation of these funds. Generally, just 30% of the money

ends up in where it belongs.409

It can be concluded that the Slovak decentralisation policy, which was developed to reach European

standards, entailed a complex system of governance layers and competences of these layers.

3.5 Corruption in the Slovak Republic

3.5.1 The Notion of Corruption

Debates on the notion of corruption definitions have always been an inherent feature of its analysis.

Illustrative in this regard is that United Nations (UN) has sought for twenty years to adopt an

international definition of corruption. Yet, a clear definition has never been adopted, despite a UN

Convention against Corruption in 2003.410

Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private

gain”411

. This definition has also been advocated by the UN Global Compact, which adds that private

gain does not only mean financial gain, but also non-financial advantages.412

Although definitions

differ, it is widely agreed that corruption can occur in many forms and that it has a negative impact on

the development of different aspects of society.

Table 3.1 Corruption Perception Index in V4 Countries, 1998-2001

COUNTRY 1998 1999 2000 2001

Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking

Poland 4.6 39 4.2 44 4.1 43 4.1 44

Hungary 5.0 33 5.2 31 5.2 32 5.3 31

Czech Rep. 4.8 37 4.6 39 4.3 42 3.9 47

Slovakia 3.9 47 3.7 53 3.5 52 3.7 51

Note: 10 = free of corruption, 0 = maximum degree of corruption (Ranking out of 180 countries)

Source: Transparency International413

The table above indicates that between 1998 and 2001, the perceived level of corruption in Slovakia

was the highest of the four Visegrad countries. Moreover, a ranking by Freedom House shows a small

409 Interview C15, E18.

410 „Defining Corruption‟, by OECD Observer, retrieved 1 April 2010 from

http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2163/Defining_corruption.html. 411

„Frequently asked questions about corruption‟, by Transparency International, retrieved 30 March 2010 from

http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq. 412

„Principle 10‟, UN Global Compact, retrieved 1 April 2010 from

http://www.unglobalcompact.org/aboutthegc/thetenprinciples/principle10.html. 413

The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index charts levels of corruption in 180 countries. It

was first launched in 1995 and is a poll of polls, reflecting the perceptions of business people, academics and risk

analysts, both resident and non-resident.

82

improvement regarding the level of corruption of the country between 2001 and 2006.414

Albeit these

slight improvements, in a 2009 press release of Transparency International the country ranked 56th

together with Namibia and Samoa out of 180 countries, showing a lower ranking than the country has

ever had before.415

The most important implication of these numbers is not the position of the Slovak

Republic in the world ranking, but its position compared to its neighbouring countries, because of their

comparable and shared history.

Corruption is also a frequent topic of public debate in the Slovak Republic. According to a

survey conducted in 2005 by the Public Opinion Research Institute of the Statistical Office of the

Slovak Republic, most Slovak citizens believe that corruption exists in health care (71%), or within

other areas such as the judiciary (34%), the educational system (31%), business (19%), the police

(18%), district and regional authorities (16%), and the privatisation process (14%).416

The respondents

of the survey also felt most compelled to give a bribe in the areas of healthcare, education, in courts

and to the police.417

Moreover, the healthcare sector is perceived to have the largest level of corruption in Slovakia

and giving modest presents is widely practiced. Some citizens characterise these mala pozornost as

small expressions of gratitude, while many regard them as a necessity to receive proper care.

According to a diagnostic survey of the World Bank and the United States Agency for International

Development, the reason for giving bribes in the education sector is either to gain admission to schools

and universities, such as medical or law schools, or in order to obtain better grades.418

From the interviews conducted in the Slovak Republic it can be established that there is a

widespread belief that corruption is accepted in Slovak society and that it can be found in almost all

aspects of society, from government to healthcare. The appointment of Mr. Harabin as the President of

the Supreme Court and therefore the perceived decline in the quality and independence of the judicial

system (see chapter on law enforcement) has led to a low level of trust among the Slovak public and to

enhanced beliefs that corruption is present. Corruption is said to have a long history in Slovakia and

bribing policemen when being fined is perceived as something normal.419

A report of the World Bank in 2000 also stated that corruption is widespread among judges

and court officials in the Slovak Republic.420

One-fifth of parties to court proceedings in Slovakia

reported to have experienced corrupt behaviour from judges. This usually took place in the form of

bribes to either influence the outcome of the cases or to accelerate their proceedings.421

According to

the Open Society Institute, Slovakia‟s main challenge was the strengthening of the rights of judges but

414 The Freedom House ratings are based on a scale from 1 to 7, whereby 1 represents the highest progress of

transition and 7 the lowest. In 2001 the ratings for corruption in Slovakia was 3.75, 3.25 for 2002, 2003 -2004

and 3.00 for 2005-2006. 415

„Corruption perceptions Index 2009‟, by Transparency International, retrieved 1 April 2010 from

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table. 416

„Nations in Transit 2006 Slovakia‟, by Freedom House, retrieved 1 April 2010 from

www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2006/slovakia2006.pdf, p. 16. 417

„Corruption in Slovakia: Ethical issues from a systematic point of view‟, retrieved 30 March 2010 from

www.aabri.com/LV2010Manuscripts/LV10042.pdf, p. 3. 418

Ibid. 419

Interview D3. 420

„Anticorruption‟, by World Bank, retrieved 09 June 2010 from

http://www.worldbank.sk/data/anticorruption.pdf. 421

COM (2002) 700 final

83

also the systems of supervision, as corruption is prevalent in society and judges‟ independence cannot

be guaranteed. Hence, effective monitoring by the media and watchdog groups and transparency of

court procedures are necessary elements to overcome corruption.422

Corruption scandals also had an impact on the Slovak political scene in 2005. Representatives

of opposition parties accused the minority ruling coalition of buying the votes of independent MPs in

order to secure ad hoc majorities before crucial votes. A secretly videotaped conversation that was

published in September 2005 confirmed these accusations.423

Furthermore, Pavol Rusko (ANO), the

Minister of Economy, was removed after having conducted obscure financial operations morally

incompatible with his post in September 2005. One month later, the Minister of Social Affairs Ľudovít

Kaník (SDKÚ) resigned after coming under strong public pressure initiated by the participation of his

wife‟s firm in a public tender to obtain financial assistance from EU funds.424

Moreover, corruption in

the call for tenders for EU funds seems to be no exception nowadays.425

3.5.2 Anti-Corruption Measures

In 1999, the Slovak Republic joined the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) which was

established by the Council of Europe (COE). Its objective is to improve the capacity of its members to

fight corruption by monitoring their compliance with COE anti-corruption standards. In its evaluation

report on Slovakia in 2008, the GRECO group stated that “the Slovak authorities have only been

successful in prosecuting corruption offences since very recently, although the first significant anti-

corruption measures date back to 1999”426

.

Table 3.2: Overview of the Slovak Republic Anti-Corruption Legal Framework

Draft Law: Entered into force:

Code of Ethics for Civil Servants427

31 July 2002

Draft Law on Special Court and Special Prosecutor‟s Office (Act No.

458/2003)

Adopted on 21 October 2003

Amendment on the Penal Code No. 457/2003 Coll.428

1 December 2003

Constitutional Law on Protection of Public Interest in Performing of

Duties of Public Officials429

Adopted in May 2004

New Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law January 2006

Source: UNDP430

422 „Monitoring the EU accession process: Judicial independence in Slovakia‟, Open Society Institute (2001), p.

430. 423

„Nations in Transit 2006 Slovakia‟, by Freedom House, retrieved 1 April 2010 from

www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2006/slovakia2006.pdf, p. 20. 424

Ibid. 425

Interview B6, D3, D20. 426

„Third Round Evaluation Report on the Slovak Republic on Incriminations‟, GRECO (2008), p. 22. 427

Act. No. 312/2002 Coll. on Civil Service, Act No. 131/2002 Coll., Act No. 143/2002 Coll. and Act No.

185/2002 Coll. 428

This amendment introduced prosecution for failure to disclose corruption and changed the approach to

corruption tolerance. 429

This law is to minimise the possibility of conflicts arising between private interests and public duties of public

office holders and provide for the resolution of such conflicts in the public interest. 430

„Anti-corruption practitioners network‟, by UNDP, retrieved 2 April 2010 from

http://europeandcis.undp.org/anticorruption/show/3B9BDA11-F203-1EE9-BA7EEB5EA1A462D3.

84

The government coalition of 1998-2002 pledged to give corruption a prominent place in its

program. Consequently, the Slovak government started a National Programme for the Fight against

Corruption in 1999 and Action Plans were drawn up the following year. The Action Plans are based on

three pillars: eliminating the situations in which corruption can occur; decreasing the risk resulting

from corrupt practices and enhancing public awareness to corruption. However, in 2003 the EC

concluded that many of the proposed actions remained vague.431

One of the most concrete anti-corruption measures that were carried out under the National

Programme was the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Department in 2003. However, it turned out

to be no real department, but rather a cooperation between the divisions of human rights and

international law of the Ministry of Justice; it worked on several draft laws or amendments to improve

the sanctioning of corruption (see table 3.2).

The 2008 GRECO Evaluation Report welcomed the establishment of the Special Court, which had led

to an increase in the number of cases processed and a more harmonised approach in dealing with

corruption cases.432

The Special Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear corruption cases, including

domestic and foreign bribery. It also dealt with organised crime, serious economic crimes and crimes

committed by government officials. Although the Special Court was de juris established in 2003, it

was not until 1 July 2005 that it became de facto operational, as a result of difficulties that had arisen

concerning the appointment of judges.433

Notwithstanding the GRECO´s positive reaction to the establishment of the Special Court, in

May 2009 the Constitutional Court ruled that it was not established in line with the Slovak Republic‟s

Constitution and therefore had to be eliminated. Several lawyers, foreign diplomats and opposition

parties expressed their concern by declaring it would seriously damage the reputation of Slovakia‟s

judicial system. Meanwhile, the ruling had been welcomed by the President of the Supreme Court

Stefan Harabin and a group of 46 ruling coalition deputies, mostly members of the Movement for A

Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). This group challenged the existence of the Special Court because it

would have jeopardised the separation of powers to the advantage of the executive powers. Moreover,

the compensation for the Court´s judges would have been disproportionate with its aim.434

From this

example, it follows that the executive involvement under the Fico government has led to a setback in

the fight against corruption that was initiated under the Dzurinda government.

Despite the government‟s anti-corruption measures, the Slovak Republic still does not

recognise the concept of criminal responsibility of legal persons. Slovakia ratified the Convention on

Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of the OECD in

1999 and therefore, the country should have implemented Article 2 of the Convention on the

431 „Anti-corruption practitioners network‟, by UNDP, retrieved 2 April 2010 from

http://europeandcis.undp.org/anticorruption/show/3B9BDA11-F203-1EE9-BA7EEB5EA1A462D3. 432

Third Round Evaluation Report on the Slovak Republic on Incriminations, GRECO (2008), p. 22. 433

Slovak Republic Phase 2. Report on the application of the convention on combating bribery of foreign public

officials in international business transactions and the 1997 recommendation on combating bribery in

international business transactions, OECD (2005), p. 25. 434

B. Balogová, „Slovakia to lose its Special Court‟, in: The Slovak Spectator (25-04-2009, retrieved 2 April

2010, http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/35358/2/slovakia_to_lose_its_special_court.html; Interview B6, C7.

85

responsibility of legal persons. Although attempts in this direction were made in 2005, implementation

still has not been achieved due to reluctance of the Slovak Parliament to ratify the draft law.435

3.5.3 Evaluation

In conclusion, corruption seems to be widespread in practically all aspects of Slovak society.

Accordingly, it can be found on the political level, but also in education, healthcare and among the

judges. To combat this trend, anti-corruption measures were initiated by the Dzurinda government,

several laws were amended to penalise corruption and a Special Court for corruption was put in place.

Consequently, this period also marked a slight decrease in the level of corruption of the Slovak

Republic. After the Fico government was installed, the level of trust among the public towards public

institutions declined due to several developments such as the appointment of Mr. Harabin as the

President of the Supreme Court and also the elimination of the Special Court for corruption. In

conclusion, the Fico government led to a setback in the fight against corruption that was initiated

under the Dzurinda government.

435 Slovak Republic Phase 2. Report on the application of the convention on combating bribery of foreign public

officials in international business transactions and the 1997 recommendation on combating bribery in

international business transactions, OECD (2005), p. 39; Interview B22.

87

4. Politics

In this chapter an overview will be provided of the political situation, both foreign and domestic, in the

Slovak Republic. The political transition that the country has experienced since 1989 and the process

of reform necessary for EU accession will be discussed. Moreover, an analysis of the democratic

development of the country after the accession to the EU will be provided. In addition, the chapter

consists of an overview of the political parties and the representation of these parties in the parliament.

Furthermore, attention will be given to the concept of political participation. The final section will

provide an analysis of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic. The bilateral relations with different

countries as well as the relationship with regard to the EU and other international organisations will be

discussed.

4.1 Political Transition and EU Accession

The institutional structure of Czechoslovakia was established by the 1968 constitution, which was an

attempt to bring a halt to political conflicts between two entities. The Czechoslovak Republic was

defined as a federal state, consisting of two separate entities – the Czech Republic and the Slovak

Republic – which both had a unicameral legislative body (the National Council) and a national

government. Both republics were granted a high degree of autonomy in certain policy areas, such as

education and cultural affairs. With the post-communist constitution of 1990 these areas were further

extended. In addition to the two National Councils governing the separate entities, the Czechoslovak

Republic was governed by a Federal Assembly (parliament) and a Federal Government. The Federal

Assembly consisted of two chambers: the Chamber of Peoples, elected on the basis of population,

resulting in a representation of twice as much Czechs than Slovaks, and the Chamber of Nations, in

which both entities were represented by 75 MPs. Legislation had to be passed in both chambers in

order to become law.436

4.1.1 Initial Reforms

Before 1989, during the Communist era, the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia enjoyed a

hegemonic position as its governing powers were recorded in the constitution. However, in late 1989

various political initiatives and associations of Slovak citizens emerged which challenged the

dominant position of the Communist Party.437

With the implementation of Gorbachev‟s politics of

„glasnost‟ and „perestroika‟ popular dissatisfaction with the communist regime increased leading to

various organised protests in Slovakia. Although the Czechoslovak Communist leadership attempted

to maintain its power, it eventually had to give in when a mass protest forced the Communist

436 P. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party Competition and Parliamentary

Institutionalization, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2001, pp. 29-30. 437

M. Rybář, Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia, in: S. Jungerstam-Mulders,

Post-Communist EU Member States. Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2006, p.

149.

88

leadership to resign.438

After the collapse of the Communist system, political opposition parties started

to materialise. As opposition movements had already been developing since 1968, it was fairly easy to

establish political opposition parties. The process resulted in two major democratisation parties: the

Civic Forum (OF) of the Czechs and Public against Violence (VPN) in Slovakia. Shortly after,

negotiations with the government over the end of guaranteed Communist rule were successfully

concluded.439

Following these negotiations the VPN and OF, together with the existing parliament – which

had removed most of its discredited members from the Communist era – decided on the

implementation of political and democratic reforms (the so-called Round Table talks). On 8 December

1989 a new government was installed (the so-called “Government of National Understanding”), which

reflected the achieved power alterations as the majority of the representatives were nominated by VPN

and OF. Shortly after, on 29 December of the same year, Václav Havel was chosen as the new

president of Czechoslovakia, for he was regarded to be the only common candidate of VPN and OF.440

In addition, a temporary, federal constitution, drafted by Czech dissident lawyers, was adopted

in 1990. However, with only minor amendments – regarding Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology

and the leading role of the Communist party – the new constitution did not radically differ from the

Communist constitution of 1968. The reformists thus opted for a conciliatory approach, rather than

radical change. One of the amendments that did get adopted involved a practical measure; it was

decided that both the regular five year presidential term and four year parliamentary term would be

shortened to two years, which was the expected time frame for drafting a new constitution.441

During the Round Table talks profound changes to the institutional design of the country were

decided upon by the three newly established institutional pillars – the president, the Federal Assembly

and the Federal government. With the Communist party being in a state of disarray, the VPN and OF

held a strong position in the reform talks. One of the most crucial reforms related to electoral law. In

February 1990, the majoritarian, or first-past-the-post, electoral system, which had been in place since

1939, was replaced by a system of proportional representation, in order to bolster pluralism. Although

the OF was divided on the issue, the party was persuaded by the VPN and other parties that such a

system was needed to allow for a complete spectrum of parties to be formed. Although the electoral

law was perceived to be temporary – applying to only the first free elections – it is currently still in

place.442

In addition the Federal Assembly adopted a law on political parties, in order to promote

pluralism. Not only did the law legitimise and legalise existing parties from the Communist era and

the newly emerged VPN and OF, the law also made it relatively easy for new parties to obtain a legal

status.443

Nevertheless, the majority of these new parties were initiated by people who were already in

parliament, rather than that they were the result of projects in society. However, through an agreement

438 M. Pittaway, „From Communist to Past-Communist Politics‟, in: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds.),

Development in Central and East European Politics, Durharn: Duke University Press 2007, p. 30. 439

P. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party Competition and Parliamentary

Institutionalization, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2001, p. 23. 440

Ibid., pp. 23-24. 441

Ibid., pp. 25-26. 442

Ibid., p. 27. 443

Ibid., pp. 27-28.

89

with the Communist party – the so-called process of co-optations – several new political associations

were able to compete in the first „free and fair elections‟ in June 1990.444

Although Czechoslovakia had a federal government at that time, both the Slovak and the

Czech part had their own separate parliamentary elections, which led to the development of two

autonomous party systems. The parties that received most of the votes in the two states made up the

federal government. After the first elections in June 1990 this did not lead to any problems as both

coalition parties were pro-democratic, pushing for economic, political and constitutional reform.445

The 1990 elections were a clear success for the VPN and OF, whereas the Communist party

suffered a painful defeat. However, due to fragmentation within the VPN, the party did not secure as

many seats as was initially expected. Nevertheless, the VPN and OF were able to form a federal

government, while a coalition of VPN and the successful Christian Democratic Party (KDH) was

established in the Slovak part.446

In addition, Vaclav Havel was re-elected as president of

Czechoslovakia by the federal government in that same year.447

Although the new government was able to implement profound economic and social reforms,

political developments stagnated. This was the result of unresolved disputes regarding the division of

powers between the federation and the two separate republics as well as the relation between the

government, the parliament and the president.448

Soon after the elections political tensions, as a result of disputes concerning the extent to

which Slovakia had made a clean break with its Communist past, reached a climax. Former dissidents,

who had been prosecuted for political reasons, put the government under pressure to call to account

those people who were believed to have served the Communist regime. In October 1991 the Lustration

Act was passed, which allowed for the Interior Ministry to dismiss or demote all persons of whom it

was confirmed that they had worked for the state security systems under the Communist rule.

Czechoslovakia‟s policies in this area were the most radical of all of the former Communist

countries.449

The political situation escalated when the VPN disintegrated in 1991 and former VPN-

member Mečiar established his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). While popular support

for Mečiar‟s nationalistic message increased, the demand for an independent Slovakia became a

serious question. In addition, the Slovak Party for the Democratic Left (the ex-communists) was

forced to break with its Czech counterpart, partly because of the former‟s support for Mečiar‟s

nationalistic approach. So when the second post-communist elections came in 1992, both republics

faced different political realities. While debate in the Czech part of the country focused on the

character of economic reforms and the responsibility for the communist heritage, the most salient issue

444 M. Rybář, „Old Parties and New: Changing Patterns of Party Politics in Slovakia‟, in: S. Jungerstam-Mulders,

Post-Communist EU Member States. Parties and Party Systems, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2006, p.

149. 445

Ibid., pp. 149-150. 446

J. Pehe, „Czechoslovakia‟s Political Balance Sheet, 1990 to 1992‟, in: RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No.

25, 1992, p. 24. 447

P. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party Competition and Parliamentary

Institutionalization, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2001, p. 29. 448

Ibid., pp. 29-35. 449

M. Pittaway, „From Communist to Past-Communist Politics‟, in: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds.),

Development in Central and East European Politics, Durharn: Duke University Press 2007, p. 35.

90

in the Slovak part was the Slovak independence question. When two ideologically different parties –

the Slovak nationalistic HZDS party and the Czech Civic Democratic Party (ODS) – won the elections

in the two separate entities in 1992, it was impossible to maintain the federal Czechoslovak state any

longer.450

4.1.2 The Mečiar Governments (1992-1998)

From the velvet divorce in 1993 until 1998 Slovakia‟s political scene was dominated by the HZDS and

its party leader and Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar. During this period, and particularly after the

HZDS‟s success in the 1994 national elections, the spread of democratic values was severely hindered

by Mečiar‟s authoritarian policies of nation building and his undemocratic actions aimed at political

opponents.451

The third Mečiar government (1994-1998) and the opposition held fundamentally different

views on what constitutes democracy.452

Because of these opposing views the Slovak political scene

during those years was characterised by sharp polarisation, causing the opposition and the governing

coalition to perceive each other as illegitimate.453

Although the government claimed to hold a pro-

integration stance and to work towards meeting the political conditions of the EU, its actual policies

did not live up to such democratic standards.454

This is illustrated by the many attempts of the

government to amend the constitution for their own party‟s advantage. Moreover, accountability

between state institutions was heavily violated as the Mečiar government carried through changes in

personnel in those institutions that were designed to check on the government‟s power.455

In other

words, the Mečiar government attempted to shield itself from any form of accountability. Moreover,

by consolidating its control over the police, prosecutors and a number of judges, the Mečiar

government averted any legal responsibility for its actions. 456

Seeing Mečiar‟s authoritarian policies it is no wonder that during the 1990s Slovakia was

described as the “hard case” of the post-communist world by political scientists. In addition, the

country was perceived as an exceptional case amongst the CEECs because of the high degree of party

organisation of the HZDS combined with severe centralisation of powers in the hands of this party and

its leader Mečiar in particular. From the HZDS‟s inception in 1991 until the elections of 2002 no other

Slovak party was able to win more votes in national elections or to even come close to the number of

votes the HZDS secured.457

450 P. Kopecký, Parliaments in the Czech and Slovak Republics. Party Competition and Parliamentary

Institutionalization, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited 2001, pp. 29-35. 451

M. Pittaway, „From Communist to Past-Communist Politics‟, in: S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds.),

Development in Central and East European Politics, Durharn: Duke University Press 2007, p. 34. 452

M. Bútora, „The Present State of Democracy in Slovakia‟, in: M. Kaldor en I. Vejvoda (eds.),

Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, New York: Pinter 1999, p. 96. 453

P. Kopecky en C. Mudde, „Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: the Czech and Slovak Republics‟,

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 16, Issue 3, 2000, p. 66. 454

M. Bútora, „The Present State of Democracy in Slovakia‟, in: M. Kaldor en I. Vejvoda (eds.),

Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, New York: Pinter 1999, p. 103. 455

P. Kopecky en C. Mudde, „Explaining Different Paths of Democratization: the Czech and Slovak Republics,

in: Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 16, Issue 3, 2000, pp. 66-67. 456

K. Deegan Krause, „Slovakia‟s Second Transition‟, in: Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, Issue 2, 2003, p. 66. 457

Ibid., p. 67.

91

In the 1998 Commission avis – a yearly evaluation report on the CEECs progress in the

application of the Copenhagen criteria – Slovakia was the only country that was judged to have failed

to meet the political conditions.458

The Commission judged that the institutional stability necessary for

the functioning of public authorities and for the consolidation of democracy was lacking. The Mečiar

government wilfully ignored the rights of the opposition and in addition, it did not respect the

delegation of powers to other political bodies. Therefore, the Commission concluded that Slovakia

could not be recommended for EU accession negotiations. However, the Commission also noted that

the fact that Mečiar was voted out of the government was evidence that Slovakia‟s political transition

was moving in the right direction.459

4.1.3 The Dzurinda Governments (1998-2006)

Indeed, the 1998 elections saw a victory for the opposition parties. The turnout of 84% was

exceptionally high, which partly reflected the population‟s discontent with Mečiar‟s authoritarian

regime. Moreover, for the first time since the communist era, voter turnout among the urban and better

educated population was higher than among the rural and often conservative population, who on

average are more susceptible to Mečiar‟s type of authoritarianism.460

Although Mečiar‟s HZDS still

remained the largest party, it was not able to form a majority coalition with its former allies, including

the nationalistic SNS. Instead, a coalition of four former opposition parties was established, consisting

of several (social-) democratic parties and the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK). Mikuláš

Dzurinda of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) became the new prime minister. The

coalition held a majority of 93 – out of 150 – seats in parliament, which was enough to implement

profound reforms. Although the coalition parties differed in political programmes and ideology, they

were all committed to implementing democratic criteria and the rule of law as well as to the

integration of Slovakia into the European Union and NATO.461

One fundamental difference between the Mečiar and the Dzurinda governments was that, in

contrast to Mečiar‟s cabinet, which was for the largest part made up of former Communists, half of the

twenty ministers of Dzurinda‟s cabinet had never been a member of the Communist Party. In addition,

they could all speak at least one western language. Another important difference was that the

Hungarian minority held no less than three ministerial positions in Dzurinda‟s cabinet, whereas

Mečiar‟s policy towards minorities had been oppressive and undemocratic.462

This change in cabinet and government mentality resulted in the immediate establishment of a

dialogue between Dzurinda and the European Commissioner for Enlargement at a high political level.

They agreed to set up a European Commission/Slovakia High Level Working Group that assisted

Slovakia in its preparation for EU accession negotiations by giving policy advice on accession-related

issues and by providing training for government officials, members of parliaments and representatives

458 K. Henderson, „Slovakia and the Democratic Criteria for EU Accession‟, in: K. Henderson (ed.), Back to

Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, Abingdon: Routledge 2004, p. 221. 459

G. Pridham, „Complying with the European Union‟s Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party

Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia, 1993-1998‟, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 7, 1999, p. 1223. 460

M. Bútora, Z. Bútorova and G. Meseţnikov, „Slovakia‟s Democratic Awakening‟, in: J. Rupnik and J.

Zielonka, The Road to the European Union: The Czech and Slovak Republics, Manchester: Manchester

University Press 2003, p. 52. 461

Ibid., pp. 52-53. 462

Ibid., p. 60.

92

from NGOs. According to an influential Slovak representative to the High Level Working Group, the

Group played an essential role in Slovakia‟s accession to the EU; through the High Level Working

Group the Slovak representatives knew which areas were crucial to focus on. It is interesting to note

that this High Level Working Group was established exclusively for the assistance of the Slovak

Republic. Other post-Communist countries did not have this privilege.463

Another significant facilitator of the democratisation process in Slovakia was the

establishment of transnational linkages between Slovak parties and their ideological counterparts both

at the EU level and in the member states.464

These transnational party linkages took different forms,

such as linkages with party groups in the European Parliament, bilateral links between Slovak parties

and their counterparts in other European countries or direct linkages with EU party federations. The

idea of these linkages was to help the emerging parties in Slovakia to develop a party identity and

political programme, to assist them in acquiring the necessary political experience and expertise and to

help them build up a party organisation. During the 1990s the democratising character of these

linkages was strengthened when the tasks of the established EU parties and party organisations was

extended with training, material support and political monitoring.465

Although these linkages have been beneficial in the democratisation process of the country,

not all parties were able to develop such linkages. The three parties of the third Mečiar government

encountered difficulties because of ideological reasons; either there were no viable partners (as was

the case with the extreme nationalist party SNS) or the Slovak parties did not conform to the European

party formations.466

On the other hand, opposition parties exploited their party linkages in their conflict with the

Mečiar government, as these linkages provided for external solidarity. This can be illustrated by the

effort of the Mečiar government to have the Democratic Union (DU) expelled from parliament in

1994. Support from external parties and party organisations greatly helped the DU to defend itself and

eventually maintain its position in parliament. Moreover, the participating parties of the Dzurinda

coalition benefited greatly from these party linkages as they helped introduce democratic principles

and practices in the political system.467

During the Dzurinda government profound reforms were carried through to strengthen

Slovakia‟s democratic system. First of all the Slovak constitution was amended in such a way that it

no longer provided for major loopholes, which had enabled Mečiar to establish an authoritarian

regime. These amendments concerned more than half of the constitutional provisions, contributing

significantly to Dzurinda‟s democratic reforms. Consequently the constitution guaranteed a deeper

democratic character and strengthened the regulation of activities of particular institutions, which

fundamentally improved the country‟s system of checks and balances. The government also

established a number of new institutions, crucial for a democratic society, such as an ombudsman for

human rights and the Judicial Council. In addition the position of the Constitutional Court was

463 Interview A12.

464 G. Pridham, „The European Union‟s Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: The

Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared‟, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2002, p. 215. 465

G. Pridham, „Complying with the European Union‟s Democratic Conditionality: Transnational Party

Linkages and Regime Change in Slovakia, 1993-1998‟, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 51, No. 7, 1999, p. 1225. 466

Ibid., p. 1231. 467

Ibid., p. 1233.

93

strengthened and a second level of self-governments was established, i.e. regional parliaments for the

higher territorial units (kraj).468

Other important reforms included changes in election legislation, such as the popular election

of the president and the adoption of the Act on a Free Access to Information, which functioned as an

important catalyst for a number of positive changes. Moreover, major improvements were made in the

implementation of minority rights, which were made possible by the adoption of the Act on the Use of

Languages of Ethnic Minorities and the ratification of the Charter of Minority and Regional

Languages. The constitutional amendments also provided for the possibility to transfer Slovak

sovereign rights to the European Union and it also confirmed the precedence of legally binding acts of

the EU over Slovak legislation. According to the new constitution Slovakia is free to join any

organisation of mutual collective security.469

The replacement of the Mečiar by the Dzurinda government in 1998 indeed proved to have

been beneficial for Slovakia‟s democratisation process. The Commission‟s second avis of 1999

concluded that Slovakia fulfilled the political conditions, but at the same time continued efforts were

needed to guarantee the stability of democratic institutions. The third Commission avis of 2000 judged

that Slovakia continued to meet the political accession criteria and that the democratic consolidation

and institutional stability were further enhanced.470

In 1999, the Slovak Republic was allowed to enter

into accession negotiations with the EU, two years later than most of the other CEECs. However, by

2002, Slovakia had managed to close preliminary more chapters of the acquis communautaire than

most of the other CEECs. The Commission‟s Comprehensive Monitoring report of 2003 concluded

that the stability of institutions, which is crucial for guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, was

present in Slovakia. The country thus fulfilled the political criteria to join the European Union.471

However, the Commission also observed that improvements were still needed in the field of

the administrative and judicial capacity. First of all, the reform of the eight self-administrative regions

was not yet complete. In addition, the Commission pointed out the insufficient levels of staffing in

those sectors that dealt with issues relating to EU accession. This was mainly due to a high number of

civil servants exchanging the public sector for the private sector. With regard to the Judicial Council

the Commission called for the financial independence of the Council and improvement in its material,

funding, staff and technical resources. Moreover, the length of the civil and commercial cases in

particular was described as problematic. The Commission also concluded that corruption was still

widespread in Slovakia, particularly in the health care sector, education, police and the judiciary.

Furthermore, improvements were needed in the transparency of the funding of political parties. The

468 G. Meseţnikov, „Slovakia: Consolidation of Democracy with State Sovereignty‟, in: Review of International

Affairs, Vol. 50, Issue 52, 2003, p. 1080. 469

M. Bútora, Z. Bútorova and G. Meseţnikov, „Slovakia‟s Democratic Awakening‟, in: J. Rupnik and J.

Zielonka, The Road to the European Union: The Czech and Slovak Republics, Manchester: Manchester

University Press 2003, pp. 64-65. 470

G. Pridham, „The European Union‟s Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: The

Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared‟, in: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2002, p. 209. 471

G. Meseţnikov, „Slovakia: Consolidation of Democracy with State Sovereignty‟, in: Review of International

Affairs, Vol. 50, Issue 52, 2003, p. 1080.

94

Commission report observed that Slovakia had already commenced implementing measures to

improve its situation, but these measures had not yet proved to have been sufficient.472

4.1.4 Democratic Development after EU Accession

The reforms that were implemented between 1998 and 2006 supported democratic practices, while at

the same time limiting authoritarian practices carried out by populist parties that served in opposition

during this period. However, since Slovakia‟s accession to the EU, political conditionality has become

much less effective, particularly regarding party politics. Consequently, political parties were no

longer “detached” from forming coalition alliances with populist or radical parties, as the influence of

international (non-)acceptance had declined. As a result, the 2006 parliamentary elections produced a

coalition of both soft and hard populist parties comprising the Smer, HZDS and SNS parties, led by

Prime Minister Fico of the Smer party.473

The Fico government is known for being critical of the reforms that were carried out by the

previous Dzurinda government. Moreover, the current government also criticises certain aspects of the

country‟s development in the political and socio-economic area since 1998.474

This discontent is

reflected in the program manifesto of the Fico government, which states that “the need to change

previous attitudes is clear”.475

Although the Fico government expressed the intention to fulfil its

obligation as both a NATO and an EU member state, there are indications that the current government

has at least sought to revise certain (democratic) reforms that were carried through between 1998 and

2006. First of all, shortly after the 2006 elections, the Fico government strengthened its grip on power

by concentrating power in the hands of the ruling parties and the Smer in particular. Through laws and

executive decisions taken by the government various personnel changes regarding public posts took

place; some of these changes involved reinstalling individuals that were ousted from public posts after

Mečiar‟s election defeat in 1998.476

However, these personnel changes primarily focused on replacing

representatives from the SMK party, so as to reduce the political influence and participation of the

Hungarian minority. Within six months after the Fico government had been installed all the SMK

nominees holding important posts in central state organs had been dismissed.477

Significant personnel

changes also took place on the regional level, with the government focusing on party affiliation rather

than qualifications. The concentration of power, particularly in the hands of the Smer party, had not

been this serious since the collapse of communism in 1989.478

472 European Commission, „Comprehensive monitoring report on Slovakia‟s Preparations for Membership,

Slovakia‟ (2003), COM(2003) 675 final, retrieved 2 April 2010 from

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_sk_final_en.pdf, pp. 11-14. 473

G. Meseţnikov, O. Gyárfášová, M. Bútora and M. Kollár, „Slovakia‟, in: G. Meseţnikov, O. Gyárfášová and

D. Smilov (eds.), Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava: Institute

for Public Affairs 2008, p. 103. 474

Ibid., p. 22. 475

Ibid., p. 37. 476

Ibid., p. 22. 477

G. Meseţnikov, „Domestic Politics and the Party System‟, in: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov and M. Kollár

(eds.), Slovakia 2006. A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007, pp.

37-38. 478

Ibid., pp. 22-23.

95

Secondly, the Fico government has the highest ratio of former members of the Communist

party since 1990: 10 out of 16 cabinet ministers. To compare, the second Dzurinda government had

only one former Communist minister.

Thirdly, the cabinet seats are divided amongst the parties in a ratio that does not represent the

distribution of seats in the National Council: Smer holds 11 of the 16 ministerial posts, whilst having

50 seats in parliament, whereas the SNS party only holds 3 ministerial posts, with 20 seats in

parliament. Moreover, the most important executive posts are assigned to the Smer party – those being

the posts of prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, minister of defence, interior minister, finance

minister and minister of economy.479

Fourthly, the program manifesto of the Fico government only briefly mentions the issues of

democracy, rule of law, public administration and self-governance. The program does not contain any

commitments for improving the performance of constitutional institutions and other public organs.

Moreover, with regard to public administration and local democracy the program manifesto only

provides for general resolutions.480

It has been argued that the political reforms that were carried out by the two Dzurinda

governments as part of the „catching-up‟ process may to some extent have been implemented too fast

and as a consequence may have been unstable. This could have attributed to the Fico government

being able to reverse some of these reforms and move away from the path of democratisation.481

However, this statement is refuted by one of the coalition parties, who claims that they have always

supported EU membership and that the current government has continued rather than reversed the path

of reform that was started by the two Dzurinda governments.482

4.2 Overview of Political Parties

After having discussed the process of political transition and EU Accession, an overview of the

political parties and their previous and current representation in the parliament will be discussed in this

section. A short description will be given of the following parties: Social Democracy (Smer-SD), the

Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ–DS), the Slovak National Party

(SNS), the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP), the People‟s Party – Movement for a

Democratic Slovakia (ĽS – HZDS), the Christian Democratic Party (KDH) and Freedom and

Solidarity (SaS).

4.2.1 Direction – Social Democracy (Smer-SD)

With 50 seats in the Slovak National Council the Smer – Sociálna Demokracia (Smer-SD, usually

called Smer) by far is the largest party of the Slovak Republic. The party was founded in 2002 by

current party leader and Prime Minister Robert Fico after a breakaway from the Party of the

Democratic Left (SDL, the former communist party) in 1999. In 2005 Smer merged with other, much

smaller, social democratic parties and was renamed Smer – Social Democracy. The Smer party

479 Ibid., p. 36.

480 Ibid., pp. 36-37.

481 Interview A12.

482 Interview D16.

96

quickly rose in popularity among the Slovak population and after the party‟s victory in the 2006

elections it was able to form a government with the SNS and HZDS.483

The Smer party describes itself

as social democratic, focusing on a social market economy with a strong role for the state. 484

Moreover, Smer is a strong proponent of a nationalist orientation in politics, which is illustrated by

their “pro-Slovak” position in international relations and ethnic issues.485

The majority of the

supporters of the Smer party are voters from the middle class.486

Currently, the Smer party holds five seats in the European Parliament and it has been a

member of the Party of European Socialists (PES) since 2005.487

However, in October 2006 the Smer

was temporarily suspended from the PES because of entering a government coalition with the SNS;

the PES claimed the SNS stirred up racial and ethnic hatred. However, in February 2008 Smer was

readmitted to the PES.488

4.2.2 Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ–DS)

The Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická strana (SDKÚ-DS, or simply SDKÚ)

has existed in its current form since 2006 as a result of a merger with the Democratic Party (DS).

Between 1998 and 2006 the SDKÚ was part of the governing coalition and its party leader, Mikuláš

Dzurinda was Prime Minister in this period. Currently, the party is led by Iveta Radičová, who was

defeated in the 2009 presidential elections by current President Ivan Gašparovič.489

The SDKÚ can be

described as a liberal and conservative party that follows Christian-democratic values. With regard to

Europe the party characterises itself as pro-European.490

The SDKÚ holds 31 seats in the National Council but the election polls for the June 2010

elections show a serious decline in votes for the SDKÚ. Part of these votes would have been lost to the

SaS party, as their ideas are closely linked to those of the SDKÚ.491

The SDKÚ currently holds two

seats in the European Parliament and it is part of the European People‟s Party (EPP).492

4.2.3 Slovak National Party (SNS)

The Slovenská Národná Strana (SNS) characterises itself as a centre-right traditional patriotistic party

that holds conservative values.493

However, the SNS is often described as ultra-nationalist or even

extreme right-wing. These labels can be attributed to the party‟s hostile attitude to ethnic minorities in

483 Website Smer-SD, retrieved 01 May 2010 from http://www.strana-smer.sk/260/profil-strany.html.

484 Interview D16.

485 G. Meseţnikov and O. Gyárfášová, „National Populism in Slovakia‟, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs

2008, p. 10. 486

Interview D16. 487

European Parliament, retrieved 01 May from

2010.http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch/search.do?country=SK&language=EN 488

G. Meseţnikov and O. Gyárfášová, „National Populism in Slovakia‟, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs

2008, pp. 10-11. 489

Website SDKÚ-DS, retrieved 01 May 2010 from http://www.sdku-ds.sk/content/historia-sdku-ds. 490

Interview A17. 491

M. Stanková, „Polls Suggest Centre-right Comeback‟, in: Slovak Spectator, 22 February 2010, retrieved 01

May 2010 from http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/37997/2/polls_suggest_centre_right_comeback.html. 492

Website European Parliament, retrieved 01 May from 2010 from

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch/search.do?country=SK&language=EN. 493

Interview C13.

97

Slovakia, and the Hungarian minority in particular.494

Founded in 1989, the SNS is the oldest party of

Slovakia. Since its establishment the party has been able to win seats in every parliamentary election,

with the exception of the 2002 elections, when the SNS party split up into two separate national

parties. Currently the SNS holds 19 seats in the National Council and together with Smer and HZDS it

is part of the government. Ján Slota, co-founder and current chairman of the party is known because of

his controversial statements regarding the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.495

During its time in government the SNS has on several occasions been associated with

corruption scandals. As many of the investigations into these scandals have not yet been concluded, it

is impossible to officially establish whether the SNS was indeed involved in corruption issues.496

However, there are certain indications that these accusations are based on true facts and thus could be

true.497

Others rather believe that the accusations of corruption can be credited to the opposition parties

and the media as they try to manipulate the electorate for the upcoming parliamentary elections of

June 2010.498

The election polls do not look very positive for the SNS. In fact, the party may not even

be able to make the 5% threshold.499

In the 2009 European Parliament elections the SNS won its first

seat. The SNS is a member of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD).500

4.2.4 Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP)

The Strana Mad‟arskej Koalície – Magyar Koalíció Pártja (SMK-MKP, often abbreviated to SMK) is

“the common, legitim[ate] political representative of the Hungarian community in the Slovak

Republic”.501

The party came into existence in 1998 as a result of a merger between three separate

Hungarian parties, which were the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Coexistence and the

Hungarian Civic Party.502

The SMK-MKP describes itself as Christian democratic and slightly

conservative. With regard to human life they hold Christian values and are rather conservative.

However, in terms of economic policy the party can be characterised as neo-liberal. Although the party

claims to represent all Slovak citizens, its main voting group is the Hungarian minority (an estimated

95%). Between 1998 and 2006 the SMK-MKP was part of both of the Dzurinda governments. Their

main achievements in this period were the establishment of the Hungarian University in Komárno and

the neo-liberal economic policies that were carried out during this period. 503

In 2009 former chairman Béla Bugár established his own political party (Most-Hid, or

Bridge), after disputes over the nationalistic approach of current chairman Pál Csáky. It is estimated

494 S. Fried, „Ultra-Nationalism in Slovak Life: An Assessment‟, in: East European Jewish Affairs, Vol. 27, Issue

2, 2007, p. 97. 495

Ibid., p. 101. 496

Interview D16. 497

Interview C12. 498

Interview C13, B18. 499

M. Stanková, „Transparancy International Ranks Slovak Political Parties in Fight Against Corruption‟, in:

Slovak Spectator, 27 April 2010, retrieved 01 May from

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/38698/10/transparency_international_ranks_slovak_political_parties_in_fig

ht_against_corruption.html. 500

Website European Parliament, retrieved 01 May 2010

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch/search.do?country=SK&language=EN. 501

Website SMK-MKP, retrieved 01 May 2010 from

http://www.mkp.sk/eng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=40. 502

Ibid. 503

Interview B11.

98

that the SMK will lose 30% of its followers because of this split.504

Currently, the SMK-MKP holds 20

seats in the National Council and it has 2 representatives in the European Parliament. Since 2004 the

party has been a full member of the European People‟s Party (EPP).505

4.2.5 People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (ĽS – HZDS)

The Ľudová Strana – Hnutie Za Demokratické Slovensko (ĽS – HZDS, often abbreviated to HZDS) is

often characterised as a conservative party. The party‟s ideology is based on three pillars: a social, a

national and a Christian pillar.506

The party currently holds 13 seats in the Slovak National Council

and it is part of the current coalition government together with Smer and SNS. The party was founded

by Vladimír Mečiar in 1991 and under his leadership the HZDS led three governmental coalitions

between 1992 and 1998.507

Although it is often said that Mečiar did not carry through the necessary

(political) reforms in order to become an EU member, the party itself claims it has supported the

European integration process from the very beginning.508

The HZDS has 2 seats in the European

parliament. After having been rejected by the EPP, because the political position of the HZDS party

did not conform to the norms of the EPP, the party joined the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for

Europe in 2009.509

4.2.6 Christian Democratic Party (KDH)

The Krest‟ansko Demokratické Hnutie (KDH) is a conservative party that was founded in 1990 and it

was part of both of the Dzurinda governments (1998-2006). However, in February 2006 the KDH left

the governing coalition because of a dispute between Slovakia and the Holy See.510

Currently, the

KDH serves in the opposition of the Slovak parliament, where it holds 14 seats.511

The party‟s current

leader, Ján Figel‟, was the Slovak chief negotiator in the EU accession talks and he has also served in

the first Barroso Commission from 2004 until 2009.512

In the European Parliament the KDH is

represented with one seat and it is part of the European People‟s Party (EPP).513

504 Interview B11.

505 Website SMK-MKP, retrieved 01 May 2010 from

http://www.mkp.sk/eng/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=40. 506

Interview E6. 507

Website ĽS-HZDS, retrieved 01 May 2010 from http://www.hzds.sk/?mod=clanky&par=strana-historia-

strany&menu=41. 508

Interview E6. 509

P.G. Lewis, „Changes in the Party Politics of the New EU Member States in Central Europe: Patterns of

Europeanization and Democratization‟, in: Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 8, 2008,

p. 160; Website European Parliament, retrieved 1 May 2010 from

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch/search.do?country=SK&language=EN. 510

The dispute involved an international treaty between Slovakia and the Holy See concerning conscientious

objection (the right to refuse military service on grounds of freedom of thought, conscience or religion). The

KDH labelled adoption of the treaty as a top priority of the government, whereas coalition partner SDKÚ

considered the content of the treaty to create unequal status between Christians on the one hand and people of

other religions and atheists on the other. When the KDH gave an ultimatum to Prime Minister Dzurinda and

when he in turn did not respect this ultimatum, the KDH decided to leave the governing coalition. 511

Website KDH, retrieved 01 May 2010 from http://staryweb.kdh.sk/article.php?historia. 512

„Curriculum Vitae Ján Figel‟, retrieved 01 May 2010 from

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/figel/profile/profile_en.htm. 513

Website European Parliament, retrieved 01 May 2010 from

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch/search.do?country=SK&language=EN.

99

4.2.7 Freedom and Solidarity (SaS)

Founded in 2009 Sloboda a Solidarita (SaS) is a very young party. SaS is a classical liberal party that

is very conservative regarding fiscal issues, yet rather liberal and progressive regarding gay issues and

gender equality. With regard to Europe the party describes itself as „Eurocareful‟: SaS is not anti-

European, but the party does want to limit the powers of the EU, as the EU would waste too much

money.514

Under the chairmanship of founder Richard Sulík, the SaS is raising in popularity in the run

up to the June 2010 parliamentary elections. It is therefore expected that the party will fairly easily

make the 5% threshold needed to be represented in parliament.515

Table 4.1: Distribution of Seats in the Slovak National Council as of 17 June 2006

Party Number of seats Government / Opposition

Smer 50 Government

SNS 20 Government

HZDS 15 Government

SMK-MKP 20 Opposition

SDKÚ 31 Opposition

KDH 14 Opposition

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic516

4.2.8 The Parliamentary Elections of June 2010

On Saturday 12 June, parliamentary elections were held in the Slovak Republic. The party Smer

remained the biggest party, since they received 34.78% of the votes, resulting in 62 seats in the

parliament (table 4.2). However, the other former coalition partners of Smer were less fortunate;

HZDS won only 4.32% of the votes, falling below the threshold of 5%, meaning that the party will not

be represented in parliament. The SNS received 5.07% of the votes and has, therefore with only a

narrow margin, assured representation in the parliament. The SDKÚ, led by Iveta Radičová, was able

to collect 15.4% of the votes, resulting in 28 seats in parliament. The new party SaS received 12.14%

of the votes, thus 22 seats. The Christian Democratic Party managed to collect 8.52% of the votes and

the new Most-Híd party 8.12%, resulting in respectively 15 and 14 seats for these parties in

parliament. In addition to HZDS, the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK) also failed to collect enough

votes to remain in parliament. The party received only 4.33% of the votes.517

Since Smer continues to be the biggest party after the elections, party leader Fico has been

charged by President Ivan Gašparovič to start negations with other parties in order to form a

government. However, since all the leaders of the centre-right parties have stated that they will not

negotiate nor cooperate with Smer, the process of forming a new government is likely to be a difficult

process. At the moment of writing this report, the outcome of this process is still uncertain.

514 Interview A1.

515 Slovak Spectator, „Polls Suggest Centre-right Come-back‟, in: Slovak Spectator, 22 February 2010, retrieved

01 May 2010 from http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/37997/2/polls_suggest_centre_right_comeback.html,. 516

„Election Statistics‟, by Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic retrieved 04 May 2010 from

http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=5684. 517

„Right wing prevails; HZDS out‟, in: Slovak Spectator, 13 June 2010, retrieved 17 June 2010 from

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/39196/2/right_wing_prevails_hzds_out.html.

100

Table 4.2: Distribution of Seats in the Slovak National Council as of 12 June 2010

Party Number of seats Government / Opposition

Smer 62 Opposition

SDKU 28 Government

SaS 22 Government

KDH 15 Government

Most-Híd party 14 Government

SNS 9 Opposition

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic518

4.3 Political Participation

An important aspect of the political situation in a country is political participation. A short description

of the degree of political participation during Communism will be provided. In addition, by means of

the concepts voter turnout, uninstitutionalised political participation, voter volatility and party

membership an assessment will be given of the degree of political participation in the Slovak Republic

after 1989.

4.3.1 Political Participation under Communism

The doctrine of the Soviet communist regime placed a strong emphasis on (mass) public participation

in political life, not only in terms of voting and elections but also in the administration of the state.

Political participation was thus certainly not absent in the former communist states, particularly in

comparison with Western European democracies. For instance, around 99% of the people who were

eligible to participate in elections were claimed to vote in every election. Moreover, a considerable

part of the population was a member of the communist party, as well as of other public organisations.

This has led some political scientists to conclude that the communist system was an even more

participant system than for example the political system of the US.519

However, two factors that have to be taken into account in this matter are whether the

communist system was based on voluntary or compulsory participation and whether political

participation under communist rule implied any influence on decision-making. When looking at these

two factors, a rather different picture can be painted. First of all, the authorities strictly defined the role

citizens were to play as political participants. Public political enthusiasm and even activism were thus

invoked by the state. Moreover, any form of activism opposing the communist rule was firmly

suppressed. This lack of genuine public participation in political life was one of the issues that gave

rise to the Prague Spring in 1968 and eventually led to the collapse of the communist regime in

1989.520

518 „Election Statistics‟, by Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, retrieved 04 May 2010 from

http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=5684. 519

P.G. Lewis, „Political Participation in Post-Communist Democracies‟, in: Potter, David e.a. (eds.),

Democratization, 1st ed., Cambridge: The Polity Press 1997, p. 447.

520 Ibid., pp. 447-448.

101

So even though the communist regime was able to generate high levels of public participation

in political life, this form of participation can be considered as involuntary and pre-defined.

Consequently, citizens did not have any real influence on decision-making under the communist rule.

4.3.2. Political Participation after 1989

Voter participation and electoral activity – activities concerning the membership and organisation of

political parties – are the main criteria for measuring citizen involvement in politics.

4.3.2.1Voter Turnout

When looking at voter turnouts in the successive national elections in Czechoslovakia and later the

Slovak Republic, it can be noted that the early elections generated high levels of voter turnouts,

whereas voter participation in the successive elections generally tended to decline.521

As can be seen,

voter turnouts dropped from 96% in 1990 to 58.83% in the last national elections of 2010.522

Table 4.3: Voter Turnouts in Czechoslovakia and the Slovak Republic between 1990 and 2010

Parliamentary Elections Turnout

1990 96 %

1992 90 %

1994 75.65 %

1998 84.24 %

2002 70.06 %

2006 54.67 %

2010 58.83 %

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic523

With regard to European parliamentary elections, all of the post-Communist countries faced low

turnouts at both the 2004 and 2009 elections. In 2004 the average barely reached over 30% in these

countries, though turnouts varied across the region. To compare, the average turnout in the EU15 was

47.97% in the 2004 elections. With only 16.97% of the Slovak people casting their vote in the 2004

EU elections, the Slovak Republic registered the lowest election turnout of all the CEEC countries.524

Although the turnout in the 2009 election had increased to 19.64% in Slovakia, this number was still

far below the average of the post-Communist countries, let alone the overall turnout in the EU

(43%).525

In addition, the 2003 referendum on EU accession generated a turnout of 50.15%, with

which the Slovak Republic had the second lowest turnout of the acceding countries of 2004. However,

521 P. Lewis, „Political Participation in Post-communist Democracies‟, in: Potter, David e.a. (eds.),

Democratization, 1st ed., Cambridge: The Polity Press 1997, pp. 452-453.

522 Ibid., p. 453.

523„Election Statistics‟, by Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, retrieved 04 May 2010 from

http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=5684; P.G. Lewis, „Political Participation in Post-communist

Democracies‟, in: Potter, David e.a. (eds.), Democratization, 1st ed., Cambridge: The Polity Press 1997, p. 452.

524 C. Fauvelle Aymar and M. Stegnmaier, „European Electoral Turnout In Post-Communist Europe‟, in : Centre

National de la Recherche Scientifique, 2006, pp. 2-3. 525

A. Malkopoulou, „Lost Voters: Participation in EU Elections and the case for Compulsory Voting‟, in: Centre

for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 317, 2009, pp. 4-5.

102

despite the relatively low turnout, the Slovak Republic did realise the highest share of yes-votes in this

referendum: 93.71%, compared to an average of 80.84% in the CEECs.526

According to various Slovak political parties these relatively low voter turnouts in national

and European elections can be explained by the fact that a large part of the electorate feels that they

are not being heard by politicians.527

Moreover, a majority of the Slovak people simply does not

understand politics, particularly European politics. People are happy with the prosperity the EU has

brought them, but they do not understand how the EU works, which is translated into low voter

turnouts in EU elections.528

Moreover, it takes time before people are used to the idea that they can

influence European policy trough the European elections.529

When looking at voter participation into more detail it can be noted that certain factors can be

of influence in an individual‟s likeliness to vote. Whereas in most countries the level of education and

income are significant factors in determining voting participation, this does not seem to be the case in

Slovakia. However, in contrast to a European trend of increasing voter participation of women, the

gender gap in Slovakia has all but vanished. Finally, age also plays a role in voter participation. Young

people in Slovakia are far less likely to vote than older people. In fact, the highest voter participation

rates can be found amongst the middle-aged part of the electorate. The situation in the Slovak

Republic is comparable to most other EU countries in this respect.530

4.3.2.2 Uninstitutionalised Political Participation

Turning to uninstitutionalised political participation, i.e. protest activities, a different development can

be noted. Whereas voter turnouts were marked by a declining trend, protest activities saw a steady rise

in Slovakia throughout the 1990s. In 1990 46% of the Slovak citizens declared to have participated in

protest activities – those being one of the following: sign a petition; join a boycott; attend a lawful

demonstration; join an unofficial strike – whereas in 1999 this number had risen to 58%. In

comparison, the average participation rate in protest activities in Eastern Europe dropped from 45% in

1990 to 36% in 1999. In Western Europe, however, this number rose from 55% in 1990 to 62% in

1999. Slovakia is thus converging to the Western European level of participation in protest activities,

rather than to the Eastern European norm. This deviation can be explained by the important role that

popular action played in bringing down the communist regime. In most of the other former communist

countries this process was predominantly elite-driven.531

Although uninstitutionalised political participation is rising in Slovakia, this form of civic

participation is limited to a small group of concerned citizens. The majority of the Slovak citizens do

not seem to consider problems regarding democracy, politics or even corruption as a priority. This can

526 P. Taggart and A. Sczcerbiak, „The Politics of European Referendum Outcomes and Turnout: Two Models‟,

in: West European Politics, Vol. 27, Issue 4, 2004, pp. 559-564. 527

Interview A17. 528

Interview A1. 529

Interview A17. 530

A. Gallego, „Inequality in Political Participation: Contemporary Patterns in European Countries‟, Center for

the Study of Democracy, UC Irvine, 2007, pp. 5-7. 531

P. Bernhagen and M. Mars, „Voting and Protesting: Explaining Citizen Participation in Old and New

European Democracies‟, in: Democratization, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2007, pp. 47-50.

103

be illustrated by the fact that several scandals involving the current governmental parties have hardly

had any effect on their popularity.532

4.3.2.3 Voter Volatility

Voter volatility refers to “the percentage of voters (…) changing their voting preference from one

point in time to another” 533

. The voter volatility index is an important indicator for party system

stability.534

When looking at the post-Communist countries in Eastern Europe it can be noted that voter

volatility rates generally are rather high, ranging up to an average of 48.5% during the 1990s.

However, in Slovakia voter volatility rates are not significantly higher than in Western Europe

(18.4% on average in Slovakia, compared to 12.6% in Western Europe during the 1990s). Yet, it has

to be noted that voter volatility rates did increase during the successive elections held in the 1990s.535

This relatively high level of voter volatility in Slovakia can to a large extent be attributed to the high

number of new parties that enters the political stage on the one hand and a significant number of

political parties that exits the political arena on the other.536

As has become clear from the section on

political transition, the development of a political party system in Slovakia has been characterised by a

continuing creation of new parties, party coalitions, party mergers and splits and changes in party

ideology. Consequently, it is harder for the electorate to understand the political space, which in turn

negatively affects party loyalty among the Slovak public.537

4.3.2.4 Party Membership

Membership of a political party is another indicator of civic political involvement. In 2000 4.11% of

the electorate held membership of a political party in Slovakia. Compared to all the other post-

Communist countries and to a large part of the older EU member states, this number is relatively

high.538

However, party membership in the 1990s was substantially higher. In 1994 the average party

membership was around 8%, with membership of certain parties even ranging up to 13.7%. Yet, it has

to be noted that these high numbers of membership occurred only with the former communist party

(SDL), which was able to maintain relatively high levels of membership due to the communist legacy,

and the Hungarian party, which provides one of the few platforms for Hungarians to be heard in

political life. It is therefore not surprising that these two parties held well-above average party

membership.539

532 G. Meseţnikov and O. Gyárfášová,„National Populism in Slovakia‟,by Institute for Public Affairs, 2008, p.45.

533 G. Tóka, „Party Appeals and Voter Loyalty in New Democracies‟, in: Political Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 3,

1998, p. 590. 534

A. Krupavičius, „Party Systems in Central East Europe‟, Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook. Issue 1,

2004, p. 51. 535

A. Sikk, „How Unstable? Volatility and the Genuinely New Parties in Eastern Europe”, in: European Journal

of Political Research, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 2005, pp. 397-398. 536

A. Krupavičius, „Party Systems in Central East Europe‟, in: Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook, Issue 1,

2004, p. 51. 537

J. Bielasiak, „Substance and Process in the Development of Party Systems in East Central Europe‟, in:

Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 30, Issue 1, 1997, p. 27. 538

P. Mair and I. van Biezen, „Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000‟, in: Party

Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2001, p. 9. 539

K. Krause, „Accountability and Party Competition in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. A Dissertation‟, by

Department of Government, University of Notre Dame, 2000, pp. 159-170.

104

When looking at the development of political party membership in the Slovak Republic it can

thus be noted that the average number of membership declined between 1990 and 2000, from an

average of 8% in 1994 to an average of 4.11% in 2000. This trend can be interpreted as a decrease in

civic political involvement.

4.4 Foreign Policy

In this section the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic will be discussed. The bilateral relations of

the Slovak Republic with different countries will be elaborated upon. In addition, the relationship of

the country with regard to the EU and other international organisations will be explained.

4.4.1 Development of Slovak Foreign Policy

The ideology of different governments has influenced Slovak foreign policy over the years. Three

periods can be distinguished in the history of Slovak foreign policy: the Mečiar years, the Dzurinda

governments and the Fico period.

4.4.1.1 The Mečiar Years

In the beginning of Mečiar‟s governmental period, one of the most important policies in foreign affairs

was the „return to Europe‟. This can be seen as an application for EU membership in disguise, as it

was clearly visible that Slovakia was preparing itself for EU and NATO membership. However, these

organisations had doubts about the value of this priority, since Mečiar had expressed his sympathies

toward the East several times, by emphasising Slovakia‟s role as a bridge between the West and the

East. In addition, Mečiar did not speak English or French, which thwarted relations with

representatives of Western states. Moreover, Mečiar did not share the ideological motives for a united

European Union, according to Western EU member states. His interest in the EU was merely based on

economic and security advantages for the new state of Slovakia, which was cause for concern in the

„old‟ EU member states.540

Mečiar‟s authoritarian governing style – which caused some ministers of foreign affairs to

resign after disagreements with him541

– drove the country into isolation in Europe. For example,

Slovakia was the only member of the Visegrad group to be left out of NATO in the 1999 CEEC

expansion. Moreover, Slovakia was initially excluded from EU accession negotiations, again as the

only Central European state, because the Mečiar government failed to meet the political conditions.

This exclusion was decided on in the Commission‟s avis of July 1997 which referred to “the instability

of Slovakia‟s institutions, their lack of rootedness in political life and the shortcomings in the

functioning of its democracy”542

. Consequently, this provoked Mečiar to react: “if the West does not

want us as we are, we will turn towards our friends in the East”543

. So on the whole, Slovakia‟s attitude

540 G. Pridham (2002) “The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: the

Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared”, Europe-Asia Studies, 54: 2, pp. 203-227, p. 203. 541

Ibid., p. 211. 542

Ibid., p. 204. 543

D. Malová and A. Valági, “Policy report on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia”, EUROREG, January 2007,

p. 3.; retrieved 9 March 2010 from:

http://www.eliamep.gr/en/wpcontent/uploads/2009/04/slovakia_policy_report_final.pdf.

105

towards the West at this time was characterised by suspicion and foreign policy in this period can be

considered as pro-Russian.544

4.4.1.2 The Dzurinda Years

During the Dzurinda governments, Slovak foreign policy was much more pro-Western and pro-

transatlantic compared to the previous Mečiar governments. For instance, both Dzurinda‟s

governments gave top priority to rectifying Slovakia‟s excluded position and improving relations with

the EU and NATO, by underlining Slovakia‟s historical and ideological motives to become an EU

member.545

As a result, at the EU Helsinki summit (December 1999), the EU eventually agreed on

opening negotiations in February 2000. This clearly demonstrates that a change in government can

have a marked effect on EU membership prospects.546

Furthermore, Dzurinda held good relationships with other Western states. His reformist image

and his friendly political behaviour made him popular with other important political leaders, such as

Tony Blair (UK), George W. Bush (US) and Jean-Claude Juncker (Luxembourg)547

. Bilateral

relationships were often described as amicable. Moreover, Tony Blair publicly expressed his

“admiration”548

for Dzurinda during a short state visit to witness Dzurinda‟s political campaign for the

Slovak national elections of 2006. According to Dzurinda‟s opponents, this was interference with

domestic politics. Dzurinda‟s good relationship with George W. Bush resulted in Slovakia supporting

the American War on Terror as they sent troops to Iraq.549

Although the focus was on the West during the Dzurinda years, the Ukraine has been a top

priority as well; most of all regarding security issues. The Dzurinda governments declared itself

willing to share expertise to help Ukraine fulfil the goals laid down in the EU Action Plan.550

This was

meant to lead to Ukraine‟s accession to the EU; therefore, it can also be seen as a covered western

priority. In conclusion, the Dzurinda government was a turning point for Slovak foreign politics, with

a marked shift from the East to the West.551

4.4.1.3 The Fico Years

Although the Fico government declared itself willing to continue the foreign policy of the Dzurinda

government, a small shift has been noticeable. Slovak foreign policy is no longer exclusively focused

544 G. Pridham (2002), “The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in Slovakia: the

Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared”, Europe-Asia Studies, 54: 2, pp. 210-211. 545

Ibid., p. 215. 546

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 265. 547

Former Prime Minister of Luxembourg and chairman of the European Council of Economic and Financial

Ministers. 548

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 262. 549

Ibid., p. 263. 550

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), pp. 262, 294. 551

Pridham, Geoffrey (2002) “The European Union's Democratic Conditionality and Domestic Politics in

Slovakia: the Mečiar and Dzurinda Governments Compared”, Europe-Asia Studies, 54: 2, p. 220.

106

on the West, it is instead also looking at “the North, the West, the South and the East”, as set out in

Fico‟s Compass strategy.552

Subsequently, the relationship with the United States has cooled down since the Smer-HZDS-

SNS government got into office. Slovakia is still in NATO, so transatlantic relations are still of

importance. However, Fico has a different view on the US than his predecessor. In 2004, he stated that

Slovakia “is the centre of Europe, not of the United States”553

. Although he did not make this comment

as a government official – at that time he merely was the Smer party leader – the message does imply

a shift away from the US. This can be further illustrated by the fact that the Fico government decided

to withdraw Slovak contingent from Iraq in 2007, after 4.5 years. This chilled Slovak-American

relations.554

In addition, the Fico government declared that it was putting more emphasis on the economic

side of foreign policy, which meant stronger relations with Russia as well.555

This can be illustrated by

remarks Fico made in 2006, such as: “Slovak foreign policy was one-sided orientated towards the

West”556

and: “I think the relationship with Russia has been underestimated lately”557

. The rhetoric of

the Fico government showed signs of Mečiar‟s rhetoric, such as “the return to eastern markets” and

“Slavic mutuality”.558

Furthermore, it seems as though the attitude towards the EU is characterised by

some nonchalance, which again is in contrast to Dzurinda‟s policies. Besides, Fico visited some states

that are not appreciated in the EU and in the US, such as Cuba and Libya and he contemplated a visit

to Venezuela. During the EU summit in Brussels of 14 December 2006 Fico complained: “I can‟t see

why they drag prime ministers to debates that can easily be solved by ministers”559

. He did not offer

solutions to improve the work structure of the EU, so it was merely a statement with a slightly

provocative undertone. In sum, Slovak foreign policy under the Fico government has slightly shifted

back to the East.

4.4.2 Juridical Base of Foreign Policy: International Law in Slovakia

Article 7 of the Slovak Constitution provides regulations on how international organisations and their

legislation are treated by the Slovak Republic. In paragraph 1 of this article, it is laid down that it is the

free decision of the Slovak Republic to enter into a state union or to withdraw from this union. The

entrance or withdrawal shall be confirmed by a referendum. Paragraph 2 contains the provisions on

how the Slovak Republic treats European law. Legally binding acts of the European Commission and

other institutions of the European Union have primacy over Slovak national law. Paragraph 3 allows

for the Slovak Republic to enter into a security alliance, such as NATO. In paragraph 4 it is stated that

legislation provided by an international organisation other than the European Union needs approval

552 T. Weiss, “The case study Slovakia” in: David Kral, Vera Řahičkova and Tomáš Weiss, “Views on American

Foreign Policy. The Atlanticism of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe” EUROPEUM Institute for

European Policy (2008 Prague), p. 201. 553

Ibid., p. 195. 554

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 260. 555

Ibid., p. 266. 556

Ibid., p. 298. 557

Ibid., p. 267. 558

Ibid., p. 269. 559

Ibid., p. 298.

107

from the National Council to be valid. Paragraph 5 gives primacy to national law over international

treaties in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This primacy is also extended towards

international treaties of which the executions do not require a law and international treaties that

directly establish duties or rights for both natural and legal persons, if ratified as laid down in law.560

It can be concluded that the Slovak Constitution is pro-international cooperation and pro-

European Union. Stating that the entrance into or withdrawal out of an international organisation is a

free choice of the Slovak Republic, indicates on the one hand that the Slovak Republic is willing to

cooperate internationally, but mentions on the other hand implicitly the sovereignty of the Slovak

Republic. By firstly mentioning the rule of European law, before mentioning other international legal

sources, the Slovak Constitution recognises the special status of European law, as the European Court

of Justice has promulgated.

Paragraph 5 of Article 7 is open to more than one interpretation. It states that every mentioned

international legal source should have primacy over national law, if ratified in a manner laid down in

law. In which law this manner of ratification should be laid down, is not mentioned. In the end, the

Slovak people will decide whether a particular international legal source will have primacy over

national law. In practice, the system of the Slovak Republic towards international law is monistic if it

concerns European Treaty Law, or provisions concerning human rights. Yet, this does not cover

secondary European Law.561

At the time of writing this report, there is a case pending before the

Constitutional Court that will clarify whether secondary European Law will have direct effect in the

Slovak legal order as well.562

Since the Slovak Republic has ratified the treaties on the EU and on the

functioning of the EU, it is probable that the outcome of this case will be that secondary law has direct

effect as well.

4.4.3 The Current Overall Foreign Affairs Strategy

For the year 2009, the Fico government created the following priorities in foreign affairs. The policy‟s

base is: “fundamental respect for democratic values, human rights and support for sustainable

development with emphasis on social solidarity”563

. The long-term strategy remains: “a successful

Slovakia in a safer world”564

. The sub-priorities are:

1. Slovakia in a safe and democratic world;

2. A successful and prosperous Slovakia;

3. The interests of Slovakia in an efficient EU;

4. Serving our citizens and Slovakia open to the world.565

The last priority is mainly administrative and concerns a good and efficient Slovak corps diplomatique

to fulfil the other goals. Therefore, only on the first three priorities will be elaborated. Not all topics

560 „Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, retrieved 17 February 2010 from www.nrsr.sk, pp. 2, 3.

561 B. Boháčik, „International Agreements in the Legal Orders of the Candidate Countries‟, in: A. Ott and K.

Inglis, Handbook on European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement Process, The Hague: T.M.C.

Asser Press 2002, pp. 324 – 327. 562

Interview C18. 563

Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava 2010)

p. 8. 564

Ibid., p. 9. 565

Ibid., pp. 8-9.

108

are new in Slovak foreign policy, since some topics have played an important role throughout

history.566

4.4.3.1 Priority: Slovakia in a Safe and Democratic World

The first priority concerns the security of Slovakia and its role in preserving global security through

institutions such as NATO and the UN. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs likes to stress „the readiness‟

of Slovakia to participate actively in solving serious global issues. Slovakia sees extremism,

nationalism, Neo-Nazism, racism, anti-Semitism and religious fundamentalism as worrying

phenomena threatening a safe world.567

However, the EU has warned Slovakia to beware of rising

nationalistic rhetoric towards the Hungarian minority in the southern part of Slovakia. In order to

overcome these threats, the government sees a large role for Slovakia within international

organisations, such as NATO. Slovakia considers NATO as its “fundamental pillar for security”.568

In addition to the aforementioned issues, Slovakia actively participates in fighting global

challenges, which it defines as being the fight against terrorism, climate change, the global economic

crisis, disarmament, uncontrolled migration, food and energy security and water management.569

An

example of Slovakia‟s help in the fight against terrorism was its participation in the Iraq War, which

will be discussed later on in this paragraph.

4.4.3.1.1 NATO

When the Slovak Republic came into existence in 1993, the first official contacts with NATO were

made. On 9 February 1994, Vladimír Mečiar, at that time Prime Minister of Slovakia, signed the

Framework Document within the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP), which is a NATO

programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual partner countries and NATO.570

Within this programme, Slovakia was actually one of the most active actors of the 27571

participants.572

Whereas other Central and East European countries like the Czech Republic, but also Hungary

and Poland, became full NATO members on 12 March 1999, the Slovak Republic had to wait until 29

March 2004 to finally become a NATO member. This was remarkable because between 1993 and

1995, political observers had included Slovakia among the „front-runners‟ for NATO membership.573

However, due to Vladimir Mečiar‟s particular style of governing, earlier described as „authoritarian‟

and his domestic policies regarding the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia, the country did not

meet all of the NATO accession criteria, which include respect for the rule of law and minority

566 Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava 2010),

p. 5. 567

Ibid., p. 8. 568

Ibid. 569

Ibid. 570

The Partnership for Peace, retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm. 571

Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia,

Hungary, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia,

Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and the Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM). 572

Simon, J., Slovakia and NATO: The Madrid Summit and After, Institute for National Strategic Studies,

retrieved 10 May 2010 from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA394276&Location=U2&doc=Get

TRDoc.pdf. 573

Ibid.

109

rights.574

Finally, during Mikuláš Dzurinda‟s second term in office (2002-2006), the Slovak Republic

became a full member of NATO.

Becoming a member of NATO has been “one of the main priorities of foreign policy of the Slovak

Republic since its foundation” 575

. Nowadays, membership of NATO is considered a “high standard

quality mark”576

regarding Slovakia‟s position in the world. Moreover, to the Slovak government it is

a “fundamental pillar for security”577

. In its long-term strategy „A successful Slovakia in a safer

world‟, the 2006-2010 Fico government even put the need for „Slovakia to be in a safe and democratic

world‟ higher on his top-priorities list than „the interests of Slovakia in an efficient EU‟.578

In short, it

is clear that Slovakia can be seen as a „NATO optimist‟.579

Although NATO is considered “the cornerstone of European security”580

, this does not mean

that the EU and NATO must be seen as competitors on the matter of security in Europe. On the

contrary, in the opinion of the Fico government, the relationship between EU and NATO should be

like a “natural partnership”, in which both organisations fully cooperate. This also implies that the

Slovak Republic does not support the aim of establishing a European army. The European Security

and Defence Policy (ESDP), in which the Slovak Republic participates, is therefore more or less

perceived as the European branch of NATO.581

The main activity of Slovakia and its armed forces within NATO is its contribution to NATO‟s

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. The aim of this mission,

which was initiated in 2001, is to “conduct operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will

of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security

Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development. This in

order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population”.582

The three main priorities of the ISAF operation are assisting the Afghan government in establishing a

secure and stable environment and a well governed state that respects the rule of law and human

rights. Furthermore, it also supports the reconstruction and development of the country.583

In May 2010, Slovakia‟s contribution to the ISAF mission was quite modest with a number of

230 armed forces – on a total number of 14,000 Slovak armed forces.584

These Slovak troops are

574 Simon, J., Slovakia and NATO: The Madrid Summit and After, Institute for National Strategic Studies,

retrieved 10 May 2010 from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA394276&Location=U2&doc=Get

TRDoc.pdf. 575

Interview D12. 576

Ibid. 577

Mission of the Slovak Republic to NATO, retrieved from http://www.nato.int/pfp/sk/slovakia1.htm, retrieved

13 May 2010; Interview D12; Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak

Republic (Bratislava 2010) p. 8. 578

Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava 2010)

p. 8. 579

Interview D12. 580

Ibid. 581

Ibid. 582

Mission ISAF, retrieved 13 May 2010 from http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html. 583

Ibid. 584

National Security of the Slovak Republic, retrieved 07 June 2010 from

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3430.htm.

110

spread over ISAF Command Headquarters, Kandahar Air Field and the Regional Command South and

they are mostly occupied with engineering tasks, guard units, training activities and demining.585

In

March 2009, the Fico government, after a meeting between Prime Minister Fico of Slovakia and

former Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende, decided to upgrade the Slovak mission in Afghanistan with

another 50 troops. In November 2009, Prime Minister Fico and Prime Minister Brown of the United

Kingdom agreed on doubling the Slovak troops from 230 to 500. This last matter, however, will only

be decided on after the June 2010 parliamentary elections by the new parliament.586

Another area in which Slovakia is working on a „safe and democratic world‟ is Kosovo, which

could be seen as a remarkable fact because until today, the Slovak Republic has refused to recognise

the declared independence of Kosovo. However, within the Kosovo Force of NATO (KFOR),

Slovakia is on the one hand able to fulfil its duties as an ally of NATO and on the other it supports

neutral solutions in order to create stability in the Western Balkan region.587

Since the end of 2009,

when Slovakia had 193 troops of its Armed Forces in the KFOR operation, the number of Slovak

troops has been reduced to 146, which is in line with NATO‟s strategy of „deterrent presence‟ in

Kosovo.588

4.4.3.1.2 Iraq

Slovakia participated with other Central and Eastern European states (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia) in the “coalition of the willing”, after

having signed the Letter of Vilnius in which the countries showed their effective support for the Iraq

invasion and for the US. In effect, Slovakia supported the US during the Iraq invasion both politically

and military, albeit with only 65 soldiers (mostly deminers589

) who were only allowed to perform

humanitarian duties. Although a common position of the EU was not achieved, Slovakia‟s position

went against Germany‟s and France‟s opposition against the invasion.590

Slovakia stated that they were

not opposing any EU position, since the EU did not have consensus on this matter. Regarding the Iraq

issue, Slovakia preferred to be a good NATO ally, although Slovakia classifies its support as neutral,

since the country never publicly expressed its support.591

When Smer was an opposition party, the party firmly opposed to the Slovak support for the

Iraqi Freedom mission. The party declared that it saw the Slovak support as “irresponsible, non-

European and bellicose”592

. In its election programme of 2006, Smer stressed that they wanted to

withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible.593

The other coalition parties were ambivalent about Iraq. The

585 Interview D12.

586 Ibid.

587 Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava 2010)

p. 8. 588

Ibid. 589

Interview D12. 590

L. Marácz “Some Consequences of EU-enlargement with the Former Soviet Bloc Countries for the Union‟s

Common Foreign and Security Policy” Conference paper at Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics at

the University of Latvia in Riga, 25 September 2008, pp. 8-9. 591

Interview B4. 592

T. Weiss, “The case study Slovakia” in: David Kral, Vera Řahičkova and Tomáš Weiss, “Views on American

Foreign Policy. The Atlanticism of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe” EUROPEUM Institute for

European Policy (2008 Prague), p. 196. 593

Ibid.

111

HZDS party of former Prime Minister Mečiar was much divided on the topic. Yet, they did not pledge

for immediate withdrawal from Iraq, because they considered the American presence to be important

for the country‟s stability. The SNS party has been against the Iraq war from the beginning and it thus

pledged for an immediate withdrawal when three Slovak soldiers were killed.594

It was therefore no

real surprise that the Fico government proceeded the Iraq withdrawal. 595

4.4.3.1.3 United Nations

The Slovak Republic has been a UN member state since 19 January 1993. Currently, the Slovak

Republic is involved in two UN missions on a modest scale, namely the UN peacekeeping force in

Cyprus UNFICYP (204 armed forces) and the mission on the Israeli-Lebanon-Syrian border, which is

monitored by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) (97 armed forces).

Furthermore, Slovakia is a member of the UN Human Rights Council, the Economic and Social

Council and the Executive Board of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.596

The Permanent Mission of the Slovak Republic for the UN is situated in New York.

4.4.3.1.4 OSCE

On 1 January 1993, when the Slovak Republic came into existence, it was directly admitted to the

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which is the world‟s largest regional

security organisation. The OSCE has three dimensions: a politico-military dimension; an economic

and environmental dimension; a human dimension. The Slovak Republic is mostly involved in

activities within the first and the third dimensions. With regard to the politico-military dimension, the

Slovak Republic supports the activities of OSCE missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo by

sending national experts.597

Furthermore, Slovakia supports the OSCE elections monitoring missions.

Within the framework of the Corfu Process, a dialogue on European security launched on 28 June

2009 in Corfu, the Slovak Republic mainly focuses on the topic of energy security in Europe.598

In

sum, stability in the Western Balkans and energy security seem to be the two main foreign policy

priorities of the Slovak Republic. Finally, the Slovak Republic also has a Permanent Mission in the

OSCE in Vienna.599

4.4.3.2 Priority: A Successful and Prosperous Slovakia

This second priority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focuses on economic issues. Among others, the

government considers the regional cooperation of the Visegrad Group as an important factor. The

focus is also on bilateral relations with other states.

594 G. Meseţnikov, Domestic Politics and the Party System, in G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollar, and T. Nicholson

(eds.) Slovakia 2002. A Global Report on the State of Society, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, 2003, p.

77. 595

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 260. 596

Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava 2010)

p. 9. 597

Ibid. 598

Ibid. 599

OSCE, Delegations. Retrieved 18 June 2010 from http://www.osce.org/contacts/?src_type=3.

112

Firstly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not only trying to reduce the impact of the financial

and economic crisis on its own, but is also helping to look actively for possibilities to fight the crisis

within international organisations, such as the EU, OECD or IMF.600

Secondly, Slovakia promotes a modern image of itself to attract foreign businesses. In

addition, the Slovak government tries to cooperate very closely with enterprises. By these means they

hope to monitor where large businesses think Slovak foreign affairs can be more active, so as to

achieve a friendly business climate. Moreover, the Fico government stressed that this knowledge will

lead to a maximum exploitation of the economic interests provided by membership of international

organisations. For instance, the obtainment of all available development funds to promote economic

growth can be seen in this light.601

This is of great importance to Slovakia, because the country‟s

inaccurate application for European structure funds can be to their detriment.602

This will be discussed

more thoroughly in section 6.11. In this section the focus will be especially on Slovakia‟s relationship

within the Visegrad Group and on its neighbours or other important states with whom the Slovak

Republic has a significant bilateral relationship.

4.4.3.2.1 The Visegrad Group

The regional Visegrad cooperation falls under the aforementioned priority and is important to

contribute to this goal. The Visegrad Group (Vyšehradská Skupina) or V4, is a regional cooperation

consisting of four Central European states: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The

group is named after a Hungarian city close to the Slovak border, where Bohemian, Polish and

Hungarian rulers had a summit in 1335 to create new commercial trading routes. Since then, the

countries have maintained close relations and on 15 February 1991, the current Visegrad group came

into existence.603

Economic cooperation was the original backbone of the V4. In addition, the V4 countries

formulated five challenges, whose similarity to the EU accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria), quite

noticeably, stood out. Because the Visegrad countries have always declared common accession to the

EU and NATO to be one of their main goals,604

it is plausible that the Visegrad countries have

established these criteria on purpose, in order to speed up the EU accession process. After all, when

the countries met these standards, it would prove their readiness towards EU accession. The

formulated challenges were as follows:

1. full restitution of state independence, democracy and freedom;

2. elimination of all existing social, economic and spiritual aspects of the totalitarian system;

3. construction of a parliamentary democracy, a modern State of Law, respect for human rights

and freedoms for minorities;

4. creation of a modern free market economy;

600 Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava 2010)

p. 22. 601

Ibid., p. 23. 602

Ministry of Construction and Regional Development(2009),Slovak Republic Strategic Report,Appendix No.1. 603

Visegrad Declaration of 1991, retrieved 9 March 2010 from

http://visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3940&ctag=articlelist&iid=1. 604

Ibid.

113

5. full involvement in the European political and economic system, as well as the system of

security and legislation.605

In addition, the V4 stressed the importance of several „European‟ notions in order to become more like

the Western European states. Among them were the achievement of the free movement of labour force

and capital, by developing infrastructure, and the emphasis on creating favourable conditions for the

free flow of information, press and cultural values, while respecting the rights of national minorities.606

This made the resemblance to the Copenhagen criteria almost complete.

In the Visegrad declaration of 2004, the Prime Ministers of the V4 declared “that the key

objectives set out in the 1991 Visegrad Declaration have been achieved with full satisfaction”607

. They

further stated their “determination to continue developing the cooperation of the Visegrad Group

countries as member states of the European Union and NATO”608

. Economically, the V4 indeed

performed very well. Their efforts to catch up with the economically more developed European

countries were successful, since the V4 countries are now the wealthiest post-communist countries in

the EU after Slovenia.609

Their common entry into NATO – with the exception of Slovakia – and the

EU were indeed praiseworthy achievements and an additional step towards the reunification of

Europe.610

However the statement about the fulfilment of the key objectives of the V4 is rather

remarkable. Most non-governmental and even governmental actors in the field do not agree with this

statement, because there are still problems concerning Slovakia‟s attitude towards minorities and its

relations with the media.611

In 2004, the V4 reformulated their challenges. This time, the focus shifted towards culture and

broader political and economic regional cooperation. They aimed at achieving greater cooperation

with other countries in the region, either in or outside the EU, such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova (the

V4 + Eastern Partnership) and the Western Balkan states. Furthermore, they aspired to raising the

region‟s voice and weight both within the EU and abroad. A practical example of closer cooperation

inside the EU is the creation of the V4 + initiative, in which Slovenia and Austria take part in a close

cooperation concerning energy security.612

The Visegrad Group is not institutionalised. The structure contains periodical meetings of

representatives at various levels, such as the annual Prime Ministers and Presidential meetings and the

monthly expert consultations. The Group has a six months rotating presidency. The state that holds the

presidency creates a one-year action plan, which is presented at the annual Prime Minister meeting in

605 Visegrad Declaration of 1991, retrieved 9 March 2010 from

http://visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3940&ctag=articlelist&iid=1. 606

Ibid. 607

Visegrad Declaration of 2004, retrieved 6 May 2010 from

http://visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3939&ctag=articlelist&iid=1. 608

Ibid. 609

Visegrad Group, Aims and Structure, retrieved 9 March 2010 from

http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=1011. 610

Visegrad Declaration of 2004, retrieved 6 May 2010 from

http://visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3939&ctag=articlelist&iid=1 611

Interview B18, D4. 612

Visegrad Group, International cooperation, retrieved 6 March from

http://visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=941.

114

June. Each V4 country has a National Visegrad Coordinator that controls the successful execution of

the Visegrad goals, in cooperation with the V4 countries‟ embassies.613

In June 2010, Slovakia holds the new presidency. The goals of this presidency are as of yet not

manifested. However, Slovakia has declared that it will follow the EU agenda, and that it will aim at

achieving economic and political stability in the Western Balkans and in the countries linked to the EU

Eastern Partnership. The Visegrad Group is in favour of further enlargement and considers itself as the

perfect choice to mediate between the new member states and the EU. The shared communist history

of the V4 would make them better suited to understand the road to EU membership. The new goals of

Slovakia for 2010/2011 will most likely be: the development of the north-south infrastructure; the

improvement of economic cooperation; ensuring energy security and obtaining a solution for the

Roma issue.614

Despite its non-institutionalised nature, the Visegrad Group has one non-political organisation:

the International Visegrad Fund, which is located in Bratislava. Since its creation in 2000, it aims at

closer, mainly cultural, cooperation between the Visegrad countries by supporting grant projects in the

fields of common cultural, scientific and educational projects, such as youth exchanges, cross-border

cooperation and tourism promotion by awarding scholarships and artist residencies.615

The budget of the Fund was €6 million in 2010, created by equal contributions of the member

states. In 2009, this was €1.5 million.616

For a smaller country like Slovakia, this can be a relatively

high amount of money, but the philosophy of the Visegrad Fund consists of equal redistribution of this

money to the V4 countries through the funding of projects. This equality is, however, mainly

theoretical, because in 2009 Slovakia received the largest amount of funding through this

redistribution (approximately €150 thousand more than the other V4 countries).617

Although the Fund is financed by the Visegrad Group, it operates independently. In this

respect, the Visegrad Fund can exert influence by putting several topics on the political agenda of the

Group. For instance, the Fund has stressed the importance of finding a regional solution to the Roma

issue and it has pledged for prioritisation of this matter.618

The Fund not only supports projects within the Visegrad Group, but often also outside the EU,

e.g. in the Caucasus and the Balkan. In addition, the Fund has been very active in Romania and

Bulgaria during their process of becoming an EU member state, by promoting European values. In this

way, the Fund not only promotes regional cooperation under the heading of the Visegrad Group, but it

also contributes to European integration on the whole.619

In the late 1990s, there were rumours concerning the abolishment of the Visegrad Group. After the EU

and NATO accession, not everyone was convinced of the continuation of the Visegrad Group.

613 Interview D4, D11.

614 Interview D11.

615International Visegrad Fund, Annual Report of 2009 and 2010 Guidelines, Bratislava 2010, pp. 7-8.

616 Visegrad Fund, http://www.visegradfund.org/about.html.

617 International Visegrad Fund, Annual Report of 2009 and 2010 Guidelines, Bratislava 2010, p. 16.

618 Interview D4.

619 Ibid.

115

However, in 2004 the V4 decided to continue the Visegrad cooperation as EU members in order to be

stronger than four small countries alone.620

With these rumours in mind, the French President Sarkozy made a rather unexpected

statement concerning the Visegrad Group meetings, in advance of the two European Council summits

in 2009, in order to achieve common positions. Sarkozy stated that he hoped that the Visegrad

countries would not make a habit of this kind of meetings.621

However, in 2009 the V4 only met twice

for such meetings. Sarkozy‟s statement provoked astonished reactions on the Visegrad side. It was

considered as an aggravated response, although very good publicity for the V4.622

The opinion of the

Slovak government was that these meetings helped to facilitate EU consensus without having the

ambition to operate as a power bloc, although the Slovak government would be in favour of increased

regional cooperation within EU structures.623

Even José Manuel Barroso, President of the European

Commission, declared in 2006 that he was in favour of the Visegrad Group within the EU. He

considered the Group to be a great contribution to the consensus-making process in the Open Method

of Coordination624

.625

Nonetheless, it is plausible that large EU states are keeping a close eye on the Visegrad Group,

because it does eventually have enormous potential to become a power bloc within the EU, not only

regarding the voting numbers in the decision making process – the V4 equal France and Germany –

but also in the light of possible further enlargement of the Visegrad Group, as has already been done

by the V4+ projects. If the Visegrad Group would cover all of Central and Eastern Europe, it could

pose a serious „threat‟ for the present influential member states.626

The Visegrad Group could indeed become a power bloc in the EU, albeit not at present.

Currently, it does not fully optimise its potential, due to internal problems. In general, the V4 countries

have the same needs and interests; although Poland‟s different territorial size sometimes demands

other needs than the other V4 countries.627

Moreover, the internal bilateral relations among the V4 can

be rather tensed, even though the Visegrad proclaims good relations with neighbour states as a

priority. However, these tensions ought not to influence the Visegrad cooperation.628

The internal

tension is, for instance, recognisable in Czech-Polish relations and Slovak-Hungarian relations. In

2006, the Slovak and Hungarian Prime Ministers had not met for a year until they did at a Visegrad

620 Interview D11.

621 Honor Mahony, “Sarkozy warns Visegrad countries not to make a habit of pre-summit meetings”

EUObserver (04.11.2009), retrieved 6 May 2010 from http://euobserver.com/9/28928 622

Interview D4, D11. 623

Interview D11. 624

Since the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) the Open Method of Coordination is the intergovernmental framework for

cooperation between the member states. Its purpose is achieving common objectives concerning policies that fall

within the competence of the member states, but where coordination is desirable. Furthermore, the member

states jointly establish measuring instruments, such as statistics, indicators, guidelines. They evaluate each other

and exchange best practices. 625

José Manuel Barroso, “Is the Visegrad regional cooperation useful for the European Union? (2006), retrieved

at 6 May from http://www.visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=1082&articleID=4061&ctag=articlelist&iid=1 626

Interview B18, D11. 627

Ibid. 628

Visegrad Declaration of 1991. Retrieved 9 March 2010 from:

http://visegradgroup.eu/main.php?folderID=940&articleID=3940&ctag=articlelist&iid=1.

116

meeting. Afterwards, in the press conference, all eyes were turned to the Slovak-Hungarian relations

instead of the Visegrad Group.629

The Slovak-Hungarian relations will be further discussed below.

4.4.3.2.2 The Czech Republic

Whereas in the period shortly after the Velvet Divorce, during the Mečiar years, there were some

tensions between the Czech and the Slovak Republic, the current relationship between the two states

could be described as very friendly and not problematic at all.630

The attitude towards the Czech

Republic, as well as the western part of Europe, changed with the election of Mikuláš Dzurinda who

sent himself on a „Czech mission‟631

in order to become part of the NATO negotiations and to be

included in the same EU accession round as the Czech Republic. During Dzurinda‟s second term in

office, the Czechs were hailing the Slovaks for the reforming measures Dzurinda implemented in for

example, health care and social security and they even took the flat tax measure of Dzurinda as an

example for their own reforms.632

The Slovak government mentioned the Czech Republic first of all neighbouring countries in

its publication „Orientation of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in 2010‟633

. This may indicate

that the Slovaks still consider the relationship with the Czechs as a different relationship, and even a

more intense and special one than the relationships they have with their other neighbouring countries,

such as Hungary, Austria and Ukraine. The Slovaks therefore consider the Czechs as their most

natural partner with whom they share an important part of their history.634

A feature of this special

relationship between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic may also be the fact that it became

an unofficial tradition that each newly chosen prime minister, either in the Slovak or the Czech

Republic, would, as one of his first activities as a prime minister, visit the prime minister of the other

state. For instance, after the elections on 9 June 2006, when Robert Fico was chosen as prime minister

of the Slovak Republic, Fico already visited his Czech counterpart Jiří Paroubek in Prague on 15 June

of the same year.635

On a political level, the Czech and the Slovak Republic are both members of NATO, the

European Union and the Visegrad Group. In addition, cooperation on a bilateral political level is

described as very comprehensive.636

For example, in 2009 when the Czech Republic took over the

presidency of the European Council from France, the Slovak Republic had the opportunity to

influence the EU agenda because of their good relationship with the Czechs.637

Furthermore, during

the gas crisis in 2009 when Slovakia found itself without Russian gas for 12 days, the Czech Republic

offered the Slovaks a helping hand by providing a reversed gas flow from the western part of Europe

629 Interview D4.

630 Interview A10, B23

631 Palata, L.,Elections: Almost Like Old Times, Transitions Online (Transitions Online), issue: 06/06 / 2006, p.2.

632 Denyer, S and Solc, M, Czechoslovakia:what‟s in the divorce settlement?, International Financial Law

Review 12, no. 2 (February 1993), p. 29. 633

Orientation of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2010, retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_78DED0BDDD8B3A35C1257706002D8E9C_EN/$File/

Zameranie_2010_fin_EN.pdf. 634

Interview A10. 635

Ibid. 636

Ibid. 637

Ibid.

117

to Slovakia.638

Therefore, after the gas crisis, one of the main features of Czech-Slovak bilateral

relations has been energy security and inter-connection of energy networks within the framework of

the EU.639

In addition, not only on the national level, but also on the regional, municipal and the

nongovernmental level (NGOs), several cross border projects have been realised.640

4.4.3.2.3 Hungary

Despite their common membership of the EU, NATO and the Visegrad Group, there are tensions

between Slovakia and Hungary, which are largely influenced by their shared history, as it is argued in

chapter 1. Their tensed relationship will be further demonstrated by several important cases.

Firstly, harsh statements in domestic politics are seen as an important reason for the aggravated

Slovak-Hungarian relations. In Slovakia, the anti-Hungarian rhetoric came foremost from SNS

chairman Ján Slota, a politician from North-Slovakia, an area that is known for its small ethnic

Hungarian community.641

Before his political career at SNS, Slota had an ethnic Hungarian wife. It has

been suggested that his divorce may have influenced his strong, negative opinions about

Hungarians.642

“Hungarians are a cancer in the body of the Slovak nation,” is one of the many harsh

statements Slota has expressed.643

Furthermore, Slota makes no distinction between Hungarians and ethnic Hungarian minorities

in Slovakia. By doing so, he scapegoats the country Hungary as well, which negatively influences the

foreign relations of Slovakia.644

For example, there has never been any official census concerning the

number of ethnic Hungarians who do not speak the Slovak language. While in practice the situation

may not be so bad, it can be useful for political reasons to strengthen the image of ethnic Hungarians

who cannot speak Slovak.645

However, Slota is not the only politician who does this, since the Smer

party is also using more and more anti-Hungarian rhetoric.646

Political culture in Slovakia is based on confrontations and conflict. Besides, populism has

become increasingly normal in political rhetoric. These developments have spill over effects on

foreign policy as well.647

Particularly, the SNS party tries to pull the „Hungarian card‟648

as often as

possible. For example, Slota set up a list of historical mistakes for which Hungary and the Hungarian

minority should still apologise, in order to ameliorate the Slovak-Hungarian relations.649

However, as

638 Interview A10, C6.

639 Orientation of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic in 2010, retrieved from

http://www.mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_78DED0BDDD8B3A35C1257706002D8E9C_EN/$File/

Zameranie_2010_fin_EN.pdf, retrieved at 10-05-2010 640

Interview A10. 641

Interview A10. 642

Interview B18, E6. 643

Grigorij Meseţnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová, “National Populism in Slovakia” Institute for Public Affairs,

Bratislava 2008, pp. 11-12. 644

Ibid., pp. 11,19. 645

Interview B18, B24. 646

Interview A11, B18, E16. 647

Grigorij Meseţnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová, “National Populism in Slovakia” Institute for Public Affairs,

Bratislava 2008, p. 32. 648

Interview B18. 649

Grigorij Meseţnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová, “National Populism in Slovakia” Institute for Public Affairs,

Bratislava 2008, pp. 23-24.

118

Hungarian officials stated, in 2008 Hungary had already apologised for historical events, such as the

invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops in 1968, in which the Hungarian troops took

part.650

It thus seems as if the SNS has the intention to maintain a poor relationship with Hungary.

Because of this nationalistic anti-Hungarian rhetoric, the SNS may increase its popularity among

voters.651

Simultaneously, the rhetoric of political parties in Hungary has hardened with regard to

Slovakia. For instance, Hungarian politician Victor Orbán of the Fidesz party said in 2008 that ethnic

Hungarians in Slovakia should be inspired by Kosovo.652

In the last parliamentary elections of April

2010, Orbán‟s party obtained the absolute majority with 52.8% of the votes. The third party in these

elections was newcomer Jobbik, with 16.7% of the votes. This extremist party is known to be in strong

support of a Greater Hungary.653

The Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Michal Lajčak declared in a

reaction to the Hungarian elections that he expected “good relations, good communication and good

cooperation”654

with the new Hungarian government. However he warned for more Jobbik influence,

because this could complicate the Slovak-Hungarian relations.655

The first decision of the new Fidesz government was to extend Hungarian citizenship outside

the borders of Hungary, by distributing passports to Hungarians living in other states. This action was

seen as a provocation by the Slovak government that reacted angrily to this law. Only a few hours

later, the Slovak government adopted a counter law that prohibits double citizenships in Slovakia. If a

Slovak citizen accepts another passport, one would not only receive a fine of € 40,000, but in most

cases, one would also lose their Slovak citizenship.656

Furthermore, Fico has announced that he will

lodge a protest against this law within the EU and OSCE.657

Despite these statements, Prime Minister Fico stressed that the ethnic Hungarian minorities in

Slovakia are being treated entirely according European standards. In 2004, he declared that “other

member states should take the Slovak situation as an example, because the legal status of minorities is

above average.”658

Fico also declared that ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia enjoy a much higher standard

of rights than Slovaks in Hungary.659

This statement led the SNS to announce that they would diminish

the rights of the Hungarian minority after the elections, which provoked angry reactions from

Hungary.660

In 2010, Fico complemented his previous statement by saying: “we are not going to

experiment with collective rights for only one group. Human rights are universal and apply to all

650 Interview A11.

651 Interview E16.

652 Grigorij Meseţnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová, “National Populism in Slovakia” Institute for Public Affairs,

Bratislava 2008, p. 28. 653

Martiná Stanková „Fidesz wins a majority in Hungary‟ The Slovak Spectator, retrieved 19 April 2010 from:

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/38565/2/fidesz_wins_a_majority_in_hungary.html 654

Annual Conference of Slovak Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2010. 655

Ibid.; Interview A6 656

„Pandora‟s Passport‟ The Economist, 3 June 2010. 657

J. Hunin, „Slowakije furieus over wet Hongarije‟, De Volkskrant, 28 May 2010. 658

Grigorij Meseţnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová, “National Populism in Slovakia” Institute for Public Affairs,

Bratislava 2008, p. 22. 659

Ibid. 660

“SNS: Po voľbách chcú zrevidovať práva menšín” [„SNS: Aims to Reduce Minority Rights after Elections‟],

SITA, 16 February 2006.

119

Slovak citizens”.661

Remarkably, this implied that he was not in favour of ameliorating standards for

the Hungarian minority.

The Slovak Institute of Public Affairs researched the – by the Slovak population – assumed

responsibility for the aggravated Slovak-Hungarian relations. They were asked to rate the following

statement: “Mutual Slovak-Hungarian relations grew more complicated recently. What is in your

opinion the reason behind this development?” The respondents could rate from a scale from one to

five, where five implied key responsibility and one meant no responsibility at all. Ethnic Hungarians

consider Slovak politicians, and above all the SNS, to be responsible. Yet, Slovaks think the relations

are more tensed due to statements made by Hungarian politicians, as is shown in table 4.4. This

implies a strong „us-them‟ division in mentality among the Slovak people.662

Table 4.4: Assumed Key Responsibility for Aggravated Slovak-Hungarian Relations

According to: Slovaks Hungarians

Hungarian Government and Hungary‟s official representatives 70 37

Other representatives of Hungary political and public life 70 36

SNS leaders 48 84

Other members of the Slovak cabinet 25 62

Prime Minister Robert Fico 16 61

Source: Institute for Public Affairs663

Secondly, there have been tensions between Slovaks and ethnic Hungarian minorities. Some alleged

racial attacks have occurred, but both sides declared that these were incidents rather than examples of

structural discrimination of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.664

Recently, the conflict between

Slovaks and ethnic Hungarian minorities aggravated. One of the reasons is the State Language Act

amended in 2009. Hungary reacted angrily to this “linguistic dictatorship”, as they call it.665

They

asked the EU to take action to preserve the rights of the Hungarian minorities. In return, this

Hungarian reaction provoked the anger of the Slovak Prime Minister. He denounced the Hungarian

objections and commented that the Language Act protects Slovaks in their right to speak the Slovak

language on the entire Slovak territory.666

Furthermore, it would improve the position of the Hungarian

minority, because when they learn the Slovak language, it would be easier to participate in jobs.667

The

State Language Act will be discussed in greater detail in section 7.6, which deals with minorities and

human rights.

Thirdly, a major diplomatic incident occurred in 2009, when the Slovak government refused entry of

the Hungarian president when he paid a visit to Slovakia. On 20 August, the Hungarian President

661 Annual Conference of Slovak Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2010.

662 Grigorij Meseţnikov and Oľga Gyárfášová, “National Populism in Slovakia”, Institute for Public Affairs,

Bratislava 2008, p. 44. 663

Ibid. 664

Interview A11, B24. 665

Heti Világgazdaság, “Dovendialoog aan de Donau”, Presseurop,

http://www.presseurop.eu/nl/content/article/68251-dovendialoog-bij-de-donau. 666

Ibid. 667

Annual Conference of Slovak Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2010; Interview A6.

120

Sólyom scheduled a visit to the predominantly Hungarian town of Komárno in the southern part of

Slovakia, to unveil a statue of King Stephen I of Hungary, who was a Hungarian monarch during the

10th and 11

th century. On the day of the visit, the Slovak government declared that the Hungarian

President was not welcome in Slovakia on that particular day and that his planned visit was a

provocation.668

The reason why Slovakia was upset about the visit changed several times and at times these

changes were even contradictory. At first, the Slovak Foreign Minister Lajčak stated that the fact that

no Slovak official was invited to the ceremony was the real cause of offense. According to Lajčak, this

was “an egregiously rude provocation when it comes to good neighbourly relations.”669

Consistent

with a poll of liberal newspaper SME, almost 60% of the Slovak population agreed, by calling the visit

of the Hungarian president a provocation.670

Allegedly, a meeting with the Slovak President

Gašparovič was requested by Hungary, but at that time, the Slovak President was on holiday.671

Later

on, the particular date of the ceremony provoked discontent on the Slovak side. 21 August was the day

during the Prague Spring that military forces of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia and

suppressed the anti-Communist movement. The Slovak government said scheduling the ceremony on

this day was insensitive.672

Lastly, the Slovak government stood by the declaration of not being able to

guarantee the security of the Hungarian President, because they were informed too late.673

The Hungarian government opposed to these reasons. The government declared that the

ceremony had nothing to do with the 1968 invasion and that they had informed Slovakia of the

President‟s visit in advance. According to Hungarian officials, Slovak and Hungarian authorities had

been discussing advanced security measures until a few days before the actual visit.674

Hungary called

the ban “unexpected and its justification deplorable and unacceptable”675

. However, also within Slovak

society, disapproval arose. For instance, political analyst Grigorij Meseţnikov declared that it was a

violation of European principles, since Slovakia denied an allied country.676

The European

Commission was even asked to mediate in this dispute, but the Commission would explicitly not

comment on the ban of the Hungarian President, because it considered it to be a bilateral issue.677

668 J. Ward, „Slovakia and Hungary: Dangerously playing with fire‟, Der Spiegel, 25 August 2009. Retrieved 9

March 2010 from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,644853,00.html. 669

Ibid. 670

Poll: do you think the government handled correctly by denying the entrance of the Hungarian President? Yes

(58%); No (28%); 27961 participants, 21/08/2009 - 08/28/2009. Retrieved 25 March 2010 from

http://www.sme.sk/anketa_archiv.asp?pol=sme_hs&st=20. 671

Interview A11; Martiná Stanková, „Hungarian President denied entry to Slovakia‟, The Slovak Spectator,31

August 2009. Retrieved at 20 May 2010 from

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36337/2/hungarian_president_denied_entry_to_slovakia.html. 672

M. Stanková, „Hungarian President denied entry to Slovakia‟, The Slovak Spectator,31 August 2009.

Retrieved at 20 May 2010 from

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36337/2/hungarian_president_denied_entry_to_slovakia.html. 673

Ibid. 674

Interview A11. 675

J. Ward, „Slovakia and Hungary: Dangerously playing with fire‟, Der Spiegel, 25 August 2009. Retrieved 9

March 2010 from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,644853,00.html 676

M. Stanková, „Hungarian President denied entry to Slovakia‟, The Slovak Spectator,31 August 2009,

retrieved 20 May 2010 from:

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36337/2/hungarian_president_denied_entry_to_slovakia.html. 677

J. Ward, “Slovakia and Hungary: Dangerously playing with fire”, Der Spiegel, 25 August 2009. Retrieved 9

March 2010 from http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,644853,00.html

121

Fourthly, a subject that has been bothering the Slovak-Hungarian relations for quite some time is the

dispute about the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dam in the Danube. The conflict is rooted in 1977, in a

treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia to build a series of dams on the Danube River. Hungary

abandoned its work in 1989, citing potential long-term environmental damage, while Slovakia

completed a modified version of the complex entirely on its territory. In 1993, the two sides filed suit

against each other at the International Court of Justice. Hungary sued Slovakia for trans-boundary

environmental damage, applying the precautionary principle to international law. On the other hand,

Slovakia sued Hungary for treaty violation. Remarkably, the dispute has survived the collapse of

Communism, the disintegration of Czechoslovakia, political and economic transitions, and NATO and

EU membership. Despite serious pressure from the EU, the countries have never officially reached an

agreement, although one would have expected these two states to have achieved a compromise in the

light of European integration.678

This issue has become an important matter in framing national identity in the foreign policies

of both countries. Nowadays, the dam represents to both countries a different meaning. For Slovakia

the dam means modernity, economic independence and stability. In other words, it has become a

modernisation symbol for national pride.679

For Hungary, the dam represents Communist repression

and it is a symbol for a maniacal Communist project. Opposition against the dam has become a

symbol of national pride, of leaving Communist times behind.680

As a result, in this dispute the dam

has become a symbol of status and rivalry, winning and losing.681

It is said that third parties, like the EU, are often unwilling or unable to create sufficient

incentives to move the countries towards a solution for a similar dispute, because of the attached

symbolic values. These issues are not subject to strict economic cost-benefit analyses, which makes it

hard for a third party to intermediate.682

This implies that the EU cannot be of much help in solving the

problem.

Moreover, both Slovak and Hungarian government officials have stated that the Gabčíkovo-

Nagymaros dam is not the most important problem in current Slovak-Hungarian relations. Both parties

seem to agree with the Solomon‟s judgement of the International Court of Justice that declared that

both sides have made mistakes. From then on, the issue has been postponed and both parties seem to

agree with this decision.683

The aforementioned examples made the two countries decide to go to the Organisation for Security

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to prevent the situation from escalating. The fact that they

wanted the OSCE as a mediator shows that they both realise the importance of good neighbourly

relations. The High Commissioner of National Minorities of the OSCE, Knut Vollebaek, has been

asked to mediate in their bickering. Other EU member states have supported this decision, as they are

678 S. Beets, “Constituting Interests and Identities in a Two-Level Game: Understanding the Gabcikovo-

Nagymaros Dam Conflict”, Foreign Policy Analysis (2009) 5, pp. 37–56. 679

Ibid., p. 38. 680

Interview A11. 681

S. Beets, “Constituting Interests and Identities in a Two-Level Game: Understanding the Gabcikovo-

Nagymaros Dam Conflict”, Foreign Policy Analysis (2009) 5, pp. 43-44. 682

Ibid., p. 40. 683

Interview A11, B18.

122

more and more concerned over the Slovak-Hungarian relationship.684

However, according to some, the

EU has already proved its effectiveness in Slovak-Hungarian disputes, albeit mostly before actual EU

accession. As a result of the conditionality process, the EU could easier exert influence by demanding

progress. This has taken the sharp edges off of the conflict and has ensured that the conflict did not

become violent. 685

However, at present, few options remain for the EU to interfere in the bilateral

relations between two member states.686

Nonetheless, the necessity of seeking intermediation at the EU and OSCE level indicates

clearly that the diplomatic relations between the two states are icy. It may seem differently, but the

problems between Slovakia and Hungary are mostly political, hardening in the period before

elections.687

Slovak and Hungarian political parties use sentiments from the past for their political

agenda and the „anti-Hungarianism‟ in Slovakia is politically exploited to fulfil nationalistic aims. In

this respect, foreign policy serves a domestic goal.688

Furthermore, in the southern regions, where the percentage of ethnic Hungarians is the

highest, Slovaks and ethnic Hungarians live next to each other without big problems or significant

discrimination. There is also a lot of cross border cooperation between Slovak and Hungarian towns,

sometimes promoted by the Visegrad Fund.689

It is plausible that more discrimination and suspicion

occur in areas where ethnic Hungarians are not present in large numbers, fuelled by a fear of the

unknown. The fact that a large number of SNS politicians originate from northern Slovakia would

confirm this.690

4.4.3.2.4 Austria

The relationship with Austria is quite distant, considering that the capitals are located so closely

together. An explanation for this could be the language barrier. Especially today, most young people

learn English instead of German. Furthermore, for a long time there was no highway connection

between the two countries. After ten years of delay, the highway connecting the two countries opened

in November 2007.691

In light of EU accession, Austria was afraid that the Slovak Republic could not fulfil the

obligations to become an EU member and was for that reason opposed to Slovakia‟s entry to the

Schengen zone and the access of Slovak citizens to the Austrian labour market.692

This Austrian

opposition led to irritation among Slovak officials.693

684 Minbuza, “Verhagen juicht bemiddeling tussen Hongarije en Slowakije toe”. Retrieved 16 March 2010 from

http://www.minbuza.nl/nl/Actueel/Nieuwsberichten/2010/03/Verhagen_juicht_bemiddeling_tussen

Hongarije_en Slowakije_toe.html. 685

S. Keukeleire and J. McNaughtan, Foreign Policy of the European Union, Londen, 2008, pp. 259-261. 686

Interview A11. 687

Interview B18, D4. 688

S. Beets, “Constituting Interests and Identities in a Two-Level Game: Understanding the Gabcikovo-

Nagymaros Dam Conflict”, Foreign Policy Analysis (2009) 5, pp. 37–56. 689

Interview A11, D4 , B18. 690

Interview A11, B18. 691

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), pp. 288-289; Interview B4. 692

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), pp. 288-289. 693

Interview B4, B23.

123

Nonetheless, in the economic field the relationship with Austria has been beneficial. Since the

EU accession there have been more investments from Austria. Furthermore, Vienna and Bratislava

will become partner cities in the near future.694

However, the government stressed that they do not

have the manpower to invest in optimising relations with every country. They take the relation with

Austria for granted, but it is not a priority at the moment.695

4.4.3.2.5 Ukraine

In contrast, maintaining good bilateral relations with Ukraine is one of Slovakia‟s top priorities, seeing

that it is also in Slovakia‟s interest to have political and economic stability in the domestic political

situation of its neighbour. At present, the two countries cooperate mainly on economic matters and the

topic of energy security. The latter was added after the gas crisis of January 2009, when Slovakia was

cut off from energy supplies due to a Russian-Ukrainian dispute. This crisis took 12 days before a

solution was reached, which cost Slovak businesses €1 million per day. For this reason, Slovakia

played a very active role, also through an EU delegation, to solve the crisis by mediating between

Russia and Ukraine. For instance, the Slovak President and the Prime Minister visited Kiev and

Moscow every other day during the crisis.696

However, the energy crisis has harmed Slovak-Ukrainian

relations.697

The Fico government has actively helped Ukraine in its process of achieving EU candidacy.

However, according to the government, the difference with previous governments is that Slovakia is

no longer forcing EU membership upon them. Nowadays, the government tries to convince Ukraine

that the EU way of life is the best option, even if this is not resulting in membership. This change

should come from Ukraine itself, even now, with the new less euro-enthusiastic Ukrainian

government. A practical example of Slovak help is that the Slovak embassy in Kiev was Ukraine‟s

contact with NATO in 2007-2008.698

Slovakia strongly supports Ukrainian membership of the EU, as

it would ensure the security of Slovakia‟s eastern border. However, Slovakia admits that it will take

decades before Ukraine has met all of the EU accession criteria.699

In Slovak-Ukrainian relations, the most important tool for Slovakia is the EU Eastern

Partnership. However, this relation has also experienced negative consequences from Slovakia‟s

accession to the EU. Nowadays, the border is also a Schengen border, which hinders the movement of

persons between the two countries.700

4.4.3.2.6 Western Balkans

In order to contribute to a safe world, Slovakia tries actively to promote stability and constitutional

reform in the Western Balkans, i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia,

Macedonia and Serbia (including Kosovo as a part of Serbia). They aim to do so within NATO and

694 Interview A5.

695 Interview B4.

696 Interview D18.

697 Interview B23.

698 J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 297. 699

Interview D18. 700

Ibid.

124

EU structures. In fact, improving the situation in the Western Balkans is a long-term priority in Slovak

foreign affairs.701

Moreover, Slovakia aims to stimulate the acceleration of the membership of the Western

Balkans to Euro-Atlantic structures. According to the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Diana

Štrofová, Slovakia would be the perfect choice to take the lead in EU accession negotiations with the

Balkan states, since Slovakia has not been stigmatised in international relations. Therefore, Slovakia

would be a neutral player.702

Slovakia has rejected the independence of Kosovo, because it considers it contrary to

international law.703

However, Slovakia‟s rejection may be linked to its fear that Kosovo‟s

independence could set a precedent for the Hungarian minority‟s demand for independence.704

It was

thus noteworthy that the SMK party was the only Slovak political party in favour of Kosovo‟s

independence.705

Yet, Slovakia was not the only state that rejected Kosovo‟s independence

declaration. Of course, Serbia did not accept the independence of Kosovo and neither did Russia and

four other EU member states: Spain, Greece, Romania and Cyprus.706

However, by opposing

Kosovo‟s independence, Slovakia went against the point of view of the big EU member states.707

4.4.3.2.7 Russian Federation

Slovakia would describe its relations with Russia as good, open and pragmatic. Open, because

Slovakia is not afraid to address Russia on subjects that can be sensitive, such as the aggravated

situation in the Caucasus, in areas like South-Ossetia. Russia does not like the fact that Slovakia

became a NATO member and acceded to the EU. However, this has not led to any worries on the

Slovak side and the countries remain in dialogue. Slovakia has acknowledged that Russia has

difficulties in dealing with the EU and that they try to use the internal problems of the EU to their

advantage. Yet, Slovakia knows that Russia will prefer to cooperate with the EU rather than the US.

The Slovak-Russian relationship is pragmatic, because it focuses on good business relations,

regardless of the historic events that have taken place between Slovakia and Russia. Slovakia is for

almost 98% dependant on Russian gas, so in this regard it is important to keep good relations.708

However, this dependency makes Slovak-Russian trade relations disadvantageous for Slovakia.709

Slovak Prime Minister Fico has declared several times to be inspired by Russian Prime

Minister Putin and his way of governing. He added that he would welcome “above standard relations

701 Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava 2010)

p. 9. 702

Annual Conference of Slovak Foreign Affairs, 12 April 2010; Interview A6. 703

Interview A10, B4. 704

Interview B5. 705

Tomáš Weiss, “The case study Slovakia” in: David Kral, Vera Řahičkova and Tomáš Weiss, “Views on

American Foreign Policy. The Atlanticism of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe” EUROPEUM

Institute for European Policy (2008 Prague), p.193. 706

Lázló Marácz “Some Consequences of EU-enlargement with the Former Soviet Bloc Countries for the

Union‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy” Conference paper at Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU

Politics at the University of Latvia in Riga, 25 September 2008, pp. 12-13. 707

Ibid. 708

Interview D18. 709

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 269.

125

with Russia”710

. Besides, President Gašparovič made a statement about stronger relations with Russia.

In October 2007, he stated that Slovakia would support Russia‟s entry into the EU, because Russia is a

significant part of the European continent. This would also lead to further cooperation within the entire

Slavic world.711

These statements raised questions in the rest of Europe. This implies that the Fico

government has the wish to re-profile towards Russia.712

4.4.3.2.8 United States of America

The relationship between Slovakia and the United States is seen as friendly and special; the US is even

considered as their strongest ally.713

The US helped a lot in the transition period after the fall of

Communism. In the 1990s the relationship slightly cooled. Former Secretary of State Madeline

Albright referred to Slovakia as “the black hole of Europe”714

. During Dzurinda‟s government, the

relationship improved. During the Bush years, when the division Old versus New Europe came up, the

relationship was outstanding. Bush jr. was the first American President to have ever set foot on Slovak

soil, during the Bush-Putin summit in 2005. Bush was very popular in Slovakia at that time, more so

than in other European states. Since Slovakia provides „neutral‟ support for the invasion of Iraq,

Bratislava was chosen to host the summit. The choice of Bratislava was considered a sign of the

Americans‟ appreciation for the Slovak non-publicly, yet military support of the Iraq war.715

Since the Obama government, the relationship has changed again. The US has backed out on

the anti-missile shield that they were to construct in Central Europe. The Fico government declared

that he perceived this missile shield as a contribution to Slovak and Central European security.716

Under Obama, Slovakia has seen its privileged position fade. According to the Slovak government, the

ideal way to cooperate with the US would be through the Visegrad Group and certainly not through

the EU, since the US would prefer bilateral relations. Furthermore, the occurred chill in Slovak-

American relations after Slovakia‟s withdrawal from Iraq was restored after the Fico government had

raised the number of troops in Afghanistan. This replacement from soldiers from Iraq to Afghanistan

led to the US‟ re-approval of Slovakia.717

Even Fico‟s statements, such as: “Slovakia is in the centre of Europe, not in the centre of the

United States”718

, or his hints about a stronger relation with Russia have not interfered with the good

710 J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 267. 711

Ibid., pp. 267-268. 712

Tomáš Weiss, „The case study Slovakia‟ in: David Kral, Vera Řahičkova and Tomáš Weiss, opeViews on

American Foreign Policy. The Atlanticism of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe, Prague:

EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy 2008, p. 195. 713

Interview B4. 714

E. Büyükakinci, „Syndromes and Alternatives for Slovak Foreign Policy: The Process of Restructuring After

the Velvet Divorce‟, in: East European Quarterly, XXXVI, No. 1, March 2002, p. 91. 715

Interview B4. 716

T. Weiss, „The case study Slovakia‟ in: David Kral, Vera Řahičkova and Tomáš Weiss, Views on American

Foreign Policy. The Atlanticism of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe, Prague: EUROPEUM

Institute for European Policy 2008, pp. 197-203. 717

J. Marusiak et al, Foreign Policy - Main trends, bilateral relations, regional cooperation (in: IVO Slovakia

State and Society 2006), p. 260. 718

T. Weiss, “The case study Slovakia” in: D. Kral, V. Řahičkova and T. Weiss, “Views on American Foreign

Policy. The Atlanticism of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe” EUROPEUM Institute for European

Policy (2008 Prague), p.195.

126

Slovak-American relations. Eventually, Slovakia would even be in favour of US access to the

European free market.719

4.4.3.2.9 Evaluation of Slovak Bilateral Relations

The bilateral relations of Slovakia with other states demonstrate the idea of Slovakia as a young state

that is still looking for its own identity, especially on the international level. It seems as if Slovakia is

trying to create a stronger national identity by consequently opposing all Hungarian aspects, which

harms their bilateral relations.

On the whole, Slovakia tries to maintain good bilateral relations with its neighbours. Clearly,

not all neighbours are prioritised, which would be impossible since the Slovak Ministry of Foreign

Affairs simply does not have enough resources to prioritise every country. When relations are steady,

the government chooses to focus on other countries where problems occur. Therefore, it can be stated

that overall, Slovakia is successful in achieving regional cooperation with its neighbours.

The bilateral relations with the US and Russia are perceived as good, for economic and

strategic reasons. Good transatlantic relations are especially important for Slovakia and for the

Visegrad Group, because they think that the US and NATO can better contribute to energy security

and security in general; issues that are of great importance to Slovakia. The government has this

preference, because they consider the EU – as an economic organisation – not yet capable on these

matters.

4.4.3.3 Priority: The Interests of Slovakia in an Efficient EU

The Slovak Republic has been a member state of the European Union since 2004, being one of the ten

member states of the „big bang‟ accession round. From 2004 until now, Slovakia has begun to find its

way in Brussels and, more generally, within the European Union. Currently, the Slovak European

Commissioner in the 2010-2014 Barroso Commission, Maroš Šefčovič, is one of the seven vice-

presidents of the European Commission and he is responsible for Inter-Institutional Relations and

Administration. Furthermore, the Slovak Republic holds 13 out of 736 seats in the European

Parliament. The 13 Slovak European politicians are spread out over four different political groups

within the European Parliament. Six MEPs joined the political Group of the European People's Party

(Christian Democrats). Five MEPs belong to the political Group of the Progressive Alliance of

Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament. Furthermore, there is respectively one Slovak

MEP in the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group and another takes part in the political Group of

the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.720

Like all other member states of the EU, the Slovak Republic is also represented in the other

bodies of the European Union: The Court of Justice of the European Union (Daniel Šváby), the Court

of First Instance of the European Union (Juraj Schwarcz), the European Court of Auditors (Július

Molnár), the European Economic and Social Committee (9 out of 344 members are Slovaks), the

Committee of the Regions (18 members are Slovaks) and the European Central Bank (Jozef Makuch,

working for the Národná Banka Slovenska). Furthermore, situated in Brussels, the Slovak Republic

719 Interview B4.

720 European Parliament, „members‟, retrieved 18 June 2010 from

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/public/geoSearch/search.do?country=SK&language=NL

127

has a Permanent Representation of Slovakia to the EU, which is the second largest embassy of

Slovakia in the world, consisting of a staff of 85 persons. At the moment, the Slovak ambassador Ivan

Korčok holds the function of Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the EU. The Slovak Republic is

one of the EU member states that also has a regional representation in Brussels, which is called the

House of Slovak Regions.721

4.4.3.3.1 Priorities for the Slovak Republic in the EU

Regional development and agriculture seem to be two of the main priorities of Slovakia within the

process of policy making in the EU, probably because the financial assistance from EU structure funds

plays an important role in the development of the country. However, the financial policies and the

energy policies of the EU are also of great importance to the Slovak Republic. The focus on energy

policies could be explained by Slovakia‟s great dependency on Russia when it comes to energy

supplies.722

This dependency became clearly visible during the energy crisis in 2008. Therefore, it is

not surprising that these days Slovakia pays special attention to energy security. Through its

Permanent Representation, Slovakia initiated several energy infrastructure projects on, for example,

interconnection of electricity grids and gas networks in the EU that have been included in the

Commission‟s Strategic Energy Review of 2009723

. In addition, Slovakia advocates for north-south

energy interconnection in Europe, which should not only improve the energy security of Central

European countries but which would also be in the interest of all EU member states.724

Furthermore, Slovakia is presenting itself as an advocate of further EU enlargement. Slovakia

supports EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans and to a certain extent, also towards the

Eastern European countries.725

In addition, the Slovak Republic has welcomed Iceland‟s application

for EU membership.726

Moreover, Slovakia could be seen as one of the most engaged member states in

the Eastern Partnership project.727

Indeed, the Slovak Republic has been a strong supporter of the EU accession of the Western

Balkan countries, living by the credo that any country that is able to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria

should have the possibility to join the European Union. The Slovak government therefore thinks it is

extremely important to confirm its commitment to the candidate countries, like for example Croatia

and Turkey.728

In this regard, the most important country to the Slovak Republic in the Western

Balkans is Serbia, because of its size and its importance in the region. Moreover, there is a minority of

721 House of Slovak Regions, retrieved 18 June 2010 from http://www.skregions.eu/

722 Interview F1.

723 Strategic Energy Review, retrieved 7 June 2010 from

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2008/2008_11_ser2_en.htm#. 724

Annual Report: Foreign Policy in 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava 2010,

p. 24. 725

Interview A10. 726

„Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic to the European Union, Slovakia welcomes the proposal to

start EU negotiations with Iceland‟, retrieved 8 June 2010 from http://www.mzv.sk/szbrusel. 727

Slovakia and EU, retrieved 6 May 2010 from

http://www.foreign.gov.sk/en/foreign_policy/slovakia_in_europe-slovakia_and_eu. 728

Interview A10.

128

70.000 Slovaks living in Serbia.729

The Slovak Republic hopes that the accession negotiations of

Serbia with the EU could have an exemplary function to the other Western Balkan states.730

As mentioned above, the Slovak Republic was one of the leading countries in the formation of

the Eastern Partnership project, launched at the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit of the Council of

the European Union on 7 May 2009. The main goal of the Eastern Partnership is “to create the

necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration between the

European Union and interested partner countries”, which are Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia,

Azerbaijan and Armenia.731

The Eastern Partnership is based on commitment to the principles of international law and to

fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights, as well as to

market economy, sustainable development and good governance.732

The Eastern Partnership can be

seen as a deepening of the relations with members of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was

developed in 2004 as a result of the European Security Strategy of 2003.733

At that time, the ambition of the European Neighbourhood Policy was to create a stable,

secure, and prosperous environment around the borders of the EU in order to increase prosperity,

stability and security within the EU.734

The most important features of cooperation within the

European Partnership are the promotion of democracy and good governance, the strengthening of

energy security, the promotion of sector reform and environment protection, the encouragement of

people to people contacts, the support for economic and social development and the availability of

additional funding for projects to reduce socio-economic imbalances and to increase stability.735

However, cooperation within the Eastern Partnership is built on the thought that “each

individual Eastern neighbour country of the EU has to be considered in terms of their own specifics

and progress”736

. Moreover, the Eastern Partnership is complementary to already existing bilateral

relations and therefore possible membership aspirations of individual countries will not be taken into

account within this framework.

One the one hand, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are not of the highest importance to the

Slovak Republic, because they are simply too far away. On the other hand, Ukraine, Moldova and

Belarus do matter to the Slovak Republic, because of their geographical and geopolitical positions in

Europe. The Slovak Republic strongly supports further development of the Eastern Partnership as a

tool to stabilise and modernise these countries and as a possible solution to frozen conflicts. This

position of the Slovak Republic does not necessarily imply that Slovakia is also a favour of EU

accession of these states. Hence, the official statement of the Slovak government on this matter:

“Eastern Partnership is not considered as a step towards EU membership, because it is not in

729 Interview A10.

730 Ibid.

731 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May 2009, retrieved 10 May 2010

from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf. 732

Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May 2009, retrieved 10 May 2010

from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf. 733

European Security Strategy, retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=266&lang=EN. 734

Ibid. 735

Eastern Partnership, retrieved10 May 2010 from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm. 736

Slovakia and EU, retrieved 06 May 2010 from

http://www.foreign.gov.sk/en/foreign_policy/slovakia_in_europe-slovakia_and_eu.

129

Slovakia‟s interest to include the countries of Eastern Europe, but to have a stabilised Eastern

border”737

.

4.4.3.3.2 The Danube Strategy

One of the current main focuses of Slovakia within the European framework is a strategy for the

Danube region, the „Danube strategy‟. The Danube region consists of the following EU member

states: Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and

the non-EU member states Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine.

This strategy was initiated by the European Council during its meeting on the 17th and 18th of June

2009 and afterwards further developed by the European Commission and the European Parliament.

The Slovak Republic was one of the eight initiators of this project together with Austria, Bulgaria, the

Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 738

The project‟s aim is to create wide-ranging and close cooperation between the several

Danube-countries within the policy areas of energy, environmental and nature protection, transport

and infrastructure, professional training and innovation, arts and cultural activities, economic activity

and tourism, food security/safety, economy, migration, governance, sport, education and culture,

labour, health and social affairs.739

Within this European project, the Slovak Republic has underlined

its national interest to include all Danube countries in the strategy, not only those that are member

states of the European Union.740

In conclusion, the focus in Slovak foreign affairs is based on security and economic cooperation with

other states. Overall, Slovakia likes to fulfil a bridge function to overcome the differences between the

EU and non-EU states. They experienced large transitions, which will make them better understand

the point of view of others, according to the Slovak Republic. They like to prevent new divisions.

Therefore, Slovakia is in favour of further EU enlargement, mainly to include the Western Balkans

and Ukraine. The Eastern Partnership is seen as a very important tool, where Slovakia likes to play a

larger role. In this regard, the newly established European External Action Service741

is of great

importance to the Slovak Republic and they wish to extend their influence in this service because they

consider themselves to be adequate in mediating between different interests.

4.5 Conclusion

The majority of the political parties in the Slovak Republic are located on the right, conservative side

of the political spectrum. However, the Communist ideology is still visible in the Smer party. There

was a rapid alternation among political parties and particularly in the 1990s, a lot of merges and splits

737 Interview A10.

738 Declaration of the Danube Summit on 25th February 2010 in Budapest, retrieved 06 May 2010 from

http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperation/danube/documents/declaration_danube_summit2010.pdf. 739

Ibid. 740

National Position on the EU Strategy for the Danube Region, retrieved 06 May 2010 from

http://www.roopis.vlada.gov.sk/data/files/5651.pdf. 741

The creation of a European External Action Service is proposed in the Treaty of Lisbon. Its official role is to

be a diplomatic service to the EU by assisting the High Representative in conducting the foreign policy of the

EU. The creation of the Service has not been finalised yet.

130

occurred. As of the 2000s, the political party system appears to have increasingly stabilised, as several

parties have been elected to parliament in subsequent elections.

As the Commission stated in its avis of 2003, Slovakia had fulfilled the political criteria

essential for EU accession. However, the Commission stressed that further attention to the

administrative and judicial capacity was needed; reforms regarding decentralisation and staffing in

sectors dealing with EU issues were not yet sufficient. Furthermore, the Commission declared that the

Judicial Council should become financially independent, in order to improve the quality and stability

of the democratic institutions. Moreover, the Commission acknowledged the fact that corruption still

was widespread in Slovakia. During the Mečiar years, no progress was made regarding these

challenges. However, the reforms that were implemented under both the Dzurinda governments

supported democratic practices. In 2003, the Commission observed that Slovakia had already

implemented fundamental reforms to improve democratic practices, but these measures had not yet

proved to be sufficient.

However, since Slovakia‟s accession to the EU political conditionality has become much less

effective. In addition, the Fico government, consisting of coalition parties Smer, HZDS and SNS, is

known for being critical of the advised reforms. Moreover, there are indications that the government

has at least sought to revise certain (democratic) reforms that were carried through by the previous

Dzurinda government. For example, the government carried through substantial personnel changes,

primarily replacing representatives of the SMK party for members of the Smer party. As a result, Smer

members were overrepresented in the state apparatus. Furthermore, the Fico government had the

largest amount of former communist ministers since the fall of the Communist regime. Moreover, the

government hardly paid any attention to the recommendations of the Commission. Therefore, it seems

that the reforms that were carried through by the Dzurinda governments may have been implemented

too fast and as a result, may have led to an unstable situation.

The parliamentary elections on 12 June 2010 have resulted again in large support for the Smer

party. However, the other coalition parties, HZDS and SNS, saw a decrease in their electoral support.

Although, the Smer party was given the task to start negations in order to form a coalition, this process

will prove to be difficult since the centre right parties have declared that they will not cooperate with

Smer.

Political participation used to be high during communism, though it can be questioned

whether this was voluntary or compulsory, since political activism was strongly restricted. The last ten

years, voter turnouts in elections have dropped severely in. This is particularly the case for European

Parliament elections, for which Slovakia has showed one of the lowest turnouts in the EU. This can be

explained by the fact that a large part of the electorate does not feel represented by the political parties.

Moreover, mostly younger people have no hopes that anything will change in the future and therefore,

they are less likely to vote.

When looking at Slovakia‟s foreign policies, it is clear that Slovakia tries to maintain good

relations with its neighbours and other important allies. Particularly the relationship with their former

associate the Czech Republic is very strong. However, the aggravated tensions in the Slovak-

Hungarian relations are strengthened by both national governments prior to the elections. This political

conflict is considered a cause for concern in the EU.

131

Slovakia sees a large role for itself in European politics in the near future, for example by

performing a bridge function between the „old‟ European states and other, mainly, Eastern European

countries that will accede to the EU in the coming years. Because of the country‟s communist past,

Slovakia feels to be related to the difficulties these countries encounter in the process of EU accession.

In this regard, the Western Balkans and the countries that participate in the Eastern Partnership are

priorities for Slovakia. The Slovak Republic aims to exert this function through NATO or EU

structures or by the means of the Visegrad regional cooperation. However, it seems as though Slovakia

prefers NATO and the Visegrad Group over the EU. This could be explained by the fact that Slovakia

is still slightly unaccustomed to their role, rights and responsibilities as an EU member state. This is

visible in the fact that Slovakia does not seem to know exactly how to apply for EU structural funds.

As a result, the Slovak Republic does not receive the amount of EU funds they are entitled to receive.

Slovakia‟s main challenge for the coming years is to determine and to shape their role and place

within the EU.

133

5. Civil Society

Apart from a democratic political system, a strong civil society is a fundamental requirement for a well

functioning and stable democratic state. The main purpose of a civil society is to express all interest of

society to the state. Because of the wide variety of participants within the domain of civil society,

special attention has been given to the role of the media and NGOs. Both media and NGOs ensure that

the political system stays fair and balanced. Furthermore, it is their role to guard over the rights of

society and the private sector. With a diverse civil society, one can make sure that all interests are

equally represented as a contra weight against the state. Because of the strong link with politics in

chapter 4, the media will be treated first.

5.1 Media and Press Freedom in the Slovak Republic

5.1.1 Media in Times of Communism

Under the Communist regime the media had to follow the strict theory of Lenin on press and media.

According to this theory the main duty of the media was to spread the communist ideology and to

mobilise society. “The press should be not only a collective propagandist and a collective agitator, but

also a collective organiser of the masses”742

said Lenin. Moreover, objective press coverage would

stand in the way of and would obstruct social communist change.743

In other words, the media had to

serve the state and was highly politicised. The media was a tool of the Communist party instead of an

objective platform for the people. “The printed press and the broadcast media were owned by various

state and party organisations, and were used as an instrument of agitation and propaganda; hence

supply was determined by the Party‟s needs rather than the audiences‟ demand.”744

One of the biggest

daily journals and promoter of the state ideology was Pravda, which still exists today. However, it has

lost its communist ideology.745

The politicisation of the media also had consequences for the position of journalists.

Everything that was written had to correspond with the communist ideology. Although preparatory

censorship was forbidden according to the Press Law from 1967, the Communist party did control the

output of the media systematically.746

Censorship and self-censorship were the order of the day.747

Furthermore, the success of a journalist did not depend on his professional qualities but on his loyalty

to the Communist party. “The journalist of that time was „the party soldier‟ and „the architect of the

742 M. McCombs, D. L. Shaw, D. Weaver, Communication and Democracy: exploring the intellectual frontiers

in Agenda-setting theory, , New Jersey: Laurence Erlbaum Associates 1997, p. 158. 743

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 381. 744

Ibid. p. 384. 745

A. Školkay in M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni, D. McQuail, The Media in Europe: the Euromedia Research Group,

London: Sage Publications 2004, p. 206. 746

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 385. 747

„Censorship in Bohemia before 1989‟ (13 January 2006), by K. Čapková, University Palacky, retrieved 02

February 2010 from http://www.euroculturemaster.org/pdf/capkova_k.pdf.

134

soul‟ whose job it was to make up for the legitimacy deficit of the regime caused by the lack of power-

holders‟ democratic mandates.”748

In the mid-1980s the grip of the Communist party on the media was loosened. With the

introduction of „glasnost‟ by USSR leader Gorbachev, the media got the freedom to present a more

objective picture of the world. However, in practice the official (state) media stayed loyal to the

communist ideology. By doing this, the credibility of the media diminished. The gap between reality

and the way the journalist depictured it increased considerably, because the official media stuck to the

terminology of communist superiority in the domain of political organisation and the planned

economy.

Besides the official state media, there were some unofficial opposition initiatives (samizdat)

that opposed the state ideology. At the end of the 1980s there was more room for these initiatives. For

example, the weekly Mladý svět (Young World), the television program Sondy (Probes) and the

journal Lidové Noviny (People‟s News) – which worked closely together with the opposition

movement Charta 77 including Václav Havel – contributed to pluralistic and objective news coverage.

They often used ecology and environmental issues as a vehicle to discuss politics indirectly.749

However, in comparison with neighbouring countries, the underground press initiatives had low

readership and therefore little influence on society.750

In 1989, the unofficial opposition press was only

read by one percent of the population on a regular basis.751

By contrast, almost 32% of the population

listened regularly to foreign radio stations such as BBC, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe,

which broadcasted in the native language of the region.752

Especially during the 1980s there was a

significant number of listeners.753

These radio stations drew a different, more objective picture of the

world. With this, the radio stations contributed to the democratic movements and the Velvet

Revolution in 1989.754

5.1.2 Media in Post-Communist Times

With the new press law of March 1990 the media landscape changed considerably. The monopoly of

the state on news coverage disappeared, which created room for private initiatives. This resulted in an

increase in the range of newspapers and magazines, from daily journals to pornographic magazines.755

Still some former Communist newspapers remained. For example, the daily Pravda, which exchanged

748P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 385. 749

Interview B13. 750

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 385. 751

A. Školkay in M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni, D. McQuail, The Media in Europe: the Euromedia Research Group,

London: Sage Publications 2004, p. 204. 752

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 385. 753

A. Školkay in M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni, D. McQuail, The Media in Europe: the Euromedia Research Group,

London: Sage Publications 2004, p. 204. 754

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 385. 755

Ibid., p. 386.

135

its communist ideology for a non-political one, is still one of the biggest journals of Slovakia.756

Furthermore, the daily journals Nový Čas, Šport and Sme also have a substantial readership.757

Besides new newspapers and magazines, the privatisation of the media also brought new

players to the media landscape, such as advertisers, foreign companies and private owners.758

With the

liberalisation of the media market, the printed media became subject to private investments and new

ownership. Consequently, business tycoons rather than publishing houses started to dominate the

market.759

However, over the last years a reverse trend is noticeable; professional publishing houses from

Germany, the United States and Switzerland repurchased journals and magazines.760

This has resulted

in a more stable media spectrum given that the publishing houses set out ethical guidelines for their

journalists.761

Radio and Television broadcasters also obtained more freedom in the 1990s. In July 1993, the

former Czechoslovakian Broadcasting Act was amended and renamed into a Slovak Act. With this, the

legal basis for a dual broadcast system was founded. On the one hand, there are the public Slovak

radio and television channels (as STV 1 and STV 2) and on the other hand there are the private

commercial channels (as TV Markiza, one of the most popular private channels). This development

resulted in a gradual change towards a more pluralistic media landscape. 762

5.1.3 Media Freedom and Possible Threats

The Slovak Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and expression. Exceptions are only

accepted “to protect the rights and liberties of others, state security, public order, or public health and

morality.”763

These regulations have resulted in relative freedom for the Slovak media.

Notwithstanding the democratic reforms, however the Slovak media remains sensitive to outside

influences.

Principally, the politicisation of the media stays an important point of concern. Politicians still

have a considerable influence on the media. “Many people, and especially the political elites, still

consider the press and media as an agent of mobilisation and question its autonomy vis-à-vis the

state.”764

In addition, the instable economic position makes media vulnerable. Furthermore, the

756 A. Školkay in M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni, D. McQuail, The Media in Europe: the Euromedia Research Group,

London: Sage Publications 2004, p. 206. 757

Ibid., p. 211. 758

„Censorship in Bohemia before 1989‟ (13-01-2006), by K. Čapková, University Palacky, retrieved 02

February 2010 from http://www.euroculturemaster.org/pdf/capkova_k.pdf. 759

Interview E14. 760

B. Balogová, M. Stankova, „Advancing from fighters journalists‟, in: The Slovak Spectator, 21 April 2010. 761

Interview E14. 762

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 387. 763

„Slovakia (2009)‟, by Freedom House Europe, retrieved 19 March 2010 from

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2009&country=7701. 764

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications‟, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol.1,

p. 389.

136

independence of judges who handle media related cases is questionable. Finally, both the status and

the level of education of journalists are not very high.765

5.1.3.1 Media under Mečiar

Especially during the election campaigns of 1998 it became clear that the media were used as a

political tool by the political elites. The state media were strictly controlled by Vladimir Mečiar, the

Prime Minister at the time. “Through his control of the state media, Mečiar fired journalists and

executives who displeased him. He struck out at the independent privately owned newspapers with

punitive taxation, and his secret police and freelance operatives were blamed for violence and threats

against journalists who had been particularly critical of his government.”766

During his campaign he

ensured that 75% of the campaign broadcast time of the public television was dedicated to his own

party.767

His opponents struck back through the private radio station Twist and the private television

channel Markiza – which became a medium for its political active owner, Pavol Rusko, to spread his

political ideas.768

Furthermore, they organised campaigns against the dominant media. Eventually, the

Mečiar opponents Mikuláš Dzurinda and Rudolf Schuster won the elections. This led to more freedom

and liberties in the media landscape.769

5.1.3.2 Media under Dzurinda

In general, the printed media flourished and developed in line with European democratic standards.

Furthermore, the level of journalism augmented, according to Gabriel Šípoš, media analyst from

Slovak Press Watch: “Through their own experience with democracy and economic progress,

journalists have grown increasingly independent from the government – able to fight for the public

interest and to become a relevant, even if imperfect, watchdog of the powerful.”770

However, the Dzurinda government did not change media legislation to a large extent, which

resulted in the continuation of the old system. The broadcast media in particular continued to be

subject to politicisation.771

The politicisation of the Slovak television has two main causes. Firstly, the

public service television has to cope with large financial debts. They receive fees, state subsidies,

revenues from advertisements and from other business activities, but this is not enough to sustain their

operations.772

Because of their weak financial position, the public television channels are susceptible

to influences of the political elite. This way, the political elite could put pressure on news programmes

and change the information to their interests.

765 Interview B13.

766 D. R. Shanor, „Freedom of the Press in Eastern Europe‟, in D. H. Johnston (ed.), Encyclopedia of

International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 2, p. 139. 767

Ibid. 768

T. Czwitkovics, M. Kollár, „Media‟, in: M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár (ed.), A Global Report on the

State of Society, Slovakia 2006, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007, p. 521. 769

D. R. Shanor, „Freedom of the Press in Eastern Europe‟, in D. H. Johnston (ed.), Encyclopedia of

International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 2, p. 139. 770

B. Balogová, M. Stankova, „Advancing from fighters journalists‟, in: The Slovak Spectator, 21 April 2010. 771

Interview E14. 772

P. Bajomi-Lázár, Z. Simek, „Status of Media in Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary‟, in D. H. Johnston

(ed.), Encyclopedia of International Media and Communications, Academic Press Elsevier Science 2003, Vol. 1,

p. 386.

137

Secondly, the members of the Broadcasting and Retransmission Council are appointed on a

political basis.773

The council has nine members, all elected by the Slovak parliament. Although the

council is legally independent, the composition is highly politicised.774

The members of the

Broadcasting and Retransmission Council have the task to check the diversity and independence of

broadcasts and grant and reverse licenses. Furthermore, they have the power to impose financial

penalties on broadcasters who do not respect the ethical and legal standards of the Broadcast Act.775

However, the International Press Institute expressed doubts on the consistency of the penalties: “The

main concern voiced by the Slovak media comes from the lack of consistency in the Council‟s

decisions regarding when and when not to penalise broadcasters, leaving broadcast editors unsure of

exactly what they may or may not broadcast.”776

Besides the Broadcasting and Retransmission Council, both the Slovak Radio and the Slovak

television have an organising council that examines the broadcasts. Their members, fifteen per

council, are directly elected by parliament. The International Press Institute has cast doubts on the

objectivity of the councils: “Concerns have surfaced that nominees face little chance of election to

either council without strong political support. The potential for political interference in the two public

broadcasting institutions is therefore self-evident.”777

Additionally, when a new government takes

office, a new director of the public television gets appointed. One could derive from this that political

support is more important than professional expertise.778

In contrast to the several public regulatory broadcast councils, there is only one independent

council for the printed media: the Slovak Press Council. It was founded by the Slovak Syndicate of

Journalists (SSN) in 2002 and its task is to consider complaints from outside the media, such as

politicians, companies and readers, regarding the content of the printed media, as well as complaints

from within the media, mostly journalists, concerning the access of information. Hereby, the SSN

Code of Ethics is used as a guideline.779

However, the Council only has the competence to address the

violation of the ethical guidelines, not to punish the infringer.780

5.1.3.3 Media under Fico

The relation between the press and Fico could be described as problematic and antagonistic. On

several occasions Fico has openly attacked the press, for instance, by blaming journalists of being an

opposition tool. In general, the press could be described as liberal and the government as socialist.

773 A. Školkay in M. Kelly, G. Mazzoleni, D. McQuail, The Media in Europe: the Euromedia Research Group,

London: Sage Publications 2004, p. 210. 774

Interview B21. 775

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 776

Ibid. 777

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf 778

Interview E14. 779

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18-03-2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved 03

March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 780

Interview C10.

138

These opposite ideologies led to mutual discords.781

One of Fico‟s major changes regarding the media

is the introduction of the new Press Act. Fearing the limitation of the freedom of press, national as

well as international journalists, publishers and media organisations have strongly reacted to this new

legislation.

In June 2008, the new Press Act was put into force. The OSCE Representative for freedom of

the media as well as Freedom House and the International Press Institute have cast doubts on the

democratic level of some provisions of this act.782

Especially the provision on the „right of reply‟ is

cause for concern. The provision obligates journals to publish the reaction of anyone who feels

offended by an article that has been published. In addition, the article has to be published in the same

size and at the same location as the original article.783

In this regard, no difference is made between a

factual or opinion article, even though both are strictly separated in the Slovak media.784

According to the International Press Institute this act could lead to a form of self-censorship:

“The concern with such provisions centres on the potential „chilling effect‟ they could have on

political criticism and articles covering public life, for fear of triggering voluminous requests to reply.

Such requests also cost a newspaper valuable publication time and publication space, and represent an

unacceptable infringement of editorial independence.”785

In general, everyone can refer to the right-on-reply provision. In practice however, mainly

politicians make use of it. This could result in the act becoming a political tool to restrict the freedom

of journalists in expressing their opinion on politics.786

Besides the right on reply, politicians can also take legal action to rectify statements.

Frequently, this is seen as the preferable route because of the amount of money that is involved.787

In

the Slovak Penal Code defamation is defined as a crime and could therefore be punished with a

financial penalty (§373 of the Slovak Penal Code from 2006).788

With this code, individuals who cause

damage to another‟s reputation by expressing untrue statements can be punished. In theory, this does

not have to pose a threat to media freedom, considering that it could contribute to the degree of truth in

publications. However, one could cast doubts on the execution of this code.

In recent years, Slovak public officials have sued newspapers and broadcasters for

disproportionate large amounts of money on ground of defamation on several occasions. This is a

781 Interview B21.

782 „Slovakia‟s draft press law risks curtailing media freedom‟ (31 January 2009), by Freedom House Europe,

retrieved 03 March 2010 from: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=70&release=619;

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved 03

March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 783

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 784

Interview E14. 785

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 786

Interview E14. 787

Interview B13. 788

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf.

139

cause for concern for the media, especially because of the questionable independence of the judiciary.

According to the International Press Institute “extreme concern exists within the media about the

independence of the Slovak judiciary in these matters, whose verdicts are often inconsistent with the

standards set by Slovakia‟s EU counterparts.”789

During the previous year alone, the court fined newspapers and broadcasters for over €300,000

in damages to public officials in civil cases.790

Prime Minister Fico also contributed to the number of

charges. In a recent example he sued the Sme newspaper over a cartoon for €33,000, which he said

“made fun of his serious health condition while at the same time ridiculing him.”791

After this incident, the International Press Institute expressed its concerns regarding the

freedom of journalists and cartoonists to criticise politicians: “Politicians are lampooned in cartoons

every single day all around the world – this may at times seem irreverent, but this irreverence should

never become a concern of the courts.”792

Instead of suing someone at court, the Prime Minister could

have solved the problem through arbitration of self-regulatory bodies like the Slovak Press Council,

whose task it is to supervise the media code of ethics.793

5.1.4 The Acquis Communautaire regarding Media

The provisions of the acquis communautaire regarding media refer to the European Union Council

Directive on Television without Frontiers from 1989, and were amended by the European Parliament

and the Council in 1997.794

In general, the aim of the directive, as described in the preamble, is to

guarantee the freedom of expression as stipulated in article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Furthermore, the directive creates the conditions for the

free movement of television broadcasts within the Community.795

With the provision in the Slovak Constitution guaranteeing protection of the freedom of

expression and speech, the Slovak Republic fulfils the first condition of the acquis. The Constitution

also offers protection to minors and the public order, in providing legal exceptions to these freedoms.

Therefore, the Slovak Republic meets the requirements of article 22 of the Council Directive that state

that “Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that television broadcasts by

broadcasters under their jurisdiction do not include any programmes which might seriously impair the

physical, mental or moral development of minors, in particular programmes that involve pornography

or gratuitous violence.”796

Also, the access to information is legally guaranteed in the Slovak Republic

789 „Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 790

„Fico sues over cartoon‟ (14 September 2009), in: The Slovak Spectator, retrieved 20 March 2010 from

http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/36490/2/fico_sues_over_cartoon.html. 791

Ibid. 792

Ibid. 793

Ibid. 794

„Council Directive of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation

or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities‟, in:

Official Journal of the European Union L 298, 17.10.1989, p. 23. 795

Ibid. 796

Article 22, sub 1, „Council Directive of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down

by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting

activities‟, in: Official Journal of the European Union L 298, 17.10.1989, p. 23.

140

by Act no. 211/2000 on Free Access to Information.797

Furthermore, the implementation of the EU

provisions on advertisement, the free movement of broadcasts in the Community and the promotion of

„European works‟798

did not pose any problems for the Slovak pluralistic and dual broadcast system.

However, it remains doubtful whether the requirement for independent regulatory bodies and

the protection of the media from political interference and pressure are guaranteed in the Slovak

Republic.799

As mentioned before, there are several regulatory bodies that control the monitoring of

the ethical media guidelines in the Slovak Republic. However, the most important ones, such as the

Council on Broadcasting and Retransmission, the Slovak Radio Council and the Slovak Television

Council, all have linkages with politics, since their members are chosen by parliament. This could lead

to political interference and pressure, thus limiting the freedom of press. Therefore, the International

Press Institute recommends that “the government must review the management structures of the

organisations to ensure that the necessary safeguards and protections are in place to keep the public

sector broadcasting at arm‟s length from politics and is thereby able to fulfil its mandate to provide

independent and diverse information to the public.”800

The Slovak Press Council is the only independent body, but it plays a minor role because it

solely focuses on printed media. Moreover, not all newspapers adopt the advice of the council, since

they do not see the necessity of an external code of ethics if they have got one of their own. For this

reason the International Press Institute recommends, in order to strengthen the press freedom, to

enhance media self-regulatory bodies: “A point needs to be reached where self-regulatory bodies are

considered the natural first port of call for those who seek to redress perceived damage done to their

reputation by the media, thus providing a viable, credible alternative to civil litigation or to legislation

mandating the „right of reply‟.”801

As we have seen, the media is an important player in civil society. They provide the general public

with information and keep a check on politics and the democratic state of the country. Apart from the

media, however, the NGOs have a crucial role within civil society as well. Therefore, the NGO

movement in Slovakia will be analysed and evaluated in the next section. With this, the development

of environmental NGOs will be used as a guideline.

797 „Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 798

Definition „European works‟, according article 6 of the „Television without Frontiers‟ directive:

(a) works originating from Member States;

(b) works originating from European third States party to the European

Convention on Transfrontier Television of the Council of Europe

and fulfilling the conditions of paragraph 2;

(c) works originating from other European third countries and fulfilling

the conditions of paragraph 3. 799

Guide to the main administrative structures required for implementing the Acquis (updated May 2005),

retrieved 19 March 2010 from

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/

negotiations_croatia_turkey/adminstructures_version_may05_35_ch_public_en.pdf. 800

„Press Freedom Audit Report – Slovak Republic‟ (18 March 2009), by International Press Institute, retrieved

03 March 2010 from

http://www.freemedia.at/fileadmin/import/media/Press_Freedom_Audit_Report_Slovak_Republic__10_.pdf. 801

Ibid.

141

5.2 NGO Movement in Slovakia

In the 1970s, it was hard to start an NGO in Slovakia due to the political repression by the communist

party. Therefore, from its establishment in 1969 until the beginning of the 1980s the Slovak Union of

Nature and Landscape Conservationists (SZOPK) was the only (environmental) NGO operating in

Slovakia.802

A second NGO, Tree of Life, was formed in 1979. In order to address the occurring

environmental problems, this youth organisation focused on organising environmentalist brigades and

environmental education. With around 3,000 members, the SZOPK remained the largest NGO in

Czechoslovakia. The communist Party condoned these environment NGO‟s in the Czechoslovak state

because they assumed that these environmentalists would not be a danger for the political system.

After the velvet revolution SZOPK continued with its activities. In some of these activities

SZOPK cooperated with similar NGOs abroad, like Friends of the Earth International and the

International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Solidarity in Poland and Charta 77 in Czech

Republic were the equivalent organisations of that time. However, these oppositional groups were not

environmentalist oriented as well political. Later on, the members and supporters of SZOPK moved -

as a result of their new-found freedom - also their activities to the field of politics and business and

they created new NGOs. After the velvet divorce this trend continued and new NGOs became active in

the Slovak Republic.803

5.2.1 NGOs in Communist Times

In the early 1970s, SZOPK‟s agenda had been apolitical and its members comprised of a small number

of enthusiasts, including environmentalists, romantics, artists, and experts specialised in issues related

to the environment and cultural heritage.804

In the years leading up to November 1989, SZOPK

developed the reputation of an active political opposition organisation. Research, education and

practical field activities were the main ambitions of the SZOPK. Given the reservoir of people who

wished to devote their free time to nature and environment and given that there was no other platform

for such activities, SZOPK became the „one-eyed king in the land of the blind‟.805

The organisation

and its management leaned on a network of district committees and local organisations (ZO). These

basically covered the whole territory of Slovakia and were controlled by national committees and

other state organisations.806

A steadily growing number of people within the organisation became conscious of the

seriousness of the depletion of the country‟s environment, the urgency of the threats to Slovakia‟s

802 S. Smith, „The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, p. 93. 803

Interview D8. 804

S. Smith, „„The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, p. 93. 805

Ibid. 806

Ibid.

142

natural and cultural heritage, and the fact that no one was addressing these threats.807

There was no

Ministry of Environment and there was no legislation for the protection of the environment. Instead,

various state committees were occupied with environmental issues.

An upcoming social movement was initially only visible in the Bratislava ZO no.6. (SZOPK).

Later however, other Bratislava branches got involved in this upcoming social movement as well. The

support for the SZOPK increased after the publication of Bratislava Nahlas (Bratislava aloud) in 1987

and peaked during the Velvet Revolution of November 1989. Bratislava Nahlas was a lengthy,

painstakingly researched document, summarising the environmental problems of the capital city

region, as well as touching upon social and cultural ecology.808

The publication of Bratislava Nahlas

represented a condemnation of the communist-era urban and rural development of Bratislava. It was a

combination of criticism and constructive advice to help the Slovak society deal with environmental

problems.809

After the publication of Bratislava Nahlas the word „environmentalist‟ acquired a positive

connotation in „democratic‟ circles. Environmentalists were more and more associated with the

concepts of independence, alternativeness, opposition, altruism and charity as well as with images of

the Green movement abroad.810

Many scientists came to rely on SZOPK as a semi-independent

platform for publishing „unfashionable‟ opinions and sociologists became interested in the

organisation as an „island of positive deviation‟.811

The organisation was also supported by

independent journalists that proclaimed the need for social change in Czechoslovakia.812

5.2.2 NGOs between 1989 and 1993

During the first post-communist months, SZOPK functioned as a reservoir of people and ideas, a

network and an infrastructure for the construction of a new democratic political system.813

However,

when members of SZOPK got the opportunity to participate in the heart of political changes, many of

them no longer had a reason to stay in the organisation. Shortly after November 1989, members of

SZOPK split into three groups. Many members of the SZOPK were appointed to posts in the newly

created regional environmental authorities814

. The second group participated in building the

administrative and managing structures of the Green Party (VPN) as a political movement. The third

group entered post-revolutionary politics, and were often given high official positions.815

807 S. Smith, „The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, p. 94. 808

Ibid., p. 103. 809

Interview D8. 810

S. Smith, „The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, p. 94. 811

Ibid., p. 93. 812

Ibid., p. 94. 813

Ibid., p. 94. 814

J. Podoba, „Rejecting green velvet: Transition, environment and nationalism in Slovakia‟, in: Environmental

politics, Vol. 7, issue 1, Spring 1998, p. 131. 815

Ibid.

143

The first post-communist months were marked by a rapid growth of the third sector – the non-

profit sector – and the establishment of many new non-profit organisations. This rapid growth of the

third sector can be explained by the new political system and the fact that the necessary requirements

and regulations to establish non-profit organisation were minimal.816

There are several additional

explanations for the rapid growth of the third sector. Firstly, the velvet revolution was a revolution of

democratic change, which gave people the opportunity to establish association for various purposes, a

chance they did not have before. Secondly, the new political situation made new problems and social

disparities visible. The non-profit organisations were there to help people deal with these new

problems. Thirdly, the opening of borders gave people the opportunity to learn about development in

the third sector in neighbouring countries.817

After the 1992 elections, Slovak environmentalists found themselves with little or no direct

representation in parliament and to a large extent the SZOPK lost its influence on the implementation

of environmental policy and the distribution of funds.818

This development can be explained by the

policy of the newly installed Mečiar government, aiming at filling government positions with political

allies. SZOPK was not considered a political ally of the government. However, between 1990 and

1993, SZOPK was able to develop a large network of transnational and international ties, which led

many international environmental organisations to set up regional headquarters in Slovakia.819

5.2.3 NGOs since 1993

The third sector in the Slovak Republic continued to evolve rapidly after 1993.820

At the same time,

however, the SZOPK increasingly lost its role and authority as the figurehead of Slovak

environmentalism, particularly among the young generation. As a result, new environmental

organisations were established that did not originate from SZOPK.821

Political freedom soon led to the

emergence of dozens of new environmental NGOs and foundations supporting environmental aims

and activities.822

In 1993, there were 6,000 non-profit organisations. One year later this number had

already increased to 9,800, including 2,634 foundations.823

Unlike the SZOPK, these new

environmental NGOs consisted of small groups of activists. Moreover, the organisations were more

specialised, campaigning on issues such as nuclear energy, protection of rivers, opposition to building

new dams and so forth. In order to finance their campaigns the organisations were usually entirely

816 K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 05 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf, p. 11. 817

Ibid. 818

S. Smith, „The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, p. 102. 819

Ibid., p. 97. 820

K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 05 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf, p. 12. 821

S. Smith, „The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, p. 103. 822

J. Podoba, „Rejecting Green Velvet: Transition, Environment and Nationalism in Slovakia‟, in:

Environmental politics, Vol. 7, issue 1, Spring 1998, p. 132. 823

M. Belejová, „Foundations in Slovakia and their Role in the Society‟, in: Master‟s thesis, Economic

University, 1999.

144

dependent on subsidies from international environmental organisations and foundations, since there

was no state funding for NGOs during the Mečiar era.824

Among the new NGOs, Greenpeace and For

Mother Earth are the most visible, both focusing on the state energy policy and nuclear energy in

particular.825

In October 1991, representatives of the non-profit sector met at the Stupava conference, which

became an annual event.826

The next conference already took place in the independent Slovak

Republic in April 1994. Participants of the 1995 Conference elected a committee called the „Gremium

of the Third Sector‟, a group of 13 people from different regions and fields of the non-profit sector to

represent the common interests of the sector.827

Pavol Demeš, Minister of International Relations in

1991-1992 and foreign policy advisor to the president of the Slovak Republic in 1993-1997828

, created

this umbrella organisation.829

The Gremium of the Third Sector played an important role in the

opposition to the Mečiar governments and it inspired the Slovak population to be politically active.830

In 1994, the Mečiar government started to supervise and control the operations of non-profit

organisations.831

Governmental representatives accused non-profit organisations and representatives of

the third sector of various crimes, such as money-laundering and anti-state or anti-Slovak activities.832

In order to underpin their claims, the Ministry of Finance commanded the Slovak Tax Office to

perform an audit on foundations.833

Although the government found minor mistakes, it continued its

allegations and promised a bill. Despite the fact that a law on foundations was not included in the list

of the government‟s legislative tasks for the year 1995, the government started to prepare the bill in

the autumn of 1995.834

Without consulting the third sector, the government presented the final version to parliament

in January 1996. In response to this act, the Gremium of the Third Sector introduced a campaign

called „Third Sector SOS‟. The proposed bill was described as restrictive and designed to hinder the

existence of foundations835

, according to the representatives of the sector and international experts on

non-profit law. The Third Sector SOS campaign stopped when the law on foundations passed.836

However, at the end of the Mečiar era, environmental NGOs decided to avoid the Gremium of

the Third Sector. Even though there was no consensus among environmental NGOs as to why

cooperation within the Gremium stopped, an environmental expert employed with the Comenius

University confirmed that the Gremium became too bureaucratic and thus was not flexible enough. In

824 J. Podoba, „Rejecting Green Velvet: Transition, Environment and Nationalism in Slovakia‟, in:

Environmental politics, Vol. 7, issue 1, Spring 1998, p. 132. 825

Ibid. 826

K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf, p. 12. 827

Ibid. 828

„GMF – Pavol Demeš‟, by The German Marshall Fund of the United States, retrieved 05 April 2010 from

http://www.gmfus.org/publications/author.cfm?id=53. 829

Interview D8. 830

Ibid. 831

K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf, p. 12. 832

Ibid., p. 12. 833

Ibid., p. 12. 834

Ibid., p. 13. 835

K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf, p. 13. 836

Ibid., p. 15.

145

2001, the Gremium became an individual legal person, aiming at the improvement of conditions of the

sector, but no longer attempting to represent all the different NGOs in the Slovak Republic.837

A few

of the more dynamic and active environmental NGOs decided to set up their own organisation called

„Ekoforum‟. In December 1998, Ekoforum signed an agreement with the Dzurinda government that

stated the commitment of the government to consult environmental NGOs in the decision-making

process on environmental issues.838

After the 1998 elections, the Dzurinda government announced its support for the non-profit

sector. Having helped the opposition during election times, representatives of the non-profit sector

were invited to cooperate with different ministries, as they were recognised as valuable professionals

in various areas.839

The government established an advisory body consisting of non-profit

organisations. During this time of cooperation with the state, the third sector continued to grow.

Moreover, as the situation in the country stabilised, foreign donors started to direct their help to other

regions, which meant a decline in foreign financial aid to the Slovak third sector. Therefore, the sector

had to find financial resources to substitute this loss of financial means. One of the responses of the

government was the 1% law, which came into effect on 1 January 2002 and allowed for individuals to

designate 1% of their income taxes to a non-profit organisation of their choice.840

Many NGOs

benefited from this tax assignation mechanism and this led to the recent rapid expansion of the third

sector.841

The most important legislative initiative concerning NGOs under the Fico government was an

amendment to the Income Tax Act, which the Ministry of Finance had submitted to the cabinet in

September 2006 and which provoked massive public debate.842

The original proposal sought to

exclude legal businesses from the income tax assignation mechanism in order to increase the minimum

amount that could be assigned by individuals to 250 SKK (€ 6.62843

). Moreover, it was also meant to

abolish the possibility for non-profit organisations to deduct 300,000 SKK (€ 7944.92844

), generated

by their side activities, from their taxes.845

The government defended this proposal by stating that the

837 K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf,. p. 17. 838

Interview D8. 839

K. Svitkova, „The Evolution of the Third Sector in Slovakia‟ (16 January 2004), retrieved 10 May 2010 from

http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wbrf_papers/K_Svitkova_WBRF_Paper.pdf, p. 17. 840

Ibid., p. 18. 841

M. Bútora, Z. Bútorová, L. Ilanovská (a.o.), „Non-Governmental Organizations and Volunteerism‟, in: K.

Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár (ed.), Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava:

Institute for Public Affairs 2007, p. 536. 842

Ibid., p. 539. 843

250 Koruna converted with the historical exchange rate of € 1 = 37,76 Skk on 1 September 2006 via currency

website XE, retrieved on April 29 2010 from

http://www.xe.com/ict/?basecur=SKK&historical=true&month=9&day=1&year=2006&sort_by=name&image.x

=48&image.y=14. 844

300,000 Koruna converted with the historical exchange rate of € 1 = 37,76 Skk on 1 September 2006 via

currency website XE, retrieved on April 29 2010 from

http://www.xe.com/ict/?basecur=SKK&historical=true&month=9&day=1&year=2006&sort_by=name&image.x

=48&image.y=14. 845

M. Bútora, Z. Bútorová, L. Ilanovská (a.o.), „Non-Governmental Organizations and Volunteerism‟, in: K.

Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár (ed.), Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava:

Institute for Public Affairs 2007, p. 539.

146

tax assignation mechanism was “an unnecessary and non-systematic element” that was “often abused”

by legal entities.846

The proposal‟s unexpected nature and the lack of alternatives provoked a strong reaction from

NGOs. In October 2006, representatives of various NGO platforms and individual civic activists

launched a campaign called „People to People: 2% of Taxes for Public Benefit Purposes‟. The

campaign‟s principal objective was to arouse public interest and force members of parliament to reject

the proposed amendment and preserve the status quo.847

Eventually, the proposal was accepted and the

amount of tax that can be assigned by legal entities to eligible organisations, e.g. charities, would be

gradually reduced to 0.5% by 2018.848

In 2008, the Fico government again ignored the advisory body of the third sector. Various

environmental issues were decided upon without consultation of the third sector. The government had

a strong interest in changing legislation and with that, in limiting the participation of NGOs in the

decision-making process. Under pressure of Brussels, the Fico government softened its attitude

towards the third sector. However, relations between NGOs and the Fico government can generally be

described as negative. 849

5.3 Environmental Policy

Over the last years, the environment has taken an increasingly important role in global and EU

politics. Not just because of global warming and the search for greener energy, but also because

sustainability is a key factor in the EU and environmental problems often are transnational. The

pollution of water and air does not stop at the borders of the responsible country. It is therefore

important to assess whether a member state is taking care of its environment and its natural resources.

5.3.1 Environmental Policy in Communist Times

Before 1989, the policy regarding environmental issues was indistinctly divided among different

public authorities. There was neither a Ministry of Environment nor any specific law on the

environment.850

Because a ministry was lacking, environmental NGOs did not get any subsidies or

grants. In those days, a system of international grants did not exist either.851

The NGOs: SZOPK and

Tree of Life partially substituted for this missing ministry, because Slovaks approached them with

846 M. Bútora, Z. Bútorová, L. Ilanovská (a.o.), „Non-Governmental Organizations and Volunteerism‟, in: K.

Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár (ed.), Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava:

Institute for Public Affairs 2007, p. 539. 847

Ibid., pp. 539-540. 848

„Amendment to the Income Tax Act‟, by KPMG Slovensko Advisory K.S., retrieved 05 April 2010 from

http://kpmgsk.lcc.ch/dbfetch/52616e646f6d4956ee67e6fe1f42a38450dfcf0fb7b6fb3fb59bcb7b7c88c5ee/tax_ne

wsflash_december_2009_en.pdf, p.3. 849

Interview B8, D8, D19. 850

S. Smith, „The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, „Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia‟, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, p. 94. 851

Interview D8.

147

their various environmental problems.852

An NGO like SZOPK, financially survived this period due to

membership fees and with the help of sponsors like writers and wealthy people.853

5.3.2 Environmental Policy between 1989 and 1993

After the collapse of communism, new state institutions were built and a new range of environmental

laws was adopted.854

The most important examples are the Ministry of Environment and Nature

Protection and newly created regional environmental authorities. These authorities act locally and

independently from the state government.855

When the members of SZOPK entered the political scene,

this influenced the financial money stream, which meant funding for environmental authorities and

personnel for its district offices.856

5.3.3 Environmental Policy under Mečiar and Dzurinda

At the beginning of the Mečiar era, former state environmental organisations and some research

institutes, such as national park authorities and the Institute of Nature Protection, were integrated into

the Slovak Environmental Agency, which led to a centralisation of environmental policy.857

The Dzurinda era held positive changes to the environmental attitude of the state because the

government wanted to prepare Slovakia for EU membership. By established an advisory body

consisting of non-profit organisations with Ekoforum, the Dzurinda government showed its goodwill

to environmental NGOs and consequently, to the EU.858

However, showing goodwill merely was a

trick to silence environmental NGOs. When the government positively approached environmental

NGOs, an illusion among environmentalists started to evolve that everything would be fine and it

would not be necessary to be active. Although the government invited environmental NGOs and

discussed and answered their questions, in practice, the government went its own way and more or less

ignored the comments of environmental NGOs. At the same time, the government continued investing

in nuclear energy, thereby attempting to discourage the third sector in continuing their work in this

field.859

The Dzurinda government‟s intentions with regard to the environmental area were only partly

achieved. The government tried to meet citizens‟ expectations and EU requirements in terms of

passing laws and strategies.860

The most negative aspects of the previous government‟s position on

852 Interview D8.

853 Ibid.

854 J. Podoba, „Rejecting Green Velvet: Transition, Environment and Nationalism in Slovakia‟, in: Routledge,

1998, p. 134. 855

Ibid. 856

S. Smith, „The Development of the Environmental Non-Governmental Movement in Slovakia: the Slovak

Union of Nature and Landscape Conservationists‟, in: M. Huba, „Local Communities and Post-Communist

Transformation, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia‟, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon

2003, pp. 96-97. 857

J. Podoba, „Rejecting Green Velvet: Transition, Environment and Nationalism in Slovakia‟, in: Routledge,

1998, p. 134. 858

Interview D8. 859

Ibid. 860

M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár, „Environment and Sustainable Development‟, in: M. Huba, J.

Trubíniová, Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007,

p. 389.

148

nature and the environment were the public statements of some cabinet members belittling the

importance of protecting the environment.861

5.3.4 Environmental Policy under Fico

The chapter headlined „Environmental Care‟ in Robert Fico‟s political manifesto in 2006 was based

on:

1. Improving the environment;

2. Protecting the environment and using resources wisely;

3. Nature conservation and landscape creation862

The chapter mentions that it will „respect citizens‟ basic rights to a favourable environment as is

guaranteed by the Slovak Constitution and as is laid down in international conventions and EU

environmental law. While the manifesto also speaks of the need for further development of

environment infrastructure, it does not make any verifiable commitments. Contrary to the

government‟s promise to finance the development of environmental infrastructure and to compensate

for the funding deficit caused by the long neglect of environmental issues, the state budget for 2007

drastically cut funding for the environment. The budget of the Ministry of Environment was reduced

the most compared to any other ministry in 2006.863

Robert Fico‟s government appointed Jaroslav Izák (SNS) as the Minister of Environment. Jaroslav

Izák is an unknown person in environmental circles. His appointment may therefore indirectly have

suggested that the environment would not be one of the priorities of the government. Despite protest

from Ekoforum, Dušan Muňko – a man who evaded criminal prosecution for an environmental crime

– was made deputy Minister of Environment.864

In the previous election term Muňko had been

scrutinised for illegally breeding rare parrots. According to an environmental expert in Slovakia,

people like Jaroslav Izák and Dušan Muňko are only appointed to these positions because of the fact

that they are subordinate to the Prime Minister.865

According to another environmental expert, the Fico government is very hard on the

environment. The SNS is responsible for the Ministry of Environment and there have been many

reappointments replacing experienced people by members of the SNS, who were relatively

inexperienced.866

A good example, from which one can deduce a lack of interest with regard to environment, is

the emission quotas scandal in Slovakia in 2009. Slovakia sold 15 million tons of CO2 emissions for €

5.05 per ton to the U.S.-based enterprise Interblue Group, while the usual European price is more than

861 M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár, „Environment and Sustainable Development‟, in: M. Huba, J.

Trubíniová, Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007,

p. 389. 862

Ibid. 863

Ibid., pp. 390-391. 864

Ibid., p. 390. 865

Interview D8. 866

Interview C12.

149

twice as high.867

According to available data, Slovakia lost approximately € 75 million by selling its

emissions under the conditions of the contract with Interblue.868

The whole case was intensively

investigated by Slovak journalists and led to serious findings.869

These findings resulted in the removal

of three ministers of the SNS and a constant change of opinions and arguments of Prime Minister Fico

and other responsible politicians. Environmental NGOs claim that the Interblue case was a case of

corruption.870

Swiss police documents seem to show that the emission quotas scandal has been

beneficial for one of the sponsors of Fico‟s Smer party.871

Another point which is often mentioned is the allocation of EU funds to environmental NGOs.

NGO projects are more likely to be funded by these EU funds if the particular environmental NGO has

good relationships with the government.872

If the environmental NGO is too critical, EU funds may be

appointed to others. In addition, part of the EU funds disappears in the allocation process.873

5.4 Environmental Issues

Although Slovakia scores high on biodiversity and has some of the best preserved ecosystems that can

be found in Europe, there have been several hot issues that have attracted the attention of the

international public.874

One of these issues is the energy issue. The state energy policy is oriented

towards developing nuclear energy and there is only little support for renewable resources and energy-

saving technologies. A PR in favour of environment friendly energy recruitment is lacking.875

Another environmental issue is climate change, which for the Slovak government does not

seem to be such an important issue as it is in for example Poland or the Czech Republic. The

government does not do more than the minimum that is demanded by the European Commission.876

The protection of the Tatra National Park currently is a big issue. 877

The Fico government wanted to

create areas to promote skiing and consequently cut off trees for economic purposes.878

Linked to the

Tatra National Park, is the Devan motorway stretching from Bratislava to Košice. Recently, the

Ministry of Environment changed some aspects of this project – substituting tunnels with bridges –

without consulting interest groups and without making a new environmental impact assessment.879

Finally, air, water and soil pollution are also serious issues demanding attention. These issues will be

discussed into greater detail later on in this section.

867 „Slovakia Can Lose € 216 Million Over Emission Quotas Scandal‟, by Sktoday.com, retrieved 06 April 2010,

from http://www.sktoday.com/content/2126_slovakia-can-lose-216-million-over-emission-quotas-scandal 868

„The Issues of Carbon Dioxide and Climate Change‟, by Visegrad.info, retrieved 07 April 2010, from

http://www.visegrad.info/climate-change-and-green-economy/factsheet/the-issues-of-carbon-dioxide-and-

climate-change.html 869

Ibid. 870

Interview C12. 871

„Corruption Rife, but Fails to Rile Slovak Voters‟, by businessneweurope, retrieved 30 April 2010, from

http://businessneweurope.eu/story2056/Corruption_rife_but_fails_to_rile_Slovak_voters 872

Interview C12. 873

Interview A7. 874

„Industry & Environment‟, by Centre for Scientific Tourism in Slovakia and Institute of Forest Ecology,

retrieved 25 April 2010, from http://www.ecosystems.sk/pages/enviro.html 875

Interview B8. 876

Ibid. 877

Ibid. 878

Interview C8. 879

Interview D8.

150

5.4.1 Energy

Slovakia‟s energy supplies are dominated by gas, oil and coal imports from Russia.880

Nuclear power

plants meet Slovakia‟s electricity demand. Coal power plants supply, together with Russia, the country

with gas.881

Electricity and gas have huge environmental consequences. Efforts to limit pollution

produced by industrial plants have been hampered by economic considerations, including concerns

about high unemployment rates.882

5.4.1.1 Nuclear Power Plants

There are two nuclear power plants in Slovakia; one in Jaslovské Bohunice and one in Mochovce.

Jaslovské Bohunice has two reactors and the same goes for Mochovce. Jaslovské Bohunice consisted

of four reactors of which two were shut down because they did not comply with the safety conditions

of the European Union. This was achieved by the lobbying of prominent environmental NGOs in

Slovakia in cooperation with environmental NGOs abroad.883

However, a third reactor is in the

making. Mochovce is currently expanding its capacity as well with two reactors that will be active in

2012-2013. These two power plants will produce approximately 50% to 55% of the electricity884

.

5.4.1.2 Coal Power Plants

There are two coal power plants; one in Vojany and one in Nováky.885

A third coal power plant was

supposed to be built in Trebišov by Ceskoslovenska Energetica Spolocnost. However, local residents,

the local council, winemakers and the Hungarian government opposed to the idea.886

An

environmental NGO helped to set up the campaign and mobilise the media. Eventually, the coal power

plant proposal was withdrawn.887

5.4.1.3 Opposition of Environmental NGOs

Environmental NGOs in general are not in favour of nuclear power plants.888

Being of old Soviet

designs, the current nuclear power plants do not have basic protection systems.889

Besides, the power

plants will raise serious environmental issues, e.g. disruption of rivers, its adjacent lands, nuclear

meltdown and disposal of nuclear waste.890

Moreover, these nuclear power plants have temporary on-

site dumps, of which the capacity is limited. At the moment there is no solution for the waste of these

880 „Slovakia and Coal‟, by Sourcewatch, retrieved 01 May 2010, from

http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Slovakia_and_coal 881

Interview C8. 882

„Slovak Republic‟, by Slovakia.org, retrieved 02 May 2010, from http://www.slovakia.org/sk-info.htm 883

Interview B20. 884

Interview B8. 885

Ibid. 886

„Slovakia/ Hungary: Objections Mount to Proposal For New Power Station in Slovakia‟ by Blinkx, retrieved

03 May 2010, from http://www.blinkx.com/watch-video/slovakia-hungary-objections-mount-to-proposal-for-

new-power-station-in-slovakia/_QPITTNrNpcJpXA4Yg9WnA 887

Interview B20 888

Interview B8, B20, D19. 889

Interview B8. 890

„Slovak Republic; Political, Economic and Social Impacts on Environmental Protection at the Spring of

1994‟, by Regional Environmental Center, retrieved 03 May 2010, from

http://archive.rec.org/REC/Publications/StratIssues/FeeBased/Slovakia.html

151

power plants.891

What is more, the places where the waste has been placed in the past are not

registered, so people do not know where the waste has been placed in Slovakia.892

NGO campaigns use the message that Slovakia does not need nuclear power893

plants because

these plants would have negative influences on the environment and to the people.894

Instead, Slovakia

should focus on environmentally friendly renewable resources and energy-saving technologies.895

Campaigning happens in several ways: trying to influence the existent legislation by approaching the

government, MPs, political parties, ministries and making comments. The same goes for laws which

are in the making.896

If these tools do not work, environmental NGOs use media to mobilise public

support.897

The government is aware of the pollution created by nuclear power plants, yet it is in favour of

it because nuclear energy is cheaper and does not contribute to CO2 emissions. Moreover, it would

make Slovakia less dependent on Russia.898

However, it is confirmed that the Fico government is pro-

nuclear reactors because members of the government have direct contact with energy companies.899

The European Union is not against the construction of these new nuclear reactors and it states that the

reactors should have the highest protection level.900

Gas power plants are seen as an alternative for the

coming twenty to thirty years when the energy system has to change course to renewable sources and

energy-saving technologies.901

However, this alternative would depend on western financial and

technical assistance.902

5.4.1.4 Renewable Resources

Effective support for the use of renewable resources such as wood/ bio-mass, geothermal, solar and

wind is among the priorities in all developed countries across the world. The current share of

renewable energy resources in covering the overall energy consumption in the EU represents 5.3%. In

Slovakia, that yearly share is 3.8%. Until 2010 the share in the EU is supposed to increase to 12%.903

There is enough potential in Slovakia to replace a relatively big part of the energy

consumption with renewable resources and energy-saving technologies by 2020. The state endorses

this notion, however not by 2020, but by 2030.904

Bio-mass is the renewable resource that gets support

from the government. There is a lot of potential in for example agricultural biomass in West-Slovakia

891 Interview B20.

892 Interview D19.

893 Interview B8.

894 Interview B20.

895 Interview B8.

896 Ibid.

897 Interview B8, C8, B20.

898 Interview B20.

899 Ibid.

900 Interview B8.

901 Ibid.

902 „Slovak Republic; Political, Economic and Social Impacts on Environmental Protection at the Spring of

1994‟, by Regional Environmental Center, retrieved 03 May 2010, from

http://archive.rec.org/REC/Publications/StratIssues/FeeBased/Slovakia.html. 903

„Industry & Environment‟, by Centre for Scientific Tourism in Slovakia and Institute of Forest Ecology,

retrieved 25 April 2010, from http://www.ecosystems.sk/pages/enviro.html. 904

Interview B8.

152

and forest biomass in Central and East-Slovakia.905

Wind energy is not considered as a potential

energy source by the government and the population, because of esthetical reasons.906

Environmental NGOs takes action in order to convince people that biomass and solar energy

can substitute electricity and gas from nuclear and coal power plants. Such a project was conducted in

the town Polana. The project modernised all energy suppliers with biomass and solar energy: bio-mass

generated electricity and solar energy heated the water. This action plan on micro level informs

municipalities and people in rural underdeveloped regions.907

5.4.2 Climate Change

The attitude of Slovak citizens towards questions related to climate change is similar to the attitude in

the whole of the European Union.908

The Eurobarometer on European attitudes towards climate change

shows that in 2008 69% of Slovak citizens believe that climate change is a very important problem.909

This is shared by 62% of the European Union citizens.910

When asked how serious the issue of climate

change is at the moment, 83%911

of the respondents do not believe that the issue has been exaggerated,

while this amount is 65% amongst the European citizens. 20% of Slovak citizens believe that the

European Union is doing just about the right amount to combat climate change.912

This is shared by

25% of the European Union citizens.

The effects of climate change on Slovakia can be seen in the form of floods, a decrease in the

level of snow, a decline in rain and high temperatures.913

Frequently occurring flash floods and storms

are other consequences of climate change in Slovakia.914

In the past such flash floods occurred only

once in a hundred or thousand years. Through time this increased to one flash flood per five years.915

According to Slovak environmental NGOs, the Slovak state does not do more than what is

required by the European Union.916

Getting in conflict with the Commission happens also from time to

time. The dispute about emissions between the Commission and Slovakia is a good example. The

Commission wanted Slovakia to emit not more than 40 million CO2 tons, but the Slovak Ministry of

Environment wanted to emit 49 million CO2 tons. Eventually, both sides found the midway in 41

million CO2 tons.

917

905 Interview C8.

906 Ibid.

907 Ibid.

908 „The Issues of Carbon Dioxide and Climate Change‟, by Visegrad.info, retrieved 07 April 2010, from

http://www.visegrad.info/climate-change-and-green-economy/factsheet/the-issues-of-carbon-dioxide-and-

climate-change.html. 909

„Europeans‟ Attitudes Towards Climate Change‟, by Special Eurobarometer300, retrieved 07 April 2010

from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_300_full_en.pdf, p. 17. 910

Ibid. 911

„Europeans‟ Attitudes Towards Climate Change‟, by Special Eurobarometer300, retrieved 07 April 2010

from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_300_full_en.pdf, p. 37. 912

Ibid., p. 48. 913

Interview B8. 914

Interview C12. 915

Ibid. 916

Interview B20, D8. 917

Interview B8.

153

Environmental NGOs have said that there is a lack of interest with regard to climate change

among politicians.918

Environmental NGOs try to influence and mobilise the average Slovak with

brochures, discussions, articles in regional newspapers and posters in public transport.919

Press releases

and conferences are also in the action curriculum of these NGOs.920

Lobbying to change Slovak

legislation is hard because Slovak politicians are not open to NGOs battling against climate change.

Therefore, NGOs approach the Commission, rather than the national government.921

5.4.3 Tatra National Park

Tatra National Park is situated in the Tatry Mountains in the north of Slovakia. Covering an area of

738 km2, its primary purpose is to converse the valuable high-mountain ecosystems such as near-

natural mountain forests, alpine habitats, mountain lakes and streams as well as glacial and rock

reliefs.922

The Park is an area with one of the highest concentrations of nature values in Europe.923

Due

to the specific location, highly isolated from other high mountains, unique flora and fauna has evolved

here with many endemic species such as types of chamois and marmot.924

Slovakia‟s accession to NATURA 2000, the European system of protected areas, should be a

significant step forward in terms of building and administering a network of nature protection areas

like the Tatra National Park.925

However, the Institute for Public Affairs in Slovakia reported in 2006

that negative trends appeared in the quality of care of protected areas and in their continuing

devastation; the list of urgent problems includes efforts to reduce standards of protection in nature

protection areas, especially in the High Tatra National Park (TANAP) following the windstorm of 19

November 2004.926

National Parks in Slovakia have a certain level of protection, ranging from the first to the fifth

degree of protection.927

Recently, Slovak authorities have submitted a proposal for zoning of the Tatra

National Park that would degrade two of the nine national parks from the fifth degree to such a degree

that makes the park open for constructions.928

These are High Tatras National Park and Low Tatras

National Park. If the proposal of zoning is approved, it would contribute to the destruction of the

National Park. The directors of these two national parks have been replaced because they opposed to

such activities and they were considered to be not flexible enough.929

There are projects to use these

918 Interview B8, C8.

919 Ibid.

920 Interview C8.

921 Ibid.

922 „Stop the Destruction of the Oldest Slovak National Park‟, by WWF, retrieved 10 April 2010, from

http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/search_wwf_news/?193066/Stop-the-destruction-of-the-oldest-Slovak-

national-park. 923

Ibid. 924

Ibid. 925

M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár, „Environment and Sustainable Development‟, in: M. Huba, J.

Trubíniová, Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007,

p. 388. 926

Ibid. 927

Interview C8. 928

„Stop the Destruction of the Oldest Slovak National Park‟, by WWF, retrieved 10 April 2010, from

http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/search_wwf_news/?193066/Stop-the-destruction-of-the-oldest-Slovak-

national-park. 929

Interview D8.

154

two degraded parks for forestry, ski resorts and a highway. This highway is called the Devan highway

stretching from Bratislava through Tatra National Park to Košice which is already in the making.

According to an environmental expert employed with the Comenius University, Tatra National

Park is being used for generating indirect incomes for politicians. A huge company that has an evident

relation with the government is the biggest player in Tatra National Park.930

On 23 April 2010,

activists from several environmental NGOs camped in tents on Bratislava‟s SNP Square to protest

against this newly proposed zoning scheme for the High Tatras National Park (TANAP).931

Activists

complained that the government had not consulted any professionals about the zoning scheme thus far.

The environmental activists believe that the rezoning represents a serious threat to the High and Low

Tatras National Park.932

Environmental NGOs try to create public awareness with actions such as described above. At

the same time, they lobby at the EU level, denouncing in which fields the Slovak government has not

implemented the EU directives.933

5.4.4 Air, Water and Soil Pollution

Slovakia faces some serious air, water and soil pollution issues. Firstly, air pollution is currently

considered to be one of the most pressing environmental issues.934

Air pollution is caused by sulphur

dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and carbon dioxide (CO2). In general, levels of pollution have

steadily decreased since the collapse of communism. 935

Total emissions of SO2 from stationary sources decreased year-on year from 105,300 tonnes

in 2003 to 96,000 tonnes in 2004, mostly due to decreased production at large industrial plants in

chemical sectors – first of all petrochemical, paper and pulp industry.936

Total emissions of nitrogen

oxides (NOx) from both stationary and mobile sources stagnated at the level of 98,100 tonnes937

. High

levels of air pollution were recorded in Košice, Stráţske, Vranov, the Humenné area, the Ţiar hollow

and the area around Ţilina and Ruţomberok and to a lesser degree also in the central Spiš region. 938

Secondly, Slovakia faces problems regarding its surface and groundwater. Chemical, food,

pulp and paper industries are the main polluters of the Danube River Basin. Discharges from such

plants significantly raise the levels of heavy metals and organic micro-pollutants in the river

network.939

Furthermore, smaller waters are often influenced by diffuse pollution from households in

930 Interview D8.

931„Tent Protestors Gather 1,200 Petition Signatures Against Rezoning of Tatras National Park‟, by the Slovak

Spectator, retrieved 16 May, from http://spectator.sme.sk/articles/view/38689/10/tent_protesters_gather_1200_

petition_signatures_against_rezoning_of_tatras_national_park.html. 932

Interview D8. 933

Interview C8. 934

„Slovak Republic; Political, Economic and Social Impacts on Environmental Protection at the Spring of

1994‟, by Regional Environmental Center, retrieved 03 May 2010, from

http://archive.rec.org/REC/Publications/StratIssues/FeeBased/Slovakia.html. 935

Interview D8. 936

M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár, „Environment and Sustainable Development‟, in: M. Huba, J.

Trubíniová, Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007,

p. 386. 937

Ibid. 938

Ibid. 939

„Industry‟, by International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, retrieved 15 May 2010, from

http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-pages/industry.htm.

155

settlements, which are not connected to public sewage systems. In 2005, only 57.1% of the population

was connected to sewage systems.940

It was in the field of water management that Slovakia requested

the longest transitional period within the environment chapter of the acquis communautaire.941

The

situation regarding water pollution and building an efficient infrastructure is still not satisfactory

compared to other EU member states.942

Thirdly, certain areas in Slovakia face serious problems regarding soil pollution. Areas with

soil pollution are widespread in the northern part of Slovakia. This part of the country has experienced

industrial influences for a long time, partly from abroad. This also goes for the areas in the central and

eastern part of Slovakia.943

Areas with non-polluted soils are widespread in the south and the south

western part of Slovakia, where soils are fertile and eligible for agriculture.944

According to an environmental NGO in Slovakia the Slovak government does not take enough

action in order to fight the pollution, because they hold the opinion that Slovakia has to develop its

economy first.945

The economic crisis in particular has led to the postponement of measures by the

government to let companies produce without extra costs.946

However, the European Union has had a

positive effect on diminishing air pollution in Slovakia through EU legislations (e.g. EC emissions

quotas).947

5.5 Conclusion

The existence of a well functioning civil society, including media and NGOs, is of great importance

for a democratic state. Under the communist regime the media in Slovakia had to follow the strict

theory of Lenin on press and media. With the introduction of „glasnost‟ en „perestroika‟ the grip of the

communist party on the media loosened. The new press law of March 1990 changed the monopoly of

the state on news coverage, which created room for private initiatives. Under Mečiar government, the

media was strictly controlled. Dzurinda government led to more freedom and liberties in the media

landscape. The relationship between the press and Fico could be described as problematic and

antagonistic. In June 2008 a new press act was put into force. Especially the provision on the „right of

reply‟ is cause for concern. The provision obligates journals to publish the reaction of anyone who

feels offended by an article that had been published. Besides the right to reply, politicians can also

take legal action to rectify statements. In recent years Slovak public officials have sued newspapers

and broadcasters for disproportionate large amounts of money on ground of defamation several times.

Another important aspect of civil society is the existence of NGOs and third sector. In order to

avoid political opposition it was hard to start a NGO during the communist regime of Slovakia. From

940 „Slovakia‟, by International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River, retrieved 15 May 2010, from

http://www.icpdr.org/icpdr-pages/slovakia.htm. 941

M. Bútora, G. Meseţnikov, M. Kollár, „Environment and Sustainable Development‟, in: M. Huba, J.

Trubíniová, Slovakia 2006, A Global Report on the State of Society, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs 2007,

p. 387. 942

Ibid. 943

J. Kobza, „Soil and Plant Pollution by Potentially Toxic Elements in Slovakia‟, in: Plant Soil Environ, 2005

(6), p. 246. 944

Ibid. 945

Interview B8. 946

Interview B20. 947

Interview B8.

156

its establishment in 1969 up to the start of the 1980s the Slovak Union of Nature and Landscape

Conservationists (SZOPK) was the only (environmental) NGO operating in Slovakia. In the years

leading up to November 1989, SZOPK got the reputation of an active opposition organisation. After

the velvet revolution it functioned as a reservoir of people and ideas for the construction of a new

democratic political system. However, many left the organisation to participate in the political sphere.

As a logical consequence, the first post-communist months were marked by rapid growth of the non-

profit sector. Since 1993, the non-profit sector in the independent Slovak Republic continued to evolve

rapidly. Political freedom soon led to the emergence of dozens of new NGOs. However, the Mečiar

government started to supervise and control the operation of non-profit organisations. Unlike the

previous government, the Dzurinda coalition government announced its support of the non-profit

sector. Despite this cooperation with the state, the non-profit sector continued to grow in the following

years. Finally, the policy of the Fico government saw a different tendency; they seem to have an

interest to change legislation and to limit the participation of NGOs in decision-making processes.

With regard to the environment, there are several environmental issues asking for attention in

Slovakia. One of these issues is the dependence on foreign energy. Therefore the state energy policy is

oriented on developing nuclear energy. Investments in renewable resources and energy-saving

technologies seem to be lagging behind. Another environmental issue is climate change, however in

this regard the government only complies with the minimum demands of the European Commission.

Another important matter is the protection of the Tatra National Park. The current government wants

to create recreational areas to promote hiking and skiing, and will therefore allow investors to develop

such activities in the Tatra National Park. This will result in the environmental degradation of the park.

Linked to the Tatra National Park is the Devan motorway stretching from Bratislava to Košice.

Recently, the ministry changed some aspects of this project substituting tunnels with bridges without

consulting interest groups or conducting a new environmental impact assessment. These actions of the

government enhance the image that there is a lack of interest with regard to the consequences of

economic development for the environment. Last but not least, air, water and soil pollution remain

serious issues asking for attention as well.

157

6. Economics

The following chapter will give an in-depth review of the Slovak economy, which has experienced a

remarkable transformation from a state-run economy to a booming free-market economy in only two

decades. The economic transition of Slovakia and its EU accession will be evaluated. Subsequently,

the economic legal framework and internal market will be discussed. After that, financial and

monetary policy and its institutions will be examined. Later on, this chapter will focus on the labour

market and its economic implications. Next, the different economic sectors, business environment and

international trade are highlighted. This chapter will be concluded with energy, transport and regional

policy.

6.1 Transition

In November 1989, the communist regime ceased to exist and the newly installed government of

Czechoslovakia embarked on a series of economic policies to transform the economy into a market

economy. During this transition period the government needed to ensure that while the economy was

transformed, adequate living standards were maintained in order to sustain the political support of the

population for the reform process. However, the communist era left behind certain less helpful

legacies that made an easy and smooth transition difficult. In terms of progress and innovation the

economy of Czechoslovakia had stagnated since the Soviet invasion of the 1960s and economic

growth started to decline from the mid 1970s onwards. The country‟s heavy industry was outdated and

dependent on markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for the input of raw materials, energy

and as the area of distribution of their produce.948

On 1 January 1991, the government of Czechoslovakia introduced a far-reaching package of

economic reforms which could be characterised as a moderate form of economic shock therapy. The

package had two goals; the first goal was to stabilise the economy by creating a surplus on the

country‟s balance of payments, reducing the outstanding debt and avoiding inflation. The second goal

was to create a competitive market that would respond to pressures of supply and demand in order to

guide the decisions of companies and consumers. In order to achieve this aim, restrictive monetary and

fiscal policies and strict wage control were introduced. Moreover, almost all subsidies were eliminated

and prices were set free.949

The philosophy behind the reform package was largely influenced by the

neo-liberal thinking of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank; these

institutions provided assistance to Czechoslovakia and other Central and Eastern European countries

during their economic transition.950

948 J.C. Brada, „The Economic Transition of Czechoslovakia From Plan to Market‟, The Journal of Economic

Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 4, Autumn 1991, p. 171-172. 949

J. Adam, „Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.

45, No. 4, 1993, p. 629. 950

J. Adam, „Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.

45, No. 4, 1993, p. 627.

158

6.1.1 The Process of Privatisation

An important aspect of the transition period was the process of privatisation. The term privatisation

entails the full or partial transfer of property rights from the state or related public agencies to private

owners.951

Privatisation was necessary, because in 1948 the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia had

nationalised many firms, manufacturing enterprises, banks and insurance companies.952

The process of

privatisation in Czechoslovakia was constrained by the shortage of domestic capital, the political and

economic demands for speed and fairness, the dismal conditions of assets and the lack of institutional

infrastructure needed for sell-offs.953

However, the goals of the government were clear; with the

process of privatisation they wanted to establish profit maximisation as a main objective for firms and

reallocate resources by means of freely transferable property rights.954

A number of programmes for

privatisation were initiated by a series of laws in 1990-1991.

The procedures for privatisation differed with regard to the type and amount of property,

which type of buyer was targeted and which methods were employed. These methods were restitution,

small scale privatisation and large scale privatisation.955

The process of restitution was introduced to make up for the unlawful and/or immoral

nationalisations and confiscations of private property. The restitution was effected either by returning

the property to the owner or providing financial compensation to previous owners. A problem during

the restitution process was the risk that investigations and legal processes could delay other aspects of

the privatisation process. The process was governed by two laws: the Act on Alleviating Certain

Consequences of Property Injustices (the Minor Restitution Act) and the Act on Extrajudicial

Rehabilitations (the Large Restitution Act. The Minor Restitution Act covered small businesses,

shops, restaurants and real estate, previously owned by physical persons and expropriated between

1955 and 1961. Claims could be filled till 2 May 1991. Property that was not claimed rightfully or in

time was auctioned off in the small scale privatisation process. The Large Restitution Act included all

the property that was nationalised between 25 February 1948 and the 1 January 1990, even if in accord

with the law of the time, given that these actions were contradictory to basic human rights. This law

affected 10% of all state property. The majority of this property was returned to its previous owners.956

The laws excluded property nationalised in accordance with the Beneš decrees. Eligible

claimants were previous owners or their heirs who were Slovak citizens and had settled in

Czechoslovakia when making their claim. The general approach was restitution, with financial

compensation being a supplement when damage had drastically altered the value of the property. The

programme remained manageable since many nationalisations in Czechoslovakia had taken place prior

to the communist coup in 1948 and were therefore not included in the restitution process.957

The Law on the Transfer of State Property of Certain Businesses to other Physical or Legal

persons was adopted to govern the process of small scale privatisation. This law organised the sale or

lease of real and movable property in ongoing business ventures. The law excluded property in the

951 M. Olsson, Ownership Reform and Corporate Governance, the Slovak Privatisation Process in 1990-1996,

Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala Studies in Economic History 49, 1999, p. 88. 952

Ibid., p. 57. 953

Ibid., p. 92. 954

Ibid, p. 93. 955

Ibid. p. 100. 956

Ibid. pp. 101-102. 957

Ibid., p. 101.

159

possession of foreigners and agricultural property. The small scale privatisation process was aimed to

complement the restitution process by privatising the assets that had not been claimed or assets that

had been privatised before 1955. The small scale privatisation process was carried out by 30 local

privatisation committees which were appointed and supervised by the Slovak Ministry of

Privatisation.

The method that was used for the privatising of the assets was mainly public auctions with

price as the only criterion to determine the value of the assets.958

The auctions were announced at least

30 days in advance by advertisements in public buildings. At these auctions all citizens of

Czechoslovakia of 18 years and older were able to bid for shares of firms that were to be privatised,

through –by the government distributed – vouchers. A book of vouchers sold at the price of 1000

koruna, the national currency of Czechoslovakia, plus a registration fee of 35 koruna. This price was

equivalent to one week of the average salary in Czechoslovakia.959

2.5 million Slovak citizens

participated in the voucher privatisation process.960

The units auctioned were sold without any

liabilities such as labour contracts and debts and the full price had to be paid within 30 days to the

National Property Fund. The first auction was held in February of 1991 and the process continued for

one year. In total 7,472 units were auctioned in Slovakia in 1992 with a total of 21, 437 units

privatised in Czechoslovakia as a whole.961

The large scale privatisation process of establishing new owners for the dominant industrial

sectors was complex and had large implications for the future economic development of the Czech and

Slovak regions. The Act on the Conditions of Transfer of State Property to Other Persons managed the

large scale privatisation process. This legislation introduced the methods for privatisation: direct sale,

public auction, sale by tender (formal offer) and transformation into a joint-stock company. This latter

method was carried out by the sale of shares in exchange for investment vouchers that had been made

available to all citizens or by transferring the shares to municipalities and pension funds free-of-

charge. This option was also used in the case of a managers or employees buy-out. In 1991, the

government had embarked on the process of privatising 4,000 large and medium size firms, out of

which 1,200 were of Slovak origin.962

6.1.2 The Transition Period in the 1990s

The transition process in Czechoslovakia did not come about without social costs for its population.

After the communist regime fell, the country plunged into a deep recession, since the artificially

created demand by the communist regime stopped, and the country‟s demand for goods and services

dropped rapidly. This decrease in demand was a result of the large price increases, the restrictive

monetary and fiscal policy of the government and the strict wage policy that was introduced. In 1991,

the country‟s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had declined by 15.9%, production by 23.5%, and in

1992, the rate of inflation was in the range of 10-15%. For the first time since the introduction of the

958 M. Olsson, Ownership Reform and Corporate Governance, the Slovak Privatisation Process in 1990-1996,

Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala Studies in Economic History 49, 1999, p. 103-104. 959

N. Sharfik, „Making a market: Mass Privatization in the Czech and Slovak Republics‟, World Development,

Vol. 23, No. 7, 1995, p. 1146. 960

Interview D6. 961

M. Olsson, Ownership Reform and Corporate Governance, the Slovak Privatisation Process in 1990-1996,

Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala Studies in Economic History 49, 1999, p. 103-104. 962

Ibid., p. 106-107.

160

Communist system, the country experienced official unemployment. 963

In 1991 unemployment had

already risen to 11.8%.964

During this deep recession, the Slovak part of the country suffered most. Unemployment was

higher in Slovakia than in the Czech part. In comparison, while in 1991 the unemployment was 11.8%

in Slovakia, in the Czech part this was only 4.1%.965

This can be explained by the fact that in Slovakia

many young people entered the labour market and instantly became unemployed.966

A large part of the

old Soviet industries were located in Slovakia. These industries were largely dependent on oil,

however, due to the reduced exports of oil from the Soviet Union and an increase in the price of oil as

a result of the Gulf War, this resource could not be provided.967

The factories were not profitable

anymore and closed down, resulting in many redundant employees. Moreover, in Slovakia there was

less emphasis on active employment policy to help people find new jobs. Due to this large difference

in unemployment rate, the Slovaks were in favour of a slower pace in the transition to a market

economy.968

By the end of 1992, the allocation of funds between the two parts of the country had changed.

In the past Slovakia had been treated generously, it was allocated a higher proportion of funds than it

was entitled to on the basis of its population. In this transition period in the early nineties, Slovakia

was told that both parts of the country needed to manage their budget based on their own revenues.

The Slovaks were not pleased with this measure, since they were in the middle of a deep recession.

They blamed this recession on the Czechs, because they had been in favour of the method of shock

therapy in the economic transition. The leader of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS),

Vladimír Mečiar, was pushing for a slower pace in the economic reforms. It can be said that the

different economic conditions in the Czech and Slovak parts of the countries and the dispute over the

distribution of revenue has strengthened the separatist force in both parts of the country.969

After the Velvet Divorce between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993, Slovakia‟s first

government was faced with the difficult task of continuing the process of economic reform in order to

transform the centrally planned economy into a market economy. Mečiar was the Prime Minister

during that time. Under his government the country‟s economic conditions did not seem to improve. 970

An explanation of this was the lack of political motivation and knowledge to adopt the necessary

economic reform policies. During that time, Slovakia became internationally isolated. In addition, the

country was almost excluded from the EU accession process negotiations due to their lack of progress

963 J. Adam, „Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.

45, No. 4, 1993, p. 630. 964

M. Carpenter, „Slovakia and the Triumph of Nationalist populism‟, Communist and Post-Communist Studies,

Vol. 30, No. 2, 1997, p. 210. 965

Ibid. 966

J. Adam, „Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.

45, No. 4, 1993, p. 630. 967

M. Carpenter, „Slovakia and the Triumph of Nationalist populism‟, Communist and Post-Communist Studies,

Vol. 30, No. 2, 1997, p. 211. 968

J. Adam, „Transformation to a Market Economy in the Former Czechoslovakia‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.

45, No. 4, 1993, p. 630. 969

Ibid., p. 632, 634-635. 970

K. Mathernova and J. Rencko, „Reformology: The Case of Slovakia‟, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall

2006, p. 630.

161

in adopting the accession requirements. As a result, foreign investors who were necessary to spur

economic growth, tended to stay away.971

By 1998, Slovakia was in a severe economic crisis due to major challenges in the banking

sector and the neglect of legal and institutional reforms in the financial system. These challenges made

it impossible for companies to finance new investments. Moreover, the country was heavily in debt;

amounting to 58% of Slovakia‟s GDP. The government had embarked on an expansive fiscal policy,

which had led to the current account deficits. These deficits were financed through foreign loans, thus

leading to an even larger debt.972

The first wave of privatisation had been conducted during the final

years of the Czechoslovakia period, and the Mečiar government decided to cancel the second wave of

privatisation to avoid excessive reallocation of ownership.973

Some previously state-owned companies

ended up in the hands of political allies of the government. These companies were mismanaged and

incapable of reform and adaptation to the new economic circumstances. In this period of economic

crisis, the National Bank of Slovakia tried to maintain price stability by embarking on a restrictive

monetary policy. The mix of expansionary fiscal policy974

and restrictive monetary policy caused the

interest rates to rise. The high interest rates made it even more difficult and risky for companies to

implement structural reforms and necessary investments.975

6.1.3 The Economic Reforms during the Dzurinda Government

After the elections in 1998, the Dzurinda government came to power. The country‟s poor economic

conditions made this new government quick to react and to implement a broad range of economic

reforms. The first set of reforms focused on stabilising the macroeconomic situation in Slovakia. The

government adopted measures aimed at reducing the current account deficits to less than 5% of the

country‟s GDP. Moreover the government was committed to cut back rigorously on their expenses.

These macroeconomic measures were strengthened by the downward pressure on the koruna.976

The government also introduced structural reforms in the banking and enterprise sectors. By

the end of 2003, 35% of the loans in the banking sector had been classified as non-performing.

Financial auditors had warned that banks could no longer solve their problems without help from the

government. Therefore, the government decided to restructure and then privatise the banks. This

process was coordinated by the World Bank in name of the Enterprise and Financial Sector

Adjustment Loan. The aim of this loan was to help the Slovak authorities to prepare the legislation

necessary for the privatisation of the banking sector and to improve the conditions in the enterprise

sector. The unfavourable loans of major banks in Slovakia, which amounted to 10% of the GDP, were

transferred to the Consolidation Agency and the Consolidation Bank. The three largest banks the

971 Interview C9.

972 K. Mathernova and J. Rencko, „Reformology: The Case of Slovakia‟, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall

2006, p. 631. 973

J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka, The Road to the European Union Volume 1 – The Czech and Slovak Republics,

Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 122. 974

Expansionary fiscal policy entails an increase in government spending through a rise in government spending,

a fall in taxation revenue, or a combination of the two. Expansionary fiscal policy is usually associated with a

budget deficit. 975

K. Mathernova and J. Rencko, „Reformology: The Case of Slovakia‟, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall

2006, p. 631. 976

J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka, The Road to the European Union Volume 1 – The Czech and Slovak Republics,

Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 122-123.

162

Všeobecná Úverova Banka (VÚB), the Slovenská Sporitel‟ňa (SLSP) and the Investičná a Rozvojová

Banka (IRB) were privatised. The Italian Intesa Bank took over VÚB, 87% of the SLSP was taken

over by the Erste Bank of Austria and the IRB was privatised in 2002.977

The World Bank provided assistance to Slovakia during this period of the transition process.

The assistance mostly focused on technical support and to a lesser extent on financial aid. There was a

lot of consultation, knowledge and experience sharing between the government and the World Bank.

The World Bank provided technical assistance to prepare Slovakia for EU accession, but also financial

aid to the public sector for the improvement of the management of the public finances and for reforms

in the health and social sector. In comparison with the other CEECs, Slovakia was the only country

that had officially invited the World Bank to be engaged in the country‟s transformation process. Such

cooperation was for example not apparent in other Central European countries.978

In addition to the restructuring and privatisation of the banks, the government decided to

continue with the process of privatisation of companies in other sectors of the economy. During the

Mečiar government the process of privatisation had come to a halt and in 1995 a law was adopted that

excluded certain strategic enterprises such as infrastructure and financial companies from

privatisation. In 1999 this law was abolished and replaced by a law on the large scale privatisation of

the financial and telecommunications sector. One of the tasks during this process was to amend some

of the irregularities that had occurred during the first privatisation process. The National Property

Fund was responsible for conducting a review of companies of which the privatisation process had

showed irregularities, or whose owners had failed to complete the whole payment for the shares of the

company to the fund.979

The revenues of privatisation increased 17-fold from almost 54 million euro (2,3 billion SKK)

in 1999 to 938,5 million euro (40 billion SKK) in 2001. In 2002 this was around 3,88 billion euro (161

billion SKK), amounting to 16% of GDP.980

One third of these revenues have been used by the

government to reduce the state debt, another third was reserved to finance the pension system and the

remainder of the revenues was used to finance the reforms in the railway sector, health care and

educational systems.981

In 2006, with the installation of the social-democratic government of Prime

Minister Fico, the process of privatisation was stopped. By then 90% of all the state assets were

privatised. The other 10% of the remaining assets are shares in strategic companies such as energy and

heating plants. 982

The last reform package during the first term of the Dzurinda government was the creation of

a legal and institutional environment for enterprise restructuring and bankruptcy, better corporate

governance rules and easy access to capital for companies. The reforms that focused on the bankruptcy

977 J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka, The Road to the European Union Volume 1 – The Czech and Slovak Republics,

Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 122-123. 978

Interview C9. 979

J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka, The Road to the European Union Volume 1 – The Czech and Slovak Republics,

Manchester University Press, 2003, p. 122. 980

Converted with the historical exchange rate of € 1 = 42,62 Skk on 31 December 1999; € 1 = 42,74 Skk on 31

December 2001 and € 1 = 41,50 Skk on 31 December 2002, via currency website XE, retrieved on April 29 2010

from http://www.xe.com/ict/?basecur=EUR&historical=true&month=12&day=31&year=1999&sort_by=name&

image.x=57&image.y=15. 981

R. Gönenç and P. Walkenhorst, „Rationalising Public Expenditure in the Slovak Republic‟, OECD

Economics Department Working Papers, No. 384, 2004, p. 20. 982

Interview C9.

163

system were the most controversial, because of the huge level of outstanding corporate debt. The

government feared that the liquidation of one enterprise could lead to the insolvency of a great number

of firms. Therefore, it was argued that an efficient exit mechanism for uncompetitive firms was

necessary in order to protect their assets, when there was a possibility for future use of these assets for

productive purposes. These reforms led to legislation that strengthened the rights of creditors and

allowed companies to continue in business after filing for bankruptcy. Other measures in this package

focused on the prohibition of „tunnelling‟, meaning the practice of stripping assets by corporate

insiders which is harmful for shareholders and creditors. In addition, in cooperation with the European

Bank for Reconstruction and Development an international infrastructure for lending was created to

improve the access to external financing.983

6.1.4 The Economic Reforms during Dzurinda’s Second Term

The second term of the Dzurinda government brought additional reforms. This time the reforms

focused on the pension system, taxation, social benefits, the labour market, healthcare, fiscal

decentralisation and finance. The reforms of the pension system, taxation, the labour market and the

public finances were essential in the creation of sustainability for long-term economic growth.

The reform of the pension system led to more responsibility for the individual regarding their

future pension. It also gave citizens the freedom of choosing between different private pension funds

that would manage their pensions.984

With these reforms the government hoped to release themselves

of the burden of an ever growing part of the public finances being spent on pensions.985

The pension

reform will be described in more detail in section 7.4.2.

In 2004, the government introduced a flat tax on personal and corporate income and a unified

rate of value-added tax of 19%. The government also eliminated the real estate transfer tax, gift tax

and inheritance tax. On the short term, these measures did not contribute to the reduction of the public

finance deficit, but these reforms were necessary in order to fully integrate into the EU‟s monetary

system. The tax reforms made the business environment in Slovakia more transparent and

internationally competitive.986

The aim of the reforms of the labour market was to increase the flexibility of labour and

decrease the level of unemployment. An active labour market policy was introduced in order to

register unemployed citizens and to bring supply and demand together on the labour market. The

reforms also lead to a reduced role of trade unions and employee organisations in influencing

negotiations on wages and benefits.987

One controversial reform in Slovakia was the reform package for the health care system. The

health care system in Slovakia was in such a condition that these reforms were deemed extremely

necessary. The reforms had the intention of making the hospitals, health insurance companies and

983 K. Mathernova and J. Rencko, „Reformology: The Case of Slovakia‟, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall

2006, pp. 633-635. 984

S.Fisher, J.Gould & T.Haughton,„Slovakia's Neoliberal Turn‟,Europe-Asia Studies,Vol.59, No.6,2007, p.983. 985

M. A. Orenstein, „Out-liberalizing the EU: pension privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of

European Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 6, September 2008, p. 913. 986

K. Mathernova and J. Rencko, “Reformology‟: The Case of Slovakia‟, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall

2006, p. 636. 987

S. Fisher, J. Gould & T. Haughton, 'Slovakia's Neoliberal Turn', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 6, 2007,

pp. 982-983.

164

health consumers aware of the costs of health care. The reforms intended to make the hospitals

competitive corporations by cutting back on their costs and encourage them to compete for patients

with other health care suppliers. Health care insurance companies needed to compete with each other

as well. Health consumers needed to insure themselves with a company that provides the best type and

price of insurance. This would also encourage consumers to think wisely about their health care usage

and costs.988

A detailed description of the health care reform can be found in section 7.4.5.

The reforms regarding fiscal decentralisation focused on the revenue of local governments and

municipalities. To decrease the financial burden of the central government, local governments were

now responsible for financing their operations. This financial self-sufficiency needed to be reached

through the entitlement of the local governments to shared central tax revenue and other fiscal

transfers. Nevertheless, this revenue has not been sufficient for the needs of the local governments. To

finance their operations, the local government also needed to sell assets, such a real estate or privatise

business facilities. Other local governments have financed their operations by lending money and

incurring debt.989

6.2 The Economic Accession Criteria

The process of economic transition had already changed Slovakia, but this process was now to be

fused with another task: the task of preparing for EU accession. The prospect of EU membership

helped to accelerate the transition process. Due to the promise of accession, trade reorientation and an

increase of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) could be accomplished. However, EU membership also

forced the economic transition process to follow a specific pattern and pace.990

The economic criteria

for EU membership are set out in the Copenhagen criteria:

- the existence of a functioning market economy;

- the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Community; and

- the adherence to the aim of the economic and monetary union.991

An assessment of these criteria will be provided in the following section.

6.2.1 The Assessment of the Economic Accession Criteria

In its Comprehensive Monitoring Report of 2003 the European Commission already concluded that

Slovakia had a functioning market economy. The report also mentioned that with the continuation of

its current reform path Slovakia should be able to cope with competitive pressures and market forces

within the EU. However, improvements still needed to be made in the macroeconomic situation of the

country. Urgent measures were necessary to reduce the fiscal and current account deficits and despite

earlier reforms a decrease in the expenditure in the areas of health care, pensions and government

subsidies remained essential. The rate of unemployment also posed a challenge and the labour market

988 S. Fisher, J. Gould & T. Haughton, 'Slovakia's Neoliberal Turn', Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 59, No. 6, 2007,

pp. 982-983. 989

P.J. Bryson and G.C. Cornia, „Fiscal Decentralisation in Economic Transformation: The Czech and Slovak

Cases‟, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, May 2000, pp. 511-512 990

J. Rupnik and J. Zielonka, The Road to the European Union Volume 1 – The Czech and Slovak Republics,

Manchester University Press 2003, p. 113. 991

Ibid.,114-115.

165

was in need of many structural reforms, including a restructuring of the social security system and

more flexible labour market legislation. Furthermore, the supervision in the financial sector needed to

be strengthened and the legal framework for a well functioning market economy was in need of further

enhancement.992

During the EU accession process the macroeconomic performance of Slovakia improved. The

GDP growth rates of the country increased steadily and the unemployment rate dropped slightly, but

remained high at 17.7%. The current account deficit was more than 8% of GDP in 2002, but this

deficit was fully covered by FDI inflows of 17% of GDP. The government deficit was 7.2% of GDP in

2002. In 2003 this deficit was brought down to 5% of GDP. The government debt decreased from

49.8% in 2001 to 44.3% in 2002. This decrease was due to privatisation receipts. Moreover, the

government reversed their expansionary fiscal policy stance, and restricted government spending in

order to further decrease their budgetary deficit. This goal was further enhanced by the proposed

public expenditure reforms, in the area of pensions and social assistance benefits.993

After the accession to the EU, some economic difficulties still remained. Some of the

challenges that Slovakia still struggles with today are the large regional disparities and high

unemployment rate. In the short term, the country also needs to deal with the consequences of the

economic crisis. Since Slovakia is an open and export-oriented economy, it was greatly affected by a

large decrease in the international demand for its produce. In order to decrease this vulnerability and to

enhance economic growth in the future, the country wants to develop a more diversified and

knowledge-based economy and improve the country‟s business environment by investing in education,

innovation and IT technology. The EU provides many instruments that can be used for the desired

development of the economy. Nevertheless, the current conditions for such EU cooperation are

different today than they were during the EU accession process. The country can still apply and

receive EU funding, but the country needs to outline and make the necessary improvements by

itself.994

During the accession period, the government was focused on fulfilling the membership

criteria. Due to the cooperation with institutions such as the World Bank and the OECD, the country

wanted to implement reforms that were not even part of the EU requirements and that were not even

implemented by the old EU member states. An example of this is the pension reform that the country

embarked on. After the period of EU accession, the drive and motivation for continuing change and

reforms seems to have diminished. The necessary economic reforms are not implemented in the same

pace as before EU accession. This could be explained by the fact that there is not an EU or World

Bank guideline anymore that the country can follow. But there also seems to be a feeling of „reform

fatigue‟. After the period of radical reform the country seems to need some time to settle into the new

situation and reassess the economic priorities for the future.995

992 SEC/2003/1209, pp. 5-8.

993 Ibid.

994 Interview C9.

995 Ibid.

166

6.3 Economic Legal Framework

The fundaments of the economic legal framework of Slovakia are laid down in chapter three of the

Constitution. Article 55 states that the economy of Slovakia is based on the principles of a socially and

ecologically oriented market economy, and that economic competition shall be stimulated by the

Slovak government.996

Details are worked out in the Civil Code, the Labour Code, the Law on Labour

Protection and the Commercial Code. Economic provisions laid down in the Civil Code are based on

subjectivity. This could be seen as problematic since legislation based on subjectivity seems to

contradict European law. The Commercial Code provides a more unified legal framework for the

Slovak economy, based on objectivity. The main principles, on which the economic provisions in

these codes are based, are the right to own and the freedom of contracts. In 2007, the Ministry of

Justice has appointed a codification commission, who should be occupied with the re-codification

process of the Civil Code. The re-codified Civil Code should be ready by 2010. Slovak experts try to

base the re-codification on the Civil Codes from other states with a market economy. The

methodology would be to compare the various law systems in a scientific research and base the

reforms on this.997

In the following paragraphs, the main economic institutions will be described, such as the

National Bank of Slovakia, the National Property Fund, the Supreme Audit Office and the Slovak

Competition Authority. The Slovak legislation concerning these institutions will be discussed, as well

as the implementation of European legislation. In addition, the implementation of European provisions

regarding the internal market and consumer protection will be discussed in more detail.

6.3.1 National Bank of Slovakia

In Article 56 of the Slovak Constitution it states that the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) is the

central independent bank of Slovakia. The NBS was established after the Velvet Divorce in 1993. The

highest managing body of this bank is the National Bank Council. This body is allowed to provide

general binding regulations.998

Further legislation about the NBS is laid down in the Act on the

National Bank of Slovakia. According to this act, the NBS has supervision over every commercial

bank in Slovakia. The legislative powers of this national institution consist of submitting bills on

monetary issues to the government. In cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, the NBS also submits

bills on foreign exchange management and the banking sector. Furthermore, the NBS has the

competence to provide general standards which are binding for Slovak banks.999

The governor of the NBS is democratically elected by the Slovak parliament and government

for a five-year term. The NBS is a branch member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB)

and is closely affiliated with the Czech, Hungarian and Polish branches. The ESCB is governed by the

996 „Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, by National Council of the Slovak Republic, retrieved 17 February

2010 from www.nrsr.sk, p. 16. 997

M. Jurčová, „The Influence of Harmonisation on Civil Law in the Slovak Republic‟, Juridical International

XIV, 2008, p. 171. 998

„Constitution of the Slovak Republic‟, by National Council of the Slovak Republic, retrieved 17 February

2010 from www.nrsr.sk, p. 16. 999

R. Kuklišová, „The National Bank of Slovakia and its Legislative Activity‟, Národná Banka Slovenska,

BIATEC, roãník 9 February 2001, p.37.

167

European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt. The ECB‟s main task is to maintain price stability and to

manage the inflation rate in the eurozone through the supervision of currency flows.

In 2006, the NBS published a working paper explaining the direct and long-term benefits and

challenges of the euro.1000

Instant benefits would be price transparency and lower transaction costs. In

the long run, trade flows would increase by the single currency market and FDI would boost economic

growth.

6.3.2 National Property Fund

The National Property Fund of the Slovak Republic was established on the basis of Act No. 253-1991

of the National Council. The principal task of the fund was to realise privatisation projects. This is

done by selecting the privatisation procedure, and preparing and concluding the sale of state assets.

The National Property Fund is independent from the state and is not financed by state funds. The fund

is able to sustain its organisation based on their income from stocks in joint-stock companies1001