Slide 1 Slide 1 Evaluation of Policy Initiatives: Transparency and Accountability Presented to: Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors play a Constructive Role? Bellagio, June 13-17, 2011 Presented by: Francesca Recanatini Senior Economist PREM Public Sector Governance World Bank
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Slide 1 Evaluation of Policy Initiatives: Transparency and Accountability Presented to: Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors play a Constructive.
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Slide 1Slide 1
Evaluation of Policy Initiatives: Transparency and Accountability
Presented to:Anti-Corruption Policy: Can International Actors play a Constructive Role?Bellagio, June 13-17, 2011
Presented by:Francesca RecanatiniSenior EconomistPREM Public Sector GovernanceWorld Bank
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Outline
Setting the stage – a few illustrations Framing the problem An alternative approach Lessons learnt and remaining
challenges (for local and international actors)
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Setting the stage…
In a low-income, democratic country in Latin America, top political leaders paid and accepted bribes from an intricate network, spanning all aspects of state and society. Through the network, the leadership controlled judiciary, legislature, and media.
Oligarchs in a country in northern Africa have divided the economy into lucrative monopolies, through government supported restrictions on competition. Civil society is weak.
The President of a resource-rich country in Central Asia accepted millions of dollars in bribes, placing them abroad in a major financial center. There are few checks on executive power.
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Setting the stage, cont. An African country has signed a peace agreement
after a decade of conflict. Formal institutions (especially local ones) are largely absent. Capacity is limited. Power is highly concentrated – a few leaders control allocation of land and awarding of public contracts for reconstruction. Nepotism and patronage are widespread.
In a low-income, democratic country in Africa, businesses finance political parties in exchange for preferential treatment. Petty corruption is widespread. Efforts to combat corruption stop prior to elections, out of fear that party financing will be cut off.
A chronically under-funded military in a country in East Asia resorted to self-financing, establishing commercial enterprises and foundations. Generals enrich themselves by sitting on boards.
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Emerging “features” of the “corruption” challenge
In practice, an heterogeneous challenge Different country’s reality (political,
institutional and cultural) Different forms of corruption Different level of skills and resources
It involves diverse actors and stakeholders (local, national and international)
It requires a significant re-allocation of powers and rents
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How to address this challenge?The emerging policy should… Be country specific Ensure and sustain coordination and
collaboration among different actors Have both short term and a medium
term vision Promote local capacity building Monitor progress and adjust to new
circumstances
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Selecting an approach
Official request from Government
Yes
Sector-specific engagement with government
GAC Diagnostic Surveys Approach
No
Selective engagement with alternative actors/ players
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A possible approach: Governance and A-C Diagnostic Surveys
A participatory process to identify governance challenges and build local capacity
Key features: Medium/long term partnership between multiple
actors for design and implementation Mechanism to facilitate feedback from different
stakeholders (focus groups) Multiple sources of data (from households, firms
and public officials) focused on experience Rigorous technical implementation Local institution implements
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What are the likely outcomes?Unbundled evaluation of corruption – administrative, state capture, bidding, theft of public resources, purchase of licenses, nepotismIdentification of weak and strong institutionsAssessment of the impact and costs of corruption on different stakeholders
To what extent has this approach helped shape public sector reforms?Only when paired with political will, donor coordination and (true) medium term vision
Lessons learnt
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Lessons learnt, cont.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of this approach?Pros: Greater local capacity, consensus and ownership that can ensure sustainability of reform process; “south-south” knowledge sharing (Costa Rica, Zambia, Mozambique, Haiti)Cons: Time consuming and costly; challenging to coordinate many different actors, especially international ones; unforeseen political changes
How do we “reconcile” aggregate indicators with national assessments?
Two sides of the same coin with different objectives. Key => the two approaches complement each other
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Lessons learnt, cont.
Who should be involved in measuring?
It depends on the country reality. Our experience: the country as a whole. But donors, INGOs can play a very important role (Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Haiti). NSOs should also be involved to promote sustainability (Peru, Paraguay)
How can we help various stakeholders make appropriate use of these tools?Local focus, local capacity building, participation, and learning by doing (Paraguay, Peru, Sierra Leone)
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THANK YOU!
Q & A
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Addendum
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The role of governance assessments
Will and PoliticalLeadership for
Institutional ReformsOn governance
Strategy and Action Plan
Governance assessment:- Identification of severe obstacles- Vulnerability of each institution- Identification of priorities
Empirical Tools and Data Capacity building and
coalition building
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0% 15% 30% 45% 60% 75% 90%
% of public officialsreporting frequentpublic funds mis-
management
% of public officialsreporting frequent
purchase of positionsin their institutions
% citizens reportingbribes used frequently
to obtain publicservices
Sierra Leone(2003) Guatemala(2004) Zambia(2003)
Paraguay(2005) Mozambique(2004) Madagascar(2005)
Country Diagnostic Results
Extent of corruption, (Selected Countries ‘03-’05)
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Corruption imposes barriers to households to access basic services, Sierra Leone 2003
Cost of Corruption:discouraged users by service
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Municipal and District Councils
Public education services
Public health services
Sierra Leone Roads TransportAuthority (RTA)
Sierra Leone Housing Corporation(SALHOC)
Proportion of head of households reporting that they decide to not conduct procedures with these institutions because they couldn't pay the unofficial costs
Sierra Leone Housing Corporation
0% 10% 20% 30%
high incomemiddle incomelow income
0% 10% 20% 30%
Sierra Leone Roads Transport Authority
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Mechanisms to participate to the policy process
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Association/NGO Direct tie topublic officials
Do not participate
Southern Northern Eastern Western
% of households reporting to use the following channel to participatein the policy process (Sierra Leone, 2003)
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Bribes to win contracts with Government, (as reported by public officials, 1999-2005)
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Colombia(2001)
Guatemala(2004)
Honduras(2001)
Paraguay(2005)
Sierra Leone(2003)
Zambia(2003)
Mozambique(2004)
% of public officials reporting that the practice is frequent
Executive Local Governments
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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Min. of DefenceMin. of Development
Min. of InformationNat. Commissions
OthersPara-statals
Min. of FinanceMin. of Local Govt.
Min. of Social WelfareMin. of Education
Min. of JusticeS.L Police
Min. of AgricultureMin. of Health
% of Public Officials that said irregularities/(misappropriations) are frequent
Public funds are mismanaged by agency(as reported by Public Officials, Sierra Leone, 2003)
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Agency-level Indicators
Using responses from public officials Public officials are employees of each
agency Public official’s responses are re-scale
(from 0 to 100) and then aggregated by agency using factor analysis technique
0 always meaning the lowest level of quality of governance, corruption, access or service performance