Sleep Indian Philosophy

8/12/2019 Sleep Indian Philosophy

1/192

SLEEP AS

A STATEOF

CONSCIOUSNESS

INADVAITA

VEDANTA

ARVIND SHARMA


2/192

Sleep as a State of Consciousnessin Advaita Vednta


3/192

This page intentionally left blank.


4/192

Sleep as a State of Consciousnessin Advaita Vednta

Arvind Sharma

State University of New York Press


5/192

Published byState University of New York Press, Albany

2004 State University of New York

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any mannerwhatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may bestored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by anymeans including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical,

photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission inwriting of the publisher.

For information, address the State University of New York Press,90 State Street, Suite 700, Albany, NY 12207

Production by Diane GanelesMarketing by Anne M. Valentine

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Sharma, Arvind.Sleep as a state of consciousness in Advaita Vednta / Arvind Sharma.

p. cm.Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-7914-6251-X (hardcover: alk. paper)1. Advaita. 2. Philosophy, Hindu. 3. SleepReligious aspects

Hinduism. I. Title.B132.A3S43 2004

154.6'0954dc22 2003069326

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1


6/192

Contents

Preface vii

Introduction 1

1. Sleep in Advaita Vednta: A Prologue 11

2. Sleep in the Prasthnatraya(Upaniads, Brahmastra, Bhagavadgt) 15

3. Sleep in Mkyakrik 41

4. Sleep in kara Advaita 49

5. Sleep in Later Advaita 73

6. Sleep in Modern Advaita 99

Conclusions 127

Notes 139

Bibliography 171

Term Index 175

Subject Index 179

v


7/192



8/192

Preface

Advaita Vednta is a well-known philosophical system ofIndia. One of the well-known doctrines associated withAdvaita Vednta is that of avasthtraya, or of the three statesof consciousness: waking (jgrat), dreaming (svapna), and deepsleep (suupti). Out of these three states of daily experience,Advaita Vednta often draws on that of deep sleep to vali-date an argument, point a moral, or even adorn a tale.

Despite this heavy reliance on the phenomenon of deepsleep in Advaita Vednta, no broad-based study of it seemsto have been undertaken from an Advaitic point of view. (Ifsuch an investigation has indeed been undertaken, I am notaware of it). This monograph is an attempt at such an analy-sis. As it tries to bring together several viewpoints under onecover, it is also an attempt at synthesis.

There are, I believe, good reasons for undertaking thisexercise. It might be of interest to those who work withinAdvaita Vednta. It might also be of interest to those whowork more broadly in the field of Vednta. The doctrine ofavasthtraya and the associated catupda doctrine, althoughimportant for Advaitic thought, are not confined to it. Theyare shared by other schools of Vednta. The monograph may

also be of interest to those who work even more generally inthe field of Hindu philosophy, for some of the differencesamong these schools turn on their analysis of deep sleep. Thesystem of Yoga, for instance, speaks of nidr or sleep as oneof the fivecittavttisor cognitive mental states.1Moreover, the

vii


9/192

viii Preface

argument it employs for postulating some form of continu-ous consciousness is also similar to the one employed inAdvaita.2However, while in Advaita the argument ultimatelypoints to the reality of tman(or more precisely the tmanassk), which is ultimately without a second, in Yoga it pointsto the reality of the purua,of whom there are many.3

The relevance of a work such as this on Advaita Vedntamay even extend beyond the confines of Hindu philosophy,to those of Indian philosophy. The apparent cessation of con-sciousness in sleep serves to illustrate Buddhist ideas of adiscontinuous but connected flow of consciousness, while itpoints in an opposite direction in Advaita. It is illuminatingthat some Buddhists even consider this difference a minorerror (alppardha) on the part of Advaitins, apparently some-thing not worth losing sleep over.

Beyond Indian philosophy, this exercise may interest thosewho work in philosophy in general, as well as those whodont work within it but attend to it. For it lifts up for consid-eration the relationship between philosophy and physiology.One might propose, for instance, at the risk of sounding re-ductionistic, that all, or most, of philosophical speculationhas a physiological basis, that philosophizing about death isbased onfearof death; that thirstfor knowledge is merely thephilosophical expression of a psychological drive, or that theconcept of objectless consciousness is only the philosophized

version of sleep. Alternatively, one might turn the tables andmaintain, like the Advaitin, that the phenomenon of sleep isonly a physiological earnest of a metaphysical reality. Afterall, empirically one cannot hope for absolute intimations, onlyintimations of the Absolute.

The exercise may also not be without relevance for thecomparative study of religion. An investigation of the natureof sleep, and deep or dreamless sleep in Advaita Vednta may

also illumine prevalent Western assumptions about con-sciousness states and reality. To our common sense,it seems absurd to argue that sleep reveals the true na-ture of things while waking is at bottom delusive. To


10/192

ixPreface

advaitins, however, the blurring of inner (psychic) ap-pearance and outer (physical) appearance in dream(and the total collapse of such distinctions in sleep) re-veals a fundamental truth (non-duality), not a lessenedgrasp on reality.

From a different common sense, dreams suggesta reality (taken to be the external physical world)which is merely a mental creation. As dreamers believetheir dreams are real (and not merely their mental cre-ations), we now believe waking is real, and not such acreation. From waking state, we know dreams arentreal; in the same way, once we become brahman, wewill know waking is not real. Thus, one should not aimfor wakings critical self-awareness, but for awaken-ing from the dream (or nightmare!) of daylightvicissitudes.4

Finally, the exercise may even be significant in the studyof psychology, as offering another perspective on alteredstates of consciousness.5After all, sleep is a state of alteredconsciousness that occupies a third of ones life!

Enough said. This is the spirit in which the monograph isbeing offered, and I hope will be welcomed as such.


11/192



12/192

Introduction

I

This monograph deals with the question of sleep in AdvaitaVednta. But the theme presupposes that the phenomenon ofsleep is an issue of some kind for Advaita Vednta in particu-lar, or Indian philosophy in general. For the reader who doesnot share this presupposition, such questions as the follow-ing will naturally arise: Why should philosophers be con-cerned with sleep as an epistemological or religious problem?Why are the Indian philosophers concerned with it? Why doAdvaita philosophers view sleep as an important philosophi-cal dilemma, and why are they losing sleep over it?

IIThe question as to why philosophers in general should beconcerned with the phenomenon of sleep can be answered intwo ways, one reductive and the other nonreductive.

According to the reductive view the superstructures ofthought raised by philosophers have physiological bases, andone cannot avoid this issue by retreating into intellectual lofti-

ness and claiming that our powers of intellection are immuneto such influences. If this reductive line of reasoning is pur-sued further, it will lead to the suggestion that the philo-sophical idea of a nondual reality may be rooted in thephysiological phenomenon of deep sleep, wherein such a

1


13/192

2 Sleep as a State of Consciousness in Advaita Vednta

nonduality is actually experienced by human beings. Theother, nonreductive approach will also hark to the same pointbut this time use the phenomenon of sleep not to account forthe claim of a nonduality reality, but as an everyday illustra-tion that might reinforce its philosophical credibility.

III

Any attempt to answer the other questions raised earlier in

section I above, must involve a brief account of the doctrineof three states of consciousness, or avasthtraya, as it is for-mally known, within the school of Hindu philosophy calledVednta, and more particularly, within Advaita Vednta. Forsleep (or more accurately deep or dreamless sleep) isidentified as one of the three states of consciousness. Hencethe kind of detailed discussion that this monograph purportsto carry out must commence with a description, if only in

outline, of the broader schema within which the phenom-enon of sleep is lodged in Hindu Vedantic thought.Any comprehensive system of thought begins by reduc-

ing the complexity of the data it must tackle to manageablecategories. Physics, for instance, reduces the material worldof everyday life, with all its buzzing, blooming confusion, tothe categories of matter and energy. Chemistry reduces thevarious substances it must deal with to a table of elements. In

the same spirit, Advaita Vednta, when faced with the prob-lem of bringing the confusing multiplicity of human experi-ences within manageable limits in preparation for furtheranalysis, tried to encompass the entire range of human expe-rience within the schema of the three states of consciousness.

Were anyone asked to list all the items in consciousnessexperienced by him or her, he or she is bound to fail in car-rying out so enormous an exercise on account of the sheer

richness and diversity of the contents of experience. One couldeven barely commence such a vast undertaking without fal-tering. It is, however, possible to circumvent the problem bysidestepping it and claiming instead that, irrespective of thespecific contents of our experiences, they are allexperienced


14/192

3Introduction

by us in one of three states of consciousnessthat of waking(jgrat), dreaming (svapna), and deep sleep (suupti). Thisclassification provides us with a handle, as it were, for grab-bing hold of that immense vessel of our rich, varied, andever-growing experiences. Small wonder then that thisclassification caught on in Hindu philosophical circles. It isalso worth noting that this classification is eminently rational.Although the classification is developed within the bodyof literature considered revelational in Hinduism, theclassification itself is not revelational but rather rational incharacter, for it does not derive its cogency by an appeal toscriptural authority, but from the support it seems to derivefrom our experience of life itself. In that sense it may bedescribed as philosophical rather than religious in nature.

IV

The following features of this trichotomy deserve specialattention as a propadeutic to the study of consciousness.(1) From the point of view of everyday life, one tends to

accord primacy, if not supremacy, to the waking state, view-ing deep sleep as a phase of rest and dreaming as the work-ing out of psychic latencies generated during the state ofwaking. From the point of Vedantic philosophy, however,such a view would be considered unsatisfactory, as it begs

the question. Sleep cannot be merely a period of rest as eventhe lazy people get sleep, while the old people [who needmore rest] get less sleep at night.1Similarly, dream is notthe mere result of the unnatural change of the nervous sys-tem because even those who are very frugal in their eatingand enjoyments and who are in a healthy state get dreams.2Indeed

Because both deep sleep and dream keep on comingto us even if we do not want them also and becausethey come to us quite naturally without being subjectto our desire to have them in a particular manner only,we will have to say that they also, like the waking, are


15/192


very essential to us. Therefore, it will be proper toopine that deep sleep and dream are independentstates created for some good purpose for our sakealone, instead of considering them as dependent stateswhich cause or create facilities or difficulties or hard-ships required by the waking state.3

(2) It may well be that from the point of view of dailyliving, the waking state holds the key, but philosophy claimsto deal with ultimate reality. Therefore,

However much in our daily transactions we may bevery highly benefited by waking, but if there is anambition to determine the Ultimate Reality, then it isclear from this that we have to practise, first of all,considering the experiences of all the three states whichare our own with a common vision (dispassionately),i.e. with equal importance given to all the three states which

are universally everybodys experiences.4

Furthermore, when the matter is probed, we realise that

we can never perceive with our waking senses thedream and the deep sleep; if it is so, where is thejustification for imagining that those two states occurin this waking world alone? In each dream we per-

ceive a different set of objects which seem to us as aworld. Do we ever believe that that world has en-gulfed within itself the world of this waking state orthis waking state itself? No. Day to day we experiencemany different dreams; do we ever believe that oneamong the worlds of those dreams exists somewhereeven when its respective dream does not exist? Not atall. If it is so, what evidence is there to imagine that

the waking world alone can exist independently apartfrom the waking state?5

(3) To the extent that Advaita Vednta emphasizes therole of experience as a datum for philosophizing, let us:


16/192

5Introduction

. . . investigate or deliberate upon the questionThroughwhich senses or instruments of knowledge do we knowor experience the waking state?then we realize that,unlike the objects being known through the senses andthe happiness and grief being experienced through themind, we have no other instruments of knowledgewhatsoever for the experience or knowledge of thewaking state. Just as we experience our dream and deepsleep directly (i.e. intuitively) without the help of anyinstruments of knowledge like the senses, the mind, etc.,in the same manner we experience the waking directlywithout the need for any instrument of knowledge. Is itnot? This is a very important fact. For, in the other schoolsof philosophy more importance is given to the instru-ments of knowledge (like the senses, mind) alone; but inthe method of the three states of Consciousness which isfollowed in Vedanta, this Intuitive experience, which isthe substratum for the instruments of knowledge, is it-self considered as the highest among all the instrumentsof knowledge that we possess.6

That it to say, our experience of the senses and the mindfollows upon our being in a waking state and not vice versa.

(4) It could be objected that there are many other statesof consciousness beyond those of waking, dreaming, and deep

sleep, such as those of intoxication, insanity, swoon, delirium,somnambulism, etc.7All of these, however, can be understoodas experiences within one of the three states, whose basic fea-ture is their mutual exclusivity: the world is included withinthe state and not in the world the states occur.8

(5) It might be claimed that Observed naturally, all thethree states belong to the category or species of Avasth, ora state of Consciousness; as dream is caused by the latent

impressions of the waking and deep sleep is the rest or re-spite caused to the body, the senses etc., it can be said thatamong them there is a temporal as well as a cause-effect kindof relationship. Therefore, to many people the statement thatthere is no relationship among the states seems to be invalid.9


17/192


This argument compromises the point regarding themutual exclusivity of the states. However, in Advaita theseconnections arise not on account of the interconnectedness ofthe states, but on account of the same person and the sameantakaraaor internal organ of the person being involved inthe states of consciousness.

(6) According to Advaita the three states of conscious-ness also involve a fourth (turya). This is supposed to be theultimate and true state which underlies the three.

Beyond suupti, both quantitatively and qualitativelydifferent from it, is the bliss of samdhiwhich is calledthe turya state. Though literally turya means thefourth, it is not to be understood as in any sense nu-merically different. For example, when speaking of acoin from the first quarter to the last, with the firstquarter, we say one quarter of the rupee, with the sec-ond we say half of the rupee, with the third quarter wesay three quarters of the rupee. But when we come tothe last quarter of it, we do not speak in terms of quar-ter; but we say One or whole Rupee. Even so, the turyais a comprehensive whole and it is not to be expressedin terms of the fourth of the four fractions.10

(7) The three states of consciousness involve change, asone state is replaced by another. Change of or inconscious-ness can only be perceived, according to Advaita, by some-thing itself not subject to such change, which can bear witnessto this change. This Advaita identifies as the true subject,often referred to as the Self, which itself cannot be known inthe usual empirical manner, for then it would become anobject and cease to be the subject. The self is never known.It only knows. It illumines all things, including the states ofdeep sleep, dream and wakefulness.11Further analysis dis-closes that the essence of this self or subject is pure conscious-ness in the following manner according to Advaita Vednta:

If again we compare the three states, namely of wak-ing, dreaming and sleeping without dreams, which


18/192

7Introduction

the human self experiences daily, we can reach thesame conception. The essence of the self must remainin all these or the self would cease to be. But what dowe find common to all these states? In the first statethere is consciousness of external objects; in the sec-ond also there is consciousness, but of internal objectspresent only to the dreamer. In the third state no objectsappear, but there is no cessation of consciousness, forotherwise the subsequent memory of that state, as oneof peace and freedom from worries, would not bepossible. The persistent factor then is consciousness,but not necessarily of any object. This shows againthat the essence of self is pure consciousness withoutnecessary relation to object.12

V

Sleep becomes an issue in Advaita Vednta for reasons which arephilosophical both generally and in a specifically Advaitic sense.

It is an issue generally because although Advaita claimsto treat all the states on par, the fact remains that just as inthe case of empirical transactions, in the same way in the caseof scriptural transactionsalso the waking viewpoint is extremelyessential13 and the issue of the primacy or otherwise of awaking state keeps asserting itself. This general point alsopossesses an Advaitic dimension, as scriptural authority (abda)is sometimes accorded great significance in the formal articu-lation of Advaita.

From a specifically Advaitic point of view the experienceof sleep poses several problems. For one, in the plenaryAdvaitic experience the subject-object distinction vanishes.This also happens in sleep, yet sleep is not normally consid-ered identical with the plenary experience. From the point ofview of the plenary experience sleep presents another para-dox. The plenary experience, wherein the subject-object di-chotomy disappears as in sleep, is supposed to consist ofhappiness par excellence. People upon awakening from sleepalso testify to having slept happily. In sleep, however, they


19/192


are also in a state of ignorance about themselves whereas theplenary Advaitic experience is also said to be one characterisedby total awareness rather than utter ignorance.

Thus the fact that both sleep and Realization representnon-dual forms of consciousness and yet the former is notconsidered soteriological in the same sense as the latter raisestantalizing issues, and generates a debate if the views of akaraand Gauapda are placed alongside. Thus akara arguablyclaims, at least on occasion, that deep sleep is a form of Brahmanexperience (on account of the association of sleep with bliss) buthis predecessor Gauapda is more inclined to look upon sleepas just another manifestation of avidy or ignorance, (on accountof the association of sleep with nonawareness).

This consideration is further complicated by the fact thereis one more significant instance where there is awarenessbecause of the witnessdespite ignorancewithout theinstrumentation of the cognitive modethe awareness of theabsence of objects as in deep sleep.14This point may be elabo-rated as follows:

What really happens when one goes to sleep? Thereseem to be intermittent periods of lapsing into totalunconsciousness. Had there been a break in the flowof consciousness one could not on waking resume thethreads of personal identity. On waking up one saysI slept soundly, I didnt know anything. Paradoxi-cally this not knowing of anything is itself known.Consciousness does not remain ignorant of its ownignorance. The sleeping self is thus revealed as reveal-ing the darkness (Ajna) which is a kind of looseembodiment for the self, and which is the matrix of alldistinctions and differentiations of the waking life.Therefore revelation is absolute and timeless, depend-

ing in the adventitious fact of there being somethingto be revealed. Advaita makes a basic distinction be-tween consciousness and knowledge. Knowledge isthe revelation of objects by means of modifications(Vttis), while consciousness is the principle of revela-


20/192

9Introduction

tion itself, without their being a principle of revelationthe entire world would be plunged in darkness (Jagadndhya Prasaga).15

The relationship of the experience of deep sleep to the ex-perience of brahmanin a sense constitutes the crux of the matter.Both possess a non-dual character and yet both are distinct. Tothe extent that the two are indistinguishable sleep can be usedto illustrate the experience of Brahman. To the extent that thetwo, though indistinguishable in some ways are not identical inall respects, some daylight between the two must be allowed. Itis within this light that the role of sleep in Advaita Vedntaneeds to be investigated.


21/192



22/192

1

Sleep in Advaita Vednta:A Prologue

Karl H. Potter, in his introduction to the philosophy of AdvaitaVednta, lists twelve propositions as constituting the theo-retical basis of Advaita. The last of these propositions readsas follows: Pure consciousness is experienced during deepsleep; since we awake refreshed, it is inferred that pure con-sciousness (reality, Brahman, the true Self) is also the ulti-mate bliss.1

The statement is merely an earnest of the profound rolethe phenomenon of deep sleep plays in the formulation of thephilosophy of Advaita Vednta. We read in one of its majorproof-texts, the Chndogyopaniad: Uddlaka son of Arua saidto his son vetaketu, Learn from me the doctrine of the sleep.When a man literally sleeps [svapiti], then he has mergedwith Existent. He has entered the self [svamapta], that iswhy they say that he sleeps. For he has entered the self. 2

The physiological experience of deep sleep continues tobe profoundly significant in the subsequent evolution ofAdvaita, as well as in its classical formulation at the hands ofakara. This is a matter of some surprise, as sleep, on thebasis of ordinary experience, may be regarded as a state ofunconsciousness, as a time we need to take off from the waking

11


23/192


state to return to it with renewed vigor in the pursuit of ournormal, or even intellectual and philosophical, pursuits. Thisrather surprising role the phenomenon of deep sleep plays inAdvaita has led William M. Indich to remark:

This phenomenological analysis of the deep sleep stateis extremely important for the Advaitin, for it is interms of this analysis that he argues for the non-dual,self-luminous and, . . . the blissful nature of pure con-sciousness. It may seem somewhat odd to a persontrained in Western philosophy that an analysis ofdreamless sleep should play a significant role in thephilosophical defense of a particular theory of con-sciousness. Of course, both Freud and Jung saw insleep a physiologically and psychologically necessaryperiod of relief and recovery from the strains of wak-ing experience, a point that goes back at least as far asAristotle, but there seems to be little of philosophicalconcern for these thinkers behind this observation. Onthe other hand, while akara discusses the physiol-ogy of sleep and acknowledges its value in allowingthe individual to recover from fatigue, he goes be-yond this and extracts arguments for his theory of Selffrom his discussion of sleep. And he is not alone amongIndian philosophers in doing this.3

This then is the paradox to be confronted: that a state ofbeing normally associated with unconsciousness becomes, inthe hands of the Advaitins, the cornerstone of their doctrine ofpure consciousness, a doctrine that constitutes the basis of thephilosophical system. A striking illustration of this is found inthe vantage point accorded to different states of consciousnessin normal living and in Advaita. In normal living the baselineis provided by the waking state.4 From this waking state wepass into sleepeither a state of dreaming or deep sleep. InAdvaita the perspective is reversed. The state of deep sleep

is said to be the gateway to cognition (cetomukha). Froma blissful non-awareness of things and events in sleep,


24/192

13Sleep in Advaita Vednta

one either wakes up gradually and eventually to fullconsciousness of the external world, or passes to theexperience of objects and events in a dream. On the onehand, one goes into dreamless sleep from waking anddream, and on the other, one lapses from sleep intoeither of these states. Hence it is called the gateway ofconsciousness, alike to its entrance and to its exit.5

It might be useful to state here, in a general way, themetaphysical status of deep sleep in Advaita Vednta, as weproceed to examine its role in particular texts and thinkers.The following account meets this need well:

Deep sleep (suupta) is the self in the form of prja,an undifferentiated and self-luminous mass of con-sciousness. Here one is desireless, without the super-imposition of gross orsubtle limitations. One rests inpure self-awareness, full of bliss (nanda). Sleep is thesource and limit of the other states, and most like theself in its true nature. Still, one inevitably returns fromsleep to waking limitations, and the sleeper is igno-rant within the bliss.6


25/192



26/192

2

Sleep in the Prasthnatraya(Upaniads, Brahmastra, Bhagavadgt)

I

The tradition of Advaita Vednta can certainly be traced asfar back as the Bhadrayaka and Chndogya Upaniads, thetwo earliest Upaniads.1They are also considered primarilyabsolutistic in character. In both of them the analysis of thehuman condition involves the analysis of deep sleep. It willbe useful to compare and contrast these analyses. With thisend in view, the analysis of sleep carried out in each is pre-sented in the context of the search for the true self of a humanbeing as depicted in these two Upaniads.

In the Chndogya Upaniad, Prajpati:

teaches first that the self is the body, but this is clearlyinadequate; the self then would suffer all the changesof the body. Prajpati teaches next that the self is hewho moves about happy in a dream; but the dreamself experiences not only happiness but also unpleas-antness and pain. Then, it is said, the self is when aman is asleep, composed, serene, knows no dream.But in that state there is no awareness even of personal

15


27/192


existence; such a one has gone to annihilation(Chndogya Upaniad 8.11.1).

Prajpati then offers a final explanation: the body,which is mortal, is only the support of the deathless,bodiless self. Freed from the body, the self rises up andreaches the highest life, where it appears in his ownform as the supreme person. There it moves about,laughing, playing, and rejoicing, without rememberingthe appendage of the body. As an animal is attachedto a cart, so is life attached to this body. It is the senseorgans that see, smell, utter sound, hear, and think: theself perceives, but is not attached to the organs of per-ception (Chndogya8.12, 45).2

In the Bhadrayaka, Yjavalkya works his way throughthe human psychological processes in the search for the self,and after discussing the two states of waking and dreaming,he presents an analysis of dreamless sleep.

In a third state, that of deep sleep, the self is freeeven from the appearance of activity. In both thewaking and dream states it might be thought throughignorance that the self is affected by what happens tothe forms or to the body; thus there is pain, fears, andcraving. In the state of deep sleep, however, these ap-parent attachments are removed and the self is seen inits true condition of freedom.2A

This verily is his form which is free from craving, freefrom evils, free from fear. As a man when in theembrace of his beloved wife knows nothing withoutor within, so the person when in the embrace of theintelligent self knows nothing without or within. Thatverily is his form in which his desire is fulfilled, inwhich the self is his desire, in which he is withoutdesire, free from any sorrow. (Bhadrayaka 4.3.21)3

This is not a state of unconsciousness, but, as the analogywith sexual intercourse indicates, a state of totally unified


28/192

17Sleep in the Prasthnatraya

consciousness in which there is no awareness of difference.The self in this condition maintains its character as a per-ceiver, but there is nothing else separate from it that it couldperceive. In this state, free of all fear and desire, and con-scious only of oneness, the self experiences the highest bliss,nanda, the bliss of the world of Brahman. But this state is notattained permanently in deep sleep, and there is an inevitablereturn to the states of dream and waking. The state of deepsleep is only a precursor of the desired permanent conditionof release.

Yjavalkya then goes on to describe the self at the timeof death and the final attainment of Brahman.

Here, as in sleep, speculation is tied to observation.When a person approaches death, his senses cease tofunction properly. They are withdrawn from the out-side world, gathered in, so that one by one the personloses external sense contact. With the senses with-drawn, the unified self departs from the body and thesenses or life breaths depart with it.4

It becomes clear from a comparison of the two Upaniadsthat although there are similarities in their analysis of thehuman condition, there are also differences in their portrayalof this condition. Some of these also extend to the treatmentof deep sleep. But these differences are connected with thedifference in their overall view about human destiny.

. . . In Yjavalkyas view, there is no merger withBrahman except for the released self, and then themerger is permanent. The transmigratory self remainsseparate from Brahman, still bound to phenomenalexistence by the influence of past actions carried alongwith the self.

. . . In Yjavalkyas teaching the vital powers aredirectly involved in bodily activity and carry the ef-fects of that attachment with them in the knowledgeand past deeds and memory that take hold of thesubtle self. No such positive influence is evident in


29/192


Uddlakas statements, and actions as such seem aless important factor in rebirth. The emphasis is in-stead more directly on the absence of knowledge. Allbodily manifestations devolve back into the Real atthe time of death, but the merger is not complete unlessthere is prior knowledge of the Real. Only a personwho knows that Brahman is his own reality remainsin the condition of union, since only his knowledge issufficiently purified of all false understanding. Onlysuch a person has no doubts, and can enter the mergerwith the One with assurance that this is his final rest-ing place.5

It is clear that the reemergence of a human being, afterhaving enjoyed deep sleep but without becoming liberated inthe process, poses a challenge in both the Upaniads but inslightly different ways. In the Bhadrayaka Upaniadthe prob-lem arises because of the striking similarities between thestatesof deep sleep and liberation. Consider for instance thefollowing passages. The first describes the state of self in deepsleep (IV.3.31). 31. Verily, when there is, as it were, anotherthere one might see the other, one might smell the other, onemight taste the other, one might speak to the other, one mighthear the other, one might think of the other, one might touchthe other, one might know the other.6

This second passage pertains to a state of liberation(II.4.14):

14. For where there is duality as it were, there onesmells another, there one sees another, there one hearsanother, there one speaks to another, there one thinksof another, there one understands another. Where,verily, everything has become the Self, then by whatand whom should one smell, then by what and whomshould one see, then by what and whom should onehear, then by what and to whom should one speak,then by what and on whom should one think, then bywhat and whom should one understand? By what


30/192


should one know that by which all this is known? Bywhat, my dear, should one know the knower?7

In the case of Chndogya, because of its, shall we say,cyclical view of absorption and emergence of human beingsfrom Brahman, in contrast to the linear view of human beingsbeing progressively reborn till release is attained, the diffi-culties seem to arise from the fact that one in some sensemerges into Brahman in deep sleep, and hence the issue of re-emergence comes to the fore. The issue in the Bhadrayakahas soteriological overtones. In the Chndogyait possesses on-tological overtones. ChndogyaVIII.3.2 reads:

2. But those of ones (fellows) whether they are aliveor whether they have departed and whatever else onedesires but does not get, all this one finds by going inthere (into ones own self); for here, indeed, are thosetrue desires of his with a covering of what is false.Just as those who do not know the field walk againand again over the hidden treasure of gold and do notfind it, even so all creatures here go day after day intothe Brahma-world and yet do not find it, for they arecarried away by untruth.8

The reference to a daily visit to the Brahma-world iswidely acknowledged as a reference to sleep.9 The issue ofthe comparison of sleep in the two Upaniads may now bepressed a little further.

There are some similarities between the BU and theChU accounts. Both teach that the purua/tman, freefrom sorrow or flaw, is the basis of changing states.They also concur that dreams are less conditioned thanwaking, and that deep sleep is free from any limita-tions at all. However the BUs serenely restful sleepbecomes going to destruction in the ChU. The BUexplicitly says that the self in sleep possesses inde-structibility (avinitva), although it sees no other (BU


31/192


IV.3.23.). Seeing no other suggests to Indra that oneisgone to destruction.

. . . Whereas the non-duality of deep sleep andthe bliss of self-knowledge are one in the BU, theyare clearly separated in the Chndogya. Something morepositive than mere non-duality is desired in the ChU;deep sleep is pure, but also seems ignorant of thehighest reality. As we shall see, later advaitins divergeon the BU and ChU interpretations.10

This does not take long. Gauapda (with the ChU) holdsthat sleep primarily indicates ignorance; akara (with theBU and the MU) emphasizes the bliss aspect. None, how-ever, disputes the idea that sleep has a special status, in someway closer to the eternal flawless self than waking anddream.11

One salient fact stands out for special notice in the dis-cussion of deep sleep in Advaita in the earliest Upaniads,namely, that finally the state of deep sleep is identified neitherwith annihilation nor liberation. There is a stage in the progres-sive teaching in the Chndogya(VIII.11.23) when a tentativeidentification with annihilation does occur, but even there itconstitutes only one of the two interpretations of sleep; it isthe identification of the selfwith deep sleep that is objected toas indicative of an unsatisfactory concept of the self:

1. When a man is asleep, composed, serene, and knowsno dream, that is the self, said he, that is the immortal,the fearless. That is Brahman. Then he went forth withtranquil heart. Even before reaching the gods he sawthis danger. In truth this one does not know himselfthat I am he, nor indeed the things here. He hasbecome one who has gone to annihilation. I see nogood in this.

2. He came back again with fuel in hand to him. Praj-patisaid, Desiring what, O Maghavan, have you comeback, since you went away with a tranquil heart? Thenhe said, Venerable Sir, in truth this one does not know


32/192


himself that I am he, nor indeed the things here. Hehas become one who has gone to annihilation. I see nogood in this.12

In the Bhadrayaka Upaniad, when the nondual nature ofdeep sleep is explained by Yjavalkya to Janaka, Janaka doesnot object to his description, part of which is cited below.

27. Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) hedoes not hear, he is, verily, hearing, though he doesnot hear, for there is no cessation of the hearing of ahearer, because of the imperishability (of the hearer).There is not, however, a second, nothing else separatefrom him which he could hear.

28. Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) hedoes not think, he is, verily, thinking, though he doesnot think, for there is no cessation of the thinking of

a thinker, because of the imperishability (of thethinker). There is not, however, a second, nothing elseseparate from him of which he could think.

29. Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) hedoes not touch, he is, verily, touching, though he doesnot touch, for there is no cessation of the touching ofa toucher, because of the imperishability (of thetoucher). There is not, however, a second, nothing elseseparate from him which he could touch.

30. Verily, when there (in the state of deep sleep) hedoes not know, he is, verily, knowing though he doesnot know for there is no cessation of the knowing ofa knower, because of the imperishability (of theknower). There is not, however, a second, nothing elseseparate from him which he could know.

31. Verily, when there is, as it were, another there onemight see the other, one might smell the other, onemight taste the other, one might speak to the other,


33/192


one might hear the other, one might think of the other,one might touch the other, one might know the other.13

The existence of a knower is never questioned, nor thefactof consciousness, although consciousness cannot manifest itselfas the consciousness of another. In the description of nondualliberation however, when Yjavalkya tells his beloved wifeMaitrey in the Bhadrayaka Upaniad(IV.5.14) that in the lib-erated state there is no consciousness, she is bewildered.

13. As a mass of salt is without inside, without out-side, is altogether, a mass of taste, even so, verily, isthis Self without inside, without outside, altogether amass of intelligence only. Having arisen out of theseelements (the Self) vanishes again in them. When hehas departed there is no more (separate or particular)consciousness. Thus, verily, say I, said Yjavalkya.Particular consciousness is due to association withelements; when this association is dissolved throughknowledge, knowledge of oneness is obtained andparticular consciousness disappears.

14. Then Maitrey said: Here, indeed, Venerable Sir,you have caused me to reach utter bewilderment.Indeed, I do not at all understand this (the Self). Hereplied, I do not say anything bewildering. This Self,verily, is imperishable and of indestructible nature.14

Two further points deserve to be specially noted in rela-tion to sleep in the Bhadrayaka Upaniad. Although we havefocused primarily on Yjavalkyas understanding of the phe-nomenon of sleep, it contains another account that in someways is closer to the Chndogya. It may be described as consti-tuting Ajtaatrus understanding of the nature of deep sleep,as distinguished from Yjavalkyas. In Bhadrayaka.1.1619:

Ajtaatru asks Grgya where the person (purua, theinternal vital force) who consists of awareness (vijna-maya) goes when sleeping. Grgya does not know, so


34/192


Ajtaatru explains that when sleeping, the personwithdraws his sense-functions and rests in the spacewithin the heart. When the senses are indrawn, so arethe vital breath (pra) and mental activity.

Then Ajtaatru describes how the puruamovesin dream with his senses indrawn. He becomes like abrahmin or a great king who goes around his owncountry as he pleases. Just like this, the purua (withhis senses) goes around in the body as he pleases.When the person reaches deep sleep (suupta), heknows nothing and moves through internal channels(hita), coming to rest near the heart. He rests as thegreat king or brahmin would, having reached theextreme oblivion (atighn) of bliss.

In this account of dream and deep sleep, we firstfind the senses indrawn and thepuruamoving aroundin the body. Then there is deep rest and no knowledgeat all. It is important to note that this oblivion is equatedwith bliss, rather than dullness or mere quiescence.15

By way of contrast, and this is the second point:

Yjavalkya describes thepuruas end as without fearor flaw and beyond desire. Embraced by the fullyconscious self (prajna tman), thepuruaknows noth-ing inside or out (or perhaps perceives nothing while

knowing all). The embrace of the self ends all sor-row and want. As we shall see, the puruas conditionnow is much like later descriptions of the self in sleep:desireless, dreamless, and knowing nothing. This qui-escence is bliss.

The passage concludes by discussing the natureof thepuruas seeing. While not seeing as one doesin waking state, thepuruasees eternally. This higherseeing could not be destroyed (avini), and is withouta second; there is no other to be seen (smelled, heard,or discriminated, etc.). Sensing another is not possiblefor the seer (dra) is one non-dual ocean. Reachingthis end is the highest goal (path, world), and greatest


35/192


bliss. Thus, this eternal seeing is a possible startingpoint for the concept of turya.16

The turyastate is the fourth state, constituting liberation,beyond the three states of waking, dreaming and deep sleep.

The point is important: Jnadoes not vary even in deepsleep: the knowing of the knower is never destroyed.17

Three other Upaniads, assigned to a period after theBhadrayakaand the Chndogya, may now be examined forthe light they shed on the question of sleep, namely, the Prana,Kautak, and Maitr Upaniads. In the Prana Upaniad, theclose association of sleep with bliss and the Supreme Self isstated as follows (IV.6.7.911):

When he is overcome with light, then in this state, thegod (mind) sees no dreams. Then here in his bodyarises this happiness.

Even as birds, O dear, resort to a tree for a resting-place, so does everything here resort to the SupremeSelf. They all find their rest in the Supreme Self.

He, verily, is the seer, the toucher, the hearer, thesmeller, the taster, the perceiver, the knower, the doer,the thinking self, the person. He becomes establishedin the Supreme Undecaying Self.

He who knows the shadowless, bodiless, colourless,pure, undecaying self attains verily, the Supreme,Undecaying (self). He who, O dear, knows thus be-comes omniscient, (becomes) all. As to this, there is thisverse: He who knows that Undecaying (self) in whichare established the self of the nature of intelligence, thevital breaths and the elements along with all the gods

(powers) becomes, O dear, omniscient and enters all.18

By contrast, in the Kautaktheprja tmanis mentionedand Kautaki III.3 equates the prja tman with the praand says that in deep sleep a person becomes one withpra.19


36/192


The pattern of relationships that finally gains consensusin Advaita differs somewhat from these and finds a clearenunciation in the MaitrUpaniad.

He who sees with the eye, who moves in dreams, whois sound asleep and he who is beyond the soundsleeper, these are a persons four distinct conditions.Of these the fourth is greater than the rest. Brahmanwith one quarter moves in the three and with three-quarters in the last. For the sake of experiencing thetrue and the false the great self has a dual nature, yea,the great self has a dual nature.20

Andrew Fort remarks on this passage as follows:

Reference to gvedaX.90 is unmistakable here, but theVedic scheme is reversed. The RVs one quarter ofbrahman which is the sphere of all beings here be-

comes three states, while the RVs three divine quar-ters are included within the Maitris turya. Thus,proportions are inverted, and emphasis is laid on con-sciousness states, particularly the one which is beyondand greater than the other three. The Upaniads finalline then indicates that the three-in-one and on-in-threereveal the selfs dual nature: one andmany.

The primary motive seems to be to update the

Vedic catupdascheme with more recent conceptions ofa non-dual and blissful self underlying ever-changingstates, while at the same time giving this new concep-tion Vedic sanction. We also notice an implicit answer toIndra in ChU VIII: there is a fourth state beyond andgreater than deep sleep. Other than containing threequarters of brahman, this fourth remains uncharacterized(and later is said to be uncharaterizable).21

Deep sleep finds a clearly established and distinguishedplace in the catupdadoctrine, as enunciated in theMkyaUpaniad, to be discussed later. The scheme in Maitrcloselyresembles the one found in Mkya. The key point to note


37/192


in all this is that there are no references to the MU or to thecatupdadoctrine, in the Brahmastraor in the Bhagavadgt.22

The last two, along with the Upaniads, constitute the triplecanon of Advaita Vednta. Hence the significance of thepresent discussion regarding the location of deep sleep in thecatupdadoctrine, of which theMkya Upaniadis said toprovide the most systematic formulation.

TheMkyasdescription of the states of conscious-ness shows continuity with earlier Upaniadic con-ceptions. The waking sphere is limited to cognizinggross and external things. Dreaming is a little closer toself-knowledge, for one then cognizes subtle and in-ternal things. Waking and dreaming are structurallysimilar howevera point which Gauapda takespains to elaborate (GK II.115).

The structural similarity of the first two quartersbreaks down in the sleep sphere. As in earlier texts,sleep is linked with bliss and unified consciousness. Itis clearly the most enjoyable and worthy of attaining.The self now becomes the omniscient ruler, the innercontroller, and the one womb of all. Sleeps auspi-cious qualities here are far different from a conceptionof sleep as dullness and mere lack of awareness.

Finally, the fourth goes far beyond the first three

quarters. A series of negations is the only appropriatedescription. The fourth is the ground of existence andawareness but, in the M U, this does not entail posi-tive attributesthey are left behind in deep sleep. Onewonders whether or not Indra (ChU VIII) would findany satisfaction here either.23

There is general agreement among the Upaniads such as

Bhadrayaka, Chndogya, Prana (IV.6), Kautak (III.8), etc.,that, so far as deep sleep itself is concerned, there are withinit no distinctions whatever of knowing subject and knownobject, and one is not conscious of what is without, or whatis within. In fact the very notions of without and withinhave no meaning when all empirical distinctions vanish in


38/192


the state of sleep. This is what is meant when it is said that insleep there is loss of objective consciousness. Thus it is gener-ally agreed that, in deep sleep, there is no duality. There isone undivided consciousness which is of the nature of bliss.24

On the basis of the experience of deep sleep, however,Advaita also draws certain conclusions about the nature ofthe self. It may be possible to agree with the description oreven the assessment of the experience of deep sleep qua ex-perience as it is presented in Advaitabut there is room fordifference of opinion when Advaita speculates about thenature of the self on the basis of this experience, as when itis claimed that the sleeper attains temporary union withthe . . . pure witness-self;25or that in sleep the selfis beyonddesires, free from evil, and fearless.26 The one who sleepsshares in these features of deep sleep but the attribution ofthese to the self raises the question whether the attributionof the features of sleep to the self is legitimate. Similarly, it isclaimed that in the state of deep sleep the self is realized tobe relationless . . . In that state the self sees and yet does notsee. There is no seeing of objects, but sightremains. The sightof the seer is never lost because it is imperishable. Just as thepresence of the objects is revealed by the self, their absencetoo is revealed by it.27It is further claimed that Conscious-ness per seneither rises nor sets. It is self-luminous. That theself is non-dual consciousness is evident from the experience of

sleep. There is then no other besides it which it could see.28

Whether such deductions about the nature of self from thenature of deep sleep are valid remains a moot point.

A further specifically Advaitin association is made inMkya6 about the self in deep sleep, namely, that Thisis the lord of all, this is the knower of all, this is the innercontroller; this is the source of all; this is the beginning andthe end of being.29

The words used: sarvevara, sarvaja, antarym are thenames used for God or Ivara in Hindu thought. Thus hereina cosmic identification seems to have been made, just a stepremoved from the tman= Brahman identity. As the self indeep sleep is called prja, one might call this the prja =Ivara identification.


39/192


I think the Upaniads perform a great service in drawingphilosophical attention to the uniquenessof the experience ofdeep sleep. In a way each statewaking, dreamingas well asdeep sleepis unique; but deep sleep falls in a class apart, asit calls the subject-object distinction experientially into ques-tion. It is unique and yet a universal experience. Without itone would be hard put to establish the credibility of a stateof consciousness of which one is not conscious while in it.However, some of the conclusions drawn on the basis of theexperience of deep sleep need to be critically examined.

(1) The tendency to identify the state of nonduality indeep sleep with that of non-dual Realization is worth remark-ing. There is an occasional tendency to do so, even in theUpaniads, as in Chndogya VI.8.2 also cited earlier: ThenUddlaka rui said to his son, vetaketu, learn from me,my dear, the true nature of sleep. When a person here sleeps,as it is called, then, my dear, he has reached pure being. Hehas gone to his own. Therefore they say he sleeps for he hasgone to his own.30Modern scholarship is also not immunefrom this tendency. For instance, M. Hiriyanna, while pre-senting the role of reason in Advaita Vednta, declares: TheUpanishads themselves declare that when a person has seenthis truth for himself, he outgrows the need for the scriptures.There a father becomes no father; a mother, no mother; theworld, no world; the gods, no gods; the Vedas, no Vedas. 31

He is cautious to note, after acknowledging the source asBhadrayaka UpaniadIV.iii.22 that this passage, no doubt,refers to deep sleep; but adds that mokais, in this respect,only a replica of deep sleep.32K. Satchidananda Murty writes:akara unhesitatingly states that when the final truth ofnon-dualism is realized, there will be no perception; for theVeda also would become non-existent then.33 Murty citesakaras gloss on Brahmastra IV.1.3 in support as did

Hiriyanna, but he alsoadds in support BhadrayakaIV.3.33:yatra ved aved without clarifying that the context here isone of deep sleep and not realization.34Even akara himself,it seems, has applied this expression to the state of enlighten-ment.35He may be justified in doing so, but this complicates


40/192


the issue when one is trying to distinguish between deepsleep and enlightenment.

(2) It is claimed on the basis of experience of deep sleepthat consciousness is self-luminous. But Citsukha, an Advaitinof the thirteenth century and author of Tattvapradpik, definesself-luminosity as the capacity of being called immediatelyknown in empiricalusage while not being an object of cogni-tion.36In deep sleep there is no object of cognition. Hence, inthissense, the state of deep sleep, one could claim, would notcorrespond to empirical usage. Nor is the state immediatelyknown, in the conventional sense, as there is no knowledgeof it as such at the time. All this raises grave doubts about theclaim of self-luminosity in relation to deep sleep, despite theassertion in Vidyrayas Pacada that it illustrates the self-revealing nature of the non-dual.37 It is certainly not self-revealing in the usual sense. This point regarding theself-luminosity as defined earlier should be carefully distin-guished from the claim that consciousness in some way oranother characterises all the three states of waking, dream-ing, and dreamless sleep.

In different ways the Advaitin establishes the supremereality of a transcendental principle of pure conscious-ness, which, though always untouched and unattachedin its own nature, is yet the underlying principle which

can explain all the facts of our experience. Vidyrayain his Paca-da states that there is no moment whenthere is no consciousness whether in our awakenedstates or dreams or in our dreamless condition. Evenin dreamless sleep there is consciousness for later weremember the experience of the dreamless state.38

This claim, however, is of another kind and not on all

fours with the one made earlier.(3) It has been claimed that the state of the self in dreamlesssleep is that of the pure subject, that of sk.39Some may regardit as a state in which a subject exists per se but without an object,perhaps on the basis of passages from the Bhadrayaka cited


41/192


earlier. But the experience of deep sleep rather seems to indi-cate the disappearance of boththe subject and the object. In thiscontext the following remarks by M. Hiriyanna help consoli-date the earlier observations and confirm the present one:

In this state, described as suupti, the manas as wellas the senses is quiescent and there is consequently acessation of normal or empirical consciousness. Thereis no longer any contrasting of one object with an-other or even of the subject with the object, and theembodied self is then said to attain a temporary unionwith the Absolute. As however suupti is not identifiedwith the state of release, this statement has to be un-derstood negativelyas only signifying that the con-sciousness of individuality is absent at the time thoughthe individual himself continues to be, as shown bythe sense of personal identity connecting the statesbefore and after sleep. It is not a state of blank orabsolute unconsciousness either, for some sort ofawareness is associated with it. It is not, however, theobjectless knowing subject that endures in it, as it is some-times stated; for along with the object, the subject also assuch disappears then. It is rather a state of non-reflectiveawareness, if we may so term it. This state is above alldesire and is therefore described as one of unalloyedbliss.40

It may be useful to draw a parallel here between sleep andsamdhiand to indicate that those who admit to an objectlessknowing subject in deep sleep are in a sense talking of sa-vikalpa suupti (or deep sleep), and those who maintain thatboth subject and object disappear in deep sleep are talkingabout nir-vikalpa suupti in the light of the following passage.

The Self is experienced as the Absolute Reality in thestate of turya. It is raised above the distinction ofsubject and object. In suupti or deep sleep, the em-pirical mind with all its modes is inactive. In sa-vikalpasamdhi the mind is concentrated on one object with


42/192


which it becomes identified. In it we have the con-sciousness of determinate reality. The consciousnessof duality is absent in this state and the self enjoysundifferenced bliss. In both these states the seeds ofknowledge and action, vidy and karma, are present.In nir-vikalpa samdhi we have the intuition of realitytranscending all determinations. This is the higheststage, the truth, Brahman.41

(4) The identification of prja, or the self in deep sleep,with Ivara, seems to be problematical. The problem arisesfrom the fact that obscuration or varaa is the basic featureof deep sleep. Indeed, one way of distinguishing it from wak-ing-cum-dreaming is to say that in their case vikepahas alsobecome operationalvaraaand vikepabeing associated withmy as its two aktisor powers. Now it should be remem-bered that in his strabhyaakara has said that God alone

is free from varaa doa (the defect of obscuration of theintellect), while individuals are not.42If this be so, then thereis a major reservation that must be kept in mind if prja isequated with Ivara. The distinction between vara andjvain this respect is explained at some length by akara in hiscommentary on the Thirteenth Chapter of the Bhagavadgt.

Now as to the objections that Ivara would be asasrin if He be one with Kshetraja, and that ifKshetrajas be one with Ivara there can be no sasrabecause there is no sasrin: these objections havebeen met by saying that knowledge and ignorance aredistinct in kind and in effects, as admitted by allToexplain: The Real Entity (viz., Ivara) is not affectedby the defect (sasra) attributed to Him through ig-norance of that Real Entity. This has also been illus-trated by the fact that the water of the mirage doesnot wet the saline soil. And the objection raised on theground that in the absence of a sasrin there can beno sasra has been answered by explaining that thesasra and the sasrin are creatures of avidy.


43/192


(Objection):The very fact that Kshetraja is pos-sessed of avidy makes Him a sasrin; and the ef-fect thereofunhappiness and misery and so onisdirectly perceived.

(Answer): No; for, what is perceived is an attributeof Kshetra (matter); and Kshetraja, the cogniser, can-not be vitiated by the blemishnot inhering inKshetrajayou ascribe to Him, it comes under thecognised, and therefore forms a property of Kshetra,and not a property of Kshetraja. Nor is Kshetrajaaffected by it, since such intimate association of thecogniser and the cognised is impossible. If there shouldbe such an association, then that blemish could not becognised. That is to say, if misery and nescience wereproperties of the Self, how could they be objects ofimmediate perception? Or, how could they ever byregarded as the properties of the Self? Since it hasbeen determined that all that is knowable is Kshetra(xiii.56), and that Kshetraja is the knower and noneelse (xiii.1), it is nothing but sheer ignorance whichmay lead one to contradict it by saying that nescienceand misery and the like are the attributes and specificproperties of Kshetraja and that they are immedi-ately perceived as such.43

It could still be argued that since, according to one inter-pretation of tat tvam asi, jvacan be equated with Ivara, thereshould be no hesitation in equating prja with Ivara. Toexamine this point let us follow the logic by which jva isequated with Ivara when tattvamasiis interpreted in this light.

The finite adjunct of the individual self is sometimesdesignated as avidy to contrast it with the cosmic Mayaof the qualified Brahman. In this view, Maya is thewhole of which the many avidys, associated with theindividual selves, are parts or phases. Just as the wholeuniverse is the effect of Maya, the portions of theuniverse which constitute the accompaniments of an


44/192


individual self, like the physical body and the internalorgan, are regarded as derived from the avidy of thatparticular self. Whatever distinction there appears tobe between the ego and the qualified Brahman orbetween one ego and another, is entirely due to thesediffering adjuncts. In themselves, the egos are notdistinct from one another or from the qualified Brah-man. This identity of denotation of the two terms,jvaand the qualified Brahman, while their connotationsare different, is the Advaitic interpretation of Thatthou art (Tat tvam asi). It does not mean, as it is sooften represented to do, that man and the qualifiedBrahman or God (to use a term which we shall soonexplain) are as such one. Such an attitude is as blas-phemous, according to Advaita, as it is according toany religion or purely theistic doctrine.44

The equation ofprjawith Ivara will have to steer clearof the last pitfall. If jva without adjuncts equals Brahman

without adjuncts, then jva in any statewaking, dreaming,or deep sleepcould be equated with vara while impli-cated in all of these states.

II

The Brahmastra, the Upaniads, and the Bhagavadgt, consti-tute the triple foundation of Vednta.45One may therefore turnnext to the Brahmastrafor its teachings regarding deep sleep.

The part of the Brahmastra that concerns us is the onewhich deals with the soul as intelligence. It is claimed, inaphorism III.3.18, that the soul is of the nature of intelligence.This invites the immediate objection that as the soul doesnot remain intelligent in the states of sleep, swoon, and wesay when we wake up from sleep that we are not consciousof anything, it is clear that intelligence is intermittent and soadventitious only.46 The Advaitin answer to this questionruns along the following lines:


45/192


Even in sleep persons have intelligence. For if intelli-gence were non-existent in sleep, the individual couldnot say that he did not know anything in deep sleep.The absence of objects is mistaken for the absence ofintelligence even as the light pervading space is notapparent owing to the absence of things to be illumi-nated and not to the absence of its own nature.47

In the discussion of aphorisms II.3.3031 in this section avery important point emergesan issue that had surfaced inthe discussion of the Upaniadic material earlier. In order tograsp its full significance the concept ofantakaraain Advaitaphysiology and psychology needs to be understood. It broadlycorresponds to the idea of the mind and the various functionsit performs. It is often translated as the internal organ. Its rolein the overall context is explained in the comment byRadhakrishnan on I.3.32 as follows:

If the internal organ (anta-karaa) of which the intel-lect is a mode is not accepted, then as the senses arealways in contact with their objects, there would re-sult the perception of every thing as the requisites ofthe soul, the senses and objects are present. If this isdenied, then there can be no knowledge and nothingwould ever be known. The opponent will have toaccept the limitation of either the soul or the senses.The self is changeless. The power of the senses whichis not impeded either in the previous moment or inthe subsequent moment cannot be limited in themiddle. We have therefore to accept an internal organthrough whose connection and disconnection, percep-tion and non-perception result. We find texts whichsay: I am absent-minded. I did not hear it. B.U.I.5.3.So there is an internal organ of which intellect is a modeand it is the connection of the self with this that causesindividuation in sasra.48

Now one is in a position to revert to earlier aphorism,that if the soul and intellect are distinct entities they could


46/192


separate. This is countered by aphorism II.3.30. It is clearfrom the Upaniads that their conjunction lasts as long asthe soul continues to be an individual and [until] its igno-rance is not destroyed by the realisation of knowledge. Thisis evident from the Scriptures.49

It could, however, be argued that no such connection ismanifest in deep sleep. To this, II.3.31 provides an answer: thatit existspotentiallyin that state of deep sleep just as virility oradulthood is potentiallypresent in the state of childhood:

If the objection is raised that in suupti, or deep sleep,there is no connection with the intellect (see C.U.VI.8.1)and so it is wrong to say that the connection lasts aslong as the individualised state exists, the answer isgiven in this strathat even in the state of deep sleepthe connection exists in a potential form. Were it notso, it could not have become manifest in the awak-ened state. See B.U.VI.8.2 and 3. Virility becomes

manifest in youth because it exists in a potential con-dition in the child.50

It must be borne in mind that while individuality ceases insleep, the individual does not, and that while the intellect becomeslatent, the Self remains patent, in the sense that some form ofawareness must be presumed to continue in deep sleep, oth-erwise one could not subsequently be aware that one was

unaware in deep sleep.

III

The Bhagavadgt does not directly refer to deep sleep, but itdoes contain allusions to elements associated with it. Forinstance, in X.20 Arjuna is addressed asgukea,as also ear-lier in I.24. W. D. P. Hill observes, regarding this epithet, thatancient commentators derive the name fromgukaand alord of sleep. But the former word is obscure, and in anycase there seems to be no good reason for applying such anepithet to Arjuna. A suggested derivation is from gu andkea.51 A lexicographical investigation produces interesting


47/192


results. Monier Monier-Williams cites the word asgukaandconsiders it a word formed for the etymology ofgu-kea,52

while V. S. Apte provides two meanings of guka: (1) slothand (2) sleep, without connecting it with the word gukea,which is subsequently cited but which is taken to mean thick-haired and noted as an epithet of both Arjuna and iva.53Interestingly, akara provides two interpretations of the wordin his gloss on X.20: (1) one who has conquered sleep or (2)thick-haired, and Hill remarks that akara here gives analternative explanation (ghanakea) which modern scholarshipapproves.54

In terms of traditional explanation, then, the word shouldbe taken asguka, and although obscure, it does make sensein two ways. Ifgukais taken to mean sloth, it would alludeto the physical agility of Arjuna; and if taken to mean sleep,and sleep is taken to mean ignorance, then it would complimentArjuna on his mental alertness. In either case, however, itdoes not do much to improve our understanding of the natureof deep sleep in Advaita Vednta.

There is one verse in the Gt, however, which may besaid to advance it, through akaras commentary on it. It iscited below:

II.69. What is night to all beings, therein the self-controlled one is awake. Where all beings are awake,that is the night of the sage who sees.

To all beings the Supreme Reality is night. Nightis by nature tamasic, and, as such, causes confusion ofthings. The Reality is accessible only to a man of steadyknowledge. Just as what is day to others becomes nightto night-wanderers, so, to all beings, who are ignorantand who correspond to the night-wanderers, the Su-preme Reality is dark, is like night; for it is not acces-sible to those whose minds are not in It. With referenceto that Supreme Reality, the self-restrained Yogin whohas subdued the senses, and who has shaken off thesleep of Avidy (nescience), is fully awake. When allbeings are said to be awake, i.e., when all beings, whoin reality sleep in the night of ignorance, imbued with


48/192


the distinct notions of perceiver and things perceived,are as it were dreamers in sleep at night,that state isnight in the eye of the sage who knows the SupremeReality; for it is nescience itself.

Works are not meant of the Sage.

Wherefore works are enjoined on the ignorant, noton the wise. Wisdom (Vidy) arising, nescience(Avidy) disappears as does the darkness of the nightat sunrise. Before the dawn of wisdom, nescience pre-sents itself in various formsas actions, means, andresults,is regarded as authoritative, and becomes thesource of all action. When it is regarded as of no au-thority, it cannot induce action. A man engages inaction regarding it as his dutyregarding that actionas enjoined by such an authority as the Veda, but notlooking upon all this duality as mere illusion, as thoughit were night. When he has learnt to look upon all thisdual world as a mere illusion, as though it were night,when he has realised the Self, his duty consists not inthe performance of action, but in the renunciation ofall action. Our Lord will accordingly show (v.17 etseq.) that such a mans duty consists in devotion towisdom, in jna-nishtha.

(Objection):In the absence of an injunction (Pra-vartaka prama = vidhi) one cannot have recourse tothat course either.

(Answer):This objection does not apply; for theknowledge of Atman means that knowledge of onesown Self. There is indeed no need of an injunctionimpelling one to devote oneself to ones Atman forthe very reason that Atman is ones own very Self.And all organs of knowledge (pramas) are so calledbecause they ultimately lead to a knowledge of theSelf. When the knowledge of the true nature of theself has been attained, neither organs of knowledgenor objects of knowledge present themselves to con-sciousness any longer. For, the final authority, (viz.,


49/192


the Veda), teaches that the Self is in reality no percipi-ent of objects, and while so denying, (i.e., as a resultof that teaching), the Veda itself ceases to be an au-thority in the waking state. In ordinary experience,too, we do not find any organ of knowledge necessi-tating further operation (on the part of the knower)when once the thing to be perceived by that organ hasbeen perceived.55

The following aspects of this commentary command at-tention. (1) Night is identified with tamas; (2) sleep is identifiedwith avidy; (3) vidy removes avidy, as sun removes the dark-ness of the night; (4) tman is self-evident; and (5) Veda-knowledge is part of the dream (which is part of the night), andthis Veda-knowledge also disappears like a dream upon awak-ening. A good section of the gloss is devoted to akaras favor-ite view that action and knowledge are mutually opposed.

The importance of this passage lies in the fact that itsubstitutes a two-tier sleep-awake metaphysicaldistinction forthe triple stream of consciousness as an existentialdistinction,dreaming being included in sleep, which, here, connotes ig-norance per se as opposed to the knowledge of Brahman. Theunrealized beings live in ignorance of Brahman and in thisstate undergo the three states of waking, dreaming, and deepsleep; in fact waking becomes like dreaming, and the distinc-tion between the two can get blurred; and even more so be-tween sleeping and dreaming. That is why akara refers tothe knowledge of the Veda as svapnakla-pramam iva prabodhe.According to R. C. Zaehner this knowledge of the jan istwelvefold in content, depending on the understanding of thenature of the seeing in payato:

(i) seeing the self (2.29); (ii) seeing the highest (2.59and n.); (iii) seeing inactivity in action (i.e. the eternalin the temporal) (4.18); (iv) seeing all beings in the self(4.35: 6.29); (v) seeing all beings in God (4.35: 6.30);(vi) seeing that Skhya and Yoga (theory and prac-tice) are one (5.5); (vii) seeing self in self (6.20: 13.24);


50/192


(viii) seeing self in all beings (6.29); (ix) seeing Godeverywhere (6.30: 1327); (x) seeing the same every-where (6.32: 13. 3728); (xi) seeing self as not being anagent (13.29: 18.16); (xii) seeing self in transmigration(15.10) and as established in the [empirical] self (15.11).56

There are two curious references in Talks with Sri RamanaMaharshi that involve reference to both the Bhagavadgt andto sleep. In the first case, Ramaa says at one point in hisexposition to Bhagavadgt II.12:

If Self is (nitya) always and (siddha) present, how canthere be ajnana? For whom is the ajnana? These arecontradictory. But such statements are for guiding theearnest seeker in the right way. He does not readilyunderstand the only Truth if mentioned in plain wordsas in natwam naham neme janadhipah (not thou, norI, nor these kings . . .). Sri Krishna declared the Truth,but Arjuna could not grasp it. Later Krishna plainlysays that people confound Him with the body, whereasin reality He was not born nor will He die. Still Arjunarequires the whole Gita for the Truth to be made clearto him.

Look, the Self is only Be-ing, not being this orthat. It is simple Being. Beand there is an end of theignorance. Enquire for whom is the ignorance. The egoarises when you wake up from sleep. In deep sleep you donot say that you are sleeping and that you are going towake up or that you have been sleeping so long. But stillyou are there. Only when you are awake you say that youhave slept. Your wakefulness comprises sleep also in it.57

This last sentence seems to restore the inversion of II.69.The second case is provided by the following extract.

The sleep, dream, samadhi, etc., are all states of theajnanis. The Self is free from all these. Here is theanswer for the former question also.


51/192


D.: I sought to know the state of sthita prajnata(unshaken knowledge).

M.: The sastras are not for the jnani. He has nodoubts to be cleared. The riddles are for ajnanis only.The sastras are for them alone.

D.: Sleep is the state of nescience and so it is said ofsamadhi also.

M.: Jnana is beyond knowledge and nescience.There can be no question about that state. It is theSelf.58

The possibility of the equation of samdhiand nescienceseems to arise on account of the undifferentiated nature ofthe two experiences, but they should not be confused no morethan being blind and being blindfolded may be confused.Ramaas remark is reminiscent of Bhagavadgt XI.12 thatBrahman is neither satnot asat(but that which illumines both).Moreover, although from an empirical point of view sleepand samdhimay afford some parallels, the perspectives di-verge radically from a transcendental point of view. In factRamaa cites from Bhagavadgt II.69 in order to make thispoint to the lady who

protested that dream and sleep do not make any ap-peal to her. She was asked why then she should becareful about her bed unless she courted sleep.

She said that it was for relaxation of the exhaustedlimbs, rather a state of auto-intoxication. The sleepstate is really dull, whereas the waking state is full ofbeautiful and interesting things.

M.: What you consider to be filled with beautifuland interesting things is indeed the dull and ignorantstate of sleep according to the Jnani:

Ya nisha sarva bhootanam tasyam jagrati samyami.The wise one is wide awake just where darkness

rules for others.You must certainly wake up from the sleep which

is holding you at present.59


52/192

3

Sleep in Mkyakrik

I

One leading Advaitin thinker who preceded akara isGauapda (seventh century), whose kriks or commentarialverses on theMkya Upaniad1have long enjoyed a specialstatus in Advaita.2In fact that Upaniad itself, despite its brevity,is regarded by many within the Advaitic tradition as contain-ing its quintessence.3The basic teaching of the Upaniad maybe summarized as follows:

Then the Upaniad proceeds to describe the three statesof experience. In the state of waking the self consortswith the objects of sense which are external, and itsenjoyments are gross. In dreams it revels in a world ofimages, and its experience is subtle. In sleep there areno desires nor dreams; the self becomes one, withoutthe distinction of seer and seen. It is then a mass ofsentience and remains as bliss enjoying bliss. The self

of the three states is designated respectively as Vaiv-nara, Taijasa and Prja. The fourth, Turya Prja whichis the real self, is beyond the changing modes of exist-ence. It is not caught in the triple stream of waking,dream and sleep, though it is their underlying substrate.

41


53/192


It is invisible; it is not the content of empirical usage; itcannot be grasped; it does not have identifying marks;it is unthinkable and unnameable; it is the one self whichis the essence of consciousness; it is that in which theuniverse gets resolved; it is tranquil bliss which is non-dual. Thus through a series of negations supplementedby their positive implications, the Mkya teaches thereal nature of the self.4

It is clear that the state of dreamless sleep, designatedprja, plays a special role in this scheme, in that it is closestto the state of liberation. But while it is true that as prja, orin the state of dreamless sleep consciousness, the self is de-void of all distinctions, a characteristic of the highest realiza-tion, even here ignorance persists,5while turyaor the fourthstate is one untouched by ignorance.6 Turya is not themassed consciousness of the state of sleep.7It is a state ofunalloyed simple consciousness unaffected by experiences. Itis therefore prajna ghana, compacted whole and entire, likesugar candy compacted of sweetness all over.8

One may now develop the theme further by comparingthe position of the kriks, that is, Gauapdas own positionas it emerges through the commentary, with the position ofthe text, that is to say, the Mkya Upaniaditself. AndrewFort concludes that while there are differences of emphasisin the two texts, no fundamental philosophical disagreementexists.9 From the point of view of our study, however, thedifferences are nevertheless worth noting. Andrew Fort writes:

Regarding the states, Gauapda basically follows theMU position. Turya is the non-dual, pervasive sub-stratum of changing consciousness states. Yet he alsodescribes the fourth in more positive (and personal)terminology than does the MU: it is called ruler,mighty lord (10), and all-seeing (12). It seems to takeon the auspicious qualities attributed to the self in thedeep sleep in MU 6, while sleep becomes mere lackof knowledge. Gauapda also more clearly devalueswaking and dream.10


54/192

43Sleep inMkyakrik

There are two special features of Gauapdas treatmentof deep sleep as suchone physical and the other metaphysi-cal. The physical consists in his assigning an anatomical locusto theprja, or the self in deep sleep. Prjais assigned to theheart, or rather the ether or space of the heart (hdayka), justas viva, or the self in the waking state, is assigned to the righteye and taijasa, or self in the dreaming state, is assigned to themind. The following description of the self asprjais offered:

When memory also ceases and sleep supervenes, theself is said to retire into the ether of the heart. TheBhadrayaka says, When this person full of con-sciousness is asleep, at that time he absorbs the func-tions of the organs through his consciousness and liesin the ether which is in the heart. Here the term ether(ka) stands for the supreme self. The meaning isthat in sleep one returns to oneself. The assignment ofthe heart, again, is for the purpose of meditation.11

The second special point of Gauapdas treatment ofdeep sleep consists of the way in which he first spells out itsmetaphysical dimension and then integrates it with the exis-tential dimension. The metaphysical treatment of deep sleepis already anticipated by the Bhagavadgt and provides botha useful cue and a useful connection here:

The statement of Gauapda that in the same body,Viva, Taijasa and Prja are located is only a preludeto his metaphysical interpretation of the three states,jgrat (waking), svapna (dream), and suupti (sleep).From the metaphysical standpoint the real wakeful-ness is spiritual awakening (prabodha), the so-calledstate of waking which is empirical is on a par withdream, and sleep is ignorance of the self. What is asnight to the ignorant is as day to the wise; and whatis as day to the ignorant is as night to the wise. To theknowers of the self the world is non-real; to thosewho are deluded by nescience the self appears as ifnon-real.12


55/192


If we travel down the metaphysical road a little further,we find that what we call ignorance or avidy possesses twoproperties. It conceals the true nature of a thing, say of a ropeas rope or shell as shell. And it then makes it appear as otherthan what it isthus the rope is not only notperceived as arope, it is also misperceived as a snake; the shell is not onlynotperceived as a shell, it is misperceived as a piece of silver.Gauapda refers to the first process as tattvjna(ignoranceof the real) and to the second as anayath-grahaa(cognizingsomething other than what it is). Thus the processes of non-apprehensionand misapprehensionare connected. This distinc-tion is the key to the rest of his exposition: The former,according to him, is nidr or sleep (suupti), and the latter issvapnaor dream.12AThen he integrates this metaphysical un-derstanding with the physiological as follows: in sleep thereis only nonapprehension. Hence it corresponds to ajna(tattvjna). In waking and dream, however, there is alsoanayathgrahaa, in the form of other positive experiences.

If we now correlate the three avasthsas they are com-monly understood and the metaphysical sleep anddream, we shall find that in the state of waking thereare both dream and sleep, viz., misapprehension andnon-apprehension of the real, in the state of dream thereis sleep also, and in the state of sleep there is sleepalone. The metaphysical sleep continues throughouttransmigratory life. Its spell is broken only at the onsetof knowledge. When thejvawho sleeps on account ofthe beginningless my wakes up, he realizes the un-born, sleepless, dreamless, non-dual (Turya).13

In other words, there is metaphysical sleep in all the states,including that of physiological sleep. But these two are notidentical, because while from physiological sleep one rises ona daily basis, in the case of metaphysical sleep one continuesin it on a metempsychotic basis. That is to say: at one levelthere is only one Sleep from which there is only one Awak-ening. Within that Sleep is comprised the merry or not so


56/192

45Sleep inMkyakrik

merry-go-round of waking, dreaming, and sleeping. Or tolook at it in terms of Sleep: in it there is only dreamingwaking being a form of itbut there is an Awakening pos-sible from it.

II

In the next chapter akaras views on sleep will be exam-ined in some detail. He is, after all, the expositor of classicalAdvaita par excellence. Nevertheless it might be helpful, beforeone moves toward such a general presentation, to examinehis commentary on theMkyakrik on the subject of deepsleep. This will serve to facilitate the transition to the nextchapter. Moreover, it will also help broaden the treatment ofthe subject as a whole, especially if the comparison of hiscommentary on the Krik with the Krik itself enables oneto gain further insights into how different Advaitins haveapproached the phenomenon of deep sleep.

akaras treatment of the subject is striking in threerespects. At one point akara gives a new twist to the three-fold classification of the states into waking, dreaming, andsleeping by applying all three to the waking state itself!Andrew Fort notes:

akaras commentary on krik two takes a surpris-ing turn: he describes the experi

Sleep Indian Philosophy

Documents