sketch for a theory of the history of philosophyWhat I want to highlight at this point is only that a chronology of philosophy is the starting point for any history of philosophy.

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SketchforaTheoryoftheHistoryofPhilosophy

UriahKriegel

Myaimsinthisessayaretwo.First(§§1-4),Iwanttogetclearontheveryideaofatheoryofthehistoryofphilosophy,theideaofanoverarchingaccountoftheevolutionofphilosophicalreflectionsincetheinceptionofwrittenphilosophy.Andsecondly(§§5-8),Iwanttoactuallysketchsuchaglobaltheoryofthehistoryofphilosophy,whichIcallthetwo-streamstheory.

I. OntheVeryIdeaofATheoryoftheHistoryofPhilosophy

1.Historyvs.Chronology

Letusstartwiththedistinctionbetweenahistoryandachronology.Achronologyisanunstructuredlistofthingsthathappened–ormoreaccurately,aliststructuredonlytemporally,thatis,byearlier-than,simultaneous-with,andlater-thanrelations.Chronologieswereprominent,forinstance,inearlyGreekhistoriographyofthe6thand5thcenturiesBCE(thinkofHerodotus’Histories).Especiallywheninformationisscarce,chronologiesareextremelyvaluable.Buttheideaofahistoryconnotessomethingthatgoesbeyondachronology.Ahistoryisnotjustalistofevents,butanattemptatunderstandinglongitudinalprocessesofdevelopment(evolution)andbreakorturningpoints(revolutions).Thushistorygoesbeyondchronologyinincorporatinganelementoftheorizationorinterpretation–atbottom:anattemptatsense-making.Todoso,ittakesthe(nearly)unstructuredlistofeventsandimposessomestructureororganizationonit.Attheveryleast,itsupplementsthelist’stemporalstructurewithacausalstructure.

Onemightthinkofachronologyofphilosophyinanumberofways.Itcouldbealistofallphilosophers,alistofallphilosophicalideas,oralistofallphilosophicaltexts.Inpracticefocushasbeenonphilosophersasthestandardnodesin

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philosophicalchronologies.Thismakescertainsense:philosophicaltextsareonlyinterestinginsofarastheyexpressphilosophicalideas,andfragmentaryphilosophicalideascoalesceintosubstantivephilosophicalconceptions,typically,intheintellectsofindividualthinkers.Demarcatingwhatmakesagiventhinkeraphilosopher(orforthatmatterwhatmakesanideaortextphilosophical)isofcoursequitethechestnut,butletusbracketthisquestionhere.WhatIwanttohighlightatthispointisonlythatachronologyofphilosophyisthestartingpointforanyhistoryofphilosophy.Itgivesusthematerial,thedata,forhistoricaltheorizing.

Incurrenthistoriographyof(Western)philosophy,inpracticethisconsistsintwotypesofresearch,plusanoutlier.Thefirsttypeofresearchisworkonthecorrectinterpretationofanindividualthinker:WasBoethiusreallyanominalist?WhatdidLeibnizmeanwithhiscrypticbutfoundationalremarkthatthemonadshavenowindows?WhatexactlywasRussell’stheoryofjudgment?Theotherlineofresearchconcernsthe(re)discoveryofunknownorlesser-knownthinkersandinterpretationoftheirideas.Therecentflourishofresearchintonon-canonizedthinkers,oftenfemale,fallswithinthisline.WhowasGeorgeStoutandwhatwerehisdistinctivephilosophicalaccomplishments?WhowasMargaretCavendishandwhatexactlywasherpositiononthemind-bodyproblem?WhowasGersonidesandwhatwashisdistinctivecontributiontoJewishAverroism?Answerstosuchquestionsconstitutecontributionstowardanaccuratechronologyofphilosophy.Inaddition,andthisismoreofanoutlierinthehistoriographyofphilosophy,somehistoriansoccasionallyattempttosynthesizeothers’interpretiveworkintosomethinglikeaself-consciouschronology.IncurrentresearchthegoldstandardforthisisPeterAdamson’smasterfulseriesofbooksonthe“historyofphilosophywithoutanygaps.”

Onthebasisofchronologiesdevisedandrefinedthroughthesetypesofresearch,onemaythengoontotheorizeabouttheunfoldingovertimeofphilosophicalideas.Butwhatdoes“theorizing”onthehistoryofphilosophyconsistin?

2.WhatisaTheoryoftheHistoryofPhilosophy?

Modelingagainongeneralhistoriography,Iwishtodistinguishfourmainstagesofpotentialtheorizinginthehistoriographyofphilosophy.Theycorrespondto(i)singularcausation,(ii)processes,(iii)causallaws,and(iv)overallor“total”theory.

Givenacompletechronologyofthingsthathappened,onemightwishinthefirstinstancetoidentifyindividualcausallinksbetweentwoparticularevents.Thisissingularcausation:thethrowingoftherockcausedtheshutteringofthewindow,the

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crashcausedtheexplosion,andsoon.Identifyingindividualcausallinksisthefirststageofhistoricalsense-making.Thesecondstageistheidentificationofcertainchainsofsingular-causallinks.Wemaythinkofsequencesofsuchindividualcausallinksthatexhibittherightkindofinternalcohesionasprocesses,leadingnon-accidentallyfromastartpointtoanendpoint.Thisisprobablythelevelofanalysisthatcharacterizesmostcloselyacademichistorians’researchnowadays.

Athirdandmoreambitiousstageofhistoricaltheorizing,onethatdefinitelydoesnotcharacterizetypicalhistoriographicresearchthesedays,wouldattempttoidentifylawsofhistory.Wemovefromsingularcausationtocausallawswhenwenoticethattokeneventsexemplifyingcertainevent-typestendtocausetokeneventsthatexemplifyotherevent-types.Thecausallawlinkstheeventtypes:thethrowingofrocksofsuch-and-suchweighttendstocausetheshutteringofwindowsofsuch-and-suchdensity.Itishealthy,ofcourse,toapproachthehistoryofhumanitywithacertainskepticismabouttheveryexistenceofsuchlaws;butarguably,itiswiththeintroductionofsuchhistoricallaws,ifsuchtherebe,thathistorywouldearnitsstatusasascience(onthis,seeComte’sCours).Finally,wecanenvisage,evenmorespeculatively,thatthereisasingleunifiedstructuretohumanhistoryasawhole.ThisiswhatIcalled“totalhistory.”Thebest-knownexampleofthisisprobablyHegel’sdialecticaltheoryofhistoryintermsoftheprogressofthehumanspirit,embodiedinthestate,throughthreestagesofeverincreasingfreedom:fromtheearlyAsianempires(notablyChinaandPersia),whereonlythedespotwasfree,throughtheGreco-Romanworldwhereonlytherulingeliteswerefree,totheGermanworld(whatelse?),whereeverybodyisfree.Ifitwashealthytoapproachwithskepticismthenotionofhistoricallaw,itispositivelyunhealthynottoapproachwithskepticismtheideaofanoverallpatternin(ordirectionof)history;nonethelessatotaltheoryrepresentstheholygrailofhistoriography,parallelinsomerespectstotheunificationofquantummechanicsandrelativityintoasingleoverarchingtheoryoffundamentalphysics.

Aswithgeneralhistoriography,researchinthehistoriographyofphilosophyisrifethattargetsindividualcausallinks,inthiscasebetweenindividualthinkers.WhenwestudyAristotle’sinfluenceonAquinas,orDescartes’onSpinoza,orCarnap’sonQuine,weconductthistypeofresearch.Oftenthecausalinfluenceisacknowledgedbythelaterthinker,butsometimesitsextentisunclearpriortocloseanalysis.

Rarerincurrenthistoriographyofphilosophyisresearchintoprocessesinthehistoryofphilosophy.Nonetheless,wetargetsuchprocesseswhenwestudytheevolutionofbroadlyScholasticmetaphysicsfromAquinasinthe13thtoSuarezinthe16thcentury(see,e.g.,RobertPasnau’sMetaphysicalThemes:1274-1671);the

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evolutionofGermanIdealismfromKanttoHegel(see,e.g.,TerryPinkard’sGermanPhilosophy1760-1860);orofanalyticphilosophyfromFrege,Moore,andRusselltoQuine,Davidson,andbeyond(see,e.g.,ScottSoames’TheAnalyticTraditioninPhilosophy).

Incontrast,researchfocusedonthesearchfor“lawsofhistoryofphilosophy”–wherebylawlikecausalpatternsgoverningtheformationofnewphilosophicalideasrecurringacrossdifferentsegmentsofthehistoryofphilosophy–isessentiallynonexistentnowadays.Ditto,ofcourse,foranexplicitlyarticulatedtotaltheoryofthehistoryofphilosophy(wherebyacertainunityof“sense”issought,perhapsencapsulatingadirectionality).Thistypeofresearchhasvanishedfromthehistoriographyofphilosophyjustasmuchasithasfromgeneralhistoriography.Itisanopenquestionwhetherthisreflectsametaphysicalconvictionthathistoryhasnolawsandnounity;amoreepistemologicalsuspicionthatevenifthereweresuchlawsorsuchunity,wesimplycouldnot,withtheevidenceatourdisposal,hopetopindownwithanyaccuracyorprecisionanythingresemblingagenerallaw;orjustthekindofinstitutionalpressuretowardeverincreasingspecializationthatcharacterizesjustasmuchastrophysicsandneurobiology,say.

Inanycase,itisworthnotingthatalthoughcontemporaryhistoriographyofphilosophydoesnotfeatureresearchintorecurrentpatternsorlawsofhistory,muchlessintoaputativeoverarchingunityordirectioninthehistoryofphilosophy,nordoesanyworkbyhistoriansofphilosophysuggestarefutationoftheideaslawlikepatternsoroverarchingunity.Thereisnotevenanexplicitstatementdenyingthefruitfulnessofanyresearchonsuchquestions.Thewholequestionisjustcompletelyofftheradarincontemporaryhistoriographyofphilosophy.Intheabsenceofanyconsiderationsfororagainstthequestionsofhistoricallawsoroverarchingunity,wemaygrantourselvespermission,Ipropose,todabbleindisciplinedspeculationonthesematters.

Wemaythinkofthispartofthehistoriographyofphilosophyasneedingtomakeaninitialdeterminationastotherelativeplausibilityofthreepositions:

[Skepticism] Therearenohistoricallaws,muchlessanunderlyingunity,tobefoundinthehistoryofphilosophy.

[Optimism] Thereisnounderlyingunityinthehistoryofphilosophy,buttherearerecurrentlawswecanidentifyandformulate.

[Exuberance]Therearelawsgoverninghistoricalevolutionofphilosophicalideas,andacertainunderlyingunitytheyembodyorexemplify.

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Optimistsmaythendividedependingonthekindsofhistoricallawstheyhypothesize,andtheexuberantmustcomedownonaparticularaccountoftheoverarchingunityinthehistoryofphilosophy.Inthenextsection,wetakealookatwhatistomyknowledgethemostrecentexuberantaccountofthehistoryofphilosophy,developedbyFranzBrentano(heof“intentionalityasthemarkofthemental”)inthelastdecadeofthe19thcentury.Itmightbeuseful,Iamthinking,toseehowthissortofthingmightlook.

3.ACaseStudy

ItisnotpartofBrentano’stheoryofthehistoryofphilosophythatittendstowardanendpoint.ThereisnodirectionofhistoryhereinthewayHegelandMarxclaimedforhumanhistoryingeneral.Moreover,forBrentanothereisnolinearprogressioninthehistoryofphilosophyofthesortwemayobserveinthehistoryoftheexactandnaturalsciences.Ratherthehistoryofphilosophyresemblesmorearthistory,wherephasesofgreatcreativitygeneratinggenuinevaluearefollowedbysuccessivephasesofdecline.

Inparticular,claimsBrentano,therearefourphasesofphilosophicaldevelopmentsthatrepeatthemselvesineveryeraofphilosophy.Thefirstphaseistheonethatgeneratesgreatphilosophicalvalueandcarriesthetorchofphilosophicalprogress.Itismarkedbytwomaincharacteristics:apurelytheoreticalimpulse,groundedintruewonderattheworld,andanaturalisticmethodthatadaptsitselftoitssubjectmatter.Thisfirstphaseisthenfollowedbythreesuccessivephasesofevergrosserdecline.Inthesecondphase,apracticalmindsetsubstitutesthespiritoftheoreticalwonder,andinconsequence,theappliedmethodologybecomeslooserandmoreapproximative.Thisleadsinevitably,thinksBrentano,tolossoffaithintheadvancementofphilosophicalunderstanding,andultimatelyushersinathirdphase,characterizedbyskepticism.However,becausesuchskepticismcanneverquenchourinherentthirstforknowledgeandunderstanding,itissoonreplacedbyakindofmysterianormysticalinclinationcharacterizedbyfacileandunprincipledbeliefformation.Inthisfourthphasewelingeruntilaneweraofphilosophybegins,studdedwithcreativeinnovationsfueledbypurelytheoreticalinterestandoiledbysoundmethodology.

Brentano’scaseforthisrecurringpatternisbriefandconsistsinclaiminganaturalplacingofsomeprominentfiguresinthehistoryofphilosophyineachphaseofeachera.TheschemeisdisplayedinTable1.

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theoreticalphase

practicalphase

skepticalphase

mysterianphase

AncientPhilosophy

AnaxagorastoAristotle

StoicismandEpicureanism

PyrrhonianSkepticism

Neoplatonism

MedievalPhilosophy

Aquinas(andDominicans)

Scotus(andFranciscans)

Ockham(andnominalists)

Eckhart,Cusanus,etc.

ModernPhilosophy

FrancisBaconandDescartes

TheEnlightenment

Hume Reid,Kant,andtheIdealists

Table1.Brentano’sInterpretationoftheHistoryofPhilosophy

TheschemenaturallyplacesBrentano’sphilosophicalheroes–Aristotle,Aquinas,andDescartes–inthefirst,ascendantphases,andassociateshisnemesesKantandHegelwithmysticssuchasMeisterEckhart.ItalsohasthefortuitousifsomewhatmegalomaniacimplicationthatwithBrentanohimselfafourtheraofphilosophicalrejuvenationisabouttostart.Butsettingasidetheseproblematicfeatures,Brentano’sscheme,ifaccepted,wouldhavethegreatvirtueofimposingaclearorganizationonthehistoryofphilosophyintoto,thusmakingsenseofit.Insteadofalonglistofprominentthinkers,wewouldgetahighlystructurednarrative.

Inparticular,Brentano’stheoryofthehistoryofphilosophyclearlyprovidesuswithlawsofhistoricaldevelopment.Wecanthinkofsuchstatementsas“askepticalphaseleadstoamysterianphase”ascapturingabasickindoflaw.Inaddition,however,wecanseethestatement“eacheraischaracterizedbythesameprogressionthroughfourphases”asasortofsupremehistoricallaw,thelawthatcaptures,inaway,thedeepuniformityinthehistoryofphilosophy.

OnemayquibbleofcoursewiththespecificsofBrentano’stheory.WhyandhowdidAquinasgettobethefirstMedievalphilosopher,wonderedÉtienneGilson,perhapsthegreatestmedievalistofthefirsthalfofthe20thcentury–dowenothaveoverhalfamillenniumofmedievalphilosophicalreflectionbeforehim?Likewise,wemaywonderwhetherReidisreallyamysterian.BrentanotreatshimsobecauseReidgroundsallknowledgeinotherwiseungrounded“commonsensebeliefs.”ThisseemsabitthinasareasontolumpReidtogetherwiththelikesofPlotinusandHegel.Infact,theattachmenttocommonsenseseems,intemperamentatleast,alltheoppositeoftheallureofmysticalflights.

Moredeeply,Ifinditmorethanalittlesuspiciousthattheorganizationofchronologiesintocyclesfeaturingthebattleofgoodversusevil,witheventualrebirthofthegoodtolaunchanewcycle–thisabstractandsomewhatcartoonishpattern–,is

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sucharecurringthemeinmanytraditions’quasi-mythologicalhistories.Eventhenumberfourseemstocomeuptimeandagaininthesesystems,forinstanceinHinduandZoroastrianconceptionsofhistory.Mighttherenotbesomethingaboutourcognitivehardwiringthatpushesustoimposecyclical-cum-tetralogicalorderonthephenomena,insteadofitbeingthephenomenathemselvesthatrecommendthesefour-phasecycles?

Inaddition,onemayalsoraiseaneyebrowaboutBrentano’sdogmaticacceptanceofthestandardperiodizationofthehistoryofphilosophyintermsofAncient,Medieval,andModerneras.Thisperiodizationleavesmuchtobedesired,aswewillnowdiscuss.

4.Periodization

Perhapsthemostelementarywaytoimposeinitialstructureonanotherwiseunstructuredlistofeventsisthroughperiodization:segmentingthelistintomoreorlessself-containedsub-lists.Althoughinitselfamerelytemporalspecification,thechoiceofperiodizationreflectsacertainconceptionofthecausalcoherenceinternaltoeachperiod,withpassagetoanewperiodindicatingabreakinnormalprocessesofdevelopment.Tothatextent,theperiodizationweadoptofanyhistorybetraysacommitmenttoabird’seyeviewanalysisofthemajorstreaksinthathistory.

Themoststandardperiodizationofhumanhistory,theonewealllearnedatschool,startshistorywiththeadventofhistoricalrecords(dismissingeverythingpriortothatas“pre-history”)anddividinghistoryintothreemainperiods:theAncientworld,goingroughlyfromthefoundingofRomeinthemid-8thcenturyBCEtoitscollapseattheendofthe5thcenturyCE;theMiddleAges,spanningroughly500-1500;andModernity,from“theageofdiscovery”circa1500tothepresent.Wherefromcametoourschoolsthisparticularperiodization?Theanswerisnotentirelyclear.EarlyRenaissancethinkers,notablyPetrarchandLeonardoBruni,havealreadydividedWesternhistoryintothreeimportantsegments,inwhichthedarkMiddleAgesinterruptedtheintellectualandculturalgrowthofideasintheAncientGreco-Romanworld,tobereborn,sotospeak,withtheRenaissance.Thisperiodizationwaspopularizedinthe17thcenturybytheGermanhistorianChristophKeller(a.k.a.Cellarius).Butthemodelbecameentrenched,andenrichedwiththeconceptof“prehistory,”primarilythroughtheGermanEnlightenment;theworksofAugustLudwigvonSchlözeron“universalhistory”inthefinalthirdofthe18thcenturyarerepresentativehere.

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Asweknow,thestandardperiodizationofthehistoryof(Western)philosophy,inscribedintheacademiccurriculum,isessentiallythesame:wehave(1)AncientPhilosophy,goingfromThalesinthe7thcenturyBCEtocirca500;(2)MedievalPhilosophy,goingbasicallyfrom500to1600;and(3)ModernPhilosophy,startingwithDescartesintheearly17thcenturyandstillongoing.Eachofthesemega-periodsalsoadmitsofamoreorlessstandardsub-periodizationinthecurriculum.ThuswedivideAncientPhilosophyinto(1.1)thePre-Socratics(7th–5thBCE),(1.2)Socrates,Plato,andAristotle,(1.3)Hellenisticphilosophy(4thBCE–3rdCE),and(1.4)LateAntiquity(3rd–6thCE);MedievalPhilosophyinto(2.1)theEarlyMiddleAges(6th–10thCE),(2.2)theHighMiddleAges(11th–13th),and,sometimesbutnotalwayssetapart,(2.3)RenaissancePhilosophy(14th–16th);whileModernPhilosophywedivideinto(3.1)EarlyModern(17th-18th,DescartestoKant),(3.2)19th-centuryphilosophy,and(3.3)20thcenturytothepresent(startingwithFrege,Moore,andRussellforanalyticphilosophy,Husserlforphenomenology).

Acuriousfeatureofthisstandardperiodizationisthatitisentirelyderivativefromtheperiodizationofhumanhistoryingeneral–ittakesintoaccountexactlynothingspecifictothedevelopmentofphilosophicalideas.Thisisintruthveryodd.Istherereallyareasonweshouldexpectphilosophicalturningpointstoalignsoperfectlywithturningpointsinthehistoryofhumanitymoregenerally?Perhapsthereissuchareason,say,asfaraspoliticalphilosophyisconcerned.Butwhenitcomestometaphysics,say,itwouldbeverysurprisingiftheriseandfallofRomeshouldcoincidewiththeriseandfallofabstracta,orifthe“ageofdiscovery”thatusheredinModernityhappenedtocoincidewiththeriseofidealism.Atanyrate,evenifmajoreventsinhumanhistorydidtriggerimportantphilosophicaldevelopments,whyshouldtheabsenceofmajorhistoricaleventsencouragetheabsenceofimportantphilosophicaldevelopments?Wemight,onthecontrary,expectlong-termstabilitytoprovidethefoundationsforcontemplativeprogress;orwemightexpectindividualgeniustoshowupincompleteindependenceofhistoricalcontext.

Assoonaswetakecriticaldistancefromthisstandardperiodizationofthehistoryofphilosophy,itsflawsbecomeinstantlyevident.Iwillnameonlytwo.

Arguably,themostimportant,mostdecisivecenturyinthewholeof(Western)philosophyisthatfromPlato’sbirthtoAristotle’sdeath.WhiteheadfamouslysaidthatthephilosophicaltraditionconsistsinaseriesoffootnotestoPlato.AsIwilllatersuggest,Whiteheadwashalfrightandverywrong:itwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythathalfthephilosophicaltraditionconsistsinfootnotesto(i.e.,elaborationsof)Plato;theotherhalfconsistsinfootnotesto/elaborationsofAristotle.Yetthispivotalsub-periodoccursinthemiddleofthestandardperiodwecallAncientPhilosophy.Ina

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properperiodization,Isuggest,thatfatefulcenturywouldlaunchanewstageinthehistoryofphilosophy.Thisisaninstancewhereacrucialjunctureinthehistoryofphilosophycorrespondstonopivotaleventinthelargerhistoryofhumanaffairs.

Secondly(andconversely),whenwelookforamajorphilosophicalturningpointtoaccompanythefallofRomein476,andtosignalatransitionfromthefirsttothesecondgreatsupposedperiodsofWesternphilosophy,wecomeupblank.ThebestcandidateissurelyBoethius’ConsolationofPhilosophy,aswellashisearliercommentariesonAristotleandPorphyry.ButalthoughBoethiuswasveryinfluentialintheMiddleAges,heisgenerallyregardedasarelativelyderivativethinker,mostlycombiningandmodifyingfamiliarAristotelian,Neoplatonist,andChristianideas.AnditisnoteworthythatmostphilosophygraduatestodayearntheirB.A.withouteverhearingofBoethiusintheclassroom–orindeedoutsideit.Clearly,then,wedonotinfactdesignateBoethiusasacrucialfiguremarkingaturningpointinthehistoryofphilosophy.

Tobeclear,IampersonallyabigfanofBoethius,whomItaketohaveastrongclaimtobeingthefirst(Western)nominalist.Butmypointisonceremovedfromthefirst-orderquestionofthemeritinBoethius’philosophicalideas.ThequestionIamraisingisratherthis:sincewedonotinfacttakeBoethiustorepresentanythinglikethekindofturningpointinthehistoryofphilosophythatwetakethefalloftheRomanEmpiretobeinWesternhistory,whydowealigntheperiodizationofthehistoryphilosophywiththatofthehistoryofhumanaffairswritlarge?Thisalignmentseemsintruthentirelyartificial.

Why,then,dowecutupthehistoryofphilosophythewaywedo?Onelineofthoughtisthatanyperiodizationofthehistoryofphilosophyisboundtobearbitrarytosomeextent,sowemightaswelladoptanotherwisefamiliarframeworkforcuttingitup.Now,inthisform,theclaimseemstomeatadtoostrong–surelysomeputativeperiodizationsarebetterthanothers.Nonetheless,itisquitelikelythatamultiplicityofpossibleperiodizationswouldproveequallygood,atleastfromcertainperspectives,andanywaythereareprobablyno“factsofthematter”aboutthecorrectperiodization.However,thispointbyitselfdoesnotquitejustifyuncriticalacceptanceofthestandardperiodizationofthehistoryofphilosophy.Infact,itencouragesthefloatingofalternativeperiodizationsandtheircomparisonwiththestandardoneandwithoneanother.

II. TheParallel-StreamsTheory

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5.TwoPhilosophicalTemperaments

IntheremainderofthispaperIwanttosketchthekindoftheoryofthehistoryofphilosophythatIfindmostinitiallyappealing.IndeedItakethistobethemostbanalandundaringtheoryofthehistoryofphilosophyonemightcomeupwith.Itsmainvirtueisjustinbeingatheory–atheoryofthehistoryofphilosophyasawhole.

Iwillstartbysketchingaportraitoftwoopposingphilosophicaltemperaments.IwillcallthemTemperamentAandTemperamentBtoavoidanybaggagethatmightcomewithmoreilluminatinglabels,thoughonewouldnotbetoofaroffthemarkifinsteadonecalledthemthePlatonistandAristoteliantemperaments.Iwillthensketchawaytomodelthedevelopmentofphilosophicalideasintermsoftheinteractionofthreeforcesfeedingintoindividualthinkers’work,resultingintheparalleldevelopmenttowardtheself-articulation,ifyouwill,ofastable,maximallyplausibleA-typeworldviewandastable,maximallyplausibleB-typeworldview.

Myportraitofthetwotemperaments,inTable2,isinthestyleofcaricature.IimaginethatasinglephilosopherembodiesallA-typetemperamentalcharacteristicsandanotherembodiesallB-typecharacteristics.Inpractice,thevastmajorityofphilosophersarethankfullymorecomplexintellectualpersonalities.Butcaricaturehasitsexpositoryvirtues.

TemperamentA TemperamentB

inmetaphysics,

awelcomingattitudetowardallmannersofabstractaanduniversals,seennotjustasnecessaryconcessionsbutasagreeableliberatorsfromthedrearinessofconcretereality;

amarkedpreferencefornominalismanddesertlandscapes,notjustasoutputsoffair-mindedevaluationofargumentsbutasapreconditionforaseriousattempttomakesenseoftheworld;

in(thepartofmetaphysicswenowcall)philosophyofmind,

ananti-materialistinstinctthatspansthegamutofdualism,idealism,andotherwaysofrecognizingsomethingotherthanbrutematteramongtheungroundedgroundsofreality;

astrongattachmenttomaterialism(or“physicalism”inthenewfangledjargon);

inepistemology,

atendencytowardrationalismandintuitionism,withafaithina

anempiricistinclinationtobaseallknowledgeonobservational

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Table2.CaricatureofTwoBasicPhilosophicalTemperaments

Averysimilaroppositionisproposed,incidentally,byWilliamJamesinChap.1ofPragmatism.Jamesdistinguishesbetween“twokindsofphilosopher,”oneofwhomhecallstender-mindedandcharacterizesas“Rationalistic(goingby‘principles’),Intellectualistic,Idealistic,Optimistic,Religious,Free-Willist,Monistic,Dogmatical”;theotherhecallstough-mindedandcharacterizesas“Empiricist(goingby‘facts’),Sensationalistic,Materialistic,Pessimistic,Irreligious,Pluralistic,Sceptical.”IbracketforpresentpurposesthequestionofwhetherJames’isinfactthesamedistinction,butwithdifferencesofemphasisduetodifferentphilosophicalclimate,orasimilarbut

prioriprinciplesasepistemicfoundationsfromwhichtherestofourknowledgeisdeductivelyinferred;

encounterwithparticularfacts–datedandlocalizedoccurrences–andinductiveratherthandeductiveinferencefromthem;

inmoralphilosophy,

arationalistapproachthatseekstoderivecommonlyacceptedmoralpreceptsfromapriorimoralprinciples;

amoresentimentalistattempttogroundmoralunderstandinginconcreteemotionalexperienceratherthanpurereason;

inphilosophicalmethodology,

awillingnesstoacceptmysterianandsometimesevenmysticalelementsinacompletepictureoftheworld(footnote:forreligiousphilosophers,entercredoquiaabsurdumetc.);

anaturalismthatputsapremiumonexplanationsthatappealonlytopositsinternaltothespatiotemporalrealm(footnote:forreligiousphilosophers,substituterationaltheism);

inmeta-philosophicalsensibility,

atirelessmonismconvincedthatthepluralityinappearancemustbelieanultimateunityinnoumenalreality,andindeedthatrealityonlybecomesfullyintelligiblewhenthisunityisuncovered;

askepticalattitudetowardthemonisticdriveandagreatertrustinpluralisticaccountsthatresistforcingunityonthephenomena;

inphilosophicalprose,

anemphasisontheliteraryandHumanisticqualitiesofpresentationandanacknowledgementoftheroleofrhetoricincommunicatingideas.

adryandliteralstylethatprizesclarityandprecisionaboveallandtakesasitsmodelsciencewritingratherthanliterature.

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slightlydifferentdistinction.IjustmeantosignalacertainprecedenttothedistinctionIdrawbetweenTemperamentsAandB.

Asnoted,itisnaturaltoseePlatoandAristotleasprototypesoftype-Aandtype-Bphilosophers.(HereIuse“prototype”intheindustrialsenseoftheterm,sotospeak;inthesenseinwhichitisusedinthecognitivepsychologyofconcepts,tomeansomethinglikeparadigm,thehonorsmaygorathertoPlotinusandHume.)Plato’swell-knownmetaphysicsofa-spatialanda-temporalFormsaswhatismostreal,hisidealismandargumentsfortheincorporealityandimmortalityofthesoul,aswellashisaccountofknowledgeasinnateandonlyrecalled(ratherthanacquired)withtheaidofsenseperception–allpresentalreadyinthePhaedo–testifytohisAtemperament;andofcoursePlato’sdialoguesaffordsomeofthegreatestliterarydelightsofallphilosophicalprose.Meanwhile,Aristotle’sfocusonthemetaphysicsofmaterialobjectsandhisunderstandingofinreuniversalsasenclosedwithinspacetime,hisintegratedhylomorphistaccountofthemind-bodyrelationship,hisstraightforwardempiriciststatement,inDeAnimaIII,that“ifwedidnotperceiveanything,wewouldnotlearnorunderstandanything,”andhisappreciationforthevarietyandmultiplicityofphenomena,perhapsmostevidentinhisbiologicalworks,allstandintestimonytohisBtemperament;butnoreaderoftheMetaphysicswouldaccuseitsauthorofexcesslyricism,howeverawestruckwemightbebyhissheerbrainpower.

6.TwoParallelStreams

ItisusefulformyproposedtheoryofthehistoryofphilosophythatPlatoandAristotlefittheAandBmoldssowell,becauseforalmosttwomillenniafollowingthem,thehistoryofphilosophywasalmostself-consciouslytheresultoftheongoingcompetitivejuxtapositionofaPlatonistandanAristotelianworldview,modulotheoccasionaldismissalofbothasrelicsofdangerouspaganismortheirattemptedsynthesisintoasingleworldviewof“thephilosopher.”AllthewayuptotheRenaissancewefindphilosopherstimeandagaindesignatingthemselvesasPlatonistorAristotelian,ordedicatingthemselvestocommentaryoranalysisofPlatonicand/orAristoteliantexts.Frommyperspective,though,itisnotPlatoandAristotlethemselvesthatdefinethesubsequentunfoldingofthehistoryofphilosophy.Rather,theyplaythespecialrolestheydoonlybecausetheyhappentoofferearlyandnear-perfectembodimentsofTemperamentsAandB.

Insofarastwothousandyearsof(Western)philosophyself-consciouslylendthemselvestomodelingintermsofacompetitivejuxtapositionofearlyembodiments

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ofTemperamentAandTemperamentB,amodeloftheentirehistoryofphilosophyasorganizedaroundtheparalleldevelopmentandself-articulationofthesetwophilosophicaltemperamentscarriesinitialplausibility.ItismostlytheextensionofthemodelintoModernPhilosophythatrequiresanelementof“creativity”onthetheory’spart.ButintruththecommonplacedivisionofModernphilosophersintorationalistsandempiricistsmapsrelativelyneatlyontoTemperamentsAandBaswell(henceJames’divisionofphilosophersintoRationalistloversofprinciplesandEmpiricistloversoffacts).MyownviewisthatthestandardclassificationofDescartesasarationalistissomethingofahistoriographicalblunder,butbracketingthecaseofDescartes,itisnothardtoappreciatehowSpinoza,Kant,and19th-centuryGermanandBritishIdealistspartakeinTemperamentA,orhowTemperamentBisexemplifiedbytheBritishEmpiricists,19th-centurycontinentalpositivistslikeAugusteComteandErnstMach,aswellasBrentanoandsomeofhisfollowers,notablythe“Polishlogiciansandnominalists,”asErnestNagelcalledtheminwhatisprobablythefirstself-conscioususeoftheexpression“analyticphilosophy”–Nagel’s1936paper“ImpressionsandAppraisalsofAnalyticPhilosophyinEurope.”

Withtheseremarksinplace,letmenowprovideasketchoftwoparallelstreamsinthehistoryofphilosophy,anA-andaB-stream.Iissueaseriesofcaveatsimmediatelythereafter.

• Plato• Speusippus,Xenocrates,andthe

OldAcademy• PhiloofAlexandria,Plutarch,and

theotherMiddlePlatonists• Seneca,Epictetus,andmostStoics

• Plotinus• Porphyry,Augustine,Boethius,

andotherNeoplatonists• Eriugena

• Anselm,Bonaventure

• MarsilioFicino,Cusanus,and

otherRenaissanceHumanists• Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz• CudworthandtheCambridge

Platonists

• Aristotle• PeripateticsfromTheophrastus

throughAlexanderofAphrodisiastoAndronicus

• EpicureansfromEpicurustoLucretius

• Boethius

• Al-Farabi,Averroes,Maimonides,andlaterAverroists

• Aquinas,Ockham,andmostlateScholastics

• Suárez,FrancisBacon• Descartes• FromLockethroughHumeto

Mill:threecenturiesofBritish

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• Kant• Fichte,Schelling,Hegelandother

GermanaswellasBritishIdealists

• G.E.Moore,neo-Kantians

Empiricism• ComteandMach(early

positivism)• Brentanoandmostpartsofthe

BrentanoSchool• TheViennaCircleandQuine

Nowtothecaveats.First,notethatthetwostreamsarenotexclusive.IhaveincludedBoethiusandDescartesinboth,becauseeachseemstometohaveinitiatedphilosophicaldevelopmentsofthefirstsignificancewithinbothstreams.(Ibracketheremyreasonsforsayingthis;thepointisjustthatthereisnothinginherentlyproblematicinthenotionofsuchdualcontribution.)Secondly,mytwostreamsarenotexhaustiveeither:Iamnotsure,forinstance,whereifanywheretoplaceAmericanPragmatism,Husserl,orWittgenstein.(Theproblemmaybejustepistemic,insofarasmoresustainedanalysiswouldissueinsomerecommendation;buttheremayalsobenofactofthematteraboutsuchthings.)Thirdly,itisimportanttokeepinmind,inanycase,thatmostphilosophersfitneithercaricatureveryclosely,andIamassigningthemtoonestreamratherthananothermostlybecausetheyresembleonecaricaturemorethantheydotheother.Fourthly,obviouslythechoiceofwhotoincludeontheselistsreflectsacertainviewaboutwhotheimportantfiguresareineachera.HereIhavenotexercisedanypersonaljudgmentbuthavesimplyplacedcanonicalfiguresonthelist.Butaproperdevelopmentofatheoryofthehistoryofphilosophyshouldexercisejudgment.Finally,andmostimportantly,itisperfectlypossibletodisagreeabouttheproperclassificationofsomeofthesethinkers.Icanseethecase,forinstance,fordenyingBoethiusaplaceintheB-stream,oraccordingAl-FarabiasubsidiaryassignmentintheA-stream.However,toquarrelabouttheproperassignmentofthisorthatfigureinstreamAorBisnotitselftoquestiontheusefulnessoforganizingthehistoryofphilosophyalongthesetwostreams.Asatoolforimposingstructureonwhatisotherwiseabrutechronologyofphilosophy,thedivisionofthehistoryofphilosophyintodevelopmentsinTemperamentA’sself-articulationandTemperamentB’sself-articulationmayproveilluminating–thatis,itmayhelpusseerealorderandrealpatternsinthehistoryofphilosophy–evenifitisnotalwaysimmediatelyclearwhereanindividualphilosopherisbestplacedwithinthissuperstructure.

Isthereadirectiontothehistoryofphilosophy,ifthisishowwethinkofit?Therecertainlyneednotbe,andperhapsowingtomyownB-ishtemperament,Iamdisinclinedtothinkofhistory,philosophicalorotherwise,inteleologicalterms.(IamwithRankeandHerzenagainstHegelandMarxonthis!)Nonetheless,itis

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certainlypossibletoimaginetwonatural“restingpoints”forthehistoryofphilosophyasmodeledhere.Thefirstistheconvergenceonsomethingresemblinglong-termconsensusonwhatthestablestandmostultimafacieplausiblephilosophicalpackagedealsaretailoredtoA-typeantecedentsensibilitiesandB-typesensibilities.Thesecondisthefashioningofthestablestandmostultimafacieplausiblesynthesisofthetwooutlooks.

Asdulypromised,theaboveisalmostbanalasatheoryofthehistoryofphilosophy.Muchofitisgeneratedbystitchingtogethertwodividinglinesfamiliarfromstandardhistoriographyofphilosophy–thePlatonist/AristotelianlineforAncientandMedievalphilosophyandtherationalist/empiricistlineforModernphilosophy–toreconstructtwomoreorlesscontinuousstreamsofunfoldingphilosophicaldevelopments.Thedistinctiveclaimhereismostlyjustthattheunderlyingrationaleforthisorganizationhastodowithadichotomybetweentwoopposingphilosophicaltemperaments,namely,thosecaricaturedabove.

7.MechanicsofProgression

Givenanorganizationofthehistoryofphilosophyalongtwoparallelstreams,howarewetounderstandtheevolutionofideaswithineachstream?Mysuggestionisthatanindividualthinker’sphilosophicalideasaretheresultantsofthreeforces.Thefirstistheinfluenceofearlierthinkersofsimilartemperament.Thesecondiscounter-influence,sotospeak,bychallengesthethinkerperceivesasemergingfromtheopposingphilosophicaltemperament.Thethirdisthethinker’sownintellectualimpetus,impartingonhisorherworkthedistinctiveandunpredictablequalitythatmakesthehistoryofphilosophysucha“live”process.

Differentthinkerswillexhibitdifferentadmixturesofthesethreeforcesintheirphilosophical“output.”Onthewhole,weseemtodesignateaskeyfiguresinthehistoryofphilosophythosewetaketo(i)havealargerthanusualportionofpersonalimpetusintheformationoftheirideasand(ii)exercisealargerthanusualinfluenceand/orcounter-influenceonsubsequentthinkers.Philosopherswetaketoexhibit(i)butnot(ii),or(ii)butnot(i),tendtositonthecuspofourpantheon–theyareobjectsofintensescholarshipbutdonottypicallyshowupintheundergraduatecurriculum(Brentanomayfitthefirstprofile,Averroesthesecond).

Amongthephilosopherswetaketoexhibitboth(i)and(ii)–thatis,high-impetusphilosophersexercisingconsiderableinfluenceandcounter-influence–certainfurtherdistinctionsmaybemade.Inparticular,wemightdistinguishthree

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profiles:(a)thosethinkerswhoarethemselvessusceptibleprimarilytocounter-influence(e.g.,Kant,slumber-wokenasheisbyHume),(b)thosemoresusceptibletostraightforwardinfluence(e.g.,Aquinas,drawingprimarilyonAristotle),and(c)thoseappearingtoformtheirphilosophicalideasalmostentirelyfrominternalimpetus(Descartes?).Here,too,ofcourse,caricaturesareusefulinbringingoutmoresharplywhatinrealityaremuchblurrieraffairs.

WithintheframeworkIamproposing,ahistoryof(Western)philosophywouldtracethedevelopmentofideasasafunctionoftheforcesofinfluence,counter-influence,andimpetusswirlingineachstream,theAstreamoriginatinginPlatoandtheBstreamoriginatinginAristotle.Thosestreamsdevelopatsomeperiodsinrelativeisolationfromeachother,atothersthroughintensecross-fertilizationorevenpartialmerging,butmostofthetimesomewherein-between.Itisveryunusual,though,fordevelopmentsinonestreamtobecomprehensiblewithoutanyreferencetoprecedingandroughlycontemporaneousdevelopmentsintheother.Fullappreciationoftheoneisthuslikelytorequiresubstantialappreciationoftheother.Still,wemaylegitimatelyvieweachstreamasseekingprimarilyitsmostplausibleself-articulationgiventhechallengesposedbytheotherstream.

Whatkindofhistoricallaws,ifany,shouldweexpectinaparallel-streammodelofthehistoryofphilosophy?Wemighthopetofind,atasuitablelevelofdescriptiveabstraction,certainrecurringpatternsinthewayindividualphilosophersbuildonpredecessorstodevelopeverpurerembodimentsofonephilosophicaltemperament;herethemini-historiesofLateScholasticism,BritishEmpiricism,andGermanIdealismmightprovidefertilematerial.Ontheotherhand,wemightalsohopetodiscoverrecurringpatternsinthewayindividualphilosophersdevelopbreakthroughideasinreactiontochallengestheyperceivefromthinkersoftheopposingphilosophicaltemperament.HerewemightthinkparadigmaticallyofAristotle’sreactiontoPlato,Kant’sreactiontoHume,andthetworoughlysimultaneousandbroadly“analytic”reactionsto19th-centuryidealism:MooreandRussell’stoBritishIdealismandBrentano’stoGermanIdealism.Ifcertainabstractregularitiescanbefoundacrossthesecases,theymightserveasprimafaciehypothesesabouthistoricallaws.Thesewouldbeputativelawsofinfluenceandputativelawsofcounter-influence.Ipersonallysuspecttherearenotalso“lawsofimpetus”forustoseek:individuals’idiosyncraticintellectualimpetusispreciselywhatinjectsintothehistoryofphilosophyitscontingent,accidental,unpredictable(inaword:Dionysian)dimension.

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Inadditiontosuchlawsofinfluenceandcounter-influence,wealsohavethe“supremelaw”thatthehistoryofphilosophyprogressesintwoparallelstreams,inwhichthestablestandmostultimafacieplausiblephilosophicalpackagedealsaresoughtthatwouldarticulateTemperamentA’sandTemperamentB’santecedentsensibilities.ThisisourcounterparttoBrentano’slawthateacherainthehistoryofphilosophyischaracterizedbythesameprogressionthroughfourphases.Itiswhatcapturesthemostfundamentalstructurewearetryingtoimposeonthechronologyofphilosophy.

8.PeriodizationAgain

Iwanttoclosewithsomeremarksonhowperiodizationofthehistoryofphilosophyshouldbeapproachedwithintheparallel-streamsframework.Butperhapsthemostimportantupshotoftheframeworkisthatweapproachthehistoryofphilosophywronglywhenwesliceit“horizontally,”alonghistoricalperiods,andexpectperiod-basedacademicspecialization.Wedothehistoryofphilosophygreaterjustice,infact,whenwesliceit“vertically,”alonglongitudinalsegmentsofthetwoparallelstreamsIhavesketched,andencouragespecializationintheevolutionofideasacrosstimewithineitherstream.Thiskindofhistorianofphilosophydoesexist:fortheA-stream,wehavetheworkofRaymondKlibansky,whopublishedonPlato,ProclusandotherNeoplatonists,thereceptionofPlatonicideasinByzantineandIslamicphilosophy,andthecontinuitythroughtheMiddleAgesallthewaytoCusanusintheRenaissance(see,e.g.,Klibansky1939);fortheB-stream,seenotablytheworkofHamidTaieb,whohaspublishedonB-typethinkersfromAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasthoughAquinasandPeterAurioltoBrentanoandTwardowski,interalia(see,e.g.,Taieb2018).Buttheacademicnormisclearlyhorizontalratherthanverticalspecialization.Thismakesacertainamountofprofessionalsense.Verticalscholarshipobviouslyrequiresnon-triviallinguisticandhistoricalcompetencies.Still,asnoteditseemstometodogreaterjusticetotheinternallogicofthehistoryofphilosophy,andismorelikelytobringusneareracorrectunderstandingoftheoverallhistoryofphilosophy.

Thatsaid,itisanindependentlyinterestingquestionhowweshouldapproachtheperiodizationofthehistoryofphilosophywithintheparallel-streamsframework.Heretwo(entirelycompatible)periodizationprojectssuggestthemselvestome.

Thefirstprojectistosegmenteachstreamseparatelyintoitsowndistinctiveperiods.WhataretheturningpointsinTemperamentA’sphilosophicalself-

18

articulation,andwhatinTemperamentB’s?ForA,wemightforinstancedesignatePlatotoPlotinusasthefirstera,PlotinustoKantasthesecondera,andpost-KantianA-typephilosophyastheerawearestillin;andforB,wemighttakeAristotletoAquinasasthefirstera,AquinastoBaconasthesecondera,thehalf-millenniumofpredominantlyAnglophoneempiricismandpositivismbetweenBaconandQuineasathirdera,andpost-QuineanB-typephilosophyasafourtheranowinitsinfancy(seeTable3).Iamproposingthisperiodizationmostlyforthesakeofillustration.Butthereareseveralgeneralpointsitservestoillustrate.Firstofall,thephilosophicalperiodizationneednotalignwiththeSchlözer-styleperiodizationofWesternhistoryintoAncient,Medieval,andModern.Secondly,theperiodizationsoftheAstreamandBstreamneednotalignwitheachother;infact,thereislittlereasontoexpectthemto.Thirdly,periodscanvarygreatlyintheirlength–thereisnoreasontoexpectneatroughlymillennium-longperiodsinthehistoryofphilosophy.Andfourthly,wemayfindthatonestreamnaturallysegmentsmorefine-grainedlythantheother;again,thereisnoapriorireasontoexpectanythingelse.

• Plato

• Plotinus

• Kant

• Aristotle

• Aquinas• Bacon

• Quine

Table3.APossibleTwo-StreamPeriodizationoftheHistoryofPhilosophy

Asecondperiodizationprojectwithintheparallel-streamsframeworkwould

seektosegmenttheoverallhistoryof(Western)philosophybytherelativelong-termdominanceofTemperamentAorTemperamentBinthephilosophicallandscape.Threetypesofpossibleperiodsmightbedistinguished:whenTemperamentAisdominant,whenTemperamentBisdominant,andwhenneitherdominates.Thus,wemightdesignatetheperiodbetweenPlatoandPlotinusasafirsteraofno-dominance;theperiodbetweenPlotinusandAverroes/Aquinasasasecondera,dominatedbyTemperamentA;theperiodfromAquinastoSpinozaas

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dominatedbytheBtemperament;andthereafterafourthperiodofrenewedno-dominance.

• Plato/Aristotle

• Plotinus

• Aquinas

• Spinoza

Nodominance

A-dominance

B-dominance

Nodominance

Table4.APossibleSinglePeriodization

Iclosewithfourgeneralnotesonthesetwoperiodizationprojects.First,

bothprojectsinvitesub-periodizationsaswell.Thus,evenifthecurrent,fourthstageinoursingleoverallperiodizationischaracterizedbyno-dominance,itmightseemnaturaltoviewthehalfcenturyfromDescartestoLockeasA-accented,thefollowingcentury–fromLocketoKant–asB-accented,andthefollowingcenturyasA-accentedagain.Itisjustwithacoarser-grainedlookthatweseethelargerperiodasmorebalanced.

Second,ifwestartourtwohistoricalstreamswithPlatoandAristotle,weareeffectivelyconfiningSocratesandhispredecessorstothepre-historyofphilosophy,somewhatasSchlözersentpre-RomanhumanityintotheDunkleofpre-history.Thisseemstomeintruthquitejustified,ifonlybecausewehaveessentiallynowrittenmaterialfromthesethinkers,onlyquotationsandtestimoniesbyothers(muchofwhatweknowaboutthepre-SocraticscomesoriginallyfromAristotleandTheophrastus,andalmosteverythingweknowaboutSocrates’philosophycomesfromPlato).

Third,asnotedIdonotexpecttheretobetheory-independentfactsofthematterthatrationallycompelustoacceptonepossibleperiodizationoverallothers.Theideaof‘naturaljoints’inthehistoryofphilosophy,whichitisthehistorian’saimtocorrectlyidentify,haslittlepurchaseonusaswesurveythemassofphilosophicalworksthatconstitutethehistoryofphilosophy.Thisraisesdifficult

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methodologicalquestionsaroundtheevaluationofproposedperiodizations,andraisesthespecterofpossiblecohabitationofseveralofperiodizationsco-acceptedinparallel.Ibracketthesequestionshere,sinceanywayIamfloatingtheperiodizationsinTables3and4mostlyforillustrativepurposes.

Fourth,therewillbeatemptationforcontemporaryphilosopherstoaskhowcertainlivingphilosophicalgiants–say,SaulKripkeorKitFine–mightfitintothevariousschemesIhaveputforwardhere.Suchquestionsarefuntoplaywith,butintruthIthinkweshouldresistthetemptationtospeculateonthehistoricalsignificanceoftheKripkesandFinesoftheworld,aswesimplylackthedistancetoevaluatetheirinfluenceandcounter-influenceontheevolutionofphilosophicalideasonthetimescalesrelevanttoahistoryofphilosophy.Thispointextendstorecentlydeceasedgiants(say,DavidLewis)aswell.Althoughthisisoftennotthecasetoday,traditionallyacademicsinhistorydepartmenthaveworkedwithamovingwallofhalfacenturytoacenturywhenitcomestodefiningwhatishistory.ThisperfectlyreasonableruleofthumbwouldrecommendsilencefornowonthehistoricalplaceofthelikesofLewis,Kripke,andFine.

8.Conclusion,withCodaonNon-WesternPhilosophy

Inaway,mymainaiminthispaperhasbeentoinviteamorecriticalapproachtothebranchofphilosophywecallhistoryofphilosophy:morecriticalbothregardingitsofficialaimsandregardingsomeofitsdeepest,mostinstitutionalizedassumptions,notablyaroundperiodization.Ihavefloatedanexpandedagendaforthehistoriographyofphilosophythatincludesmoreglobalconcernswiththeoverallstructureofthehistoryofphilosophy,andhavealsorecommendedamorephilosophicallybasedapproachestotheperiodizationofthehistoryofphilosophy.

Inamorespeculativevein,Ihavealsosketchedfirst-orderproposalsregardingboththeoverallstructureofthehistoryofphilosophy(i.e.,intermsoftheparalleldevelopmentsoftwoopposingphilosophicaltemperaments’searchfortheirbestarticulation)andfruitfulperiodizationsinlightofthatbasicstructure(i.e.,theonescapturedinTables3and4).

Invariousplaces,Ihaveindicatedparentheticallythatmysubjectmatterisrestrictedto“Western”philosophy,whichdesignationtypicallycoversEuropeancivilizationanditsModernextensionintheAmericas.Butintruthgeographyhaslittletodowithoursubjectmatter.Anythinkerwhoseworkhasthesameaimaswhatwecallphilosophy,andwhoexemplifiestoanextentTemperamentAorB,

21

wouldbelongtothehistoryofphilosophyasconceivedhere.ThisappliesobviouslytosuchfiguresasIamblicustheSyrianNeoplatonist,AvicennathePersianAristotelian,andAmotheAfricanCartesian.ButitmayperfectlywellapplytothinkerswhodidnotengagethephilosophicaltraditionoftheWestatall,solongasthesethinkers’intellectualconcernsandaimsoverlapsufficientlywiththoseofthefiguresmentionedabove,especiallyiftheirpursuitoftheseaimsmanifestselementsofTemperamentAand/orB.Fromthisperspective,thereisabsolutelynoreasonnottoinclude,say,the6th/7th-centuryIndianphilosopherDharmakīrtiinourB-stream,givenhisapparentnominalismandempiricism.

Itisanopenquestion,ofcourse,justwhattheproprietaryaimofphilosophyexactlyis.Differentpeoplewillhavedifferentviewsonthis(seemy“PhilosophyasTotalAxiomatics”formyownviews).Butwhateverone’sview,itshouldmakeitpossibleforahistoricalfigureentirelyinsulatedfromtheEuropeanphilosophicaltraditiontoshowupinthesamehistoryofphilosophy.Suchafigurewouldnot,ofcourse,participateinthesamecausalwebofinfluenceandcounter-influence.Dharmakīrti’snominalismwasnotinfluencedbyBoethius’anddidnotinfluenceOckham’s.Buttheymayyetparticipateinaseparateweb(DharmakīrtiisahighlyinfluentialfigureinIndianphilosophy,andwashimselfstronglyinfluencedbyDignāga),andanywaysufficientlybizarrecircumstancescouldleadsomeEuropeanthinker,too,tobecausallyinsulatedinthisway.Fromthisperspectivethereisnoreasonwhynon-Westernthinkerscouldnotbeplacedwithinasingleglobalhistoryofphilosophy.

Atthesametime,presumablysomeintellectualpursuits,includingonesnolessvaluablethanphilosophy,wouldnotqualifyasphilosophicalonanyminimallysubstantivecharacterizationofphilosophy’sdistinctiveintellectualaims.Andsomeofthesepursuitscouldbelabeled“philosophy”despitetheirdissimilaritytothepursuitsharedbythethinkerswehavementionedhere.Inthatcase,allsidesmaybegenerousinallowingeverybodytousethelabel,butitwouldbeusefultokeepinmindthefactthatdifferentthingsarebeingtalkedabout.Almosthalfacenturyagonow,KwasiWireduarguedthatmuchofwhatisdiscussedunderthebannerofAfricanPhilosophyisinfactnotphilosophyatall:oftenthegambitistodrawoutbroadlyphilosophicalorcosmologicalpropositionsimplicitincollectivemythsandoraltraditionsspecifictoAfricanethnicities,whereasphilosophicalreflectionischaracterizedpreciselybytherigorousandanalyticmakingexplicitofideasofsomeuniversalimport.OfcourseWireduallowsforthepossibilityofAfricanphilosophyinthesensepertinenttoushere,butforhimitissimplygoodold-fashionedphilosophythathappenstobedonebyAfricans.Compare:whenwespeakofEuropeanarchitectureversusAsianarchitecture,wehaveinmindasignificant

22

distinctionbetweentwokindsofarchitecture;butwhenwespeakofEuropeantomatoesandAsiantomatoes,weassumethattomatoesaretomatoesaretomatoesandwearesimplykeepingtrack,forwhateverreason,ofwheresomeofthemcomefrom.Thehistoryof“Western”philosophyismorelikeahistoryofWesterntomatoesthanahistoryofWesternarchitecture.

Thepoint–thepointIamadoptingherefromWiredu,thatis–isthat,atbottom,philosophyisone–evenifitisinteresting,forwhateverreason,tokeeptrackofwhereintheworldthatonethingisdone.Again,wedonotobjecttothepolysemoususeof“philosophy”todesignateotherintellectualpursuits.Weonlyinsistthat,inthesenseinwhichtheterm“philosophy”isusedhere,thereisnomeaningfuldistinctionbetweenthehistoryofWesternphilosophyandhistoriesofnon-Westernphilosophies.Sincephilosophyisone,thehistoryofphilosophyisalsoone.1

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