Simplified Vehicle Operations Roadmap

Simplified Vehicle Operations

Roadmap Ken Goodrich, Senior Research Engineer

Mark Moore, Senior Advisor for On-Demand Mobility

July 22, 2015

[email protected] 2

Goals

� Improved ease of use and safety

• Long-term goals: automotive-like training and workload with better-than

automotive safety

• Ease-of-use encompasses initial and recurrent training, preflight & in-flight

workload

Benefits

� Necessary (but not sufficient) for practical aircraft-based ODM

� Faster, less risk averse, lower-cost proving ground for new technology and

operations beneficial to transport aircraft

� Technologies that help address NTSB’s Most-Wanted aviation safety

improvements

• General aviation loss of control

• Public helicopter safety

• Procedural compliance

Goals and Benefits

ODM Safety and Ease of Use

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Gulf of Technology, Policy, and Acceptance

State-of-the-Art,Technically Advanced Aircraft

Flying that’s as Easy and Safer than Driving.

What are the Challenges?

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�Alignment of with NASA Strategic Thrusts

�Performance requirements and current state of the art

• How safe is safe enough and is it achievable?

• How has technology simplified piloting already?

• Emerging automation technologies

�“Simplified Vehicle Operations” (SVO), proposed research

strategy

• Planned evolution & incremental revolution

• Pilots -> Trained operators -> users

�Next steps

Presentation Outline: Safety and Ease of Use

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NASA Aeronautics Strategic Thrusts: Safety, Ease

Safe, Efficient Growth in Global Operations• Enable full NextGen and develop technologies to

substantially reduce aircraft safety risks

Innovation in Commercial Supersonic Aircraft• Achieve a low-boom standard

Ultra-Efficient Commercial Vehicles• Pioneer technologies for big leaps in efficiency and

environmental performance

Transition to Low-Carbon Propulsion• Characterize drop-in alternative fuels and pioneer

low-carbon propulsion technology

Real-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance• Develop an integrated prototype of a real-time safety

monitoring and assurance system

Assured Autonomy for Aviation Transformation• Develop high impact aviation autonomy applications

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ModeFatalities per hundred

million passenger miles

Rate relative to

passenger cars

Passenger Cars 0.643 1.0

Motorcycles 29.9 46x less safe

US Airline Flights 0.0038 167x safer

Commuter Airlines(<10 passengers)

0.102 6.7x safer

General Aviation 7.8 (estimated) 12x less safe

Safety of Small Aircraft Compared to Alternatives

Challenge: Bring safety of small aircraft

transportation up to level demonstrated by

commuter airlines

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ModeFatalities per hundred

million passenger miles

Rate relative to

passenger cars

Passenger Cars 0.643 1.0

Motorcycles 29.9 46x less safe

US Airline Flights 0.0038 167x safer

Commuter Airlines(<10 passengers)

0.102 6.7x safer

General Aviation 7.8 (estimated) 12x less safe

Safety of Small Aircraft Compared to Alternatives

Challenge: Bring safety of small aircraft

transportation up to level demonstrated by

commuter airlines

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How Has Technology Simplified Piloting?

1990’s 2015

+ tablet-based

electronic flight bag

for additional

pre and in-flight

awareness

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�Operationally the change has been tremendous,

improving utility, efficiency, average workload, comfort,

potential safety, etc.

• Navigation / position awareness

• Higher component reliability

• High-performance autopilots

• Electronic flight bags / tablets

• Access to information pre and in-flight

• System monitoring, failure detection

�But…


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�…Becoming and remaining proficient & vigilant is as, if

not more, challenging than ever before

• Typically, greater than 500 hours and $30,000 required to

become experienced instrument pilot

• Required knowledge and skills have increased, not decreased

• System and mode complexity has increased

�Variations between aircraft, software loads

• Pilot expected to detect, troubleshoot & backstop wider range

of non-normals

• Average workload is much lower, but peaks remain high, if not

higher



How Has Technology Simplified Piloting ?

http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/Pages/2012%20Aviation%20Accidents%20Summary.aspx

� …Realized safety has not significantly changed

2013

2014

Goal

Preliminary


Top Accident Categories

• Significant improvement in accident rate by mitigating basic human errors

and newer, more reliable systems


Are Autonomous Systems a Light on the Horizon?


Definitely, but We Should Be Realistic

�Costs are plummeting (sensor, computers, data algorithms)

�But:

• Rate of progress more modest that typically reported…

�A2003

2003, Honda offers active

Lane keeping assist system


Definitely, but We Should Be Realistic

�Costs are plummeting (sensors, computers, data, connectivity)

�But:

• Rate of progress more modest that typically reported…

• Performance in complex, novel situations likely to remain brittle

• Less capable but more reliable systems may have better return on

investment

� It’s the corner cases that drive skills, training, monitoring, and costs not the

nominal

• Regulators need statistically significant operational histories before

approving critical reliance on new technologies & operations without

reversion to proven

� One revolution at a time


Function Allocation, Humans and Automation

Cummings, 2014; Rasmussen, 1983


Knowledge areas:

� Federal Aviation Regulations

� Accident reporting, NTSB

� Radio, communication procedures

� Meteorology, weather product and NOTAM

collection, dissemination, and use

� Recognition of critical weather situations

� Safe and efficient operation of aircraft,

including collision and wake avoidance

� Visual charts, procedures, pilotage, nav.

� Air navigation under IMC

� Air traffic control procedures

� Aircraft loading, weight and balance,

performance effects

� Principles of aerodynamics, powerplants, and

systems

� Human and aeromedical factor

� Aeronautical decision making and judgment

� Crew resource management

Areas of Knowledge and Operation…

Operational areas

Preflight

� Cross-country flight planning

� Preflight inspection

� Aircraft Loading

� Passenger safety, instruction. loading

� Engine start

� Taxiing

In-flight

� Airport Operations (surface, air)

� Takeoff, landing, go-arounds

� Ground reference, performance maneuvers

� Slow flight, maneuvering, stalls

� Navigation & flight by reference to

instruments

� Instrument procedures

� Emergency operations

� High altitude operations

Post-flight…


�Transition from expert pilots -> trained operators -> users

• Key steps:

1. Demanding flight-critical, but deterministic tasks transitioned from

human to ultra-reliable automation

o Simplified flight control and loss-of-control prevention, navigation,

propulsion & systems management, communication

• Must avoid Air France 447-like breakdowns

o Initially use non-deterministic autonomy as non-critical decision aids

and in contingency/emergency situations

• Flight and contingency planning & monitoring, decision support

• Independent monitoring, and possible action, for imminent threats

& self-preservation (e.g. pilot impairment, unstable approach)

o As trust develops, transition tasks and responsibilities from human to

autonomy

• Operator training, licensing must evolve with technology, but full

credit lags behind

Pathway to Simplified Vehicle Operations (SVO)


�Motivation: “Stick to surface” manual control is significant

component of flight training & loss of control greatest cause of

fatalities

�Contributors: Coupling, unattended operation, trim, envelope

limits/non-nonlinearities, complex dynamics

�Challenges:

• Simplify control without depriving pilot of essential authority & awareness

• Graceful degradation

• Regulation of airplane & pilot

• Cost

�Potential approaches

• “Pilotless” autonomy: safety-critical control and decision making moved to vehicle

• full-time autopilot: human authority over flight parameters, flight tasks

• fly-by-wire: authority over real-time maneuvering, but not control surfaces

Flight Control Example, SVO


� Numerous flights by non-pilots demonstrated ease of use

potential—ILS approaches flown to decision altitude on 1st flight

� Envelope protection provided care-free handling at edges of

envelope

� Trained pilots almost universally complained about “car-like” stick

response

Simplified control evaluation with non-pilots ~2001

Example Simplified Control


� SVO-1 (2016 – 2026): Key deterministic tasks relegated to automation

• Technology mitigates pilot as single-point of failure

• Immediately impacts thin-haul commuter mission and small aircraft markets

• Expect only incremental airworthiness certification accommodation, but lays foundation

for future

• Current FAA training required (e.g. ab initio-to IFR in minimum of 70 hours)

• New pilots capable of comfortable, confident, near-all weather ops.

� SVO-2 (2021 – 2036): SPC, Simplified Pilot Certificate

• Simplified training & licensing based on research and operational experience from SVO-1

• New flight system, interfaces, and operation standards that allow updates to training and

operational regulations in Part 61, 91, and 135 taking full advantage of technology

• Goal ab initio to near-all weather pilot in <40 hours (similar to driver training)

� SVO-3 (2031 - 2051): Autonomous operations

• Autonomy is responsible for real-time safety of flight; user involvement is optional and at

the discretion of the automation

3 Epochs of Simplified Vehicle Operation (SVO)


Simplified Vehicle Operation (SVO) Roadmap

2016 2021 2026 2031

Ultra-reliable automation

Semi-autonomous aiding

and self-preservation

SVO 1 Guidelines

Certification Standards

2nd generation flight

systems

Revised pilot, knowledge,

training and certification

SVO-2 Flight

Test, Demo

Simplified Pilot Certificate

Consensus Standards

SVO 3 fundamental research, requirements analysis, UAS assessment

2036

Simplified Pilot

Interaction & Interface

SVO-1 Flight

Test, Demo

Thin-Haul Focus

Ab Initio Focus


Next Steps, NASA

�Build community of interest and broad base of support

• Participation of public, industry, academia and the FAA

essential to technology strategy, execution, commercialization

�Oshkosh forums

� FAA-NASA Workshop this Fall

�Connectivity and partnerships with other NASA, DoD,

DOT/FAA investments, programs

�Coordinate technology roadmap development

• Preliminary roadmap report out to NASA Aero, early 2016


Questions


Backup Material


� Small, commuter airline record highlights that even

current small aircraft can conduct scheduled

operations with safety higher than cars

� Note, equivalent safety per mile may not be societally sufficient if new

mode is used to travel many more miles

• Annual or life-time risk given typical exposure might be more appropriate

� E.g 12.5K miles/per year by car for 80 years = 1,000,000 miles and a 0.63%

lifetime risk of fatality

Performance: How Safe is Safe Enough?


�Underlying safety-critical technologies enabling SVO 1 &

2 are resilient automation, not non-deterministic

machine intelligence

• Human retains overall responsibility for safety of flight, but is totally relived

from many low-level tasks and responsibilities that 1) increase training, 2)

often bite (e.g. stall awareness)

� Integrate existing, near-existing technologies to create deterministic automation as

reliable as structure

� Machine intelligence introduced, but not for safety-critical tasks; gain experience

before critical reliance

� Possibility of support from off-board personal, for example

oPre-flight, loading

oDispatcher-like support

Technologies Critical to SVO-1 and 2


Top Ten GA Accident Causes

• Significant improvement in accident rate by addressing basic errors

• Automotive-level safety achievable by improving relatively deterministic functions

• Age of current fleet contributes to component failure rate


�Underlying safety-critical technologies enabling SVO 1 &

2 are resilient automation, not non-deterministic

machine intelligence

• Sub-component failures, rare-normals must not require novel piloting skills,

for example

� Engine-out

� Ice encounter

� Loss of GPS

• Automation capable of emergency landing if pilot incapacitated

� Digital (and/or physical) parachute

� Much less demanding than full-mission automation due to special handling by

other elements of the system (e.g. traffic cleared away) and relaxed cert

requirements due to rarity of use (back-up to a rare event, not primary capability)

• Dissimilar strengths and limitations of human and automation increase joint

system safety and performance while reducing costs and certification risk

Technologies Critical to SVO-1 and 2,cont.


� Final convergence of UAS and manned aviation

• Passenger carrying UAS

� Requires fundamental breakthroughs in machine intelligence

• Time horizon uncertain

• Current reliability of autonomous aircraft maybe 99.9% (in benign

weather), but carrying humans as cargo requires 99.9999% or better

� Full autonomy is estimated to be > 3-4 orders of magnitude more challenging

than required for SVO-1 or 2

� Incremental introduction still needed validate safe operation in real-world,

novel situations

o UAS experience will useful, but sUAS likely to take advantage of options not

appropriate for manned aircraft and larger UAS likely to rely on remote pilots

� SVO-3 leverages SVO 1, 2 and of course, advance autonomous vehicle

research

• Ideally, common-core across vehicle classes, applications

SVO-3 Technologies

Simplified Vehicle Operations Roadmap

Documents