Sierra Club Pollution & Deception 9-11 Report 2005

8/14/2019 Sierra Club Pollution & Deception 9-11 Report 2005

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Explore, enjoy and protect the planet

PollutionandDeception at Ground Zero REVISITED

Monday, September 17, 2001:The New York Stock Exchange reopens

and workers return to a still- polluted

Lower Manhattan financial district.

WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

I. Why We Must Prevent the Failures of 9/11 from Being Repeated: New Information

on the Human Health Impacts and Potential Future Hazards from 9/11 Pollution . . . . . . 6

New Confirmation that Human Health Impacts from 9/11 Pollution Are Persisting . 7

New Information on the Potential Future Health Hazards from 9/11 Pollution . . . . . 9

II. Why All Americans Should Demand Strong Policies to Protect the Public Against

Health Risks in National Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

People from Many States Came to Help New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Security Concerns and Potential Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

III. Why It Is Reasonable to Worry that the Federal Administration Will Not Meet Its Duty

to Assess Fully the Severity and Extent of Contamination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Need for Public Debate on Optimization Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Need for Investigation of EPA Testing Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

IV. Why It Will Be Harder to Learn the Truth About Health Risks from Future

Terrorist Attacks and National Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

V. Why OSHA May Fail Again to Protect Rescue and Recovery Workers and When It

Tries to Protect Workers, Its Hands Could Be Tied . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

VI. Why It Is Reasonable to Predict that EPA Will Fail to Conduct a Proper Cleanup of

Contamination from a Terrorist Attack or National Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

VII. Why Americans Should Assume that the Federal Administration Will Praise, then

Abandon, the Patriotic Rescue/Recovery Workers, Area Employees and Residents

Who Help to Rebuild an Area Devastated by a Terrorist Attack or Disaster . . . . . . . . . 34

Medical Screening and Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Medical Care . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

VIII. Why Americans Should Assume that No One Will Be Held Accountable for Failures

of Our Government to Protect the Public Against Pollution from an Attack or Disaster 40

Appendix A: The Ground Zero Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42


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INTRODUCTION

In August 2004, the Sierra Club issued a report entitled,Pollution and Deception at Ground

Zero, which documented that many hundreds of people in New York City had become ill because of

exposure to pollution from the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. The report found

that if our federal government had responded to the disaster with proper vigilance for peoples health,many toxic exposures could have been avoided. It also expressed concern that such missteps could be

repeated in a future disaster. In this report, the Sierra Club revisits these issues to determine whether

or not Americans should feel assured that our federal government will take sufficient steps to protect

health and safety in future disasters. The answer is no.

Americans cannot count on the White House Council on Environmental Quality, the Department

of Homeland Security, EPA or OSHA to protect public health in the aftermath of a terrorist attack or

national disaster. Based on the federal administrations new emergency management policies and its

continued failure to provide a proper cleanup and health management response to the 9/11 attack

Americans should assume that in any future national disaster, if political pressure is applied to resume

human activity in the affected area:

S EPA will fail to determine how harmful the contamination is and how far it spreads;

also, under its new relationship with the Department of Homeland Security, it may use

weakened toxic cleanup goals under a new federal optimization policy;

S Under the newNational Response Plan, messages to the public about health and safety

will be filtered by centralized PR staff who answer to an administration that has

repeatedly disregarded scientific data if it conflicts with a political agenda;

S OSHA will not enforce safety laws to protect rescue and recovery workers and under

the newNational Response Plan, OSHA will not have the last word in debates onworker safety;

S The federal government will fail to conduct a proper cleanup of the contamination;

S The federal Administration will praise, then abandon, the rescue/recovery workers and

the people who return to rebuild the area but then suffer health effects; and,

S No one will be held accountable for our governments failure to protect the public from

the aftermath of a terrorist attack or national disaster.

This is not what Americans deserve from their government. At times, our nation may have to

make hard choices, but concealing from the public critically important information about health risks

is not the way to manage the situation. Americans deserve and should be able to expect the straight

story about what risks they face. They also have a right to expect strong government action to protect

rescue and recovery workers and to ensure safety for the people who return and restore the affected area.

Anything less is a betrayal of the publics trust in national leadership.


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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary of Findings

S People clearly needed better protection from the pollution caused by the 9/11 attack. Early

studies raised concerns about persistent health effects from the exposures. Now, newlyreleased data confirm that not only rescue/recovery workers but also residents, small

business owners and area employees have 9/11-related respiratory health effects

symptoms that did not disappear even after a year or longer.

S The Department of Homeland Security is proposing to use optimization a policy

approach that will consider societal values and needs, such as economic impacts to

determine toxic cleanup levels for national emergencies, and EPA apparently will not have

final authority over standards or guidelines; this is of concern given the adverse health

consequences of the haste to reopen Wall Street after the 9/11 attack.

SEPAs newHomeland Security Strategy document lacks a clear policy declaration that itwill issue assurances of safety only after assessing the pollution hazards as a whole rather

than basing its assurances merely on individual chemicals, as occurred in the World Trade

Center disaster; also, it fails to adopt a better safe than sorry approach to reduce human

exposures while awaiting complete information on pollution.

S The Department of Homeland Securitys newNational Response Plan denies OSHA final

say over the protection of rescue and recovery workers, giving authority for dispute

resolution to a Joint Field Office Coordination Group.

S New Yorkers still await a proper response to the World Trade Center attack, including a

proper cleanup of the contamination that permeated homes and workplaces, and a properprogram for medical monitoring and care for the people exposed to 9/11 pollution.

S New studies of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and benzene pollutants that

were in the Ground Zero air indicate the need to monitor public health not only for cancer

but also for immune system impacts and effects on offspring. Also, new data on asthma

impacts in western Brooklyn indicate the need to investigate 9/11 impacts there.

S Rather than investigate the failures of the Workers Compensation System to aid people who

became ill from 9/11 pollution exposure, and solve the problems, the federal government

is simply turning its back on the unmet needs.

S Congress has failed to investigate and obtain disclosure of the identities of persons in the

White House who suppressed 9/11 health warnings that EPA otherwise would have issued,

and there has still been no comprehensive investigation of the methods EPA used to test the

air emissions and dust, which were the subjects of significant controversy.


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S All Americans should be concerned about what happened at Ground Zero. Many other states

besides New York are home to residents who were made ill by exposure to 9/11 pollution.

Although health effects statistics are not available, 9/11 clinical programs have screened 846

rescue and recovery workers from other states, including 363 from New Jersey, 88 from

Massachusetts, 79 from California, 77 from Ohio, 66 from Illinois, and 30 from Florida.

Over half of the 2,680 injured people who applied to the short-lived federal victim

compensation fund reported asthma or respiratory symptoms, and 339 of them lived in other

states. These states included:

New Jersey 182 applicants

Virginia 53 applicants

Pennsylvania 24 applicants

Florida 22 applicants

Also, a future disaster releasing toxic contaminants could happen in any state. Louisiana and

Mississippi are facing unknown levels of contamination as a result of the Katrina hurricane.Several reports have noted, in addition, that Americas chemical facilities remain

particularly vulnerable nationwide.

The unmistakable conclusion that must be drawn is that America remains at risk not only from terrorist

attacks and natural disasters, but also from our own federal governments unwillingness to put public

health and safety first in its response to such national emergencies.

Recommendations

Congress should hold hearings to:

S Investigate the Department of Homeland Securitys new optimization policy initiative and

challenge its role in establishing toxic cleanup goals and making cleanup decisions;

S Demand a clarification of EPAs new relationship to the Department of Homeland Security,

especially with regard to environmental cleanup in the aftermath of a disaster, and

investigate whether or not public health warnings may be compromised as a result;

S Demand a reversal of OSHAs decision not to carry out enforcement of safety and health

laws for rescue and recovery workers in national disasters, and challenge the federal

Administrations decision to take final authority for worker safety out of OSHAs hands;

S Investigate the failure of New York States Workers Compensation System to assist the

workers made ill by 9/11 pollution; and,

S Demand that the federal administration disclose the identities of the persons in the White

House who suppressed warnings of health risks from the 9/11 terrorist attack.


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The federal administration should:

S Revise its National Response Plan, EPA Homeland Security Strategy document and

National Incident Management Plan to establish a policy that public health assurances are

issued only after assessing the pollution hazards as a whole, rather than basing assurancesmerely on individual chemicals, and incorporate a better safe than sorry approach to

reduce human exposures while awaiting complete information on pollution;

S Restore the primacy of EPA in developing cleanup goals for pollution released in national

emergencies;

S Revise itsNational Response Plan, OSHA National Emergency Management Plan, and

National Incident Management Plan documents to ensure that OSHA has the final word in

health and safety protections for rescue and recovery workers in a national emergency;

SDisclose the identities of the persons in the White House who suppressed warnings of healthrisks from the terrorist attack;

S Develop a program to identify the volunteers from states other than New York who worked

in the Ground Zero area for medical screening; follow up on the health impacts of the

injured people who applied to the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund; and establish

a health screening project in Brooklyn to follow up on the results of the new asthma study

and identify people made ill from the attacks;

S Address the gaps in medical care funding that remain for recovery workers because of the

limitations of the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund and the failures of the Workers

Compensation System, and establish a program to assist, as needed, those residents, smallbusiness owners, students and area employees who are ill from 9/11 pollution exposure;

S Provide proper long-term funding -- at least 20 years but preferably 30 -- for medical

monitoring, and include monitoring for immune system effects and effects on offspring; and

S Adopt the recommendations of the World Trade Center Community-Labor Coalition to

make EPAs proposed testing and cleanup plan for World Trade Center contamination of

homes and workplaces into an effective and credible program that will identify and clean

up any remaining hazards.


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Background

In 2004, the Sierra Club issued a report showing how the federal government failed to inform

the public of the hazards of the World Trade Center pollution, fulfill its legal duties to enforce worker

safety rules, and conduct a proper environmental cleanup. The report made the following findings:

S Our federal government should have considered the pollution dangerous unless rigorous

testing proved the conditions to be safe. It did not. Instead, EPA and OSHA under the

White House Council on Environmental Qualitys direction behaved as though they

had no understanding of pollution and its impacts, and as though they did not know their

own statutory duties.

S Then, when confronted with information revealing harm such as the fact that the 9/11

dust was highly caustic or that office workers in a building several blocks from Ground

Zero were still suffering health effects months after the attack the federal government

simply did not disclose this information to the public.

S Also, the Bush administrations new disaster planning documents appeared to

institutionalize OSHAs failure to enforce health and safety standards for response

workers and establish centralized political control of hazard communications without

strong policies to protect the public against false assurances.

These failures have prolonged the harms of the September 11 attack for New York City residents and

those people from other states who generously came to help. The 2004 report recommended several

steps that the federal government should take to mitigate the harm caused by its failure to issue proper

health risk warnings, clean up the remaining World Trade Center contamination in homes and

workplaces, and promote stronger standards for protecting public health and safety in future disasters.

It urged that the Bush administration must restore trust in its agencies. Yet, today, the problemsidentified in the report remain unresolved, and new national disaster policies may make the situation

even worse.


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NYC D ept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, The WTCHR Quarterly Enrollment Update: Data Through1

Friday, September 10, 2004, World Trade Center Health Registry Data Snapshot(Fig. 8). A 2002 study found that

332 firefighters and one EMS worker had WTC cough severe enough to require four or more consecutive weeks of

medical leave; 87 percent also had gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD). Prezant, D.J., et al., Cough andBronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site, New Eng. J Med. 347(11):806-15 (2002).

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I. Why We Must Prevent the Failures of 9/11 from Being Repeated: New Information on the

Human Health Impacts and Potential Future Hazards from 9/11 Pollution

People clearly needed better protection from the pollution caused by the September 11, 2001

attack in New York City. The City Department of Health and Mental Hygienes World Trade Center

Health Registry reports that nearly 27,000 people have reported experiencing sinus problems or noseirritation after the attack, and over 21,000 reported a persistent cough. The agency reports that it does

not know for how long these symptoms lasted, and our government has not made the effort to find out.1

The federal government has failed to identify, quantify and track:

S the children who are still suffering health effects;

S the elderly people who are still suffering health effects;

S the people with asthma or other respiratory diseases who still suffer health effects;

S the people with immune system deficiencies whose conditions worsened;

S the otherwise healthy residents and college students who still suffer health effects;

S the small business owners who still suffer health effects;

Sthe building cleaners and custodians who still suffer health effects;

S the office workers, food service workers, small business employees and other area

employees who still suffer health effects;

S the transport workers, communications workers, carpenters, or electricians, plumbers,

sanitation workers, reporters and film technicians who still suffer health effects;

S the social service Ground Zero volunteers who still suffer health effects.

As a result, we still do not know the total number of people who are sick from 9/11 pollution. We know

that many thousands of people do suffer health impacts, but we do not know the total number. We do

not know because our federal government has not bothered to find out.

These people are not supposed to exist. Our federal government leaders, in their rush to reopenthe New York Stock Exchange and other Wall Street businesses and perhaps in an ideological

reluctance to acknowledge that pollution can make people sick urged everyone to come back to Lower

Manhattan. Barricades were removed. Our federal government declared the air safe. It did not limit its

welcome to healthy adults. Everyone, including young children, could return.

Neither the federal nor the local government made any reasonable effort to evaluate the safety

of homes and workplaces before issuing this broad invitation. Families with children were encouraged

to return to their homes. Schools were reopened. Employees generally had no choice at all in the matter.

No government agency said that people with respiratory conditions should consult their doctors before

they returned, or that workers should be excused from returning until the workplace was properly

cleaned. After all, according to EPA, Lower Manhattan was safe.


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GAO, September 11: Health Effects in the Aftermath of the World Trade Center Attack(Testimony to the2

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Comm. on Government

Reform)(GAO-04-1068T)(Sept. 8, 2004)(hereafter, GAO Report on WTC Health Effects), pp. 16 and 23.

Statement of Dr. John Howa rd, Director, National Inst. For Occupl Safety and He alth, in, Devlin Barrett,3

Sept. 11-related Cancers May Not Appear for Decades, Doctors Tell Congress, Associated Press (Sept. 8, 2004).

A screening of 250 rescue a nd recovery workers had foun d that nine months after the attack, 45% still had4

at least one pulmonary symptom and 52% had an ear, nose or throat symptom. R. Herbert and S. Levin, World

Trade Center Worker and Volunteer Med ical Screening Program: Report of Initial Findings to the National

Institute for Occupational Safety and H ealth of the CDC(2003). Eleven mon ths after the attack, 358 firefighters and

five EMS worke rs remained on medica l leave or light duty assignment because of respiratory illness that occurred

after WTC exposure. CDC, Injuries and Illnesses Among New York City Fire Department Rescue Workers AfterResponding to the World Trade Center Attacks, Morbid & Mortal Wkly Rpt51(special issue):1-5 (Sept. 11, 2002).

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Even the people who worked directly on the pile at Ground Zero should not be sick. The federal

government insists that they provided the workers with protective gear. It blames workers for failing

to use it, while failing to acknowledge the mixed messages about safety that EPA sent and OSHAs

failure to enforce safety standards. OSHA insists that its non-enforcement, cooperative agreement

approach to worker health and safety at Ground Zero which actually allowed rampant violation of the

requirements of protective gear that should have been in place was a great success story.

So no one should be sick.

But they are. And our federal government has neglected even to count them. In 2004, the U.S.

General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated federal actions taken to study the health effects of the 9/11

pollution and found that no comprehensive, coordinated effort occurred. The GAO identified six

government programs with varying purposes and limitations, but reported that an estimated 250,000

to 400,000 people were exposed or at risk of exposure to 9/11 pollution, and the full health impact of

the attack is unknown. At a September 2004 Congressional hearing, when Representative Carolyn2

Mahoney asked the director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, how many

people are still sick, he responded, Im not sure anyone could give you an exact figure. We do,3however, know more than we did a year ago.

New Confirmation that Human Health Impacts from 9/11 Pollution Are Persisting

It has taken three years or longer for studies to emerge confirming what workers and residents

already know that health effects from Ground Zero have persisted for a year or longer. While early

studies had revealed cause for concern, the newly released data indicate that not only thousands of4

workers but also thousands of residents experienced 9/11-related respiratory health effects that

persisted for a year or longer, and may still persist.

S A study of over a thousand rescue and recovery workers found that 78 percent reported

persistent WTC-related symptoms. An average of about eight months and a range of

seven weeks to well over a year (63 weeks) had elapsed since they had stopped working


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The study examined a subset of 1,138 of the 11,768 rescue and recovery workers and volunteers screened5

by the Mount Sinai Medical School by the end 2002, and found that 851 reported persistent symptoms. CDC,

Physical Health Status of World Trade Center Rescue and Recovery Workers and Volunteers New York City,July, 2002-August 2004,Morbid & Mortal Wkly Rpt53(35):807-12 (Sept. 10, 2004).

CDC, Physical Health Status of World Trade Center Rescue and Recovery Workers, supra, p. 8126

(Editorial Note). In a study of 62 of the nearly 3,000 N YC transport worke rs exposed to the 9/11 po llution, 10 to 25percent reported persistent eye and nose or throat irritation, and/or respiratory symptoms 7 m onths after the attack.

Loren Tapp, et al., Physical and Mental Health Symptoms Among NYC Transit Workers Seven and One-half

Months After the WTC Attacks, Am J Indl Med. 47:475-83 (2005).

Shao Lin, et al., Upper Respiratory Symptoms and Other Health Effects Among Residents Living Near7

the World Trade Center Site After September 11, 2001, Am J Epid. 162(6) (Sept. 15, 2005). The study was begun

eight months after the attack, and surveyed 49 residential buildings with approxima tely 9,200 households living

within 1.5 kilometers of Ground Zero. The number of qualified respondents was 2,362.

GAO Report on WTC Health Effects, p. 6. In a representative sample of 179 Fire Dep artment rescue8

workers, 23 percent of the highly exposed subjects and 11 percent of the moderately exposed rescue workers still

suffered from persistent bronchial hyperreactivity a year after the attack. A year after the attack 16 percent had

reactive airways dysfunction syndrome. G. Banauch, et al., Bronchial Hyperactivity and Other Inhalation Lung

Injuries in Rescue Recovery Workers After the World Trade center Collapse, Crit Care Med. 33:S102-06 (2005).[T]he particulate matter from the plume can b e irritating to your eyes, nose and throat. It can cause more

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serious reactions in sensitive populations, such as people with respiratory problems or asthma, acc ording to health

officials, but does not cause any irreversible health effects. Statement of Kathleen Callahan, Acting Dep uty

Regional Administrator, EPA Region 1, before the New York State Assembly (Nov. 26, 2001).

An EPA press release issued in March 2002 asserted, tests conducted since September 11 haveth10

indicated that there is no evidence o f significant long-term health risks to residents and office workers from the air

quality in Lower Manhattan. EPA Region 2, Press Release, Federal, State and City Agencies Announce Actionsfor Lower Manhattan Air Quality (Mar. 25, 2002).

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at Ground Zero or the site had been cleaned up. The Centers for Disease Control noted,5

[T]he persistence of symptoms for greater than one year after the 9/11 event is a new

finding and requires further study.6

S Over 1,000 residents 43.7 percent of the 2,362 residents included in a recently

published survey reported that at least one new-onset upper respiratory symptom stillpersisted a year after the attack. The study concluded that residents of the affected area

reported significantly more upper respiratory symptoms than residents of the control

area.7

S As of March 2004, about 380 firefighters were still unable to serve as firefighters

because of respiratory illnesses that they had developed after WTC exposure.8

Assurances at the time that respiratory symptoms would be temporary and that residents were not at9

risk of long-term health effects apparently were based more on what the federal government wanted10

to be true than on scientific knowledge.

New research has confirmed the existence of World Trade Center Cough as a specific medical

condition. A special CT scan analysis of 20 patients with the symptoms commonly associated with

World Trade Center Cough patients who did not have asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

(COPD) or another more easily diagnosed respiratory ailment found that they suffer from a

respiratory ailment characterized by small airway disease. Such air trapping, a manifestation of


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The researchers use of an end -expirato ry, high resolution CT revealed abn ormalities in the lung11

airways that a standard CT did not reveal. David Mendelson, et al., Abstract, Air Trapping Detected on End-

Expiratory High Resolution CT in Symptomatic World Trade Center (AC) Rescue and Recovery Workers

(presented at the Annual Meeting of the Radiological Society of North America, Nov. 30, 2004)

); Radiological Society of North America,

Press Release, CT He lps Find Cause of Puzzling Cough in W TC Rescue W orkers (Nov. 30, 2004)().

Anna Gosline, CT Scans Explain Mysterious 9/11 Cough,NewScientist.com News Service (Nov. 2004)12

().Ginger Adams Otis, Lungs Were Destroyed: Cite 9/11 Exposure for EMTs Death, The Chief(July 8,

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2005); Ridgely Ochs, Ailments, Struggles of 9/11 EMT Who Died Not Unique, Newsday (Sept. 4, 2005).

Dr. Thomas Cahill, professoremeritus of physics and engineering at the University of California at14

Davis, reported that his air samples showed unprec edented amb ient levels of fine particulate matter, sulfur, acidic

aerosols, heavy metals and other toxic comp ounds. His samples were taken on the roo f of a 12-story building at 201

Varick Street (W est Village), a mile north-northwest of Ground Zero. The results were higher than he had measured

at the Kuwaiti oil field fires during the 1991 Gulf Wa r. Thomas Cahill, et al., Analysis of Aerosols from the WorldTrade Center Collapse Site, New York, Oct. 2 to Oct. 30, 2001, Aerosol Sci. & Tech. 38:165-183 (2004), p. 182.

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obstructed lung airways, results in shortness of breath, dry cough or wheezing. The authors developed11

a visual scale for the black spots that the scans revealed in the airways. (The black spots indicate that

air is trapped in the lungs, making it difficult for the patient to breathe freely.) Reportedly, they noted

that while smokers would probably fall somewhere between 0 and 4 on that scale, the World Trade

Center rescue workers averaged 10.55. The lead author observed that the most likely culprit behind this

type of airway disease was the pulverized alkaline cement released by the collapse of the towers.12

No comprehensive research on mortality related to 9/11 pollution health impacts has yet been

released, although some concerns have been raised about individual cases. A retired Emergency

Medical Technician with the Fire Department of New York, Tim Keller, passed away on June 23, 2005,

reportedly from extreme pulmonary distress. A member of the Uniformed EMTs and Paramedics Local

2507, he had suffered since September 11 from debilitating respiratory problems, yet was deniedth

workers compensation benefits and died almost penniless. Colleagues speaking to a writer for The

Chief, a newspaper for City employees, stated their belief that Mr. Kellers death was caused by the

exposures that he suffered at Ground Zero. This is a matter that should be the subject of investigation.13

New Information on Potential Future Health Impacts from 9/11: Need to Consider

Immune System Threats, Potential Impacts on Offspring, and Geographical Scope

We are still learning more about the chemical soup to which people were exposed from Ground

Zero. The fires from Ground Zero produced a mix of toxic gasses and ultra-fine particulates (a

technical term for airborne dust) never seen before. A study released in November 2004 of induced14

sputum from New York City firefighters who worked at Ground Zero, collected 10 months after the

attack, made two important findings:

S The particles in the sputum of the New York City firefighters contained titanium, zinc,

mercury, gold, tin and nickel, while those from a control group of firefighters from Tel-Aviv contained mostly particles of silica, stainless steel and clays. Thus, the particles


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See Lung Chi Chen and George Thurston, World Trade Center Cough, The Lancet Supplement360:15

s37-s38 (Dec. 2002).

Elizabeth Fireman, et al., Induced Sputum Assessment in New York City Firefighters Exposed to World16

Trade Center Dust,Envtl Health Persp. 112(15):1564-69 (Nov. 2004). Indications of inflammation also werehigher, and increased with cumulative WTC exposure (measured in number of days worked at Ground Zero).

Robert Dyer, EPA Office of Research and Developme nt, Chemical Mixtures and Health Effects at17

Superfund Sites,Intl J Hygiene & Envtl Health 205:149-53 (2002). The solvents included toluene, chlorobenzene,trichloroethylene, and mixed xylenes. The PAH mixture included benzo[ a]pyrene, benzo{b]fluoranthene,

dibenz[a,b]anthracene, 5-methylchrysene and cyclopenta[cd]pyrene. Relatively recent studies have documented

significant additive or synergistic effects from very low doses of exposure to estroge nic chemicals that mimic

hormones in the human body. These studies found that certain endocrine-disrupting compounds could produce an

effect in combination even though the individua l chemicals were below their no-observe d-effects concentrations.

Elisabeth Silva, et al., Something from Nothing Eight Weak Estrogenic Chemicals Combined at Concentrations

below NOECs Produce Significant Mixture Effects,Envtl Sci Technol. 36(8):1751-56 (2002); Nissanka Rajapakse,et al., Combining Xenoestrogens at Levels Below Individual No-Observed-Effect Concentrations Dramatically

Enhances Steroid Hormone Action, Envtl Health Persp. 110(9):917-21(2002); J. Payne, et al., Mixtures of Four

Organochlorines Enhance Human Breast Cancer Cell Proliferation, Envtl Health Persp. 109(4):391-97 (2001).

Robert Nolan, et al., Risk Assessment for Asbestos-related Cancer from the 9/11 Attack on the W orld18

Trade Center,J Occupl & Envtl Med. 47:(8):817-25 (Aug. 2005). Similarly, an evaluation of asbestos exposure

for truck drivers working at the WTC site, based on ambient air and personal mo nitors, found that exposures were

very low and short-term. The researchers predic ted that the drivers were not at an increased risk for asbestos-relateddisease. Patrick Breysse, et al., Asbestos Exposures to Truck Drivers During World Trade Center Cleanup

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that the Ground Zero firefighter inhaled were more toxic, and the toxicity was more

complex. Also,

S Many particles that the New York firefighters inhaled were much larger, ranging from

1 to 50 microns in size rather than only the more typical 1 to 10 microns seen in the

control group. The fact that they had inhaled larger particles in addition to small onesis of concern in part because the larger ones were more caustic.15

The researchers observed, We believe the differences . . . demonstrate a unique exposure following

the WTC Collapse.16

The effects of exposure to a mixture of chemicals may be simply additive, or it may be

synergistic (the combined effect being greater than merely adding the effects of the individual

pollutants) or antagonistic (the combined effect being less than the effects of the individual pollutants).

Between 1991 and 1993, EPAs own Office of Research and Development conducted a small study of

the health impacts of mixtures of chemicals typically present at Superfund sites. A report on the results

of the study, published many years later, indicated that additive effects were most common, but thatboth synergistic and antagonistic impacts could occur.17

Mere consideration of individual chemicals, in isolation from the multiple exposures that

occurred, can lead to conclusions that exposures to 9/11 pollution will not cause certain health effects.

A recent study, for example, estimates that the risk of cancer from outdoor exposure to airborne

asbestos released by the World Trade Center attack would be less than one case over the lifetime of the

residential population of Lower Manhattan (57,514 residents) using one calculation, and 12 excess

cancers using EPAs traditional risk assessment model. This could be somewhat encouraging news18


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Operations, J Occupl & Envtl Hygiene 2(8):400-05 (Aug. 2005).

G. S. Berkowitz, et al., The World Trade Center Disaster and Intrauterine Growth Restriction (letter)19

JAMA (290(5):595-96 (2003).

Lioy (2002);Health and Environmental Consequences, p. 17.20

Calculated estimate by David Newman, NYCOSH Industrial Hygienist, presented at Sierra Club forum21

on Ground Zero environmental issues, Dec. 17, 2003.

U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Diseases Registry (ATSDR), ToxFAQs for Polycyclic22

Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs) (Sept. 1996), pp. 2-3.Christopher Sommers, et al., Reduction of Particulate Air Po llution Lowers the Risk of Heritable

23

Mutations in Mice, Science 304:1008-1010 (May 14, 2004); Research Links Air Pollution to Genetic Mutations,USA Today (Sept. 13, 2004).

Frederica Perera, etal., DNA Damage from Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons Measured by24

Benzo[a]pyrene-DNA Adducts in Mothers and Newborns from Northern Manhattan, the World Trade Center Area,

Poland, and China, Cancer Epid Bioma rkers & Prev. 14:709-14 (Mar. 2005). See also Frederica Perera, et al.,

Biomarkers in Maternal and Newborn Blood Indicate Heightened Fetal Susceptibility to Procarcinogenic DNADamage,Envtl Health Persp. 112(10): 1133-36 (July 2004).

11

for many residents and area employees. The study is based on estimates of exposure and is limited in

part because, as the authors note, EPAs air monitoring for asbestos generated by the terrorist attack

was not based on health benchmarks or on acquiring data for a risk assessment. More importantly,

the study did not take into account the potential impacts of multiple chemical exposure.

While no new health risk studies have emerged on the potential combined impact of the multiplechemical exposures that people experienced from the World Trade Center attack, studies of individual

pollutants indicate important areas of concern. Also, a study of one type of health impact indicates the

need to expand the geographical scope of 9/11-related health screenings and cleanup.

Impacts on the Newborns. A 2003 study of 187 pregnant women who were either in or near

the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 had found that 8.2 percent were born with a birth

weight below the tenth percentile for gestational age, compared to 3.8 percent in a control group. It was

suggested that the impact might be caused by exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs).19

PAHs are a group of chemicals commonly formed by incomplete combustion of oil, plastics, and many

other substances. The 9/11 attack released an estimated 200,000 to 2 million pounds of PAHs within

half a kilometer of Ground Zero, and at least 8,000 to 80,000 pounds of it probably became easily20inhalable by becoming attached to tiny dust particles. Some PAHs may reasonably be expected to21

cause cancer.22

New evidence supports further concern regarding the exposure of pregnant women to PAHs

from the World Trade Center disaster. A 2004 study had found that male mice exposed to higher levels

of PAH air pollution passed on genetic mutations at a rate 52 percent higher than that for male mice

exposed to rural levels. Now, a new study of non-smoking mothers and their newborns has found that23

babies exposed to PAHs while in the womb are susceptible to pro-carcinogenic DNA damage from

PAHs that is, damage that makes one more susceptible to cancer. Using a biomarker for

procarcinogenic genetic damage, it found that 57.5 percent of mothers exposed to the World Trade

Center dust cloud had detectible levels of the biomarker, and 60.6 percent of the newborns also wereaffected. There is reason to be concerned, therefore, that exposure to PAHs may pose a risk to24


14/44

Transgenerationa l impacts of pollution in some cases may extend ove r several generations. A new study25

in rats of two pesticides that cause male infertility found that exposure of a pr egnant rat caused fertility reductions

not only in the first generation but also in the second generation. M. D. Anway, et al., Epigenic Transgenerational

Actions of Endocrine Disruptors and Male Fertility, Science 308:1466-69 (2005).

Jean C. Pfau, et al., Assessment of Autoimmune Responses Associated with Asbe stos Exposure in26

Libby, Mondana, USA,Envtl Health Persp. 113(1):25-30 (2005).

Juan Gonzalez, A Toxic Nightmare at Disaster Site: Air, Water Soil Contaminated, New York Daily27

News (Oct. 26, 2001); EPA Daily Summary, October 14, and EPA Daily Summary, October 15. In an attempt to

persuade the Daily News publisher that hazards were minimal, former EPA Administrator Whitman argued that the

elevated levels of benzene were not a significant risk to the workers because EPA has more c onsistently found low

levels of contaminants in the breathing zone - five to seven feet above the debris pile. M emorandum from C hristieWhitman, EPA Administrator to Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Chairman & Co-Publisher, Daily News and Edward

Kosner, Editor in Chief,Daily News , re Oct. 26, 2001 Front Page News Story (undated), p. 2. Her memorandum did

not acknowled ge the fact that workers were removing materials from the pile by hand.

EPA Response to September 11, EPA M onitoring Site: WTC - South Tower Benzene Air Monitoring28

Data (< http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/benzene_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=9 >) .

EPA Office of Inspector General,EPAs Response to the World Trad e Center Collapse: Challenges,29

Successes and Areas for Improvement(Aug. 21, 2003)(hereafter,IG Report), p. 47.

Qing Lan, et al., Hematotoxicity in Workers Exposed to Low Levels of Benzene, Science30

306(5702):1774-76 (Dec. 3, 2004); University of California at Berkeley, Press Release, New Study LinksOccupational Exposure to Low Levels of Benzene with Decreased White Blood Cell Counts (Dec. 2, 2004).

12

offspring whether the father becomes exposed before conception or whether the mother becomes

exposed during pregnancy.25

Potential Impact on the Immune System. While most concerns raised about exposure to

asbestos have focused on cancer, it may also have an impact on the immune system. New research from

the Center for Environmental Health Sciences at the University of Montana has documented a linkbetween asbestos and the production of antinuclear antibodies that attack tissues, organs and cells.

The researchers found that these antinuclear antibodies occurred a surprising 28.6 percent more

frequently in a group of 50 residents from Libby, Montana a town heavily contaminated by asbestos

than in a control group in Missoula, Montana. Because the study was small, the researchers have

urged that a larger study is needed, but they noted that the study results support the hypothesis that

asbestos exposure is associated with autoimmune responses.26

For workers at or near Ground Zero, another immune system issue may be of concern. EPA

found levels of benzene at the pile that were significantly higher than OSHAs workplace health limit

several times in October 2001. Results from some air samples taken directly at Ground Zero were27

dramatically higher (up to 4000 times) than those taken in the surrounding streets. Some high levels28of benzene occurred as late as January and February 2002, when fires flared up during removal

operations. Now, a new study has linked exposure to low levels of benzene with lowered white blood29

cell counts. Benzene has long been known as a human carcinogen. Although the OSHA worker safety

standard for benzene is set at one part per million (ppm) averaged over eight hours, this study found

decreased white blood cell and platelet counts even with exposure below one ppm. Also, it found that

benzene exposure reduces the number of progenitor cells, including stem cells, that are precursors to

blood cells, and that people with certain genetic traits were more susceptible to these effects. The30
http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/dioxin_nd_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=16http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/dioxin_nd_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=16http://oaspub.epa.gov/nyr/dioxin_nd_air_monitoring?p_addr_id=16


15/44

See Testimony of Brooklyn resident Jenna Orkin to the WTC Expert Technical Review Panel (Mar. 31,31

2004).

Victoria Wagner, et al., Asthma in Medicaid Managed Care Enrollees Residing in New York City:32

Results from a Post-World Trade Center Disaster Survey, J Urban Health 82(1):76-89 (2005), p. 84 (Table 3).

E-mail communications from the Mount Sinai WTC Medical Monitoring Program in response to request33

for data (Sept. 2, 2005).

13

significance of this study for Ground Zero workers who in some cases received higher exposures but

possibly for shorter periods than the subjects of this benzene study has not been evaluated.

Need for Health Monitoring of Brooklyn Residents. City Council member David Yassky

and Brooklyn resident Jenna Orkin have for years raised concerns about World Trade Center dust

deposition in the borough of Brooklyn. A newly released study reveals that asthma-related health31

impacts occurred in Western Brooklyn after the September 11 attack. A survey of Medicaid Managed

Care enrollees having persistent asthma found that residence in both Lower Manhattan and Western

Brooklyn (Brooklyn zip code regions directly across the East River from Lower Manhattan) were

associated with self-reported worsened asthma, and that residents of Western Brooklyn had an elevated

odds ratio for emergency department/inpatient hospitalizations with diagnoses of asthma between

September 11 and December 31, 2001. While the survey response was small, the results suggest that32

residents of Western Brooklyn were subject to respiratory irritants from Ground Zero. More

investigative research should be conducted to evaluate the extent of that impact.

II. Why All Americans Should Demand Strong Policies to Protect the Public Against HealthRisks in National Disasters

People from Many States Came to Help New York

All Americans should be concerned about what happened at Ground Zero, not only because

were all in this together, but also because the effects of the governments failures in the aftermath

of Ground Zero have had an impact on people throughout the country who really believed in that moral

value -- the generous people who volunteered to help in the disaster. No concerted program exists to

identify and track the health of the many volunteers and workers who came to New York from

throughout the nation to help at Ground Zero. Still, some information is available.

- The Mount Sinai School of Medicine worked with the Association of Occupational and

Environmental Clinics to ensure the provision of 9/11 health services in other states.

While health effects statistics are not available, they have screened 846 response

workers from other states, including 363 from New Jersey, 88 from Massachusetts, 79

from California, 77 from Ohio, 66 from Illinois, and 30 from Florida.33

The Workforce Medical Clinic in Redwood, California, for example, is monitoring

health problems suffered by members of a search and rescue team who worked for 13

days on the pile, laboring for approximately 20 hours each day. The leader of that 67-


16/44

Malaika Fraley, Ailments Still Plague 9/11 Search and Rescue Team: Local Clinic to Test Those with34

Health Problems as Part of Study, San Mateo County Times (Sept. 11, 2004).

Kenneth R. Feinberg, Esq., Special Master, et al.,Final Report of the Special Master for the September35

11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Vol. I (Nov. 17, 2004)(hereafter,Feinberg Report on September 11 V ictimth

Compensation Fund), p. 102, Table 5a. Some of these injuries probably occurred as a result of the attack on the

Pentagon, but most were World Trade Center injuries.

In New Yor k City, for example, 84 percent of tall office buildings and 64 perce nt of short office36

buildings harbor asbestos. EPA, Guidelines for Catastrophic Emergency Situations Involving Asbe stos (EPA 340/1-

92-010)(Feb. 1992), p. 24.

The Indian Point Nuclear Power Plants proximity to dense population areas, including New York City,37

makes it a serious risk. In a study commissioned by Riv erkeeper, Inc., the Union of Concern ed Scientists found that

an attack resulting in a large radiological release could c ause as many as 44,000 near-term de aths from acute

radiation syndrome or 518,000 long-term deaths from cancer among people within 50 miles of the plant. Edwin

Lyman, Ph.D., Chernobyl on the Hu dson? Th e Health and Econo mic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian

Point Nuclear Plant(Sept. 2004) ( ).

See, John Mintz, U.S. Called Unprepared for Nuclear Terrorism, Washington Post(May 3, 2005); John38

Mintz and Susan Schmidt, Dirty Bomb Was Major New Years Worry, Washington Post(Jan. 7, 2004); JeremyOlshan, City Scrambling to Handle Nuke Strike, New York Post(Sept. 21, 2004).

14

member team reports that about 70 percent of them became ill from the work. Some still

suffer from World Trade Center cough and other symptoms.34

- The final report issued on the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund further

highlights the problem. While most of the 2,680 people who applied to the Fund for

physical injuries were from New York, several were from other states, including:

New Jersey 182 applicants

Virginia 53 applicants

Pennsylvania 24 applicants

Florida 22 applicants

Maryland 22 applicants (most or all may have been Pentagon-related)

Connecticut 12 applicants

Other states 24 applicants35

Clearly, long-term health impacts from a national disaster cannot simply be viewed as a local problem.

Americans from all over the country respond. It is a national issue.

Security Concerns and Potential Targets

All Americans should be further concerned about our governments failed response to Ground

Zero pollution because a future disaster releasing toxic contaminants could happen in any state.

Louisiana and Mississippi currently face unknown levels of contamination as a result of the Katrina

hurricane. Any emergency involving the destruction of a large building is likely to cause a release of

hazardous substances. Industrial chemical facilities, chemical rail cars and nuclear power plants36

nationwide present inherent hazards that could put public health in jeopardy from a terrorist attack or

a disastrous accident. The potential risk from terrorist use of a nuclear device also cannot be ignored.37 38


17/44

GAO, Hom eland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemica l Facilities, but the Extent

39

of Security Preparedness Is Unknown (GAO-03-439)(Mar. 2003)(hereafter, GAO C hemical Facilities Report), pp.

6 and 9.

Linda-Jo Schierow, Congressional Research Service, CRS Repo rt for Congress: Chemical Facility40

Security (updated July 29, 2005), p. 4.

Carl Prine, Chemical Sites Still Vulnerable, Pittsburgh Tribune-Review (Nov. 16, 2003) (available at41

).

Carolyn Merritt, chair and CEO of the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,42

Opinion Editorial, Despite Pr ogress, Chemical Spills Persist, Christian Science Monitor(Jan. 6, 2005).

USPIRG, The Dangerous Dozen: A Look at How 12 Chemical Companies Jeopardize Millions of43

Americans (June 2004).

Anne Be lli, BP Must Fix Its Safety Culture, Board Says: Saying Lapses Pose Imminent Da nger, Feds44

Issue an Urgent Call for an Outside Inquiry, Houston Chronicle (Aug. 18, 2005).

Clean Air Act, 112(r). The statute impo ses a general duty on owners and op erators of facilities to45

prevent or minimize accidental releases and to provide prompt emergency response action if a release occurs.

GAO Ch emical Facilities Report, p. 4.46

In New York, both City and State law require companies storing large amounts of hazardous chemicals to47

develop a risk-managem ent plan that City law states must at least consider using less toxic substances, but the city

reportedly has never pena lized a facility for filing a weak plan or for failing to adopt the use of safer alternative

substances. See Philip Weinb erg and Joel Shufro, Opinion E ditorial, Cut the Use of Toxics in the City,New York

Daily News (Sept. 30, 2003) ().

15

For one major category of risk chemical plant safety no federal security system is in place

despite warnings of hazards. The Department of Justice states that the risk of terrorists attempting to

cause an industrial chemical release is both real and credible. In the late 1990s, criminals at least39

twice tried to cause releases from chemical facilities in our country at a large propane storage facility

and a gas refinery. A General Accounting Office report in 2003 declared that voluntary efforts to40

ensure chemical facility security were inadequate, and the Philadelphia Tribune and CBS newsmagazine 60 Minutes identified poor security at more than 60 plants in the Pittsburgh area, Chicago,

Baltimore, and Houston, finding open rail lines, unlocked gates and broken fences. Carolyn Merritt,41

chair of the federal Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, observes that when a 48,000-

pound chlorine gas release occurred at a chlorine repackaging plant near St. Louis in 2003, neither the

community nor the plant had emergency sirens or automated alert systems, and firefighters had to go

door to door to alert residents to evacuate. A 2004 report by the U. S. Public Interest Research Group42

(USPIRG) highlighted 12 companies with facilities that could endanger millions of people. In August43

2005, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board urged BP Global to investigate safety at its

five refineries in our country after an explosion and fire at its Texas City refinery killed 15 workers and

caused 170 injuries.44

EPA rules under the Clean Air Act require chemical facilities that manage certain hazardous

chemicals in larger amounts to have a risk management plan describing its accident prevention

measures and emergency response program. The rule does not, however, specifically require such45

plans to address the threat of terrorism. Although one could interpret this section of the law to give EPA

authority to adopt rules on security from terrorism, the agency is waiting instead for action by

Congress which has not yet come. Without uniform, enforceable standards and oversight, it cannot46 47

be said that a security program is in place to protect the public.


18/44

Eric Lipton, Administration to Seek Antiterror Rules for Che mical Plants,New York Times (June 15,48

2005). The e ffectiveness of any legislation may be at risk given the House leaderships decision to leave chemicalsecurity issues under the jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee, where chairman Joe Barton of Texas

is seen as a long-time ally of chemical industries, rather than in the Homeland Security Committee. See Manu Raju,

Chemical Security Review by Homeland Department May Undercut EPA Assessment, Inside EPA (Jan. 6, 2005).

EPA,Homeland Security Strategy (Oct. 2004), p. xi-xiv.49

16

On June 15, 2005, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff finally acknowledged

publicly the need for federal standards to protect chemical plants from terrorism. Any such legislative48

efforts should focus, as recommended in the USPIRG report, both on strengthening physical security

and reducing chemical inventories or substituting safer chemicals (which would reduce the impact of

a terrorist assault if security fails.)

Even if significant progress in security measures occurs, the opportunities to create

environmental disasters will remain numerous. For this reason, all Americans should be concerned

about our federal governments improper assurances of safety after the 9/11 attack, its failure to change

those assurances even when information on health effects from Ground Zero pollution began to emerge,

its resistance to calls for a proper cleanup of contamination, and its abandonment of the patriotic

citizens who responded to the disaster caused by the terrorist attack. Such colossal governmental

failures must not be repeated in a future terrorist attack or national disaster.

III. Why It Is Reasonable to Worry that the Federal Administration Will Not Meet Its Duty

to Assess Fully the Severity and Extent of Contamination.

Most terrorist attacks are designed to have an impact on areas frequented by large numbers of

people. Such areas also have important economic or political significance. The conflict between

protecting the public and restoring or regaining access to areas hit by terrorist attacks raises important

issues that must be aired publicly.

EPAs new Homeland Security Strategy, released in October 2004, states as a Homeland

Security Objective, that the agency will use best available environmental information from internal

and external sources to ensure informed decision-making and appropriate response. This would be49

a significant improvement over EPAs performance at Ground Zero, documented in the 2004 Sierra

Club report, when it ignored its own vast knowledge about the chemicals released from combustion anddemolition, issued assurances of safety based on inadequate testing, and failed to carry out its

responsibilities under federal environmental law. Unfortunately, the public has no assurance that this

will occur, because the kinds of political pressures that were placed on EPA after the World Trade

Center attack may become part of a new goal-setting process for cleanup after future emergency

incidents. In this context, the public needs to know more about a new Department of Homeland Security

proposal to use an optimization process to make decisions about responses to toxic hazards from

terrorist attacks and other national emergencies.

Need for Public Debate on Optimization Policy. The reasoning behind the optimization

policy initiative first surfaced publicly in a 2003Inside EPA report about plans to develop cleanup goals


19/44

As noted in Sierra Clubs 2004 report, Inside EPA had reported that the White House Office of Science50

and Technology Policy had established a high-level steering group of federal agencies to develop new chemical

cleanup standards. Administration to Draft Emergency Toxic Cleanup Standard Different than Superfund, Inside

EPA (Oct. 30, 2003). The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, a political appointee, reports

directly to the White Ho use Chief of Staff. See James Glantz, At the Center of the Storm Over Bush and Science,

New York Times (Mar. 30, 2004).

While the federal limit for maximum radiation exposure to the public at the proposed Yucca Mountain51

nuclear waste site is 15 millirems per year, 40 C.F.R. 197, one benchmark under consideration would allowexposures of 100 millirems and higher. See, H. Josef Hebert, Planned Cleanup for Dirty Bombs Called Lax,Seattle Post-Intelligencer(Dec. 2, 2004). For the draft proposed guidelines, see Department of Homeland Security,

Protective Action Guides and Operational Guidelines for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and ImprovisedNuclear Devise (IND ) Incidents, Interim Final For Official Use Only, in The Inside EPA Environmental

NewsStand(Nov. 2003)()

(hereafter,DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides).

See Letter from Daniel Hirsch, Committee to Bridge the Gap, et al., to Secretary Tom Ridge, Department52

of Homeland Security (Dec. 2, 2004).

Statement of Brooke Buddemeier, a radiation specialist for the Department of Homeland Security, as53

quoted in Matthew Wald, U.S. Plans to Offer Guidance for a Dirty-bomb Aftermath, New York Times (Sept. 27,2004)(as corrected by the newspaper, Sept. 29, 2004).

Matthew Wald, Pending U.S. Advice on Dirty Bomb Exposure Is Under Fire, New York Times (Dec.54

8, 2004).

17

for chemical and radiological contamination in the event of a terrorist attack or national emergency that

would be weaker than the cleanup standards that already exist under the Superfund Law. The50

Administration did draft proposed new radiological cleanup guidelines that, as disclosed by media

sources in late 2004, would allow radiation levels posing cancer risks much higher than is allowed at

commercial nuclear reactors or even at nuclear waste dumps. The Committee to Bridge the Gap, the51

Nuclear Information and Resource Service, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Sierra Club and over50 other organizations sent a strong letter of concern to Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge

objecting to the proposal. Ironically, a radiation specialist for the Department of Homeland Security52

asserted that goals for cleanup after terrorist attacks should be weaker when the attack occurs in a

prominent location where the need to resume using the site would be higher. This, of course, provoked53

criticism that such attacks would most likely also threaten larger populations.54

As it turns out, this research scientist was voicing what appears to be the theme behind a new

policy initiative at the Department of Homeland Security. A few years ago, the Radiation Advisory

Committee of EPAs Science Advisory Board offered to analyze and provide comments on this

initiative, an offer that has not yet been accepted by EPA. The background statement for the

Committees proposal states:

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed the use of

optimization as the endpoint for final cleanup actions during recovery

from a radiological or nuclear emergency. In this context, optimization

implies a process whereby societal values and needs are integrated with

science-based risks and benefits to develop action options that can be

evaluated for their acceptability to the public . . . . In lieu of the threshold

approach, a process termed optimization was proposed that considers


20/44

EPA Radiation Advisory Committee, Science Advisory Board, Agency Request Project # 05-25:55

Optimization of Radiological Emergency Cleanup Decisions (expected fiscal year activity is to begin: 2005)(projectin queue for planning phase)(, click on Advisory Projects).

DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides, p. 10.56

It further stated, The issue of cleanup actions during the recovery phase of an emerge ncy is not unique to57

the radiation protection discipline, but the use of an optimization framework, rather than a numeric threshold

cleanup standard is a new and critical feature. EPA Radiation Advisory Committee, supra.



18

all data inputs in the context of societal objectives and needs, and results

in multiple response options.55

In other words, decisions about how much risk to tolerate will be conducted on a case-by-case basis,

rather than being based on across-the-board public health standards. The Department of Homeland

Securitys draft interim final guidance document on response to radiological emergencies, disclosedinInside EPA, insists that, Optimization (broadly defined) is a concept that is common to many State,

Federal and International risk management programs that address radionuclides and chemicals, although

it is not always identified as such The Radiation Advisory Committees background statement,56

however, clearly states:

DHSs proposed approach represents a significant change in

radiation protection guidance. The Radiation Advisory

Committee (RAC) therefore proposes to develop a commentary

to advise the EPA on the conceptual framework of a formal

method of optimization as the endpoint for final clean-up actions

during recovery from such emergencies. (Emphasis added)57

In other words, while optimization is a well-known statistical methodology used in a variety of

circumstances to weigh different databases and determine optimal allocation of limited resources, the

scientists felt that this was a new and different use of the term that required careful review and analysis.

The Department of Homeland Securitys draft document on radiological guidelines states that

the protective action guides for responding to a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear

device incident are not intended to define safe or unsafe levels of exposure or contamination, but

rather they represent the approximate levels at which the associated protective actions are justified.

Nevertheless, they do constitute advice by the Department of Homeland Security to State and local

decision-makers, and presumably would be used in major disaster responses orchestrated by the58

federal government.

It is not clear what societal objectives and needs would be included in this new approach, but

the Department of Homeland Security plans to include the potential severity of economic impact.59

An abstract presented at a July 2005 meeting of the Health Physics Society by researchers from the

Argonne National Laboratory proposed a model pursuant to the Department of Homeland Securitys

proposed optimization process that included the ability to estimate the direct and indirect business


21/44

B.M. Biwer, et al(Argonne National Laboratory), RISK-RDD, a Radiological Incident Risk60

Management Tool (abstract for presentation, 50 Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society held in Spokane,th

Washington, July 10-14, 2005) ().

Id.61

The DH S draft document states, In some cases, examining risk management options ma y help refine a62

risk analysis. DHS Draft Interim Final Protective Action Guides, p. 16.

19

disruption impacts from the loss of use of land and property due to a radiological incident. Other60

political or social considerations could potentially enter into the analysis as well.

It also is not clear how far this policy would extend. The Committees document suggests that

the optimization process could be directly applicable to other contaminants. The 2003Inside EPA

article similarly suggested that there was an intention to promulgate new emergency standards for otherchemicals. Nothing in the Department of Homeland Securitys draft document suggests that the policy

would only be used with regard to radiation.

It does appear that EPA would not have the last word on environmental safety if this policy

is implemented. The decision-making process about whether or not to allow or encourage the public

to re-enter an area, as described by the Radiation Advisory Committees background statement, would

be made by a decision-making team headed by the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security

and the Governor of the state in which the incident occurred. This would be consistent with new61

national disaster response policy documents, described further below.

Several important questions about the full implications of this new optimization initiativedeserve thorough investigation and disclosure:

S Will this new policy differentiate between a critical need to reenter an area and the need

to disclose and enforce protection against health risks? In other words, will an area be

declared safe simply because there is a need to gain access to it or a desire to reoccupy

it?62

S Will this new policy result in weaker cleanup guidelines overall, as the recent activity

on a special radiological pollution guideline for terrorist attacks and emergencies

appears to indicate?

S Will this policy instead result in a lack of either guidelines or standards, so that

decisions about tolerable levels of safety for children and adults will vary depending on

such factors as the economic or political significance of the area in which they live,

work or attend school?

As the Sierra Clubs 2004 report noted, there was heavy pressure from the White House

to re-open the New York Stock Exchange quickly after the 9/11 attack, and this appears

to have been a motivating factor in the efforts made to reassure the public that the area

was safe despite lack of test data to prove the assertion.


22/44

Most of the asbestos in WT C dust was chrysotile asbestos, which typically has many thin (less than 0.25

63

micrometers) fibers that the older analysis method called Polarized Light Microscopy (PLM) cannot detect. Also,

the force of the collapse pulverized a sbestos-based insulation released fibers mostly less than five micrometers inlength, which the PLM metho d generally cannot detect. B. Lippy , C.I.H., Safety and Health of Heavy E quipment

Operators at Ground Zero, Am J Indl Med42:539-542, 541(2002), p. 541. An analysis of 11 samples collected in

buildings near Ground Zero revealed that 95% of the asbestos fibers were below the width that the PLM method

could detect. R. H. Granger, et al., Preliminary Health Hazard Assessment: World Trade Center (submitted to

American Indl Hygiene Assn)(Oct. 2, 2001). Newer electron microscope methods, -- Transmission Electron

Microscopy (TEM) and Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) -- are far superior in detecting thin and shortasbestos fibers. B. Lippy, J. Boggs, and C. Lambesis, Controversy: The Small Fiber ,Asbestos Issues (Mar. 1989).

20

S Would implementation of this optimization policy mean that children and adults will

no longer have any right to a particular level of environmental safety if their community

becomes the target of a terrorist attack?

S Does the Department of Homeland Security plan to adopt this new policy in the form

of regulations, so that the public has the right to comment on it before it takes effect?

Such questions about the overall principle of the Department of Homeland Securitys new

optimization initiative must be examined in an open, public forum. The public needs to know exactly

what its federal government has in mind.

Americans must not make the mistake of acquiescing to weak or improper emergency

measures that we dont really want to live with on a long-term basis. The federal governments

improper response to a one-day attack on two tall buildings in Manhattan has had harmful consequences

that people are still bearing today. The war on terrorism, moreover, may be with us for many decades.

There may well be times when our nation has to make hard choices, but concealing from the public

critically important information about what they are facing is not the way to manage the situation.

Need for Investigation of EPA Testing Methods. The public also needs more information

on what happened last time -- how EPA approached its assessment of pollution hazards at Ground Zero,

and how it would approach such an assessment in a future disaster. A more comprehensive, independent

investigation is needed of the controversies surrounding the methods that EPA used to measure air

pollution from Ground Zero. These controversies include EPAs use of an older method for measuring

the presence of asbestos that is reportedly less effective at identifying very thin asbestos fibers as well

as short fibers; its failure to measure ultra-fine particles as a state-of-the-art university research team63


23/44

Dr. Thomas Ca hill, of the University of California at Davis, used a rotating monitoring unit that collected64

air samples in sizes ranging from 10 micrometers down to .09 micrometers in diameter. The heat of the W TC fire

had indicated the likely presence o f such ultra-fine particles. Testimony of Dr. Thomas C ahill, in EPA National

Ombudsman, First Investigative Hearing on WTC Hazardous Waste Contamination, hosted by U.S. Rep. JerroldNadler, Transcript (Feb. 21, 2002), p. 24. See also, Thomas Cahill, et al., Analysis of Aerosols from the World

Trade Center Collapse Site, New York Oct. 2 - Oct. 30, 2001, Aerosol Sci. & Tech. 38:165-183 (2004), p. 182.

EPAs own 1996 guidance document explained that high temperature combustion forms ultrafine particles. EPA, Air

Quality Criteria for Pa rticulate Matter(EPA/600/P-95/001af)(Apr. 1996), Vol. I, p. 6-187 to 6-188. Yet, EPA

tested only for particles 2.5 microns or more in diame ter, for which a federal standard exists, with less sensitive

equipment, even though it knew that more sensitive technolo gy was available; such technology was discussed in the1996 guideline and had been further developed since then. Id., pp. 6-187 and 6-191 to 6-192.

See, Testimony of Paul Bartlett, M.A., A.B.D., Research Associate, Center for B iology of Natural65

Systems, Queens College, to the EPA National Ombudsman, First Investigative Hearing on WTC Hazardous WasteContamination, supra, pp. 640-43. Dr. Bartlett expressed surprise at EP As inability to detect the presence of PCBs

in air samples, since the chemical is so ubiquitous, and observed that EPA was using straight GC-MS, which is gas

chromatography and mass spectrometry, while everybody else is using GCED, electron-capture detection method,

which he stated was both cheape r and far more sensitive. He testified that he only became aware of EP As limited

sampling method for toxic organic chemicals after evaluating documents obtained through a Freedom of Information

request filed by Joel Kupferman of the New York Environmental Law & Justice Project.

IG Report, App. R, p. 133.66

Id., App. R, p. 132.67

21

did; and its many findings of non-detect for measurements of chemicals that critics argue are64

ubiquitous in the environment, raising concerns about the sensitivity of its equipment.65

IV. Why It Will Be Harder to Learn the Truth About Health Risks from Future Terrorist

Attacks and National Disasters

In August 2003, the Inspector General for the EPA released a report documenting the fact that

the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) had blocked health risk information that

EPA sought to release to the public following the September 11, 2001 attack. While EPA protested that

it had provided more careful statements in other communications, the Inspector General stated that

although EPAs subsequent communications sometimes added information or clarification to the

message presented in the press releases, the Agencys overall message of reassurance about long-term

health impacts did not change. The Inspector General observed bluntly, it appeared that EPAs best66

professional advice was overruled when relaying information to the public in the weeks immediately

following the disaster. Politics, it appears, had trumped science in the communication of risks to the67

public in a national emergency.

Picking up where the EPA Inspector Generals report left off, the Sierra Clubs 2004 report

documented that the federal government EPA and other key federal agencies failed at least a dozen

times to provide proper warnings even after it gained information about the caustic nature of the dust

and even after evidence emerged that people were getting sick from the exposures. This government

inaction in the face of new information on health risks was unconscionable. Even if the federal

administration felt that the new data might be flawed, it should have cautioned the public to use better

safety measures while it evaluated the new information. It did not.


24/44

Henshaw, John, Assistant Secretary for OSHA , U.S. Dept. of Labor, Standard Interpretation Letter,68

Jan. 31, 2002;see also, IG Report, p. 34.

IG Report, pp. ii and 19.69

EPA,Homeland Security Strategy (Oct. 2004)(hereafter,EPA Homeland Security Strategy), p. x.70

EPA Homeland Security Strategy, p. 34.71

Id., p. 36.72

22

The centralized filtering of information after the 9/11 attack made it difficult to learn the truth

about safety. That information control system, however, was not perfectly controlled. As noted in Sierra

Clubs 2004 report, OSHA responded by letter to a query about proper management of World Trade

Center dust from a unions attorney. In that letter, OSHA stated since asbestos-containing materials

were used in building the World Trade Center towers, the settled dust from their collapse must be

presumed to contain asbestos, and any demolition or salvage activity at the site should follow federalasbestos protocols for construction activity. This warning was in sharp contrast to the lax messages68

provided by the federal administration overall regarding World Trade Center dust. If this officials

warning had been placed in a draft press release rather than an obscure interpretive letter responding

to an individual query, one wonders how the White House CEQ might have changed OSHAs text.

While the Inspector General had urged EPA to ensure that future assurances about public health

and safety are adequately supported by data and analysis and are appropriately qualified, the heavy69

oversight of EPA by the White House CEQ makes any EPA efforts almost irrelevant. Also, EPA has

a new relationship with the Department of Homeland Security. EPAs Homeland Security Strategy

document, released in October 2004, states,

The Department of Homeland Security was established in early 2003 to

lead a unified national effort to secure America. The 2004 Strategy

reflects DHSs new leadership role in coordinating homeland security

activities across the government. As the new Departments roles and

responsibilities continue to evolve, it will likely further influence EPAs

homeland security strategic planning process.70

The new role of the Department of Homeland Security affects the operations of EPA in a national

disaster in ways that are not yet fully understood.

The question is, to what extent will EPA experts concerns and warnings be allowed to reachthe public in a national emergency? EPAs Homeland Security Objectives states, EPA will

effectively disseminate timely, quality information to all levels of government, industry, and the public,

allowing them to make informed decisions about human health and the environment. The first tactic71

listed under this objective calls for a structure that clearly defines roles for public communication.

The second tactic, ostensibly designed to improve EPAs ability to communicate effectively with the

public regarding incidents and threats, states only that EPA will develop tools to facilitate public

communication, create environmental outreach materials on health impacts and exposure risks, and

make various changes to its data and web-based information systems, including a repository of

exposure data used to communicate with the public. Such statements do not answer the question.72


25/44

See, EPA, Strategic Plan for Homeland Security (Sept. 2002), p. 35.73

Department of Homeland Security,National Incident Management System (Mar. 1, 2004)(hereafter,DHS74

National Incident Management System ), p. 29.

The Precautionary Principle, which the United States endorsed when it signed the Rio Declaration on75

Environment and D evelopment, holds that when the risk of serious or irreversible damage is present, lack of full

scientific certainty must not be used as a reason to postpone cost-effective measures to preve nt harm. See Am J Pub

Health 91(3):20-21 (Mar. 2001).

DHS National Incident Management System , p. 11.76

23

Two key elements that could provide assurance that the missteps of Ground Zero will not

happen again are missing from this document.

S It contains no instruction to issue assurances of safety only after a careful assessment

of all the pollution hazards rather than merely measurements of individual chemicals,

as occurred in World Trade Center disaster.

S It contains no guidance regarding a better safe than sorry approach of reducing human

exposures to contaminants while complete information on the nature of the pollution is

pending. (Criminals should not be given the benefit of the doubt when they cause an

uncontrolled release of multiple chemical toxicants.)

This is not a substantive improvement over EPAs 2002 Strategic Plan for Homeland Security, which

stated only that EPA would improve the ability to communicate effectively with the public regarding

incidents and threats and ensure that lines of authority and communication roles are well-understood.73

The Sierra Club 2004 report had urged the Bush administration to work with Ground Zero-affected

communities, labor unions and environmental health advocacy groups to develop effective nationalpolicies and practices that promote truthfulness in the communication of health hazards and effective

response actions. Clearly, it has not done so.

Disturbingly, the Department of Homeland Securitys national emergency planning documents

itsNational Incident Management System and its new National Response Plan also fail to provide

assurance that the missteps of Ground Zero will not happen again in the event of another national

disaster. Stating that a joint information center will ensure that timely, accurate, easy-to-understand,

and consistent information is disseminated to the public is not enough. Many hundreds of people are74

sick in New York City today at least in part because of a top-down management approach to incident

communications from somewhere within the White House itself.

Simply using a precautionary approach (better safe than sorry warnings in the absence of full

information) could have prevented much of the toxic exposure that people experienced in the aftermath

of the September 11 terrorist attack. Unfortunately, neither theNational Incident Management System75

nor the National Response Plan contain precautionary language. Without an explicit statement of

precautionary policy and description of how such a policy must be implemented, theNational Incident

Management Systems call for integrated communications as necessary to maintain communications

connectivity and discipline and enable common situational awareness and interaction, and the76


26/44

DHS National Response Plan, Public Affairs Support Annex, p. 2.77

Id., Public Affairs Support Annex, p. 8.78

Union of Concerned Scientists, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An Investigation into the Bush79

Administrations M isuse of Science (March 2004).

Former counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke reports that on the evening of September 11 , the

th80

President told memb ers of his staff, including Clarke, that he wanted the stock market, banks and other businesses to

reopen by the next day, relenting after he was informed of the physical damag e but declaring that everything shouldshift to restoring economic activity as soon as rescue operations were do ne. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies:

Inside Americas War on Terror(2004), p. 24. Repo rter Ron Suskind similarly states that Paul ONeill, the former

U.S. Treasury Secretary, was told on Septem ber 12, 2001, by the unde rsecretary for domestic finance, The

President wants to open the New York Stock Excha nge tomorrow thats the word Im getting. . . . I think he made

his wishes known to several people on the senior staff. Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bu sh, the

White House, and the Education of Pau l ONeill(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), p. 183. ONeill, accordingto Suskinds account, convinced the President to wait through the weekend, until Monday, September 17, arguing

24

National Response Plans statement that the Federal team must operate and speak with a unified voice

and consistent message could bode more ill than good.77

TheNational Response Plan does contain the beginnings of a more appropriate public health

policy. It states:

Public information must be correct and consistent with scientific

and medical recommendations. . . . The immediate involvement

of agency subject-matter experts is critical to ensure effective,

accurate, and timely incident communications with the public. .

. . Scientific, technical and medical experts should be identified

and available for briefings and interviews throughout the

incident. These experts are critical to ensuring that a message is

clearly transmitted into common terms and is received by the

audience with credibility.78

This emphasis on consultation with experts is important. Still, the current administration has a repeatedtrack record of ignoring any science that does not fit with its political objectives, even when public

health and safety is at risk.

Under the current federal administration, politics has trumped science again and again. The

Union of Concerned Scientists issued an in-depth report in 2004, documenting an unprecedented

pattern of behavior in the current administration to distort or undermine science. The report cited

examples of the suppression and distortion of research findings on climate change, mercury emissions

from power plants, reproductive health, and air

Sierra Club Pollution & Deception 9-11 Report 2005

Documents