Should I Stay or Should I Go? Reciprocity, Negotiation, and the Choice of Structurally Disadvantaged Actors to Remain in Networks Scott V. Savage 1 and Zachary L. Sommer 2 Abstract Drawing on existing theories of social exchange as well as self-categorization theory, we con- sider how two forms of direct exchange influence whether structurally disadvantaged actors choose to stay in the micro-structures that disadvantage them. We posit that (1) the exit oppor- tunity is more likely to result in disadvantaged actors coming to view their network as a group if there has been a history of reciprocal, as opposed to negotiated, exchange and (2) this psy- chological group formation should account for disadvantaged actors disproportionately choosing to remain in reciprocal exchange networks. We also consider whether the informa- tion actors have about the alternative network affects this choice. Findings from two labora- tory experiments generally support our argument that for disadvantaged actors, psychological group formation mediates the relationship between exchange form and staying in networks. Keywords social exchange, self-categorization theory, network dynamics, group formation The stability of network exchange struc- tures that privilege some and disadvan- tage others is the subject of much theoriz- ing and research (e.g., Cook and Gillmore 1984; Dogan et al. 2009; Leik 1992; Rand, Arbesman, and Christakis 2011; Willer and Willer 2000). This scholarship often builds on Emerson’s (1972) idea that power imbalanced networks should move toward equality as disadvantaged actors attempt to improve their situation by either altering their or their exchange partner’s values or changing the struc- tural conditions of the network. The two structural changes that Emer- son identified are coalition formation and network expansion. Cook and Gillmore (1984) demonstrated that given the chance, disadvantaged actors will use coalition formation to improve their bar- gaining power. Similarly, Leik (1992) described how network expansion alters power relations by changing dependen- cies between actors. He also stressed the 1 University of Houston, TX, USA 2 University of California, Riverside, CA, USA Corresponding Author: Scott V. Savage, Department of Sociology, University of Houston, 474 Philip G. Hoffman Hall, Houston, TX, 77204, USA. Email: [email protected]Social Psychology Quarterly 2016, Vol. 79(2) 115–135 Ó American Sociological Association 2016 DOI: 10.1177/0190272516641392 http://spq.sagepub.com at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016 spq.sagepub.com Downloaded from
21
Embed
Should I Stay or Should I Go? Reciprocity, Negotiation, and the ...
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Should I Stay or ShouldI Go? Reciprocity, Negotiation,and the Choice of StructurallyDisadvantaged Actors toRemain in Networks
Scott V. Savage1 and Zachary L. Sommer2
Abstract
Drawing on existing theories of social exchange as well as self-categorization theory, we con-sider how two forms of direct exchange influence whether structurally disadvantaged actorschoose to stay in the micro-structures that disadvantage them. We posit that (1) the exit oppor-tunity is more likely to result in disadvantaged actors coming to view their network as a groupif there has been a history of reciprocal, as opposed to negotiated, exchange and (2) this psy-chological group formation should account for disadvantaged actors disproportionatelychoosing to remain in reciprocal exchange networks. We also consider whether the informa-tion actors have about the alternative network affects this choice. Findings from two labora-tory experiments generally support our argument that for disadvantaged actors, psychologicalgroup formation mediates the relationship between exchange form and staying in networks.
Keywords
social exchange, self-categorization theory, network dynamics, group formation
The stability of network exchange struc-
tures that privilege some and disadvan-
tage others is the subject of much theoriz-
ing and research (e.g., Cook and Gillmore
1984; Dogan et al. 2009; Leik 1992; Rand,
Arbesman, and Christakis 2011; Willer
and Willer 2000). This scholarship often
builds on Emerson’s (1972) idea that
power imbalanced networks should move
toward equality as disadvantaged actors
attempt to improve their situation by
either altering their or their exchange
partner’s values or changing the struc-
tural conditions of the network.
The two structural changes that Emer-
son identified are coalition formation and
network expansion. Cook and Gillmore
(1984) demonstrated that given the
chance, disadvantaged actors will use
coalition formation to improve their bar-
gaining power. Similarly, Leik (1992)
described how network expansion alters
power relations by changing dependen-
cies between actors. He also stressed the
1University of Houston, TX, USA2University of California, Riverside, CA, USA
Corresponding Author:Scott V. Savage, Department of Sociology,
University of Houston, 474 Philip G. Hoffman Hall,
Hypothesis 1: The exit opportunity willbe more likely to result in psychologi-cal group formation for disadvantagedactors in reciprocal exchange net-works than in negotiated exchangenetworks.
We also suspect that perceptions of
personal attraction will mediate this rela-
tionship. How resources are exchanged
across the two forms of direct exchange
results in reciprocal exchange being risk-
ier, less conflict laden, and more symboli-
cally valuable than negotiated exchange,
and this results in greater feelings of per-
sonal attraction for specific exchange
partners in reciprocal exchange networks
(Molm et al. 2007), with these effects
holding for those disadvantaged by the
exchange structure (Molm et al. 2000,
2012). These differences in personal
attraction, which we define as perceptions
of social unity with a specific exchange
partner, become relevant when actors
become aware of the opportunity to join
an alternative network insofar as they
provide ‘‘a cognitive criterion for common
category membership’’ (Hogg and Turner
1985:61). This is likely because positive
personal attractions amplify perceptions
of similarity (e.g., Backman and Secord
1962; Hogg and Turner 1985), thereby
resulting in the minimization of intra-
class differences relative to interclass dif-
ferences (Turner and Reynolds 2012).
Consequently, we contend that following
the exit opportunity, disadvantaged
actors will rely on their personal attrac-
tions as a basis for group formation.
Because personal attractions differ across
the two forms of direct exchange, personal
attractions should mediate the relation-
ship between exchange form and psycho-
logical group formation.
Hypothesis 2: When disadvantagedactors become aware of the opportu-nity to join an alternative network,their personal attractions for theirrespective exchange partners will pos-itively affect whether they view theirexisting network as a group.
Hypothesis 3: Personal attraction willmediate the relationship betweenexchange form and psychologicalgroup formation.
In addition to personal attractions, the
amount of information disadvantaged
actors have about the alternative may
affect group formation. Hogg (2012) con-
tends that the desire to reduce subjective
uncertainty about the social world moti-
vates individuals to think of themselves
as group members so that they can form
expectations about what they might gain
from their interactions. Thus, the amount
of information an actor has about an
exchange network should affect percep-
tions of uncertainty (Savage and Berg-
strand 2013) and consequently psycholog-
ical group formation. A complete lack of
information about the alternative makes
it impossible for disadvantaged actors to
compare the present network with the
alternative, maximizing the uncertainty
in their subjective worlds. Interestingly,
the provisioning of additional, albeit
incomplete, information about the alterna-
tive network does not improve the ability
to determine whether the new exchange
network will provide greater or lesser ben-
efits. Still, the extra information might
result in actors believing they are better
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 119
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Hypothesis 4: Psychological group forma-tion will be greater when the amountof uncertainty about the benefits pro-vided by exchange relations in analternative exchange network is highrather than low.
That the exit opportunity should differ-
entially affect psychological group forma-
tion across the two forms of direct
exchange matters because how strongly
an individual identifies with a group
should affect whether the actor stays in
it. Previous research demonstrates that
personal attractions are often poor predic-
tors of behavior at units of analysis
beyond the dyad and that a group identity
is a better predictor of behaviors at the
network level (Hogg 1992). Thus, whether
an actor chooses to remain in an existing
exchange network or not should depend
on whether the actor views the network
as a group to which he or she belongs.
Hypothesis 5: Psychological group forma-tion group will positively affectwhether disadvantaged actors chooseto remain in an existing exchangenetwork.
Hypothesis 6: Psychological group forma-tion will mediate the relationshipbetween the form of exchange andstaying in an existing network.
We test these hypotheses with data from
two controlled laboratory experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 involved undergraduate stu-
dents who earned money by exchanging
with two computer-simulated actors. The
amount earned depended on participants’
exchanges with partners. Implementation
of random assignment in concert with var-
ious experimental controls ruled out the
possibility of systematic variation across
experimental conditions (Campbell and
Stanley 1963) and allowed for a rigorous
test of our predictions.
Design and Participants
Social exchange theory assumes actors
value the resources of exchange (Molm
and Cook 1995). A precondition for partic-
ipation in the experiment then wasa desire for the resource of exchange.
Thus, we recruited undergraduate stu-
dents from a large, public university
based on their desire for the resource in
the experiment: money. The experiment
manipulated the form of exchange (recip-
rocal vs. negotiated exchange) and the
information subjects had about the alter-native network (low vs. high information),
thereby allowing us to evaluate our theo-
retical argument.2 Sixty-four undergrad-
uate students were randomly assigned to
each of the experimental conditions cre-
ated by crossing the form of exchange
and the amount of information, so that
there were 16 students per condition.3
For control purposes, equal numbers of
men and women were assigned to each
condition.4
2In addition to the form of exchange and infor-mation, Experiment 1 manipulated power byplacing participants in either high or low powerconditions. While the manuscript focuses on thelow power conditions, online Appendix A (avail-able at spq.sagepub.com/supplemental) reportsthe results of a mediation analysis using theKHB method to examine the effects of power.This analysis reveals that power moderates theeffects of psychological group formation on stay-ing behavior; the effects are strongest for thosein low power conditions. This finding strengthensour confidence in our argument.
3Sixty-seven undergraduate students actuallyparticipated in these conditions. We excludeddata from three subjects because they did notbelieve they were interacting with real people.
4Sensitivity analyses found no gender effects.
120 Social Psychology Quarterly 79(2)
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
ticipants how to use their computers tomake exchanges. Participants were told
that they would have two exchange part-
ners who each had a common alternative
partner. A diagram of this exchange net-
work appeared on subjects’ screens and
can be seen in Figure 1. Participants
also learned they would be interacting
with their partners over a series of
exchange opportunities and that for any
one opportunity they would only be able
to exchange with one partner.5 Subjects
were aware of the potential benefits theycould receive from each partner on each
exchange opportunity and thus were
aware that they had one high value (X)
and one low value (Z) partner. The
greater benefits potentially provided by
X combined with the fact that X also had
a high value relation with Y meant sub-
jects were more dependent on X forresources than X was on them and as
a result, at a power disadvantage. They
were unaware of this.
After the instructions, subjects partici-
pated in a series of exchange opportuni-
ties with their two simulated exchange
partners. The completion of each
exchange opportunity resulted in partici-
pants receiving information about who
gave them points and how many points
they received. Total earnings were
updated and reported. In order to reduce
equity effects (Cook and Emerson 1978)
and enhance the uncertainty associated
with exchange (Molm et al. 2000), sub-
jects did not receive information about
the profits earned by their exchange
partners.
We divided the exchange opportunities
into three phases, with the number of
exchange opportunities in each phase
varying by the phase and the form of
Figure 1. Diagram of the Network ThatAppeared on Subjects’ ScreensNote: Subjects were told that they were W and that
they could exchange with X and Z.
5Subjects exchanged in negatively connectednetworks (Cook and Emerson 1978). To opera-tionalize a negatively connected network underconditions of negotiated exchange, actors couldmake an agreement with one, and only one,exchange partner on any given exchange opportu-nity. To do so in reciprocal exchange conditions,actors could only give to one exchange partneron any particular exchange opportunity.
6These exchange networks are weak powernetwork structures, because ‘‘no position . . . isassured of being able to exclude another withoutcost’’ (Markovsky et al. 1993:202).
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 121
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
ties or 20 negotiated exchange opportuni-ties, and phase 3 consisting of 20
reciprocal exchange opportunities or 10
negotiated exchange opportunities.
Second, the monetary values of points
were adjusted to ensure comparable
behaviors received comparable earnings
across the two forms of exchange. The total
number of points an actor could give to anexchange partner on any exchange oppor-
tunity in reciprocal exchange was equal
to one-half the points that could be divided
between actors in the negotiated exchange
setting on each opportunity.
Amount of information about the exitopportunity. We randomly placed subjects
in one of two information conditions. In
the first condition, subjects were told
they had an opportunity to exchange in
an alternative network but received no
information about the structural dimen-
sions of the network. Importantly, the
prompt emphasized that subjects couldnot predict beforehand whether leaving
would result in better or worse earnings.
In the second condition, subjects knew
they had an opportunity to exchange in
an alternative network and the only dif-
ference between their existing network
and the alternative network would be
the people with whom they interacted.
Programming of Simulated Actors
We modified a program used by Molm
et al. (2006) for a previous social exchange
experiment to create simulated actors.
Modifications ensured simulated actors
behaved in realistic ways, appropriate to
their structural positions, and were
informed by behavioral data from previousexchange experiments using only human
subjects (e.g., Molm et al. 2000).
Subjects had one high power simulated
exchange partner (the focal partner) and
one low power simulated exchange part-
ner (the other partner) who each had
another high power exchange partner in
common. For both forms of exchange,
the behaviors of the focal partner were
set to disadvantage the low power partic-
ipant, and the behaviors of the other part-
ner were programmed to create, on aver-
age, equal value exchanges between the
low power participant and the simulated
actor. Interactions between participants
and the focal partner disadvantaged the
participant so that he or she received, on
average, 5 points for every 7 points the
simulated actor received from the subject.
In the negotiated exchange conditions,
this disparity between the participant
and the focal partner was created by
manipulating the number of points
requested by the focal actor. The focal
actor made initial requests of 7, 8, or 9
points, meaning subjects were only being
offered 5, 4, or 3 points. If this request
was not accepted, the request was low-
ered by 1 on the next round of negotia-
tions and then repeated on all subsequent
rounds. For each exchange opportunity,
the high power simulated actor had a 20
percent chance of requesting 7 points,
a 60 percent chance of choosing 8, and
a 20 percent chance of choosing 9, result-
ing in an average initial request of 8
points and an average final request of 7
points.7 Subjects who accepted a final
request of 7 received 5 points.
To create this 5/7 split in reciprocal
exchange conditions, the program manip-
ulated the frequency with which the
7There was a 10 percent chance of the highpower simulated actor reaching an agreementwith another simulated exchange partner. Inaddition to enhancing realism, including this fea-ture helped make the negotiated exchanges moresimilar to the reciprocal exchanges, where highpower simulated actors chose not to give to lowerpower participants.
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 123
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
the probability of the simulated actor giv-ing after not receiving was .15.
Measures
Personal attraction. We measure per-
sonal attraction with four items designed
to evaluate how subjects assess each of
their dyadic exchange relationships along
these dimensions: divided/united, self-
oriented/team-oriented, coming apart/
coming together, and partners/adversaries
(Molm et al. 2012). These measures
ranged in value from 1 to 7, with higher
scores indicating greater attraction.
From these items, a personal attraction
measure was created for each participant
for each exchange relationship. Averaging
responses for the high value relation
resulted in a scale with an alpha reliability
of .88. A similar scale for the low value
relation had an alpha reliability of .86.
Psychological group formation. After
subjects were made aware of the alterna-
tive network, they were asked to answer
three questions designed to measure psy-
chological group formation. The first item
had subjects indicate whether they felt
very unattached/very attached to the
three other participants with whom they
had been interacting (Bargozzi and Lee
2002). The second item asked subjects to
describe how much obligation (very lit-
tle/very much) they felt toward these
other participants (Bargozzi and Lee
2002), and the third had subjects indicate
the extent to which they felt a sense of
belonging with this set of participants
(Bargozzi and Lee 2002; Thye et al.
2011). All items ranged in value from 1
to 7, with higher scores indicating greater
levels of psychological group formation.
The alpha reliability score for these three
items was .84. A factor analysis with var-
imax rotation (not shown) of all of the
items for the personal attraction meas-
ures and the psychological group forma-
tion measure produced a three-factor solu-
tion with the psychological group formation
items loading on a unique factor and the
personal attraction measures for the focal
actor and the personal attraction measures
for the other actor also loading on separate
factors. We are therefore confident that
although related to the personal attraction
measures, the measure of psychological
group formation is distinct.
Staying behavior. We measured staying
behavior by having participants choose to
join an alternative exchange network or
not. Those who chose to stay in their
existing network received a 1. Those
who chose to leave received a score of 0.
Exchange frequency. Higher frequen-
cies of exchange generate greater
8We added realism to the experiment by hav-ing this low power simulated actor occasionallyreach agreements with another simulated actorafter the second round of negotiations. For eachexchange opportunity, there was a 6 percentchance of this occurring.
124 Social Psychology Quarterly 79(2)
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
by dividing the number of agreementswith (negotiated exchange) or acts of giv-
ing to (reciprocal exchange) the high
value simulated actor by the total number
of exchange opportunities.10 Exchange
with the high value partner is of utmost
importance as participants experiencedpower differences through this relation-
ship. Exchange frequencies ranged in
value from 0 to 1 for each exchange
relation.
Results
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics by
condition for the aforementioned meas-
ures. In line with expectations, mean
scores for personal attraction, psychologi-
cal group formation, staying intentions,
and actual staying behaviors are gener-
ally higher for the reciprocal exchange
conditions. The table also reports the
exchange frequencies between subjects
and their two exchange partners for the
entire experiment. Across the two forms
of exchange, the exchange frequencies
between subjects and high power simu-
lated actors were similar to those in an
experimental study conducted with only
human subjects (Molm et al. 2012).
Because these descriptive statistics are
consistent with our expectations, we test
our hypotheses more formally using
a series of regression models. Our argu-
ment hinges on the idea that the exit
opportunity prompts individuals to reflect
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Measures by Experimental Condition (N = 64)
Reciprocal exchange Negotiated exchange
Measures Low info High info Low info High info
Personal attractions forFocal actor 4.94
(1.04)4.48
(1.22)4.00
(1.56)4.17(.70)
Other actor 3.28(1.21)
3.75(1.19)
3.03(1.33)
3.05(1.27)
Psychological group formation 4.33(1.32)
4.54(1.04)
3.5(1.22)
2.88(1.41)
Staying behavior .5 .5 .19 0Exchange frequency with focal actor .76
(.12).67
(.15).67
(.15).70
(.14)N 16 16 16 16
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
9Our measure of exchange frequency had a rel-atively high correlation with earnings (r = .77).We therefore did not include earnings in the sta-tistical models we present. Doing so, however,does not result in different conclusions. Seeonline Appendix B available at spq.sagepub.com/supplemental for these results.
10While our measure is consistent with thatused by Molm, Collett, and Schaefer (2006), analternative way of constructing the measure forreciprocal exchange conditions would be to con-sider how often the participants received pointsfrom their focal partners. Our models are stableregardless of how we operationalize exchange fre-quency. See online Appendix B available atspq.sagepub.com/supplemental for these results.
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 125
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Model 2 adds the two personal attractionmeasures. The significant main effects
for both measures show that personal
attraction affects psychological group for-
mation, and Sobel-Goodman tests reveal
that both attraction measures partially
mediate the relationship between the
form of exchange and psychological group
formation, with personal attractiontoward the high value partner mediating
about 32 percent of the total effect and
with personal attraction toward the equal
value partner mediating about 21 percent
of the total effect. These results provide
support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3—
following the exit opportunity, psycholog-
ical group formation is stronger fordisadvantaged actors located in a recipro-
cal exchange network and personal
attractions for specific exchange partners
partially mediate this relationship.
Next, we consider whether the amount
of information actors have about the
alternative network affects psychological
group formation. Model 3 in Table 2
reveals that increasing the amount of
information did not motivate greater
Table 2. Unstandardized Ordinary Least Squares Coefficients from the Regression ofPsychological Group Formation on Independent Variables (N = 64)
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Form of exchange (Rec. = 1; Neg. = 0) 1.26*(.32)
.81*(.32)
.81*(.32)
Exchange frequency with focal partner 2.24(1.13)
2.29(1.09)
2.34(1.09)
Personal attraction with focal partner .50*(.14)
.50*(.14)
Personal attraction with other partner .29*(.13)
.29*(.13)
Information 2.22(.29)
Constant 3.35*(.80)
.48(1.13)
.61(1.15)
R2 .21 .36 .37
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.p \ .05 (two-tailed tests).
11Analyses run using the frequency ofexchange between the subject and other simu-lated actor as the control are generally consistentwith those reported. The measure of exchangefrequency included in the reported results wasthe average of the exchange frequency for thefirst two exchange phases. Sensitivity analysesreveal that only including exchanges thatoccurred during the first phase of exchange doesnot modify results.
126 Social Psychology Quarterly 79(2)
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Future research should more directly eval-uate the effects of uncertainty.
Two questions remain: Does psycholog-
ical group formation affect whether indi-
viduals ultimately choose to remain in
their existing exchange networks, and
does it mediate the relationship between
the form of exchange and staying?
Hypothesis 5 states that because individ-uals who view themselves as part of
a group come to favor that group over
other groups, disadvantaged actors
should be more likely to choose to remain
with their existing network the more they
identify as a group member. A bivariate
logistic regression analysis (not shown)
yields support for this prediction. A one-unit increase in psychological group for-
mation increases the odds of staying in
the network by a factor of 4.60.
But does psychological group forma-
tion mediate the relationship between
the form of exchange and staying in
one’s network as predicted by Hypothesis
6? We answer this question using the
KHB framework, which was created to
compare coefficients of nested nonlinear
models (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2013;
Karlson and Holm 2011). The KHB
framework is a multistep procedure that
first regresses the mediator on the exoge-
nous variables and retains the residual.
This residual then is included in a reduced
model that does not contain the mediator,
thereby ensuring that any difference
between the model with the mediator
(i.e., the full model) and the reduced
model is attributable to the mediator.
This process ensures that coefficients
across models are measured on the same
scale and thus, comparable.
Table 3 presents the results of an
application of the KHB method and the
mediation analysis. Including psychologi-
cal group formation in the model results
Table 3. Logistic Regression Coefficients Predicting Staying in One’s Social Network. Thechange in coefficients was derived using the KHB method. (N = 64)
Independent variable Model 1a Model 2 Change in b
Form of exchange (Rec. = 1; Neg. = 0) 4.36*(1.31)
2.48*(1.00)
1.88*(.90)
Exchange frequency with focal partner 2.93(3.18)
2.14(3.16)
Personal attraction for focal actor 2.10(.42)
21.26*(.58)
Personal attraction for other actor 2.32(.41)
21.00*(.48)
Information 21.70(.99)
21.19(.93)
Constant 21.36(3.49)
22.78(3.51)
Psychological group formation 2.32*(.69)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.*p \ .05 (two-tailed test).aThe coefficients from this model differ from a standard logistic regression model because the residualizedpsychological group formation measure is included in the model, thereby making the coefficients in thismodel comparable to those in Model 2. We do not report the coefficient for the residual here.
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 127
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Table 4. Firth Logit Model Predicting Staying in One’s Network (N = 64)
Independent variable b (St. Error)
Form of exchange (Rec. = 1; Neg. = 0) 1.95*(.85)
Exchange frequency with focal partner 2.02(2.77)
Personal attraction with focal partner 2.98(.51)
Personal attraction with other partner 2.80(.42)
Information 2.93(.82)
Psychological group formation 1.80*(.57)
Constant 22.17(3.08)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.*p \ .05 (two-tailed tests).
12We also ran a generalized structural equa-tion model to test the full model. The results areconsistent with those we report here. See onlineAppendix B available at spq.sagepub.com/supplemental for these results.
128 Social Psychology Quarterly 79(2)
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Table 5. Unstandardized Ordinary Least Squares Coefficients from the Regression ofPsychological Group Formation on Form of Exchange and Exchange Frequency (N = 34)
Independent variable Model 1
Form of exchange (Rec. = 0; Neg. = 0) .74(.44)
Exchange frequency with focal partner 1.97(1.36)
Constant 1.55(.96)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
130 Social Psychology Quarterly 79(2)
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
ory and point to its general applicability.Thus, by explaining how micro-level
processes can affect choices that ulti-
mately affect the stability of macro-level
structures, our research illustrates how
theories of social exchange can inform
sociological research more generally. It
also answers Molm and colleagues’
(2012) call to consider processes of rela-
tionship stability and change. With two
experiments, we show that whether the
exit opportunity triggers psychological
group formation for disadvantaged actors
depends on their exchange histories, with
those in reciprocal exchange networks
being more likely to undergo psychologi-
cal group formation and thus, stay in
their networks. Although this finding con-
firms reciprocity as an integrating force,
it also awakens us to its potential cost for
the structurally disadvantaged and for
the lessening of structural inequalities.
EDITOR’S NOTE
Both editors serve as editor-in-chief on all manu-scripts. In this article, Richard T. Serpe served asthe editor-in-chief because Jan E. Stets had a con-flict of interest.
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
Additional supporting information may be foundat spq.sagepub.com/supplemental.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Linda Molm, Joseph Gala-skiewicz, Kelly Bergstrand, David Melamed, andthe members of the social psychology seminar atUniversity of California, Riverside for their adviceon this paper. Earlier versions of this paper werepresented at the 22nd Annual Group ProcessesConference in Atlanta, Georgia, in 2010 and the110th Annual Meeting of the American Sociologi-cal Association in Chicago, Illinois in 2015.
FUNDING
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the followingfinancial support for the research, authorship,and/or publication of this article: This projectwas funded by a National Science FoundationDissertation Improvement Grant (SES-1003281)awarded to Linda Molm and Scott V. Savage.
REFERENCES
Adler, Patricia A., and Peter Adler. 1995.‘‘Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion inPreadolescent Cliques.’’ Social PsychologyQuarterly 58(3):145–62.
Backman, Carl W., and Paul F. Secord. 1962.‘‘Liking, Selective Interaction, and Misper-ception in Congruent Interpersonal Rela-tions.’’ Sociometry 25(4):321–35.
Bargozzi, Richard P., and Kyu-Hyun Lee.2002. ‘‘Multiple Routes for Social Influence:The Role of Compliance, Internalization,and Social Identity.’’ Social PsychologyQuarterly 65(3):226–47.
Blau, Peter M. 1964. Exchange and Power inSocial Life. New York: Wiley.
Breen, Richard, Kristian Bernt Karlson, andAnders Holm. 2013. ‘‘Total, Direct, andIndirect Effects in Logit and Probit
132 Social Psychology Quarterly 79(2)
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Campbell, Donald T., and Julian C. Stanley.1963. Experimental and Quasi-Experimen-tal Designs for Research. Chicago: RandMcNally Publishing Company.
Cheshire, Coye, Alexandra Gerbasi, and KarenS. Cook. 2010. ‘‘Trust and Transitions inModes of Exchange.’’ Social PsychologyQuarterly 73(2):176–95.
Collett, Jessica L., and Jade Avelis. 2011.‘‘Building a Life Together: Reciprocal andNegotiated Exchange in Fragile Families.’’Pp. 227–54 in Advances in Group Processes.Vol 28, edited by S. R. Thye and E. J. Law-ler. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publish-ing Limited.
Cook, Karen S., and Mary R. Gillmore. 1984.‘‘Power, Dependence, and Coalitions.’’ Pp.27-58 in Advances in Group Processes. Vol1, edited by E. J. Lawler. Greenwich, CT:JAI Press Inc.
Cook, Karen S., and Richard M. Emerson.1978. ‘‘Power, Equity and Commitment inExchange Networks.’’ American Sociologi-cal Review 43(5):721–39.
Cook, Karen S., Richard M. Emerson, Mary R.Gillmore, and Toshio Yamagishi. 1983.‘‘The Distribution of Power in ExchangeNetworks: Theory and ExperimentalResults.’’ American Journal of Sociology89(2):275–305.
Dogan, Gonul, Macel A. L. M van Assen, Arn-out van de Rijt, and Vincent Buskens.2009. ‘‘The Stability of Exchange Net-works.’’ Social Networks 31(2):118–25.
Emerson, Richard M. 1972. ‘‘Exchange Theory,Part II: Exchange Relations and Net-works.’’ Pp. 58–87 in Sociological Theoriesin Progress. Vol. 2, edited by J. Berger, M.Zelditch, Jr., and B. Anderson. Boston:Houghton-Mifflin.
Firth, David. 1993. ‘‘Bias Reduction of Maxi-mum Likelihood Estimates.’’ Biometrika80(1):27–38.
Greenberg, Martin J. 1991. ‘‘College CoachingContracts: A Practical Perspective.’’ Mar-quette Sports Law Review 1(2):207–82.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, andLoyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,Organizations, and States. Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press.
Hogg, Michael A. 1992. The Social Psychologyof Group Cohesiveness: From Attraction toSocial Identity. New York: New York Uni-versity Press.
Hogg, Michael A. 2012. ‘‘Uncertainty-IdentityTheory.’’ Pp. 62–80 in Handbooks of Theo-ries of Social Psychology. Vol. 2, edited byP. A. M. Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski,and E. T. Higgins. Thousand Oaks, CA:Sage Publications Ltd.
Hogg, Michael A., and John C. Turner. 1985.‘‘Interpersonal Attraction, Social Identifica-tion, and Psychological Group Formation.’’European Journal of Social Psychology15(1):51–66.
Homans, George C. 1974. Social Behavior: ItsElementary Forms. Rev. ed. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979.‘‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisionunder Risk.’’ Econometrica 47(2):263–91.
Karlson, Kristian Bernt, and Anders Holm.2011. ‘‘Decomposing Primary and Second-ary Effects: A New Decomposition Method.’’Research in Social Stratification andMobility 29(2):221–37.
Kmec, Julie A. 2007. ‘‘Ties that Bind? Race andNetworks in Job Turnover.’’ Social Prob-lems 54(4):483–503.
Kollock, Peter. 1994. ‘‘The Emergence ofExchange Structures: An ExperimentalStudy of Uncertainty, Commitment, andTrust.’’ American Journal of Sociology100(2):313–45.
Kurtzberg, Terri, and Victorica Husted Med-vec. 1999. ‘‘Can We Negotiate and Still BeFriends?’’ Negotiation Journal 15(4):355–61.
Kuwabara, Ko. 2011. ‘‘Cohesion, Cooperation,and the Value of Doing Things Together:How Economic Exchange Creates Rela-tional Bonds.’’ American SociologicalReview 76(4):560–80.
Lawler, Edward J. 2001. ‘‘An Affect Theory ofSocial Exchange.’’ American Journal ofSociology 107(2):321-52.
Lawler, Edward J., Shane R. Thye, and Jeong-koo Yoon. 2008. ‘‘Social Exchange andMicro Social Order.’’ American SociologicalReview 73(4):519–42.
Lawler, Edward J., Shane R. Thye, and Jeong-koo Yoon. 2014. ‘‘Emotions and Group Tiesin Social Exchange.’’ Pp. 77–101 in Hand-book of the Sociology of Emotions: VolumeII, edited by J. E. Stets and J. H. Turner.Netherlands: Springer.
Lawler, Edward J., and Jeongkoo Yoon. 1993.‘‘Power and the Emergence of CommitmentBehavior in Negotiated Exchange.’’ Ameri-can Sociological Review 58(4):465–81.
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 133
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Lawler, Edward J., and Jeongkoo Yoon. 1996.‘‘Commitment in Exchange Relations: Testof a Theory of Relational Cohesion.’’ Ameri-can Sociological Review 61(1):89–108.
Lawler, Edward J., Jeongkoo Yoon, and ShaneR. Thye. 2009. Social Commitments ina Depersonalized World. New York: RussellSage Foundation.
Leik, Robert K. 1992. ‘‘New Directions for Net-work Exchange Theory: Strategic Manipu-lation of Network Linkages.’’ Social Net-works 14(3–4):309–23.
Markovsky, Barry, John Skvoretz, David Wil-ler, Michael J. Lovaglia, and Jeffrey Erger.1993. ‘‘The Seeds of Weak Power: An Exten-sion of Network Exchange Theory.’’ Ameri-can Sociological Review 58(2):197–209.
Mauss, Marcel. 1925. ‘‘Essai sur le Don: Formeet Raison de l’Echange dans les SocietesArchaiques.’’ Annee Sociologie 1:30–186.
Molm, Linda D. 1994. ‘‘Dependence and Risk:Transforming the Structure of SocialExchange.’’ Social Psychology Quarterly57(3):163–76.
Molm, Linda D., Jessica L. Collett, and DavidR. Schaefer. 2006. ‘‘Conflict and Fairnessin Social Exchange.’’ Social Forces84(4):2331–52.
Molm, Linda D., Jessica L. Collett, and DavidR. Schaefer. 2007. ‘‘Building Solidaritythrough Generalized Exchange: A Theoryof Reciprocity.’’ American Journal of Sociol-ogy 113(1):205–42.
Molm, Linda D., and Karen S. Cook. 1995.‘‘Social Exchange and Exchange Networks.’’Pp. 209–35 in Sociological Perspectives onSocial Psychology, edited by K. S. Cook, G.A. Fine, and J. S. House. Boston: Allyn Bacon.
Molm, Linda D., Gretchen Peterson, andNobuyuki Takahashi. 1999. ‘‘Power in Nego-tiated and Reciprocal Exchange.’’ AmericanSociological Review 64(6):876–90.
Molm, Linda D., David R. Schaefer, and Jes-sica L. Collett. 2009. ‘‘Fragile and ResilientTrust: Risk and Uncertainty in Negotiatedand Reciprocal Exchange.’’ SociologicalTheory 27(1):1–32.
Molm, Linda D., Nobuyuki Takahashi, andGretchen Peterson. 2000. ‘‘Risk and Trustin Social Exchange: An Experimental Testof a Classical Proposition.’’ American Jour-nal of Sociology 105(5):1396–427.
Molm, Linda D., Nobuyuki Takahashi, andGretchen Peterson. 2003. ‘‘In the Eye ofthe Beholder: Procedural Justice in SocialExchange.’’ American Sociological Review68(1):128–52.
Molm, Linda D., Monica M. Whitham, andDavid Melamed. 2012. ‘‘Forms of Exchangeand Integrative Bonds: Effects of Historyand Embeddedness.’’ American SociologicalReview 77(1):141–65.
Moore, Sally Falk. 1978. Law as Process: AnAnthropological Approach. Boston: Rout-ledge and Kegan Paul.
Powell, Walter W. 1990. ‘‘Neither Market norHierarchy: Network Forms of Org-anization.’’ Pp. 295–336 in Research inOrganizational Behavior, edited by B.Staw and L. L. Cummings. Greenwich,CT: JAI Press.
Rand, David G., Samuel Arbesman, and Nich-olas A. Christakis. 2011. ‘‘Dynamic SocialNetworks Promote Cooperation in Experi-ments with Humans.’’ Proceedings of theNational Academy of Sciences 108(48):19193–98.
Rousseau, Denise M. 1989. ‘‘Psychological andImplied Contracts in Organizations.’’Employee Rights and Responsibilities Jour-nal 2:121–39.
Rousseau, Denise M., and Snehal A. Tijori-wala. 1998. ‘‘Assessing PsychologicalContracts: Issues, Alternatives, and Meas-ures.’’ Journal of Organizational Behavior19:679–95.
Savage, Scott V., and Kelly J. Bergstrand.2013. ‘‘Negotiating the Unknown: TheRole of Uncertainty in Social Exchange.’’Sociology Compass 7(4):315–27.
Schilke, Oliver, Martin Reimann, and Karen S.Cook. 2015. ‘‘Power Decreases Trust inSocial Exchange.’’ Proceedings of theNational Academy of Sciences 112(42):12950–55.
Thibaut, John W., and Harold H. Kelley. 1959.The Social Psychology of Groups. NewYork: Wiley.
Thye, Shane R., Edward J. Lawler, and Jeong-koo Yoon. 2011. ‘‘The Emergence of Embed-ded Relations and Group Formation in Net-works of Competition.’’ Social PsychologyQuarterly 74(4):387–413.
Turner, John C., Penelope J. Oakes, S. Alexan-der Haslam, and Craig McGarty. 1994.‘‘Self and Collective: Cognition and SocialContext.’’ Personality and Social Psychol-ogy Bulletin 20(5):454–63.
Turner, John C., and Katherine J. Reynolds.2012. ‘‘Self-Categorization Theory.’’ Pp.399–417 in Handbooks of Theories of SocialPsychology. Vol. 2, edited by P. A. M. VanLange, A. W. Kruglanski, and E. T. Higgins.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd.
134 Social Psychology Quarterly 79(2)
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from
Uzzi, Brian. 1997. ‘‘Social Structure and Com-petition in Interfirm Networks: The Para-dox of Embeddedness.’’ Administrative Sci-ence Quarterly 42(1):35–67.
Willer, Robb, Francis J. Flynn, and Sonya Zak.2012. ‘‘Structure, Identity, and Solidarity:A Comparative Field Study of Generalizedand Direct Exchange.’’ Administrative Sci-ence Quarterly 57(1):119–55.
Willer, Robb, and David Willer. 2000. ‘‘Explor-ing Dynamic Networks: Hypotheses andConjectures.’’ Social Networks 22(3):251–72.
BIOS
Scott V. Savage is an assistant professor
in the Department of Sociology at the
University of Houston. Currently, with
support from the National Science Foun-
dation, he and his collaborators are
investigating whether person identities
can overcome structural pressures to
exploit others as well as how identities
can generate social inequality when struc-
tural pressures are absent. He is also
studying how status processes affectwork group dynamics. His recent research
appears in The Sociological Quarterly
(2016) and American Journal of Sociology
(forthcoming).
Zachary L. Sommer received his BA in
sociology at Augsburg College, located inMinneapolis, Minnesota, in 2010 and his
MA in sociology at the University of Cali-
fornia, Riverside in 2012. His primary
research interests focus on the role of
human emotions and identities in
exchange processes.
Should I Stay or Should I Go? 135
at ASA - American Sociological Association on May 25, 2016spq.sagepub.comDownloaded from