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SECURE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION WITH DYNAMIC SECRETS Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom
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Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Dec 16, 2015

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Page 1: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

SECURE WIRELESS COMMUNICATION WITH DYNAMIC SECRETS

Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom

Page 2: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Outline

Problem statement Overview Dynamic secrets

ExtractionCollectionAmplification

System secret protection Bootstrapping security and implementation Summary and conclusion

Page 3: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Problem statement

Data security in wireless communication

Security mechanism desirable in the case of secret leakage

Solution: use dynamic secrets, based on the link layer communications between wireless devices

Page 4: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Related Work

Prior work uses the wireless physical channel properties for secret sharing

However, they usually demand special hardware upgrades or at least specific interfaces to provide channel measurement information.

Page 5: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Related Work Instead of working with the physical layer

channel model to calculate the secret capacity, we shift attention to the link layer and emphasize the dynamics of secrets.

In wireless communication, it is practically impossible to eavesdrop link layer communication for a long period without errors

The single-point of failure occurs at the attackers

Page 6: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Outline

Problem statement Overview Dynamic secrets

ExtractionCollectionAmplification

System secret protection Bootstrapping security and implementation Summary and conclusion

Page 7: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Series of Dynamic Secrets Let Hk indicates how many bits the adversary

needs to guess about the key. When Hk = 0, the adversary knows the key explicitly and the communication is not secure.

Solution: Use a series of dynamic secrets, i.e., updates between t0 and t1

Rationale: Secrecy replenished as the attacker cannot constantly overhear perfectly

Page 8: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Secret Safety Model

No dynamic secrets

Dynamic secrets, i.e.,

Page 9: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Advantage of Dynamic Secret Information loss is not recoverable by any

computational effort

Information loss can be accumulated

Page 10: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Outline

Problem statement Overview Dynamic secrets

ExtractionCollectionAmplification

System secret protection Bootstrapping security and implementation Summary and conclusion

Page 11: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Extracting Dynamic Secrets Key ideas

Monitor retransmissionsSender and receiver agree on set of framesHash such frames into dynamic secrets

One Time Frame (OTF) is refers to a frame that is only aired once and correctly received.

Page 12: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

AET Algorithms

Page 13: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Example: Stop-n-Wait

Page 14: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Collecting Dynamic Secrets Maintain a set of frames ψ

Initially ψs = ψr = Ø

Remarksψs and ψr differ of at most 1 frame

The reception of a new frame ensures ψs = ψr

Page 15: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Collecting Dynamic Secrets Maintain a set of frames ψ

Initially ψs = ψr = Ø

Remarksψs and ψr differ of at most 1 frame

The reception of a new frame ensures ψs = ψr

ψ

Page 16: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Amplifying Attacker’s Entropy Goal: Increase attacker’s uncertainty Input: ψ set Output: A secret S with high entropy

Denoted as

S = F(ψ)

Page 17: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Amplifying Attacker’s Entropy Random hashing theory

uniform-randomly choosing a function from a universal-2 hashing class

The expected hash output distribution will be close to the uniform distribution when the output is sufficiently short [1] - J.L. Carter and M. N. Wegman. Universal classes of hash functions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 18:396-407, 1979

Page 18: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Amplifying Attacker’s Entropy Entropy amplification

If Attacker has < 1 bit info about S If Uncertainty bounded by ϵ - 1

[2] – Alfred Rényi. On measures of information and entropy. In Proceedings of the 4° Berkeley Symposium on Mathematics, Statistics and Probability, 1960

Page 19: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Dynamic Secret Generation The above discussion justifies the use of the

following method

Collect OTFs until | ψ | > nts

Agree on a randomly chosen universal-2 hash function F

Generate S(t) = F(ψ)Reset ψ = Ø

Page 20: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Outline

Problem statement Overview Dynamic secrets

ExtractionCollectionAmplification

System secret protection Bootstrapping security and implementation Summary and conclusion

Page 21: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

System Secret Protection

At secret generationDivide s(t) = u(t) || v(t)To protect the private public key pair and secret

symmetric key respectively

Remark: information loss will accumulate Entropy is non decreasing

Page 22: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

System Secret Protection

Page 23: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Outline

Problem statement Overview Dynamic secrets

ExtractionCollectionAmplification

System secret protection Bootstrapping security and implementation Summary and conclusion

Page 24: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Bootstrapping Security

Scenario: Use time to invest in security Solution: the sender transmits random

data at first to build up security

Page 25: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Prototype Implementation 802.11g

Hash

Extracting dynamic secrets at sender

Extracting dynamic secrets at receiver

Page 26: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Outline

Problem statement Overview Dynamic secrets

ExtractionCollectionAmplification

System secret protection Bootstrapping security and implementation Summary and conclusion

Page 27: Sheng Xiao, Weibo Gong and Don Towsley,2010 Infocom.

Summary and conclusion

Our work strengthens security in the case of secrecy leakages by using dynamic secrets

For future work, use prototype for experimental evaluation