Share It or Lose It? Authoritarian Power-Sharing and Regime Stability in Multi-Ethnic States. Yannick I. Pengl 1 and Ilyas Saliba 2,3 1 International Conflict Research, ETH Zurich 2 Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Humboldt University 3 Department Democracy and Democratization, Berlin Social Science Center (WZB) June 17, 2015 Abstract In this paper, we examine the impact of ethnic cooptation on authoritar- ian stability. We argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that the inclusion of elites from politically relevant ethnic groups significantly reduces the risk of authoritarian breakdown. We also showhow this e↵ect varies across di↵erent forms of regime change and type. While a prominent explanatory factor in conflict research, inter-ethnic competition for state power has so far been understudied within the literature on authoritarian regime survival. Although accounts of cooptation strategies have recently gained prominence, most remain structuralist and focus on formal institutions such as authori- tarian parties, parliaments and elections that facilitate cooperation between a dictator and coopted elites. We go beyond institutionalist analyses and shift the attention to the identity of those who need to be coopted, the degree to which cooptation is actually achieved and the contexts in which cooptation works best. We present three main findings: 1.) Ethnic cooptation stabilizes authoritarian regimes. 2.) It reduces the risk of irregular and autocratic but not of regular and democratizing forms of regime change. 3.) It is most e↵ec- tive where formal institutions are weak, namely in personalist dictatorships. 1
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Share It or Lose It? Authoritarian Power-Sharing
and Regime Stability in Multi-Ethnic States.
Yannick I. Pengl1 and Ilyas Saliba2,3
1International Conflict Research, ETH Zurich2Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences, Humboldt University
3Department Democracy and Democratization, Berlin Social ScienceCenter (WZB)
June 17, 2015
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of ethnic cooptation on authoritar-ian stability. We argue theoretically and demonstrate empirically that theinclusion of elites from politically relevant ethnic groups significantly reducesthe risk of authoritarian breakdown. We also showhow this e↵ect varies acrossdi↵erent forms of regime change and type. While a prominent explanatoryfactor in conflict research, inter-ethnic competition for state power has sofar been understudied within the literature on authoritarian regime survival.Although accounts of cooptation strategies have recently gained prominence,most remain structuralist and focus on formal institutions such as authori-tarian parties, parliaments and elections that facilitate cooperation between adictator and coopted elites. We go beyond institutionalist analyses and shiftthe attention to the identity of those who need to be coopted, the degree towhich cooptation is actually achieved and the contexts in which cooptationworks best. We present three main findings: 1.) Ethnic cooptation stabilizesauthoritarian regimes. 2.) It reduces the risk of irregular and autocratic butnot of regular and democratizing forms of regime change. 3.) It is most e↵ec-tive where formal institutions are weak, namely in personalist dictatorships.
1
Introduction
In this paper, we examine how ethnic cooptation strategies a↵ect authoritarian
stability. While cooptation in general has figured quite prominently in the recent
comparative authoritarianism literature, strategies that address specifically ethnic
challenges to regime survival remain understudied. Most recent work on the role
of cooptation in authoritarian regimes focus on how formal, often semi-democratic
institutions such as regime parties, authoritarian legislatures, and more or less com-
petitive elections tie in potential challengers and facilitate monitoring and commit-
ment among the dictator and his ruling elite (see e.g. Svolik, 2012; Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2006).1
While providing novel insights in the sources of authoritarian stability, analyses of
formal cooptation institutions often remain quite detached from the actors involved.
As Pepinsky (2014) has recently argued “the institutionalist turn in comparative
authoritarianism” may all to liberally gloss over how institutions are shaped by the
preferences of and power balance among the most important political agents. In
this vein, formal institutions undoubtedly provide opportunities for the cooptation
and inclusion of potential regime challengers. However, it remains opaque who
these challengers are and whether this cooptation potential is realized. Only by
identifying the most relevant social actors and gauging the extent to which they
are coopted one can judge whether formal institutions actually perform the task
they are assumed to perform in the authoritarian institutions literature. Shifting
the attention to relevant social groups and their representation in political regimes
thus seems promising to improve our theoretical understanding and empirical tests
of cooptation mechanisms in authoritarian regimes.
In this context, we regard politicized ethnicity as particularly relevant to the
question of authoritarian stability. Where political competition is structured along
ethnic lines, included and excluded groups struggle for material resources and po-
litical power, quite frequently by violent means (Olzak, 1983; Horowitz, 1985; Ce-
derman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013). If ethno-political competition is linked to
political instability in the form of violent conflict, it may also matter in determining
the stability and instability of authoritarian regimes. Focusing on ethno-political
power struggles between included and excluded groups thus allows us to move one
step closer to the actual locus of agency than has been the case in previous analyses
of formal institutional contexts that may or may not serve cooptation purposes. In
short, we see ethnic elites excluded from the regime as especially important potential
challengers. Thus, ethnically targeted cooptation strategies may be needed to foster
1Other relevant studies highlighting the role of formal cooptation institutiuons include Levitskyand Way (2002), Levitsky and Way (2010), Lust-Okar (2004), Brownlee (2007), and Wright andEscriba-Folch (2012).
2
authoritarian stability.
In further developing and testing this argument, we borrow concepts and opera-
tionalizations from seminal work on ethnic conflict (Cederman, Wimmer and Min,
2010) as well as from the literature on neopatrimonialism (Bratton and Van de Walle,
1994) and apply them to the study of autocratic resilience. Our approach provides
a novel and we believe more suitable and actor-centered way of modeling the role
of cooptation in authoritarian regimes. In what follows, be briefly summarize the
theoretical building blocks that we borrow from the previous literature before we
turn to the main theoretical part of the paper.
Theoretical Building Blocks
Let us briefly discuss the most important concepts and insights from the three
literatures upon which we base our theoretical argument.
Comparative Authoritarianism: First and as already discussed above, com-
parative authoritarianism research provides the most natural point of departure for
our study. In line with recent work from this strand of literature, we regard coop-
tation as an essential pillar of authoritarian stability (Gerschewski, 2013; Wintrobe,
1998). The other most important pillars are repression and legitimacy (Gerschewski
et al., 2013). Cooptation is often defined as the strategic targeting of resources, gov-
ernment posts and policy concessions to potential regime challengers (Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2007). The aim is to buy their loyalty and provide them with a vested
stake in the continued survival of the regime (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014).
Authoritarian institutions may facilitate this in two main ways. First, they provide
posts and forums, in which coopted elites can be placed (Malesky and Schuler, 2010;
Schedler, 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006). Second, they reduce uncertainty and
enhance the credibility of authoritarian powersharing arrangements. Formalized
procedures and repeated interaction within legislative bodies and regime parties are
expected to alleviate ruling coalition members’ fears of a dictator defecting from
a powersharing deal (Geddes, 1999; Brownlee, 2007; Boix and Svolik, 2013; Maga-
loni, 2008). Recent quantitative analyses indicate that formal institutions such as
authoritarian legislatures and regime parties e↵ectively reduce the risk of at least
some forms of regime failure (Wright and Escriba-Folch, 2012; Boix and Svolik,
2013).
We see two main reasons why getting a more fine-grained understanding of au-
No. of Groups �0.025 �0.032 �0.030 �0.020(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024)
Constant �2.885⇤⇤ �3.134⇤⇤ �2.926⇤⇤ �2.489⇤
(1.053) (1.037) (1.087) (1.061)
Observations 3248 3199 3199 3199Duration Polynomials Yes Yes Yes YesClustered SE (Country) No No No NoRandom E↵ects (Country) Yes Yes Yes YesCountry-Fixed E↵ects No No No No
Standard Errors in Parentheses
+p < 0.10,⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤ p < 0.01,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
16
Figure 1: Failure Risk across Number of Coopted Groups
substantive size is comparable to the e↵ect of increasing a country’s economic growth
rate from 0% to 3% and amounts to almost a third of the e↵ect of introducing a
single regime party.5
Distinguishing Types of Regime Change: Turning to the distinction between
di↵erent types of regime failure, Table 4 presents the results of our competing risks
analysis of regular vs. irregular forms of authoritarian breakdowns. H2 above pre-
dicts ethnic cooptation to be e↵ective when it comes to preventing coerced and
extraconstitutional forms of regime changes such as coups, rebellions, and popular
uprisings. It may be a less potent tool when it comes more regular, i.e. electoral and
elite-led instances of regime change. Model 5 is a simple multinomial logit model,
whereas Model 6 includes country-random e↵ects to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity. The results provide clear support for our hypothesis that ethnic cooptation
primarily safeguards against irregular challenges initiated by excluded ethnic elites
and their followers. In both models, the coe�cient on our main explanatory variable
is negative and significant at the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2 depicts the predicted probabilities of regular and irregular regime change
based on the random-e↵ects specification (Model 6). While Increasing the number
of politically relevant groups included in the ruling coalition has no discernable
e↵ect on the risk of regular regime change, it markedly reduces the probability of
irregular regime change.Substantively, moving from a three-group to a two-group
ruling coalition increases the risk of irregular regime failure by 27% (from 1.9% to
5calculations based on Model 1 and Model 4 in Table 3, respectively
17
Figure 2: Risk of Regular vs. Irregular Regime Failure
Table 4: Competing Risks (Regular vs. Irregular Change)
Model 5 Model 6Type of Regime Change Regular Irregular Regular Irregular
Observations 3199 3199Duration Polynomials Yes YesClustered SE (Country) Yes NoRandom E↵ects (Country) No YesCountry-Fixed E↵ects No No
Standard Errors in Parentheses
+p < 0.10,⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤ p < 0.01,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
21
Conclusion
Our analysis highlights the importance of ethnic cooptation strategies in multi-
ethnic autocracies. Including elites from politically relevant ethnic groups at the
executive level may indeed influence authoritarian regime survival. The empirical
results confirm a strong e↵ect of ethnic cooptation across a number of models and
specifications. We have also demonstrated how this e↵ect varies across di↵erent
regime types and how it only reduces the risk of irregular and autocratic forms
of regime change. Our results are robust to including controls for other typically
mentioned explanations of regime stability. In sum, our analysis suggests that ethnic
inclusion at the executive level not only reduces the risk of ethnic rebellion, as e.g.
Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) have shown, but also prevents other threats to
regime stability.
These findings complement previous cooptation research, which predominantly
highlights the role of formal institutions instead of focusing on the most relevant
actors that need to be coopted. In addition, moving beyond seemingly democratic
institutions such as legislatures and political parties enables the study of less formal,
more clientelistic or neopatrimonial cooptation strategies. We regard both of these
points as promising avenues for future research. Methodologically, our large-n re-
search design allows us to show that ethnic inclusion matters yet remains too crude
to pin down the precise mechanisms of elite cooptation in multi-ethnic autocracies.
Moreover, it seems extremely challenging to rule out all potential sources of omitted
variable bias and reverse causality in quantitative models of authoritarian stability
(Pepinsky, 2014). In order to better understand whether our hypotheses and the
underlying causal mechanisms hold true, process-tracing case studies may fruitfully
complement the large-n analysis presented in this paper.
22
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No. of Groups �0.021 �0.029 �0.030 �0.019(0.016) (0.023) (0.026) (0.020)
Constant �2.615⇤⇤ �2.802⇤⇤ �2.467⇤ �2.197⇤
(0.878) (0.909) (0.968) (0.934)
Observations 3248 3199 3199 3199Duration Polynomials Yes Yes Yes YesClustered SE (Country) Yes Yes Yes YesRandom E↵ects (Country) No No No NoCountry-Fixed E↵ects No No No No
Standard Errors in Parentheses
+p < 0.10,⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤ p < 0.01,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
27
Table A3: Fixed-E↵ects Logit Models of Regime Failure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. Included Groups �0.428⇤ �0.464⇤
(0.185) (0.189)
Legislature 0.123 0.171(0.274) (0.275)
Single Party �0.568+ �0.625⇤
(0.311) (0.311)
Repression 0.502⇤⇤ 0.483⇤⇤ 0.474⇤⇤ 0.507⇤⇤
(0.173) (0.176) (0.175) (0.179)
GDP p.c. (log) �0.435 �0.461 �0.451 �0.370(0.480) (0.486) (0.481) (0.495)
GDP Growth �4.564⇤⇤⇤ �4.782⇤⇤⇤ �4.834⇤⇤⇤ �4.693⇤⇤⇤
Observations 2349 2325 2325 2325Duration Polynomials Yes Yes Yes YesClustered SE (Country) No No No NoRandom E↵ects (Country) No No No NoCountry-Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes Yes Yes