SHAKESPEARE'S SONNET 121 - ScholarWorks

SHAKESPEARE'S SONNET 121: K

AN ANALYSIS OF ITS MEANING

V

by

Donald J. Butler

A thesis

submitted in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in the Division of English

Fresno State College

June, 1966

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. MAIN CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS 1

II. MACHIAVELLIAN INTERPRETATIONS 6

III. KEY PHRASES 31

Just Pleasure ......... 32

Sportive Blood 37

I Am That I Am 39

IV. CONCLUSION 46

BIBLIOGRAPHY 51

APPENDIX A: THE TEXT 55

APPENDIX B: CRITICS AND COMMENTARY . 56

CHAPTER I

MAIN CRITICAL INTERPRETATIONS

The fascinating game of attempting to justify an autobiograph­

ical story underlying the 154 sonnets in Shakespeare's cycle has almost

eclipsed interest in the poems for their individual content. Attempts

to identify the principal actors in this sonnet story have resulted in

a flood of literature about the sonnets, and have created subsidiary

waves endeavoring to arrange and date them in accordance with particular

interpretations. This has tended to focus critical studies on certain

key sonnets (i.e. 107) almost to the exclusion of more deserving ones.

Rollins suggests that:

Perhaps an ideal edition of the sonnets would be devoted to facts, explanations of meaning, and esthetic criticism, giv­ing little or no stress to theories about sonnet problems or to identifications of sonnet personages . . . .*

This study will attempt to interpret the meaning of Shakespeare's

Sonnet 121 based on its content as an individual poem, with reference to

Shakespeare's other published works and to the historical period in which

he wrote, but without consideration of the autobiographical aspects of

the sonnet cycle.

Sonnet 121 was selected because it poses an ethical problem of •

universal interest and can be isolated for purposes of analysis from

^Hyder Edward Rollins (ed.), A Hew Variorum Edition of Shakespeare.

1944, p. v.

2

Shakespeare's other sonnets and from autobiographical concerns without

losing its effectiveness. Furthermore, the sonnet has attracted con­

tinued and contrasting critical appraisal, indicating that its interpre­

tation is both interesting and difficult; and lastly, it poses practic­

ally no textual problems.

This study will examine critical interpretations over the years

in the endeavor to find some trend or concordance of opinion, and on the

basis of this survey, will give detailed consideration to a particular

interpretation. The sonnet will then be carefully analyzed and compared

where possible with the poet's other works, in an effort to justify a

final interpretation.

A preliminary study of the sonnet soon makes it evident that the

interpretation of the phrase "just pleasure" (which involves the first

four lines) is the turning point in the interpretation of the whole poem.

Roughly, the critics seem to fall into two broad schools; those who

consider the poet innocent of "vileness" and those who consider him actu­

ally guilty to some degree of vileness, whatever it may be. Those who

dean the poet innocent either associate "just pleasure" with the well

being derived from a good reputation which is being slandered, or with

the enjoyment of a "vile" activity which is not in any way evil but is

simply misinterpreted by others. Those who consider the poet guilty

refer to the compensating enjoyment of being vile.

3

To Justify an overall interpretation from either of these view­

points, it is necessary to explain other key expressions, such as "salu­

tation to my sportive blood," "I am that I am," and "in their badness

reign." In Appendix B of this study there are listed in chronological

order pertinent comments by twenty-five editors and critics relative

to the various interpretations of this sonnet.

Until the beginning of the twentieth century, criticism of this

sonnet was overshadowed by the autobiographical interest in the series

as a whole, and was focused primarily upon attempts to explain "sportive

2 blood," "frailties," and "abuses." Most of these earlier critics con­

sidered the poet innocent, and those who did not eased the censure--e.g.

Samuel Butler (1899) who considered that the poet never went beyond in­

tentions of being vile. In 1918 Pooler questioned the interpretations

of earlier editors Dowden, Tyler, and Beeching; and along with editor

Case raised the problem of reputation versus conscience. Forrest (1923),

Reed(1923), and Tucker (1924) believed the poet morally innocent, but 4

Knights (1934) indicates a turning point in the vain attempt to palliate

the poet's vile activities. Hubler (1952), Knight (1955), Barber (I960),

Spender (1962), Landry (1963), and Rowse (1964) all believe the poet

guilty of vileness—probably of a sexual nature; hence "just pleasure"

is "lost" through concern for reputation, not because of personal recti­

tude. Hubler, Knight, Barber, and Spender attempt to justify the poet's

2nc VflT-iorum II. "The Question of Homosexuality," pp. 23

4

aberrations by placing him above and beyond conventional standards of

judgment. Knight believes that in this sonnet Shakespeare has "pene­

trated beyond good and evil," and Barber feels that "Sonnet 121 con­

fronts in a frightening way the breakdown of moral categories . . .

A survey of the above indicates a chronological trend from the

earlier consensus that the poet is innocent of vile intent, through

attempts to reconcile the emphasis on reputation in competition with

moral right or wrong, to the more recent conclusion that the poet ad­

vocates a pragmatic ethic and denies responsibility, except to his own

conscience, for problems of good and evil.

In addition to interpretations of "just pleasure" in the all-

important first quatrain, critical comments on other key phrases--

though not necessarily in chronological order--support this trend.

Concerning "salutation to my sportive blood," the consensus is that the

poet has his own standards; and if his wanton blood is stirred, it is

not because of association with truly lascivious people, nor should they

treat him as one of their ilk. Explanations of "1 am that I am" are in

accord with the trend placing the poet above conventional moral responsi­

bilities. It is significant that Steevens, in 1780, and Knight, in 1955,

both quote Gloucester's remark in 3 Henry VI, "I am myself alone."

Mackail (1911) feels that Shakespeare speaks as though he were "God

himself"; Fripp (1938) calls it a "daring use" of Exodus. Regarding

5

"in their badness reign," the general conclusion is that mankind is not

basically evil, which poses the problem of justifying vileness in the

poet.

Of the critics suranarised in Appendix B, four are given special

consideration. Pooler (1916) presents contrasting and detailed crit­

ical opinions on key points in the sonnet which question the Innocence

of the poet. Tucker (1924) represents the school of innocence. Knight

(1955) serves as spokesman for the school of evil in refuting Tucker.

Landry (1963) brings critical opinion of the sonnet to date through de­

tailed comparisons of differing comments on key sonnet problems.

Of the excerpts from Shakespeare's plays which appear in Appen­

dix B, the great majority refer to Xago, "I am not what I am," and to

Richard III, "I am myself alone." It is significant that both lago and

Richard III are Machiavellian villains.

It appears that both the chronological trends and the excerpts

from the plays support analysis of the sonnet as a statement of philo­

sophical relativism; reputation has gained ascendency over the dictates

of the poet's personal moral conscience; the preponderance of direct

citations from the plays is to Machiavellian types.

CHAPTER II

MACHIAVELLIAN INTERPRETATIONS

This chapter is devoted to a consideration of Sonnet 121 as a

statement of Machiavellian principles because none of the critics

studied suggests such an interpretation. The popularity of Machiavel­

lian villains in Elizabethan drama affords an opportunity to compare

Shakespeare's treatment of this subject in his earlier plays with his

more sophisticated attitude after 1600, and maxims selected from the

early Elizabethan translation of Machiavelli invite comparison with

specific thoughts and phrases in the sonnet. Machiavellian charac­

ters in Shakespeare's plays will be associated with the key phrases

and thoughts in the sonnet in an attempt to measure the validity of

this interpretation.

Considering the opening line and the general tone of the sonnet,

it appears strange that no editor or critic has interpreted this poem t

in a Machiavellian light. Perhaps this oversight is due to the pre­

ponderance of interest in the potentially autobiographical undertone

of homosexuality3 as the vileness under question, with the correspond­

ing reluctance to associate a poet of Shakespeare's stature with this

3Loc. cit., Variorum II.

7

aberration. As Indicated In the previous chapter, Knight evinces in­

terest In a Machiavellian theme, but he does not develop it.

More probably earlier critics believed that Shakespeare's know­

ledge of Machiavelli was based upon the translation by Simon Patericke,

in 1577, of Gentillet's Contre-Machiavel. Later scholars have proved

that there were other translations available to Shakespeare so that as

the poet matured he may have gained a more reasonable understanding of

Machiavelli*8 precepts. Robert Ornstein points out that:

It is one of the chief ironies of intellectual history that Machiavelli, who sought to eradicate political illusions, was indirectly responsible for the grand political myth of the Renaissance and unwittingly supplied the Elizabethan dram­atists with a fascinating archetype of unscrupulousness and intellectual villainy. We no longer believe, as did earlier scholars, that Gentillet's Contre-Machiavel was the chief source of the myth of Machiavellian evil in Elizabethan England, for we know that first-hand knowledge of Machiavel-li's works was fairly extensive among the Elizabethan intel­lectuals.^

Nonetheless, some misunderstanding still exists, tfyndham Lewis says:

This /Contre-Machiavel7 was translated into english /sic] by Simon Patrick in 1577. The first time on the other hand that the book containing Machiavelli's characteristic doctrines was translated into english was 1640. These are the dates of translations of his books into english: ....

Discorsi (translated by Daere, 1636). Principe (translated by Dacre, 1640).

' ̂ Robert Ornstein and Spencer Hazelton (eds.), Elizabethan and Jacobean Tragedy. An Anthology. 1964, p. x.

8

So it Beens fairly certain that it is from Gentillet that most of the elizabethan dramatists would get their notion of Machiavelli.5

For this reason, and because of references in Appendix B by Steevens,

Dowden, Pooler, Brooke, Knight, and Landry to lago or to Richard III,

villains of Marlowe's school, this discussion will be treated by refer­

ence to the earlier and later Elizabethan periods.

In 1513 Machiavelli wrote The Prince, which contains the gist

of his political doctrine, but which was not published until 1532, five

years after the author's death. In the meantime it circulated in manu­

script, but it was not considered objectionable to the Church until

publication, after which criticism grew until The Prince was placed on

the Index by Paul IV. The French Huguenots were the harshest critics.

"Gentillet in particular, by an unfair but sensational selection of

maxims increased the feeling of colossal wickedness with which the name

of Machiavelli was associated."^ In his Anti-Machtavel (1576) he ac­

cuses Machiavelli of "atheism, ignorance, cruelty, tyranny, usury, and

of every detestable vice."^

Gentillet divided his book into three parts:

< Wyndham Lewis, The Lion and the Fox. 1951, p. 71.

^Clarence Boyer, The Villain as Hero in Elizabethan Tragedy. 1914,

p. 33.

7 Ibid,, p. 34.

9

. . . treating of the counsel, religion, and policy which a prince ought to have. Under each heading he groups a certain number of maxims selected from different parts of the Discourses an® The Prince. After stating the maxims he branches out into lengthy essays wherein he exhausts the literature of antiquity to refute them. Such a method, though unjust because it omitted the context, was remarkably effective in centering attention on Machiavelli's most striking axioms.®

Several of these axioms resemble the sentiments expressed in Sonnet 121:

A Prince which will make a straight profession of a good man, cannot long continue in the world amongst such an heape of naughtie and wicked people ....

"All men are bad and in their badness raigne." (1.14)

A Prince above all things ought to wish and desire to be esteemed Devout, although hee be not so indeed ....

"Tis better to be vile than vile esteemed." (1. 1)

A Prince ought not to trust in the ami tie of men ....

"By their rank thoughts, my deeds must not be shown." (1. 12)

A wise Prince ought not to keep his faith when the observa­tion thereof is hurtful to him, and that the occasions for which he gave it, be taken away.

"When not to be, receives reproach of being." (1. 2)

Obviously these axioms taken out of context are as unfair to this Inter­

pretation of the sonnet as they are to Machiavelli's true political doc­

trine. They do, however, serve to highlight the more startling elements

which were adopted as "good theater" by the early Elizabethan dramatists

and which culminated in Marlowe's Barabas.

®Boyer, ibid., p. 243.

10

Whether or not Shakespeare at that time accepted Gentillet's

misinterpretation of Machiavelli is not important; the audience loved

the blood-and-thunder villain, and the tradition of Machiavellianism

was established. These principles

. . . exercised great fascination over the dramatic artist. Nothing could be more natural, for such principles . . . sug­gested the interesting situations arising where the will and the conscience of man conflict ....

The basic problem of our sonnet involves this conflict.

Earlier Machiavellian villains are of two general classes. In

Shakespeare the revenge type is illustrated by Aaron and Iago, the am­

bitious type by Richard III. The opening statement of Sonnet 121 sug­

gests Iago, since his very nature entails dissimulation. Both Dowden

and Knight cite his speech in Othello*

In following him, I follow but myself Heaven is my judge, not I for love and duty But seeming so, for my peculiar end: For when my outward action doth demonstrate The native act and figure of ray heart In compliment extern, it is not long after But I will wear my heart upon my sleeve For daws to peck at: I am not what I am. (I,i,58-65)

If conventional notions of good and evil are reversed, Iago*a

character may conform in some respects to the sentiments expressed in

the sonnet. As the epitome of vileness Iago could derive a sadistic

^Boyer, ibid.» P« 39.

11

"just pleasure" from the success of his machinations, and would be

aware that he dare not be "vile esteemed" since the cloak of reputation

for integrity and candor is vital to his role as "honest lago."

Conceivably Iago's "sportive blood" could be stirred by the ele­

ments of risk and excitement involved in carrying out his intrigues.

His "frailties" and "abuses" might refer to his seeming servility in

his decision to "follow the Moor" instead of taking more direct steps

to obtain his revenge. "I am not what I am" then becomes his justifi­

cation for his modus operandi.

In spite of his protestations lago does not really hate his

victims. "Cassio's a proper man" who has "a daily beauty in his life

which makes me ugly," and Desdemona is simply a convenient means to an

end. lago apparently does not always feel that "all men are evil,"

since the success of his villainies depends upon the gullibility of

honest men.

The Moor is of a free and open nature, That thinks men honest that but seem to be so, And will as tenderly be led by the nose As asses are. (I,iii,405-408)

Despite his candor and apparent honesty with himself, lago does

not offer convincing reasons for the role of a "revenge" villain.

He is too profoundly immoral to feel the sting of wounded honor, and too conscious of his power to be gravely concerned about office and rank .... His passionless cynicism is hardly more capable of hate than it is of love.

12

If we consider Iago as a stock revenge villain, analogy with the sonnet

is faulty, because the sonnet decries injustice but does not suggest

revenge as an end in itself. Iago's true motive is deeper. "Evil is

Iago'a good. The base hint of mischief afoot fires his imagination."11

He gains perverse pleasure from utilizing a false reputation for honesty

to lead honest people to their downfall. Iago's machinations illustrate

the illusory nature of moral standards which permit an excess of "honor,"

combined with gullible "honesty" to result in the triumph of evil.

E. K. Chambers concurs:

Once more, and now to be treated as what he is, a symbol, not as what he is not, a human being, there comes upon the stage the terrible man according to Machiavelli, with his deliberate and self-conscious choice of evil to be his good, and his super­human resource and efficiency in shaping all events towards the realization of his diabolical end.12

Iago is completely dispassionate. He would be indifferent to the sexual

undertones of "false adulterate eyes" because, being inhuman, his "sport­

ive blood" is not stirred in that sense; he does not really care whether

the Moor "has done his office." Nor is Iago concerned with the nature

of his "abuses" or whether he is "straight or bevel"; he would only ob­

ject to others' "rank thoughts" should they threaten to expose him, since

his "deeds must not be shown." Being amoral, Iago would not find a phil­

osophical problem in the sonnet.

UHereford, ibid., p. xxxix.

12ShakesPeare: A Survey, 1925, p. 220.

13

Iago's view of the "bubble reputation" la pertinent:

Reputation is an idle and most false imposition} oft got without merit, and lost without deserving: you have lost no reputation at all, unless you repute yourself such a loser. (Ill,iii,268-72)

Here Iago voices one of the sonnet's basic tenets; he points out that

reputation is often unjustly measured, "Not by our feeling but by others'

seeing." This speech, and the circumstances under which it occurs, again

illustrate the relative nature of conventional values. Ironically Iago

is voicing his candid opinion, but "he is wearing the mask of seeming

13 virtue" when he answers Cassio, who associates reputation with honor

and justice. Iago is well aware that he is belittling the very quality

which enables him to function as "honest Iago," but the very incongruity

of the situation doubtless would appeal to his one sympathetic trait,

his sardonic sense of humor.

Iago is not a Machiavellian embodiment of the precepts of Sonnet

121 because his motives are selfish and personal. In spite of his even­

tual downfall, he represents in Othello the triumph of evil over good,

which conflicts with the critical consensus regarding the sonnet's clos­

ing couplet. Iago*s amorality could be associated with Machiavelli*s

attempt to divorce ethical questions from his political doctrine, but

Iago does not attempt to justify his deeds as political expediency; he

uses vile means to vile ends.

13 Irving Ribner, Patterns in Shakespearian Tragedy. 1960, p. 99.

14

In the important matter of motivation, Richard III differs, at

least ostensibly, from Iago. Being a creation of Shakespeare's earlier

history plays, and being a Machiavellian villain in the tradition estab­

lished before 1600, Richard is expected to seek

. . . the ripest fruit of all, That perfect bliss and sole felicity, The sweet fruition of an earthly crown.

The use of villainy to attain this end is at least a human, though re­

prehensible, trait; and even though he is a prototype of the stock

Machiavellian villain, Richard might be considered as a man, not just

as a symbol of evil. For this reason, he is more closely allied with

the sonnet than Iago.

Richard's stock Machiavellian traits allow him some degree of

sympathy. He is intelligent, courageous, energetic, and, like Iago,

exhibits an ironic sense of humor. Along with Aaron and Iago, he is

completely consistent in his villainy; by some degree of recantation

Edmund and Iachimo violate this tradition of Machiavellism and thereby

seem to lose stature. Part of the popularity of the Machiavellian vil­

lain is due to his candor in deflating the chivalric shibboleths of

honor and virtue. In their ignoble fashion, Richard, and especially

Iago, serve a purpose in this regard similar to Palstaff's. This

^Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine the Great. Part 1, 1959,

I,vii,27-29.

15

realistic attitude towards the nature of honor and honesty is appropri­

ate to an interpretation of Sonnet 121.

Like lago, Richard is disdainful of conventional morality, but

unlike lago he blames fate rather than mankind for his attitude. When

he murders the King in 3 Henry VI. Richard exclaims:

For this amongst the rest, was I ordain'd .... Then, since the heavens have shaped my body so, Let hell make crook'd my mind to answer it. I have no brother, I am like no brother; And this word "love," which greybeards call divine, Be resident in men like one another And not in me: I am myself alone. (V,iii,58 ff.)

Steevens, Brooke, and Knight all noted the similarity to "I am that 1

am."

It is significant that Richard stresses the word "love" when

stating his reasons for outlawing himself from humanity. He returns to

this subject in Richard III:

He capers nimbly in a lady's chamber To the lascivious pleasure of a lute. But I, that a® not shaped for sportive tricks, Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass; I, that am rudely stamp'd and want love's majesty To strut before a wanton ambling nymph; . . . since I cannot prove a lover, . . . I am determined to prove a villain. (l,i,12 ff.)

Here Richard approaches the sexual tone of Sonnet 121. The terms

"lascivious pleasure," "wanton ambling nymph" and "sportive tricks" com­

pare with the sonnet's "adulterate eyes" and "sportive blood." Onlike

16

the dispassionate Iago, Richard is acutely conscious of sexual pleasures.

Richard, an accomplished dissembler, relies on the same methods as does

Iago; he assumes the guise of an honest, virtuous man whose sincerity

is often misjudged by "others* false adulterous eyes." He is at his

hypocritical best when he asks:

Cannot a plain man live and think no harm, But thus his simple truth must be abused By silken, sly, insinuating Jacks? (I,iii,51-53)

Richard again dons his virtuous mask when he enlightens young Prince

Edward:

Nor more can you distinguish of a man Than of his outward show; which, God he knows, Seldom or never jumpeth with the heart. (Ill,i,9-11)

Although Richard is a supreme hypocrite, he is usually honest

with himself; however, his avowed motives are open to suspicion. In

3 Henry VI (HI,iii) he claims that his misshapen body precludes his

enjoyment of human love, which incites him to "set the murderous

Machiavel to school." Actually his desire for the crown is secondary

to his delight in his machinations; his vile means became ends in them­

selves. This is evident in Richard III when he woos Lady Anne.

Richard's surface motive in this suit is a political one; none­

theless, he is impressed by his success in his role of lover. With

typical candor he admits:

17

Upon my life, she finds, although 1 cannot, Myself to be a marvelous proper man. (I,ill,254-55)

But his true delight is in the very effrontery and success of his dis­

simulation:

Having God, her conscience, and these bars against me, And 1 nothing to back my suit at all But the plain devil and dissembling looks, And yet to win her, all the world to nothing! (I,lit,35-38)

Richard probes the depths of hypocrisy when he appears to the pop­

ulace, prayer book in hand, and sided by:

Two props of virtue for a Christian prince. (IH,vii,96)

Again the motive is apparently political, but Richard's inner pleasure

is in mocking religious principles in a bizarre setting.

E. K. Chambers says:

He makes evil his good; but, as 1 read him, it is not so much for the sake of evil itself, as for the sheer joy in the technique of villainy, in the nice adjustments of springs and wires whereby evil comes about.

Neither Richard nor Iago truly represents the precepts of Sonnet

121. Their disregard for morality corresponds with earlier Elizabethan

Machiavellism, but their vile schemes cannot be justified as political

expedients. The sonnet's poet does not deride nor ignore ethical stand­

ards; his resentment is directed towards those who misuse or misinter­

pret these standards, thus forcing himself into a position where his

"deeds must not be shown." He advocates dissimulation as an unfortunate

necessity, not as an end in itself.

18

Machiavelllsm as portrayed by Richard HI was still excellent

theater after 1600, but as Shakespeare grew more sophisticated, he may

have tired of these melodramatic villains. The tradition persists of

course in Iago, and to a degree in Don John, Edmund, and Iachimo; but

in Shakespeare's later history plays and in the Roman plays, his in­

terest in the true nature of Machiavellian doctrine becomes evident.

Whereas Richard and Iago executed their evil deeds for the sheer

Joy in villainy, the true Machiavellian prince stooped to vile measures

only when necessary for the greater good of more efficient government.

The decisive aspect of Machiavelli's political theories is not that he recommends the use of evil means: it is that in discussing the measures which a prince should take, their ethical value--whether morally good or bad--is never con­sidered; the only criterion is whether or not the methods adopted promise success.^

That Shakespeare was aware of this was apparent as early as I Henry VI

17 when Alencon, "that notorious Machiavel," advises:

To say the truth, it is your policy To save your subjects from such massacre And ruthless slaughters as are daily seen By proceeding in hostility; And therefore take this compact of a truce, Although you break it when your pleasure serves.

(V.iv,159-64)

In 3 Henry VI. however, Shakespeare bows to the popular misconception

and allows Gloucester to:

^Felix Gilbert, "The Prince," The Encyclopedia Americana (1961

ed.), XXII, 580.

j- i i? \7 T \t -i \r 7A .

19

Change shapes with Proteus for advantages And set the murderous Machiavel to school.

(111,111,192-93)

A more genial reference In The Merry Wives of Windsor illustrates his

later attitude:

. . . hear mine host of the Garter, am I politic? am 1 subtle? am I a Machiavel? ... X have deceived you both . . . your hearts are mighty, your skins are whole, and let burnt sack be the issue. (111,1,103 ff.)

Shakespeare's portrayals of Henry IV and Henry V in the later

history plays are ample proof that he was aware of and interested in

Machlavelll's actual principles as evidences of realistic elements in

men's natures. By this time Shakespeare's interests lay in developing

true-to-life characters and depicting their reactions when placed in

situations that would test the validity of the characterizations. The

marked contrast between Bolingbroke in Richard II and the King in the

two parts of Henry IV shows that Shakespeare appreciated the value of

Machiavelli's realistic political doctrine as a background for the

actions of his central figures. Prince Hal's gradual development into

Henry V represents the culmination of Shakespeare's thinking at that

time; but it was not until later, in Octavius Caesar, that Shakespeare

presented his most accurate analysis of Machiavellian political philo­

sophy.

Shakespeare was apparently aware that:

20

. . . in Machiavelli 's view the most perfect example of suc­cessful political action is to be found in the history of Rome, and his approach leads him to an idealization of everything the Romans did. Contemporary politics and Roman history, then, form the material out of which he forms these generalizations which by their very neglect of custernary morality have shocked the world, such as "it is much more secure to be feared than to be loved," and "a prudent ruler can not and should not ob­serve faith when such observance is to his disadvantage."18

Shakespeare appreciated the appeal of these shocking axioms and exploited

them in his traditional villains, but he also realized that Machiavelli*s

worth basically derived from his attempt to deal with men as they are

rather than as they ought to be. In the realm of politics Machiavelli

sought to divorce men from religion and ethics. By turning to pagan

Rome he could avoid the religious tenets of his time, but the weakness

of his doctrines became apparent when he ignored conscience, the ethical

element in men's natures.

Shakespeare made no such error. As he progressed in his art, he

realized that true dramatic interest detives from man's struggle between

his desires and his conscience under conditions which force him to take

decisive action. In the cycle of history plays, beginning with Richard

II, Shakespeare indicated that he was no longer interested in a simple

chronicle of English history; he sought for meaning in events, emotional

emphasis, clash of ideas, and realistic characterization.

^Gilbert, op. clt., p. 53.

21

To illustrate the illusory nature of moral shibboleths, Shakes­

peare exposed three of his central characters to the demands of "honor."

Hotsput reacts in the tradition of the dying era of irrational romantic

chivalry. Acting in contrast is realistic Falstaff whose "brief cate-

19 chiam on honor is a mocking echo of Hotspur's heroics." Prince Hal

portrays an attitude of rationalistic Machiavellian compromise in the

interests of reputation and political effectiveness. Hotspur lives

his honor; Falstaff scoffs at it; Prince Hal utilizes it.

Shakespeare's genius evinced itself in the fact that none of

these characters becomes a symbol; all are recognizable human beings.

Hotspur is rash and foolish, but his honesty and courage inspire Prince

Hal's respect--". . . fare thee well, great heart!" Even Falstaff bows

to the tradition in his inimitable fashion: "A plague upon it when

thieves cannot be true one to another!" When he states, "Honor is a

mere escutcheon," and "The better part of valor is discretion!" he is

soliloquizing, ''Nothing confutes me but eyes, and nobody sees me."

Prince Hal's true honor is within himself; he cares for reputation only

insofar as it is politic—for example, his Quixotic offer to settle the

issue before Shrewsbury by individual combat is ignored even by Hotspur.

Falstaff's Immediate popularity was no doubt due to the fact that

both Shakespeare and his audience had been satiated with the affected

19Harrison, op. cit., p. 336. Cf. 1 Henry IV, V,i,143.

22

pomposities which passed for moral standards, and they were delighted

to see them deflated. Richard III mocked, but being inhuman he did not

strike home as did the true-to-life Falstaff, who with his irrepressible

humor expressed the feelings of Shakespeare's contemporaries.

It is significant that after completing his portrayal of Henry V

as his ideal man of action,"^ Shakespeare moved his political setting

to Roma. Whether this was due to a further interest in Machiavellian

doctrine is problematical, but it did provide him with the freedom to

develop a true Machiavellian character. Most important, it released

him from considerations of "divine right"—always a touchy subject dur­

ing Elisabeth's reign, and particularly so at the time of her troubles

with Essex.

In Julius Caesar, the first of his great tragedies, Shakespeare

continued his theme of honor and reputation in contrast to honesty and

conscience. L. C, Knights states:

Shakespeare examines more closely the contradictions and illu­sions involved in political action .... it seems to me un­deniable that the play offers a deliberate contrast between the person and the public persona, the face and the mask; that tragic illusion and error are shown to spring from the wrench­ing apart of the two worlds—the personal and the public; , .

20Cf. Herford, op. cit., p. xxiii.

2^Further Explorations. 1965, p. 15.

23

Although Brutus, "an honorable man," Is the tragic hero, Julius Caesar,

potentially the greatest Machiavellian ruler of them all, hovers in the

background.

Octavius appears very briefly in Julias Caesar and indicates, at

this early stage in his career, his innate sense of appearances and

order. This is apparent in the closing speech of the play in which he

insists that the proper ceremonies be accorded to the fallen Brutus, for

whom he had previously evinced little respect,

According to his virtue let us use him, With all respect and rites of burial. Within my tent his bones tonight shall lie, Most like a soldier, ordered honorably.

This characteristic is evident again in Antony and Cleopatra when Octavia

returns to Rome without sufficient pomp to please her brothers

But ye have come A market maid to Rome, and have prevented The ostentation of our love, which left unshown Is often unloved. (Ill,vi,50-53)

His consistency is proved in the final speech in Antony and Cleopatra:

Our army shall In solemn show attend this funeral, And then to Rome. Come Dolabella, see High order in this great solemnity.

Octavius is the efficient, rational, unemotional man who wins

out over the emotional Antony who would rather die than lose his honor.

Honor to Octavius consists of reputation, of the proper appearance at

24

all times. When Lepldus has served his purpose, Octavius coldly elim­

inates him from their triumvirate, but he is careful to claim hepidus'

former letters as justification. His "just pleasure" is in efficiency,

even to the point of sacrificing his sister to political expediency.

Although strictly virtuous in his personal life, he is really as amoral

as lago--the difference being that he has no desire to be vile for per­

sonal reasons. He does not feel that men are evil, nor does he really

object to Antony's dissipation or emotional entanglements until they

affect the machinery of state.

Unlike Antony, Octavius would never become "passion's slave"j

hence, when he is considered in the light of "sportive blood," "frail­

ties," and "abuses," he fails to conform with Sonnet 121. Ribner

points out that:

Octavius and Octavia together stand for a cold, rational morality which the audience may intellectually approve, but which emotionally it must reject as lacking the warmth and vitality of the immoral and foolish Antony and Cleopatra. Octavius represents the necessity of empire. To the forward march of an expanding Rome^he will sacrifice everything, in­cluding his own humanity.

He is not concerned with "false adulterate eyes" because, having

no "sportive blood," he has no deeds that "must not be shown." Even

during the drinking bout in Pompey's galley (ll.vii) he remains sober

since "graver business frowns at this levity." Only once does he show , - . . . v• *n ;• i , •

22Ribner, op. cit., p. 177.

25

some evidence of emotion—upon learning of Antony's death:

Look you sad, friends? The gods rebuke me, but it is tidings To wash the eyes of Kings. (V,i,26-29)

But this display of humanity is short lived.

In Antony and Cleopatra Shakespeare indicated his evaluation of

Machiavelli's doctrine carried to its extremes. Excessive efficiciency

--even justified by effective government--is not desirable. Ribner sums

i t up:

We have tragic waste and loss, but the emphasis is upon the destruction of the things of this world, of glory, honour, reputation, self-esteem.

Octavius at the end of the play has indeed attained mastery of the world, but Shakespeare leaves us also with the feeling that this world, in spite of its far reaching magnificence, is small and insignificant.^

Octavius appears to have won the war but lost the peace. In true

Machiavellian style he divorces himself from morality, but by doing so

he loses his humanity and becomes a symbol, whereas the poet in Sonnet

121 is facing a moral problem as a human being.

This theme is continued in Coriolanus. Coriolanus is a pagan

version of Hotspur, "jealous in honor" and "seeking the bubble reputa­

tion," even at the sacrifice of home and country. He lacks Hotspur's

human qualities—particularly his blunt sense of humor—but Coriolanus

is honest in his conception of honor. He is confronted with Machiavellian

230p. cit., p. 2 and p. 168.

26

precepts in times of peace by Volumnia who asks:

If it be honour in your wars to seem The same you are not, which, for your best ends, You adopt your policy, how is it less or worse That it shall hold companionship in peace With honour, as in war, since that to both It stands in like request? {Ill,ii,46-51)

She admits: •' v •' ' S r • > r;. . ' •%

I would dissemble with ray nature where My fortunes and my friends at stake required I should do so in honor. (Ill,ii,62-64)

And because he "is that he is," Coriolanus cannot adhere to her advice;

hence, he loses the peace. Later, when he softens at the pleas of his

family, he loses the war as well:

Aufidius, though I cannot make true wars, I'll frame convenient peace. (V,iii,190-96)

To this Aufidius comments in an ironically Machiavellian aside:

I am glad thou hast set thy mercy and thy honor At difference in thee. Out of that I'll work Myself a former fortune. (V,iii,200-203)

Thus, Coriolanus, an "honest fool," loses both war and peace in a Machi­

avellian sense, but gains peace of mind by conceding to humanity.

It would seem that Shakespeare, although he realized the neces­

sity for Machiavellian traits in his ruler, indicated that a king is

also a man and must compromise in each role. Whereas Octavius deviated

from the pattern of the sonnet by his lack of "sportive blood," Prince

Hal's wayward youth comes immediately to mind.

27

Prince Hal, then, combines Machiavellian rationalistic praeti-

cality with an element of human warmth and understanding:

There is no littleness in him, and no excess; Shakespeare has granted to him what he withheld from the heroes of his tragedies--a well balanced nature.^

For this reason, he resembles the pattern of the sonnet more elosely

than any of the other Shakespearian characters under discussion. The

first quatrain of the sonnet is a general statement which could apply

to Bollngbroke or Octavius, but "sportive blood" could best be explained

in the light of Hal's associations with Falstaff and his cronies.

The first four lines refer to the abstractions--vileness, reputa­

tion, and just pleasure. It would be easy to consider that Henry 9, as

a man, would feel vile about his rejection of Falstaff. He would then

be losing what he considered a just pleasure in Falstaff's company,

which he knew in his own heart was not evil, in order to protect the

reputation necessary to a king. The underlying resentment would not be

simply because of the loss of pleasure, but because of the realization

that there is an element of evil and/or ignorant people in this world

which makes such a compromise of personal integrity necessary. Partially

through his association with Falstaff, King Henry could have learned the

relative nature of moral standards, and could well believe that Falstaff

24Frederic W. Moorman (ed.) , The First Part of Henry the Fourth.

The Arden Shakespeare, 1917, p. xxv.

28

and his cronies did not deserve to be censured by those in high repute

with both church and state, who are no better at heart.

As a man he might resent the fact that others' eyes misrepresent

his personal actions which are just in the light of his own conscience;

for, considering the ephemeral value of moral standards, his only re­

course is to his own conscience. Therefore, he could just as well con­

tinue his association with Falstaff by resorting to secrecy—which in

itself might be vile but which could be justified as a means to an end

which would not be vile. However, as a king, he could not afford to

take the chance of having his actions misrepresented; therefore, he

must sacrifice his personal just pleasure to the greater good of the

people who as a whole are not evil--although there is still an element

of doubt on that score.

The traditional villains violated the tenor of the sonnet be­

cause they delighted in evil for its own sake—their actions were vile

for vile personal ends and served only to provide "shocking'' interest

and to pave the way for consideration of shibboleths, ethical and re­

ligious, on a more realistic basis. Emphasis upon these stock villains

has caused critics such as Landry to state that!

. . . there is no place in Shakespeare's range of values for the kind of cynicism that Elizabethans associated with the

realistic Machiavelli

25Hilton Landry, Interpretations in Shakespeare*s Sonnets. 1963,

p. 95.

29

This may well be true in regard to the plays, but not necessarily so

in regard to the sonnets, which were written for an audience that may

have been more aware of Machiavelli's true principles. The true

Machiavellian prince:

. . . judged private virtue to be the basis of all healthy national existence; but in the realm of politics he sub­ordinated morale to political expediency,

Shakespeare's most accurate portrayal of a Machiavellian prince,

Octavius, is not completely in harmony with the sonnet because of his

cold, rational morality which does not account for "sportive blood."

The character of Prince Hal is well attuned to the sonnet because he

displays human warmth and understanding. His professed motives for as­

sociating with vile company are open to suspicion--they might be con­

sidered as personal as well as political. He doth protest too much

when he asserts:

My reformation, glittering o'er my fault, Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes Than that which hath no foil to set it off.

(1 Henry IV. I,ii,236-38)

The human compromise seems to be Shakespeare's answer to extreme

Machiavellian doctrine.

Although Henry V fits the Machiavellian framework of the sonnet,

there is still the feeling that this interpretation is incomplete. This

^'Machiavelli," Encyclopedia Britannics (1959 ed.), XIV, 577.

30

is probably because of the basic impracticality of dissociating ethics

from politics. 'Only gradually have we recognized that political econ­

omy has unavoidable points of contact with ethics."27 Shakespeare was

too wise not to have realized this necessity. Also, there is no direct

proof that the sonnet relates to politics, "I am that I am" could be

considered as pertaining to a person of unusual importance whose actions

could affect the condition of the state; and the last word "reign" could

imply a political problem. However, both expressions could be inter-v' a* . •« ' •••" w- ijti" i •* ymtpejl* ' jwifc

preted as general statements from a personal standpoint.

Such expressions as "sportive blood" definitely bring the sonnet

down to a personal level. Therefore, it should be considered as the

poet's philosophical soliloquy, concerned with the deeper moral prob-i »rvt fed r»th* theeit that 4** Sa­

lens of good and evil in men's affairs despite its obvious Machiavel-, t4 ") J • ' 't * * Jv ; '5 ijk' • i hiHT T •

lian precepts.

CHAPTER III

KEY PHRASES

Hubler considered Sonnet 121 Shakespeare's commitment to a

pragmatic ethics, engendered by the poet's emphasis upon the value of

reputation, and related to his "knowledge that nothing, not even evil,

is of necessity completely evil, for some good may come of it."28 This

leads directly to the major sonnet problem, which is to reconcile "just

pleasure" with "vileness."

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of several concepts in

the sonnet which relate to this question. Attention will be paid to

Shakespeare's plays in the attempt to evaluate the thesis that in Son­

net 121 the poet: resents the large element of narrowness and hypocrisy

in men which often forces the honest man to compromise his conscience in

order to maintain a reputation that may not be a true measure of his

worth; illustrates the relative nature of conventional moral standards;

decides that he roust make his own moral decisions, even in the face of

accepted opinion; regrets that he must stoop to some degree of hypocrisy

in order to utilize his innate potentials; hints that material existence

may be an illusion and that this reputation may be man's only reality.

28Edward Hubler, The Sense of Shakespeare's Sonnets. 1952, p. 131.

32

Just pleasure. The first quatrain contains all the elements

necessary to Interpret the sonnet, but since it makes a general state­

ment using abstract terms, the remainder of the sonnet is required to

complete its meaning. The first step is to accept the relative nature

of the terms "vile," "reputation," and "just pleasure." Since the just

pleasure must refer to vlleness for the sonnet to make full sense, It is

necessary to realize that the vlleness to which the poet refers is not

the same vlleness seen by others' eyes. To him the vlleness is the dis­

simulation necessary to save his reputation. Secondly, the poet, al­

though forced to vlleness, is at heart an honest and just man who is on

the side of good, not evil. If he is regarded as basically evil or

amoral, his just pleasure becomes ironic, and the quatrain is reduced

to the trite statement: "I might as well have the game as the name."

But there is more than this to the sonnet. The poet says, "It is better

to be vile than vile esteemed"; he does not say, "I might as well be

vile." "Better" seems to imply a decision in favor of moral rectitude

—which is further confirmed by the adjective "just.

Furthermore, the poet does not say that it is always better to

be vile than vile esteemed, but only when unjustly slandered; nor does

he state that the others who misunderstand him are necessarily all evil.

Were he to consider all people as evil, the sonnet would lose its sense

of inner conflict and depth of meaning.

33

The poet is placed in a position wherein he must be guilty of

some degree of vileness for what he hopes is a greater good. Although

he doe9 not directly name hi3 vileness, It must be in practicing decep­

tion, or simply in not being open and honest. Thus, he retains the just

pleasure in his activity and maintains his reputation as well; but it is

not simply the Just pleasure in continuing the activity under question

that is important to him--it is resentment towards the evil element in

the world which prevents him from being open and honest about something

which his conscience tells him is good.

Reputation too is viewed as a necessary evil by the poet, because

often it is based upon judgments that are false to his inner feelings,

while to the world, reputation is a measure of man's worth.

Just pleasure, to the poet, means affirming his own moral judg­

ment in spite of some others' opinions, and secondarily the actual plea­

sure involved in his activity. The poet is questioning the conventional

moral standards men profess to live by, and the fact that false adulter-4* sr* " -U« j ft U

ers can influence his (and other men's) reputation in the eyes of all

men, who may be honest but are led astray by false standards of personal

behavior.

What does the poet mean by the term "vile"? In All's Well That

Ends Well. Shakespeare remarks:

Good alone Is good without a name. Vileness is so: The property by what it is should go, Not by the title. (II,iii,136-38)

These lines could well portray the subjective nature of vileness and

reputation with its big brother "honor"—the basic theme of the sonnet.

The term "vile" is used in many ways by Shakespeare. In this

study alone, instances of its use were noted in all of Shakespeare*s

plays. He uses the word with its original Latin meaning of "cheap" or

"common," as in the following excerpt from 1 Henry VI:

But with a baser man of arms by far Once again in contempt they would have barter'd me: Which I, disdaining scorn'd; and craved death, Rather than I would be so vile esteem'd. (I,iv,30-33)

He uses it in referring to common animals in Cymbeline:

In killing creatures vile, as cats and dogs, of no esteem. (V,v,250)

He refers to Pisanio's sword as a vile instrument and to Caliban as a

vile race. Polonius calls "beautified" a vile phrase, and Cassius ac­

cuses the poet of rhyming vilely. Gloucester's eyes are "vile jelly."

Young Clifford's speech in I.Henry VI:

0 let the vile world end (V,ii,40)

compares with Cleopatra's death scene:

What should I stay-in this vile world? <V,ii,318)

and with the poet's sentiments in Sonnet 71:

35

Give warning to the world that I am fled From this vile world with vilest worms to dwell.

Harrison points out that Shakespeare's early style was marked by

devices such as repetitions, word play in which one word is used in two

or three different meanings, and a general delight in cleverness rather

29 than in psychological insight." While there is no evidence of a face­

tious tone in the sonnet, there may be a deliberate juxtaposition of the

terms "vile" to illustrate the relative nature of any standards of judg­

ment. This practice is described by William Empson in Seven Types of

Ambiguity:

In the fourth type the alternative meanings combine to make clear a complicated state of mind in the author.30

The second line of the sonnet introduces the element of ignorance

and evil which forces the poet into dissimulation. Shakespeare's bitter­

ness towards this trait of mankind is evident even in his early works,

but it seems to culminate at the time he started examining moral prob­

lems realistically. Hamlet says:

For in the fatness of these pursy times Virtue itself of vice must pardon beg. (Ill,iv,153-54)

Particularly pertinent to the visual theme of the sonnet is Gloucester's

remark in King Lear:

2®G. B. Harrison (ad.), •ih.l.aapeare: Major Play.. 1948, p. 106.

Gillian Empson, a-.- Typa, of toMjUig, 1949, p. ».

36

'Tis the times' plague, when madmen lead the blind.

(IV,i,50)

**r*ler» in a more humorous vein, even Falstaff remarks:

. . . Hal? thou knowest in the state of Innocence Adam fell. And what should poor Jack Falstaff do in the days of villainy? (1 Henry IV. Ill,iii,185-86)

Tha moat cutting criticism of the times comes from lady Macduff's small

aon:

Then the liars and the swearers are fools; for there are liars and swearers enow to beat the honest men and hang up them.

(Macbeth IV,ii,55-58)

Reputation, as emphasized in the remainder of the first quatrain,

is really inseparable from honor. which is probably the most important

single concept in Shakespeare's plays. "Honor," as the last foolishly

idealistic remnant of a chivalric age, seemed to Shakespeare the symbol

for most of the false standards which result in the problem forced upon

the poet in this sonnet. !>. C. Knights remarks:

It is, I think, true to say that one of Shakespeare's major preoccupations was with the distortion and falsifica­tion in political and public life that goes with excessive simplification of the issues—with the habit of abstract­ing from the rich complexity of the actual in the interest of an abstract notion such as 'honour' or 'policy. '31

The poet, as a man of honesty in his own conscience, resists the neces-

sary concessions to the tradition of shibboleths. This sane conflict

appear, throughout Shakespeare's plays. A»ong the .en of honor (honest

31Purther Emlorations. 1965. p. 58.

37

fool.) «r. Talbot. Hotspur, Brutus. Hector, Anton,, and Corlolanus, each

of whom:

Holds honour far more precious-dear than life. (Troilus and Cressida V,ill,28)

In contrast are such realists as Jaques, Apemantus, Thersites,

and Autolycus, who would embrace the precepts of their indomitable

leader Falstaff:

I myself sometimes, leaving the fear of God on the left hand and hiding mine honor in my necessity, am fain to shuf­f le , t o h e d g e a n d t o l ur c h . . . .

(Merry Wives of Windsor II,ii,23-25)

As Shakespeare's ideal man of action, Henry V, was forced to compromise,

so must the poet in our sonnet, but his resentment is not towards the

honest fools, but towards the liars and swearers.

Sportive blood. The second quatrain moves from the general to

the specific, establishes a clue to the personal nature of the vileness

under consideration, and places the poet s rancor directly on the false

and evil element in mankind.

. . .Hide thee, . . .

Thou perjured, and thou simular man of virtue That art incestuous. Caitiff to pieces shake, That under covert and convenient seeming

Hast practiced on man's life. (King Lear 111,11,53-56)

The "false adulterate eyes" indicate a persistent theme through-

„ calls the "curious undercurrent of sexual out Shakespeare which Murry cana

38

di.gu,t which 1. a.arked In HnjOet and Mca.ure for and

— ***°" °f Alhann . . . ,..32 nu only ln

the., plays, but also ln his treatment of Joan of Arc, ln Richard Ufa

•portive tricks, and in the tedious shallowness of Love's Labor Ln^.

It is particularly noticeable in Much Ado About Nothing. All's Well

Ifrat Ends Well, Troilus and Cressida. Othello. Cymbeline. The Winter's

Tale, and in Prospero's emphasis upon premarital behavior in The Tan-

Jgest. Possibly one of the most incongruously distasteful females «in

this tradition is the disgustingly virtuous Helena, who illustrates

a type of Machiavellian activity--though hardly political:

Let us assay our plot; which if it speed, Is wicked meaning in a lawful deed And lawful meaning in a lawful act, Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact.

(All's Well That Ends Well III,vii,44-48)

Cressida, too, has received her share of notoriety. In Troilus and

Cress Ida "love is smirched and mocked with a filthy bitterness, and

33 heroism is made ridiculous." In the later plays the lack of trust

and excessive jealousy reiterate this theme in the persons of Othello,

Leontes, and Posthumus. Leontes speaks for all when he says:

But with her most vile principal, that she's A bed swerver. (Winter's Tale IIfi,90)

32John Middleton Murry, Shakespeare, 1936, p. 90.

33Harrison, on. cit., p. 656.

39

The poet's frailties (like vileness, honor, and reputation) are

relative. The degree of vileness involved in the activities of Shake­

speare's array of bed swervers varies with the observer's viewpoint.

To some Helena may seem virtuous; to others she is more ignoble than

the inconstant Cressida. The nature of the poet's sportive blood and

frailties is not stated; but since he is accepted as a basically virtu­

ous man, it is fair to assume that his wrongdoing is venial rather than

mortal. When reproached for his sins, the poet might well respond like

the tutor of his riots:

If sack and sugar be a fault, God help the wicked. (1 Henry IV II,iv,516)

I am that I am. "I am that I am" is one of the most controver­

sial statements in the sonnet. As the critics have pointed out, it can

be accepted as an amoral pronouncement in which the poet is stating, "I

am myself alone, and I have no standards more reliable than my own con­

science"; or it can be regarded as an evidence of omnipotence through

divine right, an agnostic disregard for teligious tenets, or a simple

acceptance of God's will as manifested in the poet's personal conscience.

The extreme view which places the poet beyond any moral standards

is stated by Oscar Wilde, who called this a "sonnet of noble scorn."34

He further states that there had been critics:

3^The Portrait Mr* **•> 1958» p* 35'

40

. . . who had regretted that the Sonnets had ever been written, who had seen in them something dangerous, something unlawful even. To them it would have been sufficient to answer in Chapman's noble words:

There is no danger to a man that knows What Life and Death is: there's not any law Exceeds his knowledge: neither is it lawful That he should stoop to any other law.^5

This statement might be justified as an acceptance of Cod's will by

comparing Hamlet's speech:

There'-'3 a divinity that shapes our ends, Rough-hew them how we will. (V,ii, 10-11)

However, the final evidence of faith does not appear until later, in

the constancy of Perdita and Floriael:

. . . what I was, I am. (Winter's Tale IV,iv,466)

It seems likely that "I am that I am" was a spontaneous expres­

sion by Shakespeare, without reference to the Bible. However, the

Geneva (or the Breeches) Bible of 1562, to which Shakespeare had ac­

cess, contains this exact pronouncement (continued in the King James

Bible, 1611) which, taken in context, is God's answer to Moses' request

for proof of His powers—an ironic twist, showing that even God must

maintain a reputation.

Hamilton Coleman state. In Shakespeare and the Bible that Shake-

apear. p.. definitely . student of Holy Hrlt, and that he »ae thoroughly

41

{Miliar with both the teataeents. It ia significant that CoImm, a

theologian, finds that:

. . . Shakespeare's philosophy goes beyond morality. His irreverence was not an agnostic's disdain for religion; it was a thinker's reaction to clericalism . . . .3®

In a political sense, "No, I am that I am," might be associated

with divine principles as related to the theory of divine right, a very

pertinent question during the last years of Elizabeth's reign. The poet

could be chiding himself for his neglect of duty, as did Richard II:

I had forgot myself: am I not king? Awake, thou coward majestyI thou sleepest.

(Ill,i,83-84)

This could represent a decision to reform, as did Prince Hal:

Presume not that I am the thing I was. (2 Henry IV V,iv,60)

But more likely this indicates an agnostic attitude similar to Edmund's:

Tut, I should have been that I am had the maidenliest star in the firmament twinkled on my bastardizing.

(King Lear I,ii,141-43)

Or, as expressed more simply by the Bastard:

And I am I, howe'er I was begot. (King John I,i,175)

Thus it would seem that the statement "I am that I am" is too

broad to offer the poet a practical moral guide, and is flexible enough

to be adapted to almost any interpretation of the sonnet.

361955, p. 123.

42

The poet concludes the third quatrain on a practical note. The

terms 'abuses and rank thoughts" continue the theme of sportive blood,

but in this quatrain, the poet has reached the decision that his per­

sonal convictions are justified, but that he must conform to popular

opinion. Whether he sacrifices his just pleasure by discontinuing the

activity under question or whether he dissimulates in order to continue

this activity in secret is unimportant:

For policy sits above conscience. (Timon of Athens III,ii,94)

As for liars and swearers who put him in this position, the poet feels

that:

Wis dean and goodness to the vile seem vile; Filths savor but themselves. (King Lear IV,ii,38*39)

It Is significant that the closing couplet poses a question which

could reverse the entire trend of thought in the sonnet up to this point.

The poet says: "My sacrifice of personal integrity to reputation is

only Jus titled if most of the world is honest, for somebody has to pro­

tect the honeet fools from the liare end swearers. However, if I a.

wrong, and the world is really made up of evil people, my eecrlfice I.

for nought. ft My he possible thet the poet Included thl. disput­

ing thought in the last couplet to reaffirm the theme of the relative

nature of ell standards of Judgment in this world.

Regarding reputation, Hubler states:

43

Like the other convictions basic to Shakespeare's writings, the view of reputation seems to have been pre­sent from the beginning and to have taken on new associ­ations as he matured, so that in the later works it does not stand alone and cannot be estimated in Isolation from correlative thoughts and attitudes .... Shakespeare always wants to see life whole--therefore the juxtaposi­tions and complexities which so disturb readers of a neo­classical turn of mind, who, in our day assume as dogma the canons which have no authority beyond personal pre­ference.

The relative view of all moral standards justifies the poet's

choice of the lesser evil of dissimulation as long as he does his duty

to society by maintaining his reputation:

The purest treasure mortal times afford Is spotless reputation. (Richard II I,ii,176)

Consequently, the evil element in this sonnet is slander:

No, 'tis slander;

Where edge is sharper than the sword; whose tongue

Outvenoms all the worms of Nile. (Cyrabeline III,iv,45)

With the acceptance of the completely relative view of reputa­

tion a. an important standard, a sense of illusion and unreality is

inevitable. Coleman attempted to evaluate Shakespeare's plays without

being influenced by theological preconceptions. He determined that:

Shakespeare concluded that material existence is an * * in god's likeness must eternally remain illusion, that man in God s usei

"tk. Of -I- S°2B££Z- »• 123"

44

so, and that the so-called man of dust, the Adam man, must be of such stuff as dreams are made on."̂ ®

The poet gives the impression that he is unhappy that the honest fools

cannot compete with the liars and swearers, for, like Hotspur, they have

But shadows and the shows of men to fight.

(2 Henry IV I,i,193)

Of course, in his later plays Shakespeare indicated that there was hope

through faith, as in Winter's Tale:

It is required You do awake your faith. (V,iii,90)

Despite this note of hope, in Winter's Tale practically all the principal

characters are disguised or deceived. It is significant that Leontes

(V,i,90) distrusts Florezel's approach because of lack of ostentation.

Even Perdita, one of Shakespeare's finest and most sympathetic feminine

characters, participates in deception:

I see the play so lies That I must bear a part. (IV,iv,443)

Although comparison to Shakespeare's plays is always intriguing,

about all that may be definitely said is that there are many similari­

ties between precepts in the sonnet and in the plays. As the devil

cites scripture for his purpose, so may the critic quote Shakespeare's

plays to serve his particular interpretation of the sonnet. Nonethe­

less, general trends of thought and theme may be assimilated through

•^Shakespeare and the Bible, p. v.

Che study of Shakespeare's

a continual application of

the necessity of wearing a

such a point that the poet

rage that dissimulation is

complete works. It is not inconceivable that

disguise and make-believe as a dramatist, plus

social mask in daily life, might build up to

of this sonnet might express a sense of out-

necessary even in his personal relations.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

None of the Interpretations of Sonnet 121 offered by the critics

studied is completely satisfactory, but many critics raised points that

aid in a fuller understanding of the sonnet. As indicated in Chapter I,

the stumbling block, "just pleasure," forced the critics to a concord-

ance in admitting vileness in the poet. Knight (1955) senses the tone

of the sonnet, and his overall paraphrase Is the best of the "evil"

school.

Knight's interpretation is considered in detail in Appendix B,

Briefly, he believes that the poet is engaged in a "vile" activity of a

sexual nature, but that the poet is not to be judged by normal standards

of behavior since his personal sense of values is more accurate (at least

in regard to himself) than the precepts of society. Hence the poet con­

tinues in his "vileness" and ignores reputation. Knight's flair for the

dramatic gives a sense of unity to his paraphrase, but he ignores the

problems raised by a detailed line-by-line analysis. He does not solve

the basic problem of the sonnet, which is the reconciliation of "vile­

ness" with "Just pleasure." He simply ignores the question by releasing

the poet from any responsibility to society. This approach is unsatis-

factory because there is too much evidence within the sonnet that the

47

poet Is aware of the necessity of maintaining a reputation: i.e., "By

their rank thoughts my deeds must not be shown." Furthermore, there is

no evidence to indicate that the poet's problem cannot be settled, or at

least compromised, within the social mores of the everyday world.

A Machiavellian interpretation of the sonnet, which was suggested

by the problem of justifying vileness, was examined in Chapter II and

found wanting, because the poem is personal and not political in tone.

A further study of the key phrases, particularly the enigma of "just

pleasure," led to the realization that the vileness under consideration

must be viewed as within the poet. Many of the critics conclude that

the vileness should not be so considered in the poet's conscience, but

none of them suggests that the poet is referring to a vileness other

than that derived from his own activity. Once it is understood that

the poet's vileness and reputation are constant factors, and that vile­

ness in the world's eyes is relative, the entire poem may be satisfact­

orily explained.

The conclusion of this study is that all considerations can be

consolidated into a satisfactory interpretation by accepting dissimula­

tion as the vileness with which the poet is concerned.

The first two lines indicate that the poet feels that his reputa-

tlem 1. of prime Importance. Whether thi. Judgment h, ether.' eye. 1.

48

a true measure of a man's worth or not, it must be accepted if he is to

maintain his desired place in the social order. The remainder of the

first quatrain raises the problem of evil in man's nature that leads

to unfair judgments about man's personal affairs. This evil prevents

him from openly following the honest dictates of his conscience. It

poses the problem of whether to defy convention or to assume a social

mask.

The second quatrain emphasizes the fact that the activity (vile-

ness in the world's eyes) under question is a personal one, and stresses

the sexual nature of this activity to indicate that this is an area in

which a man should be allowed to make his own judgments. Here the poet

changes from "our" to Hmy" and indicates that it is a relatively minor

human frailty under consideration.

The stress upon opinion in the second quatrain indicates that

there is some doubt in the poet's mind as to the overall justice of the

decision he is forced to make. He is outraged by the fact that others'

eyes force him to take decisive action on a question for which there are

no real "divine" guideposts.

He resolves in the third quatrain that, in the absence of fixed

. „ artivitv under question by his own intui-• tandards, he must judge the activity «n

tloo, b, being true to the intelligence th.t 1. hi. "divine" gift. But

be .till re.ent. the hypocrite, and bigot, that force bin to ccprcol.e

49

hi. conscience in order to preserve the reputation necessary to maintain

hi. place in the social order. Whether he resorts to hypocrisy or pre-

tense to continue the activity concerned, or whether he forgoes the

activity, is not important. What he resents is the censorious element

in mankind, be they liars and swearers or honest fools, that try to

force him (and mankind as a whole) to abide by standards that are not

as real as the judgments of his own conscience.

If "I am that 1 am" is accepted as an ironic reference to Exodus

3:14, it is possible to assume that the poet is resentful that divine

law has not established guideposts to reconcile God-given intelligence

with human activities. He wants to be allowed to judge his personal

activities himself. He does not deny the necessity for reputation, but

he questions the qualifications of those who sat the standards by which

man's reputation becomes established. He is not against order and con­

formity in society, but he is against abuse of personal liberty when it

does not materially affect others.

In the closing couplet, the poet intimates that in the event that

evil does rule the world, then it makes no difference whether he preserve

his reputation or refrain from any activity in which he wishes to indulge.

Y.t, considering th. identity of the poet concerned, it is diffi-

C.U not to in.tinctiv.Xy agree with biographer Peter Q».=n.l,

Typical of Shakespeare's genius, however, is the balance niai"tained between his contradictory attributes, between

a strain of deep, instinctive pessiaism, and the no less in­stinctive love of life that drew him back towards the 'sweet world.'

39Peter Quennel, Shakespeare, 1963, p. 162.

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Baldensperger, Fernand. Les Sonnets de Shakespeare. Berkeley: Uni­versity of California Press, 1943.

Baldwin, T. W. On the Literary Genetics of Shakespeare's Poems and Sonnets. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950.

Barber, C. L. "An Essay on the Sonnets," The Sonnets of Shakespeare. Charles Jasper Sisson (ed.). The Laurel Shakespeare. Hew York: The Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1960.

Beeching, H. C. The Sonnets of Shakespeare. Boston: Ginn & Company,

1904.

The Bible and Holy Scriptures- Printed at Geneva, 1562.

Boyer, Clarence Valentine. The Villain as Hero in Elizabethan Tragedy. London: George Routledge and Sons, Limited, 1914.

Brooke, Tucker (ed.). Shakespeare's Sonnets. London: Oxford Univer­

sity Press, 1936.

Butler, Samuel (ed.). Shakespeare's Sonnets. London: A. C. Fifield,

1899.

Chambers, E. K. c^-peare: A Yorkl Hill and Wang, 1925.

Coleman, Hamilton. Shak<^^ York: Vantage Press,

Inc., 1955.

Cr.lg, Hardin (ed.). Th. Coc>lete.«"rh. of ShaEe.peere. Chicago, Scott,

Foresman and Company, 1959.

»ewde„. Edward (ed.). «•» Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1885.

52

Empson, William. Seven Types of Ambiguity. New York; A New Direc­tions Book, 1949.

Forrest, H. X. S. The Five Authors of 'Shake-speares Sonnets.' London: Chapman and Dodd, Limited, 1923.

Gilbert, Feliz. "Machiavelli," The Encyclopedia Americana <1961 ed.), XVIII, 52-53.

. "The Prince," The Encyclopedia Americana (1961 ed.), XXII, 580.

Harrison, G. B. (ed.). Shakespeare: Major Plays. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1948.

Herford, C. H. (ed.) . Othello. New York: D. C. Heath and Company (The

Arden Shakespeare), 1950.

Hub 1 er, Edward. The Sense of Shakespeare's Sonnets. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952.

Knight, G. Wilson. The Mutual Flame. London: Methuen&Co., Ltd.,

1955.

Knights, L. C. Explorations. London: Chatto & Windus, 1958.

. Further Explorations. California: Stanford University Press,

1965.

"Shakespeare's Sonnets," Scrutiny, III (September, 1934),

133-60.

Landry, Hilton. T„-rpr«tatioM in ShakgSEMielsJoEqetg.' Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1963.

Leishman J. B. th-,- and in Shakespeare's Sonnets. London:

Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1961.

Lewis, Wyndham. --- "and the FojC> L°nd°n: Meth«en & Co. Ltd,, 1951.

"Machiavelli, Wccolo." EaciclcES^iiJriHHllSi <»" "6""-

Harder, Louia. ,11- E"tran"a ' ""P"1"" Company, 1963.

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Marlowe, Christopher. Tamburlaine the Great: Fart X. Havelock Ellis (ed.). New York: Hill and Hang, Inc. (A Mermaid Dramabook) , 1959.

Moorman, Frederick W. (ed.). The First Part of Henry the Fourth. New York: D. C. Heath and Company (The Arden Shakespeare), 1917.

Murry, John Middleton. Shakespeare. New York: Hareourt, Brace and Company, 1936.

0rn8tein, Robert and Hazelton Spencer (eds.). Elizabethan and Jacobean TragedyT Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1964.

Pooler, C. Knox (ed.) . The Works of Shakespeare. Vol. XXXVI. London:

Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1918.

Quennell, Peter. Shakespeare. New York: The World Publishing Company,

1963.

Reed, Edward Bliss (ed.). Shakespeare's Sonnets. New Haven: Yale Uni­

versity Press, 1923.

Ribner, Irving. Patterns in Shakespearian Tragedy. London: Methuen &

Co. Ltd., 1960.

Rolfe, William J. (ed.). ^«k»«P*are's Sonnets. New York: American

Rowae, A. L. A Bloaragjg. •>„ York, Pocket Book.,

Book Company, 1911.

"Review of ""tual b* G* *ils°n Kni«ht'" Shakespeare

Quarterly, VII (Winter, 1956), 107-108.

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"Shakespeare's Poems re. New York: G. P

•oems," The Cambridge History of G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909. Vol. V,

pp. 256-63.

'a Sonnets. Being a Reproduction in

Edition 1609. Prom the Copy In the Malone Introduction by Sidney Lee.

54

Spender, Stephen. "The Alike and the Other," The Riddle of Shakespeare's Sonnets. New York: Basic Books Publishing Co., Inc., 1962.

Tucker, T. G. (ed.) . The Sonnets of Shakespeare. Cambridge: University

Press, 1924.

Wilde, Oscar. The Portrait of Mr. W. H.. Vyvyan Holland (ed.). London:

Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1958.

/

appendix a

THE TEXT

The following copy of Sonnet 121 has been taken directly from a

reproduction In facsimile of the first edition, 1609, from the copy in

the Malone Collection in the Bodleian Library.40

Tis better to be vile than vile efteeined, When not to be, receiues reproach of being, And the iuft pleafure loft, which is fo deemed, Not by our feeling, but by others feeing. For why fhould others falfe adulterat eyes Glue falutation to my fportiue blood? Or on my frailties why are frailer fpies; Which in their wils count bad what I think good? Noe, I am that I am, and they that leuell At my abufes, reckon vp their owne, I may be ftraight though they them felues be beuel By their rancke thoughtes, my deedes muft not be fhown Vnleffe this generall euill they maintains, All men are bad and in their badneffe raigne.

So far as this particular sonnet is concerned, the textual prob­

lems have been practically nonexistent. There have been minor changes

in punctuation to fit the individual interpretations of the editors,

and two words have been changed. Francis Gentleman, in his 1774 edi­

tion, replaced wh£ with who in line 7. Samuel Butler, in his 1898

41 edition, replaced raigne with feign in line 14.

4°Willlam Shakespeare, Shakespeare's Sonnets, ed. Sidney Lee,

>05, page not given.

41*ollins, Wp« Variorum, p. 304.

appendix b

CRITICS AND COMMENTARY

3 tee vena (1780). 42 Regarding the key phrase, "I am that I am,"

Steevens compares 3 Henry VI V,vi,83, "I am myself alone."

Burgersdi1k (1879). Alden cites L. A. J. Burgersdijk (Jahrb.,

14:363), who had an interesting historical approach to the sonnet. He

considered that Shakespeare was attacking the Puritans in rebuttal to

their slender and persecution of the stage, poets, and actors:

In this time, he says, gradually dominated by Puritanism, it would be better to be bad, than to belong to a profession de­famed as bad. These pious or pietistic people spoiled his pleasure /"line 3j, which was considered bad by some specta­tors ("by others' seeing"); the attendants on the theatre, who applauded his humour /line 47, were depraved ("adulter­ate") in the judgment of these weak spirits. But the poet maintains his position; he believes that the stage is chiefly hated because it holds up a mirror before these people /tine 1Q7, and considers itself as straight (the exact epithet for Puritans) as they,--at least unless they are right in their thesis that humanity and all its deeds are evil ....

Dowden (1885) .45 Dowden is equivocal in his interpretation of

lines 3 and 4. He says, "And the legitimate pleasure lost, which is

42Steevens, cited by Rollins, New Variorum, p. 306.

43Cited by Raymond Macdonald Alden <ed.), The Sonnets of

Shakespeare. 1916, pp. 283-85.

^Ibid., p. 285.

45 . ~ t*A ^ The of William Shakespere. 1885,

57

deemed vile not by us who experience it, but by others who look on and

condemn." He does not make clear what is lost--the compensating plea­

sures of vileness or the clear conscience and personal pride in not

being vile. The others who look on and condemn" could be referring

to condemnation of the actual vileness or to reputation's being unjustly

besmirched.

In clarification of the line, "Give salutation to ay sportive

blood," he cites King Henry VIII II,iii,103: "Mould I had no being,/

If this salute my blood a jot." He compares, "No, I am that I am," b-jt a ; . . v s »•*** «*«>&•£ «tiam4

with Othello I,i,65, Iago's speech: "I am not what I am." It is

Interesting to note how often references to Machiavellian stage charac­

ters appear in later comments.

&ut:ler (1899).46 Butler feels that lines 1 to 4 indicate that

the poet never went beyond intentions of being vile. He was the only

editor who deemed it necessary to alter the last word of the sonnet,

by changing ralgne to fei^n. His interpretation:

The sense I take to be, "I am not to be Judged by the rank thoughts of those men,unless, Indeed the, ate prepared to admit that all »en are bad. but pretend to be better than the, are. For if they admit this, it dots not matter much

what they say.

^Samuel Butler <ed.), Shakespeare's Sonnets, 1899, p. 155

58

However, he conclude. that he .till ie not ..defied with hi. oeder-

standing of the passage.

Beeching (1904).47 Beeching paraphrases lines 1 to 4 as;

It is better to be vile, when although not vile we incur the reproach of vileness; because else we are the poorer by a pleasure, which is the vileness they mean, though, maybe, we should not so reckon it.

His consent on line 14 is interesting;

I have marked the whole line as the theory of the "spies." But the sense of "reign" is not clear. Schmidt explains it as "exult." Perhaps it means "what makes 'kings of men'is but a higher degree of badness." The sonnet cannot be aimed at the Puritans, but at "the world," which puts the worst pos­sible construction upon conduct.4®

Rolfe (1911) .49 Rolfe cites Tyler's general statement that:

The poet declares that, though he "does not claim to be blameless, he was traduced by persons worse than himself, who were therefore unfit to criticise and censure his con­

duct."

With reference to line 6, "Give salutation to," etc., he again quotes

Tyler:

"Take account of and criticise what my somewhat warm nature may

do in gay or unrestrained moments."

47H. C. Beeching, Introduction and Notes to The Sonnets of

Shakespeare. 1904, p. 119.

4g Ibid., p. 120.

49William J. Rolfe (ed.), Shakespeare's Sonnets, 1911, p. 186.

59

M^Ck*tl (1911>*50 Mackail Is extreme In his evaluation of "I

*• that I am." He says:

These words are in effect Shakespeare's single and final self-criticism. They are almost appalling in their superb brevity and concentrated Insight; besides them even the pride of Milton dwindles and grows pale; for here Shakespeare, for one single revealing moment, speaks not as though he were God's elect, but as though he were God himself.

Alden (1916).Alden's comment on the preceding statement of

Mackail is: "All Sh. says is, 'I have an independent standard of char­

acter, and when others do not find theirs fitting it, the crookedness

(line 11) may be theirs."

Pooler (1918).52 Pooler** interpretation is particularly inter­

esting because he analyzes the sonnet in much greater detail than the

previous editors; consequently, he clarifies his position—right or

wrong. His paraphrase of lines 1 and 2 is, "It is better to be vicious

Ch.n to b« thought Bo, when Innocence is reproached as guilt." This

•sake. ..nee but 1. not logic.ll, defen.ible. Even though "to b. ,11."

l„Ue. guilt, not to be vile does not nec.ss.ril, Icpl, Innocence.

There could b. «n, degree, of eulp«bllit, het»..n guilt -nd innocnc.

en 1011 b 196. cited by Rollins, op. 50J. Mackail, Lectures, 1911, p.

cit., p. 306.

51Th. Sonnet. 2"5-

52C. Knox Pooler (ed.>, Th^dnrH "MlWHa. VoU

XXXVI, pp. 115-17.

60

In regard to the crucial lines 3 and 4, Pooler's analysis is

outstanding. He asks:

Can this mean: And when we lose the pleasure of being just C°r the legitimate pleasure of having a good character? /brackets in original^ which is deemed a pleasure not so much from what we feel ourselves as from the way In which others regard us? For slander deprives a man of the second of the two natural rewards of virtue, viz. a good conscience and public approbation.

He continues with quotations from the following three authorities:

Prof. Dowden explains: "And the legitimate pleasure lost, which is deemed vile not by us who experience it, but by others who look on and condemn"; Dean Beeching: "because else we are poorer by a pleasure, which is the vlleness they mean, though, maybe, we should not so reckon it"; Mr. Tyler: "the just pleasure—that is of self-respect or an approving conscience. Which is so deemed looks back to what had been said in lines 1 and 2; 'When the character is not vile is so deemed, looked at by the eyes of others; though all the time our conscience tells us that we are misjudged and that we are not really vile"" i.e. the antecedent of "which" is the phrase "not to be," a construction hard to accept, and one which leaves us embarrassed by the truism that our freedom from vice is not deemed vicious by our own feeling.

Pooler adds that he is not satisfied with his own explanation,

and that the statements of Dowden and Beeching are open to the objec-

ions:

m t-hat it is not "a pleasure" that is mentioned, but

g^es "the pleasure," Ro wit7 of being vile (?); (2) that there is no legitimate pleasure in being vile. Shakespeare has so far referred to two things only, vice and unjust sus-oicion To treat "to be vile" as if it meant "to do what I ^llk right and my censor, think «rong," is to deprive the nrTt line of all leaning. Besides. Shakespeare doe. not

61

tell us that he has refrained from all acts capable of mis­interpretation, and if he has not refrained, he has not "lost" "the Just pleasure." Prof. Case writes! "The poet says; It is better to be vile than merely reputed so. He does not says It is better to take a legitimate pleasure notwithstanding that others declare it vile. Consequently, if we could count on Shakespeare*8 consistency, I should regard the 0. and B. as ruled out, notwithstanding the temptation to see a correspondence between Innocence regarded as villainy and legitimate pleasure regarded as vile pleasure. In that case I should prefer to take 'so deem'd' as 'deem'd just,' rather than as 'deem'd a pleasure,' and would paraphrase the whole in this way: 'And there is lost the just pleasure in our rectitude, which is deemed Just (or our due) not because we feel it to be so, but because it is so in the eyes of others.' But then, again, we have 1. 8 raising a doubt, for here certainly opinion comes in as it does not in 1. 1."

Here again is the problem of determining whether the poet is good or

evil. According to Tyler, he takes pleasure in his own good conscience;

according to Case, he takes pleasure in his good reputation, no matter

what his conscience.

Regarding the next quatrain, lines 5 through 8, Pooler offers

two possible meanings for "salutation to my sportive blood": (1) "al-

lurement of meretricious charms"; or (2) the more likely notion that

the sportive blood, or pa,sloes. s.ight be aroused a. though "I looked

vlth the lascivious eye, of others." He then cents th.t th. latter

Interpretation vould i»pl, * ln »"lch * Vlrt,"~ "" VO°l<i

be eafe, but In -blch n wicked sum might find opportunities to b. evil.

VTTT II iii.103, "If this salute my blood a jot," He quotes H»«ry VIII, »

,hp New Dictionary, under the heading, "to giving as his source the «e——

62

effect or act upon in any way." He cites Dean Beeching, who concurs

with the notion of "stirring" and "infecting" of the wanton blood. He

concludes by quoting Professor Case:

"I take these lines to be illustrative: 1 atn not looking through the corrupt eyes of others when my wanton blood is stirred; why should I use their eyes? And why should my weaknesses be noted by still weaker men, whose standards are not mine?"

From line 8 until the final couplet, Pooler believes the poet to

be unjustly spied on, having done no real wrong, but being simply mis­

understood.

As to line 14, Pooler asks if "in their badness reign" can mean

"delight in evil." He cites Schmidt's explanation of this line as "to

exult in, to be made happy by." Schmidt compares Richard III IV,iv,53:

That excellent grand tyrant of the earth, That reigns in galled eyes of weeping souls.

Here la another direct reference to a Machiavellian villain of the

Marlowe school.

Pooler, however, concludes by disagreeing with this interprets-

tlon. He quae, the — Dictionary "

closer the. "to go on or continue in sou* state or course of action."

He says:

„ Uvellf. "Also generaly prelatls regnen f. ralgn7

in symonye," I.e. bishops sre without exception Jobber,.

63

'•Perhaps " says Dean Beechlng, "it means that what makes men 18 but a higher degree of badness." Possib­

ly .. . their influence is due to their vices.

Again Pooler sounda a somewhat Machiavellian note.

Pooler poses probing questions; some of them seem unrealistic,

but he compensates by giving contrasting views from other recognized

editors. He uses the method of the Variorum except that he interpo­

lates his own views. It is difficult to summarize his interpretation

of the sonnet as he offers a variety of viewpoints, yet does not syn­

thesize. Although his method has its advantages, the unfortunate

aspect of a line-by-line criticism is that it makes it easy to lose

sight of the overall meaning of the sonnet.

Forrest (1923) .53 H. T. S. Forrest, an Indian Civil Servant,

compiled an amazing and detailed theory that Shakespeare was only one

of five authors of the sonnets (two of the others being John Donne and

Samuel Daniel), which were written as a literary contest to please their

patron. His very complicated and lengthy theory hinges, surprisingly,

on Sonnet 121 which he believed was written by the patron to chastise

hi. ft., admirers: ^ ̂

now come Co wh.r is, from the point of

Theory, the mo.t important sonnet in the whole collectien,

53H t Sj Forrest, Author of 'Shake-speares Sonnets'.

Pa"°"'S 121 • ln h« "P"« to th. strictures passed upon him by the poets ....

The Patron considers his "irregularities" (dubbed by Forrest "P. P.,"

for "Patron's Peccadillos") as merely "sport" and then

. . . goes on to admonish his monitors severely, the puz­zling verb reign" in his final couplet being an allusion to the royal position accorded to him by all the . . . poets in the P. P. Series, and the final couplet itself a lofty rebuke to them for accusing him of disreputable conduct and doing homage to him as a king of men in the same breath.

Forrest adds that problems in interpretation disappear when we realize

that the author:

(a) is not a professional 'rogue and vagabond' attempting to justify his conduct in the eyes of his Noble Patron, but himself vigorously 'strafing' his social inferiors for presuming to criticise his private life.

(b) Is not a supreme master of the English language, embody­ing in deathless verse sentiments suitable to the 'gentle Shakespeare' of the biographers, but a literary novice struggling to express in an unfamiliar medium a patently fictitious outburst of virtuous indignation.

(c) is not moralizing 'at large,* but delivering a counter­attack in reply to the P. P. offensive, and turning against their authors various words and phrases used in

that audacious enterprise.-***

He paraphrases the sonnet "in the language of a young blood of the

orszent day" as follows:

"Upon my word, it's better to lead a fast life and get what fun you can out of it, than to run straight .nd y.t h.W people putting you down as a debauchee wallowing in hectic

^Forrest, p. 93.

65

pleasures that exist only in their own imaginations. I know I make slips occasionally, and play the fool more than 1 should do, but that's no reason why a gang of real sensu­alists should hail me as one of themselves, and put their own vile construction on actions of mine which I know to be harmless. Your last batch of sonnets gives the whole four of you away hopelessly, because they make it clear that your working theory of life is that everybody is out to get as much vicious pleasure out of it as he can, and the finest fel­low is the man who manages to get moat. Anyhow, straight or crooked, I intend to 'gang ma ain gait.' The tone of your comments shows that you have disgustingly low minds, and I'll thank you to keep your thoughts to yourselves in the future. Understand quite clearly that I am not going to have you people criticizing my private conduct like this again.

Reed (1923) .56 Reed quotes Dowden's version of lines 3 and 4:

"And the legitimate pleasure lost, which is deemed vile not by us who

experience it, but by others who look on and condemn." Ha interprets

salutation (line 6) as meaning "greet" (as if the poet were one of

their unsavory kind). He classes sportive as "wanton."

Tucker (1924) ,57 Tucker is one of the editors who believes in

the innocence of the poet. His paraphrase of lines 1 to 8 is as fol-

*vs:

Th.ee difficult lines should be interpreted, with repeated • tree..., ss 'It is better to be vicious then to be ttpght

vicious, when, though one is not so, one is reproeched s.

Forrest, loc. cit.

"tdw.rd Bliss Reed <ed.), Shakespeare's Sonnets, 1923, p. 61.

57, 0 Iucker (ed.), t-nets of Shakespeere. 1924, pp. i98-99

66

bain* .o, and when (meanwhile) there is not obtained (as some compensation) the pleasure from the vice, which (in the cir­cumstances) would only be fair, (though in point of fact it would not be real pleasure, but only pleasure) which is deemed so by others' way of looking at it, and not by any such feeling on our own part: (not felt as such, I say,) for why should any wantonness in m£ blood be aroused by what others. misled by their lewdness, choose to see (in a certain connection), or why are frailer men on the watch for frailties in me, choos­ing at their own good pleasure to find badness where I find nothing but innocence?'

Tucker, too, has difficulty with the phrase "just pleasure lost."

Although his thesis is to prove the poet innocent, he is forced to con­

clude that injustice excuses vice, even if it is not enjoyed or desired.

He states that this phrase means:

. . . t h e p l e a s u r e ( t o b e f o u n d i n t h e v i c e ) , w h i c h w o u l d only be fair (if one has to be taxed with it) , is sacri­

ficed (by not indulging in it).

He palliates lines 5 and 6 by stating that they constitute a condensed

expression. "Lewd men find their own blood 'saluted' when they look at

e certain object, but why should I find the same salutation because of

what they see?" "Sportive blood" he considers proleptic for "tempt it

to become sportive."

"1 am that I am" he deems a declaration of innocence, which

n-o, on the part of frailer men. "My cannot be affected by base thinking on cne p

ahu..." h. extenuates a. »eaning "errors and lapses ascribed to ..."

Whereas fooler attribute, an .1—t Machiavellian touch to the

final line of the aonnot. Tocher describes the reigning evil as a,1.ting

67

only la the minds of evil men. His criticism could be summarized in

Hamlet's words, 'There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking

makes it eo." (ll,ii,259)

58 Knights (1934) Knights feels that in sonnets such as 121

we find in embryo many of the themes of the later plays; there is vari­

ety enough to make discussion difficult." He continues: . . in the

sonnets Shakespeare is working out a morality based on his own finest

perceptions and deepest impulses." After quoting Sonnet 121 in its

entirety, he gives his own paraphrase, which attributes the guilt of

vileness to the poet.

'As things are, it is more expedient to be really vile than vile in the opinion of the world, since not to be so is no safeguard against the reproach of vileness. DReproach of being' also suggests: 'I am reproached for being what I am. '_7 /Brackets in the original.J, and just pleasure has to be for­feited not because I feel it is wrong but because it appears

wrong in the sight of others.*

'Why should my (real or apparent) frailties be judged by

those who have a greater share of human imperfections, par­ticularly since the scheme of morality imposed by their wills (or by convention) is opposed to mine? I am myself not to be

judged by them . . . . '

Knight.' criticism is on. of th. first of ch. "«vll" school, uhich t>.-

11.... th.t th. poet may be guilty, but that h. i. not to b. Judged b,

conventional moral standard.. His summary is .specially perceptive.

58L. C. Knights, "Shakespeare's Sonnets," Scrutin* Vol. HI, 2

Sept. 1934, pp. 133-60.

68

The sonnet is a protest against the rigidly imposed moral scheme that the majority see fit to accept, a protest on behalf of a morality based on the nature of the writer. But that morality can only be discussed in terms that the poetry supplies.

59 Brooke (1936) . Brooke feels that Sonnet 121 "contains some

of the most dignified words he /3hakespear$7 ever wrote and is addressed

. . . t o h i s o w n c o n s c i e n c e . " H e v i e w s l i n e s 3 a n d k a s m e a n i n g :

The justifiable pride in a good reputation, which is deter­mined, not by our inward knowledge of ourselves but by others' Judgments. The idea is similar to that in Macbeth I,vii,32 ff.:

'I have bought Golden opinions from all sorts of people, Which would be worn now in their newest gloss,

Not cast aside so soon.'

Cf. also Antony and Cleopatra UI,vi,52 ff.:

'You . . . have prevented

The ostentation of our love, which, left unshown

Is often left unlov'd. '

He interprets line 6 as:

Give salutation to. Salute as a familiar friend. The con-adulterate and sportive. Why should others

who are thoroughly vicious regard my blemishes as ranking me

with them?

Line 8. "Which in their will, count bad what I think good," he con.ld-

er. .. meaning, "Who arbitrarily or capriciously reckon a. sin. thing,

•bout .. that I can Ju.tify." Brooke also cite. lago. "I an not what

59Tucker Brooke (ed.), eare's Sonnets. 1936, p. 323.

69

I an, and Richard III, "I am myself alone."

Fri££ (1038).60 Rollins cites Fripp (Shakespeare. 1938, I 330)

regarding I am that I am." Fripp calls this "a daring use" of Exodus

Si 14.

Baldensperger (1943).61 In his footnotes to his French trans­

lation of Sonnet 121, Baldensperger emphasizes the phrase, " Je suis ce

qua je aula," suggesting that it may have a bearing on Shakespeare's

endeavors to gain a coat of arms for his father, John Shakespeare.

Harrison (1948) .62 Harrison considers the "just pleasure" to

be vile, and interprets "Give salutation to my sportive blood" as mean­

ing "Salute as one of themselves." He considers "bevel" to mean "slant­

ing."

Craig (1951).63 Craig whitewashes "sportive blood" by suggest­

ing, "Why should others who are really wicked greet as an equal me, who

only mirthful?" He considers "bevel" to mean "out of square, crook­

ed." "This general evil" he interprets as meaning "this general prin­

ciple of evil."

60Hew Variorum, p. 306.

61 . , loo Sonnets de Shakespeare, 1943, pp. Fernand Baldensperger, Leg -?onnet-0 c

344-45. *•» ... The Complete Works, 1948, G. B. Harrison (ed.), Shakes£ea£= c—

Botes to Sonnet 121. 63 t j \ ru Complete Works of Shakespeare, 1951, p. 49

Hardin Craig (ed.), Thejupmp^ec.

70

HUM" (1952).64 Hubler's events are Interesting becae.e he

saphaslta, the Importance of reputation to Shakespeare and his a,e. He

discusses three words, "scandal," "slander," and "disgrace," of which

he claims that 'scandal is the most odious in Shakespeare's view.

Hubler considers the poet guilty of being vile:

Shakespeare asks why his "frailties" should be spied on, why ths "false adulterate eyes of others should give "salutation to my sportive blood." He says that in recounting his "abuses" they but "reckon up their own." It is a kind of defense, al­though the sportive blood is admitted.

To establish that Shakespeare was concerned with the reputation

of good or evil rather than with moral guilt or innocence, he quotes the

first quatrain of the sonnet. His paraphrase is that an evil reputation

unearned is "worse than the evil itself, since the accused person pays

the price of evil without even the fleeting reward of the wrongdoer's

65 Illicit pleasure."

Hubler suggests that it is unlikely that Shakespeare wrote this

sonnet during the period of his great tragedies, because at that time

he stressed the reality of good and evil rather than appearances. He

further states that Shakespeare is a "poet and playwright, not a philo­

sopher or a theologian, and he cannot be held to systems of thought."65

». th,„ categorizes tht, partlcuLr sonnet e, >.lt. pagan." He clalns

"Edward Hubler, The Sense ofjbake.psare'. Sonnet., 1952. p. 115.

65Ibld., p. 131.

n that this poem is Shakespeare's only commitment to a pragmatic ethics,

is caused by his belief in the value of reputation, and is related to

his "knowledge that nothing, not even evil, is of necessity completely

evil, for some good may come of it."

Knight_(1955),66 Being the protagonist of the "evil" school,

Knight strongly criticizes Tucker's interpretation, stating that

"Tucker's conclusion, instead of raising great issues of good and evil,

becomes merely a trite statement that such men apparently think everyone

as bad as themselves." What Knight asks for is a meaning that is "better

supported by the sonnet as a whole."

He cites the first eight lines of Tucker's summary in toto. He

objects to Tucker's rendition of "I am that I am," because it appears

to be a simple statement of rectitude; he feels that Tucker's entire

paraphrase, which reduces the sonnet to a declaration of complete inno­

cence, is unjustifiable.

Knight then offers his own alternative. Like Hubler, he does

not mince words:

'Since I am being unjustly slandered, I might as well be , , A o i t i s I merely lose the correspond-thoroughly vicious. As it is, J . . ing pleasure, which anyway only appears evil from an j 8 P ' , , -n<j would not necessarily be tivs and impersonal viewpoint, ana wouau

felt as such, inwardly, by me!*

«<j. tfil.on Knight, a- ""tual <""• *' "8"

72

It t. rofreahing to find . critic who take such an unequivocal stand

on thla flr.t quatrain, and who dl.po.ea of this controversial passage

with such dispatch. His paraphrase continues:

Why should the lustful and falsifying eyes of other people enjoy recognising and prying into the secrets of my sexual indulgence? Why should my own weakness be scrutinized by those far worse, if the truth were known, than myself; people who, by reason of their own lustful propensities, consider evil something which I consider good?

Again an "evil" interpretation is consistent with this rendition of

the second quatrain, except possibly for "the secrets of my sexual in­

dulgence. " There is no proof within this sonnet that the vlleness is

of thle nature, though, of course, Knight uses this term to aid in de­

veloping the theme of his book as a whole, over and above this indivi­

dual sonnet.

Ha concludes his summary in the same vein:

I refuse to submit to their judgments. I am being true to my own nature, and those who criticise my faults are in reality recording their own limitations by so doing. The truth may well be that I am running straight after all, even though their wrong-headedness cannot see it; it is they who era crooked. I will not have my actions assessed and labelled

by moralists who.e thoughts are thoroughly unclean: it is their thought, that are evil, not my actions. The only way to make sen., of their attitude would be to supple that man a

by nature a wicked creature, human vitl" * ,. -uies the world; which would be a ZLSU r i r i . * . -

I, appaara chat might way have chcen Tucker'. Infcrprataflon

.luply a. a fall for hi. own. Alter concluding hi. nun p.r.phr... ha

73 i due — -"»• ^KiiUDIiniOUSlV-.t-n "n«^r,l t . .

me, ignominiously—to "people speak well of »- "

•l M (MH h... . .oral „„ ni ,tm contlmi., th.(

there m tim,.when .. all speak i„ thl. manner, but that It dot, not

Mk« for groat poetry.

It l a certainly true, aa proven by the preponderance of critical

uterlal about the sonnets, that lust is mor e interesting than philo­

sophy. Knight utilises this to dramatize his interpretation of the

sonnet; bat this is not justified by the sonnet's content, which has a

<U«per philosophical sieanlng. While not referring to Sonnet 121 direct­

ly, Ryder Rollins has made a general attack against the sexual intima-

67 tlons and flamboyant style of Knight's book.

Regardless of his definition of vileness, Knight's paraphrase

!• the best to date of the "evil" school. He looks at the sonnet as a

whole rather than line by line, and in accordance with his viewpoint,

conveys a sense of unity and completeness. He displays insight in

•uch statements as the following:

It 1. only because Shakespeare had, in certain moods the mood

of this sonnet, penetrated beyond good and evil, that ha daploy their interaction with so impersonal a cUri«y .. . .

L.u; •! - that I -• « c nark In 3 Hanr, VI (V,vl,83), 'I am "7"" it h.ld the dark, or seemingly dark, thing be n on .

the gem of RichsrdJU. o£

latad; and in our story, with axj. it lust and vice, it is certainly contained.

67 . "Review of T h e J f c itual_FljSe_by G. Wilson Hyder K. Rollins, Re (wlnter, 1956), 107-8.

Inith, " Qkek.enaora Ouarterly, VII '

74

68 Barber (1960). In his "Essay on the Sonnets," C. L. Barber

gives the following view:

There is no set posture in these poems against morality or convention: if they simplified things by adopting a romantic or bohemian rationale, they could not be so serious in explor­ing the way passion turns corners that it cannot see around and moves in directions contrary to the will. Sonnet 121 con­fronts in a frightening way the breakdown of moral categories in this territory: "'Tie better to be vile than vile esteemed . . . .No, I am that I am." The pressure of experience on received categories i3 so great in this sonnet . . . that it is impossible entirely to comprehend the meaning--though we can apprehend it obliquely. In the dramatic form, Shakespeare could present directly, in several persons, what here is looked at askance from one vantage.

Barber continues the trend towards placing the poet above conventional

standards of good or evil. Since the poet's "evil" cannot be compre­

hended or condemned, the sonnet cannot be interpreted exeept in a

general sense.

fQ Spender (1962) Spender assumes that the reader will not be­

lieve a confession of guilt by the poet "because the world of the poet'

imagination is profoundly moral, and encloses and reaches beyond any

sin that he might commit." He offers a more lyrical than logical justi

fication of "evil" in the poet. In his essay, The Alike and the Other

he rhapsodizes:

68C. L. Barber, "An Essay on the Sonnets," The Sonnets of Shake

speare. Charles Jasper Sisson (ed.), I960, p. 30.

^Stephen Spender, "The Alike and the Other,*' The Rlddle_of

Shakespeare's Sonnets, 1962, pp. 106-8.

75

The sonnets have religious feeling, but being concerned with a world totally transformed into poetry, there is no feeling of an external judge who condemns, say, sensual faults. It is an Eden invented by the poet's imagination into which ex­ternal values are not disregarded, but have been absorbed and reinvented.

To account for this unique freedom on the poet's part to commit "moral

sin," Spender quotes Hamlet's lines, "There is nothing good or bad, but

thinking makes it so," and "I could be bounded in a nut-shell, and

count myself a king of infinite space." It would seem that Spender

might have been well advised to complete Hamlet's line: "Oh God, 1

could be bounded In a nut-shell . . . were it not that 1 have bad

dreams." But Spender, undaunted, continues:

At the center of the world there is the simple awareness of the bare "I am." The poet is aware of primary naked existing behind all the externals of place and reputation, acts and station. This sense of simple being, separate from what the neighbors say about him, and even from his own actions and formed character, is elaborated in 121, where the poet seems

to address his own soul.

After further preamble of a like nature, Spender off,era his sense of

the sonnet, in which he states in part:

"If people blame me for what they think I do when I don't do it, then I might as well do It and enjoy the jus­tice of my bad name. But what I do—or what they think I do--is something quite apart from what I am and therefore my way of doing, which is to act out of my being, is dif­ferent from theirs when they do the same thing: because

they have become identical with their acts.

Spender concludes with a complete justification of any aberrations by

the poet:

76

One has the sense of concentric circles of bad, and less bad, the outer circle of which is the proposition "all men are bad." But at the center of all, that which maintains him is "No, I am that I am," the final inviolable fortress of an awareness of his own being, separate from the actions which he shares with all, and therefore not at all to be condemned or fixed down by others' opinions because forever escaping into unscathed, ever-renewed, and renewing existence.

Marder (1963).70 Marder is the only critic encountered who gave

some cryptic recognition to H. T. S. Forrest's The Five Authors of

Shakespeare's Sonnets (ignored even by Alden in The Variorum). Marder

briefly summarizes The Theory, and concludes!

Among the propositions Forrest asks his readers to accept is that the series was a "literary contest" conducted by speci­fic rules. If the reader cannot swallow this--or if indeed any one of his basic propositions cannot be accepted--Forrest says, "then the whole thing is rotten right through, and the sooner it is carted away to limbo along with the Biliteral

Cipher and honorificabilitudinitatlbus the better."

Possibly there is some poetic justice in the fact that this follows

directly after Spender's offering.

Landry (1963).71 The study of the sonnet by Landry is by far

the most comprehensive and complete of all. He cites many of the crit­

ics listed here in the course of his thorough survey. In his chapter,

"This Vile World," he discusses Sonnet 121 in conjunction with Sonnets

66 and 129, but he analyzes 121 independently. He believes that this

70Louis Marder, His Exits and Entrances, The Story of Shake­

speare's Reputation, 1963, p. 183. nHUton Landry, T...rnr«tatlon- Sh.lo.paare's Sonn.t., 1963,

pp. 87-96.

77

sonnet presents "strong negative feelings chiefly in the form of moral

indignation . . . He further avers that "though he is indignant

about his vilification, the speaker is not claiming complete innocence."

Landry points out several general views discussed previously in

this survey, and concludes that "any critic must stand or fall on his

interpretations of the details of this difficult Sonnet." He states

that "A sense of personal outrage underlies the main point of the first

quatrain." After discussing three possible interpretations of lines 3

and 4 as suggested by previous critics, he offers the following:

It is better to be evil than to be judged evil when we receive this disgrace without deserving it and even lose, by not experiencing or feeling it, what is considered to be the appropriate or rightful pleasure in the view of others who slander us. This reading, which is similar to Tucker *s is guided by the natural syntax of the third and fourth lines.

Regarding "Give salutation to," he suggests:

. . . t o s a l u t e o r g r e e t ( a s a n e q u a l o r c o m p a n i o n i n s i n ) , with a sense close to that of "salute" in Troilus and Cres-

sida (III.ill.107-108), " . . . e y e t o e y e o p p o s ' d

Salute each other with each other's form."

rather than in Henry VIII (II.til.102-103),

"Would I had no being If this salute my blood a jot."

Since it follows "sportive" (amorous or lustful), one as­sumes that prominent among the moral weaknesses of all kinds to which "frailties" refers is an inclination to sexual sport

(cf. Othello. IV.iii.99 ff.).

78

Landry believes that since "I am that 1 am" is to be found in

Exodus 3:14:

This may be a shorthand way of saying that to honest men he is what he seems, no better or no worse, with evident frail­ties but not vile or evil; that in his character, unlike Iago's, there is no difference between appearance and reality.

Landry cites Iago's speech, "I am not what I am.1"

Regarding the closing couplet, Landry's comments are outstand­

ing. He quotes from Ralegh's History of the World to illustrate the

traditional view of man as "Cod's noblest creation," and then states:

I suggest that Shakespeare's general intention in the last line of Sonnet 121 is to present the preposterous anti­thesis of this traditional view of man's nature and his place in the universe. Instead of reigning by virtue of his excel­lence, whether actual or potential, man rules the world in and by his badness. Since it is unthinkable that the poet's slanderers could actually maintain such a generalization, it serves to destroy the case against him by reducing their

position to the absurd.

Landry, by bringing critical information on this sonnet to 1963,performs

a function similar to that of Pooler in 1918.

Rowse (1964).72 Through the historical method, Rowse claims to

have had no difficulty in solving the problem of the sonnets. His para­

phrase of the first quatrain of Sonnet 121 follows:

That seems clear enough: it is better to enjoy oneself, what­ever other people think; even if one is not being vile, they

72A. L. Rowse, Hi 11 jam Shakespeare, 1964, p. 193.

79

will think one is; then one loses one's just pleasure, if pleasure has to be rated not by one's feeling, but by how other people view it. That Shakespeare was giving himself to pleasure, and the pleasures of sex, we see from what fol­lows .

He cites the second quatrain and continues:

Then comes a downright affirmation of himself, as no better than he should be, but no worse than others.

After quoting the third quatrain, he concludes:

In fact, he regards himself as straighter than they are: they are not straight (i.e. 'bevel'), and he refuses to have his actions judged by their rank thoughts.

Rowse conveniently disregards the closing couplet, as he does

the problem of "just pleasure." However, he is consistent with the

trend which finds the poet "guilty" of sexual pleasures. It is inter­

esting to note that H. T. S. Forrest in The Five Authors of 'Shake-speares

Sonnets' also claimed to use the historical method in solving the sonnet

problems.