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Shadows of Uncertainty:Clausewitz's Timeless Analysisof Chance
in WarThomas Waldman aa Kabul Centre for Strategic Studies ,
AfghanistanPublished online: 20 Sep 2010.
To cite this article: Thomas Waldman (2010) Shadows of
Uncertainty:Clausewitz's Timeless Analysis of Chance in War,
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Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 (September 2010), pp. 336368ISSN
1470-2436http://www.informaworld.comDOI:
10.1080/14702436.2010.503678 2010 Taylor & Francis
ARTICLE
Shadows of Uncertainty: Clausewitzs Timeless Analysis of
Chance in War
THOMAS WALDMAN
Taylor and
FrancisFDEF_A_503678.sgm10.1080/14702436.2010.503678Defence
Studies1470-2436 (print)/1743-9698 (online)Original
Article2010Taylor & Francis103000000September
[email protected]
Think, too, of the great part that is played by the
unpredictable in war:think of it now, before you are actually
committed to war. The longera war lasts, the more things tend to
depend on accidents. Neither younor we can see them: we have to
abide their outcome in the dark.
Thucydides
This article examines in some detail one of the central elements
of Carl vonClausewitzs remarkable trinity which concerns the play
of chance andprobability within which the creative spirit is free
to roam.
1
Clausewitzexplains how war, like no other human activity is so
continuously oruniversally bound up with chance and that there is
an interplay of possi-bilities, probabilities, good luck and bad
that weaves its way throughout thelength and breadth of the
tapestry.
2
Clausewitzs description may appearlittle more than his
common-sense bordering on wit,
3
however thisignores the fact that others have overlooked chance
as an integral elementof the nature of war. Earlier thinkers had
either marginalised its importanceor subscribed so fully to its
force that they abandoned all hope of producingconcrete theory,
while today its anticipated negation represents the basis ofan
entire school of thought which contends that a technological
Revolutionin Military Affairs (RMA) promises to dispel Clausewitzs
fog of war.
4
Colin Gray reminds us that, commonplace though emphasis upon the
roleof chance in war may appear, such emphasis is highly unusual
amongstrategic theorists.
5
Humans like to feel in control of their environment, to be the
mastersof their fate, and may feel uncomfortable when things have
to be left tochance, the course of events cannot be reliably
predicted or, as Machiavelli
Thomas Waldman, Research Fellow at the Kabul Centre for
Strategic Studies, Afghanistan.
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR
337
suggested, fortune appears as a fiendish Goddess wanting to be
mistress ofall human affairs.
6
Such thinking can lead to dangerous misunderstanding,strategic
myopia and even historical myth.
7
For such reasons, Clausewitzsanalysis remains important today:
it forces us to confront reality and toemphasise the demands chance
and uncertainty places on human action,will and creativity.
In order to comprehend Clausewitzs ideas, the article begins by
consid-ering some of the influences, precedents, and experiences
that contributedto his ideas, before presenting a detailed analysis
based on textual analysisand secondary scholarship.
Influences
The origins of Clausewitzs ideas on this subject are certainly
somewhatunclear and diverse: aspects of his own experiences merge
with imageryreflective of Romantic literature; humanistic
philosophy finds its place nextto concepts drawn from the physical
sciences. Yet, despite this eclecticism,the following analysis
draws attention to three areas for which there isreason to believe
that they contributed importantly to his ideas: these
are,precedents in existing military theory; Machiavelli; and
Clausewitzs ownexperiences.
Existing Military Theory
Clausewitz was adamant that earlier Enlightenment theorists had
devotedinsufficient attention to the concepts of chance and
uncertainty. Rational-ist theorists preferred to emphasise those
aspects of war that were tangible,controllable, and calculable.
Such thinkers were not entirely blind to theexistence of chance,
rather it was the nature of their theoretical approachthat
precluded the incorporation of these factors into their systems: a
formof methodological determinism.
8
As Gat states, Enlightenment thinkerswere quite aware of the
factors of uncertainty but focused on what theyconsidered to be
suitable for intellectual formulation.
9
Clausewitzexplicitly attacked such views when he stated that
those thinkers aimed atfixed values; but everything in war is
uncertain and calculations have to bemade with variable
quantities.
10
While some theorists appreciated theimpact of chance on war,
they failed to formulate such ideas into clearconcepts and develop
them in theory, which ultimately led to a significantdisconnect
between their ideas and reality. As Clausewitz noted, suchfactors
were vital because they were ultimately what differentiated realwar
from war on paper and which theory must tackle if it is to
remainrelevant.
11
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DEFENCE STUDIES
The Enlightenment theorists failure to seriously analyse chance
mightbe characterised as a form of theoretical denial or what today
we might termcognitive dissonance
12
the refusal to contemplate that which you cannotreliably
explain. Theory would only concern itself with that which
wasexplicable through observable laws. Determined to reduce warfare
to asystem, they focused on those areas which were most susceptible
to precisecalculation. They started from the bottom up, developing
systems directedmainly at tactical matters or fields where the
enemys independent will didnot have to be taken into account,
rather than at the more complex andintangible problems associated
with strategy.
13
Foremost among these wasthe science of siege warfare, which
encouraged the belief that theory couldconfine itself to
mathematical prescriptions that would leave almostnothing to
chance.
14
In the 17th century, Marshal Vauban purported to have discovered
aninfallible method of defending a fortress
15
while also (somewhat paradoxi-cally) claiming to have devised a
plan for the besieging army, offering analmost certain breakthrough
with little bloodshed.
16
Although Vauban alsoconsidered the role of fortresses as part of
the larger strategic picture, theselectivity of his theory is clear
and thus the extent to which uncertaintycould be eliminated through
its application was necessarily limited.
17
Later theorists such as Count Jacques de Guibert (174390) and
BaronDietrich von Blow (17571807) , although army officers by
training, hadlittle experience of actual warfare and were thus poor
qualified to appreciatethe existence and effect of chronic
uncertainty.
18
This is reflected in Blowsconcentration on geometrical lines of
operation, whereby elaboratestrategic planning would serve to
reduce the element of pure chance thatFrederick [the Great] had
feared in it. Armed with such principles hebelieved planning could
become more fruitful, prediction somewhat morepossible, warfare
more of a science.
19
It would be inaccurate to claim that all previous thinkers had
not recog-nised the difficulties that chance presented for theory.
Marshal Maurice deSaxe (16961750) recognised that often outcomes
will be dependent uponthe favor of fortune, which sometimes is very
inconstant
20
and that, as aresult, commanders require courage and
intelligence, a talent for suddenand appropriate improvisation, and
the ability to see the opportunity andto know how to use it.
21
Likewise Baron Henri-Antoine de Jomini recogn-ised uncertainty
as one of the chief causes of the great difference betweenthe
theory and the practice of war.
22
Yet, as Echevarria notes, the problemis not so much that Jomini
assumed a world without friction, but rather thathis underlying
assumption was that if a commander were to hold fast to[his]
proposed principles, and use them as guidelines, he would succeed
in
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR
339
the face of the confusion and chaos of battle.
23
Futhermore, Jomini makesthe point that if success was achieved
by chance, then it would be chanceaction in line with principles,
nothing else. Clausewitz believed theoristslike Jomini directed
their principles towards unilateral activity andconsidered only
factors that could be mathematically calculated.
24
Theythus formulated wholly lopsided principle[s] that could
never govern a realsituation.
25
Saxe and Jomini failed to grasp or sufficiently articulate, as
Clausewitzsubsequently would, that chance could not simply be
viewed as somethingincidental to theory, but was in fact central to
it. As Daniel Moran notes,even those fully aware of wars uncertain
nature,
might feel that the surest path to clarity requires that
incidentaldifficulties be ignored, in the same way that a scientist
seeking aconstant pattern or signal within a mass of data is
entitled, indeedrequired, to ignore the noise that surrounds it.
For Clausewitz it wasunrealistic to adopt such an attitude to war,
in which the effects ofchance are so profound that they become the
signal, the centralreality, and not an exogenous variable to be
discounted.
26
Given these theorists tendency to marginalise chance in their
theoriesit is not surprising that detailed discussions of genius
are largely absent fromtheir work or mentioned only in passing.
They devoted little attention tothis subject or situated it in a
sublime realm presumed to be beyondtheory. If war is determined by
rational laws, what role is there for geniuswhen presumably the
enemy will submit following the application of logi-cal principles?
Such wars would be decided by superior algebra rather thancreative
genius. This characteristic of rationalist theory led to a
curiousposition, which Clausewitz would later mock, whereby
anything not clearlyexplicable through correct principles must be
due to the workings ofsublime genius which is able to spurn the
rules. As Echevarria states,Enlightenment writers tended to place
genius outside the realm of whatcould be understood scientifically.
They regarded genius as a rare, inexpli-cable, and therefore
inconvenient phenomenon.
27
However, at the other extreme, the increasingly dominant
Romanticworld-view depicted war as the sphere of clashing wills,
rising emotions,uncertainty, and confusion diverse complexity and
endless confusion;[that] could only be mastered by the generals
practical genius and ironwill.
28
The
Sturm und Drang
writers emphasised the play of chance intheir works, as well as
the subjective creative will that must overcome it: acentral theme
in Johann Schillers
Wallenstein
(1796) which was one ofClausewitzs favourite works.
29
That Clausewitzs own inquiries into the
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DEFENCE STUDIES
psychological qualities of great commanders such as a
GustavusAdolphus, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon often stressed
character andspirit over education or cognitive ability, betrays a
debt to the Romantics.
30
Also, in this vein, Georg von Berenhorsts work articulated a
view of wardetermined purely by the contingent, exceptional, and
unpredictable.
31
Heheld that, far from being scientific, war was anarchic,
dominated by acci-dent Efforts to control, let alone abolish, this
primeval wildness wereabsurd.
32
Clausewitz was at least sympathetic to the causes of
Berenhorstsdespair, yet would not follow him in his submission to
the caprice offortune. Clausewitzs conception of genius differed
from that of theRomantics, so where Goethes genius acted
spontaneously Clausewitzsgenius took action only after correctly
assessing the overall situation.
33
Clausewitzs was an altogether more cerebral genius. The teaching
of Lieu-tenant Gerhard von Scharnhorst (17551813) his great friend
and mentor may have been vital. Paret notes that, even though the
Berlin Academywas still teaching the Enlightenment dogma that sound
theory could elim-inate chance, Scharnhorst was encouraging his
students to consider themore realistic notion of the ability of
theory to help men deal with surprise,to help them exploit the
unforeseen.
34
So, essentially there was either a perceptible avoidance of the
subject inexisting theory, or where chance was considered, it was
marked by an overlymelodramatic reaction. Nevertheless, some of the
ideas that Clausewitzwould ultimately develop are detectable.
Progressing beyond these prece-dents, the Prussian would develop a
conception which represented neithera capitulation to fortune nor
an overoptimistic belief in theorys ability toovercome it. It
appears Clausewitz had to reach further back in time to finda
thinker Machiavelli who had appreciated more fully the importance
ofchance in war.
Fortune and Virtue in Machiavelli
We know that Clausewitz was an avid reader of Machiavelli and
believedthat his judgement in military matters is very sound.
35
Machiavellisrendering of
fortuna
and
virt
which pervade all his major works
36
furnished Clausewitz with the conceptual keys to his
analysis.
Fortuna
forMachiavelli held a similar meaning to the chance employed by
Clausewitz,in essence referring to the incalculable and the
fortuitous. Machiavellibelieved that, The continued existence of
struggles and uncertaintiespatterns the character and the methods
of war: there is no safe course.
37
Neal Wood notes that for him, In no other human situation are
chance,accident, and uncertainty so prominent as in the peril and
hardship ofmilitary encounter.
38
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR
341
In the penultimate chapter of
The Prince
(1513) Machiavelli notes howmany people in his own times,
because of the great variations and changes,beyond human
imaginings, had come to believe that there is no pointsweating over
things, but that one should submit to the rulings of
chance.Machiavelli does not subscribe to this fatalistic view, but
instead proposes acompromise that allows for the operation of human
will: fortune isprobably arbiter of half the things we do, leaving
the other half or so to becontrolled by ourselves.
39
He did not share the widespread contemporarybelief that man is
entirely in the hands of
Fortuna
.
40
This amalgam of chance and human will broadly reflects the
duality thatClausewitz proposes, for instance when he states that
with uncertainty inone scale, courage and self-confidence must be
thrown into the balance.
41
Machiavelli explains how fortune is not a wholly overpowering
force; likea violent raging river, one can still take precautions
to control its power.
42
Here, both share the belief that in facing the vicissitudes of
chance, menmust adapt to changing times because fortune is
changeable whereas menare obstinate in their ways, men prosper so
long as fortune and policy are inaccord, and where there is a clash
they fail. Machiavelli declares thatfortune is a woman and as such
one can only command her with greateraudacity.
43
The key for Machiavelli is acting when fortune favours you what
wemight term opportunism. As he states, Nothing is of greater
importance intime of war than knowing how to make the best of a
fair opportunity whenit is offered.
44
In
The Prince
he explains that outstanding princes do notseem to have from
fortune anything other than opportunity. Fortune, as itwere,
provided the matter but they gave it its form; without
opportunitytheir prowess would have been extinguished, and without
such prowess theopportunity would have come in vain.
45
Machiavellis insights helpedClausewitz develop a conception of
chance which was, if not unambigu-ously positive, at least
malleable in hands of great ability.
The qualities that enable men to face fortune are encapsulated
in Machi-avellis concept of
virt
, which strikingly parallels Clausewitzs discussion ofgenius.
These similarities are noted by Wood, who states that
Clausewitzsanalysis of the qualities of generalship and of military
virtue can be inter-preted as an illuminating commentary upon
Machiavellis concept of
virt
.
46
The attributes associated with
virt
in Machiavellis work arestrikingly Clausewitzian: boldness,
bravery, resolution, and decisivenesscombined with endurance and
firmness, the necessary resilience, [and] thepower of sustaining a
course of action until the end is achieved.
47
Virt
isassociated with vital creative energy
48
and resembles the notion of creativespirit in the trinity.
Virt
for Machiavelli and Clausewitz is never simply the
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DEFENCE STUDIES
Romantic notion of unruly energy, unbridled ferocity, and
rapidlyexhausted boldness, rather intellect and knowledge serve to
direct andcontrol the bold creative urge.
49
So, for both, chance is not necessarily cause for despair, but
isnevertheless a powerful force that cannot be avoided. As Paret
notes ofClausewitz, to exclude or deny chance was to go against
nature Despite its constant power, chance was more than danger: it
was a posi-tive force to be exploited.
50
Fortune rules mostly where men lack
virt
orgenius attributes which apply to all actors in war.
51
These parallelssuggest Clausewitz was heavily indebted to
Machiavelli the two thinkersclosely correspond in their
understanding of this subject, even if theirways of expressing it
differed.
Clausewitzs Experiences
Clausewitz believed the best proofs in theory are personal and
historicalexperience: careful consideration of both emphasised to
him the enormousdistance that separated actual warfare and existing
theories. They presentedneat, precise, and sterile principles which
could not be reconciled with theconfused and messy reality he had
witnessed. What was the element thatkept theory so divorced from
reality? Early in his studies Clausewitzrecognised that the missing
factor was the uncertainty, unpredictability, andfriction of war.
Following the Wars of the First Coalition (179297) hisregiment was
endlessly drilled in antiquated methods and Clausewitzwould later
recall his disdain at the formalistic, ceremonial character ofthese
maneuvers
52
when, as he stated, even a modicum of reflection onthese
exercises was bound to lead at once to the realization that none
ofthis had taken place in the war that we had fought.
53
Clausewitz was struck by the omnipresence of chance events in
the warsin which he had fought; perhaps none more so than during
the disastroustwin defeats at Jena-Auerstdt in 1806. The Prussian
campaign, Clausewitzobserved, was dogged by every kind of friction
from divided command,indecision, insubordination, disorder, and
confusion.
54
The defeat was alsopartly caused by the failure of Prussian
intelligence.
55
Clausewitzs dismiss-ive views of intelligence may well derive
from this experience andNapoleons skilful use of deception and
operations security may havepersuaded him of the difficulty of ever
accurately determining the enemysintentions.
56
So, Clausewitz concluded his lectures on little war in 1811with
the following modest statement:
As little combat experience as I have, it is enough to give me
an accu-rate view of the way most episodes in war unfold, as well
as the
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR
343
numerous chance incidents, which touch everything, and of
thenumerous difficulties that inhibit accurate execution of the
preciseplans that theory tends to formulate. We might term these
the frictionof the whole machinery, which can be recognised only
throughexperience, and which so many authors ignore completely.
57
Perhaps also Clausewitz was compelled to emphasise this aspect
of wardue to the extent to which the character of the wars of the
Napoleonic erawere more suffused with chance than those of the 18th
century and eventhose of the First Coalition, as rules and
geometric calculation gave way topassion, massive friction and
uncertainty.
58
The French Revolution madepossible mass conscription, which
necessitated far-reaching changes in theorganisation, supply,
discipline, and training of the new armies, which in turnwould
greatly increase the tempo and range of operations the wars of
thisperiod would become more complex and less predictable than
before.
59
These personal experiences, combined with his detailed analyses
of vari-ous campaigns revealed how often outcomes were decided by
chance andluck, how the detailed plans of commanders rarely
survived contact withthe enemy, and how mistaken reports on the
strengths or dispositions of theenemy often were. The challenge,
however, would be to explain suchfactors in a theoretical manner,
using clear concepts, and to reveal theirrelationship to other
aspects of war.
Analysis
Now we have some idea of the various influences on Clausewitzs
thought,we can explore the subject in greater detail. The various
concepts of chance,uncertainty, probability, friction, the fog of
war, and genius are all stronglyrelated and interconnected.
Nevertheless, Clausewitz meant somethingspecific in his use of
these individual concepts; they do not simply representsynonyms for
a single phenomenon, therefore it is important to explore
thedistinguishing features of each. Equally, the various concepts
clearly consti-tute a coherent family of ideas connected by a
common thread. Moderninterpreters often emphasise the integration
of these concepts, employinggeneric terms such as general friction,
which encompasses danger,exertion, uncertainty and chance.
60
Such approaches are welcome, but onlyif based on a solid grasp
of the individual concepts that comprise them.
The Intruder: Chance
The concept of chance employed by Clausewitz is intended in its
pureform, of arbitrary and incalculable events characterised by an
absence of
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DEFENCE STUDIES
predictability or regularity in the sequence of action and its
antecedentconditions.
61
Chance is the intruder that makes everything uncertain
andinterferes with the whole course of events.
62
If chance renders war thedomain of the unexpected
63
one can perhaps understand the cognitivedissonance displayed by
Enlightenment theorists given that it representsthe negation of the
very order and uniformity they sought to uncover.
64
Because the very nature of something that happened by chance is
that itwas unforeseen, we can prepare only in the general sense of
anticipating itsprobable existence; as something we know will
occur, but we are ignorantas to the precise form it will take. It
was recognition of this fact thatcompelled the elder Moltke to
claim that there was no point in devisingdetailed schemes beyond
the deployment phase.
65
Clausewitz explains howwar is rich in unique episodes. Each is
an uncharted sea, full of reefs. Thecommander may suspect the reefs
existence without ever having seenthem; now he has to steer past
them in the dark.
66
In war, success or failurerarely accrues simply from the skill
or incompetence of the commander,but is greatly determined by good
luck or misfortune. Although this is notsomething humans like to
accept Clausewitz describes the tendency toexplain success as the
result of genius alone as a gratifying assumption
67
that even successful commanders leave to chance what they cannot
controlis the ultimate acknowledgement its centrality.
68
In addition to this standard conception, Alan Beyerchen, drawing
on thework of the French mathematician Jules Poincar, has
identified two otherprincipal forms of chance in Clausewitzs work.
Beyerchen refers to a formof chance deriving from analytical
blindness.
69
This is perhaps bestconceived as chance that results from human
mental weakness, or asPoincar put it, our frailty and ignorance an
inability to comprehend thewhole so that we may happen to overlook
circumstances which, at firstsight, seemed completely foreign to
the anticipated fact, to which we shouldnever have dreamed of
attributing any influence.70 When things do notproceed as expected
due to causes that lay beyond our mental horizon, suchoccurrences
appear as blind chance as E. H. Carr had it, they are themeasure of
our ignorance.71 This myopia might also derive from a form
ofcognitive dissonance or intolerance of ambiguity, as noted
earlier: theway in which humans deal with developments that appear
discrepant or donot fit with preconceived ideas, but which leads to
self-delusion andmisperception.72
A large part of the experience of chance may in fact turn out to
be dueto this fundamental human weakness. No human mind is capable
ofcomprehending simultaneously the complex whole, its interactions,
andthe infinite relations between causes and effects. With
hindsight we may be
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR 345
able to better understand the circumstances that led to certain
events, butthe point remains that, for those involved at the time,
whether due to sheerincompetence or analytical blindness, events
were not foreseen. We mustbe mindful, as Clausewitz counselled, not
to project our knowledge of whatwe know happened, back on to those
who had to make decisions at thetime.73
Another form of chance Beyerchen highlights concerns the concept
ofmicro-cause or what historians might know as the problem of
Cleopatrasnose.74 Micro-cause refers to situations in which
disproportionately largeeffects result from apparently trifling
initial causes. Clausewitz draws atten-tion to this problem in
relation to his discussion of the critical analysis ofpast
campaigns: the process is made difficult by the fact that in war,
as inlife generally, all parts of the whole are interconnected and
thus the effectsproduced, however small their cause, must influence
all subsequentmilitary operations and modify their final outcome to
some degree.Furthermore, if such causes happen to be transitory or
accidental, historymay not have recorded them at all.75 The great
gap between infinitely smalland inappreciable causes and such
potentially enormous, inescapableeffects means we have to ascribe
to chance that which we could not hope toexplain. This is not so
much a function of human weakness as the objectivefact of the
incredible complexity of reality Clausewitz emphasises thevast,
almost infinite distance there can be between cause and
effect.76
To subscribe to the pervasive existence of chance in war is not
to denythat things are causally determined as E. H. Carr notes,
accident is not anabsence of causal determination.77 The point is
that causes in war are some-times so incredibly small as to escape
our notice and appear detached fromobservable effects or appear so
unexpectedly from beyond our conceptualradar that they appear as
chance. Put differently, we can maintain that everychance event
does ultimately have causes, they were just causes we failed tosee,
understand, or predict. They are nevertheless rightly
consideredobjective, as far as they are both a consequence of the
human condition andthe incredible randomness of reality.
A final point to note is to be suspicious of commanders who
retrospec-tively explain their own failure in war by an appeal to
chance. Just as E. H.Carr describes how, In a group or a nation
which is riding in the trough,not on the crest, of historical
events, theories that stress the role of chanceor accident in
history will be found to prevail,78 so defeated generals will
belooking to explain away their shortcomings by claiming the
Goddess ofFortune was against them, when in success that same
general would nodoubt emphasise his complete control of the
situation throughout.79
Chance contributes to both success and failure, but rarely is it
the sole
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arbiter of either: both talent and incompetence figure greatly.
One mightsuspect an underlying ineptitude in those who claim all is
decided bychance, and a measure of undeserved self-assurance in
those who deny itsexistence. In what was perhaps a rare instance of
modesty, Napoleon wasquoted as saying, Engage the enemy, and see
what happens80 it is tellingthat one of historys greatest
commanders should pay heed to chance andluck in this way.
The Shadows of Uncertainty81
Clausewitz remarked that war is the realm of uncertainty; three
quarters ofthe factors on which action in war is based are wrapped
in a fog of greateror lesser intensity.82 So, how are we to
distinguish this concept from that ofchance? Certainly these
concepts are related in the sense that a psychologi-cal state of
uncertainty is often a consequence of the play of chance. Yet,
asHerbig notes, one may feel uncertain for many reasons other than
chance,and chance does not always lead to uncertainty.83
The concept of uncertainty essentially refers to the human
reaction tothat which cannot be fully known or controlled and
concerns the subjectivepsychological condition of those involved in
war.84 As such, uncertaintybecomes evident as integral to the
nature of war as soon as we consider thehuman forces that are
central to it. To ensure theory does not lose touchwith reality,
Clausewitz stresses that it must also take the human factor
intoaccount The art of war deals with living and moral forces.
Consequently,it cannot attain the absolute, or certainty; it must
always leave a margin foruncertainty.85 War is not only about
factors that can be counted orcalculated, but is suffused with
psychological factors which are inseparablefrom physical factors:
unlike an alloy, they cannot be separated by
chemicalprocesses.86
All decisions in war must be taken with regard to consequences
in thismoral realm; whether this relates to ones own forces,
government, andwider society, or those of the enemy and neutral
actors. As Clausewitzstates, it would be platitudinous to list all
such phenomena because most arecommonly known. A few examples
indicate the types of issues concerned:the enemys intentions and
strength of will, public opinion, morale, and soon. It is because
these factors are inherently intangible and unpredictable they
cannot be classified or counted that attaining certainty as to
theirprecise character or ultimate effect is necessarily limited
regardless of thequantity or quality of information one might
have.87 Clausewitz explainshow similar actions against different
people, or even against the samepeople at a different time, can
produce entirely different effects. Further-more, he notes how, for
the commander, Thousands of wrong turns
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running in all directions tempt his perceptions; and if the
range, confusionand complexity of the issues are not enough to
overwhelm him the dangersand responsibilities are.88
The extent to which uncertainty and confusion is typical in war
is exac-erbated by the incredible prevalence and potency of the
factor of surprise.89
The enemy will be constantly trying to achieve the unexpected
arrival oftheir forces where not expected through the use of
deception, secrecy,speed, and cunning. What Clausewitz describes as
the universal urge tosurprise can have a serious paralysing
psychological effect on morale andloosen the bonds of cohesion
within the force. Importantly, surprise, asClausewitz emphasises,
is often dependent on chance, coincidence, and themistakes or
misperceptions of the opponent.90 Surprise, therefore, stemsfrom
the weakness of human perception and basic uncertainties.
So, in gauging and evaluating such factors, Clausewitz extolled
thevirtues of intuition, the inward eye,91 and discreet
judgement.92 Forinstance, when discussing decisions regarding the
levels of effort to be madeand force to be employed, he states that
such intangibles introduceuncertainties that make it difficult to
gauge the amount of resistance to befaced and, in consequence, the
means required and the objectives to be set,so the most appropriate
approach is to,
gauge the strength and situation of the opposing state gauge
thecharacter and abilities of its government and people and do the
samein regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political
sympa-thies of other states and the effect that war may have on
them.93
The stress on judgement over calculation is a direct consequence
of uncer-tainty deriving from the inescapable presence of
intangibles. This point iseasily overlooked. Even for militaries
equipped with the most advancedintelligence gathering technology,
definitively determining potential effectsand reactions in the
sphere of the mind and spirit will remain a unattainablechimera. As
David Kahn notes, not even the most energetic intelligenceoperation
can penetrate an enemys brain.94 Moreover, even the enemymight not
fully know itself the limits of its ambitions.95
Lack of proper understanding is often exacerbated by forms of
ethno-centrism and strategic-cultural myopia, which distort
accurate assessmentsof ones enemies (and even ones own or allies)
intentions and capabilities,or the political environment. As Ken
Booth argues, this lack of empathy hasmeant an absence of intimate
understanding of the feelings, thoughts andmotives of others: this
has prevented an accurate forecasting of likelyresponses.96
Clausewitz was well aware of the way such perspectives
distortevaluations, which are not only a problem of obtaining
objective
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knowledge, but also crucially dependent on the qualities of mind
andcharacter of the men making the decision.97 All actors make
sense of theworld through unique cultural perspectives. They
observe, orientate them-selves, and act based on assumptions,
prejudices, and even illusions aboutthe world. It is also easily
forgotten that all information (even if derivedfrom advanced
sources) only attains meaning once it is digested by humanagents
and subsequently used as the basis for decisions decisions that
willinevitably be shaped by the unique outlook of the actor. The
consequencesarising from ethnocentric perspectives can be serious,
exacerbate uncer-tainty and be highly detrimental to operations:
for instance, a failure tounderstand enemy intentions can increase
the likelihood of political, strate-gic, or tactical surprise.98
Also, cultural taboos may distort clear thinking, sothe Western
nuclear taboo (non-utility as orthodoxy), for instance, mightcloud
the fact that others may see atomic weapons as potentially
useful.99
The Fog of WarRegardless of the difficulties of mitigating
uncertainty associated withmoral forces, the information upon which
assessments are made in war is,for Clausewitz, ineluctably
deficient. The Prussian general is wellknown for his emphasis on
the interminable poverty of reliable informationin war and his
dismissive attitude regarding the substance and value
ofintelligence. In a notably evocative passage Clausewitz states
that,
the general unreliability of all information presents a special
problemin war: all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of
twilight, which,like fog or moonlight, often seems to make things
seem grotesqueand larger than they really are. Whatever is hidden
from full view inthis feeble light has to be guessed at by talent,
or simply left tochance.100
This general idea is expressed in many other parts of his
work.101 Clausewitzstates that, If we consider the actual basis of
this information, howunreliable and transient it is, we soon
realise that war is a flimsy structurethat can easily collapse and
bury us in ruins.102 At best, and even this may bedoubted,
Clausewitz notes, that the only situation a commander can knowis
his own; his opponents he can know only from unreliable
intelligence.103
Moreover, it is likely that the enemy will be doing his level
best to deny usknowledge of its intentions, or even actively
attempting to deceive, fool, andsurprise us. Also, intelligence is
often false and inaccurate because fearcauses people to exaggerate
bad news.104 Ken Booth has remarked that,Worst-case forecasting is
to strategic analysis what the god of the gaps isto theology: it
fills in for what we do not understand. In conditions of
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR 349
danger, where survival may be in jeopardy, there may be a
proclivity for thepossible to become thought of as the
probable.105
So, fear, intermixed with chance, numerous imponderables,
thelimitations of accurate observation and the vast amount of
variablesinvolved before which Newton himself would quail are
provided assome of the chief reasons for Clausewitzs scepticism
with regard to thereliability of information.106 Together, these
factors create what Clausewitzmemorably termed the fog of war.
However, as Kahn rightly points out,despite this intense scepticism
regarding intelligence, Clausewitz does notdogmatically maintain
that it can never serve.107 Clausewitz takes it forgranted that
more and better information will be sought, the potential valueof
which would be dependent on the commanders ability to
effectivelyexploit what was made available, but perhaps more
importantly, to be ableto withstand the endless torrent of false or
contradictory reports.108
Nevertheless, the central point for Clausewitz is that a
superlative degree ofaccurate information is both an objective
impossibility and a dangerouslydeceptive fantasy.
Of course, since Clausewitz wrote, intelligence-gathering
techniqueshave been enhanced by enormous strides in technology and
institutionalspecialisation. Both the potential quality and
quantity of information avail-able to politicians, commanders, and
troops is vastly superior to that inClausewitzs day.109 Some of the
major developments would perhapsinclude the development of large
staff bureaucracies and permanent,professional military and
civilian intelligence bodies; signals intelligenceand the more
advanced cryptographical techniques associated with WorldWar II. In
more recent years, intelligence-gathering techniques havebecome
enormously technologically sophisticated.
Yet, as argued, by specialist scholars, regardless of
technologicaladvances, failures of intelligence are inevitable. As
soon as one explores theactual processes and organisational
dynamics of the acquisition, analysis,and appreciation of
intelligence, the potential for failure is overwhelming.The sources
of this inevitability of failure particularly at strategic levels
have been masterfully studied by Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, and
MichaelHandel.110 They point to such factors as basic human
psychology, ingrainedpreconceptions, the nature of the
relationships between consumers andproducers of intelligence,
differences of opinion among analysts anddecision-makers, but
perhaps most importantly the wishful thinking, cava-lier disregard
of professional analysts, and the premises and preconcep-tions of
policy makers.111
Also, one only has to factor in the enemys almost certain
efforts in therealm of counter-intelligence, misinformation,
deception, and so on none
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350 DEFENCE STUDIES
of which can be definitively negated and scepticism creeps back
in. Knoxnotes that intelligence collection devices obey the same
dialectical law asweaponry. Counteraction or evasion or deception
may at any point surpriseeven or especially those made slothful by
seemingly effortless techno-logical superiority.112
While perhaps Clausewitz was too stridently dismissive of
intelligencegiven the limited nature of the art in his time, it
would be just as mistakento be overly impressed by the claims of
those information warriors whostalk the corridors of modern
military organisations. As Keegan states:There is no such thing as
the golden secret, the piece of pure intelligence,which will
resolve all .113 Early 21st century high-profile
Westernintelligence failures in relation to the 9/11 attacks and
Iraqs putativeweapons of mass destruction arsenal only adds
credence to these insights.
Lifting the Fog?In recent decades a so-called Revolution in
Military Affairs has beenproclaimed. Its more extreme proponents
believe it will lift the fog of warand remove friction and
uncertainty. This idea is centred around the impactof new
technologies and seriously took hold in the 1990s. Its
materialcomponents can be divided into systems: sensors, such as
satellites andunmanned aerial vehicles (drones); communications,
such as computersand command centres; and advanced weaponry, such
as cruise missiles, theparadigmatic weapon of the RMA.114
However, it is their complete integration the system of systems
thatrepresents what is specifically novel. The associated doctrine
of NetworkCentric Warfare (NCW) focuses on the prospect of
achieving dominantbattlespace knowledge and holds out the potential
for the seamless collec-tion, assessment, and communication of
information, allowing force to beapplied through advanced weapons
systems with greater range, lethality,and accuracy. All this
contributes to enhanced situational awareness andimproved mission
effectiveness encapsulated in the concept of FullSpectrum
Dominance.
Yet, despite these far-reaching developments, many commentators
haveemphasised the limitations of such claims. Indeed, many of the
problemsClausewitz identified remain: inevitably new solutions
spawn new prob-lems and new dependencies create new
vulnerabilities.115 For instance, thereis a serious potential
problem of potential information overload, wherebycommanders cannot
comprehend the immense noise they are faced with:as Clausewitz put
it, we know more, but this makes us more, not less,uncertain.116
Once all information has been collected it still has to
becomprehended, interpreted, and acted upon. At all stages human
fallibility
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and innumerable complications intervene, reflecting the eternal
problem ofconverting information into knowledge and knowledge into
action. Over-emphasis on new technologies can also lead to a form
of informationdependence, distracting attention away from crucial
intangibles such asmorale, the orientation of allies, or the state
of domestic opinion: suchstrategic tunnel vision potentially
downplays the value of human percep-tion of cultural and political
dynamics.117
The deepest cause for scepticism relates to the challenge of
convertingtechnological superiority into political effect. If
indeed a revolution is takingplace, it is principally occurring at
tactical/operational levels, whereas instrategy success is not so
narrowly dependent on better weaponry andequipment. Sir Lawrence
Freedman notes that, the real difficulty is thatmilitary power can
only be truly judged against the political purposes it isintended
to serve.118 Advanced systems may enable rapid victories
againstconventional forces, however this by no means guarantees
their translationinto meaningful political outcomes.119 This is not
to argue that informationsuperiority is not worth attaining, only
that it should not be seen as amagical elixir, particularly at the
strategic level. So, should Clausewitzsscepticism be viewed as
hopelessly time-bound? The weight of professionalopinion would
suggest not. As Gray succinctly concludes, no technicalpanacea can
eliminate uncertainty altogether.120
Decision-making DynamicsThe paucity of reliable information is
further exacerbated by clashes ofopinion among decision-makers and
precisely because the lack of informa-tion inevitably leaves room
for diverse judgements. Clausewitz explainshow such disputes are
often overlooked retrospectively because they areseen as the
scaffolding that can be removed once the building iscomplete.121 In
other words, when we look back on a successful operation,for
instance, it is rarely the difficult decisions that led to action
that are thefocus, but rather the action itself and its outcome
this has the effect ofdownplaying the fundamental problem of choice
that decision-makers faced,so that what the layman gets to know of
military events is usually nonde-script [and] it would be
impossible to guess what obstacles were facedand overcome.122
Clausewitz could not fail to recognise this problem assuch
paralysis in decision-making was largely to blame for Prussias
defeatin 1806. Probably with such events in mind, he states that,
Nowhere aredifferences of opinion so acute as in war, and fresh
opinions never cease tobatter at ones convictions.123
In this respect, if there was ever a suitable subject for
counter-factualreasoning, then strategic history is a prime
contender. What if questions
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encourage consideration of the acute problems actors faced and
that areoften lost in narrative accounts whereby events are often
explained with anunderlying air of inevitability. Of course, things
did turn out as they did forgood reason and thus lingering too long
in this realm of might-have-beenscan be unhealthy for things to
have been different, the causes would alsohave had to be
different124 nevertheless, consideration of alternativefutures can
impress upon the observer the great uncertainty that
alwaysconfronts decision-makers.
The negative effects or symptoms of uncertainty often include
delay,hesitation, and vacillation. Such effects should not be
confused with activestrategies of delaying or avoiding battle, such
as the Periclean125 or Fabian126
approach, although the latters strategy may have derived from an
indecisivepsychological disposition rather than considered waiting.
Moreover, tothose not inured to uncertainty, the psychological
consequences of uncer-tainty can so relentlessly sap confidence as
to induce great anxiety, if notoutright behavioural paralysis
consider for instance General Erich Luden-dorffs nervous breakdown
in 1918. Clausewitz notes how most generals,when they ought to act,
are paralysed by unnecessary doubts.127
Irresolution and reluctance to act, Clausewitz remarks,
particularlyharm those on the offensive, which generally requires
continuous momen-tum, quick decision, and exploitation of the
initiative: if the commanderdemands absolute certainty he will
inevitably delay until the optimummoment for action has passed. A
mind racked by uncertainty will alwayswant that little bit more
time to weigh up alternatives and check all availableinformation
before acting. Much to his consternation, in 1809 Clausewitzhad
witnessed the strategic consequences of such vacillation when
Napo-leon was close to collapse against the Austrians at
Aspern-Essling in 1809and the Prussian King, Frederick William
failed to act: his hopeless messageto the Austrians was, One more
victory and I am with you.128 The instancesof such fatal indecision
are legion. A notable example is that of Unioncommander George
McClellan during the American Civil War, whorefused to attack even
when armed with the enemys campaign plan andwith circumstances
favouring action.129
Equally, however, uncertainty can also lead to overconfidence,
even inthe face of an enemys massive numerical superiority because,
after all,fortune purportedly favours the bold. Clausewitz suggests
that a balancedreaction to uncertainty is required: While one man
may lose his best chancethrough timidity another will plunge in
head first and end up looking asdazed and surprised as if he had
just been fished out of the water.130 AsClausewitz recognised, it
is part of human nature to place confidence inones own success. It
was this sentiment that lay behind Clausewitzs
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thinking in his Political Declaration of 1812 in which he argued
that evenagainst the odds, Prussia could find courage in despair:
It is true that theprobability of success is against us How can
anyone demand the probabil-ity of success! It is enough that
success is not impossible; whoever asks formore contradicts
himself.131
The overriding consequence of this chronic uncertainty is that
almost allmajor decisions will be largely based on probability and
inference andshaped by the psychological disposition of and nature
of the relationshipsbetween the commanders and statesmen at the
time rather than any universalstandard. Clausewitz states that,
Circumstances vary so enormously in war,and are so indefinable,
that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated mostly in the
light of probabilities alone. 132 As such, he is adamant that
reli-able prediction is impossible: absolute, so-called
mathematical factors neverfind a firm basis in military
calculations.133 In a more objective sense, it is
thisunpredictability which entails that, as he puts it, no
prescriptive formulationuniversal enough to deserve that the name
of law can be applied to theconstant change and diversity of the
phenomena of war134.
Incidental frictionIf the Enlightenment military thinkers had
conceived of military institutionsas mathematical reason in action
or as great machines where each partfulfilled its prescribed
function, with no waste motion and no supernumer-ary cogs,135 then
it was Clausewitz who shrewdly introduced the logical,adverse
corollary of the metaphor through his concept of friction.
Frictionwas notably absent from the military machines envisaged by
the militaryphilosophes, as if they operated in a vacuum. The
Prussian thinker endeav-oured to correct this oversight. In The
Principles of War Clausewitz comparesthe conduct of war to the
workings of an intricate machine with tremen-dous friction.136 In
On War he describes how, Iron will power can overcomethis friction
but of course it wears down the machine as well.137 But ashe makes
clear in his study of The Campaign of 1812, the analogy does
notentirely suffice because, unlike in mechanics, the friction
cannot be reducedto a few points, but is everywhere in contact with
chance.138
As Barry Watts has persuasively shown, the concept of friction
can beunderstood in both its incidental and general manifestations.
In the firstinstance, friction needs to be understood as a separate
phenomenonexplaining a particular pervasive feature of war. The
concept appears fairlyearly in Clausewitzs thinking and rapidly
became a major theme in OnWar.139 Incidental friction is for
Clausewitz an unseen, all pervadingelement and a force that theory
can never quite define,140 but its generalfeatures are quite clear,
particularly when accompanied by the powerful
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354 DEFENCE STUDIES
metaphors he provides. It is a factor that reduces the
efficiency of the wholeand impedes activity through natural inertia
as countless minor incidents combine to lower the general level of
performance.141 A defining featureof the concept is its cumulative
nature, in the sense that a multitude of smalldifficulties leads to
much larger problems. It conveys, as Beyerchen notes,the
amplification of a microcause to a macro-consequence, in a kind
ofcascade of things gone wrong.142 Clausewitz states that
difficulties accumu-late and end by producing a kind of friction
that is inconceivable unless onehas experienced war.143
This cumulative effect results largely from the nature of
militaries,which like complex and intricate machines, are made up
of many individualparts each with the potential to produce friction
and make, as Clausewitzputs it, the apparently easy so
difficult.144 It is these factors that make warlike movement in a
resistant element and here Clausewitz employs theanalogy of walking
in water: Just as the simplest and most natural of move-ments,
walking, cannot easily be performed in water, so in war it is
difficultfor normal efforts to achieve even moderate results.145
Friction is composedof all manner of difficulties, whether they be
fatigue, command incoher-ence, adverse weather conditions,
insufficient provisions and more: hestates that it would take
volumes to cover them all.
Moreover, Clausewitz explains that friction is everywhere in
contactwith chance, and brings about effects that cannot be
measured, just becausethey are largely due to chance.146 He also
notes that, Often we encounterobstacles which were impossible to
foresee147 and that you can never knowwhen one of the parts of the
whole will chance to delay things or somehowmake them go wrong.148
Friction, like chance, is not something that can beprevented or
forestalled one can only attempt to limit its effects and bemindful
of its universal presence.
General FrictionSo far we have discussed the prominent concepts
in theoretical isolation toarrive at a firmer understanding of
their distinctive features. However,Clausewitz also believed that
it was possible for these factors to beconceived of in a unitary
sense. All these factors, along with danger thedebilitating element
and physical exertion, correspond with respect totheir restrictive
effect and as Clausewitz argued, for this reason can begrouped into
a single concept of general friction.149 As commentators
haveconcluded, the various concepts discussed in this article,
coalesce tocomprise a compound concept of general friction. There
are clearly manyoverlaps in relation to the individual concepts
discussed above, such aschance and uncertainty, but the idea of
general friction can be regarded as a
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means to collectively perceive all the various ways in which
activity in waris impeded everywhere and at every stage. The basic
nature of the forcebeing described is essentially analogous to that
associated with incidentalfriction, but here it encompasses the
whole range of factors associated withaction in war.
In Wattss excellent study, he draws attention to other potential
sourcesof general friction, which are identifiable in Clausewitzs
wider work. Inparticular, he draws attention to the political
constraints on the use of forceand the intractable difficulty of
matching military means to political ends.150
Whatever factors we include, the overarching thrust is clear, as
is the extentto which this friction pervades the entire gamut of
war, from thosedetermining the political object to individual
soldiers. While identificationof this intrinsically restrictive
force in war may seem like cause for outrightnegativity, this would
be a mistaken conclusion. Given wars interactivenature, it is
always necessarily relative.151 This tremendous friction in war
issomething best offset through the efforts of the energetic and
creativegenius natures compensation for uncertainty.
Playing the Lethal Game of WarWar, states Clausewitz, can be
compared to a game of chance, a gamble, andthus guesswork and luck
come to play a large part in war.152 In its dangerand seriousness
war is perhaps most akin to Russian roulette,153 but this doesnot
convey the extraordinary talents required, which are perhaps
moreaccurately captured in the analogy of card games, such as
poker, where it isa matter of skill as well as odds.154 In the
latter, ones fate, while still subjectto the laws of probability,
is more heavily dependent on choice andaccurately reading ones
opponents, while in the former ones fate is leftpurely to chance.
In his analysis of Napoleons 1799 campaign, Clausewitzstates that,
since war always has something of the nature of a game, theconduct
of war cannot avoid this element at every stage, and thecommander,
who has little inclination for the game, will, without
anticipat-ing it, be left behind the line and will fall into deep
debt in the great accountbook of military success.155 Yet, what
makes war such a unique game ofchance is the mixture of uncertainty
with ever-present danger, fear, physicalexertion and, for the
commander and policy-maker, an enormous burdenof responsibility: so
luck in war is of a higher quality than luck ingambling.156 Far
from being a mere pastime, Clausewitz asserts, war is nota place
for irresponsible enthusiasts. It is a serious means to a
seriousend.157
On War is essentially geared towards preparing commanders for
thisrelentless struggle with the unforeseen.158 Yet he recognised
no book can
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provide the requisite abilities needed to face such an ephemeral
foe. AsParet explains, Clausewitz believed it is the creative
employment of intel-lectual and psychological strengths that alone
can overcome friction, exploitchance, and turn the imponderables
into an asset.159 The qualities of geniusrepresent the counterpoise
to the effects of chance and uncertainty or, asClausewitz puts it,
With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be
thrown into the other to correct the balance.160
Here a definite dualism is apparent concerning the inherent
interrela-tionship between the condition of uncertainty on one hand
and theconsequent human reaction on the other: they form two sides
of the samecoin. The relationship can often appear somewhat
unbalanced, with chancedictating terms to the submissive human
will. However, a more accurateconception is one of mutual
dependence and even symbiosis in so far ashuman creativity, free
will, boundless imagination, and choice arefundamental causes of
the condition in the first instance. Put simply, thefact that the
enemy is a living and thinking entity with a will of its own is
amajor source of chance and uncertainty war is never activity aimed
atinanimate matter.161 As Gray states, War is a duel and the enemy
may proveuncooperative.162
Even absent the unpredictability of the external physical
sources ofchance, this fundamental reality may appear, almost
paradoxically, to beboth problem and solution. Consequently, the
apparent relationship thatemerges between chance and creativity is
more one of chicken and egg,especially when war is viewed properly,
as Clausewitz insisted it alwaysshould, as an interactive,
multilateral whole.
Genius: The Creative TalentAs noted earlier, in his description
of genius, Clausewitz was echoingmany of those attributes which
Machiavelli had identified in his conceptof vitr, while examining
them in a more systematic and analyticalfashion. Considering that
fact that the science of psychology was only inits infancy as
Clausewitz acknowledged his penetrating analysis inBook 1, Chapter
3 is a jewel of his work. Clausewitz prefaced hisdiscussion with
the observation that genius is the combination of certainqualities
of mind and temperament that are specific to war and that maynot
necessarily be appropriate elsewhere, emphasising that the gifts
ofmilitary genius are those which pertain to the unique climate of
war.The qualities required are different from those of pure
understanding,intellect, or even technical knowledge. Rather, for
Clausewitz, genius isa complex mix of intellect and emotional
qualities, a blend of brains andtemperament.163
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As Strachan notes, The romantic in Clausewitz had to embrace
themilitary genius, the rationalist had to define him.164 Genius in
war, heexplained, must be grounded in courage. However, if the old
adageconfirms that discretion is the larger part of valour, then
Clausewitzemphasised a form of courage that was not wild, but
controlled andeducated.165 Courage encompasses such traits as
boldness, presence of mind(such as dealing with the unexpected or
keeping ones nerve), strength ofwill (in the face of anxiety and
crushing responsibility), as well as the abilityto take risks and
to trust in fortune. Purely rational thinking would struggleto cope
with or even be overwhelmed by the lack of evidence and certaintyin
war, so rather a form of intellectual instinct or coup doeil the
quickrecognition of a truth reinforced by determination was
necessary,166
which would enable the commander to effectively turn knowledge
intoability.167
The military genius would also need to possess adaptability
andcreativity, combined with great strength of character, as well
as lucidity andfirmness of mind in order to follow through
steadily, to carry out theplan, and not to be thrown off course by
a thousand diversions.168 All thisrequires great energy or what
Clausewitz terms a spirit of endeavour.169
Importantly, and recalling Machiavelli, genius is not just about
coping withuncertainty but actively exploiting it, thus one can
attempt to turnuncertainty to ones own advantage.170
Individuals of great ability continue to exert an enormous
influence, forinstance, consider the importance of American General
David Petraeus inrecent years.171 Echevarria also makes the point
that Clausewitzs frameworkof genius is by no means limited to
conventional military figures.172 Forinstance, the ideas can be
extended to guerrilla leaders such as Mao Zedong,counter-insurgent
specialists such as Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer orperhaps even
terrorist masterminds such as Osama bin Laden. However, inthe face
of the growing complexity of war, a notable feature of
modernwarfare has been the increasing collegiality of command and
the rise ofsprawling military bureaucracies and planning staffs.173
During the 19thcentury General Staffs emerged which increasingly
took responsibility formany of the decisions that would formerly
have taken place in thecommanders mind.174 As a result, genius has
become increasingly dissoci-ated from the individual and supplanted
by considerations of bureaucraticefficiency and consensual
decision-making. These changes have primarilybeen functional
imperatives in response to the expanded dimensions andvarieties of
knowledge required in modern warfare. However thesedevelopments
have encouraged practices and behaviour often unsuited todealing
with the uncertainties of war; not least excessively rigid
planning.
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358 DEFENCE STUDIES
For instance, in the decades prior to 1914, planning became an
obsessionof European staffs, yet, as events were to reveal,
brilliant execution of thewrong plan can be extremely dangerous.
The French strict adherence toPlan 17 led to dispositions and
movements almost wilfully unsuited tounfolding events.175 This is
not to argue that detailed planning is unimpor-tant. Rather, the
danger is that rigid plans can become confused with futurereality,
when in fact no blueprint, however sophisticated, can
entirelyaccount for unpredictable events that will inevitably be
encountered at alllevels. Dogmatic planning can encourage a
mistaken belief that victory canbe orchestrated in advance: Gray
quotes US Rear Admiral Joseph C. WylieJr (191193) who stated that
planning for certitude is the greatest of allmilitary mistakes.176
In this regard, the genius of the overall commander canbe the
crucial factor preserving the element of coup doeil, flexibility,
andadaptability in the face of failed plans and unexpected
occurrences.
Military VirtuesSo far we have concentrated principally on
higher command in war, but wemust also consider relevant features
evident at lower levels. Indeed, one ofthe central problems in war
is how to produce soldiers willing to risk theirlives in the
debilitating element of battle and stand fast in the face of
poten-tial death.177 As Dyer notes, Soldiers in battle, however
stable they mayappear, are always a potential mob capable of panic
and flight.178 Desertion,mutiny and the collapse of morale are the
nightmares of generals.Consequently, throughout history, armed
groups of all persuasions havedeveloped a diverse range of
mechanisms (consciously and unconsciously)to overcome such
problems, even if they sometimes solidified into culturalhabits
that no longer truly served their purpose.179 Nevertheless, where
thelatter occurred, military necessity, and the requirement to
adapt or die,generally engendered the discarding of outdated
forms.
Clausewitz discussed such issues through the concepts of
militaryvirtues and military spirit, which in fighting forces he
regarded as thesteering quality, [the] refinement of base ore into
precious metal.180 Today,many of the qualities which Clausewitz
recognised as vital in command areincreasingly required by soldiers
at all levels as closed order formations havebeen increasingly
replaced by more open fighting, such as skirmishing orguerrilla
operations, demanding the free play of intelligence, the
clevermerging of boldness with caution.181 Clausewitz believed that
foremostamong the virtues that can reduce friction in fighting
forces is simplycombat experience or long familiarity with danger,
and described it as theonly lubricant that will reduce the abrasion
of friction.182 He noted how,Habit hardens the body for great
exertions, strengthens the heart in great
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR 359
peril, and fortifies judgement against first impressions.183 For
militarieswithout direct experience of war, efforts are often made
to provide troopswith training approaching true battlefield
conditions, although, as Clause-witz recognised, peacetime
maneuvers are a feeble substitute for the realthing.184
The development of detailed military doctrine has become a
centralmeans to reduce uncertainty given the complexity and
technicality ofmodern warfare. Dyer notes how militaries are often
criticised for reducingaction to routines and rules, but all it
amounts to in practice, is a desperateand partially successful
attempt to reduce the immense number of variables[in war].185 This
is true, but doctrine can also be greatly counterproductivedue to
the rigidity of thinking it encourages. Clausewitz warned that, in
wartheoretical directives tend to be less useful here than in any
other sphere.186
The dangers of such methodism was revealed in Vietnam,
whereDoctrine became dogma187 and the US Army found it difficult to
adapt tothe unique demands of counter-insurgency, being as the
troops were,geared to fight large-scale conflicts. Of course, in
1806 Clausewitz hadwitnessed the most downright stupidity to which
methodicism ever led.188
It is little wonder that the new Prussian Army Regulations of
1812, whichClausewitz helped draft, emphasised flexibility,
initiative, and exploitationof the unexpected.189
Discipline and drill represent historic practices that derive
from theimperative to stand fast in the face of the enemy without
giving way tothe natural impulses of fear and panic.190 Clausewitz
notes how such prac-tices form an army that maintains its cohesion
under the most murderousfire; that cannot be shaken by imaginary
fears and resists well-founded oneswith all its might.191 Strict
discipline has often been employed wheresoldiers have been
reluctant to fight. At times, outright coercion has beenruthlessly
applied. Indeed, the term decimation derives from the
Romanpunishment of executing every tenth man from units who were
defeated orotherwise humiliated in battle.192
Countless other ways of preparing troops for the uncertainties
of warhave been adopted. Formalised hierarchies ensure orders are
followed inthe confusion of war. Regimental insignia, flags (or
colours), ceremonies,and histories serve to foster a culture of
duty, valour, and group belongingnecessary to maintain cohesion in
an atmosphere of disorientating confu-sion. Such characteristics
are not exclusive to regular military institutions.In the brutal
conflicts in West Africa during the 1990s, rebel forces, such asthe
Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone, wore distinctive
Americansports gear, were branded with tattoos, and adopted noms de
guerre.193
Also guerrilla forces and terrorist organisations frequently
adopt the
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360 DEFENCE STUDIES
nomenclature of regular forces. Indeed, Clausewitz describes how
fightersoften think of themselves as a member of a guild, in whose
customs thespirit of war is given pride of place.194 Efforts to
boost morale can takethe form of inspiring eve-of-battle speeches
or measures to encourage thevilification of the enemy.195
Also, at a more personal level, if, as Clausewitz stated, what
is mostneeded in the lower ranks is courage and self-confidence,196
then soldiersthroughout history have adopted diverse ways of
reconciling themselves tothe dangers and uncertainties of war, such
as taking drugs,197 drinking alco-hol,198 saying prayers, singing
songs, covering themselves in war paint, andfinding consolation in
religion or even Stoic philosophy.199
These examples are intended to emphasise the extent to which
many ofthe iconic images and practices we associate with war derive
largely from itsinherent uncertain nature. But, as Clausewitz
believed, none of thesemeasures can truly prepare the soldier for
the sheer emotional intensity andconfusion of actual combat. As he
states, discipline, skill, goodwill, a certainpride, and high
morale have no strength of their own. They stand or falltogether.
One crack and the whole thing goes, like glass too
quicklycooled.200 Like the best lubricants, they can only reduce
the friction of war,but not entirely eradicate it.
Reflections
Theorists prior to and since Clausewitz have approached the
concept ofchance in a manner which tends to be either parochial,
melodramatic orsmugly dismissive. Following Machiavelli, Clausewitz
developed a morerealistic conception. For him chance is essentially
neutral: it can createpossibilities and opportunities to be
exploited, or equally dash the best laidplans.201 Uncertainty may
paralyse one commander, but it may appear toanother as a world full
of possibilities within which creative genius can takewing. Given a
rough equality between belligerents in relation to thesefactors,
this is where genius, political acumen, flexible planning,
effectiveintelligence, morale, experience and other factors can be
crucial. The scopefor chance and uncertainty in war is vast,
complex, and inescapable. Yet,while always there, it must be
remembered that it is always there for theenemy also.202 This
sentiment was expressed by Thucydides when he stated,That
imponderable element of the future is the thing which counts in
thelong run, and, just as we are most frequently deceived by it, so
too it can beof the greatest possible use to us.203
Clausewitz was impressed by the demands chance and
uncertaintymakes on those faced with such a reality. His
fascination with the creative
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talents such conditions call forth is revealed when he states
that, Althoughour intellect always longs for clarity and certainty,
our nature often findsuncertainty fascinating. It prefers to
daydream in the realms of chance andluck rather than accompany the
intellect on its narrow and tortuous path ofphilosophical inquiry
and logical deduction.204 Individual soldiers facedwith the fear of
death or commanders holding the fate of nations intheir hands must
make decisions in the midst of relentless uncertainty andcrushing
responsibility: what greater test can the human will face?
Chance and uncertainty should not be conceived as being
everywhere,all of the time there are observable linear
cause-and-effect relationships inwar. However, uncertainty is
central to the nature of the phenomenon,along with the measures
humans employ to overcome it. Modern develop-ments, such as those
associated with high-tech systems or professionalinstitutional
intelligence agencies have not rendered these insights obsolete.If
anything, these ideas may be even more relevant to modern
warfarewhich takes place in multiple dimensions, often among
civilian popula-tions, employs a mind-boggling mix of old and new
technologies, and ispervaded by endlessly complex political, legal,
and ethical dynamics,refracted through the omnipresent 24-hour mass
media, and involvesmultiple actors, diverse groups, and complex
bureaucracies.205
During the Iraq War of 2003 Coalition forces armed with
advancednetworked technology and precision weapons, shaped in their
applicationby detailed doctrine, rigorous training exercises, and
detailed operationalplanning pushed aside what Iraqi opposition
barred the advance toBaghdad. Yet, however much these forces
managed to dissipate the fog ofwar at the operational level,
unforeseen occurrences in all of wars dimen-sions would, in the
years that followed, render what immediate gains theyhad achieved
almost meaningless. In many respects, they were a victim oftheir
own operational, technical potency, where over-confidence bred
arro-gance and strategic myopia. Too few troops were deployed to
contain theviolent insurgency that ensued, itself a manifestation
of political dynamicsignored by Pentagon planners over-enamoured by
technical solutions andblinded by utopian scenarios. Furthermore,
it took a flexible, determinedand intelligent commander to rescue
the US effort from the desperatestate in which it had fallen. The
Iraq War underlines the extent to whichClausewitzs analysis remains
relevant still today.
NOTES
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War [1832] , trans. and ed. Michael
Howard and Peter Paret(New York: Everymans Library 1993) p.101.
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362 DEFENCE STUDIES
2 Ibid. p. 97.3 Marx quoted in Beatrice Heuser, Reading
Clausewitz (London: Pimlico 2002) p.13.4 The popular classic is
Bill Owens, Lifting the Fog of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP
2001).5 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: OUP 1999) p.95.6
Quoted in Hanna F. Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1999) p.153.7 Howard explains how successes that were due
more to exceptional luck may be written in
terms of brilliant generalship, often in order to massage
narratives of national greatness.Michael Howard, The Causes of War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1983) p.190.
8 Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, Chance in Human
Affairs, Sociological Theory12/1 (March 1994) p.53.
9 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the
Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford: OUP2001) p.187.
10 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.156.11 Ibid. p.138. As Alan
Beyerchen comments, Facing up to the intrinsic presence of
chance,
complexity, and ambiguity in war is imperative. For Clausewitz,
this is preferable to therisk of being blind-sided by the
strictures of a theory artificially imposed on the messinessof
reality in the name of clarity. Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz,
Nonlinearity and theImportance of Imagery, available online at ,
retrieved 20 April 2009.
12 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (London: Croom Helm
1979) p.25.13 Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military
Thought (New York: Smithsonian
Books, 2005) p.78.14 Clausewitz himself acknowledged that siege
warfare was primarily a matter of mathematics
and geometry. Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.251.15 Richard
Holmes, Vauban, Marshal Sbastien le Prestre de (16381707), in
Richard
Holmes (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Military History (Oxford:
OUP 2003) p.946.16 Gat, Military Thought (note 9) p.37.17 See Henry
Guerlac, Vauban: The Impact of Science on War, in Peter Paret
(ed.), Makers
of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
(Princeton UP 1986) pp.8390.18 R.R. Palmer, Frederick the Great,
Guibert, Blow: From Dynastic to National War, in
Paret (note 17) p. 95.19 Ibid. p.117.20 Maurice de Saxe,
Reveries on the Art of War [1757], trans. and ed. Thomas R.
Phillips (New
York: Dover Publications 2007) p.18.21 Ibid. pp.11719.22
Antoine-Henri de Jomini, The Art of War [1838], trans. G. H.
Mendell and W. P. Craighill
(Texas: El Paso Norte Press 2005) p.215.23 Antulio J. Echevarria
II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: OUP 2007) p.108.24
Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.155.25 Ibid. p.156.26 Daniel Moran,
Strategic Theory and the History of War, in John Baylis, James
Wirtz ,
Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds.), Strategy in the
Contemporary World: An Introduction toStrategic Studies (New York:
OUP 2002) p.8.
27 Echevarria, Clausewitz (note 23) p.102.28 Gat (note 9)
p.315.29 Ibid.pp.1812.30 Ibid. p.183.31 Michael Howard, Clausewitz:
A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OUP 2002) p.23.32 Peter Paret,
Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times
(Princeton UP
1985) p.202.33 Echevarria (note 23) p.112.34 Paret, Clausewitz
and the State (note 32) p.71.35 Peter Paret writes that, As a
student in Berlin, Clausewitz had read Machiavellis Discorsi
and Arte della Guerra Either during those years or soon after
the war he had also read ThePrince. Ibid. p. 169.
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CLAUSEWITZS ANALYSIS OF CHANCE IN WAR 363
36 Niccol Machiavelli, The Discourses [1516], trans. Leslie J.
Walker (London: Penguin2003); The Prince [1513], trans. George Bull
(London: Penguin, 1999); and The Art of War[1521], trans. Ellis
Farneworth (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press 2001).
37 Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of
War, in Paret, Makers (note 17)p.24.
38 Neal Wood, Some Common Aspects of the Thought of Seneca and
Machiavelli,Renaissance Quarterly 21/1 (1968) pp.15 and 20.
39 Machiavelli, The Prince (note 36) p.79.40 Gilbert,
Machiavelli (note 37) p.24.41 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.97.42
Machiavelli, The Prince (note 36) p.80.43 Ibid. p.82.44
Machiavelli, Art of War (note 36) p.202. Also, one chapter in the
Discourses is entitled, That
it behoves one to adapt Oneself to the Times if one wants to
enjoy Continued GoodFortune. Machiavelli, Discourses (note 36)
pp.4302.
45 Machiavelli, The Prince (note 36) p.18.46 Neal Wood,
Introduction, in Machiavelli, Art of War (note 36) p.xlvi.47
Machiavelli, Art of War (note 36) p.lv.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 Paret,
Clausewitz and the State (note 32) p.203.51 Machiavellis virt was
not confined to the military commander, but was the quality
that
enabled any human to face the whims of fortune. Clausewitz
equally emphasised thevirtues and spirit that enabled ordinary
soldiers to face the possibility of death in battle.
52 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 32) p.45.53 Carl von
Clausewitz, Observations on Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe, in
Clausewitz,
Historical and Political Writings, trans. and ed. Peter Paret
and Daniel Moran (Princeton UP1992) p. 40.
54 Ibid. pp.3284. See also Roger Parkinson, Clausewitz: A
Biography (New York: Stein & Day1979) pp.5182.
55 Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan 2005) p.150.56 Although the French suffered their own
weaknesses on this score, particularly in relation
to reconnaissance and communications and largely because
Napoleon attempted to do toomuch. Peter Paret, Understanding War:
Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power(Princeton UP
1993) p.88.
57 Quoted in Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 32) p.191.58
Parkinson, Clausewitz (note 54) p.312.59 Paret, Understanding War
(note 56) p.7860 See Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and
Future War (Washington DC: National
Defense Univ. 1996).61 Christopher Bassford, The Primacy of
Policy and the Trinity in Clausewitzs Mature
Thought, in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.),
Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: OUP 2007) p.89.
62 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.117.63 Ibid. p.119.64 J. G.
Manis and B.N. Meltzer, Chance in Human Affairs, Sociological
Theory 12 (1994)
p.46.65 Gat (note 9) p.336. Moltke had been a student at the
Berlin war school while Clausewitz
was its director, but there is no evidence of the two ever
meeting. We do however knowthat Moltke was a great admirer of
Clausewitz, even if he misrepresented many of his ideas.
66 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.139.67 Ibid. p. 195.68
Katherine L. Herbig, Chance and Uncertainty in On War, in Michael
I. Handel, Clause-
witz and Modern Strategy (London: Frank Cass 1986) p.109.69
Beyerchen (note 11).
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364 DEFENCE STUDIES
70 Henri Poincare, Science and Method (Princeton UP 1949)
p.75.71 Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin
1990) p.102.72 See Booth, Strategy (note 12) p.25.73 On this point
Clausewitz states that we can understand why later critics who know
all the
previous and attendant circumstances must not be influenced by
their knowledge whenthey ask which among the unknown facts they
themselves would have considered probableat the time of the action.
Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.193.
74 The theory has it that it was the beauty of Cleopatras nose
that determined the outcomeof the decisive Battle of Actium due to
Antonys infatuation. See Carr (note 71) pp.87108.
75 Clausewitz (note 1) pp.1825.76 Ibid. p. 698.77 Carr (note 71)
p.99.78 Ibid. p.101.79 So Hitler denied his own responsibility for
failure as he dictated to his secretary Martin
Bormann in the Spring of 1945. As Overy notes, to Hitler,
Germany was a plaything forfate, doomed by the forces of world
history. Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (London:Pimlico 1996)
p.315.
80 Quoted in Herbig (note 68) p.108. Napoleon also stated that I
have never really been myown master; I have always been governed by
circumstances. Quoted in Charles Esdaile,Napoleons Wars (London:
Penguin 2008) p.2.
81 Carl von Clausewitz, The Principles of War, trans. and ed.
Hans W. Gatzke (New York:Dover Publications 2003) p.64.
82 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.117.83 Herbig (note 68) p.104.
A chance event that works in ones favour may even strengthen
ones resolve, clarify something that was formerly shrouded, or
make possible an actionpreviously discounted.
84 Uncertainty usually manifests itself in the asking of
questions such as: where is the enemy,what are his
plans/intentions, when will he strike, what will I do next, what
will be theeffect of this action, and so forth.
85 Clausewitz, On War (note 1) p.97.86 Ibid. p.216.87 Ibid.
pp.21617.88 Ibid. p.693.89 Colin S. Gray, How Has War Changed Since
the End of the Cold War?, Parameters 35/1
(Spring 2005) p.15.90 Clausewitz,