SANDOVAL vs. COMELEC Case Digest
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS[G.R. No.133842.
January 26, 2000]FACTS:Petitioner and private respondent herein
were candidates for the congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas
legislative district during the elections held on May 11, 1998.
After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the
district board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected
congressman. The petitioner took his oath of office on the same
day. Private respondent filed with the Comelec a petition, which
sought the annulment of petitioner's proclamation. He alleged that
there was a verbal order from the Comelec Chairman to suspend the
canvass and proclamation of the winning candidate, but the district
board of canvassers proceeded with the canvass and proclamation
despite the said verbal order. He also alleged that there was
non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, which would
result in an incomplete canvass of the election returns. The
Comelec en banc issued an order setting aside the proclamation of
petitioner and ruled the proclamation as void. Hence, this petition
for certiorari seeking the annulment and reversal of the Comelec
order.
ISSUES:1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance
of SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98- 206
SPC No. 98-143an "Urgent Appeal from the Decision of the
Legislative District Board of Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas
with Prayer for the Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico
S. Sandoval as Congressman."SPC No. 98-206. The petition sought the
annulment of petitioner's proclamation as congressman.2. whether
the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's proclamation was
valid.
RULING:On thefirst issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC over the petitions filed by private respondent. The COMELEC
has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.
As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of
Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits candidates in the presidential,
vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from
filing pre-proclamation cases. It states: "Sec. 15.
Pre-proclamation cases Not Allowed in Elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of
Representatives. For purposes of the elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives,
no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or the certificates of canvass, as the case may
be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint
of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it." The
prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner
in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these
sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the
exception. The second sentence of Section 15 allows the filing of
petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of
canvass or election returns even in elections for president,
vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for the
simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not
prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the
winner in the election. This rule is consistent with and
complements the authority of the COMELEC under the Constitution to
"enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right
to vote, all questions affecting elections."
We now go to thesecond issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed
with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No.
98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction
tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the
proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered
without due process of law. Procedural due process demands prior
notice and hearing. The facts show that COMELEC set aside the
proclamation of petitioner without the benefit of prior notice and
hearing and it rendered the questioned order based solely on
private respondent's allegations.
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not
be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its
administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of
the board of canvassers.
We cannot accept public respondent's argument.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for
annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely
performing an administrative function. The administrative powers of
the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and location
of polling places, appoint election officials and inspectors,
conduct registration of voters, deputize law enforcement agencies
and government instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections, register political parties,
organizations or coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the
Commission, prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the
President the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary
action upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation
or disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the
Commission also has direct control and supervision over all
personnel involved in the conduct of election. However, the
resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and
petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in the
questioned certificate of canvass requires the COMELEC to act as an
arbiter. It behooves the Commission to hear both parties to
determine the veracity of their allegations and to decide whether
the alleged error is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of
this issue calls for the exercise by the COMELEC of its
quasi-judicial power. It has been said that where a power rests in
judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or
character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a
judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial
officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. The COMELEC therefore, acting
as quasi-judicial tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of
procedural due process in resolving the petitions filed by private
respondent.
The COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC
No. 98-206 is ANNULLED.
Midland Insurance Corporation vs Intermediate Appellate
Court
143 SCRA 458
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: On October 1, 1984, a judgment was rendered by the
Insurance Commission in favor of complaint-appellee, Sisenando
Villareal, and against herein petitioner Midland Insurance
Corporation.
Petitioner's appeal was initially-accepted by the IAC as can be
gleaned from the letter-advice dated February 8, 1985, notifying
petitioner's counsel to file appellant's brief. However, a Motion
to Dismiss appeal dated March 1, 1985 was filed by the
complainant-appellee on the ground that the petitioner herein,
failed to perfect its appeal within the reglementary period.
Despite the opposition thereto interposed by petitioner Midland
Insurance Corporation, the Respondent IAC, on August 14, 1985
granted the stated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that by said
court's computation of the elapsed period from the date of receipt
by herein petitioner of the decision of the Insurance Commission to
the time the notice of appeal was filed before said Commission and
notice of appeal and manifestation submitted to the IAC on December
5, 1984, it would appear that petitioner's appeal was belatedly
made.
Respondent-appellant's contended that under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of the decision
or judgment within which to file an appeal is not applicable to
quasi-judicial agencies such as the Insurance Commission. However,
in its dismissal IAC ruled that the applicable rule is explicit in
No. 12 (c), providing for appellate procedure under the Interim
Rules which state that 'appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court
from quasi-judicial bodies shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same is not
inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129. The pertinent
provisions in Rep. Act No. 5434 provide:
SEC. 2.Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within the
fifteen (15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision
or judgment.
There is no conflict between the period to appeal in R.A. No.
5434 and Sec. 39, B.P. 129 which provides:
Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided,
however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall
be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appeal
from.
The petitioner's case, however, rests on the assumption that it
had timely filed its appeal on November 7, 1984 because Section 2
of Republic Act No. 5434 which governs appeals originating from
quasi-judicial bodies grants a party ten (10) days from notice of
the resolution denying a Motion for Reconsideration. As notice of
the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration by the
Insurance Commission was received by petitioner on October 30,
1984, the latter maintains that it had ten (10) days thereafter or
until November 9, 1984 within which to file its appeal and this was
filed with the IAC on November 7, 1984. Petitioner's submission is
that the appeal was thus filed within the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner had timely filed its appeal
because Republic Act No. 5434 which governs appeals originating
from quasi-judicial bodies grants a party ten (10) days from notice
of the resolution denying a Motion for Reconsideration
RULING: Yes. It can be gleaned from the powers and duties of the
Insurance Commissioner enumerated in Sections 414-416, 187, and 241
of the Insurance Code performs quasi-judicial functions a term
which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate
facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Section 2 of R.A. 5434 explicitly provides:
Sec. 2.Appeals to the Court of Appeals shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision
or judgment or from the date of its last publication if required by
law for its effectivity or in case a motion for reconsideration is
filed within that period of fifteen (15) days, then within ten (10)
days from Notice or publication when required by law, of the
resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. No more than one
motion for reconsideration shall be allowed by any part.
We find that petitioner herein is correct in maintaining that
its appeal was timely filed. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Insurance Commission and advice
of such denial was received by petitioner on October 30, 1984. As
petitioner would then have ten (10) days from October 30, 1984 or
until November 9, 1984, its appeal was well within the ten day
period within which an appeal can be made to the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court.
What We note is that Respondent IAC fell into error because it
failed to consider and apply the pivotal Section 2 of R.A. 5434,
which recites that "in case a motion for reconsideration is filed
within that period of fifteen (15) days, then within ten (10) days
from Notice or publication, when required by law, of the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration ... ." Respondent's court's
failure to do so led to its erroneous conclusion.
The Insurance Commission is an administrative agency, with
quasi-judicial functions. Consequently, the period of appeal from
final orders, decisions, resolutions or awards of said Insurance
Commission may not be necessarily modified or limited by section 39
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
RATIO: "Quasi-judicial functions" is a term which applies to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature. National Housing Authority vs Almeida
525 SCRA 383Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA)
awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land which are
part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna.The records show
that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
(the mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs.
Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.On August 22,
1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita
Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is
the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of
the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of
the late Margarita Herrera.
The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera.
The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for
annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication before the then Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
On December 29, 1980, a decision on the case questioning the
Deed of Self-Adjudication was rendered and the deed was declared
null and void.
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of
Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the
NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a copy of the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private respondent
Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the
application.
In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the
application made by Francisca Herrera. Private respondent Almeida
appealed to the Office of the President. The NHA Resolution was
affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision dated January
23, 1987. On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs
executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they
submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the
NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs
of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor.
Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda
Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.
Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President
and the resolution of the NHA, private respondent Segunda
Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in
favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February
8, 1988, for "Nullification of Government Lot's Award," with the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.
In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her
forty-year occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the
fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has
been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were
disregarded.
The defendant heirs of Francisca Herrera alleged that the
complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of the Office
of the President was already final and executory.
The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed
and held that the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case involving "title and possession to real property
within its jurisdiction." The case was then remanded for further
proceedings on the merits.
On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision
setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of the
Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of
Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in
favor of Herrera's heirs null and void.
The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which
shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said document
must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer
property.
Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their
respective motions for reconsideration which were both denied on
July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner NHA elevated the case to
this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolution of the NHA and the decision
of the Office of the President have attained finality, and if so,
whether or not the principle of administrative res judicata bars
the court from further determining who between the parties has
preferential rights for award over the subject lots
RULING: Yes. Res judicata is a concept applied in review of
lower court decisions in accordance with the hierarchy of courts.
But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative
res judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well
to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers . It
has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the
citizen is examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or
a certiorari, such final adjudication may be pleaded as res
judicata.
To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the
doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to
decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts without
unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that the more
equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to
decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been
conferred.
the rule prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be
enforced in the courts in the absence of an express statutory
provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial
agencies.
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will
always be subject to true judicial powerthat which is held by the
courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power of
adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a
final order."
This function applies to the actions, discretion and similar
acts of public administrative officers or bodies who are required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature.
However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in
their strict sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes
the three great powers into its three (3) branchesthe legislative,
the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and
coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the
executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment
of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the
expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to
"determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Courts have an expanded role under the 1987 Constitution in the
resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of
Article VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other
branches of government committed an act that falls under the
category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 where it is therein provided that the
Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of Appeals) shall exercise
the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial
Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution." and contends
that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to rule over
awards made by the NHA.
Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its
decision of August 28, 2003, already ruled that the issue of the
trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has
already been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
June 26, 1989 (which has become final and executory on August 20,
1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989). We find no
reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end
to controversies. The system of judicial review should not be
misused and abused to evade the operation of a final and executory
judgment. The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the
case which must be adhered to by the parties by reason of
policy.
RATIO: A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when
it renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of
adversarial parties, which decisions or awards have the same
binding effect as a judgment of a court of law, such that when they
attain finality, they have the effect of res judicata that even the
courts of justice have to respect.Destileria Limtuaco & Co. vs
Advertising Board of the Philippines
572 SCRA 455
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: The present dispute focuses mainly on the power of the
Advertising Board of the Philippines (AdBoard) to require its
clearance prior to commercial advertising and to impose sanctions
on its members who broadcast advertisements without its clearance.
AdBoard is an umbrella non-stock, non-profit corporation created in
1974 composed of several national organizations in the advertising
industry. Destileria Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Destileria) was
formerly a member of PANA.
In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation
(Convoy), through its advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a
member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the
airing of a radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi (Nakatikim ka na
ba ng Kinse Anyos).
AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long
after the ad started airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from
the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but
there was no response. With the continued complaints from the
public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its
advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the
clearance previously issued, effective immediately. Said decision
to recall was conveyed to SLG and AdBoard's
members-organizations.
Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they
filed a Complaint which was later on amended, for Dissolution of
Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction
with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati.
On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02,
reminding its members-organizations of Article VIII of the ACRC
Manual of Procedures, which prohibits the airing of materials not
duly screened by it. On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the
present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a
constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right.
Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before
advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property
without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's
regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to
constitutional proscriptions.
The Amended Complaint sought the revocation/cancellation of
AdBoard's registration and its dissolution on the grounds, inter
alia, that it was usurping the functions of the Department of Trade
and Industry and the Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board by misrepresenting that it has the power to screen, review
and approve all radio and television advertisements.
As to the merits of petitioners' arguments, AdBoard counters
that it derives its authority from the voluntary submission of its
members to its jurisdiction. According to AdBoard, there is no law
that prohibits it from assuming self-regulatory functions or from
issuing clearances prior to advertising.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of AdBoard sought to be
prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board,
officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions
RULING: Yes. First of all, the petition filed in this case is
one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from
requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions
on any agency that will air, broadcast or publish petitioners' ads
without such clearance. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must
establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against
a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions,
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal,
corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of
its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c)
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which
he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these
questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and
discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their
official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs
in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and
without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.
The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts
of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. What is at contest here
is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of
several members-organizations, which power and authority were
vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not
lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of
prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or
group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ
will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so
acting.
RATIO: Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the
action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies,
which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis
for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed
manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.De Guzman, Jr. vs
Mendoza
453 SCRA 565
Adjudicatory Powers
FACTS: This is a complaint filed by Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.
against Antonio O. Mendoza, Sheriff IV, and Floro G. Calixihan,
Jr., Branch Clerk of Court, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 58, for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the judiciary. Specifically, the respondents
were charged with conniving with each other in causing the issuance
of an alias writ of execution and profiting on the rentals
collected from the tenants of the subject property.On October 13,
2000, a writ of execution was issued by then Judge Escolastico U.
Cruz, Jr. which ordered respondent sheriff to cause the
satisfaction of a civil case decision rendered on May 2, 1988.
Complainant for this case was the counsel for the plaintiffs in the
aforementioned civil case.On April 4, 2001, an Alias Writ of
Execution/Possession/Ejectment/Demolition and Others was issued.
Unlike the October 13, 2000 writ of execution which only ordered
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and payment of
attorneys fees, the April 4, 2001 alias writ directed the transfer
of possession, ejectment, payment of monthly rentals, and
demolition, which were not covered by the courts decision dated May
2, 1988.Thereafter, respondent sheriff, together with Atty.
Melotindos who was the counsel for the defendant, went to the
subject property and served the Notice to Comply upon the five
tenants of the plaintiffs. Respondent sheriff allegedly intimidated
the tenants to vacate the premises, pay monthly rentals of
P50,000.00, and demolish the structures therein.Complainant averred
that respondent sheriff intentionally failed to attach page 3 of
the alias writ of execution to the notice to comply. He insisted
that the missing page was important because it contains the
signatory of the writ, the date it was signed, and the dispositive
portion of the May 2, 1988 decision which did not mention
ejectment, monthly rentals, demolition or possession.
In his comment, Calixihan claimed that he does not know any of
the parties in the civil case; thus, he could not be charged with
connivance. He averred that the void alias writ of execution was
prepared and issued by then Judge Cruz and implemented by the
respondent sheriff. He never profited from the rentals because he
immediately turned over the same to Atty. Melotindos who issued a
receipt. He argued that as a clerk of court and a subordinate
employee, he had no authority to prevent the judge from conducting
hearings or proceedings in court.
In the Agenda Report dated March 7, 2003, the Office of the
Court Administrator noted that the alias writs have been declared
null and void by this Court in its en banc Resolution dated
September 18, 2001.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August 19, 2004,
Executive Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. found respondent sheriff guilty
of simple misconduct and recommended his suspension for thirty days
without pay. It was established that on two occasions, he received
P24,000.00 and P1,500.00 representing rentals from two tenants. In
October 2001, he also received P500.00 from Atty. Melotindos which
he claimed as legal fees. The investigating judge, however, noted
that the amount exceeded the limit for legal fees provided under
Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, and the respondent
sheriff also failed to comply with the requirements stated
therein.
In a Memorandum dated January 31, 2005, the Office of the Court
Administrator agreed with the investigating judge that by receiving
money from the lawyer of the prevailing party without complying
with Rule 141, the respondent sheriff is guilty of simple
misconduct and act inimical to the best interest of the judiciary.
It thus recommended respondent sheriffs suspension from the service
for one month and one day without pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent sheriff committed any
infraction in the enforcement of the void alias writ of
execution
RULING: No. there is no proof that respondent sheriff
participated in the issuance of the void alias writ of execution.
Neither did he commit any infraction in the enforcement of the
same. Thus, when he ordered the tenants to vacate the premises, pay
monthly rentals of P50,000.00, and demolish the structures therein,
he was merely implementing the writ as issued by the judge. At the
time of its enforcement, respondent sheriff had no way of knowing
that ultimately, the alias writs would be nullified by this
Court.
The duty of a sheriff to execute a valid writ is ministerial and
not discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
A discretionary act, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon
a court or official by which he may decide the question either way
and still be right.
In general, a sheriff is the proper officer to execute all writs
returnable to the court, unless another is appointed, by special
order, for the purpose. It is not his duty to decide on the truth
or sufficiency of the processes committed to him for service. When
a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the
absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with
reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its
mandate. He is supposed to execute the order of the court strictly
to the letter.
RATIO: Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed
manner and without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
TOPIC: AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.
FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in
Baguio City, was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and acquired later on by the
said bank as the highest bidder. On 11 April 1983, through its
President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject property was donated
to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated
that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs,
projects, activities in human settlements and economic development
and governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements.
On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85
abolishing the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under
the its supervision as well as all its assets, programs and
projects, were transferred to the Presidential Management Staff
(PMS).
On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its
application before the PMS to acquire a portion of the Dominican
Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United agreed that the latter may
purchase a portion of the said property from HOME INSURANCE
GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on a selling price of
P75.00 per square meter.
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property
to UNITED. The deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per
cent of the purchase price would be paid upon signing, with the
balance to be amortized within one year from its date of execution.
After UNITED made its final payment on January 31, 1992, HIGC
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.
Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents
entered the Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and
constructed houses thereon. Petitioner was able to secure a
demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of
their houses, private respondents, under the name DOMINICAN HILL
BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity)
filed an action for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private
respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but
their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later
denied.
The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages,
injunction and annulment of the said MOA. It was later on dismissed
upon motion of United. The said Order of dismissal is currently on
appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office
of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City.
However, petitioner avers that private respondents returned and
reconstructed the demolished structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order,
private respondents filed a petition for annulment of contracts
with prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Commission
on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner,
HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as
the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public
respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties
to maintain the status quo. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order, petitioner
filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP.
ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for
annulment of contracts with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status
quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?
RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over
the controversy. It discharges quasi-judicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature."
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an
administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial
functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered
courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers
observed in our system of government reposes the three (3) great
powers into its three (3) branches the legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary each department being co-equal and coordinate,
and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive
department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of
its own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Antipolo Realty Corporation vs National Housing Authority
153 SCRA 399
Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative
AgenciesFACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial
ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights
Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty
Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando
transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent
Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution
of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the
subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause
17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson
paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and
including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter.
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a
notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required
improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and
requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot
No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with
the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the
representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November
1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request, citing the decision
rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976
in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs.
Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have
"substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers
pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full
and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing
installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the
period while the improvements were being completed i.e., between
September 1972 and October 1976.
Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly
installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments.
Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and
claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made
by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before
NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering
the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. A motion for
reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA in ordering the reinstatement of
the Contract To Sell, acted on a matter beyond its competence
RULING: No. The extent to which the NHA has been vested with
quasi-judicial authority must be determined by referring to the
terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides
as follows:
National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business in accordance with the provisions of this decree.
Presidential Decree No. 1344 (which amended Presidential Decree No,
957) clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the
grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite
specific terms:
In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the
following nature:
B.Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub-
division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C.Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.
There is, in any case, no question that under Presidential
Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and
protect the rights of contracting parties under the law
administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as
to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully
performed.
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to
complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within
the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of
the Contract to Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its
options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner could
neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment
payments made by the private respondent as forfeited in its favor.
The NHA was therefore correct in holding that private respondent's
prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of
petitioner.
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original
jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. The
very definition of an administrative agency includes its being
vested with quasi-judicial powers. Under the "sense-making and
expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
RATIO: Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of
Administrative Agencies: Function ordinarily judicial may be
conferred. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned
must commonly interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights
of private parties under such contracts, and award damages whenever
appropriate. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative
agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely
judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts but may
be conferred upon an administrative agency.Siapian vs Court of
Appeals
327 SCRA 11
Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative
Agencies
FACTS: The records disclose that the spouses Diosdado Tarlengao
and Dominga de la Cruz owned a residential lot located at Tandang
Sora Street corner Katipunan, Caloocan City. In July 1947, the late
Dominga Siapian leased the said residential lot from the aforenamed
spouses and built thereon a two-storey house where her family
lived. The lessee religiously paid the agreed monthly rental of
P100.00 until June 1979 when the lessor stopped collecting the
same.
In a letter dated June 9, 1979, Theresa Yu informed Dominga
Siapian that she purchased the lot from its previous owners. Yu
said that she wanted to take immediate possession of the property
since she had no other residential lot and she intended to make use
of the lot for the construction of her own house. She gave Dominga
Siapian three months notice to vacate and to demolish the
improvements which the latter had built on the lot.
After four ejectment cases filed before the MeTC, the MeTC ruled
in favor of private respondent. The MeTC ruled that petitioner
indeed failed to pay rentals in arrears and even requested for
extension of time to settle the same. It also held that petitioner
did not deposit rentals due with the bank as the latter claimed,
for no evidence was adduced to prove it. In fact, when private
respondent inquired from the bank as to the alleged deposit, no
statement was given.
Petitioner interprets the demand letter asking him to vacate the
premises as merely asking him to pay rentals. He contends that the
said letter does not constitute a demand to vacate the leased
premises which is a condition precedent for instituting ejectment
suit. He argues that the ejectment case must fail since the
jurisdictional requirement of demand was not fulfilled.
On appeal, the RTC reversed the MeTC decision. The RTC declared
that the demand letter was not precise in asking petitioner to
vacate the premises because it only asked for payment of arrearages
and current rentals. It also held that this latest ejectment suit
against petitioner is barred by the final and executory decisions
in previous cases. Hence, the ejectment suit was dismissed.
On review by the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed
the aforequoted judgment of the RTC, and in lieu thereof,
reinstated the decision of the MeTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ejectment case must fail since the
jurisdictional requirement of demand was not fulfilled
RULING: No. Petitioner belabors the fact that the letter is not
categorical and precise in seeking his eviction from the property.
He misses the point. It must be stressed that courts and
quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in
making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict
themselves to literal interpretation of words, phrases and
sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to
render a just and equitable judgment. When the lessor demanded
payment of the due and unpaid rentals or a case for ejectment would
be filed against them, the owner was giving strong notice that you
either pay your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have
you thrown out of my property.
The word vacate is not a talismanic word that must be employed
in all notices. The alternatives are clear cut. The tenants must
pay rentals which were fixed and which became payable in the past,
failing which they must move out. There can be no other
interpretation of the notice given to them. Hence when the owner
demanded that either they pay or a case for ejectment would be
filed against them, the tenants were placed on notice to move out
if they do not pay. There was, in effect, a notice or demand to
vacate.
In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the appellate court
cannot be said to have erred in finding that the written demand is
sufficient to eject petitioner from the property subject of
controversy.
RATIO: Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of
their functions and in making decisions, must not be too dogmatic
as to restrict themselves to literal interpretation of words,
phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken
in order to render a just and equitable judgment.
Tejada vs Homestead Property Corporation
178 SCRA 164Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of
Administrative Agencies
FACTS: Private respondent offered to sell to petitioner a lot
owned by respondent corporation. Private respondent suggested that
petitioner pay a reservation fee of P 20,000.00, which would form
part of the consideration in case they reach a final agreement of
sale and which amount was to be returned to the petitioner should
the parties fail to reach an agreement.
Petitioner paid the reservation fee with the tentative agreement
that the said lot would cost P 1,150.00 per square meter, or a
total price of P 230,000.00. A 24% downpayment was to be paid by
petitioner. The balance will be payable monthly within 1 or 2
years, depending upon the terms of the agreement. However, when the
terms were unilaterally altered by respondent corporation by
increasing the proposed amortization payments, petitioner refused
to go through with the proposed purchase and he asked the private
respondents to return the reservation payment. Respondents refused
to return the amount.
Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of
money with damages against respondents with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig. Petitioner alleged that defendants refused to
return the reservation payment for no justifiable reason despite
verbal and written demands. Petitioner further contended that such
refusal to refund the amount constitutes malicious and wanton
breach of legal duty that makes them liable to pay moral
damages.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss disputing the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court and claiming that jurisdiction lies
with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). The trial
court denied the motion. Respondents' motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court.
Private respondents brought the case to the Court of Appeals on
a petition for certiorari claiming that the trial court committed a
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss. The CA
ruled that the jurisdiction over the controverted case is with the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission, now the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board.
Hence, the instant petition wherein petitioner argues that
inasmuch as there is no perfected contract of sale between the
parties, the claim for recovery of the reservation fee properly
falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not that of
the HSRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the claim for recovery of the reservation
fee falls within the jurisdiction of the courts
RULING: No. There can be no doubt that under Presidential Decree
No. 1344, the NHA has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
claims involving refund and other claims filed by a subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, etc. There is
no such qualification in said provision of law that makes a
distinction between a perfected sale and one that has yet to be
perfected. The word "buyer" in the law should be understood to be
anyone who purchases anything for money.
Under the circumstances of this case, one who offers to buy is
as much a buyer as one who buys by virtue of a perfected contract
of sale.
Moreover, upon the promulgation of Executive Order No. 90, if,
is therein provided that the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over
claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers,
and dealers, among others. The former provision that the claim be
made by a buyer has been eliminated. Thus, any previous doubt as to
who may file the claim has been eliminated. Now, any claim for
refund whether by a buyer or other in any other capacity is
definitely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLRB.When an
administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter
pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within
the jurisdiction of said administrative agency or body. Split
jurisdiction is not favored. Since in this case the action for
refund of reservation fee arose from a proposed purchase of a
subdivision lot obviously the HLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over
the case.
RATIO: Split jurisdiction not favored. - The rule is that when
an administrative body or agency is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter
pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within
its jurisdiction. Split decision is not favored.
Thus, an agency with exclusive jurisdiction over controversies
involving sale of subdivision lots has also jurisdiction to hear
and decide claims for refund by a subdivision buyer.
GUERZON V CA
FACTS: Petitioner executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corp (later
acquired by Shell) a Service Station Lease and Dealers Sales
Contract. Respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) approved
the latter contract and issued a Certificate of Authority in
Petitioners favor. After the contract, respondent Shell wrote
Guerzon informing him that they are not renewing the contract. A
copy of said letter was furnished to BEU. Thereafter, BEU issued an
order directing petitioner to vacate the premises and to show cause
in writing why no administrative order and/or criminal proceedings
shall be instituted for his violations. Shell was able to secure
the possession of the gas station. Guerzon then filed with the RTC
a complaint but such was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to
annuk the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as
the RTC.
ISSUES W/N the BEU has the authority to order petitioner to
vacate the premises.
RULING NO. The power of an administrative agency has only such
powers as are expressly granted (here PD 1206) to it by law and
those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Said PD
states that after notice and hearing, it can impose and collect a
fine and failure to pay the fine or to cease and discontinue the
violation of the law (i.e. illegal trading in petroleum products)
shall be sufficient reason for suspension, closure or stoppage of
operations. Nowhere in the order is it stated that petitioner
engaged inillegal trading or any other violation of BP 33. It
merely made a vague reference to violation of BEU laws, rules and
regulation. The BEU (like its predecessor, the Oil Industry
Commission) has no power to decide contractual disputes between
gasonline dealers and oil companies. It cannot order petitioner to
vacate the premises as this is an appropriate case in the vicil
courts for unlawful detainer. Assuming arguendo that it did had the
authority, it still failed to comply with the requirement of notice
and hearing. NOTE: Nevertheless,petitioner could not require that
possession be given to him as the contract was not renewed.
Provident tree farms vs Batario mar 28 1994
DOCTRINE:
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior
to elevating the issues to a regular court in keeping with the
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
FACTSIn the extrant case, PTFI seeks to set aside the 8 February
1990 order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of
the hearing inCivil Case No. 89-48836. PTFI claims that what was
brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction,
i.e., "restraining the entry of safety matches into the country . .
. for the purpose of securing compliance with Sec. 36 (l) of the
Forestry Code and for damages, "to seek redress of its right which
has been clearly violated by the importation of safety matches . .
. . (which) is a denial to the petitioner of the protection and
incentive granted it by Section 36 (l) of the Forestry Code . . .
."
Naturally, PTFI asserts the inapplicability of the procedures
outlined in R.A. No. 1125 relative to incidents before the Court of
TaxAppeals because the instant action is not a protest case where
the aggrieved party is not an importer. It then argues that since
it could not avail of the remedies afforded by the Tariff and
Customs Code, resort to the courts is warranted, citing
Commissioner of Customs v. Alikpala. Petitioner asserts his
complaint on a statutory privilege or incentive granted under Sec.
36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code. The only subject of
this incentive is a ban against importation of wood, wood products
or wood-derivated products which is to be enforced by the Bureau of
Customs since it has, under the Tariff and Customs Code, the
exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases
and, in fact, it is the duty of the Collector of Customs to
exercise jurisdiction over prohibited importations .The enforcement
of the importation ban under Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised
Forestry Code is within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of
Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Regional Trial
Court to compel the Commissioner of Customs to enforce the ban is
devoid of any legal basis. Now it follows that to allow the regular
court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches,
as petitioner insisted, is clearly an interference with the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over seizure and
forfeiture cases. An order of a judge to impound, seize or forfeit
must inevitably be based on his determination and declaration of
the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation of the
prerogative and an encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs. In other words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau
of Customs as well as the prayer for injunction against importation
of matches by private respondent AJIC may not be granted without
the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs .ISSUEw/n the BOC holds jurisdiction in the
matter of wood product importation
HELD
Petitioners position is inconceivable! The claim of petitioner
that no procedure is outlined for the enforcement of the import ban
under theTariff and Customs Code, if true, does not at all diminish
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs over the subject matter.
The enforcement of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the
absence of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of Customs has
the power to"promulgate all rules and regulations necessary to
enforce the provisions of this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . .
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Finance." Moreover, it
has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does not require
any particular method of procedure to be followed by an
administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method
to carry out its functions."But over and above the foregoing,
PTFI's correspondence with the Bureau of Customs contesting the
legality of match importations may already take the nature of an
administrative proceeding the pendency of which would preclude the
court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction
Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)
FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800
public school teacher, among them the 8 herein private respondents
who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass
concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight resulting
from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters
attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of
Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights
violations
RULING: No.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is
to say, determine with the character of finality and definiteness,
the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the
Secretary of Education and subject to appeal to CSC, this Court
having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers
affected may take appeals to the CSC on said matter, if still
timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the CHR has the power
under the constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of
justice or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or
adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or dear
and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares that the CHR to have no such power, and it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding
is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of
a court of justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied
by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions
to the end that the controversy be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to
repeat, the Commission does not have.
Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate,
cannot and not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it
has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if there be a
claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against
the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS,
their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed.
Sanado vs. Court of Appeals
356 SCRA 546
Legal effect of a decision rendered by an administrative body in
a case filed in the regular courts
FACTS:
Sanado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries
Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering an area of 50
hectares. On July 16, 1973, Sanado executed a contract with
Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop 30 hectares of the
50 hectares covered by Sanados fishpond permit. Two days later, the
parties modified this earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10
hectares already cultivated and fully developed and providing that
the contract is renewable on terms acceptable to both of them.
Sept. 28, 1979
Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the
then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion of Sanados
fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which
covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a Fishpond
Lease Agreement was issued.
July 17, 1981
Sanado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for
recovery of possession and damages, alleging that Nepomuceno failed
to deliver Sanados share of the net harvest among other things.
While this case was pending, the then Minister of Agriculture and
Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the
improvements thereon in favor of government. Later, said order was
reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to
apply for the area and that his improvements thereon were not
considered forfeited in favor of the government.
Sanado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but
appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision
over Sanados complaint for recovery of possession in his favor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President has
any legal effect on the civil case for recovery of possession
Whether or not the judgment of the trial court has attained
finality
HELD:
What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision and
what is its effect on the resolution of Civil Case No. 2085?
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying,
or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or
certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative
or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the
ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a
decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined. As
such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is
explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial
power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of
the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the
executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take
judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive
Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as
the President, his powers and duties.
The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision is
premised on the essential function of the executive department
which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is being
enforced is Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and
revised all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such
enforcement must be true to the policy behind such laws which is
"to accelerate and promote the integrated development of the
fishery industry and to keep the fishery resources of the country
in optimum productive condition through proper conservation and
protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704).
Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still
entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned
by an ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the
administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter the
Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The policy of the courts as
regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of
the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies. This policy is specially
applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the
approval, rejection, or revocation of applications therefor (Manuel
vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 [1971]). Such respect is based on the
time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that
these bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate rank as courts.
The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion,
which we find absent in the case at bar.
The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing
petitioner's appeal are quite clear. Transferring or subletting the
fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of
the administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to
develop the area required by the fisheries rules, are definitely
solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one's license.
Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of
the President, he should have elevated the matter by petition for
review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of
judicial review. Nowhere in the record do we find such action on
petitioner's part.
Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the
fishpond area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989 decision of
the Office of the President which can hardly be described as an
unrelated matter, considering its patent implications in the result
of both Civil Case No. 2085 and CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could
the appellate court award possession to the very same party whose
license has been cancelled by the executive or administrative
officer tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the
development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been
sustained by the Office of the President? Petitioner must remember
the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a vested right
given by the government but a privilege with corresponding
obligations and is subject to governmental regulation. Hence, to
allow petitioner to possess the subject area is to run counter to
the execution and enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which
would easily lose its "teeth" or force if petitioner were restored
in possession.
The trial courts decision did not attain finality. It was
appealed within the reglementary period. If the court could modify
or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or
requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the
judgment has become final and executory (David vs. Court of
Appeals, 316 SCRA 710 [1999]) and when it becomes imperative in the
higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it
(People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 [1999]), what more if the judgment
has not yet attained finality?
It is thus plain in the case at bar that the July 31, 1989
decision of the Office of the President is a substantial
supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances of
the parties to the subject fishpond lease agreement. For to award
possession to petitioner is futile since he has lost the fishpond
license.
In point is our ruling in Baluyot vs. Guiao (315 SCRA 396
[1997]) where we held that judgment is not confined to what appears
on the face of the decision, but also covers those necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. For example, where the
ownership of a parcel of land is decreed in the judgment, the
delivery of the possession of the land should be considered
included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party's
claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of
ownership.
By analogy, the July 31, 1989 decision, is not confined to the
validity of the cancellation by the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food of petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 3090 for
violation of the terms thereof and/or the fisheries rules. The
right to possess the subject fishpond area is necessarily included
in the decision. The cancellation or revocation of petitioner's
license necessarily eliminated his right to possess the same since
the new licensee would then be the one to enjoy this right.
PHIL. CONSUMERS FOUNDATION INC V SECRETARY OF EDUCATION FACTS In
1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education submitted a
report, which favorably recommended to the DECS courses of action
with respect to the Government's policy on increases in school fees
for SY 1987-1988. On this basis, the Secretary of DECS issued an
order authorizing a 15-20% increase in school fees as recommended
by the Task Force. Philippine Consumers Foundation Inc (PCFI)
opposed the order on the ground that the increases were too high.
DECS issued Dept Order No. 37 reducing the increases to a lower
ceiling of 10-15%. Again, PCFI opposed. ISSUE W/N DECS has the
power to prescribe school fees HELD YES. In the absence of a
statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to
prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested
with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should
be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and
effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. The
function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be
either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a
legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the
affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards
rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to
the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down
by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises
of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a
legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply
exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact,
then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Is Department
Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative
function? YES. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum
school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the
country for SY 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance.
Radio Communications v NTC G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987
Facts:
RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under
legislative franchise granted by Republic Act No. 2036 (1957). The
petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon,
Sorsogon (1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman, Samar
(1983).
Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the
NTC to operate radio networks in the same areas.
RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit
Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the same areas. The NTC ruled
against the RTCs favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the
operation of radio telegraphs in the three areas.
RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied.
In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had
sections that was still in effect even if the Public Service
Commission was abolished and the NTC was established.
These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all public services and their
franchises S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commissions
authority except with respect to the fixing of rates And S 15-no
public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing
a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service
Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience,"
Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a
legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it
can validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone
services in the aforementioned areas
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was
abolished and its functions were transferred to three specialized
regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the
Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The
functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations
provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as
amended.
The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of
Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were
abolished and their functions were transferred to the National
Telecommunications Commission
Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of
operation of particular operators of public service communications;
and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the
operation of such public utility facilities and services except in
cases where charges or rates are established by international
bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating
member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the
proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless
telephone and telegraph systems and radio communication systems
including amateur radio stations and radio and television
broadcasting systems;
The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction
of the Public Service Commission and the Board of Communications no
longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization
Law and implementing executive orders.
The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by
Executive Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in
operation since 1957 cannot be sustained.
Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the
sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is
subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police
power through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan
transportation Co.- statutes enacted for the regulation of public
utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police
power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming
into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already
established and in operation .
Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D.
No. I insofar as it amends the Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as
amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its
provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its
franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio communications
system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous.
Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any
powers thereunder be exercised by the grantee until the Secretary
of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the
grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to
the grantee a license for such case.
Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a precondition
before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it
desires to operate.
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from
the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications before the
petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San
Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio
telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar
in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears
to have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent
when such certificate,was required by the applicable public utility
regulations.
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive
in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be
subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature
when the common good so requires.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989
Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an
Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving
telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that
were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner
of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were
ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive
Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said
order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt
from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now
respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued
on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction,
control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service
Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rule-making
power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates
are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout
the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore,
temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While
respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of
the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary
though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural
requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to
rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without
first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary
or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing
nor it did give any notice to the petitioner
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy
like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is
quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondents
contention that notice and hearing are not required since the
assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and
temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public
Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon
notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix
rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the
exceptions, limitations or saving provisions.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has
no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary
investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the
present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of
respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS VERA
G.R. No. L-45685 November 16 1937 En Banc [Non Delegation of
Legislative Powers]
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court
of Manila. He filed a motion for reconsideration and four motions
for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme
Court of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC
denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu-Unjieng for a motion
for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of
origin for execution of the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the
application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set
the petition for hearing. The Fiscal filed an opposition to the
granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things,
that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless
violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. The private
prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on
the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue
delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several
provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an
improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the
provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and
void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads
as follows: "This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which
the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by
the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of
the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine
for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the
Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial
boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation
officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful
examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the
system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the
different provincial boards through appropriation of the salaries
for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for
provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various
boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the Secretary
of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if
not one of the provinces and this is the actual situation now
appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation
officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would be illusory. There can
be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a
probation officer without the probation system.
US v Ang Tang HoGR L-17122February 27, 1922Johns
Facts: The Philippine Legislature enacted Act 2868 with one of
its salient provisions, Section 1,authorizing the governor-General
fro any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of
palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Thus,
on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General signed EO 53, fixing the
price of rice. On August 6, 1919, Ang TangHo was caught selling a
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos, a price higher
thanthat fixed by EO 53. Defendant was found guilty and now assails
the constitutionality of the Act 2868 for invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
Issue:Won Act 2868 is unconstitutional?
Held:Yes. Said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power
since the said Act authorized the Governor-General to promulgate
laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect thelaw. The
said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed
to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the
proclamation as the said Act states for any cause. It also failed
to define extraordinary rise that such proclamation by
theGovernor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act
authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency
measures by the Governor-General
US v. Ang Tang Ho
G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922
Issue:
whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power
Held:
Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act
No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix
the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that
section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the
Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of
temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify
or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the