Session 4: EWEA PMI

Case Study : Indonesian Red Cross

• Background• Tsunami Early Warning System• EQ Situation• Challenges & Lessons

• Two earthquakes with 8.6 and 8.2 Richter scale magnitudes occurred at the west coast of northern Sumatra on April 11, 2012.

• The earthquakes were located respectively 100 km and 200 km to the southwest of the major sub-duction zone that defines the plate boundary between the India/Australia and Sunda plate’s offshore Sumatra where at this location, the India/Australia plates move north-northeast with respect to the Sunda plate at a velocity of approximately 52 mm/year.

• These earthquakes triggered tsunami warning for areas on the west coast of Sumatera including Aceh and West Sumatra provinces.

• The study is done on April-May, 2014, to review the effectiveness of its Disaster Management system including the Contingency Plan and personnel capacities; as well as for other stakeholders including the Indonesia Red Cross (PMI-palang Merah Indonesia) to assess the impact of its intervention in strengthening DP-DR capacities at the community and government levels in addition to their own institutional capacities

• The review team consists of staff and volunteers from PMI, Aceh Provincial Disaster Management Agency (BPBA/BPBD), American Red Cross, and Canadian Red Cross

The Data Collection was done at 2 level :• At the provincial government and PMI , the data were gathered

from PMI internal review and stakeholder review meetings, on April 18, 2013.

• At the district and community level, the data were collected through focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, and observations in 13 villages in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, and Aceh Jaya districts during April 24 – May 2, 2012. Those villages were selected purposively with judgment sampling approach that enabled researchers to study information rich samples.

04/08/2023 Willy Wicaksono - Local Advisor Padang 6

Collect Data and Information

from Credible External Provider

Translate and Analysis Early Warning into

Local Language

Disseminate Early Warning to the community

Mobilize Community to Conduct Early

Action

5” (15:43)BMKG Issue

First Warning

322” (22:00)Electricity

Company turn on the

electricity wire

237” (19:45)BMKG issue “all-clear”

124” (17:43)BMKG issue

First Warning2nd EQ 8.1 SM

15:38 21:3816:38 17:38 19:38

0” (15:38)EQ 8,5 SM

70” (16:48)Activate siren manually in

Governor Office

91” (17:09)Activate siren manually (fail)

93” (17:12)Activate siren manually (fail)

101” (17:20)Activate siren

manually

6” (15:44)BMKG Issue

First Warning 10” (15:48)

BMKG activate siren (fail)

19” (15:57)Electricity Black

Out

• Newly established Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBA) prevented them to provide adequate response within the first 20 minutes after the earthquake on April 11, 2012.

• The Quick Response Team (SRC) is in place, but they had not been provided with any training.

• Contingency Plan, Early warning System (EWS) and Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) for earthquake and tsunami in place but was not operationalized during the April 11, 2012 earthquakes.

• The absence of an approved contingency plan at the PMI chapter has provided a gap in its capacity to response internally.

• the equipment (radio base, handhelds, hand siren, etc) were not all fully functioning because on maintenance and electricity black out.

• With the current HF radio, PMI could only communicate internally and monitor others but cannot exchange communication with other stakeholders such as RAPI (Radio antar Penduduk Indonesia, People Radio Network).

• PMI chapter and branches received the updates from village volunteers (CBAT).

• PMI assisted the communities to evacuate to safer areas and also provided first aid support to those injured because of accident during the evacuation process.

• Most of communities knew that they need to evacuate immediately to higher ground, but they did not have preparedness bag or bring some supplies along with them to evacuation point and knew which route to take too.

• Although there are 3 evacuation buildings, very few people used the facilities but instead decided to farther location which require more than 30 minutes to reach and would be at risk if tsunami was to happen, not to mention the risk of being injured and stuck in traffic.

• the communities knowledge on tsunami signs is limited to the sea level and water retraction.

• Improve the effectiveness of DP/DR system……..Improve tsunami and Earthquake Contingency Plan, EWS and

SOP including its chain command and support system…..Agreed radio channel managed to communicate and update

information during emergency

• Strengthening the effectiveness of Evacuation Shelter……..Review the effectiveness and capacities as well as location

of current escape buildings, and consider to build more so that the facilities can be reached within 10 – 15 minutes.

…..Explore the possibility of utilizing escape building for other public activities in order to help ensure its maintenance

…..Consider reviewing the road arrangement and evacuation routes to avoid traffic jam during evacuation process in emergency

• Improve PMI’s Preparedness and Response capacities…….Finalize its Contingency Plan, radio communication protocols

and equipment, as well as finalize the Disaster Command Post management.

…..Review the existing capacities at the branches so that gaps can be addressed.

…..review the SoP of hand siren utilization and placement once they update the village contingency plan so that the equipment can be better used in the future

• Strengthening the auxiliary role to the government……..Optimize the partnership with BPBA as defined in the MoU between the two

agencies and play an active role in strengthening the capacities of BPBD’s Quick Response team and promoting the utilisation of its SATGANA team as well as assisting in the contingency plan development/ review and increase its effort in strengthening community capacities in DP/DR

…..Collect information on all community evacuation points including their GPS coordinates and altitudes and existing facilities, capacities, and condition to address the gaps in facilities as well as to be a reference in distributing logistic support in emergency.

….. Facilitating the integration of DRR into the government planning and funding mechanism, policy on district contingency plan development and regular drill, and the link between need to combine government-funded structural mitigation activities with community-based DRR initiative.

…..Facilitate and link the Village Committee and CBATs with BPBD and promote their involvement in the development of the Earthquake and tsunami contingency plan as well as to acknowledge their roles in the document.

• Strengthening The DP/DR System at Community Level……..Village contingency plans need to be revisited and simplified

and then socialized to all community members so that it can guide them in emergency.

…..The Integration between community and school evacuation plan (e.g. sharing responsibilities; teachers will evacuate students and community will look after the teachers family in the villages), link Community Contingency Plan (CCP) with the government plan, link CBAT into PMI volunteer network and with the government, increased frequency of awareness and simulation

• Improve Community awareness to respond to disaster……..Include knowledge on the characteristics of earthquake that

triggers tsunami as well as the physical signs of tsunami, evacuation routes and place, its distances to seaside and time required to reach the safer place

….. Include the importance of having a family contingency plan and preparedness bag.

…..the use of different media to disseminate messages on DP/DR measures including through the use of sms and emergency radio channel, as well as village leaders as the Government representation who are the closest to communities