September Issue

I LNJ (2012) Nazir Vs. The State (Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder, J.)

463

67, Ayub Ali (Md) Vs. Abdul Khaleque, 56 DLR(HC)(2004) 489, 49 DLR (HCD) (1997) 630, Sher Ali(Md) and others Vs. State, 46 DLR (AD) (1994) 67 and Md. Khoka Mollah Vs. The State, 22 BLD (AD) (2002) 229, Abu Taleb Vs. The State, 59 DLR (AD) (2007) 93, Amir Hossain Hawlader Vs The State, 4 BLD (AD) (1984) 193, ref.

Mr. Md. Shah Alam Dewan, Advocate ....... For the Petitioner

Mr. Md. Shohrowardi, D.A.G with Mr. Md. Nazibur Rahman, A.A.G & Mr. Md. Monjur Kader, A.A.G.

....... For the Opposite party

Judgment

Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder, J: This Rule, at the instance of the convict-

petitioner, was issued calling upon the opposite-party to show cause as to why the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 19.7.2006 passed by the learned Judge of the Special Tribunal No. 4, Dhaka in Special Tribunal Case No. 144 of 1999 arising out of Keranigonj Police Station Case No. 11 dated 4.12.1998 corresponding to G.R. No. 412 of 1998 convicting the convict-petitioner under section 4 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908 and sentencing him thereunder to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 (seven) years and to pay a fine of Tk. 5,000/= in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 6 (six) months more should not be quashed and/or pass such other or further order or orders as to this Court may seem fit and proper.

2. Facts relevant for disposal of this Rule may be, briefly, stated as follows: Acting on a tip-off, in the morning of 4.02.1998, the informant came to know that a gang of dacoits would go at Rajarhat on Dhaka Mawa road for committing dacoity. The informant along with some Constables, on the basis of aforesaid information, went to the place of occurrence.

After reaching the place of occurrence, the informant and others started searching out the different vehicles which were plying on the way. On the date of occurrence at around 7:15 a.m, a baby taxi being No. Dhaka Metro. 031289 was heading towards the place of occurrence from Dhaka. At the time of searching the baby taxi, 5 suspected persons tried to flee away from the baby taxi. However, the informant and others caught them red-handed and carried out a search and recovered a pipe gun loaded with one round bullet from the waist of the convict, namely, Akram, 9 Cocktails from the waist of present convict-petitioner, a Chapati of 15 inches long with a wooden bat from the waist of another convict, namely, Alamgir, 8 Cocktails from the waist of convict, namely, Babul and 5 Cocktails from waist of convict, namely, Safar Ali. The informant and others prepared a seizure list in presence of the local witnesses and took their signature on it. The convict-petitioner and other convicts could not offer any satisfactory account for keeping the alleged arms and explosive substance in their possession. Hence, the F.I.R was lodged against the convict-petitioner (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) and others under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act on 4.12.1998.

3. During investigation, the police recorded the statements of the witnesses under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Having found prima-facie case, the police submitted charge sheet No. 2090 dated 7.6.1999 against the petitioner and others under section 4 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908. After submission of the charge sheet, the case record was sent to the Special Tribunal for trial.

4. At the time of commencement of trial, the learned Judge of the Tribunal framed charge against the petitioner and others under section 4 of the Explosive Substance Act and the same was read over and explained to them who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried in accordance with law.

Nazir Vs. The State (Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder, J.) I LNJ (2012) 464

5. At the trial of the case, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses to prove the case. The learned Judge of the Tribunal after recording the evidence from the witnesses and on perusal of the same found the petitioner and others guilty under section 4 of the Explosive Substance Act and sentenced them thereunder by the impugned judgment and order as aforesaid.

6. It is to be noted that the petitioner was arrested by the police on 5.12.1998 and he was enlarged on bail by the learned Judge of the Tribunal on 29.02.2000, but after enlarging on bail he was found absent from the proceeding and accordingly, the order of bail was cancelled by the learned Judge of the Tribunal on 23.10.2000. However, the petitioner remained absconding till delivery of judgment.

7. After delivery of judgment, the petitioner was arrested by the police in connection with another case and he was shown arrested in the present case on 11.02.2009 and produced before the learned Judge of the Tribunal, who sent him to jail to undergo the sentence. The petitioner thereafter submitted an application for certified copy of the impugned judgment and order and other relevant papers for preferring a miscellaneous case under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. After procuring the certified copy of the judgment and order, the petitioner approached this court with an application under section 561A or the Code of Criminal Procedure and obtained the present Rule.

8. At the very outset, Mr. Shah Alam Dewan, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that there is no sufficient legal evidence on record to connect the petitioner with the alleged offence under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act and that the evidence adduced by the police

personnel was not supported by the public witnesses. He next submits that P.W.4, a seizure list witness, has not supported and corroborated the prosecution story and the recovery of the Cocktails from the possession of the petitioner. He then submits that since the informant and Investigating Officer are same person, the evidence adduced by him appears to be doubtful and the impugned judgment and order, on the basis of doubtful evidence, is liable to be quashed. He empathically submits that though Cocktails allegedly recovered from the possession of the petitioner were not examined by any explosive expert to come to a decision as to whether the alleged Cocktails were really Cocktails or not and as such the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is not based on satisfactory and reliable evidence and as such the same is liable to be quashed. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, in support of his submissions, relied upon the cases of Masud and others Vs. State, 3 BLC 107, State Vs. Sarowar Uddin, 5BLC 451, Delwar Hossain Vs. State, 16 BLC(2011) 32 and Md. Harun Bepari Vs. State, 5 MLR (2000) 395, Md. Sayem Islam Vs. State, 13 MLR 155, Aslam Jahangir Vs. State, 20 BLD 426, Pear Ali Vs. State, 7 BLT (HCD) 59 and Ashok Kumar Saha Vs. State, 2 BLT (HCD) 79.

9. On the other hand, Mr. Md. Shohrowardi, learned Deputy Attorney-General along with Mr. Md. Nazibur Rahman, learned Assistant Attorney-General and Mr. Md. Monjur Kader, learned Assistant Attorney-General appearing on behalf of the State, submits that there is sufficient legal evidence on the record of the case to connect the petitioner with the alleged offence under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act. He next submits that the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses to prove the prosecution case and that there is


465

sufficient legal evidence on record to connect the petitioner with the offence under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act. He then submits that this Court not being the Court of appeal has hardly any scope to sift and assess the evidence like a Court of appeal in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He emphatically submits that the convict-petitioner being enlarged on bail deliberately remained absconding at the time of cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and that he also remained absconding at the time of delivery of judgment. He lastly submits that since the petitioner has not come before this Court with clean hands, he is not entitled to get relief under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and as such the Rule should be discharged.

10. We have gone through the application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the materials annexed thereto.

11. Before we take up the question for consideration as to whether the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence should be quashed or not, it will be necessary to see the extent of power, scope, principles and categories of cases in which High Court Division may invoke its power and authority under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

12. In the case of Abdul Quader Chowdhury Vs. The State, 28 DLR (AD) (1976) 38, it has been held that the High Court Division may quash a criminal proceeding invoking its jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the following circumsta-nces:

(1) Interference even at an initial stage may be justified where the facts are so preposterous that even on admitted facts no case stands against the accused.

(2) Where the institution and continuation of the proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of the court.

(3) Where there is a legal bar against the initiation or continuation of the proceeding.

(4) In a case where the allegations in the F.I.R or the petition of complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence as alleged.

(5) The allegations against the accused although constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

13. Similar view on the principles and categories of cases for quashing the proceeding was, subsequently, followed in many cases including the cases of Ali Akkas Vs. Enayet Hossain and others, 17 BLD (AD) (1997) 44,and Bangladesh Vs. Tan Khen Hock, 31 DLR (AD) (1979) 69.

14. It is pertinent to note that the inherent power under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be invoked at any stage of the proceeding even after conclusion of the trial, if it is necessary to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the case of Sher Ali (Md) and others Vs. The State, 46 DLR (AD) (1994) 67 it has been decided that the inherent power under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised to quash a proceeding or even a conviction on conclusion of a trial if the court concerned got no jurisdiction to hold the said trial or the facts alleged against the accused do not constitute any Criminal offence, or the conviction has


been based on no evidence or otherwise to secure ends of justice.

15. Coming back to the present case, we want to address the submissions of the learned Advocates for the petitioner seriatim.

16. It is on record that in order to prove the prosecution case, the prosecution examined as many as 11 witnesses to prove the prosecution case. P.W.1 Rabindra Narayan Saha supported and corroborated the prosecution case in his deposition and cross-examination and claimed that 9 Cocktails were recovered from the possession of the petitioner. The aforesaid evidence given by the P.W.1 was also supported and corroborated by P.W.2, P.W.5,6 and 7. A reference to the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses clearly and manifestly shows that 9 Cocktails were recovered from the exclusive control and possession of the convict-petitioner. It should be borne in mind that the jurisdiction under section 561A can not be invoked for the purpose of examining the correctness, legality and propriety of any finding, sentence and order passed by the criminal Courts inferior to this Court. Section 561A may be invoked only for the specific purpose set out in this section and this Court may, in appropriate cases, exercise its extra-ordinary power under this section to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Admittedly, the power of this Court under section 561A is very limited. This court not being the court of appeal is not in a position to re-assess and sift the evidence on record like the court of appeal in its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

17. In order to address the submission of learned Advocate for the petitioner that since the informant and investigating officer is the

same person, the informant is an interested witness and the impugned judgment and order based on the evidence of interested witness is not sustainable in the eye of law.

18. It is true that generally, an informant who is a police officer should not be an investigation officer in order to maintain the neutrality and acceptability of the trial of the case in the estimation of litigant public and the posture to appoint the informant as an investigating officer is normally deprecated and discarded. Practically, there is no bar on the part of the informant to act as an Investigating Officer in the eye of law. It is a well settled principle of law that the evidence of police personnel should not be discarded simply because they belong to police force as their evidence is also legal evidence within the meaning of section 3 of the Evidence Act. Section 134 of the Evidence Act contemplates that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact and as such conviction can be based on the evidence of a solitary witness if his evidence is full, complete and self-contained having no blemish and taint thereto. There is nothing on record to show that there was any enmity between the petitioner and the informant nor any suggestion was given to that effect. Under the circumstances, we do not find any material and circumstances which may lead us to hold that the evidence of informant and investigating officer is blemished and tainted one that may persuade us to keep the same out of consideration. Furthermore, this Court not being the Court of appeal has hardly any scope to sift and assess the evidence like the Court of appeal in its extra ordinary jurisdiction and the aforesaid view has been reflected in the case of Ayub Ali (Md) Vs. Abdul Khaleque, 56 DLR(HC)(2004) 489. Against this backdrop of the case, the submission made by the learned


467

Advocate does not hold good and the same falls through.

19. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence of record, it can not be said that there is no legal evidence against the petitioner to connect him with the offence levelled against him and for insufficiency of the evidence if any, it can not be said that the petitioner may escape from the conviction and sentence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the case under the Jurisdiction of section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

20. Precisely speaking, it is not the case of the petitioner that the trial of the case was a coram non-judice. So, we would not like to embark upon that aspect of the case for our consideration and decision.

21. Now, we want to consider as to whether the petitioner has come before this Court with clean hands or not. It appears from the record of the case that the petitioner was enlarged on bail by the learned Judge of the Tribunal on 29.2.2000 which is very much evident from the annexure-E to the application. However, the petitioner being admitted to on bail remained absconding during cross examination of the prosecution witnesses. Accordingly, during trial, the learned Judge of the Tribunal cancelled the order of bail of the petitioner on 23.10.2000. Admittedly, the petitioner remained absconding during trial of the case and as such he could not cross examine the prosecution witnesses. Any way, the trial was held in absence of the petitioner. The learned Judge of the Tribunal, after taking evidence and on perusal of the evidence and other materials on record, found the petitioner guilty under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act and sentenced him thereunder to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 (seven) years and to pay a fine of Tk. 5,000/-, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 6 (six) months more. Admittedly, the petitioner was found absent at the time of delivery of judgment.

However, after delivery of judgment the petitioner was arrested in connection with another case and sent to jail to suffer the sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed this application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court and obtained this Rule.

22. In this connection, it may be mentioned that this Court has always disfavored to grant relief in its extraordinary jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure to an absconder who does not approach the Court with clean hands. In the case of Alamgir Hossain Vs. State reported in 49 DLR (HCD) (1997) 630, it has been decided that:

A convict may invoke the jurisdiction of this Division under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure if he can make a case of Coram non judice of the trial Court or that the facts alleged do not constitute any criminal offence or the conviction has been passed on no evidence or other wise to secure the ends of justice and with that we add that he should approach the Court with clean hands.

23. The aforesaid view has been reflected and endorsed by the Appellate Division in the cases of Sher Ali(Md) and others Vs. State, 46 DLR (AD) (1994) 67 and Md. Khoka Mollah Vs. The State, 22 BLD (AD) (2002) 229.

24. It is an indisputable fact that after being admitted to bail on 29.2.2000, the petitioner remained absconding till delivery of judgment on 19.7.2006 and he was also on the run for a long time till he was shown arrested in the present case on 11.2.2009. Section 27(6A) of the Special Powers Act, 1974 provides that if the accused being enlarged on bail remains absconding , there is no necessity for issuing a further direction directing the accused to appear in the proceeding. The aforesaid view finds support in the case of Abu Taleb Vs. The State, 59 DLR (AD) (2007) 93. Since the petitioner was enlarged on bail and he,


deliberately, avoided the proceeding keeping himself in abscondence which disentitles him to get relief under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In view of section 8 of the Evidence Act, abscondence of an accused lends support to the direct evidence of eye witnesses connecting the accused with the crime. The aforesaid view has been reflected in the case of Amir Hossain Hawlader Vs The State, 4 BLD (AD) (1984) 193.

25. However, the petitioner could not offer any plausible explanation as to his abscondence from proceeding jumping bail. Taking this aspect of the matter in view, we feel constrained to hold that the convict-petitioner has not approached this court with clean hands.

26. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the settled proposition of law as discussed above, the decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner do not fit in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the facts, purpose and scope of those decisions are quite different and distinguish-able from the present case and as such those decisions have no manner of application in the instant case.

27. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record, it cannot be said that there is no legal evidence on the record of the case to connect the convict-petitioner with the offence levelled against him under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act.

28. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and the stated decisions discussed above, we are of the view that the present case is not a case of no evidence; rather it is a case of evidence, however insufficient it may be.

29. Having considered all aspects of the case, we do not find any merit in this Rule. 30. Accordingly, the Rule is discharged. Communicate this judgment to the concerned Tribunal immediately. Ed.

HIGH COURT DIVISION (Special Original Jurisdiction)

Mr. Syed Mahmud Hossain, J.

And

Mr. Quamrul Islam Siddiqui, J.

Judgment 16.3.2009

}

}

}

}

Zahida Ahmed (Liza)

...Petitioner.

Vs.

Syed Noor Uddin Ahmed and another

...Respondents.

Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972 Article 102 It appears that the detenu was illegally removed from the custody of his mother while living in the U.K. The law of U.K does not permit such removal of a child from the custody of his mother without her consent. Before adjudication of the family suit the detenu must be restored to the custody of the petitioner. Removal of the detenu from the custody is without lawful authority and that he is being held in the custody of the respondents in an unlawful manner. Moreso, the age of the detenu cannot be the sole basis for deciding the question of custody. ... (12 and 17)

Md. Abu Baker Siddique Vs. S.M.A Bakar and Others, 38 DLR (AD) 106; Rumana Afrin Vs. Fakir Ashrafuddin Ahmed and Others (1996) 1 BLC 517 and Abdul Jalil Vs. Sharon Laily Begum Jalil (1998) 50 DLR (AD) 55, ref.

Mr. Sara Hossain ...For the Petitioner.

Mr. M. Ashraful Ali ... For respondents.

Judgment Sayed Mahmud Hossain, J: In this application under Article 102 of the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, a Rule Nisi has been issued calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the detenu Syed Shafin Ahmed (Ayon), aged 10

Writ Petition No. 1344 of 2009.

Zahida Ahmed (Liza) Vs. Syed Noor Uddin Ahmed and another (Syed Mahmud Hossain, J.)

I LNJ (2012) Pubali Bank Ltd. Vs. M/S Amin Iqbal Corporation and others, (Khondker Musa Khaled, J.)

455

HIGH COURT DIVISION (Civil Appellate Jurisdiction)

Mr. Khondker Musa Khaled, J.

And

Mr. S.H. Md. Nurul Huda Jaigirdar, J.

Judgment 22.5.2012

}

}

}

}

Pubali Bank Ltd, Agarabad, Chittagong

...Appellants.

Vs.

M/S. Amin Iqbal Corporation and others ...Opposite parties

Artha Rin Adalat Ain (VII of 2003) Sections 18(2), 47 and 50(2) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) Section 9 In view of the overwhelming evidence regarding the arrival of the goods and after releasing the same kept in the Banks godown for 9 years had to sell the same in public auction and Bank informed his client regularly in each stage, it can not be accepted the contention that the defendants were not aware of all these things. The plaint of other Suit No. 2 of 1994 shows that the defendants set up a counter claim of more than Taka Fifty Lac and some odds. Apparently nature of claims were baseless and there is hardly any foundation in the evidence as well. The defendants suit of compensation and damages as set up in other Suit No. 2 of 94 has got no merit. The learned Judge of the Artha Rin Adalat has no jurisdic-tion to entertain other Suit No. 2 of 1994 under general law along with the Money Suit filed by the financial institution under the Special law. Under the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003, Section 18 (2) also stands as a clear bar to entertain any suit or counter claim against the claim of the financial institution. The learned Judge of the Artha Rin Adalat assumed illegal jurisdiction over the said other suit and held

First Appeal No. 219 of 1996.

the trial of the civil suit without having any jurisdiction. Keeping consistency with the section 50(2) of the Artha Rin Adalat, 2003 simple interest was awarded at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal amount from the date of filing the suit till realization subject to maximum payable under section 47 of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003 meaning thereby the simple interest payable shall not exceed 200% of the original claim.

The plaint of the Other Suit no. 2 of 1994 shows that the defendants set up a counter claim of Tk. 57,08,529.17 due to their loss in the business and damages for a period of 15 years. Apparently the nature of claims were baseless and there is hardly any foundation in the evidence as well. But unfortunately, the learned Judge of the trial court accepted the contentions of the defendants in an arbitrary manner and decreed their suit in part awarding compensation for on amount of Tk. 15,00,000/-,>0ur considered view is that the defendants' suit for compensation and damages as set up in Other Suit no. 2 of 94 has no merit to succeed.

(15).

Apart from the merit of the suit, the learned Judge of the Artha Rin Adalat has no jurisdiction to entertain Other Suit no. 2 of 94 and give hearing of the said suit under general law alongwith the Money Suit filed by the financial institution under the special law. It is legally barred and he cannot hold trial of any other suit of the Civil Court unless it is filed by any financial institution for recovery of loan under the Artha Rin Addalat Ain. ... (16).

Under the existing Artha Rin Addalat Ain 2003 section 18 (2) also stands as a clear bar to entertain any suit Or counter cliam against the claim of the financial institution. .... (16).

It transpires from the L.C.Rs. that the other suit No. 25 of 1992 was filed before the 2nd court subordinate judge, Chittagong under the

Pubali Bank Ltd. Vs. M/S Amin Iqbal Corporation and others, (Khondker Musa Khaled, J.) I LNJ (2012) 456

general law and it was not even filed before the Artha Rin Addalat or commercial court. Therefore, the learned Judge of the Artha Rin Adalat, appears to have assumed illegal jurisdiction over the said other suit and held the trial of the said civil suit without having any jurisdiction. .... (17).

Keeping consistency with the section 50(2) of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003, we are inclined to award simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal amount from the date of filing the suit till realisation subject to maximum payable under section 47 of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003. It means that the simple interest payable shall not exceed 200% of the original claim. ... (20).

Sultana Jute Mills Ltd. and others -Vs- Agrani Bank and others 14 BLD(AD)- 196, 22 BLD(HCD)-127, ref.

Mr. Zakir Hossain Mazumder, Advocate. ..For the appellant

None appears ... For Respondent

Judgment

Khondker Musa Khaled, J:

This First Appeal is directed against a common judgment and decree dated 18.5.96 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge (now Joint District Judge) Artha Rin Adalat, and Commercial Court No. l, Chittagong, in Money Suit no. 181 of 1988 filed by Pubali Bank Ltd. against the M/S. Amin Iqbal Corporation and others for realization of Tk. 15,77,113.50 and Other Suit no. 2 of 1994 filed by M/S Amin Iqbal Corporation against the Pubali Bank Ltd. for a counter claim of Tk. 57,08,529.17 over the same dispute, which were heard analogous.

2. Precisely, the relevant facts are that the Pubali Bank Ltd. instituted the Money Suit no. 181 of 1988 alleging in the plaint that the

defendant No. 1/S. Amin Iqbal Corporation was Proprietary firm dealing with Sewing Machine and the defendants 2-3 used to carry on business through it, and they maintained a current account in the name of defendant No. l with the plaintiff-Bank. The defendant No. 3 being operator of the account, approached the Bank for opening Letters of Credit (L.C.) to import 457 packages of household Sewing Machine from Taiwan. Accordingly, the plaintiff-Bank, opened two Letters of Credit on 16.4.75 and 1.12.75 in the name of the defendant No. l M/S. Amin Iqbal Corporation for the amounts of #3,672.30 and #2,849.25 British Pound respectively. The documents were executed by the defendant no.3 in the name of defendant No. l. The imported goods covered by the Letters of Credit duly arrived at the Chittagong Port. On receipt of the shipping documents, the plaintiff-Bank requested the defendant to retire the same on payment of the plaintiffs dues. But they did not respond. Subsequently, the defendants requested the plaintiff-Bank to retire the documents and clear the imported goods through its own clearing and forwarding agent. Thereafter, the plaintiff-Bank had to clear those goods on payment of necessary custom duty and other charges, and stored those imported items in the godown of the plaintiffs Bank. Against the expenditure on account of sales, tax, duties and other charges for clearance of the goods, the plaintiff opened two merchandise accounts namely, L.A.M account no. 21 of 1976 and 28 of 1976. Then it became obligatory on the part of the defendants to take delivery of the goods on payment of the outstanding dues in the said L.A.M. accounts. But inspite of repeated requests by personal approach and in writing, they failed to take delivery of those goods from the godown and adjust their liabilities. Since the value of the goods was deteriorate-


457

ing due to prolonged storage, the plaintiff Bank had to sell out those goods by public auction after observing necessary formalities for a total sum of Tk. 2,80,000,/ and credited the same in the respective L.A.M. accounts towards partial adjustment of the defendants' liabilities in accordance with Rules. Thereafter, the plaintiff-Bank started demanding the balance amount from the defendants and issued lawyer's notice demanding payment. On receipt of the notice, although the defendants made promise from time to time to adjust the liabilities, ultimately they did not pay any amount of money to the Bank. The defendants' total liabilities stood at Tk. 15,77,113.50 as calculated on 30.11.88 together with interest and incidental charges. At last on 16.8.87, the defendants were served with legal notice for payment, and on 5.12.88 an F.D.R. of the Defendant No. 2 available in the Bank was adjusted in the L.A.M. account no. 21 of 1976. The plaintiff -Bank thereafter, fi led the suit for the realisation of remain-ing balance amounting to Tk. 15,77,113.50 and also prayed for penal interest thereon at the rate of 20% per annum from the date of filing the suit till realisation along with the cost of the suit.

3. The defendants 1-3 contested the suit by filing a written statement admitting that the defendant No. l was a Small industrial enterprise while the defendants 2-3 were its owner and Managing Director respectively. It is contented interalia that the defendant No. 2 being entrusted to operate the business of the defendant No. l, opened a current account bearing no. 2683 and subsequently opened two Letter of Credits for 3,672.30 and 2,849.25 British pound for the purpose of importing goods from Taiwan and that the shipping documents and though the imported goods duly reached, the defendants were not informed anything about the same.

That the defendant No. 3 went to the Pubali Bank to get information about the consignment under the L.Cs, but the Bank maintained silence. The defendant No. 3 came to know that the two ships carrying those imported goods had already left the Chittagong Port and as such., he wrote letters including the letters dated 15.3.76 and 28.6.76 to the Bank to get the goods released, but the Bank did not make any reply. It is contended further that Mr. Bose an employee of the Bank misbehaved with him when he approached to the Bank personally. Subsequently, the defendants approached to the Bank to open another Letter of Credit for the years 1976-1977 to run the business, but the Bank refused and did not even return the import license of the defendants preventing them from operating their business by opening Letter of Credit in another Bank. The plaintiff at first sent a letter dated 6.11.86 to the defendants informing about the import consignment, auction sale of the goods and claimed an amount of Tk. 4,71,156.60. The defendants came to know that the imported goods were sold by the Bank on auction on 18.9.84. As the plaintiff-Bank failed to make any amicable settlement of the dispute on 22.7.91, the defendants instituted the Other Suit No. 25 of 1992(subsequently renumbered as Other Suit no. 2 of 1994) for a declaratory decree and compensation of Tk. 5,08,529.17 on different counts. So the suit of the plaintiff- Bank is liable to be dismissed.

4. The defendants 1-3 of the previously filed Money Suit also instituted Other Suit no. 25 of 1992 subsequently renumbered as Other Suit No. 2 of 1994 against the Pubali Bank for getting compensation of Tk. 57, 8,529.17 as a counter claimed as evident from the written statement filed in Money Suit no. 181 of 1988. The defendants being plaintiffs in the Money Suit also filed written statement in that


Other Suit denying the plaint case and narrating the same facts of their plaint as stated above. So, we do not feel it necessary to state elaborate same facts of the written Statement and plaint of the subsequent suit to avoid repetition.

5. The trial Court appears to have framed the following issues for adjudication of both the suits:-

(1) Are the suits of the plaintiffs maintainable in the represent form?

(2) Whether the plaintiffs have cause of action for filing the suits?

(3) Are the plaintiffs of the respective suits entitled to get decree?

(4) To what the relief are the plaintiffs entitled?

6. At the trial, the plaintiff -Bank examined 2 P.Ws. and the defendants M/S. Amin Iqbal Corporation and others examined 1 D.W., and series of documents submitted by the both the parties were admitted in evidence with exhibit marks.

7. Considering the facts, circumstances and evidence on the record, the learned Subordinate Judge, First Court, Artha Rin Adalat, Chittagong passed the impugned analogous judgment and decree dated 18.5.96 dismissing the Money Suit no. 181 of 1988 without cost and decreed Other Suit no. 2 of 92 with costs directing the defendant Pubali Bank to pay Tk. 15,00,000(fifteen lac) to the plaintiff M/S. Amin Iqbal Corporation and others as compensation within 6 months.

8. Being aggrieved, the Pubali Bank (plaintiff in the Money Suit and the defendant in the Other Suit) preferred this appeal.

9. Mr. Zakir Hossain Mazumdar, learned

Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant-Bank, submits that the trial Court being Artha Rin Adalat had no jurisdiction to entertain Other Suit no. 2 of 1994 filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge and hold trial of the same together with the suit filed by the financial institution. Because a case pending in the Artha Rin Adalat under the special law cannot be heard analogous with a suit pending in any Court created by the general law. In support of his submission , the learned Advocate has relied upon the case of Sultana Jute Mills Ltd. and others -Vs- Agrani Bank and others reported in 14 BLD(AD)- 196 and another case decision reported in 22 BLD(HCD)-127. He submits that both the cited cases are related to Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 1990 under which the instant case of the Bank was dealt with at the earlier stage. It is further submitted that there is also specific bar under section 18(2) of the existing Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003 to try a suit instituted under the general law by the Artha Rin Adalat. So, the trial Judge, according to him, exercised jurisdiction not vested on it by the law and the impugned judgment and decree so far it relates to Other Suit no. 2 of 94 is illegal, void and without jurisdiction and as such, it is liable to be set aside.

10. As regards the judgment and decree dismissing Money Suit no. 181 of 1988, the learned Advocate submits that the trial Court did not consider series of exhibited documents submitted by the Bank and as such, erroneously found that the defendants were not informed about the consignment and that the suit was barred by limitation. That the plaint has clearly disclosed cause of action for filing of the suit from which limitation should run. The learned Advocate has referred to the Exhibit-l(Ga) to show that on 6.11.86 an elaborate letter was issued by the Bank to the plaintiff about the


459

consignment asking to clear dues of L.A.M. accounts with reference to the defendants letter dated 26.1.86 (Exhibit-5(Gha). It is submitted that so many correspondences were made with the defendants regarding the matter and as such, it is down right falsehood to say that the defendants were totally in the dark about the release of imported goods by the Bank. Rather on the request of the defendants, the Bank had to clear the goods on payment of custom duty, tax and other charges, and store the same in the godown for a long time. But the defendants, having full knowledge, did not come to release the goods on payment of dues payable to the Bank. As a result, those goods were sold in public auction to the highest bidder and after partial adjustment of the dues by the sale proceeds and F.D.R. money of the defendant No. 2; the Bank lawfully filed the suit for realisation of the remaining balance. It is submitted that there is no earthly reason to refuse the genuine claim of the Bank and dismiss the Money Suit. The learned Advocate has relied on the Bank statement (Exhibit-4) to prove the outstay-nding dues and preyed for decree in Money Suit on setting aside the judgment of dismissal. He has also prayed for setting aside the judgment and decree so far it relates to Other Suit no. 2 of 1994.

11. None appeared on behalf of the respondents on several dates when hearing was going on.

12. We have gone through the impugned judgment, oral and documentary evidence available on record and considered other attending; facts and circumstances of this case.

13. Admittedly, the defendants opened two Letter of Credits (L.C.) in the Pubali Bank on 16.4.75 and 1.12.75 in the name of the defendant No. l for importing 457 packages of

household Sewing Machine components from Taiwan, and those goods arrived at the Chittagong port in due time by two different ships. It appears that the plaintiff Bank thereafter issued series of letters of addressing the defendants on various dates ranging from 1976 to 1987, which are in Exhibits-1,2 and 5 series. Those documents show that the Pubali Bank requested the defendants to retire the L.C. documents on payment of the dues and receive the imported goods, but the defendants did not. Exhibit- l(Kha), a letter dated 11.9.85 and Exhibit-l(Cha), a letter dated 18.12.76 along with so many other letters in the exhibits show that the Bank requested the defendants time and again to take delivery of the consignment on payment of the bills.It transpires from the Exhibit- l(Ga), a letter dated 6.11.86 that the defendants also made a reply to the some letters of the Bank requesting it to clear the consignment by a letter dated 3.2.77 and keep the goods in the Bank's godown. It appears that they also assured the Bank to receive the goods on payment of the dues positively by 30.6.80, but ultimately they did not. A letter dated 26.1.1986 (Exhibit-S(Gha) page 57 of the P.B.) shows that the defendants also sent reply to the letter of the Bank regarding the subject matter in , disputes. So, it is not an acceptable contention that the defendants were not aware of the arrival of goods and subsequent release of the same by the Bank and after keeping in godown for about 9 years sold the same in public auction without their knowledge. In fact, after keeping the goods in the Bank's godown for a long time, the Bank was ultimately compelled to sell the same on auction.

14. Exhibit-3 series are tender notices published in the daily Ittefaque on 1.6.82 and the particulars of the imported goods for auction


sale were also made known to all concern and those were sold to the highest bidder in accordance with law, as the importer did not turn up to receive the goods from the Bank's godown. It is evident that the imported goods arrived in Chittagong Port in the year 1975 and it was disposed of by open public auction in the year 1984 i.e. after about 9 years. It also transpires that the sale proceed of the goods .were duly adjusted in the L.A.M. accounts no. 21 of 1976 and 28 of 1976. Exhibit-4 is the Bank statement of those L.A.M. accounts and it shows that on 30.11.88, the balance in the L.A.M. account no. 21 of 1976 and 28 of 1976 stood at Tk. 8,90,542.50 and 6,86,571/- respectively in total balance amount was Tk. 15,77,113.50 and accordingly, the plaintiff-Bank appears to have instituted the suit for realization. of the said amount along with interest thereon t i l l realisation.

15. The learned Judge of the Court below could not detect any mistake in calculating the balance as shown in statement of the Bank (Exhibit-4). The defendants contested the Money Suit in the Court below, but could not specifically identify any mistake in calculating the balance payable amount, for which, the sui t was f i led by the Bank. The learned Judge of the Court below appears to have avoided in taking consideration of the pleadings and evidence available in favour of the plaintiff-Bank. If those are considered properly, there is no reason to dismiss the suit. In case, the Money Suit succeeds, the defendants cannot get any compensat ion in the Other Suit t i led by them. The plaint of the Other Suit no. 2 of 1994 shows that the defendants set up a counter claim of Tk. 57,08,529.17 due to their loss in the business and damages for a period of 15 years. Apparently the nature of claims were baseless and there is hardly any

foundation in the evidence as well. But unfortunately, the learned Judge of the trial court accepted the contentions of the defendants in an arbitrary manner and decreed their suit in part awarding compensation for on amount of Tk. 15,00,000/-, our considered view is that the defendants' suit for compensation and damages as set up in Other Suit no. 2 of 94 has no merit to succeed.

16. Apart from the merit of the suit, the learned Judge of the Artha Rin Adalat has no jurisdiction to entertain Other Suit no. 2 of 94 and give hearing of the said suit under general law alongwith the Money Suit filed by the financial institution under the special law. It is legally barred and he cannot hold trial of any other suit of the Civil Court unless it is filed by any financial institution for recovery of loan under the Artha Rin Addalat Ain. In this respect we rely upon the case of Sultana Jute Mills Ltd. and others-Vs- Agrani Bank and others reported in 14 BLD(AD)-196 wherein it was decided that the Artha Rin Adalat Ain 1990 does not give Artha Rin Adalat any jur isdict ion to adjudicate upon any matter other than that provided in section 5(l) of the said Ain. It has been well settled that the defendants cannot also claim a set-off and make out a case of counter claim in a suit filed under the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 1990. Under the existing Artha Rin Addalat Ain 2003 section 18 (2) also stands as a clear bar to entertain any suit Or counter cliam against the claim of the financial institution. The relevant subsection 2 section 18 runs as follows:

Kvb FYMnxZv, Kvb Avw_K cwZvbi wei, GB AvBbi Aaxb Av`vjZ, mswk FY nBZ DZ Kvb welq, Kvb cwZKvi `vex Kwiqv gvgjv `vqi KwiZ


461

cvwieb bv, Ges FYMnxZv-weev`x, ev`x- Avw_K cwZvb KZK `vqiKZ gvgjv wjwLZ Reve `vwLj

Kwiqv, D wjwLZ Reve cwZMYb (Set-Off) ev cvv`vex (counter claim) Afz KwiZ cvwieb bv

17. It transpires from the L.C.Rs. that the other suit No. 25 of 1992 was filed before the 2nd court subordinate judge, Chittagong under the general law and it was not even filed before the Artha Rin Addalat or commercial court. Therefore, the learned Judge of the Artha Rin Adalat, appears to have assumed illegal jurisdiction over the said other suit and held the trial of the said civil suit without having any jurisdiction.

18. Generally if a suit is tried by a Court without having jurisdiction, the same is required to be sent to a competent Court having jurisdiction to hold trial and make disposal of the suit afresh. But in the instant Other Suit no. 2 of 94, we have already considered merit of the suit and seen that when the Money Suit no. 181 of 1988 succeeds, the Other Suit no. 2 of 1994 must fail having no other third course. Since we have reached to such a finding, sending back Other Suit no. 2 of 1994 to the appropriate Civil Court for retrial would be useless and unnecessary time consuming and a mere futile exercise. So, the Other Suit no. 2 of 94 is also going to be dismissed in the appeal.

19. The learned trial Judge appears to have dismissed the Money Suit of the Bank on another ground that it was berred by law of limitation, though no such issue was raised by the parties and framed before trial. However, it is true that the Money Suit was not filed within

three years from the date of auction sale of the imported goods in the month of September, 1984. But it appears that subsequently FDR. -money of the defendant 2 was adjusted with the balance and several correspondences were going on to settle up the dispute amicably. Paragraph -11 of the plaint has clearly disclosed cause of action for the Money Suit. It appears that on 5.12.88, the F.D.R.-money belonging to the defendant 2 was at last adjusted with the balance amount. So the matter was not closed before that date. Moreover, last correspondence with the defendant was made on 6.11.88 and as the defendant did not comply with the request to pay the balance amount of money, the plaintiff-Bank had to file the Money Suit on 24.12.88. Therefore, the question of barring the suit by article 57 of the Limitation Act, as found by the trial Court does not arise. It is a wrong finding of the trial Court. As such, we are inclined to hold that the money suit was not barred by the law of limitation.

20. It appears that in money suit No. 181 of 88 the plaintiff-bank also has prayed for interest at the rate of 20% per annum on the principal amount from the date of filing of the suit till realisation. But we are not inclined to impose such an exorbitant rate of interest as claimed by the plaintiff. Keeping consistency with the section 50(2) of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003, we are inclined to award simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal amount from the date of filing the suit till realisation subject to maximum payable under section 47 of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003. It means that the simple interest payable shall not exceed 200% of the original claim.

21. Having due regard to the aforesaid


observations and findings, we are inclined to hold that the impugned judgment and decree suffers from gross mistake and legal infirmity, and as such, the same is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the impugned analogous judgment passed in the two suits may be reversed.

22. Consequently, the First Appeal succeeds. 23. Court fees paid on the memorandum of the appeal is sufficient.

24. In the result, the First Appeal no. 219 of 1996 is allowed without any order as to costs. The impugned judgment and decree dated 18.5.96 passed analogous in Money Suit no. 181 of 1988 and Other Suit no. 2 of 1994 are set aside. The Money Suit no. 181 of 1988 is decreed on contest with cost. The plaintiff-Pubali Bank is entitled to get Tk. 15,77,1 13.50 from the defendants alongwith simple interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing the suit till realisation subject to the restriction imposed under section 47 of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003. The interest amount shall not exceed 200% of the Principal amount in any case. Accordingly, the defendants Are directed to pay the said amount to the plaintiff- Bank within 60(sixty) days from this date, failing which The plaintiff shall be entitled to get the same the same through the court in accordance with law.

25. The Other Suit No. 2 of 1994 is dismissed without any order as to costs. The analogous judgment and decree so far it relates to that suit are hereby set aside.

Send down the L.C.Rs. along with a copy of the judgment to the Court below immediately.

Ed.

HIGH COURT DIVISION (Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction)

Mr. Moyeenul Islam Chowdhury, J.

And

Mr. Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder, J.

Judgment 07.06.2011

}

}

}

}

Nazir ...Petitioner.

Vs.

The State ...Opposite party

Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898) Section 561A Considering the evidence on record, it cannot be said be said that there is no legal evidence against the petitioner and for the insufficiency the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of section 561A of the Code. Moreso, the petitioner after being enlarged on bail remained absconding till delivery of judgment and he was arrested in connection with another case and then he was shown arrested in the present case. Since the petitioner deliberately avoided the proceeding keeping himself abscondence, he has not approached this court with clean hands, he cannot get any relief under section 561A of the Code. (19, 21, 24 and 25).

Masud and others Vs. State, 3 BLC 107, State Vs. Sarowar Uddin, 5BLC 451, Delwar Hossain Vs. State, 16 BLC(2011) 32 and Md. Harun Bepari Vs. State, 5 MLR (2000) 395, Md. Sayem Islam Vs. State, 13 MLR 155, Aslam Jahangir Vs. State, 20 BLD 426, Pear Ali Vs. State, 7 BLT (HCD) 59 and Ashok Kumar Saha Vs. State, 2 BLT (HCD) 79, Ali Akkas Vs. Enayet Hossain and others, 17 BLD (AD) (1997) 44,and Bangladesh Vs. Tan Khen Hock, 31 DLR (AD) (1979) 69, Sher Ali (Md) and others Vs. The State, 46 DLR (AD) (1994)

Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 19601 of 2009.

Nazir Vs. The State (Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder, J.

Dr. Abdur Rahman Vs. The State and another, (Siddiqur Rahman Miah, J) I LNJ (2012) 484

HIGH COURT DIVISION (Criminal Miscellaneous Jurisdiction)

Mr. Siddiqur Rahman Miah , J.

And Ms. Krishna Debnath, J.

Judgment 26.05.2010

}

}

}

}

Dr. Abdur Rahman ...Petitioner Vs.

The State and another ...Opposite Parties

Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898) Section 561A Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) Section 138(1) (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897) Section 27 Non disclosure of the date of receipt of notice under section 138 (1) (b) of Negotiable Instruments Act is a question of fact which will be decided at the time of trail after taking evidence and non disclosure of date of receipt of notice in the petition of complaint and consequently the failure to disclose the cause of action cannot render the proceedings under section 561A, Cr.P.C liable to be quashed. The notice was issued through registered post with acknowledgement due. Hence it can be legally presumed that the notice has been served properly as per section 27 of General Clauses Act. (23 and 26)

Nizamuddin Mahmood vs. Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan 60 DLR(AD)195, Ali Akkas vs. Enayet Hossain and others 17 BLD (AD) 44, ref.

None appears ....For the petitioner.

Mr. Bakir Uddin Bhuiyan ... For respondent No. 1

Mrs. Syed Mizanur Rahman For opposite party No. 2

Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 16182 of 2006.

Judgment

Siddiqur Rahman Miah, J:

This Rule on an application filed under section 561 A of the Code of criminal Procedure was issued calling upon the opposite parties to show cause as to why the proceedings of Metro. Sessions Case No. 1494 of 2006 arising out of CR Case No. 3247 of 2005 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, now pending before Metro-politan Assistant Sessions Judge, 5th court, Dhaka should not be quashed.

2. The prosecution case, in short, is that the complainant is a businessman; that the accused for payment of outstanding money on 02.10.2005 issued a cheque bearing No. 1526509 for an amount of Taka 2,20,000.00 ( Two lac and twenty thousand) to be drawn from an account being Account No. 1425 lying with Janata Bank, Mugdhapara Branch, Dhaka maintained by the accused; that the complainant presented the said cheque for encashment on 03.10.2005 but returned unpaid due to insufficiency of fund and that thereafter the complainant through his engaged Lawyer served a legal notice on 12.10.2005 upon the accused and thereby requested the accused to repay the cheque amount within 15 days but the accused did not pay the said amount of money. Hence the case.

3. The Magistrate examined the complainant on 10.11.2005 and issued summons against the accused-petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 fixing the next date on 23.01.2006.

4. The accused petitioner appeared and voluntarily surrendered before the Magistrate on 23.01.2006 and prayed for bail. After hearing the Magistrate enlarged accused petitioner on bail on 23.01.2006. Thereafter the case record was transferred to learned

I LNJ (2012) Dr. Abdur Rahman Vs. The State and another, (Siddiqur Rahman Miah, J)

485

Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Dhaka by order dated 08.03.2006 for trail.

5. The learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Dhaka received the case record and took cognizance against the accused petitioner on 15.06.2006 and transferred the case record to learned Metropolitan Assistant Sessions Judge, 5th Court Dhaka for disposal.

6. Learned Assistant Metropolitan Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Dhaka received the case record on 18.06.2006 and fixed the next date on 22.08.2006 for charge hearing.

7. The petitioner appeared before the learned Assistant Metropolitan Sessions Judge, 5th Court Dhaka on 22.08.2006 and filed an application under Section 265(c) of Code of Criminal procedure praying for discharge on the ground that the petition of complaint does not disclose any cause of action under clause (c) of proviso to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 and as such the charge is groundless and therefore the petitioner is entitled to be discharged.

8. After hearing upon both sides, the learned Assistant Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Dhaka rejected the application for discharge by order dated 22.08.2006 and fixed the next date on 03.09.2006 for charge hearing.

9. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Metropolitan Sessions No. 1494 of 2006 the petitioner moved this application before this court and obtained Rule.

10. Mr. Md. Bakir Uddin Bhuiyan, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that there being no assertion in the petition of complaint as to when the notice for payment of money sent by the complainant was actually received by the accused and as such the countdown of 15 days has not yet been begun for a cause of action, the petition of complaint ,

in the instant case and the proceedings suffer for patent illegality and thus on the face of the petition of complaint even if it is accepted in its entirety, it does not constitute any offence or no offence shall be deemed to have been committed as alleged and as such it would be manifestly unjust to allow.

11. He further submits that under section141 of the Negotiable Instruments act, 1881 it has been provided that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section138 of the act except on a complaint in writing and such complaint is to be made within one month form the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 but in the instant case there is no cause of action and as such the cognizance taken by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge , Dhaka is on the face of it is unjust and as such the continuance of the proceedings of the instant case is an abuse of the process of the court and therefore liable to be quashed.

12. Mr. Syed Mizanur Rahman the learned Advocate for the opposite party No.2, on the other hand, submits that the contention of the petitioner is subject to prove; that impugned proceedings is legal and the complainant categorically described the very arising out of cause of action having no ambiguity in it and therefore there is no legal flaws in the impugned proceedings and the learned Assistant Metropolitan Sessions Judge, 5th court, Dhaka on appreciating the said legal aspect rightly framed charge. He further submits that there is no legal ground in the instant Rule by which this court can at all interfere with the impugned proceedings initiated and pending for trial and as such, the


Rule is liable to be discharged and stay be vacated.

13. In order to appreciate the contention of the accused petitioner and the submission made by the learned Advocate for the opposite party No.2, let us now see whether the complainant opposite party No.2 has filed the case before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate strictly complying with the provision of law envisaged under section 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and whether the proceedings under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is liable to be quashed. Now let us see the provision of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments act which reads as follows:

138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account (1). Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to dis-honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to (thrice) the amount of the cheque, or with both;

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and

(c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within (fifteen days) of the receipt of the said notice.

14. On a careful analysis of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is seen that its main part creates an offence when a cheque is returned by the bank unpaid for any of the reasons mentioned therein. The significant fact , however, is that the proviso lays down three conditions precedent to the applicability of the above section and, for that matter, creation of such offence and the conditions are: (i) the cheque should have been presented to the bank within six months of its issue or within the period of its validity whichever is earlier; (ii) payee should have made a demand for payment by registered notice after the cheque is returned unpaid; and (iii) that the drawer should have failed to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of notice. It is only when all the above three conditions are satisfied that a prosecution can be launched for the offence under section 138.

15. Now let us see the provision of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which runs as follows:

141. Cognizance of offences Notwithst-anding any thing contained in the Code of criminal Procedure 1898.


487

(a) No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

(b) Such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138.

(C) no court inferior to that of a court of sessions shall try any offence punishable under section 138.

16. From the plain reading of the above section it is manifest that a competent court can take cognizance of a written complaint of an offence under section 138 if it is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause ( c) of the proviso of section 138.

(Emphasis supplied).

17. From the above provisions, we find the following three different propositions which have been supported by our apex court.

i) a cheque can be presented for encashment on any number of occasions within the period of its validity and its dishonour on every occasion will give rise to a fresh Cause of action within the meaning of clause (b) of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act so as to entitle the payee to institute prosecution under section 138 on the basis of the last cause of action;

ii) A cheque can be presented for encashment on any number of occasions within the period of its validity but there can be only one

cause of action under section 141(b) arising from its last dishonour and

iii) Only for the first dishonour and not subsequent dishonours can a prosecution under section 138 be instituted as per section 138 (c) read with section 141(b) envisages only one cause of action in respect of one and the same cheque.

18. Now the point for determination is (1) whether the petitioner filed the case satisfying the provisions of law and (II) whether taking cognizance of the offence in this case is in contravention of law and (III) whether framing of charge and the continuation of the case is legal.

19. On the critical analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the complainant opposite party No. 2, Khalilur Rahman as per proviso (a) of sub-section (1) of section 138 has presented the cheque to the Bank with 6(six) months of its issuance or within the period of its validity. As per proviso (b) of subsection (1) of section 138, the complainant opposite party No.2 also made a demand for the payment of the said amount by giving registered notice, in writing, to the accused petitioner within 15 days after the cheque is returned unpaid. Thus the complainant opposite party No.2 has fulfilled two conditions out of above mentioned 3(three) conditions. The third condition is whether he has filed the case within 15(fifteen) days as per proviso (c) sub-section (1) of section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act.

20. Since the date of receipt of notice was not mentioned in the complaint petition and thus the cause of action of this case cannot be ascertained.


21. On perusal of the record, it appears that the notice for demand of money was issued on 12.10.2005. It is alleged that said notice was not received by the accused petitioner. But the accused petitioner alleged that he did not receive the notice. The case of the opposite party No.2 is that the legal notice under section 138 (1) (b) of the Negotiable Instruments act was issued on 12.10.2005 through registered post with AD; that it is presumed as per the provision of law that the said notice has been duly served upon the accused petitioner but the accused petitioner did not turn up to clear up the dues after getting notice as per the provision of law.

22. The only contention of the accused petitioner is that no notice was served upon him and thus no cause of action arose in the instant case and as such the proceedings of the instant case is liable to be quashed.

23. Since the notice was issued through registered post with AD and thus it is deemed to be served on and received by the accused petitioner, So it can be legally presumed that the notice has been served properly as per article 17 of General Clauses Act. The accused petitioner no where in his entire petition mentioned that he did not receive the legal notice. There is nothing in the four corners of section 138 or of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act that for non mentioning of receiving date of the legal notice in the petition of complaint, the case will render illegal when all other ingredients in filling the case is very much available in the materials on record. We find support of above view in the case of Nizamuddin Mahmood vs. Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan reported in 60 DLR(AD)195.

24. More so the very correctness of serving legal notice under section 138 (1)(B) of the act by the opposite party No.2 and receiving so by the drawer of the cheque can only be adjudicated in the trial and as such the

proceeding can not be quashed for factual aspect of a case. Whatever the defence case might be, that cannot be the basis of quashing the proceedings initiated against the petitioner when it is proved that the alleged cheque has been issued by him and it was bounced from his Bank.

25. In this connection we may profitably refers the decision in the case of Nizamuddin Mahmood vs. Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan and another reported in 60 DLR (AD) 195 wherein their Lordships held Since the date of receipt is a question of fact to be ascertained at the time of trial, non-disclosure of such fact in the complaint petition cannot render the proceeding liable to be quashed to the great prejudice of the complainant who is entitled to prove his case on evidence.

26. In view of the decisions of our apex court, we are of the view that non disclosure of the date of receipt of notice under section 138 (1) (b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a question of fact which will be decided at the time of trial after taking evidence and thus non-disclosure of date of receipt of notice and consequently the failure to disclose the cause of action can not render the proceedings under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure liable to be quashed.

27. In this connection we may also profitably refer the decision in the case of Ali Akkas vs. Enayet Hossain and others reported in 17 BLD (AD) 44 wherein their lordship held the settled principle of law is that to bring a cause within the purview of section 561A of the purpose for quashing a proceedings one following conditions must bee fulfilled.

1. Interference even at an initial stage may be justified where the facts are so preposterous that even on admitted facts no case stands against the accused;


489

2. Where the institution and continuation of the proceeding amounts to an abuse of the process of the court;

3. Where there is a legal bar against the initiation or continuation of the proceeding;

4. In a case where the allegations in the FIR or the petition of complaint, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely, do not constitute the offence alleged; and

5. The allegations against the accused although constituted an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

28. In the light of the above decision and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that since there is no legal bar against the initiation and continuation of the proceedings and as such the proceedings do not amount to an abuse of the process of the court. We could safely presumed that the proceedings shall not be quashed and the accused petitioner is not therefore entitled to get relief as prayed for and as such the Rule should be discharged. 29. In the result, the Rule is discharged and the proceedings in Metro. Sessions Case No. 1494 of 2006 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which is now pending in the court of Metropolitan Assistant Sessions, Judge, 5th court, Dhaka should not be quashed. The order of stay granted earlier shall stand vacated. Let a copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Metropolitan Assistant Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Dhaka for compliance. Ed.

HIGH COURT DIVISION (Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction)

Mr. Syed Md. Ziaul Karim, J.

And

Mr. A.N.M. Bashir Ullah, J.

Judgment 05-01-2012 and

08-01-2012

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

The State Vs.

Milon alias Md. Milon, and others

...Condemned-Prisoners.

Milon alias Md. Milon and others ...Convict-Appellants.

Vs.

The State ...Respondent

Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898) Sections 164, 342 and 364 Evidence Act (I of 1872) Sections 3 and 137 The confessing accused Milon at the time of recording confession did not raise any objection regarding its truth and voluntariness but at the time of examination under section 342 of the Code, he offered an explanation to the effect that the confession was extracted under coercion and torture and he made out a new story of torture, which are inconsistent with that of the evidence on record and no attention was drawn to the I. O. at the time of cross-examining him which was left out of consideration. ... (61 and 62)

Code of Criminal Procedure (V of 1898) Section 164 Evidence Act (I of 1872) Section 24 The confessing accused implicated himself in commission of rape and murdering and his confession was proved not only as voluntary and true but also inculpatory in nature and as

Death Reference No. 43 of 2006 with Criminal Appeal No. 2185 of 2006 with Jail Appeal Nos. 407 of 2006 to 412 of 2006.

The State Vs. Milon alias Md. Milon and others (Syed Md. Ziaul Karim, J.)

Agrani Bank Ltd. Vs. Kazi Mustafizur Rahman, (Sheikh Abdul Awal, J.) I LNJ (2012) 452

HIGH COURT DIVISION (Civil Revisional Jurisdiction)

Mr. Sheikh Abdul Awal, J.

Judgment 16.02.2012

}

}

} }

Agrani Bank Ltd.

.Petitioner

Vs.

Kazi Mustafizur Rahman.

Opposite Party

Code of Civil Procedrue (V of 1908) Order VII, rule Order IX, rule 13 Artha Rin Adalat Act (IV of 1990) Sections 6 and 7 It appears that under the Ain of 1990, if any party is aggrieved by the ex-parte decree of the Artha Rin Adalat two remedies are available to judgment debtor or aggrieved party. One, a petition under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the other, an appeal before the High Court Division. In both the cases deposit of half of the decreetal amount is a positive requirement and mandate. The plaintiff-opposite party without taking the remedies available to him challenged the rightness of the judgment and decree in a suit before a Court of ordinary civil jurisdic-tion. The suit, thus is clearly barred by law justifying rejection of plaint. (14 and 17)

49 DLR(AD)-135, 16 MLR-97, 12 MLR-73, 9 MLR-17, 18 BLD (AD)-268, 56 DLR-695, 8 MLR(AD)-01, 49 DLR (AD) 135, ref.

Mr. Md. Kamruzzaman, Advocate For the Petitioner

No one appears For the opposite party.

Judgment

Sheikh Abdul Awal, J.

This Rule was issued calling upon the opposite party to show cause as to why the

Civil Revision No. 07 of 1996.

order dated 28.9.95 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Barisal in Title Suit No. 30 of 1995 should not be set aside and / or such other or further order or orders passed as to this Court may seem fit and proper.

2. Facts necessary for disposal of the Rule are that the opposite party as sole plaintiff brought the aforesaid suit being Title Suit No. 30 of 1995 in the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Barisal impleading the petitioner-Agrani Bank as defendant praying a decree declaring the exparte decree passed in Money Suit No. 3 of 1993 by the Artha Rin Adalat, Barisal is illegal, collusive and not binding upon the plaintiff.

3. The defendant Agrani Bank entered appearance in the Suit and filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for rejection of the plaint stating that: AbGZ Bcmal XHl hl Acmal Le jLj BCeax lreu eqz AbGZ Bcma BCe, 1990 l Eq pfe hla hVz Haaa jLj ajc co J hla hVz

4. The learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Barisal by the impugned Order No. 12 dated 28.9.1995 rejected the application holding that if the plaintiffs allegation of non service of summon is correct, his remedy of a separate suit is not barred.

5. Being aggrieved thereby the present defendant-petitioner-Agrani Bank moved this Court and obtained the present Rule.

6. Mr. Md. Kamruzzaman, the learned Advo-cate appearing for the petitioner Agrani Bank at the very outset upon referring a number of decisions reported in 49 DLR(AD)-135, 16 MLR-97, 12 MLR-73, 9 MLR-17, 18 BLD (AD)-268, 56 DLR-695 and 8 MLR(AD)-01 submits that the proposition of law is by now well settled that no separate suit lies against the

I LNJ (2012) Agrani Bank Ltd. Vs. Kazi Mustafizur Rahman, (Sheikh Abdul Awal, J.)

453

judgment and decree or order passed by the Artha Rin Adalat.

7. Drawing my attention to the provision of section 6 of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 1990, Mr. Md. Kamruzzaman submits that the impugned order does not reflect the true position of law and as such the same is liable to be set-aside.

8. No one has entered appearance to oppose the Rule.

9. I have considered the submission of the learned Advocate and perused the Revisional application along with other materials on record. It is found that the plaintiff-opposite party filed Title Suit No.30 of 1995 impleading the petitioner-Agrani Bank for declaration that the exparte decree passed in Money Suit No. 3 of 1993 is collusive, illegal, without jurisdic-tion and not binding upon the plaintiff.

10. Now, the only question calls for consideration in this Rule whether any separate suit lies against the judgment and decree passed by the Artha Rin Adalat. In order to resolve this point certain provisions of law are required to be referred to for having a better view of the dispute in question.

11. In this connection, I feel it proper to quote Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the outset which reads as follows :-

12. The Plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action.

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued , and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court fails to do so:

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon insufficient stamp and the plaintiff on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so :

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.

(Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp paper shall not exceed twenty one days ).

13. From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision of law, I find that Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 is relevant for our purpose. Since, the defendant claims that the said suit is barred under the specific provision of law as contemplated under section 6 of Artha Rin Adalat Ain,1990. Therefore, I also feel it necessary to quote the aforesaid provisions of law. Section 6 of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 1990 reads as follows :-

6| A_ FY Av`vjZi wmv Pyov| (1) aviv 7 Gi weavb mvc, A_ FY Av`vjZi Kvh aviv, Av`k, ivq I wWx mcK Kvb Av`vjZ ev Ab Kvb KZci wbKU ck Dvcb Kiv hvBe bv|

(2) Dcaviv (1) G hvnv wKQyB _vKzK bv Kb, Kvb A_ FY Av`vjZ KZK weev`xi wei c` Kvb GKZidv wWx i` Kivi Rb weev`x Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1903) Gi Order IX Gi rule 13 Gi weavb gvZveK Av`vjZ ìLv KwiZ Pvwnj ZvnvK Zvnvi wei wWxKZ A_i AZt AaK A_ ev Dnvi mgcwigvb A_i evsK RvgvbZ ìLvi mwnZ Av`vjZ Rgv KwiZ nBe, Ges Dic Rgv Kiv bv nBj Zvnvi ìLv Mnb hvM nBe bv|

Agrani Bank Ltd. Vs. Kazi Mustafizur Rahman, (Sheikh Abdul Awal, J.) I LNJ (2012) 454

14. From a plain reading of the above quoted provisions of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 1990, it appears that under the Ain of 1990, if any party is aggrieved by the ex-parte decree of the Artha Rin Adalat two remedies are available to judgment debtor or aggrieved party. One, a petition under Order IX, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the other, an appeal before the High Court Division. In both the cases deposit of half of the decreetal amount is a positive requirement and mandate.

15. In this connection I must quote a passage from a case of Nur Islam (Md) Vs Agroni Bank reported in 49 DLR (AD) 135 for having a better view in the dispute in question which reads as follows:

Mr. AKM Nurun Nabi Khan, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, contends that when the petitioner-defendant challenged the exparte decree on the ground of fraud his application under section 151 CPC is quite maintainable. We do not find any substance in this contention, for the Artha Rin Adalat Act specifically provides for only two remedies against an exparte decree. It is either by an application or by an appeal; but in both the cases deposit of 50% of decretal amount is necessary. To avoid this deposit, it appears, the petitioner has sought a short-cut by invoking section 151 CPC which is not applicable in such a situation. The application under section 151 is found to have been rightly dismissed.

(The under linings are mine)

16. In the case being M. Tariqullah Sikder Vs. Sonali Bank reported in 56 DLR(2007)695 also provides similar feature to the effect that provision of Section 6 of the Artha Rin Adalat

Ain 1990 bars instituting of separate suit to set aside exparte decree passed by Artha Rin Adalat. Only available scope for setting aside ex-parte decree passed by Artha Rin Adalat in Artha Rin case is to file miscellaneous case under Order IX rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure by deposit of 50% of decreetal amount or in the alternative in the appeal as contemplated under the said Ain.

17. As, I have already noticed that in this case the plaintiff-opposite party without taking the remedies available to him challenged the rightness of the judgment and decree in a suit before a Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. The suit, thus is clearly barred by law justifying rejection of plaint.

18. For the reasons stated above, I am inclined to hold that the learned Assistant Judge seriously erred in law in passing the impugned order without properly applying his judicial mind into the facts and circumstances of the case and law bearing on the subject and the same has resulted in an error in the impugned decision occasioning failure of justice.

19. In the result, the Rule is made absolute. The impugned order dated 28.9.95 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, 1st Court, Barisal in Title Suit No. 30 of 1995 refusing to reject plaint stands set-aside. Plaint of Title Suit No. 30 of 1995 of the said Court stands rejected.

20. The order of stay granted earlier by this Court so far it relates to Execution Case No. 19 of 1994 arising out of Money Suit No. 03 of 1993 pending in the 1st Court of learned Subordinate Judge, and Artha Rin Adalat, Barisal stands vacated.

The Artha Rin Adalat concerned is directed to proceed with the Money Execution Case No. 19 of 1994 arising out of Money Suit No. 03 of 1993 expeditiously.

Ed.

I LNJ (2012) Zahida Ahmed (Liza) Vs. Syed Noor Uddin Ahmed and another (Syed Mahmud Hossian, J.)

469

years son of Zahida Ahmed (Liza) now detained in the custody of the respondents should not be brought before this Court so that this Court may satisfy itself that he is not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful manner.

2. The facts leading to the issuance of the Rule, in brief, are:

The petitioner was given in marriage to respondent No. 1 on 27.2.1998. The petitioner is the mother of the detenu child. She has been residing in London, England for the last 6 years. Currently, she has been enrolled in two years diploma course in business management and marketing at London Reading College, London, England. She has also been employed part time as a child care worker at City Literacy Institute. Respondent No. 1 is the father of the detenu. He had been employed in a number of jobs, most recently as a kitchen porter in Park Town Casino, London until his sudden departure from the U.K in December 2008.

3. On 6.11.1998, the detenu Ayon was born to the petitioner and respondent No. 1 and he is now ten years old. He has been living with his parents in London since he was three years old. After arrival in London, the detenu was diagnosed with significant psychological and physical health problems and had been suffering from chronically poor growth and difficulty in eating. He requires regular treatment and care for his condition and has been receiving such specialist treatment and care while living in London. The detenu has been enrolled in the reception class (nursery) at the Holy Trinity St. Sailors Primary School, Camden, London. He had been studying there for the past six years prior to his wrongful removal from the petitioners custody. The detenu had been receiving specialized support

for his speech and language difficulties. He had been cared for and nurtured exclusively by his mother (petitioner), since his birth and had never been parted from her until his removal from her custody by respondent No. 1 on 29.12.2008.

4. The petitioner is aggrieved by the deceitful removal of the detenu by the respondents from her custody without her consent. As a result, the detenu is being deprived of his right to access to his mother and also to appropriate and specialized healthcare, nutrition and education facilities. In September 2008, the petitioner and respondent No. 1 had a blazing argument after which respondent No. 1 forcibly prevented the petitioner from leaving the house stating that if she were to leave, he would take no responsibility for her or for the detenu child.

5. In October 2008, the petitioner left the house with the detenu and started living in a rented house. By mutual agreement, respondent No. 1 had regular contact with the detenu, speaking to him daily on the telephone every weekend but did not make any payment towards his maintenance including food or clothing except for the fees for a coaching centre attended by the detenu. In November 2008, respondent No. 1 informed the petitioner that he wished to take the detenu child on a five days family visit to his relatives in Ireland. Respondent No. 1 also repeatedly assured the petitioner that the child would be returned to her custody within five days.

6. On 31.12.2008, the petitioner came to learn that respondent No. 1 left for Dhaka, Bangladesh on Ettihad Airlines accompanying by Mrs. Rokhsana Chowdhury, aunt of the detenu. On 31.12.2008, the petitioners sister telephoned respondent No. 2 who informed her that neither respondent No. 1 nor the child was there and that he did not know their

Zahida Ahmed (Liza) Vs. Syed Noor Uddin Ahmed and another (Syed Mahmud Hossian, J.) I LNJ (2012) 470

whereabouts. On 1.1.2009, respondent No. 1 informed the petitioner over telephone that he is a Bangladeshi and that according to Bangladesh law the child was his and refused to let her to speak to the child. The petitioner made a missing child complaint with the Barnet Police Station, which was recorded as Case No. 08MIS031027. The police thereupon questioned Mr. Mamun Chowdhury, uncle of the detenu, and thereafter arrested Mrs. Rokshana Chowdhury who admitted that she accompanied respondent No. 1 and the detenu child to Bangladesh. The petitioner thereupon filed a petition before the High Court of Justice, Family Division, Principal Registry, in London (England) in respect of the detenu child and recovery of his custody against respondent No. 1 and Mr. Mamun Chowdhury. The petitioners Barrister in London on 23.1.2009 contacted the respondents by telephone but they refused to let the child speak to the petitioner. The High Court of Justice, Family Division, in London on 26.1.2009 was pleased to pass an order making the detenu child a ward of the Court and further directing respondent No. 1 to return him to the jurisdiction of England.

7. The petitioner returned to Bangladesh on 12.2.2009 after making all effort to take the detenu from the custody of the respondents but to no avail. Therefore, the petitioner had to file the instant Writ Petition and obtained the Rule Nisi.

8. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 filed an affidavit-in-opposition denying all the material allegations made in the Writ Petition. Their case, in short, is that the detenu was not diagnosed with psychological or mental disability. He had been studying at the school with other students for the last six years. The detenu successfully passed the exams in previous years after competing with the other

students. After his coming to Bangladesh, the detenu was taken to the doctor who found no psychological or mental disability in the detenu. The detenu is about ten years old, who can form his own opinion. The petitioner was never subjected to torture or oppression. The detenu is a Muslim child who is above seven years of age. According to Muslim law his father (respondent No. 1) is entitled to retain the child in his custody. Moreover, according to section 17 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 the paramount consideration will be the welfare of the minor. Since the petitioner is a lone mother in the U.K. and since she is on student visa there, she can only work limited hours. It would be difficult for her to maintain herself and the child. After attending class and doing the job, she would have a little time left for the child. The detenu child is now with his father who is the legal guardian of the child. The child is now growing up with care of his grandmother, uncle and aunty. So, the welfare of the child will be best protected if he is allowed to remain in the custody of his father.

9. Ms. Sara Hossain, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, submits that the detenu was illegally removed from the custody of her mother while he was in London and as such the removal of the detenu from the custody of the pe

September Issue

Documents

waist of convict

dlr ad

place of occurrence

bld ad

baby taxi

dhaka metro

date of occurrence

special tribunal case