G.R. No. 90501ARIS (PHIL.) INC., petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO
DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO
TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS
DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B.
NADALA, respondents.FACTS:- On 11 April 1988, private respondents,
who were employees of petitioner lodged a protest action against
the management concerning their working surroundings which had
become detrimental and hazardous. For these actions, private
respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and
regulations.- Private respondents then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against petitioner with the NLRC.- After due
trial, Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondents with
order of reinstatement, etc. Pending appeal by petitioner, private
respondents move for issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to
Section 12 of RA 6715.- Petitioner assails the constitutionality of
the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as
amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement
aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on
Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also
questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of
the said Interim Rules.The challenged portion of Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as
follows:SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as
follows:ART. 223. Appeal.xxx xxx xxxIn any event, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in
so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately
be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option
of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a
bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
provided therein.
ISSUE:- W/N Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is unconstitutional and
it can be applied retrospectively.RULING:- Execution pending appeal
is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced
from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or
a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may
be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the
appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional,
natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory
origin 18 and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by
statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or
qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the
event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. - The validity
of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the
foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it
is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if
the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is
subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of
its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of
the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is
more vital than the preservation of corporate profits.- The charge
then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are
unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed
constitutional. 24 To justify nullification of a law, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid
unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond
reasonable doubt. 25 In Parades, et al. vs. Executive Secretary 26
We stated:"For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled
doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a
finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a
result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not
that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all,
the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The
onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to
nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional
provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on
its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not
suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism is apropos: To doubt is to
sustain.The reason for this:... can be traced to the doctrine of
separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper
respect for the acts of the other departments. ... The theory is
that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive
authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and
determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence,
as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts
for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will
not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available
grounds.- Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in rules of
procedure. A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases
pending at the time of its enactment.- Petition is
DISMISSED.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R.
No. 115044HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila,
and the City of Manila, petitioners,vs.HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as
Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED
CORPORATION, respondents.G.R. No. 117263TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and
DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, petitioners,vs.HON. VETINO REYES and
ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.FACTS:- The Charter
of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949.
Section 18 thereof provides:Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. The
Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:xxx xxx
xxx(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by
the public on boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and
dog races, cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating on any
sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to
establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law
to the contrary.- On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was
issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).- On 20 June
1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act to
Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And
To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation". The provisions of
Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows:Sec. 4. No
person, or group of persons other than the operator or maintainer
of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota
games (Jai-alai), shall offer, to take or arrange bets on any
basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or
other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basque
pelota game or event.Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a
fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games
shall offer, take, or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or
event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or
system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event outside
the place, enclosure, or fronton where the basque pelota game is
held.- On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila
nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated
Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A
Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions
And For Other Purposes."- On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree
No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled
"Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant
Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The
Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other
Forms Of Gambling", in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all
existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.- On 16
October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act
granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A
Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque
Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila Area," was
promulgated.- On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of
Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the
incumbent legislative powers until the first Congress was convened,
issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and
revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine
Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.- In May 1998, Associated
Development Corporation tried to operate jai.alai. The government
through the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked PD
771, issued on August 20, 1975, Sec 3 pf which expressly revoked
all existing franchises including (jai alai) issued by local
governments. ADC assials the constitutionality of PD 771 as
violative of equal protection and non.impairment clauses of the
Constitution.HELD:- The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD
No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or
unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII
Section 3 of the Constitution states:Sec. 3. All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or
revoked.
- There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No.
771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised
legislative powers).- Neither can it be tenably stated that the
issue of the continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of
the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said
case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of
nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En
Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.- And on the question of whether or not the government
is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise,
the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel
by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents
(Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)-
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we
conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of
Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The
Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of
its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its
governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the
general
welfare.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R.
No. 149276JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners,vs.THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH
217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM,
respondentsThe constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties
for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being
challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of
the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the
Constitution.FACTS:- Petitioner spouses issued to private
respondent two postdated checks. First check was dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds while
the other was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners
who promised to replace the dishonored check.- When petitioners
reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check, the private
respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the
City Prosecutor charging petitioner spouses with the crime of
estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by PD 818.
- The City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause
against petitioners and recommending the filing of an information
for estafa with no bail recommended. On the same day, an
information for the crime of estafa was filed. Thereafter, the
trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners.-
It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting
affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexes that probable
cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused is
probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the
accused be issued. No Bail Recommended.- Petitioners filed the
instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City
Prosecutor, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional
provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment.ISSUE: W/N PD 818 is unconstitutional.HELD:-
When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in
favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one. 4 The burden of proving the
invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case,
petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat
the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.- The petition is
DISMISSED.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R.
No. 94723KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion,
Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N.
SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION,petitioners,vs.CENTRAL
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG
BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents.FACTS:- On February 4, 1989, Greg
Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four
days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once
on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7,
1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living
nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at
the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli
the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No.
021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No.
104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy
Bear) used in seducing the complainant.- On February 16, 1989,
Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg
Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and
Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of
Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary
attachment against Greg Bartelli.- On February 24, 1989, escaped
from jail. - Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the
complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After
hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered in favor of
plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter to pay
plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.- The Deputy Sheriff
served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation.- The
corresponding writ of execution was issued but respondents China
Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to
honor the writ of execution on the strength of Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 wherein dollar deposits of defendant
Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency
or any administrative body, whatsoever.- Expanding, the Central
Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency
deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process
of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in
the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of
foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby
placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel
the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country; that the
subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods
of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits
made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.- Respondent Central Bank
further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote
the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot
just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society
suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some
measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing
persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints
or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest.
Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of
the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are
exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and
R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically
provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be
exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.ISSUE:- W/N Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by
P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be
made applicable to a foreign transient.HELD:- This petition for
declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a
petition formandamusto require respondents to honor and comply with
the writ of execution.- This questioned law, therefore makes futile
the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her
parents fully deserve. The reason for imposing exemplary or
corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner
defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious
illegal detention of his hapless victim. If Karen's sad fate had
happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to
fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more
important than his child's rights to said award of damages; in this
case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the
gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a
mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned
provisions.- It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted
in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles;
when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the
reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the
present times show that the country has recovered economically; and
even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention
of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and
inequality such as the case before us.- The petition raises the
question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or
other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No.
1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come
from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who
is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.- The
resolution of this question is important for the protection of
nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are
merely passing through.- One of the principal purposes of the
protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to assure the
development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit
system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines".- Obviously,
the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is
not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and
given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor
stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will
maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.- In fine,
the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result
especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when
the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those
fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).- It would be
unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No.
960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense
of the innocent.- IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of
CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8
of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby
REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution
issued.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[G.R.
No. 123169.November 4, 1996]DANILO E. PARAS,petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.FACTS:- Petitioner Danilo E.
Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay ofPula,CabanatuanCitywho won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994.A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay.- The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election
in view of petitioners opposition.- Petitioners argument is simple
and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no
recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the
scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808
on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.
In support thereof, petitioner citesAssociated Labor Union v.
Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK
election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as
the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall
election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election
from the recall election.ISSUE: won petitioners contention is
correct.RULING:No. The subject provision of the Local Government
Code provides:SEC. 74.Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local
official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence.(b)No recall shall take
place withinone (1) year from the date of the officials assumption
to office orone (1) year immediately preceding aregular local
election."It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together
with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.[4]The evident intent of Section 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall election once during
his term of office.Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph
(a) merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second
year of his term of office.Thus, subscribing to petitioners
interpretation of the phraseregular local electionto include the SK
election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local
Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term.And if the SK
election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years
from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then
no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.- In the interpretation of a
statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature
is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute.[5]An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under
which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed,
explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative
or nugatory.[6]- It is likewise a basic precept in statutory
construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution.[7]Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the
Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should
not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of
Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization witheffective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum x x x.- Moreover, petitioners too literal
interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as
this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat
the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not
in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x
x[8]- The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read
according to its spirit and
intent.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ACHILLES
C. BERCES, SR.,petitioner,vs.HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T.
GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and
MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY,respondents.A CASE OF implied
repeal is not favoredFACTS:- Petitioner filed two administrative
cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of
Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay-The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in their judgement, suspended the mayor.-
Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the
President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for
the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of
the Local Government Code, which provides:Administrative Appeals.
Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from
receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:xxx xxx xxx(b) The
Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities.- Acting on the
prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the
Office of the President issued an Order on July 28, 1993, the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:xxx xxx xxxThe stay of
the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and
Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February 1987,
quoted below:Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. An appeal shall not
prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent
shall be considered as having been placed under preventive
suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the events he wins
such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he
shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the
pendency of the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).Sec. 6 Except as otherwise
provided by special laws, the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed upon filing of
the appeal within the period prescribed herein. However, in all
cases, at any time during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of
the President may direct or stay the execution of the
decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No.
18).xxx xxx xxx- After due consideration, and in the light of the
Petition for Review filed before this Office, we find that a stay
of execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent
undue prejudice to public interest.- WHEREFORE, premises
considered, this Office hereby orders the suspension/stay of
execution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigans Decision of Suspension-
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is
R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal
"shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory."
He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987,
(entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals
to Office the President") authorizing the President to stay the
execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency
of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on
January 1, 1991.ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid
repeal.RULING:There was none.Petitioner invokes the repealing
clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:All
general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which
are incosistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.- The aforementioned clause is not
an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18
because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive
orders that are intended to be repealed (cf.I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction 467 [1943]).- If there is any repeal of Administrative
Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication though
such kind of repeal is not favored. There is even a presumption
against implied repeal.An implied repeal predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express
repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior
law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in
the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible (maayo pa ang law, naay compatible ) There must be
such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to
stand together.- We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A.
No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not
irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in
fact be read together.The term "shall" may be read either as
mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire
provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences
that would follow from construing it one way or the other. In the
case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the
word as
mandatory.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CARLOS
ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO,petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT and TECLA PADUA,respondentsA CASE OF DEFERRING NOT "the
letter that killeth" BUT TO "the spirit that vivifieth," FACTS:-
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equalpro indivisoshares a
parcel of land. - One of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his
undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by
way of absolute sale.2One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia
Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees- By
virtue of such agreements, the petitioners ALONZO occupied, after
the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said
lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees
subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. - On February 25,
1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the
area sold to the spouses Alonzo and followed by Marianos sister and
co-heir Tecla Padua also filed her own complaint invoking the same
right of redemption.- A written notice of the sale was not clearly
established in the case. However, the court apparently agreed that
there was a valid notice of the sale to the co-heirs as evidenced
by the facts narrated, however it not made in writing. (this is
where the issue lies because the law says the notice should be in
writing and it will run 30 days from the receipt thereof. However,
there was no evidence of such written notice but the court is
convinced that the coheirs knew of the sales on 1964 and 1964)-
Both parties invoked the statutes on redemption and its procedural
aspects:Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary
rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the
co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale by the vendor.- The Court emphasized that the
written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees,
conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as
follows:Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption
shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in
writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of
Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.-
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining
owners.- Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to
only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the
30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less
expired in 1977.ISSUE: Whether or not statutes should be applied
strictly in this case.RULING: We test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that,
in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way
as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is torender
justice.Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable,
and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that,
while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to
their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the
word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to
the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence.While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless
have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the
will of the legislature. While we may not readintothe law a purpose
that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to readout of
itthe reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the
letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give
effect to the law maker's will.The spirit, rather than the letter
of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be
read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the
spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the
letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within
the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the
statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the
letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers.14In requiring written notice, Article 1088
seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the
sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time
of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of
the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint
the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of
alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.In the
face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private
respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by
their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written
proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious
truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus
exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is
clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly
notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and
sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.We
realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating
from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court
understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said
court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In
fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing
simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case.The co-heirs in this case were
undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was
given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period
began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question
and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the
co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the
justifications for this
exception.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R.
No. 103982 December 11, 1992ANTONIO A.
MECANO,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondent.(this digest is
an internet find but it sums up what I wanted to write)
FACTS:- Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized
and on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization
expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.-
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to
the benefits under Section 699of the RAC, the pertinent provisions
of which read:Sec. 699.Allowances in case of injury, death, or
sickness incurred in performance of duty. When a person in the
service of the national government of a province, city,
municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance
of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound,
the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any
period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay,
though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his
discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance,
necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the
injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged
first against vacation leave, if any there be.xxx xxx xxxIn case of
sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of
some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his
discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.-
Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of
Justice. Finding petitioners illness to be service-connected, the
Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice
favorably recommended the payment of petitioners claim.- However,
then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim
to Director Lim, having considered thestatements of the Chairman of
the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987.- Petitioner then re-submitted
his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991of
then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular
Section 699 of the latter.- Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos
claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration;
Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA Chairman,
recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had
been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for
thereason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in
the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the
claim may be filed with the Employees Compensation Commission,
considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.- Eventually,
petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice
Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires.Hence this
petition forcertiorari.ISSUE: WON Administrative code of 1987
repealed or abrogated sec. 699 of Revised administrative
code.RULING:No.The question of whether a particular law has been
repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative
intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating
therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically
cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are
intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its
repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by
its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others
are implied repealsIn the case of the two Administrative Codes in
question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of
the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly
depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions)
of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:Sec. 27.Repealing
Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.The question that should be asked is:What
is the nature of this repealing clause?It is certainly not an
express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate
the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.Rather, it is an
example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which
predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter
situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.There are
two categories of repeal by implication.1. Where provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes
an implied repeal of the earlier one.2.If the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.Comparing the
two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There
are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in
the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave
law, the public bonding law, military reservations,claims for
sickness benefits underSection 699, and still others.According to
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears
clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that
pertain to administration, organization and procedure,
understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the
government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of
years ago.Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the
provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are
in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such
conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature
being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the
Administrative Code of 1987.Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of
statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored.20The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.NOTES:1. the COA would have Us consider that
the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA
anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code,
which states:WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be
enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in aunified
documentthe major structural, functional and procedural principles
and rules of governance; andxxx xxx xxxIt argues, in effect, that
what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of
1987. This contention is untenable.The fact that a later enactment
may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute
is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior
act, since the new statute may merely becumulative or a
continuation of the old one.What is necessary is a manifest
indication of legislative purpose to repeal.2. Regarding COA
contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar
the recovery of benefits under the Employees Compensation Program,
the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173,
Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees Compensation and State
Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D.
1921, expressly provides that the payment of compensation under
this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for
in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose
benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by
other agencies of the government.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Ursua
vs CAFACTS:Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May
1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of
the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint
for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of
unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was
initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a
resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of
petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and
hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.2On 1 August 1989 Atty.
Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the
complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client
Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman
because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to
some personal matters.When petitioner arrived at the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer
to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his
name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was
told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the
complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the
Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then
gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged
by writing the name "Oscar Perez."When Loida learned that the
person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually
petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her
gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman
who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.Petitioner
now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his
innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used anyaliasname; neither is
"Oscar Perez" hisalias. Analias, according to him, is a term which
connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also
known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and
that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the
express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an
essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as
amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the
prosecution failed to prove that his supposedaliaswas different
from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further
argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the
defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.5ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of RA No. 6085?RULING:While the
act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such
does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142
as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which theanti-alias lawand its related
statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances
are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the
legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a
valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended
by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the
statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences.12Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal
statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in
favor of the accused.13The reason for this principle is the
tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object
is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would
be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.14Indeed, our mind
cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be
convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by
him. Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ESSO
vs CIRFACTSIn CTA Case No. 1251, petitioner ESSO deducted from its
gross income for 1959, as part of its ordinary and necessary
business expenses, the amount it had spent for drilling and
exploration of its petroleum concessions. This claim was disallowed
by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground
that the expenses should be capitalized and might be written off as
a loss only when a "dry hole" should result. ESSO then filed an
amended return where it asked for the refund of P323,279.00 by
reason of its abandonment as dry holes of several of its oil wells.
Also claimed as ordinary and necessary expenses in the same return
was the amount of P340,822.04, representing margin fees it had paid
to the Central Bank on its profit remittances to its New York head
office.On August 5, 1964, the CIR granted a tax credit of
P221,033.00 only, disallowing the claimed deduction for the margin
fees paid.ESSO settled this deficiency assessment on August 10,
1964, by applying the tax credit of P221,033.00 representing its
overpayment on its income tax for 1959 and paying under protest the
additional amount of P213,201.92. On August 13, 1964, it claimed
the refund of P39,787.94 as overpayment on the interest on its
deficiency income tax. It argued that the 18% interest should have
been imposed not on the total deficiency of P367,944.00 but only on
the amount of P146,961.00, the difference between the total
deficiency and its tax credit of P221,033.00.This claim was denied
by the CIR, who insisted on charging the 18% interest on the entire
amount of the deficiency tax. On May 4,1965, the CIR also denied
the claims of ESSO for refund of the overpayment of its 1959 and
1960 income taxes, holding that the margin fees paid to the Central
Bank could not be considered taxes or allowed as deductible
business expenses.ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioner is entitled for
the tax deduction?RULING:NO, ESSO has not shown that the remittance
to the head office of part of its profits was made in furtherance
of its own trade or business. The petitioner merely presumed that
all corporate expenses are necessary and appropriate in the absence
of a showing that they are illegal orultra vires. This is error.
The public respondent is correct when it asserts that "the
paramount rule is that claims for deductions are a matter of
legislative grace and do not turn on mere equitable considerations
... . The taxpayer in every instance has the burden of justifying
the allowance of any deduction claimed."5It is clear that ESSO,
having assumed an expense properly attributable to its head office,
cannot now claim this as an ordinary and necessary expense paid or
incurred in carrying on its own trade or business.WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the petitioner's
claims for refund of P102,246.00 for 1959 and P434,234.92 for 1960,
is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
Miriam Defensor Santiago V ComelecFacts:The controversy in this
case is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system ofinitiativeunder Section 2 of
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional
Commission itself, through the original proponent1and the main
sponsor2of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3Indeed it
is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two
methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized,viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.4For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we
resolved to give due course to this petition.Issue: Whether or not
Republic Act 6375 incomplete, inadequate or enacting. Ruling:The
foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of [the] Act. The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be
delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim:potestas delegata non
delegari potest.59The recognized exceptions to the rule are as
follows:(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;(2) Delegation of
emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;(3) Delegation to the people at large;(4)
Delegation to local governments; and(5) Delegation to
administrative bodies.60Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and
regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under
no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation,
there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.61A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits,
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be
effected.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Florencio
Eugenio V Executive Secretary and HLURBFacts:The heart of the
controversy is the Presidential Decree 957 or The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree". On May 10, 1972, private
respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his
co-owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta
Village in Quezon City. Acting on complaints for non-development
docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village
Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority
rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979inter aliaordering
petitioner to cease and desist from making further sales of lots in
said village or in any project owned by him.While NHA Cases Nos.
2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case
No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina
Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he
suspended payment of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold
one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor
title to the said property was registered. Private respondent
further alleged that he suspended his payments because of
petitioner's failure to develop the village.Issue: WON PD 957 is to
be given retroactive effect.Ruling:We hold otherwise, and herewith
rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his
discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so
as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976.P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable
intent of the law.The intent of the law, as culled from its
preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it
sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading
authority on statutory construction stressed:The intent of a
statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital part, the essence
of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent.The intention of the legislature in
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a
statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the
legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. . . . In construing statutes the proper course
is to start out and follow the trite intent of the legislature and
to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of
the legislature.1(emphasis supplied.)It goes without saying that,
as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and
the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers
and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in
view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who
may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of
"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers", and such intent
is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble, pertinent
portions of which read as follows:of Title No. 168119 of which the
parcels of lands subject of this contract is a part in accordance
with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-66 and the
Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and
abide by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision
and development of lots for residential purposesas may be presently
in force or may hereafter be required by laws passed by the
Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the
Bureau of Lands, the General Registration Office and other
government agencies.(emphasis supplied)
People of the Philippines V Hon. Vincente EchavesFacts:The
record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed
with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons
charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree
No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici, which is similar to
the other fifteen informations."That sometime in the year 1974
continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality
of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of
a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty.
Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant
Celestina de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No.
8919,Accuseds entrance into the area has been and is still against
the will of the offended party; did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the
said grazing land: said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and
has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for
which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing
applicants cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing
damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant,
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr." Issue: Whether or not Presidential
Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies
to agricultural lands. Ruling: On the other hand, it should be
noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing
lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947
which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association
to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands"SECTION 1. It
shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or association to
enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth, any public agricultural land including such public lands
as are granted to private individuals under the provisions of the
Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the disposal of
public agricultural lands in the Philippines, and are duly covered
by the corresponding applications required for the purpose
notwithstanding the fact that title thereto still remains in the
Government; or for any person, natural or judicial, to instigate,
induce or force another to commit such acts."cralaw virtua1aw
libraryThe rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species)
invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the
intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only
to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The
rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction
which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain
(Genato Commercial Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals,
104)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Commisioner
of Customs V EssoFacts:Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining
Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum
refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act
No. 387 which provides: "During the five years following the
granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of
customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments,
supplies and accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the
special import tax.
Issue: Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by herein private
respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted
by Republic Act No. 387, or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should
embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394,
or the Special Import Tax Law.Ruling:We have examined the records
of this case thoroughly and carefully considered the arguments
presented by both parties and We are convinced that the only thing
left to this Court to do is to determine the intention of the
legislature through interpretation of the two statutes involved,
i.e., Republic Act No. 1394 and Republic Act No. 387.It is a well
accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic
Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts may examine both the printed
pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that
may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the
history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill
and purposes to be accomplished by the measure.On the contention of
herein petitioner that the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO
under R.A. No. 387 have been abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold
that repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest
that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on
the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it
was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law
relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two
is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a
result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully
embraces the subject matter of the earlier.
Vera V CuevasFacts: The controversy arose from the order of
defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein,
requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from the
market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the
inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that
failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to comply with said
order will result in the institution of the necessary action
against any violation of the aforesaid order.Application of
Statcon:Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax
Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and
qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed
skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the
scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which
the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words,
the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed
milk" under the familiar rule ofejusdem generisthat general and
unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms
they follow in the statute.Skimmed milk is different from filled
milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and
Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk
in whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled
milk, on the other hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed,
evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has
been added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or
oil other than milk fat so that the resulting product is an
imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim milk." The difference,
therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the
former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the
fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined
coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or
safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and
filled
milk.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NAPOLCOM
vs De GuzmanFACTS:RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing
the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of
the Interior and Local Government", took effect on January 2,
1991.RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP
members. Section 39 reads: "SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement.
Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon
the attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of
any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or
deputy director general, the Commission may allow his retention in
the service for an unextensible period of one (1) year.Based on the
above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private
respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine
Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six.Private
respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer
for the issuance of an exparte restraining order and/or injunction
before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age of retirement set
at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to
them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which
provides:"Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and
within the transition period of four (4) years following the
effectively of this Act, the following members of the INP shall be
considered compulsorily retired:"a) Those who shall attain the age
of sixty (60) on the first year of the effectivity of this
Act."b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the
second year of the effectivity of this Act."c)Those who shall
attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the
effectivity of this Act."d)Those who shall attain the age of
fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the effectivity of this
Act."Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former
members of the PhilippineConstabulary and the local police force
who were earlier constituted as the IntegratedNational Police (INP)
by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.On the other hand, it is the belief of
petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided inSection 89
applies only to the local police forces who previously retire,
compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of
Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for the
PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP
law.Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed
by a writ of injunction. He declared that the term "INP" in Section
89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine
National police, irrespective of the original status of the present
members of the Philippine National police before its creation and
establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative
after the lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the
preliminary injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he
observed, among others, that it may have been the intention of
Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the
PNP Law failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The
natural recourse of the court is to trace the source of the "INP"
as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject
and to investigate the antecedents involved.ISSUE:Whether or not
Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the
presentPhilippine National police, irrespective of the original
status of its present members and thatSection 39 of RA 6975 shall
become applicable to petitioners only after the lapse of the
four-year transition period.RULING:From a careful review of
Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of the term
INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the
statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of
the whole Philippine National police (PNP) for retirement purposes
and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC
and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes
the members of the PC.Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent
judge that the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec.
90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,"SEC. 90. Status
of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. Upon the effectivity of this Act, the
present National police Commisdion and the Philippine
Constabulary-IntegratedNational police shall cease to exist. The
Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of thePhilippine
Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to be a major
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated
National police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National police, shall cease to be the
national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be
establish and constituted pursuant to this Act."It is not
altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed
to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of
no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the
application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in
favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity
as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age
fifty-six (56).Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court
need not have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the
term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are
not without recourse in determining the construction of the statute
with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
during the legislative deliberations may be adopted. Courts should
not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it
runs counter to the legislative intent.The legislative intent to
classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is
applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question
now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is
reasonableness such that it must conform to the following
requirements:(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;(2)
It must be germane to the purpose of the law;(3) It must not be
limited to existing conditions only;(4) It must apply equally to
all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil.
12[1939]).WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of
injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the
assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Casco vs GimenezFACTSThis is a petition for review of a decision
of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. Pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange
Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July
1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. The Bank later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said
Republic Act No. 2609.The petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co.,
Inc. bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of
synthetic resin glues. Petitioner sought refund relying upon
Resolution No.1529 of the Monetary Board which declares that the
separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said
fee. Central Bank issued margin fee vouchers for the refund.
However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and
approve the said vouchers on the ground that the exemption of the
separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord
with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. No. 2609.
The petitioner also contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea"
and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements
in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea"
formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product.ISSUE:Whether
or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of
the aforesaid margin fee. RULING:National Institute of Science and
Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic
resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of
urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to
temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when
applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture
of plywood. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished
product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and"
formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde. It is well settled
that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde"
instead of "urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the
bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Municipality
of Nueva Era vs Municipality of MarcosFACTSThe Municipality of
Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong,
Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and
Uguis whichwere previously organized as rancherias, each of which
was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the
provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and
created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 66 dated September 30, 1916.The Municipality of Marcos,
on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuantto Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of
Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte. There is no issue insofar
as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the
mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the
description of Marcos boundaries as stated in the second paragraph,
particularly in the phrase: on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary.ISSUES1. Whether or not the mode of appeal
adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and 2.
Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and
covers a portion of Nueva Era.RULING:1. Marcos correctly appealed
the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42. Under
Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes
involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province
shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan
concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said
sanggunian in case the disputing municipalities fail to effect an
amicable settlement. Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No.
7902,38 vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
or commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further
supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review
under Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction.Thus, the CA need not treat the
appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for
certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such
judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction.2. No part of Nueva Eras territory was
taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A.No. 3753. Only the
barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its
territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since only the barangays of
Dingras are enumerated as Marcos source of territory, Nueva Eras
territory is, therefore, excluded.Only Dingras is specifically
named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said
description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the
listed barangays of Dingrasas a compact and contiguous territory.
Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos
under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in
light of the legislative intent.
G.R. No. L-69344 April 26, 1991REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES ANTONIO and
CLARA PASTOR,respondents.FACTS:On April 15, 1980, the Republic of
the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced
an action in the Court of First Instance to collect from the
spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income
taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 in the amount of P17,117.08.On
August 2, 1975, they filed an answer admitting there was an
assessment against them of P17,117.08 for income tax deficiency but
denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of
the tax amnesty among others under P.D. No. 213 and had paid the
corresponding amnesty taxes provided by the State under the law.
Consequently, the Government is in estoppel to demand and compel
further payment of income taxes by them.Trial court:Repondent
spouses had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955
to 1959, under P.D. 213, as shown in the Amnesty Income Tax
Returns' Summary Statement and the tax Payment Acceptance Order for
P2,951.20 with its corresponding official receipt, which returns
also contain the very assessment for the questioned years. By
accepting the payment of the amnesty income taxes, the Government,
therefore, waived its right to further recover deficiency incomes
taxes "from the defendants under the existing assessment against
them.Petitioner RP's contention:1. Private respondents were not
qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the
benefits of that decree are available only to persons who had no
pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue
Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-73 issued by the BIR as part of the
implementation of PD 213 among others. Since the Pastors did in
fact have a pending assessment against them, they were precluded
from availing of the amnesty among others under PD 213.2. Tax
exemptions should be interpretedstrictissimi jurisagainst the
taxpayer.Respondent spouses' contention: 1. P.D. 213 contains no
exemptions from its coverage2. There is nothing which can be
construed as authority for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
introduce exceptions and/or conditions to the coverage of the
law.
Issue:Whether or not the payment of deficiency income tax under
the tax amnesty, P.D. 213, and its acceptance by the Government
operated to divest the Government of the right to further recover
from the taxpayer, even if there was an existing assessment against
the latter at the time he paid the amnesty tax.Ruling:The petition
is devoid of merit.Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment
of P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were correct, since the
latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount to the
Government by way of amnesty taxes under P.D. No. 213, and were
granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax
failings, the Government is estopped from collecting the difference
between the deficiency tax assessment and the amount already paid
by them as amnesty tax.A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or
intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a
revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver
by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be
due it, and in this sense, prejudicial thereto, particularly to
give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a
chance to do so and thereby become a part of the new society with a
clean slate (Commission of Internal Revenue vs. Botelho Corp. and
Shipping Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).The rule is thatin case of
doubt,tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the
Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being
burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute
expressly and clearly declares.
G.R. No. L-23623 June 30, 1977ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS,petitioner,vs.MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and COURT OF TAX
APPEALS,respondents.FACTS:Respondent Manila Electric Co. seek for
an exemption from the special import tax of its importation of
insulation oils. Respondent claims that it is exempt from the
special import tax not only by virtue of Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 1394, which exempts from said tax equipment and spare parts for
use in industries, but also under Paragraph 9, Part Two, of its
franchise, which expressly exempts insulators from all taxes of
whatever kind and nature. Par. 9 of its franchise provides: The
grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate,
buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and
insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are
or may be hereafter required by law to pay. In consideration of
Part Two of the franchise herein granted, to wit, the right to
build and maintain in the City of Manila and its suburbs a plant
for the conveying and furnishing of electric current for light,
heat, and power, and to charge for the same, the grantee shall pay
to the City of Manila two and one-half per centum of the gross
earnings received from the business under this franchise in the
city and its suburbs: ... and shall be in lieu of all taxes and
assessments of whatsoever nature, and by whatsoever authority upon
the privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires,
transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which taxes and
assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted."It noted that
the above "exempts it from all taxes of whatever nature, and by
whatever authority, with respect to its insulators in consideration
for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross earnings."Acting
Commissioner of Customs's decision:Respondent is not exempt due to
the following reasons:1. An exemption from taxation must be
justified by words too clear to be misread.2. An exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted
it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively
put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting
provision should be construed strictissimi juris."3. 'Insulating
oils' does not within the meaning of the term 'insulator'Court of
Tax Appeals' decision:Repondent is exempt from the said
taxISSUE:Whether or not the insulating oil come within the meaning
of the term 'insulator.RULING:Yes. Hence, respondent is exempted
from payment of the said special import tax.While it is true that
in the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions (and deductions
are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed
strictissimi juris against the ta