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Self-Enforcing Clientelism
Jorge A. Gallego
February 15, 2012
Abstract
Political clientelism is a dyadic relation in which a politician
(the patron) gives
material goods and services to a citizen (the client), in
exchange for political
support. If, at different stages of this relationship, both the
patron and the client
have incentives to defect and not honor informal agreements,
what makes clien-
telism self-enforcing? The following paper presents a
game-theoretical model of
political clientelism in which a candidate disciplines a
majority of voters through
the promise of a future flow of benefits. A mixed strategy
involving a randomized
allocation of resources among constituencies makes clientelism
feasible when the
politicians action is contingent on the result of the election.
Higher campaign
budgets and lower voter aversion towards clientelistic parties,
as well as higher
patience and higher heterogeneity across groups of voters, make
clientelism more
likely. Swing voters tend to be gifted more frequently than core
supporters with
this frequency increasing as group heterogeneity increases,
presenting a positive
association.
1 Introduction
July of 2007 was the month in which the Colombian government
reported that in the
weeks prior, in 16 states of the country, the Sisben (the system
used for allocating
welfare state expenses) had been manipulated by politicians for
electoral purposes.
This system classifies people according to their income and
socio-economic status,
and offers benefits, subsidies, and services according to this
classification. It can,
thereby, be inferred from this report that the system is an
important instrument
Forthcoming, Journal of Theoretical Politics. I would like to
thank Rebecca Morton, Adam
Przeworski, Alastair Smith, Joshua Tucker, Leonard Wantchekon,
two anonymous referees and the
editor of the journal for their helpful comments.Department of
Politics, New York University. Contact: [email protected]
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used by politicians for the establishment of clientelistic
links: citizens that give po-
litical support and votes to certain candidates that may
influence the assignment of
subsidies, may benefit from the system. The problem is that some
medium-income
people are classified as belonging to the first tier of the
system, which implies the
biggest flow of benefits. In contrast, some low-income citizens
are erroneously clas-
sified as those not deserving subsidies. This shows that
clientelism may become an
important obstacle for redistributive programs and may
perpetuate income inequal-
ity and poverty.
However, clientelism is not an exclusive Colombian phenomenon.
Urban politics
during the twentieth century in some of the most important
cities in the US reveal
that patronage and clientelism can be found in other latitudes.
In his analysis of
Chicagos machine politics, Gosnell (1937) presents the results
of a survey involving
over 300 and 600 Chicago precinct captains in 1928 and 1936,
respectively.1 One
half of the captains interviewed in 1928, and almost 70% of
those interviewed in
1936, acknowledged that they handed out food to those
constituents who were in
need. Naturally, they expected political support for their
candidates in exchange
for this benevolent behavior. Many of these captains also
revealed that they helped
their voters with other goods and services such as coal,
Christmas baskets, temporary
shelter, legal aid and juvenile guidance, among others. Not
surprisingly, most of them
also acknowledged that they acted in the role of job brokers at
different governmental
offices, at the federal, state, county, sanitary district, city,
school, and park levels.
As such, this phenomenon seems to present in a global capacity.
Important
studies have reported characteristics of clientelism in
Southeast Asia [Scott (1972)],
tropical Africa [Lemarchand (1972)], Southern Italy [Golden
& Picci (2008)], Japan
[Kobayashi (2006)], Mexico [Greene (2001)] and Argentina [Stokes
(2005); Weitz-
Shapiro (2007)], as well as several other countries and regions.
How can we define
clientelism? Is clientelism exclusive to twentieth-century
democracy or is it found in
other political regimes along human history?
Clientelism is a dyadic (two-person) relation in which a patron
gives material
goods, services, benefits, or protection to a client, who
reciprocates with some type
of general, political, or military support and assistance.
Political clientelism, on
the other hand, is a special case of what we could term general
clientelism. Political
1In Gosnells words precinct captains are the backbone of any
metropolitan political organiza-
tion, since upon them rests the responsibility for seeing and
winning the voters (p.51). They are
extremely important for the party machine as they act as the
link between the party organization
and the voters in a determined precinct.
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clientelism is characterized by a politician who acts as the
patron, offering goods, ser-
vices, jobs, resources, protection, or other variables of value
to a (group of) voter(s),
in exchange for political support, which in most cases, includes
the vote, itself. The
conjunction of several dyads and relations forms a clientelistic
network, as those de-
scribed in the examples given above. Nation-level leaders are
linked with regional,
rural and urban brokers that establish relations with voters.
Although some scholars
typically refer to patronage as the exchange of jobs in the
bureaucracy for political
support, in this paper this term is used interchangeably with
clientelism.
If clientelistic relations cannot be enforced through contracts,
what makes the
agents comply and respect this type of informal agreement? For
instance, given
that in many countries (after the introduction of the Australian
Ballot) the vote is
intended to be confidential, why should a voter who received a
gift from a politician
he dislikes honor the agreement and give him his vote? If during
his campaign a
politician promised to his constituency certain goods and
services that are costly, why
should he comply after he is elected? The main purpose of this
paper is to explain
why clientelism is self-enforcing, meaning that the nature of
the relationship between
the patron and client gives them incentives to cooperate with
each other and respect
the informal agreement. This paper also tries to solve other
questions related to
patronage systems. Some scholars recognize that clientelism is a
typical phenomenon
related to poor and unequal societies [Robinson & Verdier
(2003); Medina & Stokes
(2007); Stokes (2007)]. If this is the case and a context of
scarce resources exists,
then how does a candidate allocate his limited budget among
different groups of
the electorate, which are interested in becoming the clienteles?
Are core voters
more frequently awarded for being loyal to the candidate? Or, on
the contrary,
are swing voters the real target of the politician, given the
political value of their
votes? Is group heterogeneity within a society, in terms of
ethnic, social, or economic
characteristics, beneficial for clientelistic politicians?
In light of these questions, this paper presents a theoretical
model that seeks
to address these issues. Within an infinitely repeated setting,
in which elections
take place periodically, a budget-constrained clientelistic
candidate has to allocate
his resources among three groups of voters. These groups share a
common dislike
towards the candidates party, but differ in their attitude
towards the candidate,
him or herself. The repeated nature of the interaction helps
both the candidate and
the voters construct reputations and sustain cooperation in the
long run. In order
to efficiently allocate campaign resources, the clientelistic
candidate plays a mixed
strategy during each period. This involves rewarding more than
one group with
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positive probability, sacrificing the group that is
ideologically more distant to the
candidate. Groups play grim trigger strategies in which each
periods cooperation is
contingent on observing the politicians provision of gifts in
the previous stage. The
politician, in turn, observes the aggregate result of the
election and gives a gift in
a certain period, only if he has won the election. Consequently,
aggregate electoral
results, as opposed to individual monitoring, discipline voters
and motivate them to
comply with clientelistic politicians. The model shows that
conditions for clientelism
are more favorable as dislike towards the party diminishes,
diversity among the
groups rises, and as voters increasingly value the gifts offered
by the candidate. In
this context, increased heterogeneity among the voters is
beneficial for the candidate.
The model also predicts that swing voters tend to be gifted more
frequently than
core supporters, and that this frequency increases as the groups
become more distant
in their political preferences (i.e. as diversity
increases).
This paper is divided into five sections, beginning with this
Introduction. It then
proceeds to Section 2, which relates the subject of the article
to existing literature on
the topic. Section 3 then presents a simple model of political
clientelism, demonstrat-
ing how patron-client relations become more or less feasible as
a function of several
parameters of interest. The basic feature of this model is that
a candidate plays
a mixed strategy when allocating certain goods and benefits
among constituencies
and utilizes this as an instrument for disciplining voters.
Finally, Section 4 expands
on this analysis, incorporating random shocks into players
preferences. A unique
mixed strategy that maximizes the candidates probability of
being elected is found.
Comparative statics of this equilibrium show how ideological
dislike towards the
clientelistic party, group heterogeneity, and the candidates
wealth, affect the allo-
cation of goods among ideologically close or distant groups.
Section 5 then presents
the conclusion to this paper.
2 Related Literature
In recent years, clientelism has been actively studied in
economics and political
science.2 Stokes (2005), using an infinitely repeated prisoners
dilemma, gives a
theoretical explanation of why candidates and voters have
incentives to honor their
agreements and establish clientelistic relations. Politicians
use what the author refers
to as perverse accountability, by threatening to cease the flow
of benefits to a citizen
2Stokes (2007) and Kitschelt & Wilkinson (2007) survey much
of the classic and recent literature
related with clientelism and patronage in modern societies.
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if he fails to comply with a previous agreement. In this model
it is assumed that ma-
chines (clientelistic parties) are able to (imperfectly) monitor
individuals votes and
reward them, accordingly, in an ongoing interaction. During each
period, a weakly
opposed voter either opts to vote for a candidate or not. In
turn, the candidate
then simultaneously rewards the citizen or not. Players use grim
trigger strategies,
punishing defection whenever the counterpart fails to honor the
tacit cooperation.
Nevertheless, even though Stokes (2005) proposes some
interesting questions per-
taining to the dynamics of patronage and clientelism, some of
them remain unan-
swered. For example, according to the author (p. 315):
Yet in the societies where clientelistic parties or machines are
active,
not all poor voters receive benefits. Limited resources force
political
machines to choose among poor voters. Machine operatives
everywhere
face a version of the dilemma that an Argentine Peronist
explains. About
40 voters live in her neighborhood, and her responsibility is to
get them
to the polls and get them vote for her party. But the party
gives her only
10 bags of food to distribute, ten little bags, she laments,
nothing
more. How does she (. . . ) decide who among her neighbors shall
and
who shall not receive handouts?
The aforementioned quote reveals one of the main puzzles posed
by clientelism.
In a context of scarce and limited resources, how does a
clientelistic politician allocate
them among his constituency? Nonetheless, Stokes fails to answer
this important
question. In her model, the machine distributes gifts (or at
least makes the offer) to
every weakly opposed voter and budget limitations never
constrain this distribution.
Some voters are excluded and do not receive a gift, but not
because of budget
limitations. Loyal voters are never gifted because they always
vote for the party,
regardless of whether or not they are a recipient of a gift.
Similarly, opposition
voters never receive gifts, either, because their dominant
strategy is to vote against
the party, even if a reward is given. Therefore, only weakly
opposed voters are
rewarded. However, the model fails to discuss if the party has
to select among this
class of voters due to gift scarcity or other considerations. In
particular, if there are
40 weakly opposed voters, but only 10 bags of food, it cannot be
inferred from the
model how the machine is going to allocate these resources.
Robinson & Verdier (2003) recognize that for clientelism to
be self-enforcing,
neither public goods nor investment are attractive instruments
for politicians to
use for the purpose of obtaining votes. For this reason
patronage, understood by
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the authors as employment in the bureaucracy, emerges as a
politically efficient
strategy that enforces the relation, although it is economically
inefficient. This model
explains why clientelism is significant, as well as frequent in
countries that boast high
inequality and poor technology. It is cheaper to buy voters with
jobs in a context
of low incomes. It also shows that clientelistic redistribution,
with its associated
inefficiencies, tends to be worse in situations where
productivity is low, the desire to
hold political power is high (rents are large), where money is
relatively un-important
compared to ideology in determining political preferences, and
where inequality is
high (p.21).
Wantchekon (2003) is one of the few empirical papers on
political clientelism.
Using Benins 2001 presidential election and attempting to
understand the effect of
voting platforms on voting behavior, the author randomizes the
content of electoral
campaigning across villages. With the active participation of
parties in the design of
the experiment, randomized villages were exposed to purely
clientelistic platforms,
purely national public-policy platforms, or to a default mix of
platforms. From the
results of the experiments, it can be inferred that clientelism
is an effective vehicle
for acquiring votes and that, in certain cases, it is, indeed,
self-enforcing. Further, it
has been found that clientelism has a greater effect on men, as
well as less informed
and segregated voters [Vicente & Wantchekon (2009)].
Clientelism has also been
found to be electorally effective, especially for incumbents and
regional candidates.
Incumbents have the advantage of making their clientelistic
promises more credible,
perhaps because of their access to public resources.
Nonetheless, challengers might be
provided the opportunity to highlight the failure of the
incumbent should he neglect
to fulfill previous promises. The experiment also reveals that
targets of clientelistic
politicians have traditionally been men, co-ethnics of the
candidates and voters with
better access to information.
Myerson (1993) presents a static game-theoretical model that
studies candidates
incentives to cultivate minorities and special interest groups,
instead of appealing
equally to all voters under different electoral systems. Both in
a two-candidate elec-
tion framework and in multicandidate electoral system,
politicians choose indepen-
dently and simultaneously an offer distribution made to
homogenous voters, in the
beginning of the game. Next, voters go to each candidates
campaign headquarters,
receiving a randomly and independently selected offer from each
one. Afterwards,
on the day of election, each voter compares the offers and votes
for the candidate
that promises a bigger transfer. This framework is especially
useful for explaining
why candidates have incentives that favor minorities and special
interest groups un-
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der different electoral systems. However, it fails to explain
why this mechanism is
self-enforcing. In particular, it is assumed that voters are
homogenous (so that they
do not show an ideological preference for any candidate and they
only care about
the amount offered). As such, the model then cannot explain if
candidates favor
swing or core voters. Additionally, as in Dixit & Londregan
(1996), it is assumed
(and not endogenized) that candidates and voters trust each
other and believe in
their promises (of distributions and votes).
Dixit & Londregan (1996) analyze the determinants of success
in special-interest
(pork barrel) politics. In the presence of what they term
tactical redistribution,
they ask the question: do politicians prefer to favor core
voters or to favor swing
voters whose voting decision is not completely determined?
Through their theoretical
model, the authors find that when political parties are equally
effective in delivering
resources to any group in the society, swing voters are favored
by transfers. On the
other hand, when groups have party affinities and parties are
better at delivering
economic favors to their own groups, core voters (machine
politics) prevail. Given
the static nature of this model, it is assumed that citizens
trust politicians and that
they implement their campaign promises of transfers and taxes
once they get elected.
In other terms, in this model what this paper seeks to explain
is taken as granted,
because it is assumed that politicians honor their campaign
promises, while citizens
trust politicians and, therefore, vote accordingly. Thus, even
though the model gives
interesting answers to the question of how governments allocate
economic benefits
among its constituencies, it does not explain why pork barrel
politics is self-enforcing.
It is unclear why politicians redistribute and comply with tax
and transfer promises,
as well as why citizens honor their commitment and do not simply
vote for the
candidate that they ideologically prefer. Naturally, the static
nature of the model
greatly explains this flaw.
One of the main puzzles that scholars aim to solve within this
literature is why
clientelism and ethnicity tend to present together. For Fearon
(1999), political coali-
tions are motivated to limit their size, so that the portion of
the political pork
assigned to each member is not too low. In this sense, ethnicity
becomes a natural
and efficient barrier that deters the entrance of people into
winning political coali-
tions, limiting its size and thus maintaining a higher amount of
material benefits for
each member. But, why is ethnicity the salient trait that
identifies clientelism in
some societies, rather than religion, social class, education,
party affiliation or any
other characteristic? Fearons basic argument is that a barrier
is efficient as long
as potential members cannot choose the criterion that determines
if somebody is
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included or excluded from the group. The politics of pork favors
coalitions based
on features not easily chosen or changed by individuals (p. 5).
Ethnicity, to some
degree, satisfies this requirement.
Chandra (2007) also studies the relationship between patronage
and ethnic pol-
itics. In her theory, patronage adopts the form of ethnic
favoritism as the result
of a self-enforcing equilibrium, in which information
constraints bias voters to favor
politicians of their same ethnic group, while politicians
respond to these biases fa-
voring such categories. In her theoretical reasoning, Chandra
questions the role of
secret ballots in patronage democracies and its impact on the
enforceability of the
relationship between voters and politicians. She concludes that
voting procedures
are unlikely to be confidential under patronage and for this
reason candidates and
incumbents are motivated to offer material benefits to citizens
in exchange for their
political support.
Signals as time spent in the booth, or aggregate results at
group levels, provide
valuable information for the politician and motivates citizens
to use their votes as
instruments to extract material benefits (p. 90). This paper
follows a similar ap-
proach in the model presented herein. A candidate might ignore
who did or did not
vote for him, but observes the aggregate result of the election.
This serves a signal
of compliance of the different groups involved in the political
transaction. Therefore,
secret balloting is not a barrier for the self-enforcing nature
of clientelism. From this
analysis, it is also interesting to note that in patronage
democracies citizens have
motivation to form groups in the pursuit of material benefits
and politicians have
the motivation to target groups rather than free-floating
individuals. In this paper,
clientelism is modeled precisely as the interaction between a
candidate and different
groups of voters.
Yet another commonality between Chandras approach and the one
developed
within the paper presented here is that, in both cases, it is
argued that voters
evaluate candidates promises by checking the past record of
patronage transactions.
In this paper this is modeled through an infinitely repeated
game in which citizens
follow a grim trigger strategy, penalizing those candidates who
do not comply with
the commitment. In Chandras words By probing for broad patterns
in the history
of previous patronage transactions by incumbents, they [voters]
identify the principle
on which patronage benefits were distributed in the past, which
is their best guide
to how they will allot benefits in the future. Perhaps, the main
variation between
both approaches is that in Chandras analysis, imperfect
information governs the
relationship between citizens and politicians, and consequently
ethnicity serves as
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a signaling device that reduces the impact of this imperfection.
For this reason,
Chandra provides an endogeneous mechanism that explains why
groups are driven
to conform by members of the same ethnicity. In contrast, in the
approach presented
within this article, this feature is not explained and can only
be exogenously assumed,
at best. Nonetheless, this is not considered a major flaw of the
model given that in
some countries (of which Colombia is a good example) patronage
does not adopt the
ethnic flavor that it has in other latitudes.
3 A Model of Political Clientelism
In a context of scarcity and given that politicians are
budget-constrained, how does a
patron allocate his gifts among those constituencies interested
in becoming the clien-
teles? Are core voters awarded for their loyalty? Or, are swing
voters the target
of candidates, given that they can be pivotal in an election? To
answer these ques-
tions, consider a game in which a candidate to a public position
interacts with three
equally-sized groups (1, 2, and 3). Each group casts one vote
for the candidate or
his contender, and at least two out of three are needed in order
to win. One of the
most interesting puzzles that the study of clientelism should
solve is why citizens
who dislike a candidate and a party will vote for them in an
election. Therefore, in
the following model, this paper ignores those citizens who
prefer the candidate to his
contender. Instead, this article concentrates on groups that
share a natural (ideo-
logical) dislike towards the candidates party. This dislike will
be measured through
the parameter < 0, which represents the disutility that each
group experiences
each time the party is in office.
Even though the three groups share a common dislike towards the
party, they
differ in their sympathy, neutrality, or antipathy towards the
candidate. This is mea-
sured by > 0, so that the ideological payoffs for each group
when the politician
(p) is elected is given by
pi1(p wins) = pi2(p wins) =
pi3(p wins) = +
with > , so that the third group still experiences disutility
if the candidateis elected. Hence, group 1 totally dislikes the
candidate, group 2 remains neutral,
while group 3 likes him. Also, can be interpreted as a measure
of heterogeneity
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between the three groups, with a higher implying a higher degree
of diversity in
their political preferences. For simplicity, assume that if this
candidate is not elected
and his contender wins the election, the ideological payoff for
each group is zero. This
means that pii(p loses) = 0, for i = 1, 2, 3.
To answer the questions posed at the beginning of this section,
it is important to
recognize that the candidate has scarce resources he must use in
order to obtain at
least two votes from the three groups. Assume that g > 0
represents an indivisible
benefit that the politician can only give to one of the groups.
We can think of g as
a public job, a local public good, or any other indivisible
commodity that cannot
be shared simultaneously by two distinct groups. Consequently,
the total payoff for
group i, when the clientelistic candidate is elected, is given
by
ui(p wins) =
pii + g if i receives a giftpii otherwiseFinally, assume that ps
benefit for winning the election is given by v > 0, and that
g < v, so that the office is sufficiently valued regardless
of the cost of buying the
clientele. The timing of the interaction, which will be called
the clientelism-game,
is as follows:
1. The candidate p offers g to group 1, group 2, or group 3, or
does not offer it
to anyone.
2. After observing ps action, the election takes place and each
group votes simul-
taneously for or against p.
3. Payoffs are realized and p wins if he gets two or three
votes. Otherwise, his
contender is elected.
Solving this extensive-form game yields five subgame perfect
equilibria (SPE): in one
of them the candidate is elected with three votes, and in the
other four he receives
less than two votes and loses the election. In every case, the
politician chooses not to
give the gift to any of the groups. Clientelism does not exist
in equilibrium because
the candidate never has incentives to favor any of the groups.
Consequently, if the
game is played once, the underlying structure makes it
unsuitable for explaining the
emergence of clientelism within electoral systems.
Now assume that the clientelism-game described above repeats
during t = 1, 2, . . .
periods, so that the players ignore the time horizon. Every
period the candidate
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decides who receives g and each group votes or not for the
candidate. The feasibility
of this interaction naturally results from the fact that
elections are held periodically
and politicians run for reelection, with the possibility of
interacting with the same
(group of) citizens every period. Given this new structure, the
candidate has no
incentives to give the gift to the same group during each
period. But it might be
the case that making uncertain this allocation is in his
interest, because this could
discipline at least two groups and make them vote for him.
Consequently, in what
follows this paper assumes that the politician might follow, in
each period, a mixed
strategy of the form (0, 0, , 1 ), where 0 < < 1 is the
probability that group 2receives the gift, while 1 is the
probability that the benefit goes to the third group.The first two
zeroes in the vector indicate that the candidate assigns
probability zero
to the event of not giving a gift to any group, and to give it
to group 1, respectively.
In this context, the candidate randomizes between the neutral
and the sympathetic
group, and excludes the group that is less likely to vote for
him.3
Being more precise, it assumed that players follow grim trigger
strategies with
the following characteristics: the candidate plays (0, 0, , 1 )
in t = 1; For anyt > 1, he plays (0, 0, , 1 ) if he won the
election in t 1; Otherwise, he plays(1, 0, 0, 0) forever. Group 1
votes against the candidate in every t = 1, 2, . . .. Groups
2 and 3 vote yes in t = 1, and in t > 1 if the candidate won
and played (0, 0, , 1)in t 1. Otherwise, they vote against this
candidate forever. Define (0, 1) asthe common discount factor for
the players. Under what conditions these strategies
form part of a SPE in the infinitely repeated version of the
game? Proposition 1
establishes sufficient conditions for the above strategies
conforming a SPE.
Proposition 1:
Consider the infinitely repeated clientelism-game defined above,
in which the candi-
date and groups 2 and 3 follow grim trigger strategies while
group 1 always votes
against the candidate. Then, any mixed strategy of the form (0,
0, , 1 ) can bepart of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as
g 1 + +
g(1)
for sufficiently close to one.
3In the context of repeated games, we might interpret as the
proportion of periods in which
group 2 is honored with the gift. Nonetheless, being strict with
the definition of mixed strategy,
is just a probability. Assuming that g in fact is divisible, it
is also possible to interpret as the
fraction of the gift given to group 2 during each period.
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Proof:
It is straight forward to show that the politician has no
incentives to unilaterally
deviate from his strategy. Suppose that groups 2 and 3 vote for
the candidate. If he
follows his strategy, his discounted payoff is
up(coop) =
t=1
t1(v g)
=v g1
If he cheats and deviates from giving a gift in every period,
gets up(cheats) = 0.
Then, because v > g, the candidate always honors his
strategy. In subgames that
come from a defection of either group 2 or 3 (or both), the
present value of the
candidates payoff after following the grim trigger strategy is
0, while a one-stage
deviation (which implies giving g to either group after losing
the election) yields a
payoff of g. Then, the candidate has no incentives to deviate
from his strategy.Consider a subgame in which in the first period
of the stage game, g is given to
group 2. In this case, group 2s payoff for cooperating is
u2(coop) = g + +t=1
t(g + )
= g + +
1 (g + )
After receiving the gift, if group 2 cheats, its discounted
payoff is
u2(cheats) = g + (0) + 2(0) +
= g
Then, group 2 has no incentives to deviate from the grim trigger
strategy as long as
g + +
1 (g + ) g
which is equivalent to
g (2)
It is easy to show that (2) is also the necessary condition so
that group 2 has no
incentives to deviate in subgames in which the gift was given to
group 3. In these
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type of subgames, group 3s payoff for following the grim trigger
strategy is
u3(coop) = g + + +t=1
t[(1 )g + + ]
= g + + +
1 [(1 )g + + ]
If this group cheats, receives u3(cheats) = g. Therefore, group
3 has no incentives
to deviate from the grim trigger strategy as long as
g + + +
1 [(1 )g + + ] g
or, equivalently, if
1 + + g
(3)
Again, (3) is also the condition for group 3s compliance in
subgames in which the
gift is given to group 2. Finally, if the candidate and groups 2
and 3 follow their
strategies, no matter what group 1 does, it always receives an
average payoff of
u1() = 1 . For the result of the election and the
materialization of payoffs, it doesnot matter if this group votes
against or in favor of the candidate. Hence, summing
up, a grim trigger strategy that supports a candidates mixed
strategy of the form
(0, 0, , 1 ) constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the
clientelism-game aslong as
g 1 + +
g
which completes the proof. Proposition 1 shows that there an
infinite number of mixed strategies that can
be implemented by the politician, in a SPE of the
clientelism-game. Within this
paper, the set of mixed strategies that satisfy (1) is referred
to as the feasible set.
What are the basic properties of this set of equilibria? How
does the feasible set
respond to changes in dislike towards the party, heterogeneity
among the groups, the
magnitude of the gift, or players patience? Proposition 2 shows
that some interesting
comparative statics of the infinitely repeated clientelism-game
can be described.
Proposition 2:
Consider the clientelism-game in which any mixed strategy played
by the candi-date in a SPE satisfies condition (1). Then, there
exist:
1. A minimum gift (gmin) necessary for equilibrium which is
(a) Increasing in the magnitude of dislike towards the party
().
13
-
(b) Decreasing in the overall level of group heterogeneity
().
(c) Decreasing in players patience ().
2. A maximum level of dislike (max) towards the party, which
is
(a) Increasing in the gift given by the candidate (g).
(b) Increasing in the level of heterogeneity among groups
().
(c) Increasing in players patience ().
3. A minimum level of heterogeneity (min) necessary for
equilibrium, provided
that 2 > g. This level is
(a) Increasing in dislike towards the party ().(b) Decreasing in
the gifts value (g).
(c) Decreasing in players patience ().
Proof:
1. From condition (1), the minimum necessary gift that the
candidate must pay,
in equilibrium, is given by
gmin =2
which implies: a)gmin() =
2
> 0 for any (0, 1); b) gmin
= 1
< 0
for any (0, 1); and c) gmin
=2+
2< 0 for any (0, 1) because we
assumed > .
2. The magnitude of the maximum level of dislike towards the
candidate, in equi-
librium, is given by
max = g + 2
which implies: a)(max)
g=
2> 0 for any (0, 1); b)(max)
= 1/2;
and c)(max)
=g
2> 0 for any g > 0.
14
-
Figure 1: Set of feasible mixed strategies as a function of
g
g
(2+)
1
3. From (1), the minimum level of heterogeneity admissible for
equilibrium is
min = 2 g
Therefore: a)min() = 2; b)
ming
= < 0 for any (0, 1); and c)min
= g < 0 for any g R++.
Proposition 2 describes the basic comparative statics of the
feasible set of equi-
libria, in which the candidate disciplines groups 2 and 3
through clientelism. Even
though an infinite number of mixed strategies might be possible
in the SPE of this
repeated game, particular conditions on heterogeneity, dislike
towards the party, pa-
tience, and the size of the gift, constrain the politicians
ability to establish patron-
client relations with the constituent. From this analysis, it
should be clear that a
lower level of dislike towards the party, a higher level of
heterogeneity, a higher mag-
nitude of the gift, and a higher level of patience, favor the
candidates intention of
establishing a clientelistic relation with groups 2 and 3.
In figure 1 the set of feasible mixed strategies is plotted as a
function of the
gift. The lower bound (i.e. the necessary condition for making
group 2 comply) is
decreasing in g, while the upper bound (i.e. the necessary
condition for disciplining
group 3) is increasing in this parameter. The shaded region
represents the set of
mixed strategies that can be implemented by the candidate, for
any given value of
15
-
Figure 2: Set of feasible mixed strategies as a function of
1
g+2
the gift. The intersection of and determines the minimum gift
necessary for
equilibrium: gmin =2
. Naturally, this amount is positive because, 2 > .It is
interesting to note that if the magnitude of the dislike towards
the party ()diminishes, equilibria in which the given gift is lower
are still admissible. In other
terms, if citizens feel more identified with the party, lower
gifts are needed in order to
buy their votes. In a multidimensional policy-space setting, if
citizens and candidates
are less distant in certain issues, like religion or security,
it might be easy to explain
why voters support candidates that are apparently more distant
in another issue,
even if gifts are not so tempting.
Additionally, this minimum gift is decreasing in the level of
diversity among
groups (). Higher heterogeneity means that group 3 feels more
sympathy for the
candidate when he is elected, while group 2s ideological utility
remains unchanged.
This makes things easier for the candidate, which has to offer a
lower gift because
group 3 will be more easily convinced. Finally, players patience
(measured through
the common discount factor ) makes groups 2 and 3 value more the
cooperative
agreement in which they vote for the patron, making gifts less
important.
Figure 2 depicts the set of feasible mixed strategies, but now
as a function of
the magnitude of dislike towards the party (.) The lower bound
is increasing in while the upper bound is decreasing. This implies
that as dislike increases, lessextreme or degenerate mixed
strategies are implementable in equilibrium. The
intersection of both bounds yields the maximum level of
intolerance to the party:
16
-
Figure 3: Set of feasible mixed strategies as a function of
1
g 2
max = g + 2
. This level is increasing in g, , and . Richer candidates can
buy
voters that dislike more their party. More diversity makes party
dislike less costly
to the politician. As stated above, this is because represents
the sympathy that
group 3 feels when the candidate is elected. This attenuates and
makes clientelism
easier. Higher patience makes intolerance towards the party less
important because
the groups value more their future flow of payoffs.
Finally, figure 3 plots the set of feasible as a function of
diversity . The lower
bound is constant in this case, because it does not depend on .
Group 2s utility
does not depend on this parameter, so that the necessary
condition for making
them comply is not a function of heterogeneity. Nonetheless, the
upper bound is
increasing in . The intersection of both lines yields the
minimum admissible level
of heterogeneity:
min = 2 gAs rises, more heterogeneity is needed to compensate
the increased dislike
towards the party. Higher gifts or higher patience, make group
3s sympathy less
necessary for the establishment of clientelism. In this section
a simplified model
of political clientelism and the comparative statics just
described serve to illustrate
how the feasibility of patronage varies as a function of
ideological and economic
conditions.
17
-
4 Clientelism-Game With Random Shocks
Even though the model presented in the previous section provides
some interesting
predictions pertaining to how clientelism becomes more or less
feasible as relevant
parameters change, the fact that an infinite number of mixed
strategies can be imple-
mented does not solve some of the most interesting questions. As
such, the following
section presents an extended version of the clientelism-game,
incorporating random
shocks into the groups ideology payments. It was argued that
groups exhibit a
natural aversion towards the party ( < 0) and that group 1
dislikes the candidate,
group 3 feels sympathy towards him, and group 2 remains neutral.
This paper now
assumes that during each time period t in which the
clientelistic candidate is elected,
the three groups are exposed to a random shock i, for i = 1, 2,
3, which increases or
decreases group is ideological payoff at time t. More
specifically, groups ideological
payoffs now are given by
pi1(p wins) = + 1pi2(p wins) = + 2
pi3(p wins) = + + 3
where E[i] = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. For simplicity, assume that i is
uniformly distributed
over the interval [k, k], for k R++. Naturally, this implies
that E[i] = 0 for eachgroup.
As before, assume that the game repeats during t = 1, 2, . . .
periods and that
the candidate and groups 2 and 3 follow the grim-trigger
strategies specified in the
previous section. Consequently, during each period the
politician plays a mixed
strategy (0, 0, , 1 ) in which he assigns the gift g to group 2
with probability (0, 1). In the last section necessary conditions
for equilibrium where establishedon . But how is really determined?
What motivates the candidate to give the
gift with a higher probability to the close or to the distant
group? Does he prefer to
more frequently solicit the group that ideologically is more
distant to him, or is the
group that sympathizes with him awarded for this?
Given these conditions, it is natural to consider cases in which
group 1 votes for
the candidate, even though they strongly dislike him and never
receive a gift. Define
pi, for i = 1, 2, 3, as the probability that group i votes for
the candidate. Therefore,
if [0, 1] represents the probability that the candidate gets
elected in a givenperiod, = p1[1 (1 p2)(1 p3)] + (1 p1)p2p3. Assume
that in equilibrium the
18
-
three groups play according to the following rule: If i xi, for
certain thresholdvalue xi R, group i votes for the candidate.
Hence, xi simply represents a cutpointwhich determines if a group
supports or not the clientelistic candidate. Therefore,
the probability of having group i voting for the candidate
is
pi = 1 F (xi)
where F (xi) = Pr(i < xi) is the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of i. Con-
sider the case in which the candidate chooses in order to
maximize his probability
of being elected in any given period. Then, the clientelistic
politicians problem for
each period can be stated as
max = p1[1 (1 p2)(1 p3)] + (1 p1)p2p3s.t. [0, 1]
pi = 1 F (xi)
Naturally, we have to carefully establish the cumulative
distribution functions F (x1),
F (x2) and F (x3) in order to solve this game. We know that each
period group 1
votes for the clientelistic candidate as long as
+ 1 0
This equation implies that group 1s threshold value is
x1 = + (4)
Similarly, group 2 supports the candidate if
+ 2 + g 0
which implies
x2 = g (5)
Finally, the candidate receives support from group 3 if
+ + 3 + (1 )g 0
Consequently, group 3s threshold value is
x3 = (1 )g (6)
19
-
Now that we explicitly know the threshold values for each group,
it is time to present
the main result of the model: the optimal value that the
candidate chooses inorder to maximize the probability of being
elected.
Proposition 3:
Consider the infinitely repeated clientelism-game with random
shocks in which the
candidate chooses in order to maximize his probability of being
elected in each
period. Then, in the optimal mixed strategy supported by a SPE,
group 2 receives
the gift in every period with probability
=1
2+
2g
Proof:
We know that i is uniformly distributed in the interval [k, k].
Then, if f(x) is theprobability density function for any x [k, k]
it is true that f(x) = 12k . Therefore,for group i
pi = 1 F (xi)
=
kxi
f(x)dx
=
kxi
1
2kdx
=1
2 xi
2k
Substituting (4) into the last equation, we find that
p1 =1
2+
2k(7)
Similarly, using (5) we find that for player 2
p2 =1
2++ g
2k(8)
Finally, from (6) for player 3
p3 =1
2++ + (1 )g
2k(9)
The candidate wants to maximize the probability of being
elected, which can be
written as
= p1[1 (1 p2)(1 p3)] + (1 p1)p2p3= p1(p2 + p3) + p2p3(1 2p1)
20
-
From (7) it is clear the p1 is not a function of , so we can
treat it as a constant.
Also, from (8) and (9)
p2 + p3 = 1 +2+ + g
2k
Consequently, p2 +p3 also does not depend on and can be
considered as a constant
in this analysis. Therefore, in an interior solution of the
candidates maximization
problem, the first order condition is
=(p2p3)
[1 2p1] = 0
From (7), it is clear that p1 < 1/2. Hence, the first order
condition implies that
(p2p3)
= 0
Also, from (8) and (9) we know that
p2p3 =
(k + + g
2k
)(k + + + (1 )g
2k
)Consequently, the first order condition reduces to
g
2k
(k + + + (1 )g
2k
) g
2k
(k + + g
2k
)= 0
and solving, we find the optimal mixed strategy for the
candidate:
=1
2+
2g(10)
The second order condition isg22k2
< 0
for any . Therefore, is a maximum. It is important to note that
since 2g > 0, it is always the case that
> 1/2.This means that group 2, the neutral group (which at
the same time is more distant
from the candidate than group 3), receives the gift with a
higher probability than
the sympathetic group 3. The politician gives the gift more
frequently to the
group that is ideologically less identified with him, probably
because a bigger effort
is necessary in order to make this group comply. In other words,
1 < 1/2 is aconsequence of group 3s sympathy to the candidate.
This does not mean that the
politician only allocates resources to one group. He still has
incentives to randomize
in order to make clientelism self-enforcing. Some interesting
features characterize
this randomization, as established by proposition 4.
21
-
Proposition 4:
In the SPE in which the candidate and groups 2 and 3 use the
grim trigger strategies
established in the clientelism-game with random shocks, the
optimal mixed strategy
implemented by the politician has the following properties:
1. Higher heterogeneity between groups implies higher odds of
giving the gift to
the neutral group.
2. Higher gifts available to the candidate imply lower
probability of giving them
to the neutral group.
3. In equilibrium, groups 2 and 3 vote for the clientelistic
candidate with the same
probability
Proof:
Partial derivatives (comparative statics) of the optimal mixed
strategy reveal that:
1. is increasing in :
=
1
2g> 0
for any pair g > 0.
2. is decreasing in g:
g=2g2
< 0
for any pair (g, ) R++ R++.
3. Substituting (10) into (8) yields
p2 =2k + 2+ g +
4k(11)
While (10) into (9) yields
p3 =2k + 2+ g +
4k
Therefore, in equilibrium, p2 = p3.
Proposition 3 describes the unique mixed strategy that a
clientelistic politician fol-
lows in equilibrium. Proposition 4 shows how this mixed strategy
varies as a function
of the relevant parameters of the model. First, as diversity
between groups rises, the
probability that group 2 receives the gift also increases. This
should be intuitive.
22
-
More diversity, in the context of this model means that group 3
feels more sympathy
towards the candidate, while group 2 remains neutral.
Consequently, the candidate
makes a higher effort trying to convince the more distant group
(2). Second, as the
gift is higher, is lower. Higher gifts make it unnecessary to
bribe the same groupso frequently. A richer candidate will have the
capacity to bribe with a relatively
more egalitarian frequency both groups. In other terms, a higher
budget makes the
politician more democratic. The third result of this proposition
shows that in equi-
librium the candidate chooses in order to make equally likely
that groups 2 and 3
vote for him. This explains why > 1/2: It is necessary to
reward with a higherprobability (or in a higher proportion) the
more distant group in order to compensate
its larger dislike towards the candidate. For this reason, in
order to make equally
likely core and swing voters support, in equilibrium the
probability of rewarding
swing voters should be higher. Propositions 5 and 6 show how
group heterogeneity,
dislike towards the party, and the candidates budget, affect the
politicians likelihood
of being elected, and his expected time in office.
Proposition 5:
Define the expected time in office of the candidate, R+, as the
expected numberof periods in which the politician serves for the
public position he is competing
for. For simplicity, assume that group 1 never votes for the
candidate. Then, for
the clientelism-game with random shocks, in equilibrium, the
probability that the
politician is elected in every period, and the expected time in
office are given by
=(2k + 2+ g + )2
16k2
and
I =16k2
16k2 (2k + 2+ g + )2if the candidate is the incumbent at the
beginning of the game, or
C =(2k + 2+ g + )2
16k2 (2k + 2+ g + )2
if he is the challenger.
Proof:
If group 1 never votes for the candidate, p1 = 0 and = p2p3 =
p22. Therefore, from
(11) we find out that
=(2k + 2+ g + )2
16k2(12)
23
-
Also, if the candidate is the incumbent at the beginning of the
game, the expected
time in office is given by
I = 1(1 ) + 2(1 ) + 32(1 ) +
= (1 )i=1
ii1
which simplifies to
I =1
1 (13)
Substituting (12) into (13), yields
I =16k2
16k2 (2k + 2+ g + )2
If the candidate is the challenger at the beginning of the game,
his expected time in
office is
C = 0(1 ) + 1(1 ) + 22(1 ) +
= (1 )i=1
ii
which is the same as
C =
1 (14)
Using (12) and (14) we find that
C =(2k + 2+ g + )2
16k2 (2k + 2+ g + )2
Which completes the proof.
Finally, proposition 6 presents the comparative statics of both
the candidates
likelihood of being elected in each period, and his expected
time in office.
Proposition 6:
Suppose that groups dislike towards the party is sufficiently
small, so that 2 0
Therefore, it is also the case that j
,j
g , andj
are all positive when 2 0. Then, inthe optimal mixed strategy
supported by a SPE, group 2 receives the gift in every
period with probability
=1
2+
2g+k1(k3 k2)2g(+ )
Proof:
Following the same procedure of proposition 3, we know that
groups support the
clientelistic candidate with probabilities:
p1 =1
2+ 2k1
; p2 =1
2++ g
2k2; p3 =
1
2++ + (1 )g
2k3
Once more, assuming that in order to win the candidate needs the
support of at
least two groups, he is elected with probability
=
(k1 +
2k1
)[1 +
+ g
2k2++ + (1 )g
2k3
]+
(+ k1
)(k2 + + g
2k2
)[k3 + + + (1 )g
2k3
]Given that the candidate chooses to maximize , in an interior
solution we have
(k1 + )(k3 k2)g4k1k2k3
+
(+ k1
)(g(k3 k2 + + g 2g)
4k2k3
)= 0
and solving, we find the optimal probability of rewarding group
2:
=1
2+
2g+k1(k3 k2)2g(+ ) (15)
26
-
The second order condition is(+
k1
)(2g24k2k3
)< 0
Therefore, is a maximum. Given that playing forms part of a Nash
Equilibriumof the stage game, the grim trigger strategy supporting
in every round of therepeated game is a SPE.
Hence, the probabilities (frequencies) at which groups 2 and 3
are rewarded by
the candidate are now functions of the relative densities of the
groups. In other
words, the distribution of clientelistic benefits now also
depends on how many swing
or undecided voters comprise each group. Additionally, there are
other important
changes in the comparative statics of this equilibrium. Of
particular relevance, the
effects of heterogeneity, party identification and the
candidates budget on the dis-
tribution of clientelistic benefits, now depend on the relative
amount of swing voters
in groups 2 and 3.
Proposition 8:
In the SPE in which the candidate and groups 2 and 3 use the
grim trigger strategies
established in the clientelism-game with random shocks and
heterogeneous density
functions, the optimal mixed strategy implemented by the
politician has the following
properties:
1. Lower density in group 1 implies higher odds of giving the
gift to the group
with more swing voters.
2. If k3 k2 increases, the probability of rewarding group 2
increases as well.
3. Higher intergroup heterogeneity increases the probability of
rewarding group 2
if k3 k2 is sufficiently small. Otherwise, higher heterogeneity
implies thatthis probability is lower.
4. A higher candidates budget increases the probability of
rewarding group 2 if
k3 k2 is sufficiently small. Otherwise it decreases such
probability.
5. Higher dislike towards the clientelistic party increases the
probability of re-
warding group 2 if its density is lower than group 3s.
Otherwise, it decreases
such probability.
Proof:
Partial derivatives (comparative statics) of the optimal mixed
strategy of the game
with heterogeneous densities reveal that:
27
-
1. Opposers density:
k1=
k3 k22g(+ )
Therefore
k1> 0 if k3 > k2.
2. Relative density between neutrals and supporters:
(k3 k2) =k1
2g() + > 0
3. Intergroup heterogeneity:
=
1
2g k1(k3 k2)
2g(+ )2
Hence,
> 0 if k3 k2 < (+)2
k1.
4. Candidates budget:
g=k1(k3 k2)2g2(+ )
2g2
Consequently,
g > 0 if k3 k2 < (+)k1 .
5. Party identification
() =k1(k3 k2)2(+ )2
Therefore,
() > 0 if k3 < k2.
The first item of proposition 8 illustrates that having less
swing voters in group 1
(higher k1) favors group 2 only if this group is comprised of
more swing voters than
group 3. In other words, as group 1 becomes less swing, the
candidate allocates
more resources to the group with the higher population of swing
voters between
groups 2 and 3. Item 2 depicts that, as the number of swing
voters in group 2 in-
creases relative to group 3 (higher k3k2), the probability of
group 2 being rewardedalso increases. Thus, with all else being
equal, possessing a greater population of
undecided or easy-to-buy voters results in a guarantee of more
resources. The
third item of this proposition concludes that when there are
sufficiently more swing
voters in group 3 compared to group 2 (k3 k2 sufficiently
small), more intergroupheterogeneity increases the amount given to
group 2.4 The rationale for this outcome
4It makes sense to talk about amounts if we interpret as a
fraction, instead of a probability.
28
-
is as follows: When group 3 has more swing voters, it is natural
to infer that more
resources are given to that group. But if grows, group 3, as a
whole, becomes more
loyal so more resources can be given to the neutral group.
The fourth item of proposition 8 suggests that if there are
sufficiently more swing
voters in group 3 compared to group 2, more resources are given
to group 2 as the
candidates budget increases. The rationale is similar to before.
When group 3 has
many more swing voters than its counterpart, it is natural to
infer that it receives
more resources. However, if the budget increases, those extra
resources can then be
allocated to persuade members of group 2. Finally, item 5
reveals that as dislike
towards the clientelistic party increases (higher ), the
probability of rewardingthe neutral group grows if there are more
swing voters in group 3 and vice-versa.
Hence, the model predicts that as party identification grows,
the group comprised
of more extreme (inflexible) voters will benefit, while the
group comprised of more
swing voters will be punished.
5 Discussion: What is Clientelism?
The model presented in this paper describes a particular type of
clientelism: the
transfer of material benefits (cash) in exchange for political
support. This particular
choice does not mean that any type of transfer between a
candidate and the elec-
torate will equate to clientelism. For example, if an incumbent
politician running
for reelection favors certain group of voters through a subsidy,
it is not necessarily
representative of clientelism. Instead, such strategy could be
another form of redis-
tribution as it could simply be the result of the ideological
and programmatic agenda
of the candidate. Nonetheless, the way clientelism is modeled in
this paper distin-
guishes it from other forms of redistribution for one basic
reason: the allocation of
gifts is conditioned in accordance with previous voting
behavior.
In the context of the model, if g were to represent a subsidy,
for instance, it
would then not be necessary to employ a grim trigger strategy,
involving allocation
by the candidate only if the groups formerly supported him.
Under programmatic
redistribution, allocation of resources would be modeled based
on the maximization
of an ideological utility function and its outcome. Time would
only matter if the
structural economic conditions that determine such allocation
change. It would not
be because citizens vote in a particular manner. Therefore, in
order to appropriately
model clientelism, this paper includes the repeated interaction
between the candidate
and the groups of voters even when this is not mathematically
required: the one-shot
29
-
version of the probabilistic voting model presented in section 4
would be sufficient.
But the repeated framework developed in section 3 is kept
precisely to distinguish
between clientelism and other forms of redistribution.
Naturally, the transfer of material benefits or cash based on
past or present
voting behavior is not the only plausible form of clientelism.
In many cases, politi-
cians discipline voters by using mechanisms that determine
future flows of income
based on electoral results. Typical examples of this method
include employment
in the public sector or public contracts. Robinson and Verdier
(2003) discuss this
other form of clientelism, illustrating that, if incumbents and
challengers compete
for votes through policies and transfers, then under certain
circumstances the incum-
bent has incentives to reduce investment in order to attract
supporters. A reduction
in investment makes the private sector less productive, which
makes employment
in the public sector appear more attractive for certain groups.
Hence, those voters
will support the incumbent, because his victory will promote
public sector employ-
ment. Consequently, under a clientelistic regime, a lower level
of investment results
in negative consequences to productivity and efficiency, thereby
increasing poverty
and inequality.
There is no doubt that employment in the public sector is an
important compo-
nent of clientelism. But it is not the only one. In fact, most
of the empirical litera-
ture on vote-buying and clientelism shows that cash and other
immediate material
goods are widely used all across the globe [see Vicente (2010),
Gonzalez-Ocantos
et al. (2012), Finan & Schechter (forthcoming), and Gallego
& Wantchekon (2012)].
Robinson and Verdier (2003) do not have a satisfactory theory
for this form of pa-
tronage. In fact, in their model the optimal amount of transfers
that candidates give
to voters is zero. On the contrary, the model presented in this
paper provides a the-
oretical description of why this form of clientelism takes place
and is self-enforcing.
6 Conclusion
One of the major puzzles of political clientelism is explaining
why agents comply with
these types of agreements, even when they have incentives to
cheat and even provided
that in most democracies the vote is confidential. In this
paper, a simple mechanism
that explains why clientelism is self-enforcing is presented.
The result of the election
provides politicians with a signal of voting behavior. However,
more interestingly, the
election results provide a powerful mechanism for disciplining
voters. Therefore, in
a repeated context in which votes are unobservable but results
are, clientelism might
30
-
emerge as a result of equilibrium behavior. Citizens have
incentives to honor their
agreements in order to maximize their future flow of payoffs,
which in many cases
is higher when the clientelistic candidate wins the election and
gives future benefits.
In addition, the candidate has incentives to cultivate his
clientele and provides them
with goods and benefits (even at a personal expense), in order
to promote voter
compliance and secure their vote. It is interesting to note that
in this model the
promise of future gifts attenuates the ideological disutility
that a citizen experiences
when a disliked party comes into power.
Some contexts are more favorable than others for patron-client
relationships. In
the model presented here, the clientelistic politician is
favored when dislike towards
his party is not so high, when diversity among neutral and
sympathetic groups is
higher, when agents are more patient and place higher value on
the future, as well
as when his budget allows him to offer better and more valuable
goods or benefits.
Nonetheless, its results are extremely important to
understanding what determines a
politicians allocation of scarce resources. Under certain
circumstances, swing voters
are more valued and, consequently, they receive higher benefits
more frequently. But,
the case also exists that other circumstances make core voters
more important in
relative terms, so that allocations are more egalitarian in
equilibrium.
Nevertheless, several puzzles remain unanswered. What is the
relation between
clientelism and poverty? And with income inequality? In the
model presented,
groups differed in their ideological preference towards the
candidate. However, it
would be interesting to understand how a clientelistic
politician allocates resources
among groups that differ in income. Are poor voters more
frequently bribed? Is the
medium class the main target of politicians? Some studies
suggest (Stokes, 2005)
that clientelism is more frequent in poor and unequal societies.
This seems reasonable
given that for a politician it is cheaper to buy poor voters. In
addition, as inequality
increases, the gap between the rich elites that support certain
candidates and the
poor voters increases. As such, it would be certainly intriguing
to incorporate these
dynamics into the framework described in this paper.
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