Selective online exposure and political polarization during Swedish election campaigns

Selective online exposure and political polarization during Swedish election campaignsa longitudinal analysis using four waves of panel data

Peter M. Dahlgren

Adam Shehata

Jesper Strömbäck

@peterdalle

peterdahlgren.com

[email protected]

Selective online exposure

Background

• Internet is a high-choice media environment

• Personal motivations increasingly important in news selection

• Prefer attitude-consistent news, but don’t avoid attitude-inconsistent

• Political ideologies more salient during elections

Purpose

Examine how political ideology and selective exposure mutuallyreinforce over time, and whether they become more extreme

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Reinforcing spirals model

Slater (2007, p. 284)

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Reinforcing spirals model

Slater (2007, p. 284)

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Media Use

Belief/attitude/

behavior

Reinforcing spirals model

Slater (2007, p. 284)

Time 1 Time 2 Time 3

Hypotheses

More selective exposure more ideologically extreme

Less selective exposure less ideologically extreme

Research questions

Selective exposure over time?

Role of political interest?

RQ1

RQ2

H1

H2

Method

• Panel survey during five months in the 2014 EU and Swedish national election: ”super election year”

• Random sample

• 2,281 (33%) completed all waves

Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4

May 22–25 September 14May 26–June 4April 11–22 August 1–13 September 15–24

Sample (n=2,281)

Sex:

Education:

Age: 19–76 years (M=46, SD=17)

Left-leaning Moderates Right-leaning

Results: political ideology

Left-leaning Moderates Right-leaning

Results: political ideology

Left-leaning Moderates Right-leaning

Results: political ideology

Results: political ideology

Attitude-inconsistent

news exposure

Attitude-consistent

news exposure

Results: selective exposure

Attitude-inconsistent

news exposure

Attitude-consistent

news exposure

Results: selective exposure

Attitude-inconsistent

news exposure

Attitude-consistent

news exposure

Results: selective exposure

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Cross-lagged panel model

Political

Ideologyw1

Political

Ideologyw2

Selective

Exposurew2

Political

Ideologyw3

Political

Ideologyw4

Selective

Exposurew4

Political

interest

Income

.7

.31 1*** .91***

1*** .96***

.03*

.23***

.09***

–.05***

.08***

–.07***

.03**

Selective

Exposurew1

Selective

Exposurew3

Sex

.05**

.04**

Education

Standardized path coefficients.

χ2(6, N=3,557) = 3.67

p = .721

RMSEA < .001

CFI = 1.0

R2 = .107

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Results: mutual reinforcement

Conclusions

No support for political ideology and selective exposure mutually reinforcing and becoming more extreme over time.

Individuals exposed to attitude-inconsistent news get slightlyless extreme (but mostly moving toward right).

High political interest: more extreme political ideology, and more exposure to attitude-inconsistent news.

RQ1

RQ2

H1

H2

Peter M. Dahlgrenselective exposure and media effects

@peterdalle

peterdahlgren.com

[email protected]