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Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley I have modified.

Dec 22, 2015

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Page 1: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Security Management

Page 2: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Given Credit Where It Is Due

Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley

I have modified and added some slides

Page 3: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Outline

Key Management Group management Authorization management

Page 4: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Authentication Using Public-Key Cryptography

KA+, KB

+: public keysA

lice

Bo

b

KB+(A, RA)1

2 KA+(RA, RB,KA,B)

3 KA,B(RB)

What if KA+ or KB

+ is faked?

Page 5: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Security Management

Problem: how do you get keys in the first place?

Key distribution: securely associate an entity with a key- Example: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a system that manages

public key distribution on a wide-scale

Key establishment: establish session keys- Use public key cryptography (we already know how to do it)

- Diffie-Hellman key exchange

Page 6: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Components of a PKI

Page 7: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Digital Certificate

Signed data structure that binds an entity (E) with its corresponding public key (KE

+)- Signed by a recognized and trusted authority, i.e.,

Certification Authority (CA)

- Provide assurance that a particular public key belongs to a specific entity

How?- CA generates KCA

-(E, KE+)

- Everyone can verify signature using KCA+

Page 8: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Certification Authority (CA)

People, processes responsible for creation, delivery and management of digital certificates

Organized in a hierarchy (use delegation)

CA-1 CA-2

Root CA

Page 9: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Registration Authority

People, processes and/or tools that are responsible for

- Authenticating the identity of new entities (users or computing devices)

- Requiring certificates from CA’s.

Page 10: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Certificate Repository

A database which is accessible to all users of a PKI, contains:

- Digital certificates,

- Certificate revocation information

- Policy information

Page 11: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Example

Alice generates her own key pair

public keyAlice

private keyAlice

Bob generates his own key pair

Both send their public key to a CA and receive a digital certificate

public keyBob

private keyBob

Page 12: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Example

Alice gets Bob’s public key from the CA

private keyAlice

public key

Bob

private keyBob

public keyAlice

Bob gets Alice’s public key from the CA

Page 13: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Certificate Revocation

Process of publicly announcing that a certificate has been revoked and should no longer be used

Approaches:- Use certificates that automatically time out

- Use certificate revocation list

Page 14: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Key Establishment Method 1

What’s your public key?

Bob picks a symmetric key and encrypts it using Alice’s public key

Alice decrypts the symmetric key using her

private key

Then sends the key to Alice

Bob encrypts his message using the symmetric

key

Then sends the message to

Alice

Alice decrypts the message using the

symmetric keyhi

Page 15: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Key Establishment Method 2: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Agree on two numbers n, g; both numbers can be made public! Alice and Bob pick two secret numbers x and y

Page 16: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Outline

Key Management Group management Authorization management

Page 17: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Secure Group Management

Motivation: offer high availability for security services

How: replicate services

Problem: how to add a new replica to a group without compromising the integrity of the group?

Page 18: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Securely Admitting A New Group Member

join request

New

pro

cess

Pro

cess

in g

roup

G

CKG: secret key used for communication within group KG

+,KG-: public-private key pair to communicate with non-group

members KP,G: secret key RP: reply pad T: local time Notation: [X]Y: X was signed by Y

group admittance

Page 19: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Outline

Key Management Group management Authorization management

Page 20: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Authorization Management

Granting authorization rights

Related with access control which verifies access rights

Page 21: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Capabilities (1)

How to grant a capability?

How to verify a capability?

Page 22: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Capabilities (2)

Capability: - Unforgeable data structure for a specific resource R

- Specify access right the holder has with respect to R

Capability in Amoeba (one of the first object-based DS):

48 bits 24 bits 8 bits 48 bits

Server port Object Rights Check

Page 23: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Capabilities (3)

Generation of a restricted capability from an owner capability

Owner

Page 24: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Delegation: Motivation Example

A user Alice has read-only access rights on a large file F

Alice wants to print F on printer P no earlier than 2am- Method A: Alice sends the entire file F to the printer P;

- Method B: Alice passes the file name to P and printer P copies the file F to its spooling directory when F is actually needed.

- For method B, Alice needs to delegate her read-only access rights on F to printer P

Page 25: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Delegation

A wants to delegate an operation on a resource to B

Problem: how does A delegates its access rights to B?

Solutions: A signs (A, B, R)

If B wants to delegate operation to C, C needs to contact A- Avoid this problem using a proxy (Neuman scheme)

- Proxy: a token allowing its owner to operate with the same or restricted rights as the entity granting the token

Page 26: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Delegation: Neuman Scheme

The general structure of a proxy as used for delegation:

Page 27: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Delegation: Neuman Scheme

Using a proxy to delegate and prove ownership of access rights In practice S+

proxy, S-proxy can be a public-private key pair and N can be a nonce

If Bob wants to delegate some of his access rights to Chuck, how to do that securely without Alice’s involvement?

Page 28: Security Management. Given Credit Where It Is Due  Most slides are from Scott Shenker and Ion Stoica at University of California, Berkeley  I have modified.

Virus vs. Worm