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Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.
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Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Dec 18, 2015

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Page 1: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Security in the Cloud:Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch?

Rob Johnson

Security Architect, Cloud Engineering

Unisys Corp.

Page 2: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 2

Security in the Cloud: Agenda

• Introductions

• What is Cloud Computing, and what are the risks?

• Cloud Security Architecture

• Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Wrap-up

Page 3: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 3

Security in the Cloud: Introductions

• Who am I?

– Rob Johnson, Distinguished Engineer, Unisys Corp.

– 30 years doing I/O, networking, and security

• Who is Unisys?

– 130+ year heritage

– Provides technology, services, and solutions to the world’s largest enterprises

• Who are You?

Page 4: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 4

Security in the Cloud: What is Cloud Computing?

• National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST): http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloud-computing/cloud-def-v15.doc

– Essential Characteristics: On-demand self-service, Broad network access, Resource pooling, Rapid elasticity, Measured service

– Service Models: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)

– Deployment Models: Private cloud, Community cloud, Public cloud, Hybrid cloud

– On/off Premise

• Security controls being defined by industry: FedRAMP, PCI DSS v2.0, etc.

Page 5: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 5

Security in the Cloud: What are the Risks?

• #1 Loss of control of assets (applications and data)

– Where are they?

– How many copies are there?

– Who can access them?

• #2 Compliance

– Regulatory Audits: PCI DSS v2, HIPAA, COBIT, FedRAMP, etc.

– Jurisdictional Boundaries: Patriot Act, Data locality regulations

• #3 Provider Transparency

– Process visibility

– Audit, logging, and Incident Event Management (IEM)

Page 6: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 6

Cloud Computing: Service Models

• Software as a Service (SaaS):– Complete application environment supplied and

managed by the Cloud Provider, not tenant

• Platform as a Service (PaaS)– Provider supplies an application development

and execution environment.

– Tenant can secure data and inter-process communication.

• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)– Provider supplies the infrastructure components

(compute, network, storage), but little else.

– Tenant runs a virtual data center.

Infrastructure as a Service

Platform as a Service

Software as a Service

Page 7: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 7

Security in the Cloud: Cloud Security Architecture

• Service Models wrapped in Access Planes

Provider Administration

End

Use

r A

cces

s

Tenant Administration

Infrastructure as a Service

Platform as a Service

Software as a Service

Intr

a-C

loud

Acc

ess

Page 8: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 8

Cloud Security Architecture: Access Planes

• Service Models wrapped in Access Planes

– Provider Administration:Controls and manages the service components

• IaaS: Hypervisors, vSwitches, vFirewalls, storage vLUNs, etc.

• PaaS: VMs for hosting applications, web services, storage containers, load balancers, etc.

• SaaS: Application suites, databases, identity management, etc.

Provider Administration

End

Use

r A

cces

s

Tenant Administration

Infrastructure as a Service

Platform as a Service

Software as a Service

Intr

a-C

loud

Acc

ess

Page 9: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 9

Cloud Security Architecture: Access Planes

• Service Models wrapped in Access Planes

– Provider Administration

– Tenant Administration:Manages per-Tenant components

• IaaS: VMs, vFirewalls, vLUNs

• PaaS: Applications, object stores

• SaaS: Users, application data objects

Provider Administration

End

Use

r A

cces

s

Tenant Administration

Infrastructure as a Service

Platform as a Service

Software as a Service

Intr

a-C

loud

Acc

ess

Page 10: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 10

Cloud Security Architecture: Access Planes

• Service Models wrapped in Access Planes

– Provider Administration

– Tenant Administration

– End User Access• IaaS: VM console (RDP,

rsh, etc.)

• PaaS: Distributed apps (SOA, webapps), test/dev, etc.

• SaaS: Application presentation

Provider Administration

End

Use

r A

cces

s

Tenant Administration

Infrastructure as a Service

Platform as a Service

Software as a Service

Intr

a-C

loud

Acc

ess

Page 11: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 11

Cloud Security Architecture: Access Planes

• Service Models wrapped in Access Planes

– Provider Administration

– Tenant Administration

– End User Access

– Intra-Cloud Access• Service-to-service

• Intra-tenant

• Web services

Provider Administration

End

Use

r A

cces

s

Tenant Administration

Infrastructure as a Service

Platform as a Service

Software as a Service

Intr

a-C

loud

Acc

ess

Page 12: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 12

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

• Identity and Access Management:“Who are you, and why do they keep sending you here?”

• Transparency:“Where are my assets, and who is doing what to them?”

Page 13: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 13

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

– Data in Process• Memory

• Processors and caches

• NICs

• HBAs

• etc.

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Page 14: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 14

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

– Data in Process

– Data in Motion• Cloud Intranet

– VLANs and Firewalls

– Cryptographic Communities of Interest

─ IPsec─ SSL─ Unisys Stealth

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Page 15: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 15

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

– Data in Process

– Data in Motion• Cloud Intranet

• Extranet / Internet

– Tenant DMZs

– Site-to-site VPNs

– Remote users

– Web access

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Internet

Page 16: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 16

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

– Data in Process

– Data in Motion

– Data at Rest• Network Attached Storage

(NAS)

– Per-tenant file servers

– Access Control Lists (ACLs)

– Encrypted File Systems

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Internet

Page 17: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 17

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

– Data in Process

– Data in Motion

– Data at Rest• Network Attached Storage

(NAS)

• Storage Area Network (SAN)

– Virtualized LUNs

– Encryption / Authentication

– Replication / Dispersal

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Internet

Page 18: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 18

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

– Data in Process

– Data in Motion

– Data at Rest• Network Attached Storage

(NAS)

• Storage Area Network (SAN)

• PaaS storage objects & containers

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Internet

Page 19: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 19

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

• Identity & Access Management:“Who are you, and why do they keep sending you here?”

– Identification: Who are you?

– Authentication: Prove you are who you say you are.

– Authorization: What are you allowed to do / what is your role?

– Validation: Double-check before executing

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Internet

Active Directory

Active Directory

Page 20: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 20

Security in the Cloud: Multi-Tenancy Considerations

• Isolation and Containment: Tenants Share Physical Resources

• Identity & Access Management:“Who are you, and why do they keep sending you here?”

• Transparency:“Where are my assets, and who is doing what to them?”

– Accountability: All actions are securely audited

– Chargeability: Pay-for-play

– SLAs: Availability, scalability,performance, etc.

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Memory

Hardware Resources (CPUs, NICs, HBAs)

Hypervisor

VM-1a

VM-1b

VM-2a

VM-2b

VM-3a

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Tenant DMZ

Firewall Intrusion Detection Anti-virus

Internet

Active Directory

Active Directory

Page 21: Security in the Cloud: Can You Trust What You Can’t Touch? Rob Johnson Security Architect, Cloud Engineering Unisys Corp.

Page 21

Security in the Cloud: Wrap-up

• Cloud Computing = losing control of assets (data, applications)

• Secure Cloud Computing = regaining control through identity management, secure networking, secure storage, and provider transparency

Questions?